When part of ‘us’ becomes ‘them’ : assessing the potential for escalation of conflict in Turkey

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When part of ‘Us’ becomes ‘Them’

Assessing the potential for escalation of conflict in Turkey

Iris Loonen (10672184)

Master thesis Conflict Resolution and Governance Graduate School of Social Sciences, University of Amsterdam

Supervisor: Dr. Martijn Dekker Second reader: Dr. Beste İşleyen

Date of submission: 30 June 2017 Word count: 28.020 words

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ABSTRACT

Polarization in Turkey has reached a level that should alarm even optimists, eating at the glue that holds society together (Erdoğan, 2017, p.1). This thesis addresses the question as to how social polarization between Erdogan/AKP-supporters and Erdogan/AKP-critics in Turkey can contribute to the potential for escalation of conflict in this country. In Turkish society, polarization between Erdogan/AKP-supporters and Erdogan/AKP-critics seems to manifest as an ‘Us’ versus ‘Them’ dynamic with a zero-sum character. This thesis considers ‘everyday’ narratives from Istanbul to uncover the dynamics and root causes of this ‘Us’ versus ‘Them’ dynamic with its zero-sum character. It is concluded that this ‘Us’ versus ‘Them’ dynamic with a zero-sum character seems to constitute one of the antecedents of conflict escalation, namely a high perceived divergence of interests. The other antecedent of conflict escalation, low stability, also seems to be present in the Turkish context, whereby the likelihood for social polarization in Turkey to spiral into further conflict seems substantial. This study augments the existing body of research by assessing the relationship between social polarization and the escalation of conflict in the Turkish context. It can further inform Turkish domestic policy and international policy to curb such polarization. Further research should continue monitoring social polarization and the potential for escalation of conflict in Turkey, particularly considering whether it is experienced by the wider population of Turkey, and the role of other factors contributing to polarization, such as political actors and the media.

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LIST OF FIGURES

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my supervisor dr. Martijn Dekker for guiding me through the process of writing a Master’s thesis. Thank you, Martijn, for your constructive feedback and your positive tone.

I would furthermore like to thank dr. Beste İşleyen for taking the time to be the second reader of my thesis.

Certainly, I would not have been able to write this thesis without the

contributions of my respondents. Thank you for sharing your stories with me, for being vulnerable, and for showing me the hope and resilience that exists in Turkish society. Çok teşekkür ederim.

I would also like to thank everyone in Turkey and the Netherlands that helped me make the most out of my fieldwork experience. Thank you for introducing me to your families and friends, for hosting me, for taking care of me, for making me feel comfortable, for opening up to me, for, in a word, taking me in as one of your own. It means the world to me.

Lastly, I would like to thank my family, my boyfriend, my classmates and my friends for always supporting me.

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GLOSSARY OF TERMS

AKP – Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi

CHP – Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi

DHKP-C – Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi FETÖ – Fethullahçı Terör Örgütü

FSI – Fragile States Index

HDP – Halkların Demokratik Partisi ICG – International Crisis Group

IS – Islamic State

MHP – Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi

NGO – Non-Governmental Organization

OSCE ODIHR – Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

PKK – Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê SER – State of Emergency Rule

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1 “People don’t swallow it anymore, they want to react, there’s a concentrated anger,

mixed with fear, [it] is an endless anti-dialogue”, Betül (professor in conflict studies,

Erdoğan/Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP)-critic) said about the tensions she observes between secular anti-Erdoğan/AKP students and conservative pro-Erdoğan/AKP students at the university she works at1. Interestingly, a survey by Kaya and Sunar

(2015) indicates that there is no evidence for increasing polarization between conservatives and seculars between 1990 and 2011 (p.408). Particularly since 2011, however, the right-wing populism espoused by now President Erdoğan and his political party AKP seems to have contributed to the growing polarization in Turkish society (Aydın-Düzgit & Balta, 2017, p.6). In May and June 2013, furthermore, there were the Gezi park protests, which started out as an environmentalist movement to save the park, but soon pulled in a diverse array of people disenchanted by the politics and policy of then Prime Minister Erdoğan and the AKP (Azizleri, 2013). In August 2014, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was elected President of Turkey, ever since occupying this constitutionally ceremonial office in an executive manner (Özbudun, 2014). In June 2015, there were parliamentary elections in which the AKP lost their absolute majority in parliament for the first time since they came to power in 2002 (Nardelli, 2015). Furthermore, the Kurdish Halkların Demokratik Partisi (HDP) passed the 10 percent electoral threshold for the first time (Nardelli, 2015). In November 2015, however, new elections were held as the Turkish political parties were not able to form a coalition (Arango, 2015). Over the summer of 2015, furthermore, the armed conflict between the Turkish government and the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (PKK) in the Southeast of the country was renewed after the ceasefire between them was broken (Arango, 2015).

In 2016, Turkey experienced multiple terrorist attacks from Kurdish groups and the Islamic State (IS), not to mention the 15 July 2016 attempted coup by Fethullahçı Terör Örgütü (FETÖ). After the coup, the State of Emergency Rule (SER) was declared, and there was a huge crackdown on Gülenists and Erdoğan/AKP-critics more broadly. In this tense environment, a Constitutional Referendum on Turkey’s potential move from a Parliamentary system of governance to a Presidential system was held on 16 April 2017. With just over 50 percent of the votes having been casted for ‘Yes’, the Turkish public decided to reform its system of governance to an executive Presidency (Topping, 2017).

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The constant state of electioneering, the threat of terrorism, and the discontent of half of the Turkish population with the current government have contributed to the sustenance of the high intensity of political debates and the consolidation of stark divisions in Turkish society across partisan lines (Aydın-Düzgit & Balta, 2017, p.7).

At present, as Erdoğan (2017) writes, political polarization in Turkey has reached a level that should alarm even optimists (p.1). As polarization increases on the political level, it furthermore “eats at the glue that holds a society together” (Erdoğan, 2017, p.1). Currently, polarization is not only present on the political level in Turkey; it also exists socially. As Evans and Kaynak (2015) point out, the most volatile issue on the Turkish public agenda is this deep societal rift, characterized primarily by the supporters and detractors of President Erdoğan and the AKP (p.145). At present, Cagaptay (2017) writes, “Turkey is […] deeply polarized around the powerful persona of its president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan”, with pro- and anti-Erdoğan blocks opposing each other. Similar tensions were present in Turkish society in the pre-AKP era too (Akyol, 2013), but there is now a growing consensus in literature that Turkey’s population is currently more polarized than ever over a range of issues, including economic policy, democracy, secularism and foreign policy (Aydın-Düzgit & Balta, 2017, p.4). Furthermore, 61.7 percent of the Turkish public thinks their society is currently polarized (Aydın-Düzgit & Balta, 2017, p.5).

What is polarization exactly? The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines polarization as a “division into two opposites”, or, more specifically, “the concentration [of] opposing extremes of groups or interests formerly ranged on a continuum” (2017). In social science, the focus is mostly on macro-political polarization. On a political level, polarization constitutes a sharpening of the divide between dominant political parties, often at the expense of smaller political parties (Akdede, 2012, p.21). Such political polarization can also involve the formation of larger clusters or groups of political parties into the two main poles (Esteban & Ray, 1994, p.819). With such polarization often comes an alignment of cleavages. Simply put, a cleavage is a politicized dividing line; a deep and lasting division between groups based on a conflict (Bartolini, 2000, p.13; Bornschier, 2009, p.2). With cleavage alignment, or reinforcing cleavages, those who are divided by one cleavage are also divided by another (Grove, 1977, p.217). In the extreme case, two autonomous, homogenous poles differing from each other along many cleavages emerge in society (Grove, 1977, p.217). Such polarization can be considered a conflict, as Rubin, Pruitt and Kim (1994) define conflict as a “perceived divergence of interests” (p.5).

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3 As in democracies the political parties are elected by the population, political polarization also “reflects the degree of the divergence of attitudes toward political matters in a society” (Grechnya, 2016, p.10). As such, political polarization can be indicative of polarization on the social level. On a micro-level, polarization constitutes a division of society into well-defined and separated camps with substantial intra-group homogeneity and inter-group heterogeneity (Esteban & Ray, 1994, p.820). With such social polarization, formerly neutral parties are pulled towards one side or another because it is difficult for them to stay neutral when there is a heavy conflict of interests (Rubin, Pruitt & Kim, 1994, p.96, 109). As such, social polarization can also be considered a conflict, as it points to a divergence of interests in society. Furthermore, social polarization often involves weakened social cohesion, patterns of segregation, social unrest, and increased tensions (Esteban & Ray, 1994, p.820; Castree, Kitchin & Rogers, 2013).

This study particularly considers the question as to how social polarization between Erdoğan/AKP-supporters and Erdoğan/AKP-critics in Turkey can contribute to the potential for escalation of conflict in this country. It considers ‘everyday’ perspectives from people in Turkey to uncover if and how they see social polarization, and what they believe its causes and consequences to be. After this introduction, the theoretical lenses that are used to analyze the narratives on polarization from Turkey are discussed in the theoretical framework. The third chapter subsequently considers the research methodology. The fourth chapter reports and makes sense of the results of the study. The first two sections of this chapter consider how polarization manifests on the social level in Turkey, and what the root causes of this polarization might be. Particularly, it is argued that social polarization in Turkey seems to manifest as an ‘Us’ versus ‘Them’ dynamic. In the second section, the apparent zero-sum character of this dynamic is discussed in depth. Thirdly, the potential for escalation of conflict is assessed, and it is argued that the ‘Us’ versus ‘Them’ dynamic with a zero-sum character seems to contribute to the potential for escalation of conflict in Turkey. The study concludes by summarizing the argument and pointing to directions for further research.

Before delving into the theoretical framework, let us briefly consider the relevance of this study. Firstly, it is relevant to research the current polarization in Turkey because this issue seems to be a red thread that runs through the various issues Turkey is currently facing. As social polarization seems to be a critical issue on Turkey’s domestic as well as the international political agenda, it is a crucial matter to deal with. ‘Everyday’ narratives on polarization, particularly social polarization, are likely to give

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insight into the perceived nature, origins and consequences of this conflict, whereby they are likely also informative in assessing the potential for escalation of conflict in Turkey. As such, they could also point towards crucial points to consider when devising Turkish domestic and international policy to tackle social polarization and prevent the escalation of conflict in Turkey. Besides, by assessing how the macro-concept of polarization plays out socially in the Turkish context, this study builds on existing research on this topic. Lastly, this study also aspires to add depth to the stories on polarization in Turkey that appear in the Western media. Particularly, it aims to paint a more holistic picture of the opinions and motivations of different people in Turkey, to nuance the stories that are disseminated via mainstream media. To achieve this, let us first establish the theoretical framework with which the narratives on polarization in Turkey are analyzed later.

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2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter situates the question as to how social polarization between Erdoğan/AKP-supporters and Erdoğan/AKP-critics in Turkey can contribute to the potential for escalation of conflict in this country in a theoretical framework. Combining theories of polarization and ‘Us’ versus ‘Them’ dynamics, theories of narrative and framing, and conflict escalation theory, it is shown that theoretically, social polarization can create or increase the potential for escalation of conflict. Later, these three sets of theoretical lenses are employed to analyze the results of this study.

2.1: ‘Us’ versus ‘Them’

Social polarization often involves a dynamic of ‘Us’ versus ‘Them’. With such a dynamic, society is not only divided into distinct camps, but there is also opposition and tensions between these camps. Essentially, the tensions present with an ‘Us’ versus ‘Them’ dynamic can be traced back to an initial sense of threat (Northrup, 2012, p.68). This sense of threat creates distrust; a perception that there is a divergence of interests with the ‘Other’ (Pruitt, Rubin & Kim, 1994, p.16). At some point in the relationship between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’, an event occurred that was perceived as invalidating the core sense of identity of one or both parties (Northrup, 2012, p.68). When identities are threatened, conflict almost inevitably arises, because such a threat calls into question the beliefs, values and convictions that people hold (Wondolleck, Gray & Bryan, 2003, p.210). When someone’s core sense of identity, someone’s core frame of reference, is invalidated, living becomes more random, and the world becomes less predictable and more frightening (Northrup, 2012, p.66). As such, such an invalidation of identity is likely to elicit defensive responses, such as distortion (Northrup, 2012, p.64).

With distortion, an individual denies the invalidating information, or he or she redefines its nature to respond to the threat this information poses (Northrup, 2012, p.69). As such, the threatened individuals or groups begin to develop increasingly rigid interpretations of the world (Northrup, 2012, p.70). Differences within groups are minimized, whereas differences between groups are exaggerated (Northrup, 2012, p.71, 72). Furthermore, due to the basic human tendency to favor the in-group over the out-group, and to derogate the out-out-group, tensions and exclusion are promoted (Rubin, Pruitt & Kim, 1994, p.17; Wondolleck, Gray & Bryan, 2003, p.208). That is, (group) identities foster a dynamic wherein outsiders are stereotyped to elevate the in-group’s view of themselves (Wondolleck, Gray & Bryan, 2003, p.208). Here, the out-group, from

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which the invalidating information was coming, is increasingly perceived as and treated like someone entirely different from the self (Northrup, 2012, p.70). This process is called rigidification, and is aimed at putting distance between the self and the threat (Northrup, 2012, p.70). Ultimately, not only behaviors and demands of the ‘Other’ party are construed as threatening, but also beliefs and characteristics which are not related to the original threat are re-interpreted as such (Northrup, 2012, p.70).

In the extreme case, the ‘Us’ versus ‘Them’ dynamic has a zero-sum character in which one party’s gain constitutes another the other party’s loss (Rubin, Pruitt & Kim, 1994, p.20). Zero-sum thinking is an important condition that encourages conflict, because members of one party believe that their own existence is threatened by the mere existence of the other (Rubin, Pruitt & Kim, 1994, p.20; Northrup, 2012, p.68). Often, conflict arises not because issues are truly zero-sum in nature, but are still treated as such by the parties in conflict (Rubin, Pruitt & Kim, 1994, p. 20). As Northrup (2012) writes, all conflicts have subjective components, while not necessarily all conflicts have objective components (p.59). That is, whenever people are involved in a relationship, be it one of conflict, they are interpreting events and attributing meaning tot them (Northrup, 2012, p.60). These meanings, in turn, are used to guide behavior (Northrup, 2012, p.60). In the extreme case, conflicts may be the result of beliefs and perceptions only, with no basis of evidence in the ‘real’ world (Northrup, 2012, p.60). For example, the mere perception of belonging to two distinct groups may trigger intergroup discrimination favoring the in-group (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, p.38).

As separation between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ increases, the processes of deindividuation and dehumanization begin to occur (Rubin, Pruitt & Kim, 1994, p.88; Northrup, 2012, p.72). With the process of deindividuation, parties to the conflict start to view each other as members of a category or group rather than individuals (Rubin, Pruitt & Kim, 1994, p.88). Here, the issues turn from specific to general, as the parties deal not with threats from the out-group but with the general issue of how to resist an enemy (Rubin, Pruitt & Kim, 1994, p.84). With the process of dehumanization, furthermore, the members of the out-group are not only perceived to be separate and different from the in-group, they are also evaluated as being bad, evil, and less valuable (Northrup, 2012, p.72). The out-group comes to be viewed as a diabolical enemy, which is blamed for everything that goes wrong (Rubin, Pruitt & Kim, 1994, p.87). Negative characterizations are used to delegitimize the claims and standing of ‘Others’, to assign blame, and to simply discredit and diminish them (Wondolleck, Gray & Bryan, 2003, p.209). Furthermore, individuals and groups increasingly rely on their psychological

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7 construction of the ‘Other’, rejecting information coming from them (Northrup, 2012, p.74). As such, the process of dehumanization makes violence more tolerable; it is simply easier to harm someone construed as different and inhuman, an enemy, than it is to harm someone that is like the self (Northrup, 2012, p.74). Moreover, the less human the members of the ‘Other’ group are perceived to be, the more inhumanly they can be treated by those who have that perception (Lübbe, 2009, p.4). When both sides are engaged in these processes of rigidification, deindividuation and dehumanization, conflict is likely to spiral into further escalation (Wondolleck, Gray & Bryan, 2012, p.209). Having considered how polarization can play out socially, let us examine theories of narrative and framing.

2.2: Narratives, framing and controversies

As narratives embody the themes of the cultural context in which they are developed, it seems useful to research social polarization in Turkey by considering people’s narratives about it (Stewart & Maxwell, 2010, p.32). Narrative is a tool through which people construct, present, and preserve their identity, and they can be the means of carrying out action (Stewart & Maxwell, 2010, p.4). Narratives furthermore engender and transform social experience (Brenneis, 1988, p.287). That is, we create narratives to interpret and understand the realities around us, and because these narratives then affect our perceptions of reality, they also affect our actions in response to or in anticipation of events (Patterson & Monroe, 1998, p.315). Ultimately, narratives authorize, enable and justify specific actions while precluding others (Autesserre, 2014, p.38).

How people make sense of reality, however, fundamentally depends on their frames; underlying structures of belief, perceptions, and appreciation (Schön & Rein, 1994, p.23). These perceptions may be shaped by many factors such as race, gender, ethnicity, and culture (Northrup, 2012, p.60). There is no way of perceiving and making sense of social reality except through a frame, for the task of making sense of complex, information-rich situations requires an operation of selectivity and organization, which is what framing means (Schön & Rein, 1994, p.30). Interestingly, identity itself can be considered a frame, as it is a system of beliefs or a way of construing the world that makes life predictable rather than random (Northrup, 2012, p.55).

When actors have fundamentally different frames, by which they interpret a situation differently, there is the potential for a controversy to arise (Schön & Rein, 1994, p.23, 29). A controversy is a conflict that is particularly hard to resolve, because parties’

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conflicting frames determine different facts and arguments to be relevant and compelling (Schön & Rein, 1994, p.23). Put differently, the parties to the conflict are operating from different rules and with different basic assumptions about the world and the people in it (Northrup, 2012, p.60). As such, the notion of the controversy is much related to the notion of the meta-conflict; a conflict about what the conflict is about (Bell, 2006, p.356). With such a controversy or meta-conflict, the parties to the conflict have “significantly different definitions of conflict, differential valuing of conflict, different values concerning how, when, by whom, and even if the conflict should be resolved” (Northrup, 2012, p.60). In that sense, it seems to be mostly a difference in diagnostic frames as described by Benford and Snow (2000) that is at the center of such a controversy or meta-conflict. Diagnostic framing revolves around problem identification and attribution of blame (Benford & Snow, 2000, p.615). When parties differ in terms of their diagnostic framing, they fundamentally disagree as to what the problem is and who is to blame. As a result, their prognostic frames, which revolve around proposing a solution to the problem, and their motivational frames, which provide a rationale for engaging in action, also contradict (Benford & Snow, 2000, p.615-617). That is, if different parties cannot agree on what the problem is exactly, they cannot begin to agree on solutions to it or actions to take. Having discussed theories of narrative and framing, let us consider theories of conflict escalation.

2.3: Escalation of conflict

So how can social polarization contribute to the potential for escalation of conflict? As Mitchell (2005) writes, the literature dealing systematically with precise relationships between change and conflict is sparse (p.2). However, it is possible to find some indications as to how exactly conflict changes. Rubin, Pruitt and Kim (1994) define conflict as a perceived divergence of interests (p.5). With escalation of conflict, there is an increase of the intensity of conflict over time (Rubin, Pruitt & Kim, 1994, p.69)2_.

Essentially, escalation of conflict entails a party to a conflict using a contentious (aggressive) tactic for the first time, or employing heavier contentious tactics than before (De Dreu, 2010, p.997), aiming to make the other party to the conflict abandon their goals (Mitchell, 2005, p.11). Theoretically speaking, escalation of conflict has two antecedents; a high perceived divergence of interests and low stability (Rubin, Pruitt & Kim, 1994, p.119). When these two antecedents of escalation are present, the likelihood for conflict

2_{This thesis considers the concept of escalation of conflict in a narrow sense. Mitchell (2005)} offers a more in-depth review of the various changes that occur when a conflict escalates.

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2.3.1: Two antecedents of escalation of conflict

The first antecedent of escalation of conflict, as mentioned, is a high perceived divergence of interests. When the perceived divergence of interests is high, there are rigid aspirations on both sides and there is little apparent common ground (Rubin, Pruitt & Kim, 1994, p.119). In such circumstances, yielding is unthinkable and the only way to succeed seems to be the use of harsh tactics (p.119). If such tactics are used, they are likely to produce a similar response from the other party, starting a conflict spiral (Rubin, Pruitt & Kim, 1994, p.119). With social polarization, and especially with an ‘Us’ versus ‘Them’ dynamic with a zero-sum character, there is a high perceived divergence of interests which is exemplified by the formation of two autonomous groups in society and the tensions between them.

Let us now consider the other antecedent of escalation, low stability, in more detail. The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines instability as “the state of being likely to change” (2017). As such, describing a country or region as unstable suggests the presence of social, political, or economic upheaval (Donovan, Smart, Moreno-Torres, Kiso & Zachariah, 2005, p.1). Brinkerhoff (2011) and Kaplan (2014) further help us make sense of the concept of (in)stability, explaining that stability means a country can adapt when there is a crisis (p.134; p.51). Such crises can take many different forms, such as an economic depression, a contested election, a secessionist movement gaining traction, changes in external conditions or changes in political will (Brinkerhoff, 2011, p.135; Kaplan, 2014, p.52). When there is stability, a country responds effectively to these shocks, but when there is instability the country struggles to overcome them (Kaplan, 2014, p.51). When this happens, these crises can linger on and the country experiences a ‘fragile moment’ (Kaplan, 2014, p.51).

The high perceived divergence of interests that social polarization exemplifies could be seen as a crisis a country has to respond to. A stable country can respond effectively to such a conflict, while an unstable country has more difficulty to overcome it (Kaplan, 2014, p.51). Without the country adapting and responding effectively to the high perceived divergence of interests that comes with social polarization, this conflict lingers on. As explained before, with a high perceived divergence of interests the use of harsh tactics by both parties is likely (Rubin, Pruitt & Kim, 1994, p.119). As such, a conflict spiral ensues wherein provocations and harsh tactics encourage similar

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responses from the other party (Rubin, Pruitt & Kim, 1994, p.74). Therefore, escalation of conflict becomes more likely merely because the factor of time allows the parties to enter a spiral of conflict. As such, unstable countries run higher risks of descending into violence than their stable counterparts (The Hague Center for Strategic Studies, 2014).

Importantly, when there is a potential for conflict to escalate, this does not necessarily mean that such escalation will take place. The divergence of interests can still be dealt with; the term ‘potential’ for escalation merely indicates an increased likelihood for escalation, precisely because an unstable country is less able to deal with and adapt to this divergence of interests. As Donovan et al (2005) write, the prediction of the timing and nature of a crisis remains difficult, as it depends on a complex chain of events and interactions (p.1). Close monitoring of such events, interactions and risks, however, enables early response when conflict does arise or escalate, which can prevent the conflict from escalating even further (Donovan et al, 2005, p.2). Having discussed the theoretical lenses which are employed to analyze the results of this study, let us consider the research methodology.

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3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This section discusses the methodology that was employed to explore the question as to how social polarization between supporters and Erdoğan/AKP-critics in Turkey can contribute to the potential for escalation of conflict in this country. First, the ‘everyday’ focus of this research is considered. Then, the fieldwork that was conducted in İstanbul is described. Particularly, the used research methods are reviewed, and the ethical considerations and limitations of the research design are discussed. Lastly, this section goes into how the data gathered in İstanbul was analyzed.

3.1: Research focus: The ‘everyday’ level

To gain more insight into social polarization and the potential for escalation of conflict in Turkey, this research focuses on the ‘everyday’ level. The notion of the everyday describes the lives of ordinary people; it is regarded as the normal habitus for individuals and groups (Mac Ginty, 2014, p.550). Importantly, the notion of the everyday recognizes that we are all ultimately anchored in the mundane (Felski, 2000, p.16). As such, this approach helps us move beyond formal institutional spheres towards spheres of life that are empathetic and social (Mac Ginty, 2014, p.550). According to Felski (2000), everyday life is an essential, sometimes taken-for-granted, approach (p.15), but Oliver and Badham (2013) describe that the formations, articulations, and situations of living that constitute everyday life are currently accepted methodology in social science (p.160). The everyday is constitutive of the international, and is thus an important level of analysis to consider (Mac Ginty, 2014, p.550).

It furthermore seems useful to assess the “lived subjective experience” of the current polarization between Erdoğan/AKP-supporters and Erdoğan/AKP-critics (Oliver & Badham, 2013, p.156), because people for whom polarization is a daily reality can be considered experts on this topic. They are exposed to, interact with, and navigate through this situation daily, by which they, wittingly or unwittingly, become experts on these realities. Every day they make sense of and deal with polarization, so they must have narratives on what this situation is about, and what its origins and effects are. The main objective of this research was thus to gain insight into social polarization in Turkey by learning from the people who experience it daily. Therefore, I went to İstanbul for a month to collect the data for this research.

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3.2: Data collection

Having considered the everyday focus of this study, let us discuss how the data for this research was collected. This section first discusses why the city of İstanbul was chosen as the location to collect data on social polarization in Turkey. Afterwards, the research methods that were employed are reviewed. Then, the section goes into some ethical considerations and limitations of the research design.

3.2.1: Fieldwork in İstanbul, Turkey

As mentioned, the data for this research was collected in İstanbul. For practical reasons, I decided to spend the entire month of fieldwork in one city in Turkey. As Kalekin-Fishman (2013) says, “the city is the locus in which the concept of everyday life is realized to the full” (p.720). To be able to paint a picture of social polarization in Turkey from an everyday perspective that is as complete as possible, the sample of respondents furthermore needed to come close to representing the diversity of Turkish society. In İstanbul, which is the largest city in Turkey with around 15 million inhabitants, I was most likely to find such a diverse array of people. İstanbul is home to most of the ethnic and religious minorities in Turkey, and with up to three million Kurdish inhabitants it is the largest ‘Kurdish’ city in the world (World Population Review, 2017). Furthermore, only 28 percent of İstanbul’s population originates from this city, while it has a small foreign population (World Population Review, 2017). This suggests that İstanbul hosts many migrants from other parts of the country.

Another reason to pick İstanbul as the fieldwork destination was the fact that its inhabitants, like the inhabitants of other large cities in Turkey, were directly exposed to various events that contributed to the current degree of polarization in the country. In the past few years, the inhabitants of İstanbul experienced numerous protests with subsequent police crackdowns, multiple ISIS attacks, and the 16 July 2016 attempted coup, amongst other events (Sharma, 2016). Therefore, I expected people in İstanbul to be likely to have formed a narrative on polarization in Turkey, simply because I expected the impact of this polarization on their daily lives to be large. This rationalization also points to a limitation of my study; as I expect the impact of the current polarization on the daily lives of people to be larger for people in İstanbul than for people in other places in Turkey, their narratives are less likely to be representative for the entire population of Turkey. Having considered why the city of İstanbul was chosen as the location to collect the data for this study, let us discuss the research methods that were employed.

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3.2.1: Research methods

The research methods employed in this study are twofold. Firstly, semi-structured interviews were conducted. The ethnographic method of participant observation was used as an additional research method. This section further discusses and reflects upon these research methods.

3.2.1.1: Semi-structured interviews

As mentioned, the data for this study was mainly collected by conducting semi-structured interviews. This section first discusses the sampling method, and afterwards explains the relevance of conducting semi-structured interviews particularly.

3.2.1.1.1: Sampling method

No statistical method to randomly select respondents was used. Rather, the sample of respondents was selected using a mix of qualitative sampling methods. Firstly, the snowball sampling method was used, which involved asking well-situated people to locate information-rich respondents (Patton, 1990, p.176). This sampling method started before going on fieldwork, by asking experts in the field if they had contacts I could interview in İstanbul. When I arrived in İstanbul, furthermore, I asked my local contacts and my first respondents to direct me to new potential interviewees. Besides the sampling method of snowball sampling, convenient sampling was used to select respondents for my research. In İstanbul, I hand-picked respondents that were easy for me to access (p.181). This method of hand-picking respondents was also used to diversify the sample, by asking my local contacts to direct me to potential respondents with specific characteristics. Furthermore, I made use of opportunistic sampling, taking advantage of new opportunities as they unfolded during data collection (Patton, 1990, p.179).

3.2.1.1.2: Conducting semi-structured interviews in practice

To learn more about social polarization and the potential for escalation of conflict in Turkey, everyday narratives were collected by conducting in-depth semi-structured interviews. Employing the mixed research method of conducting semi-structured interviews allowed me to ask specific, prepared questions throughout the interview, but also enabled the interviewees to take control and discuss what they thought important. The direction of my research was thus, to a certain extent, shaped by my respondents, which is likely to have made my research more relevant for people in Turkey. In total, 21

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in-depth interviews were conducted3_{. Of these interviews, 16 were conducted in English.}

The others were conducted in Turkish with the help of a translator. The diversity of the sample is further discussed in the section ‘Limitations of the study’.

3.2.1.2: Participant observation

Besides conducting semi-structured interviews, I employed the ethnographic method of participant observation as an additional research method. This research method allowed me to move beyond looking simply at what people are saying, towards what they are doing too. Researching the experience of social polarization in Turkey, this proved to be a valuable addition to the narratives collected through semi-structured interviews. Furthermore, doing participant observation allowed me to gather additional data that I was not able to gather through semi-structured interviews. This additional data includes (extended) informal conversations4_{, contextual observations, observations}

of interactions between people, and observations from events that I participated in. Furthermore, doing participant observation allowed for an extent of triangulation of the research findings. For example, in informal conversations I could check the data that I gathered through the semi-structured interviews. This also worked the other way around; in the semi-structured interviews, I could ask about casual remarks that I had heard in informal conversations or about political propaganda that I saw in the streets or on television.

3.2.2: Ethical considerations

Having discussed the research methods employed in this study, let us elaborate on some of the ethical considerations of this research. First, the issue of informed consent is discussed, and secondly some of the respondents’ risks that were considered to ensure respondents’ safety are examined.

3.2.2.1: Informed consent

One of the most important pillars of sound social science research is informed consent (Krause, 2016). During the semi-structured interviews, I always ensured that the interviewees were informed about the study by explaining my research topic, my questions, and my motivation to study this topic before starting the interview. Thereby,

3_{Background information on the interviewees can be found in Appendix I: Interview} Identification Key.

4_{Details on the people I had extended informal conversations with can also be found in} Appendix I.

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15 the respondents could make informed decisions on whether to consent to participating or not. Furthermore, I gave the interviewees the option to withdraw before or during the interview, considering the respondents’ risks discussed in the next section. Lastly, I always immediately anonymized the data gathered during the semi-structured interviews.

The issue of informed consent became more complicated with the ethnographic research method of participant observation. In public spaces, I did not inform people about my research, as this would likely have influenced their behavior. As I was merely a witness of what they said and did in the public sphere, this decision seems ethically justifiable. Naturally, my observations were written up in an anonymized form to ensure that the information cannot be tracked to a specific person or place. The same was done for semi-private places, such as café’s or university buildings. In contrast to the observations in public and semi-private places, I did inform people about my research in private spaces, such as private homes. Notably, I informed the people that I stayed with during my time in İstanbul about the purpose of my research and the measures I employed to ensure the safety of my respondents and myself. Having discussed the issue of informed consent in some detail, let us move on to consider some respondents’ risks.

3.2.2.2: Respondents’ risks

Krause (2017) describes four main risks for respondents; reprisal by authoritarian governments, stigmatization in neighborhood or community, re-traumatization, and social rejection. In my study, most attention was paid to the first two of these respondent’s risks. With the current sensitivity of the research topic, both Erdoğan/AKP-supporters and Erdoğan/AKP-critics run the risk of being stigmatized by the other group. Furthermore, Erdoğan/AKP-critics even risk being fired from their jobs or arrested if they openly criticize the government. As Fujii (2012) describes, researchers alter the social landscape by “drawing attention to those in their orbit, such as key informants, research assistants, and interpreters. Such attention may be […] a threat” (p.720). Therefore, I made sure that both my respondents and the people I generally spent time with felt comfortable and safe around me.

One way in which I minimized respondents’ risks was by immediately anonymizing my data. In this thesis, pseudonyms that do not approximate the respondents’ real names in any way are used to refer to the respondents (Fujii, 2012, p.721). Another way to protect my respondents and myself was to phrase my interview questions in a neutral way. In the interviews, I emphasized that I was trying to

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understand social polarization in Turkey from the respondents’ point of view, and that I was there to listen and to learn. By not taking a stance on sensitive issues in Turkey, I minimized the risk of offending my respondents and those who might have overheard our conversations. Furthermore, to ensure my interview questions fit the context and customs of Turkish people, I tested my interview questions with my local contacts. As Fujii (2012) describes, “researchers should first look to their local contacts for insight into what risks (and benefits) might matter to local people” (p.719). My local contacts reviewed my interview questions and helped me formulate them in a neutral and culturally sensitive way.

3.2.3: Limitations of the study

Having elaborated on some of the ethical considerations of this study, let us consider its main limitations. These limitations particularly pertain to the representativeness of the study and the personal bias of the researcher.

3.2.3.1: Representativeness of the study

Several limitations contribute to the findings of this study not being generalizable to the wider population of Turkey or İstanbul. Having conducted 21 in-depth interviews, the sample size is small, and one month of fieldwork was not enough to completely immerse myself in the Turkish context and make optimal use of the ethnographic research method of participant observation. Furthermore, the sample of interviewees is biased in several respects. Importantly, there is an imbalance of Erdoğan/AKP-supporters and Erdoğan/AKP-critics in the sample, with Erdoğan/AKP-critics being overrepresented. In total, I conducted five in-depth interviews and several informal conversations with Erdoğan/AKP-supporters. Having conducted 16 in-depth interviews with Erdoğan/AKP-critics, the data is clearly skewed. However, having collected narratives from the pro-Erdoğan/AKP side too, the stories from pro-Erdoğan/AKP-critics can at least be nuanced.

Furthermore, nearly all my respondents received university-level education, which is not representative of Turkish society. As Ahmet (political scientist, Erdoğan/AKP-critic) explained, “if you want to have a sample of people that represents

Turkish society, you should have five people that only finished primary school, two or three 5

17

Pro-AKP Anti-AKP

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that finished high school, and one that finished university”5_{. In my sample, there is thus}

also a clear bias towards university-level education. Besides, most of the people that I interviewed were politically active or at least politically conscious. Among them were scholars and students of different social sciences, political activists, politicians, journalists, and analysts at Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). These people try to make sense of social polarization in Turkey daily not only because they live through it, but also because they engage with the topic professionally. This fact makes it likely that their narratives on social polarization in Turkey differ from those of the general population in Turkey. However, just like other people in Turkey, these experts are also ultimately anchored in the mundane (Felski, 2000, p.16), whereby their stories do not contest the everyday focus of this study.

Besides the bias in level of education and expertise on the topic, there is also a bias in terms of lifestyles of respondents. Most of the respondents had a secular lifestyle rather than a conservative lifestyle6. Importantly, however, I was able to add several

Alevi and Kurdish voices, a LGBTQI-voice and a foreign voice to my sample. These narratives add to both the diversity and the representativeness of the study.

As mentioned, most of the interviews were conducted in English. Five of them, one of which was conducted with two respondents, were conducted in Turkish with the help of a translator. As people who speak English in Turkey are more likely to belong to the middle class and upper class rather than the lower classes, my data also seems to be skewed towards middle- and upper-class people. The language barrier also impeded optimal use of the research method of participant observation. I was not able to gather much data in public and private places, because I do not understand Turkish well enough to understand what people are talking about. This issue was partly solved by constantly asking my local contacts to translate any points of interest.

In all, the findings of my study are thus not generalizable to the wider population of Turkey İstanbul. However, the purpose of this research is to explore some of the different narratives that are present in Turkish society, rather than to draw generalizable conclusions from the data. Therefore, even though the sample of respondents does not reflect the diversity of Turkish society, the findings still highlight interesting points and trends that future research can further examine.

5_{Ahmet, interview, Sarıyer (İstanbul), 18 April 2017.}

6_{In the first section of the results chapter, these lifestyles and the difference between them are} characterized.

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3.2.3.2: Personal bias of the researcher

Besides issues with the representativeness of the study, my personal biases likely influence the findings of this study. Having studied in İstanbul for half a year in 2015, the topics that were studied for this research are close to my heart. Ever since I first arrived in İstanbul in January 2015, I have been studying topics related to Turkish politics and conflicts. For example, I took a course on Turkish politics, I did a research internship for one of my former professors on voting behavior of Turkish people residing in the Netherlands, I wrote my bachelor’s thesis on the conflict between the Turkish government and the PKK, and I wrote several papers on topics such as SER in Turkey, Turkey’s policy towards Syrian refugees, and the Kurdish question. Furthermore, I started learning the Turkish language over the summer of 2016. To a certain extent, I can thus contextualize the findings of this study.

Additionally, I still have friends and professors in Turkey that I am in touch with, who are all Erdoğan/AKP-critics. Naturally, their stories and experiences influence my own opinion on Turkish politics. Precisely because of this bias, however, I was eager to learn more from Erdoğan/AKP-supporters. Still, I expected some difficulties talking to them, as I assumed they would expect my opinions to be skewed towards the anti-Erdoğan/AKP side of the spectrum. Therefore, I emphasized my neutrality as a researcher and my wish to understand their side of the story at the beginning of each interview.

3.3: Analyzing the data: Discourse analysis

To analyze the data that I gathered, I employed the method of discourse analysis. The data that was gathered through semi-structured interviews and participant observation was first converted into text; the interviews were transcribed and the field notes were digitalized. These texts were then coded and analyzed through discourse analysis. This method allowed me to identify key themes in the stories people told me, which helped me answer my research question from their perspective. As discourse analysis “considers how language, both spoken and written, enacts social and cultural perspectives and identities”, this research method constituted a practical way for me to make sense of my data (Gee, 2011, p.i). Rather than taking a linguistic approach to discourse analysis, I employed the research method merely to look at the content of the language being used, and the themes being discussed (Gee, 2011, p.8). Having considered the research methodology of this thesis, let us delve into the results of the study.

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4: RESULTS

What do narratives from İstanbul about the polarization between Erdoğan/AKP-supporters and Erdoğan/AKP-critics in Turkey tell us about the potential for escalation of conflict in this country? Most of the interviewees observe and feel the social dimension of the current polarization in their daily lives. Intuitively, it seems logical for polarization on the political level to trickle down to the social level, as Turkish society’s “cultural, ethnic, and sectarian fault lines correspond to party constituencies” (International Crisis Group (ICG), 2016, p.ii). Turkish society is currently deeply polarized, with almost half the nation being deeply concerned about the President’s consolidation of power, and interpreting every government move in that context (ICG, 2016, p.20). At present, Murat (Member of Parliament for CHP, Erdoğan/AKP-critic) mentioned, “the citizens are

separated as pro-Erdoğan people and those who are against him”7_{. Whereas this division}

used to exist primarily in the political arena, it begins to trickle down to the social level too. Malcolm (foreign journalist and analyst residing in Turkey, Erdoğan/AKP-critic) recounted: “for most of the time I’ve been here, […] tensions [were present] between

enemies in society and the state security forces. What’s different now is there’s tensions among people in society”8_{. He gave a striking example of how he observed these tensions}

straight after the 15 July 2016 attempted coup9_{. For three months after the coup,}

Erdoğan/AKP-supporters were driving around in Malcolm’s secular neighborhood in the evenings:

“They stopped with the red lights and they got out of their cars, and were shouting

‘Allahu Akbar’ […]. And slightly opposite where I live, there’s a place where they have wedding receptions. And they serve alcohol, they have singing music […], it’s a very secular venue. And on one night, […] it was about […] twelve o’clock, and people were leaving this wedding reception. So, you had all these women, all of them beautifully dressed, and then you had the menfolk, also wearing suits and ties, waiting for the valet to bring the car, […] and these people got out of their cars, and they shouted ‘Allahu Akbar’. At a distance of 5 meters. Which […] must have been absolutely terrifying.”10

7_{Murat, interview, Ataşehir (İstanbul), 27 April 2017.} 8_{Malcolm, interview, Kadıköy (İstanbul), 19 April 2017.} 9_Ibid.

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In the run-up to the referendum, furthermore, there were many reports of ‘No’-campaigners being attacked or otherwise obstructed in their work, either by government agents or by Erdoğan/AKP-supporters. Murat described how one of his friends got shot while advocating for ‘No’ prior to the referendum: “he was heavily injured and almost lost

his life. […] And we found the guilty men, but all of them are free now”11_{. These examples}

show that, at least for some people, the current polarization seems to have social dimensions next to political dimensions.

The purpose of this chapter is to describe and make sense of the main findings of this study. Particularly, it is argued that on a micro-level, polarization in Turkey plays out as an ‘Us’ versus ‘Them’ dynamic. In this dynamic, the two groups seem to be mostly divided in terms of lifestyles and worldviews. At one end, there are people with a secular lifestyle, who are mostly critical of President Erdoğan and his political party. At the other end, there are people with a more conservative lifestyle, who are mostly supportive of President Erdoğan and the AKP. Furthermore, this ‘Us’ versus ‘Them’ dynamic has a zero-sum character in the Turkish context. That is, the freedom in terms of lifestyle for the one group is perceived to be a limitation in this regard for the other group. This ‘Us’ versus ‘Them’ dynamic with its zero-sum character, combined with the low stability Turkey currently experiences, increases the potential for this polarization to escalate into further conflict.

4.1: ‘Us’ versus ‘Them’ dynamic

As mentioned, the current polarization in Turkey takes the shape of an ‘Us’ versus ‘Them’ dynamic on the social level. There are two poles, ‘Us’ and ‘Them’, with one extreme consisting of Erdoğan/AKP-supporters, and Erdoğan/AKP-critics at the other extreme. As such, there is a lot of social distance12_{between the constituencies of different}

parties (Erdoğan, 2016, p.1). A recent survey on the current polarization in Turkey indicated that 83 percent of the respondents did not want their daughter to marry someone voting for the party that they feel distant to (p.2). Furthermore, 78 percent rejected the idea of doing business with someone voting for the ‘Other’ party (p.2). 74 percent rejected the idea of his or her children playing with the children of someone who votes for the ‘Other’ party (Erdoğan, 2016, p.2). These examples show that also on the social level, polarization along political party lines is present.

11_{Murat, interview, Ataşehir (İstanbul), 27 April 2017.}

12_{Social distance is a concept that measures the degree to which members of different social} groups are willing to cooperate with each other (Erdogan, 2016, p.1-2).

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21 At the core of the ‘Us’ versus ‘Them’ dynamic in Turkey seems to be a difference in lifestyles and worldviews. That is, Erdoğan/AKP-supporters mostly seem to have a conservative lifestyle, Erdoğan/AKP-critics mostly seem to have secular lifestyles. The polarization of Turkish society along secular-conservative lines was not only emphasized by the respondents, but also in previous research on polarization in Turkey. As Aydın-Düzgit and Balta (2017) write, Turkish politics and society are “increasingly divided into two value camps; cultural conservatives with a religious view of morality and cultural progressives with a secular view” (p.6). Kadir Has University’s survey on socio-political trends in Turkey further indicated that 47.6 percent of Turkey’s population think the current polarization in their country is driven by the secular-conservative divide (cited in Aydın-Düzgit & Balta, 2017, p.5).

This section first briefly characterizes both the conservative and the secular lifestyle. Afterwards, evidence of this ‘Us’ versus ‘Them’ dynamic is discussed, particularly considering the negative characterizations of the ‘Other’ which are employed by both parties in conflict. Lastly, the core of the ‘Us’ versus ‘Them’ dynamic in Turkey is further analyzed by considering the difference in lifestyles and worldviews in depth.

4.1.1: Seculars and conservatives: A characterization of the two groups

The difference between the secular and conservative lifestyle was emphasized by many interviewees as being at the center of the current polarization. Doruk (university employee, Erdoğan/AKP-supporter), for example, described, “there is a part

of society who desires to live in a Western lifestyle, another part of society […] wants to keep the old way”13_{. Enver (political scientist and activist, Erdoğan/AKP-critic) further}

mentioned that a significant portion of “the anti-Erdoğan society in Turkey […] can be

defined as secular”14_{. Gökhan (professor in engineering and socio-politically active,}

Erdoğan/AKP-critic) had similar views, saying the people “who really dislike [President

Erdoğan] are mostly seculars”15_{. Before arguing that a difference in lifestyles is at the core}

of the ‘Us’ versus ‘Them’ dynamic in Turkey, let us briefly characterize both the secular and the conservative lifestyle.

Seculars in Turkey are mostly liberal urban dwellers of higher socio-economic status and education (Çarkoğlu & Toprak, 2007, p.14; Aydın-Düzgit & Balta, 2017, p.6).

13_{Doruk, interview, Küçükçekmece (İstanbul), 2 May 2017.} 14_{Enver, interview, Beyoğlu (İstanbul), 13 April 2017.} 15_{Gökhan, interview, Beşiktaş (İstanbul), 4 May 2017.}

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According to Gökhan, they “would like to stay in a country [which] Atatürk created, in his

values”16_{. As such, Betül said, seculars are more progressive rather than conservative}17_.

In accordance with the views of many respondents, the secular lifestyle can furthermore be viewed as a non-Muslim way of life (Göle, 1997, p.48). That is, seculars in Turkey are less likely to practice their religion. This does not mean, however, that these people are not religious. As Can (scholar of new media and activism, Erdoğan/AKP-critic) said, “most of the population would describe themselves as Muslim”18_{. Fuat (researcher/analyst}

at a large NGO, Erdoğan/AKP-critic) further clarified this point, explaining that people with a secular background were also brought up “in a Sunni, Islamic tradition, culture. So,

you know the code, you know how to behave in certain situations, you just don’t practice it. […] These cultural codes are also there for the secularists”19_{. Seculars, however, tend to}

feel less bound by the Sunni religious belief system (Çarkoğlu & Toprak, 2007, p.14). Among seculars, furthermore, there are many Alevis. “Their religious rules”, Gökhan said, “are not as strong as the Sunni’s”20. According to Gökhan, the sectarian

division is at the root of the difference in lifestyles and worldviews in Turkey. He said, “they don’t even get married with each other, Alevi’s and Sunni’s”21_{. Further evidence of}

this claim, Gökhan explained, can be found in the voting behavior of the Kurds. There are Kurds opposing President Erdoğan and the AKP and there are Kurds supporting these political actors, so in that sense there does not seem to be an alignment of this ethnic cleavage in terms of political preferences. When we look at Kurdish voting behavior more closely, however, we see that “most of the Sunni [Kurds] are voting for AKP, and all of the

Alevi [Kurds] are voting for HDP”22_{. So, according to Gökhan, the secular-conservative}

divide also has sectarian elements23_.

Having briefly considered the secular lifestyle in Turkey, let us discuss the conservative lifestyle in more detail. According to Hakan (previously politically active shop owner, Erdoğan/AKP-critic), conservatives in Turkey attach more importance to “their Islamic background”24_{. They are more traditional and religiously devout than}

seculars, and are more likely to have a lower socio-economic status and education

16_Ibid.

17_{Betül, interview, Beşiktaş (İstanbul), 4 May 2017.} 18_{Can, interview, Kadıköy (İstanbul), 7 April 2017.} 19_{Fuat, interview, Beyoğlu (İstanbul), 3 May 2017.} 20_{Gökhan, interview, Beşiktaş (İstanbul), 4 May 2017.} 21_Ibid.

22_Ibid. 23_Ibid.

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23 (Çarkoğlu & Toprak, 2007, p.14; Ezikoglu, 2017). As they are more likely to practice their religion, Selim (political scientist, Erdoğan/AKP-critic) told, many of them would also prefer “their children to go through […] religious education”25_{. However, just as we cannot}

claim that someone that has a secular lifestyle is not religious, we can also not assert that someone with a conservative lifestyle is not secular. As Fuat explained, most conservatives “would say that they prefer a secular state system, […] where the state does

not interfere with any of their religious practices. […] But they don’t want a secular lifestyle. They want to practice their religion”26_{. As such, the process of secularization in Turkey}

shaped the identities and practices of conservative people too (Göle, 1997, p.48). Whereas it is possible to characterize seculars and conservatives in Turkey to some extent, it is important to mention that these groups are by no means monolithic. The 2013 Gezi park protests, for example, show the diversity of the anti-Erdoğan camp, which included “environmentalists, soccer fans, Kurds, secular nationalists, and even some leftist Islamists” (Adalet, Over, Ozgode & Salihoglu, 2013). Can further illustrated the diversity among conservatives, saying:

“Conservatism in rural areas and conservatism in the urban cities are two very

distinct entities. From the way people dress, to the way they practice their religious rituals […]. So, if you just draw a big line between the secular and the religious, then you would be essentially putting these two groups on the same camp, but probably they would have less to share with each other than maybe a religious urban dweller and a secular urban dweller.”27

As Göle (1997) wrote, new hybridizations between tradition and modernity, religion and secularism, community and religion have been created, which makes it difficult and problematic to put certain labels on people (p.54). However, as Ahmet pointed out, “all categorizations are wrong, because reality is more complex, but they can

still be useful”28_{. So, keeping in mind that there is no stark division of Turkish society into}

two monolithic blocks in terms of lifestyles, discussing general trends and characteristics that can be observed between Erdoğan/AKP-critics and Erdoğan/AKP-supporters can still be useful in trying to understand the social polarization that currently seems to be present in Turkish society. As Aydın-Düzgit and Balta (2017) wrote, the divergence in cultural value systems that the difference in lifestyles reflects provides a rich ground for

25_{Selim, interview, Kadıköy (İstanbul), 28 April 2017.} 26_{Fuat, interview, Beyoğlu (İstanbul), 3 May 2017.} 27_{Can, interview, Kadıköy (İstanbul), 7 April 2017.} 28_{Ahmet, interview, Sarıyer (İstanbul), 18 April 2017.}

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polarization to flourish (p.6). Having characterized both the secular and the conservative lifestyle, let us discuss the ‘Us’ versus ‘Them’ dynamic that seems to be present in Turkish society.

4.1.2: Evidence of the ‘Us’ versus ‘Them’ dynamic in Turkey

The purpose of this section is to show that social polarization seems to be present in Turkey in the form of an ‘Us’ versus ‘Them’ dynamic. To achieve this, the negative characterizations of the ‘Other’, which are employed by both groups in conflict, are discussed. Afterwards, it is noted that although social polarization seems to manifest as an ‘Us’ versus ‘Them’ dynamic in Turkey, real clashes between Erdoğan/AKP-supporters and Erdoğan/AKP-critics have only been incidental.

4.1.2.1: Negative characterizations

Exemplary of the ‘Us’ versus ‘Them’ dynamic in the Turkish context are the characterizations employed; the ways in which the two groups frame the ‘Other’ group (Wondolleck, Gray & Bryan, 2003, p.209). In the current context of polarization, there is much prejudice whereby ‘Others’ are framed negatively. By judging such ‘Others’ critically, they are distinguished from the self (Wondolleck, Gray & Bryan, 2003, p.209). A recent survey on polarization in Turkey highlighted the prejudices of the respondents towards supporters of the opposing party (Erdoğan, 2016, p.2). The respondents were asked to associate a set of adjectives they commonly use with either the supporters of the party they feel close to, or the supporters of the party they feel distant from, or both, or neither (p.2). “An overwhelming majority”, Erdoğan (2016) writes, “associated positive attributes such as ‘patriot’, ‘honorable’, ‘open-minded’, ‘generous’, and ‘smart’ with the supporters of the party they feel close to, while they associated negative attributes such as ‘arrogant’, ‘hypocrite’, ‘bigot’, and ‘cruel’ with the supporters of the party they feel most distant to” (p.2). These negative characterizations, Fuat said, are “what’s creating the polarization”29_.

Various interviewees discussed the use of negative characterizations in Turkish society. Interestingly, many of them also employed these negative characterizations themselves. Let us first discuss how Erdoğan/AKP-supporters are negatively framed by people who are critical of the political actors. Afterwards, it is illustrated how

When part of ‘us’ becomes ‘them’ : assessing the potential for escalation of conflict in Turkey