Patronage and Innovation in Bulgarian City Municipalities: The Role of Motivation

(1)

Patronage and Innovation in Bulgarian City

Municipalities: The Role of Motivation

By

Valeria Vasileva

A Master’s Thesis

Presented to

The Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs

Leiden University

For the Degree of

Master of Science

International and European Governance

June 2020

Thesis Supervisor:

Dr. K. Suzuki

(2)

To answer the question, I rely on Weber’s theory and construct two hypotheses. The first positions that financial remuneration plays a significant role in less meritocratic bureaucracy. This type of incentive is an essential element that is able to encourage innovative conduct. The second, in turn, asserts that extrinsic, or non-monetary values that appear within, are indicative factor to induce innovation. It is expected for this form of stimulus to matter more for officials as compared to monetary values.

The aim of this research is, hence, theory application of Weber’s traditional model as well as the development of a theory that could manifest how the phenomenon patronage affects and function. Furthermore, the contribution of the work to literature is through its explanatory and qualitative approach. The thesis is unique through its thicker analyzation and exploration of local governments on a sub-regional level in a less developing country.

To achieve the purpose of the study, semi-structured, online interviews with open and closed-end questions were conducted. Evidence is collected from experts as well as from civil servants on a low- and intermediate-level in both municipalities. Units of observations were chosen through snowball effect sampling. When it comes to case selection, the process of that is based on the 2013 European Quality of Government Index (EQI), the data of which was as the result of a survey organized by the Quality of Government Institute.

Patronage in politics is an intriguing topic worth investigating even as one confronting democracy. Rather than disappearing in the nowadays modern world, it is actually argued to be emerging as a product of modernization (Kopecký and Mair, 2006). Kopecký and Mair give a different perspective on patronage in contemporary democracies by suggesting that patrimonial links can be effective tool for parties that try to cope with problems related to party organization and building, as they become more intertwined within the institutions of state and begin to lose

(4)

control over the communication networks (2006). In other words, the scholar represent patronage as a resource on which parties rely to survive in a multi-level governance system (ibid).

The findings of the thesis are a few. The final results support the second hypothesis and disapprove for the first hypothesis. The majority of Haskovo officials emphasized intangibility. Conversely, Pleven officials concentrated on both type of values. But, in general, the inference is a prevail of inherent values over material worth. However, it is to mind that this is a partial causal relationship and that the motivation to begin innovation depends on conditions. While respondents may prefer certain values over others, it is necessary to distinguish between the wish from action for which an encouragement is needed. Variables such as on-the-job training, type of recruitment, and prior experience with innovation matter.

The study is not free of drawbacks. The work could suffer from types of bias, such as social desirability bias and attentional bias. Considering that this is was an interview with closed questions, response bias is possible. Awareness have been paid to these kinds of potential limitations and, consequently, efforts have been given in attempt to minimize them in order to ensure validity.

The thesis begins with literature review where I discuss contemporary research on patronage and public innovation as well as how these two strands of scholarship began. It then proceeds with describing and building my hypothesis on Vroom’s expectancy and Weber’s theory. The theory section elaborates on how the hypothesis were logically constructed. A follow-up is analysis for which the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) is used and finding which are divided into three sub-sections. One explains how Teodoro’s external and internal recruitment relate to the cases. The second refers to values and the last connects values with the last Vroom’s principle. The final steps examine limitations in more detail and provide

conclusion.

Literature Review

Patron-client connections have existed for hundreds of years. But the perception of it changed. During the Progressive and Second Industrialization eras in 1920s, the US was failing at

providing a satisfactory welfare state development because of its ill-established state bureaucracy and political connections (Orloff and Skocpol, 1984). The environment there contrasted with that in Britain which had the ability to supply its citizens with a more well-developed and rich

(5)

welfare system (ibid). The historical event, as a result, invoked a lot of criticism from American workers. It also counterchanged the legitimacy of patronage and the public’s view of it as a productive activity beneficial for the future. People became increasingly more interested in learning about government’s agenda. With the modernization of technology and mass

communications, the population became more informed about the political issues that affect their daily life. Consequently, research about patronage took off.

However, the study enthusiasm was fragmented and low and it even declined among scholars who did not approve the political appointment. Frank Sorauf, one of the first classical authors, noted the lack of scholarship which was due to by the willingness of scholars to accept the traditional assumptions about patronage (1960). Scholars assumed patronage to be an

important factor for a healthy and strong party governance and in general succumbed to the idea that party serves as a useful instrument through which discipline and responsibility and social outcomes could be achieved (Sorauf, 1959). As a result, the party’s high prestige and importance erected patronage to a respectable and tolerable practice (ibid). As parties began to shift to the merit system after the felt the self-destructing nature of patronage, academics still did not

reformulate their untested convictions. For instance, Daryl Fair tested the assumed argument. His conclusion, however, did not refute the disadvantages of patronage but rather detailed that the activity was a non-necessary but a sufficient factor for a strong party (1964). Sorauf noted the intellectual gap and, accordingly, called for a rigorous revolution in the literature.

The work of Sorauf was the catalyst that accelerated the growth of scholarship. Scholars took a sociological perspective and went forward to characterize patronage, to understand how it worked and behaved.

But even after more than 40 years after Sorauf’s statements, very little is still known about the functions and nature of patronage (Bearfield, 2009). Contemporary scholarly literature is centered on exploring the history and characteristics of weak administrations in developing nations, including (but not only pertaining to) current and post-communistic countries, to figure out patronage. For example, the O’Dwyer’s (2004) ‘runaway state-building’ theory explains why personnel grew while party-state development halted by linking party consolidation and

fragmentation to the expansion of state bureaucracies in Poland, Czechia, and Hungary. Likewise, Meyer-Sahling and Mikkelsen (2016) show that merit recruitment and politicization

(6)

are associated with less and more corruption as respectively by capturing the views of public servants in five East European post-communist states.

Single-case approaches are also popular and more fruitful since they are context-based and tend to provide an in-depth understanding. One article (Jiang, 2018) finds that patronage in China can improve economic performance if there is mutual trust, articulation of interests, long-term cooperation, client protection and no ideological differentiation and partisan competition and another (Dussauge Laguna, 2011) reveals how patronage in Lebanon prevents the effective implementation of a merit system even under the support by international aid organizations. Brierly (2018) also explains how electoral competition could trigger politicians to hire and award menial, low-ranking public sector job (e.g. sanitation officers and security guards) while

avoiding the recruitment of high-ranked positions in order to sustain their party machines. By studying the different political cultures and social structures, small-case studies are helpful in revealing variations among countries which could unravel how patrimonial

relationships are structured and supported. Apart from them, the current modern literature constitutes a lot of explanatory and cross-case research. For instance, Dahlström, Lapuente and Teorell (2012; Charron et la, 2016) reveal the positive influence of professional recruitment on corruption rates and Rauch and Evans (2000) present that meritocratic staffing and rewarding future career are associated with higher economic growth. Academic work, furthermore, shows that the patronage can hurt the adequate provision of public services and effectiveness

(Dahlström and Lapuente, 2017b) through the desire of politicians to increase wasteful governmental expenditures and through discouraging public management to perform better. Political networks also have a negative effect on work behavior through politicians forcing civil servants to follow orders (Dahlström and Lapuente, 2017a) and persuading them to overstep the rules of public procurement as to benefit a certain bidder (Charron et la, 2016). In turn,

Nistotskaya and Cingolani (2016) disclose that meritocracy and job security can improve

business quality regulations and, consequently, entrepreneurship growth rates. Another scholarly article (Nistotskaya, et la, 2015) finds out that the poor quality of government can reduce

business inequality between large and SMEs within states, and increase concentration of business venturing in capital areas.

The foundation of New Public Management (NPM) in the 1990s into the public sector and governance added a new path to inspect. At large, Interest in public innovation research

(7)

expanded from 1980s onwards and it initially concentrated on the eruption and adaptation of new communication technologies in public organizations (Torfing and Triantafillou, 2016). But the new doctrine differs from the traditional ideal type of bureaucracy with its introduction of market and entrepreneurial concepts and strategic management into the public sector (ibid.). Its goal is to strengthen governance and improve public services by stressing on efficiency, greater

competition, discipline in resource usage, greater output control, measuring performance, etc. (Hood, 1991).

The general objective of innovation studies is to understand the processes that trigger the phenomenon and the connection between it and social and economic changes (Windrum, 2008). Present work accounts for the impact of different factors on innovation such as cultural

characteristics (Kaasa and Vadi, 2010; Kaasa, 2017), corruption and trust through trade

development (Anokhin and Schulze, 2009), and human and social capital like institutional trust (Kaasa, Parts and Kaldaru, 2012). A notable and important work is the article by Damanpour (1991) that constructs a meta-analysis showing the positive association between organizational innovation and ten determinants, such as specialization, functional differentiation,

professionalism, external and internal communication, and other.

Furthermore, academics also analyze the topic from a historical perspective with the participation of various actors. For instance, Solberg (2014) explores the patron-client relationship between environmental organizations and politicians and the effect of this interaction on organizational innovation. Suurna and Kattel (2010) explain the unsuccessful impact of EU support on innovation policies in former communistic CEE states due to the lack of attention to the bad development of public administration. There is also evidence that motivation could foster innovation. Fernandez and Pitts consider how certain variables related to

encouragement, such as innovation rewards, the availability of slack resources, job satisfaction, training and capability growth, correspond to greater employee innovation (2011).

Similarly, publications discover the influence of patron-client relations on innovation. Moynihan and Pandey (2007) explore the strong impact of education and professional

socialization on public service motivation, Suzuki and Demircioglu account of the positive influence of professional civil service on innovation outputs (2017) and overall national

innovative activity (2019). Finally, Kim and Kellough (2014) discover that at-will employment, used to fire skillful employees in order to make place for people with connections, in the US

(8)

could discourage employees to take risks that lead to policy innovation. Additionally, the study concludes that employees who have trust in their organizations are more likely to believe that at-will employment increases efficiency and effectiveness (ibid.).

As a concluding point, despite the existence of research involving patronage and innovation, it still remains underdeveloped. The purpose of the thesis is therefore to suppose a possible causal mechanism that connects patronage or meritocracy with innovation.

Theory

The independent variable posed in the thesis is political patronage. For the purpose of argumentation, I use the definition by Kopecký and Spirova (2011) who describe the concept as the ability of a party to appoint their own members or other individuals to positions in the public and semi-public sector. A party allocates jobs to individuals in order to gain control over policy-making processes and/or reward members and supporters, or even their relatives, for their political loyalty (Kopecký and Spirova, 2011). Patronage is the opposite of meritocracy where professional people are recruited objectively and fairly based on their achievements and talent.

The dependent variable consists of motivation represented as an innovation input. ‘Innovation’ is a slightly fuzzy concept that can consist of many components. Its heterogeneity, therefore, presents a difficulty to the public sector studies in which academics try to reach a consensus regarding its definition (Brown and Osborne, 2005). A more recent and updated definition of the term is used. Sørensen and Torfing define innovation as the “intentional and proactive process that involves the generation and practical adoption and spread of new and creative ideas, which aim to produce quantitative change in a specific context” (2011).

The meaning is broad. Firstly, the process of innovation can be unpredictable resulting from a series of accidental scenes. It can also be the deliberate attempt for a reform and

improvement with the intention to solve issues. Secondly, innovation is a process and not a goal. The activity is specifically employed as a mean to achieve some final goal such as effectiveness, efficiency, quality improvement, and so on. Thirdly, innovation is not only about taking and introducing already established models from another public organization but also about inventing and composing new ideas. Fourthly, ‘qualitative’ is about making a reform that would ‘move’ routine organizational models, and not about keep delivering almost the same types of services. Lastly, innovation is contextual: stakeholders view outcomes as successful or failed, novel or old, external or acquired, based on their perspective.

(9)

Studies and efforts about measuring innovation performance and capabilities identify a number of different variables that influence public sector innovation, but which of them work and do not when it comes to causality is uncertain ([OECD], 2019). Nonetheless, the innovation is depends on several influencing factors: inputs (e.g. funds and personnel, knowledge and investment, training and education), processes (e.g. collaboration, innovative culture, and hierarchy), outcomes (satisfaction rates, efficiency, and quality), and environmental conditions (budget restrictions and political leadership) (ibid.).

The thesis is focused on the input side in the form of motivation, which is an important factor closely related to the personal and professional development that flows from successful innovations (Arundel, Bloch and Ferguson, 2019). A lack of organizational support from the higher level of management restricts inventiveness, resulting only in little change (ibid.). Moreover, Sahni, Wessel and Christensen (2013) posit theoretically that incentives for

improvement are vital for motivation and that the innovation is conditioned on their existence. Demircioglu and Audretsch (2017) empirically test the claim and find that motivation can trigger innovative desire.

A bureaucrat could be inspired depending on either intrinsic, or extrinsic motivation. The former refers to self-initiating an activity if it is interesting and pleasurable on its own and the latter refers to doing an activity to receive an external goal (Stanley, 2014) such as a financial return. This study inserts these two types of stimulus by positioning them into two hypotheses.

The first hypothesis involves external incentives, which the study identifies as monetary payments. They are basic resources that make motivation and change happen. As depicted in Maslow’s hierarchical pyramid, financial resources help provide the physiological needs of people in order to live properly. To construct the hypothesis, the thesis relies on the traditional Weberian model.

In Economy and Society, Max Weber identifies six main principles that define the functions of a traditional bureaucracy (Weber, 1921; translated by Waters et la.). They hold that the competencies of different officials are well-defined and fixed (ibid.). It states that a

bureaucracy is governed by a strict division of labor in which officials know and carry out their own respective duties. The fulfillment and nature of duties is regulated and separated by chains of command, and secured through the recruitment of qualified and experienced individuals. Bureaucrats have the duty to be objective and loyal to their job without forming a relationship

(10)

with power. They also have the duty to make sure they are well-educated and pass fair examinations in order to be employed.

As an award for their work, public employees receive financial remuneration in the form of a salary that is based on their rank and respective duties. When financial and job provision by a high social appreciation are satisfactory, the position of a bureaucrat seems attractive (ibid.). Officials will be then willing to seek to advance their bureaucratic career and gain a higher standing. Public employees recruited through merit examinations are more willing to work hard and deliver good results as compared to these recruited through an appointment (Oliveros and Schuster, 2018). Additionally, they are less likely to be persuaded to provide political services (such as electoral mobilization and attendance of campaign event) because they do not owe their recruitment to patrons (ibid.). In turn, Damanpour, Walker and Avallaneda (2009) find out about the positive innovation-performance relationship and the beneficial combinative impact of different innovation types on organizational effectiveness.

In addition, according to the Weberian model, appointment is done by a higher authority, whereas, election is conducted by the people from below. Transparent and free elections,

thereby, depend on the layout of the nomination procedure. An incorrect design may open the door to issues such as an intentional choice of a candidate for an election or its mechanism may be modified to result in patrimonial relations and weakly-developed professional administration. This is the case with Bulgaria after communism and, accordingly, the reason of why I decided to focus on this European country.1

When patronage happens, the natural duties of civil service are violated. In this context, it is expected for officials to perform not to their highest standards since the rewarding system becomes subjective and unequal, and job security weak. Firstly, in an integrated career system the opportunity of wasteful spending exists which allows a principal to desire and spend more resources to reward the loyal people with compensations and payments (Dahlström and

Lapuente, 2017a). Patrons would tend to ‘steal and hide’ from the people whom they dislike, and disadvantage the ones who are protected under the civil servant act. This quid pro quo leads to a negative equilibrium where renumeration is no more matched with the duties of employees and their sphere of technocracy. The unequal distribution disadvantages the certain bureaucrats with

(11)

lower financial incentives which makes them more discouraged to innovate. To sum up, the first hypothesis goes as:

H1: Bureaucrats from an administration with low meritocracy would be motivated to innovate through financial renumeration.

In addition to extrinsic encouragement, there are also intrinsic values that are personal and

congenital and drive individuals to look out to deliver themselves gratification. Examples include job enrichment and challenging tasks. Competency is one factor brings about extrinsic

motivation (Stanley, 2014). It refers to the desire to master situations and look out for new challenges (ibid.). In contrary to intrinsic incentives, they are considered as part of the upper top layer of the Maslow’s hierarchy. When injected in the innovation process, they are constantly developing by the interactions and relationships of the participants. Since a bureaucracy is traditionally perceived as a body managed by qualified officials, a second hypothesis tells that:

H2: Bureaucrats from an administration with high meritocracy would be motivated to innovate through intrinsic values.

To define the outcome variable, the expectancy theory of Victor H. Vroom (1964) is considered. The model serves to explain the cognitive process behind why individuals are or are not

motivated to perform well and give their efforts. According to Vroom, individuals choose a certain behavioral path over another one because they expect positive outcomes from their choice. The theory has three components. The first component points to the degree that a perceived effort results in the desirable level of performance. The second refers to the extent to which performance leads to the desirable rewards. The last part relates to the personal value attached to the ending result. The three elements of the framework are modified to fit the topic and the dependent variable. The adjusted theory follows as:

1) Perceived level of effort will result in a desirable level of an innovation outcome (work-innovation expectancy)

2) Perceived innovation outcome will lead to a reward (innovation outcome-reward) 3) Innovation reward has a positive value to the employee (reward perception)

There are other theories related to motivation. But Vroom’s model is probably the most famous one compared to the other due to its behavioral aspect which is in relevance to the thesis because

(12)

it accepts the concept of rewarding as an opinion-based in addition to motivation and innovation which are conventionally apprehended through the subjective reality of people.

Research Design

The thesis topic focuses on Bulgaria. The Balkanic country is one of the most patrimonial and corruptive on the European continent. It is quite infamous for the way which political figures use the patronage to remain in power and run the economy to maximize their benefits and

interests. The Corruption Perception Index 2018 by Transparency International ranks Bulgaria at

the 77th_{position among 180 territories. The assessment makes the place most corrupt Member of}

the EU. Despite that corruption is not the same as patronage. The latter, however, leads to the former. Additionally, Bulgaria has been continuously criticized by the European Union in Commission’s reports for high levels of corruption and politicization in the public sector

(Zankina, 2017). In 2005, before the large enlargement, the Commission noted that Bulgaria has yet to explicate ‘the division of responsibilities between the political and administrative levels of the public administration’ (Spirova, 2012) . However, the EU has compromised on the

requirements and Bulgaria became a member despite the fact that is has repeatedly criticized for the corruption, the weak judiciary, and incompetent administration (Zweers, 2019).

There is another reason that justify the decision to delve into Bulgaria. Specifically, it relates to the historical path of Bulgaria and to how the timing and sequencing of country’s past processes evolved. Although many people believe that patronal relations in Bulgarian politics began during communism, it is, in fact, that this problem has been a long-standing one set

following state’s de jure independence in 1908 from the Ottoman Empire. After five centuries of Ottoman ruling, a new Government had to be created from the beginning. Secondly, following the end of World War II, politicization deepened even more following the consolidation of communistic power and state development under a one-party system regime.

During the late communistic era, the Bulgarian economy prospered. After Todor Zhivkov became the new prime minister in early 1960s, the nation began to industrialize, prioritize

technological modernization and fiscal stability, and break up isolationism with Western states. The nomenklatura system, a limited circle of people, usually an elite of party functionaries selected based on political loyalty, held key state positions in industry sectors and governmental levels. Politicization swept further into all levels of government and political loyalty was the tool

(13)

that party members used to make their way up the top. But unlike in the rest of countries, the Bulgarian communistic party faced up a weak organizational coalition and number of regime dissidents that, in turn, allowed the nomenklatura system to exist (Zankina, 2017).

Due to the lack of resistance movement, the population re-elected the communistic party with the first democratic election, which, in turn, was pivotal for the trajectory of country’s future development (Ganev, 2017:35) because centralization and the nomenklatura continued to persist (Zankina, 2017). During the governance, the party’s goal was mainly about preserving the power and protecting it from the other parties, and monopolizing the state. The Communist Party preserved its grip on power until early 1992, and retained its hegemonic position in national politics, especially the local level, until 1997. As a result, the separation process between the state and the party lagged behind which damaged the institutional design even more seriously that created hidden chain of reactions in future that diverged state transformation and

democratization (Ganev, 2017:48). Because politicians at that time were concerned with power and parties did not communicate and trusted each other well, the development of the new Constitution lagged (ibid.). The supreme law was finally adopted in 1990 but the outcome was ill-considered fundamental principles. The Constitution limits the role of the President and empower the Parliament. For example, the law gives the Prime Minister the ability, with the approval of the Parliament, to create, restructure and close ministries, and governmental bodies (Zankina, 2017). This right, in turn, opens the door for each new government to politically dismiss and appoint with the idea to control the government (ibid.).

From an academic perspective, the scholars Charron, Dahlström, and Lapuente (2016) measure meritocracy in the public sector on the European continent. Their measurement scores 24 European countries in terms of meritocracy based on the experience of public sector versus the perception of citizens. Their measurement shows that Bulgaria is one of the most politicized countries on the European continent together with Serbia, Croatia, Slovakia and Ukraine

(Appendix 1). With a score that varies between 6.00 and 8.00, the scholars place Bulgaria on the 19th position out of the total sample. In the case of Bulgaria, the results are quite peculiar. The nation has the second widest within-country variation after Serbia which contributes further to the assertation that it is doing poorly in terms of the indicator. In addition, the variation may demonstrate the disparity in party centralization across municipalities (Appendix 2). Rich municipalities are better positioned to take the lead in administrative reform at local level and

(14)

introduce their own improvements in service delivery (Zankina, 2018:78), distancing them more from the wishes of the political cabinet. Poor municipalities, on the other, are more dependent on funding and directives from the central government, thus, making them more exposed to

centralization (ibid.).

To test the hypothesis, a comparative research design is used by focusing on the regional level of Bulgaria. The sample in the study consists of two cases which in the thesis are identified as municipalities. To randomly select both municipalities, an ‘extreme’ strategy was employed. This approach maintains the logic, according to which cases have to be polar: one with high values needs to be selected and contrasted with another one with low values. In order to satisfy this criterion, a Most Similar Systems (MSS) design type I is hence adopted. In general, the MSS scrutinizes two or more cases that are similar as much as possible by controlling for a set of chosen factors (Toshkov, 2016:263). Yet, the MSS can be divided into type I and II. Both differ in terms of the values of their main explanatory (MEV) and dependent variable. Type II uses inductive reasoning and considers cases that are similar but whose outcomes, in the meantime, vary. Type I, on the other hand, uses deductive reasoning and maintains the opposite idea: cases’ dependent variables should be analogous but their MEV values are diverse. Following the rule of MMS model II, the study work picks out one municipality administration that is highly

patrimonial and a second one that is more professional and meritocratic.

It is also beneficial to add that the study has an explanatory approach. The goal of the comparative study is to uncover a partial relationship (a limited number of rather than a

multitude of causal mechanisms) about a general phenomenon (Toshkov, 2016:35). Lastly, it is to mention that the empirical research means to contribute through theory generation and theory application. Theory development stems from descriptive research and it helps provide an

explanation to how events are causally related (pp.38). The latter refers to using the Weber’s and Vroom’s models to facilitate finding the causal mechanisms between the two concepts.

Next, this section proceeds with discussing case selection for which the European Quality of Government Index (EQI) is used. The EQI contains the first source of data that extensively analyzes the quality of government of many countries on a regional and cross-country level (Charron et al, 2015). The index has been re-done since 2010 every three years, or in 2013 and in 2017. In interest of the study, the 2013 version is utilized. This is because in addition to being the first dataset containing data on a sub-regional level, the 2013 EQI is also a premier in offering

(15)

the most reliable and rich quantitative measurement of meritocratic bureaucracy (ibid.; see

Appendix 3 for more details about the database).

To collect the necessary data, the research acquired the QoG EQI Data 2010 & 2013 on an Individual level from the institute’s official website. The material was compromised in an CVS file format but was further filtered out by refining for the following columns: year, nuts, Q21b, and d5. Firstly, since the file encompasses details for both years, data was filtered out by considering only year 2013. Next is the ‘nuts’ column. The database has used the official NUTS country codes to label regions. The code is made of the country’s two-letter suffix, which is BG, accompanied by the numerical values from 31 to 34, 41 and 42. The third variable is Q21b and it represent the above-mentioned scale question about meritocratic perception. Although it was mentioned that results range from 1 to 10, the column also contains values coded with 99, pinning missing data and that connoting participants who replied with “I do not know” or “refused” answer. Results with 99 do not serve a purpose for the specific work and were,

therefore, separated out. The last element, d5, is a variable describing a demographic property. It depicts candidates’ current occupation, whether they work in the public or private sector, or whether they are without a professional activity (see Micro Data Codebook; Charron et al, 2015). The options are enumerated from 1 to 3, where 1 represents the public sector. Thus, the

operationalization of politicization neglects option 2 and 3 as well as 99 it has due to the same reason mentioned above. The filtration procedure produced a total of 481 Bulgarian public employees. However, this number is too small and it, therefore, further challenges the validity, especially if we consider of how the findings are diffused among the regions. For example,

Yugozapaden2_{, where the state’s capital Sofia is located at, has covered only 50 employees}

which is inequitable considering that over 1 million people live in the large city. There is, thus, a possibility for the limited number of participants to be underestimating the average patronage values which is, in turn, undermines case selection.

The resulting material, following filtration, is processed and summarized in an Excel pivot table that calculates the average of meritocracy values for each single planning region. The estimations are recorded in table 1, situated below. The table reveals that Severozapaden region

2

(16)

(with code BG31) is the most politicized region, while Yuzhen Tsentralen area (with code BG42) is the most meritocratic3_.

NUTS code NUTS name Average of Patronage N BG31 Severozapaden (Northwestern) 7.78 (high) 99 BG32 Severen Tsentralen 7.37 99 BG33 Severoiztochen 6.20 84 BG34 Yugoiztochen 6.65 81 BG41 Yugozapaden 7.46 49 BG42 Yuzhen Tsentralen (Southern Central) 5.94 (low) 69 Total 6.93 481

Table 1: Regional meritocracy in the Bulgarian public sector

To choose the municipalities, the methodology tailor population as a conditional factor. The most populated city in the Northwest is Pleven with more than 120,000 citizens. Pazardzhik is the second largest city In South Central with little less than 110,000 inhabitants. As a back up to no-reply or rejection, another two extra cases were chosen, including Haskovo and Pernik. Haskovo, with around 90,000 residents, is the third largest city after Pazardzhik in Southern Central. Pernik, conversely, is the largest town located in Southwest with approximately 90,000 citizens, a similar population size. A no second option was chosen from the Northwestern region because the next most populous town in the territory has 65,000 occupants. The number is too low, thus making Northwest incomparable. Instead, the research design moved on to the second least meritocratic region, or Southwestern.

Following the attempts and failures to reach out(see Appendix 4 for explanation), the

final sample is made of Haskovo and Pleven local bureaucracies. In addition to population, there are other conditional variables that make them both similar such as economic progress and e-government development. First, the total GDP for Pleven in 2018 was 2.13 billion euros while

3_{Severozapaden and Yuzhen Tsentralen are translated to Northwestern and Southern Central, as respectively, into}

(17)

the GDP for Haskovo was 1.96 billion euros in the same year ([NSI], 2018). The service sector was the main contributor which accounted for 59% share of Pleven’s GDP and for 56% of Haskovo’s GDP. Also, the annual GDP per capita for both sub-regions revolved around 4,000 euros in 2017 (Regional Profiles, 2019). To add, the average annual employment rate of Pleven was recorded to be 64% at that same year in comparison to Haskovo where it was 66%. Second, the growth of e-government in each territory is also comparative: in 2019, digital government expanded by 2.73% in Pleven and by 2.78% in Haskovo (Regional Profiles, 2019).

After case selection, the unit of analysis is stated out. In the thesis, the unit represents the public employee and expert who are positioned in the middle or high levels of the administration structure and work in the field of technology policy. The reason of why technological policy was put into focus is twofold. Firstly, the public-sector development in post-communistic CEE countries is going through its fourth phase called e-Governance that started in 2014 and

continues up to today (Randma-Liiv and Drechsler, 2019). During this stage, CEE countries are modelling the ‘First World’ by investing in the expansion and innovation of e-Governance, SMART city and Big Data in the public sector (ibid.). On the other hand, the focus on the middle- and high-level positioning is explained by the extensive and deep essence of party patronage (Spriova, 2012:59). Governing parties in power are ordinarily able to replace top positions such as ministers, deputy ministers, and their political cabinets, but quite often also heads of sections, permanent secretary of the ministry, and even sometimes civil servants, such as experts and deputy directors of departments (ibid.). Subsequently, the two levels are

considered by assuming the higher level in a municipality to be run by political connections, whereas the middle-level mostly by professionals.

To collect supporting information, semi-structured interviews were conducted. Due to communication obstacles, the questions were organized and transferred to a Google Form document. The form comes into two variants, one in Bulgarian and another one translated to English. Links to the forms were eventually sent to the administrators. To try to avoid selection bias in picking up the units of observation, a snowball effect was adopted. Each administration was requested to choose a total of 8 subjects willing to participate in the survey by asking each candidate to recruit the other participant. By utilizing the technique, the reliability of acquired responses was preserved because the interest is about analyzing the feeling- and belief-state.

(18)

However, the snowball sampling is not bias-free but it instead could enhance the problem with selectivity4_.

Nonetheless, the interview consists of a total of 20 questions: 9 closed, 10 open questions and 1 related to individual characterization. The closed set compromises of 1 yes/no questions and Likert scale statements that range from 0, ‘Strongly agree’, to 5, ‘Strongly disagree’. The complete questionnaire could be found under Appendix 5.

Several scholarly articles have been used to design the questions. Questions 4 and 5 in Respondent Characteristics and 1 in job stability were extracted from the Teodoro’s paper about job mobility (2009). As by his argument, external hiring suggests a desire for innovation: governments that recruit from outside tend to accentuate professionalism, place qualification as important selective criteria, and rely heavily on consultation by experts. Internal employment, on the other hand, signifies a lack of interest in innovation. Professionalism is not an important factor; instead, organizations and governments would select applicants whom they are

comfortable with and who are adherents to the organizational norms. Additionally, externally recruited bureaucrats tend to initiate professional policy innovations in comparison to those recruited within the organization because they are interested in building reputation and ‘prove themselves’ (Teodoro, 2009). The expectations are for the analysis to demonstrate a

predisposition towards the latter option especially considering how public servants are employed. By law, each governmental body has to implement own competitions when hiring new

personnel. But a competition is not organized under several circumstances, including the 1) re-appointment in the same administration 2) re-appointment in a newly created administration until a competition is not held 3) part-time appointment 4) temporary or permanent transfer to another administrative unit ([Ordinance for Conducting Civil Service Competitions of 2004]). The circumstances appear to facilitate patronage even more and, hence, make innovation development less likely.

Questions about financial renumeration are also drawn out from the scholarly article by Kellough and Lu (1993). The two academics look through Vroom’s theory and add a few components that can affect how the model works. The components they mention include the equality and fair distribution of pay, effect of compensation on motivation, importance of intrinsic values, and effectiveness and justification of performance appraisal systems.

4

(19)

Lastly, the dependent variable is extended by adding three more questions in addition to Vroom’s principles. They are pulled out from the questionnaire of de Jong and Den Hartog’s report (2008) that distinguishes among four dimensions of innovative behavior, two of which are considered: idea generation and championing. While the former refers to generating concepts for the purpose of improvement, the latter relates to the selling of ideas to others: persuading and pushing other employees or management to support and adopt creative novelties (Den Hartog and de Jong, 2008).

The interview questions were completed by seven candidates from Haskovo and another nine from Pleven. Responses from Haskovo came from civil servants working in the department of Human resources and Public Administration, experts who belong to the IT sector, the sphere of electronic governance and law, and two individuals who are line managers (sectors have been rejected to be specified due to anonymity concerns). On the other hand, answers from Pleven came from an operation’s officer, a system administrator, and professionals involved with administrative service delivery, public procurement, and law. Managerial figures include the Head of Technical Support, Head of Registry for Classified Information, and Director of Crisis, Public Order and Security Directorate.

Analysis

To analyze the interviews, a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) is employed. QCA is a data analysis method that allows for the analyzation of a multitude of cases at a time. The technique is a way to understand the causation of different conditions which produce the final outcome. It helps to answer the question of why there is a specific change in this case but not in the another. The main tool for establishing a causal relationship is the design of a “truth table”. To create such table, the interview has been compressed to end up with including the main elements that are likely to produce a change, including the three principles of Vroom’s theory, the questions by Den Hartog and de Jong, the two types of values, external and internal recruitment, and training for improving innovation. The result is as follows:

(20)

Haskovo Case Internal Vs External Prior innovative experience Monetary or non-monetary Management persuasion Problem & Idea generation New execution ways Training Effort Innovative Result Result reward Reward Positive value E 0 NM rarely several times a week cannot decide 1 A A A

E 0 NM often often often 1 A A A

I 0 NM none when

needed rarely

0 - - A

I 0 NM often daily daily 1 A A A

E 0 NM rarely when

needed often

1 - - A

E 0 M quite rarely often quite

often

1 - A -

E 0 M when needed daily daily 1 A - -

Pleven Case

I 0 M often constantly constantly 1 A - A

E 0 NM cannot daily/none daily 1 - - A

I 1 M daily daily daily 1 - - A

I 0 NM+M

very often

always when

possible

1 - D A

E 1 M rarely rarely rarely 0 A - A

I 1 NM+M often very often sometimes 1 A A A

I 0 NM+M often often rarely 0 - - A

E 1 NM+M often always it happens 1 A A A

E 0 NM+M systematically when

necessary

when required

1 A A A

Figure 1: A Truth Table in QCA for Pleven and Haskovo (E=External; I=Internal; M=monetary,

or extrinsic values; NM=non-monetary, or intrinsic, values; A=Agree; D=Disagree; - sign = Not Applicable)

Internal and External Recruitment

The first finding refers to interrelationship between job mobility and innovation from Teodoro’s article. When considering all answers from Haskovo, slightly less than 30% of the civil servants were hired internally while the rest 70% were recruited externally, four individuals following a competition and one individual by transfer from another municipality. A second observation to

(21)

mark is the professional interests of the answerers. Within-employed bureaucrats did not say there were any engaged within their professional community. In comparison, without-employed bureaucrats declared that they were active participants in professional organizations, such as the Association of Communications Specialists in Municipalities (ASKO), and attendants in

conferences during 2019, such as regarding labor occupation.

However, this may not necessarily mean that Haskovo municipality accentuates on professionalism. Even though external experts went through an exam procedure, four of them were hired through connections and/or the recommendations of friends and acquaintances. In this case, it is unsure whether top directorate looks for innovative input if it decides to selectively employ certain qualified professionals over others. Second, none of the respondents had any prior experience or educational practice pertaining to innovation. Third, understanding the contextual factor of why Haskovo directorate would prefer to recruit from inside is important. Respondent #3, one of the two within-promoted officials, works as a senior expert in the City Secretary’s Office. He reasoned that his promotion was as a result of the hard work, diligence, and the good results he generated. Respondent #4, the second internal official, works as a main specialist also at the City Secretary. The reason for his work mobility within the bureaucracy is a permanent replacement of another colleague. He explained that it was too costly for the

department to invest in the right person from outside and not someone who is already familiar with the working procedures. The administrative unit is an institution customized by individuals who have prior obtained an organizational socialization and have already established knowledge base of procedures. It is less technocratic by nature and therefore tends to be less flexible in transmitting tacit information.

In contrast to Haskovo municipality, it could be said that Pleven experts and bureaucrats are mainly internal incomers. A little more than 55%, or five out of nine, of the respondents were promoted from within. But yet, this does not mean there is a correlation due to the unequal sample size between both cases and due to context as well. Some of the officials are

professionally active, while others are not. Also, unlike Haskovo, some of the internal appointees have a prior experience with innovation. But, similarly, context should not be avoided.

Interviewee #3 from the Pleven sample is an internal hiree and has been working for a couple of years in the bureaucracy as a line manager of Technical Support. Although he did not attend

(22)

conferences or associations during 2019, his innovative experience is vast. Throughout his career, he took part in operational and supplementary trainings, conferences, practical courses, and competitions which allowed him to progress in his area of specialization. His effort and competence urged the municipality to hire him following a competition for the position in

accordance to the statutory legal requirements but also following administration’s increased need for people to solve sets of highly technical tasks. An additional of other three internal employees also stated that they have been hired through management's recommendations and due to their correct and hard work. But none of them declared low effort in trying to persuade senior

management to accept innovative idea and in creating new approaches to perform obligations. In contrast, it is to consider Respondent #5, who comes externally and with past experience in innovation, but rarely even tries to contribute to new innovations and creative problem-solving.

To deduce, internal employees are not necessarily prone to innovate less. This section shows that it is necessary to consider different factors that may affect the scholar’s hypothesis such as the organizational structure, department characteristics, degree of centralization, training, or preference for promotion. Demircioglu and Audretsch (2017) find that budget cuts do not have any effect on the ability of employees to innovate. Despite the no association, budget constraints could be a pressuring factor that limits the opportunity to recruit from outside since it requires extra contribution of expenditures. About 40%, or three out of seven, of Haskovo responses referred to budget limits as an obstacle to higher salary, with one respondent revealing that “carrying out a state policy for low incomes of the population” is a factor. Oppositely, almost 90%, or eight out of nine, of Pleven answers perceived financial ceiling as preventative mechanism to a promotion.

Monetary and Non-Monetary Incentives

A second finding regards the values for motivating behavior. The expectation that monetary values would be an incentivizing element for motivation in less meritocratic administration did not quite hold. Neither did the second hypothesis. Choices of respondents much depend on their preferences or needs. Nonetheless, a slight contrast is observed between the two cases.

Answers from Haskovo officials and experts exhibit a divergence: favoritism is directed towards either intrinsic, or extrinsic values, but not both. They also show that motivation

(23)

depends on people’s needs, personal values, and preferences. There are a few officials who prefer monetary inducements as a way for motivation because they are more concerned with what is happening in their life such as family issues. Nonetheless, a bigger part of the replies identifies personal incentives as paramount. Examples include executing difficult tasks, working in a close relationship with people and learning about their problems, and the personal

satisfaction form seeing good results. One of the interviewees, identified as a senior expert, elucidated that innovation could lead to higher salary. But it is hardly possible without working hard and spending a few years or at least enough time in a challenging and educational

environment that would develop your intellect. On the contrary, an extreme reliance on the material would have the opposite effect and lead to nowhere. For this reason, he concluded, any kind of encouragement and learning support coming from the top management is important to induce inventive behavior. Individual’s prior education is not enough. To foster development, the municipality invests in trainings implemented under the Operational Program “Administrative Capacity” (OPAC), co-financed by the European Union. The overall goal of the project is to increase the capacity and motivation of civil servants, as well as to improve their individual qualifications through empowering and helping them to work better in a team and to overcome conflict situations in the work environment. Additional training programs come in the form of seminars and e-training.

Work training has been identified as a factor in changing traditional and established organizational practices (Wise, 1999). Fernandez and Moldogaziev find that access to job-related learning could positively affect employees’ creativity and their encouragement to innovate, and the successful acceptance and spread of ideas (2013). By creating skill development,

organizations can also motivate employees to improve efficiency and performance (Demircioglu and Audretsch, 2017). However, on the other hand, there is the account that learning

opportunities are a way to deal with low performers who lack sufficient abilities and experience (ibid.). If supervisors are able to correctly respond to underperforming employees, innovation would be enhanced as other employees would feel that they should do their job well (ibid).

Responses from Pleven show slightly different results. While a few participants perceived monetary values as an important stimulus to innovation, the majority of them considered both forms of incentives as necessary to promote innovative thinking. Non-financial motives that

(24)

officials mentioned include balance of recognition/evaluation, opportunities for self-improvement and learning, work enrichment, and challenging tasks. Only three specialists accepted promotion and salary as important for their innovative abilities because they can give security and gratification in the longer term. However, the rest of six officials stated that both forms of values matter since they are interconnected and tend to operate in a cycle: intrinsic incentives produce extrinsic values which, in turn, are needed for more innovation. According to the cycle, a work environment treated with the above-mentioned benefits drives employees to innovate. Innovational success, or the perception of it, in turn generates the feeling of a well-done job and satisfaction. Sufficient outcomes, on the other hand, imply a lead to higher payment and promotion in the future. A larger salary, in the final stage of the cycle, is important for it gives security, career development, and some excitement to pursue further inventiveness.

Consequently, the provision of on-the-job training could aid this relationship, enhance the incentive system, and raise the perception of pleasure. Similar to Haskovo municipality, the Pleven municipality also supports the professional development of employees by putting them through trainings. These include OPAC as well as annual trainings and qualification programs, which are ordered by the mayor and which aim to improve the skills of bureaucrats. On top of this, some of the respondents have gone through a six-month initial training which employers conduct and organize whenever they doubt the competence of newcomers. However, in the meantime, not everyone has been subjected to training. It this observed in the table that the people with zero supported learning show a rarer and lower values on the statements by Den Hartog and de Jong regardless on whether they are external or internal appointees, or whether they differ based on incentivization.

Expectancy Theory and Motivational Values

A final finding is the mixed relationship between the three elements of Vroom’s theory and both types of values. Many interviewees did not have a strong stand when it comes to the first two principles. While they did not disagree, most of them expressed doubt about their relevancy and took neutral positions. However, a difference is observed between both cases regarding the third statement.

Haskovo employees with intrinsic values gave a positive meaning to innovation reward. In contrast, bureaucrats and experts who leaned on extrinsic values did not consider rewards

(25)

from innovation as fruitful and worthful. An interviewee disclosed that although the system for evaluation is accurate and objective, its own application calls for improvement. productivity There is a need for a better control over the work of servants so that their efforts are accredited and thereby assessed more correctly. Although this may not matter for intrinsic choosers who tend to see the pleasure of productivity, it is important for extrinsic pursuers since their goal is to obtain financial resources.

On the other hand, none of the respondents from Pleven municipality rejected the third principle but instead attached with a certain positive value on innovative return. The result diverges from Haskovo case and is slightly surprising. Conversely, Pleven bureaucrats perceived the performance appraisal system as subjective and inflexible without clear rules. The current accent is not on objectivity but on registering productivity. Results following innovation in the administration are evaluated but are not always proportional. The lack of a more modern system could affect promotion. As by another interviewee #2 from a lower administrative level, there is no such thing as a fair distribution of remuneration. Monetary payments are fixated: his salary is the same for his respective position and this is it. Non-financial seekers expressed the difficulty of the system and the hardship to get a better pay. However, in the meantime, extrinsic pursuers did not believe that getting a better position is impenetrable.

Research Limitations

Several limitations exist in the thesis. First, there is the likeliness that the study suffers from a social desirability bias, a type of response bias, which occurs when responders answer on delicate topics in a way that makes them sound desirable and admissible. Sensitive issues, like patronage, may induce individuals to give incorrect information to avoid disclosing critical facts. The bias could refer to both cases, but it is mainly applicable to Pleven because its administration is considered as the less meritocratic case in the thesis. Thereby, the probability of bias to arise from the interviewed employees is more likely. However, the thesis has minimized the negative effects of the bias. The interview questions have been designed as indirect and neutral and phrased in a way to look less undesirable and salient. Moreover, the study sample has excluded public servants located at a top level where patronage could be most common. It has rather focused on officials and experts who work either at the middle, or low level. By doing so, the work has been able to extract objective and representative answers.

(26)

Second, participation bias may also exist because it was difficult to gather participants. Haskovo employees did not wish to take a part due to fear of inquiry from the senior

management. In turn, many bureaucrats and experts from Pleven declined to engage due to disinterest and their busy workload. The result was a survey in which there is missing variables (such as for the three principles) which limited inference. Finding volunteers in general was a drawback in the beginning which is why a snowball sampling was used. This technique, in turn, may have caused an unequal randomization if the online form was purposely given to specific individuals who were pleased to react (or supposed to respond in a certain way) while neglecting others who carry essential and different information. If actual randomization is unachievable, then the sample can not be perfectly representative of the population.

Yet, the selective problem speaks for another limitation which is attentional bias, a sort of cognitive bias that causes people to focus on some events while ignoring less important ones. The point is that there were several respondents who threatened internal validity and the confidence of results by answering swiftly and concisely without being much inclined to

elaborate or detail. But the study coped with this type of bias by matching and coordinating both complete and incomplete answers together to uncover the facts.

A last limitation that jeopardizes validity comes from doing comparative design. A weakness of this research is the small number of participants that reduces the likelihood of complete generalization of the sample to the whole population. A quantitative approach is necessary to prove the findings. A follow-up qualitative research to this current work is also desired in order to further develop the hypotheses by providing a deeper understanding in other similar and non-similar contexts.

Conclusion

To sum up, there is less support for the first argument but a bigger endorsement for the second argument. It turned out that individuals Haskovo tend to give a bigger importance on intrinsic values. There is also a correlation between them and Vroom’s “reward perception”. In turn, a lot of Pleven bureaucrats tend to find both types of values essential as a way to begin with

innovation. Likewise, they also had a strong positive view on “reward perception”. However, it is surprising that both sample groups had a more negative and insecure opinion on the last two statements. This tells that the connection between work and proper and correct distribution of

(27)

salary and promotion need to be strengthened. Additionally, different conditions such as the provision of training and prior innovative experience could contribute to the sustenance of motivation but are not the only factors. On the other hands, recruitment form plays a more minimal role in defining stimulus if there is the inner wish for inventiveness.

Correlations among various variables are still unsure. A reason for this is the missing values and unclear data. There may also be additional conditions that give a fuller explanation, such as decentralization and the conduct of senior management. However, this is less likely to be known if it is less unknown about the work environment.

(28)

References

Anokhin, S., & Schulze, W. (2009). Entrepreneurship, innovation, and corruption. Journal of

Business Venturing, 24(5), 465-476.

Arundel, A., Bloch, C., & Ferguson, B. (2019). Advancing innovation in the public sector: Aligning innovation measurement with policy goals. Research Policy, 48(3), 789-798. Bearfield, D. (2009). What Is Patronage? A Critical Reexamination. Public Administration

Review, 69(1), 64-76.

Brierley, S. (2018). Combining Patronage and Merit in Public Sector Recruitment. (pp 1-60). http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3326874

Brown, K., & Osborne, S. (n.d.). Understanding and managing innovation in public services. In

Managing Change and Innovation in Public Service Organizations (pp. 125-178).

Routledge.

Charron, N., Dahlström, C., & Lapuente, V. (2016). Measuring Meritocracy in the Public Sector in Europe: A New National and Sub-National Indicator. European Journal on Criminal

Policy and Research, 22(3), 499-523.

Charron, N., Dijkstra, L., & Lapuente, V. (2015). Mapping the Regional Divide in Europe: A Measure for Assessing Quality of Government in 206 European Regions. Social

Indicators Research, 122(2), 315-346.

Dahlström, C., & Lapuente, V. (2017a). Why Relations between Politicians and Bureaucrats Matter. In Organizing Leviathan: Politicians, Bureaucrats, and the Making of Good

Government (pp. 1-12). Cambridge University Press.

Dahlström, C., & Lapuente, V. (2017b). Effectiveness. In Organizing Leviathan: Politicians,

Bureaucrats, and the Making of Good Government (pp. 128-154). Cambridge University

Press.

Dahlström, C., Lapuente, V., & Teorell, J. (2012). The Merit of Meritocratization: Politics, Bureaucracy, and the Institutional Deterrents of Corruption. Political Research

Quarterly, 65(3), 656-668.

Damanpour, F. (1991). Organizational Innovation: A Meta-Analysis of Effects of Determinants and Moderators. The Academy of Management Journal, 34(3), 555-590.

(29)

Damanpour, F., Walker, R., & Avellaneda, C. (2009). Combinative Effects of Innovation Types and Organizational Performance: A Longitudinal Study of Service

Organizations. Journal of Management Studies, 46(4), 650-675.

Demircioglu, M., & Audretsch, D. (2017). Conditions for innovation in public sector organizations. Research Policy, 46(9), 1681-1691.

Den Hartog, N.D., & de Jong, J. (2008). Innovative Work Behaviour: Measurement and Validation. RePec, 19(1), 23-36

Dussauge Laguna, M. (2011). The Challenges of Implementing Merit-Based Personnel Policies in Latin America: Mexico's Civil Service Reform Experience. Journal of Comparative

Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, 13(1), 51-73.

Fair, D. (1964). PARTY STRENGTH AND POLITICAL PATRONAGE. Southwestern Social

Science Quarterly, 45(3), 264-271.

Fernandez, S., & Pitts, D. (2011). Understanding employee motivation to innovate: Evidence from front line employees in United States federal agencies. Australian Journal of Public

Administration, 70(2), 202-222.

Fernandez, S., & Moldogaziev, T. (2013). Using Employee Empowerment to Encourage

Innovative Behavior in the Public Sector. Journal of Public Administration Research and

Theory, 23(1), 155-187.

Ganev, I. V. (2017). The Separation of Party and State as a Logistical Problem (pp. 33-61). In

Preying on the State: The Transformation of Bulgaria after 1989. Cornell University

Press.

Hood, C. (1991). A Public Management for All Seasons?. Public Administration, 69(1), 3-19 Jiang, J. (2018). Making Bureaucracy Work: Patronage Networks, Performance Incentives, and

Economic Development in China. American Journal of Political Science, 62(4), 982-999. Kaasa, A. (2017). Culture and Innovation: Evidence from the European Union and Neighbouring

Countries. Tijdschrift Voor Economische En Sociale Geografie, 108(1), 109-128. Kaasa, A., & Vadi, M. (2010). How does culture contribute to innovation? Evidence from

European countries. Economics of Innovation and New Technology, 19(7), 583-604. Kaasa, A., Parts, E., & Kaldaru, H. (2012). The role of human and social capital for innovation in

(30)

Innovation Systems in Small Catching-Up Economies: New Perspectives on Practice and Policy (pp. 259–276). New York, NY: Springer New York.

Kellough, J., & Haoran Lu. (1993). The Paradox of Merit Pay in the Public Sector: Persistence of a Problematic Procedure. Review of Public Personnel Administration, 13(2), 45-64. Kim, J., & Kellough, J. E. (2014). At-Will Employment in the States: Examining the Perceptions

of Agency Personnel Directors. Review of Public Personnel Administration, 34(3), 218-236.

Kopecký, P., & Spirova, M. (2011). 'Jobs for the Boys'? Patterns of Party Patronage in Post-Communist Europe. West European Politics, 34(5), 897-921.

Kopecký, P., & Mair, P. (2006, April). POLITICAL PARTIES AND PATRONAGE IN

CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACIES: An Introduction. ECPR Joint Sessions. Nicosia. Meyer‐Sahling, J., & Mikkelsen, K. (2016). CIVIL SERVICE LAWS, MERIT,

POLITICIZATION, AND CORRUPTION: THE PERSPECTIVE OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS FROM FIVE EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. Public Administration,

94(4), 1105-1123.

Moynihan, D., & Pandey, S. (2007). The Role of Organizations in Fostering Public Service Motivation. Public Administration Review, 67(1), 40-53.

National Statistical Institute [NSI]. (2018). БВП И БДС ПО ИКОНОМИЧЕСКИ СЕКТОРИ И

РАЙОНИ С ДАННИ ЗА 2018 Г. [Data file].

https://www.nsi.bg/bg/content/2215/%D0%B1%D0%B2%D0%BF-%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%B3%D0%B8%D0%BE%D0%BD%D0%B0%D0%BB%D0% BD%D0%BE-%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B2%D0%BE

Nistotskaya, M., & Cingolani, L. (2016). Bureaucratic Structure, Regulatory Quality, and Entrepreneurship in a Comparative Perspective: Cross-Sectional and Panel Data Evidence. Journal Of Public Administration Research And Theory, 26(3), 519-534. Nistotskaya, M., Charron, N., Lapuente, V., Börzel, T., & Fagan, A. (2015). The wealth of

regions: Quality of government and SMEs in 172 European regions. Environment and

Planning C: Government and Policy, 33(5), 1125-1155.

Nikolova, N. (n.d.). Особености На Иновационния Процес В Публичния Сектор [Features of The Innovation Process In The Public Sector] [PDF file]. Retrieved from

(31)

O'Dwyer, C. (2004). Runaway State Building: How Political Parties Shape States in Postcommunist Eastern Europe. World Politics, 56(4), 520-553.

Oliveros, V., & Schuster, C. (2018). Merit, Tenure, and Bureaucratic Behavior: Evidence From a Conjoint Experiment in the Dominican Republic. Comparative Political Studies, 51(6), 759-792.

Наредба За Провеждане На Конкурсите За Държавни Служители От 2004 Г [Ordinance for Conducting Civil Service Competitions Of 2004], Pub. L. No. 1-3. Retrieved from https://www.lex.bg/laws/ldoc/2135477172

Orloff, A., & Skocpol, T. (1984). Why not equal protection? Explaining the politics of public social spending in Britain, 1900-1911, and the United States, 1880s-1920. American

Sociological Review, 49(6), 726-750.

Randma-Liiv, T., & Drechsler, W. (2019). The politics of bureaucracy: The Central and Eastern European perspective. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 21(3), 504-512.

Rauch, J., & Evans, P. (2000). Bureaucratic structure and bureaucratic performance in less developed countries. Journal of Public Economics, 75(1), 49-71.

Регионални Профили [Regional Profiles]. (2019). Сравнение на области [Data file]. https://www.regionalprofiles.bg/bg/compare/regions:pleven;haskovo;/

Sahni, N. R., Wessel, M., & Christensen, C. M. (2013). Unleashing Breakthrough Innovation in Government. Stanford Social Innovation Review, 11(3), 27-31.

Solberg, M. (2014). Patronage, Contextual Flexibility, and Organisational Innovation in Lebanese Protected Areas Management. Conservation and Society, 12(3), 268-279. Sorauf, F. (1960). The silent revolution in patronage. Public Administration Review, 20(1),

28-34.

Sorauf, F. (1959). Patronage and Party. Midwest Journal of Political Science, 3(2), 115-126. Sørensen, E., & Torfing, J. (2011). Enhancing Collaborative Innovation in the Public

Sector. Administration & Society, 43(8), 842-868.

Spirova, M. (2012). ‘A Tradition We Don’t Mess With’: Party Patronage in Bulgaria. In Party

patronage and party government in European democracies. Oxford [etc.]: Oxford

Patronage and Innovation in Bulgarian City Municipalities: The Role of Motivation