State capacities and civil wars : do state capacities matter for the outbreak of civil wars?

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State Capacities

and Civil Wars

Do state capacities matter for the outbreak of civil

wars?

Rubar Ferhat Ilan

Student Number: 10279253

MSc International Relations

Research Project: The Political Economy of Conflict

30 September 2014

Supervisor: Prof.Dr. G.R.D. Underhill

Second reader: Prof. Dr. B.M. Burgoon

University of Amsterdam

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Abstract

This thesis presents research regarding the question: to what extent does state capacity play a role on the outbreak of civil wars. Through statistical analysis, it was tested whether there is a relation between state capacity and the outbreak of civil wars. Low state capacity can work as an opportunity but it may also work as evoker of grievances such as poverty because the state lacks in supporting the economy and society. The notion of state capacities is based on the

research of Hanson and Sigman (2013) and the three-dimensional state capacity model. The general state capacity measurement and the separated dimensions are being tested on the outbreak of civil wars. The role of collective identities and grievances in the relationship between state capacities and the onset of civil wars is also being tested .The findings of this research indicate that state

capacities do not have a significant effect on the onset of civil wars. State capacities do also not have a significant value in relationship to the onset of civil wars via economic grievances and the presence of fractionalized society.

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1 Introduction

Research shows that civil wars are more prominent in the world than international conflict. According to Blattman and Miguel (2010:3), almost a third of all the states in the world are confronted with internal conflicts that have death rates over a thousand during the conflict. Civil wars dominate the theater of war and therefore it has become a large part of the war literature. Examples of internal conflicts are the Syrian Civil War, the Chechen war in the Russian Federation and the insurgency of the Tamil Tigers. The literature on civil wars looks at different aspects of civil wars such as the incentives that may trigger a civil war. Do people rebel because of grievances or do they rebel because of certain economic benefits that rebellion offers (greed). By new insights made by Collier and Hoeffler (2002) and Fearon and Laitin (2001), it seems that it also important to look at the opportunity structure, rather than only the

motivational grievances for rebellion.

The literature on the start of civil wars is divided about what the main causes of civil wars are and under which conditions a civil war should erupt. Civil wars are the result of

violent acts by different organized groups within a country, but what creates the right condition to rebel? Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch (2011:478) claim that horizontal inequalities create grievances and that these grievances are crucial in explaining the incidence of civil wars. But Fearon and Laitin (2003) claim that the opportunity is of far greater importance, since certain grievances amongst group members are not enough to rebel. The right conditions to rebel are of more importance according to Fearon and Latin (2003). Collier and Hoeffler (2002) found that motivational factors such as grievances are of lesser importance for instances of conflict. The military or financial viability correlated with more instances of conflict. The ‘pro’s and cons’ are the driving forces of rebellions according to Collier and Hoeffler (2002). The viability and thus the opportunity or the constraints are of greater importance. But this raises different questions such as, are the capabilities of the state of

importance in order to act against rebels or implement policy to reduce the chance on civil war? By analyzing state capacities, such questions may be answered.

The state is still present in the current system, even with the rise of civil society and globalization. The instruments to support and guide society seem still present in the form of the ‘state’. While the literature on civil wars focused on different motives that may trigger civil conflict, such as ethnic fractionalization and levels of inequality, the political opportunity structure that affects potential rebels decision to fight seem can offer a better understanding of civil wars. Hendrix (2010:723) places state capacity at the center of the political opportunity structure since the decisions to rebel takes into account the government’s capacity for repression and accommodation. If the state is capable of repressing, then the likelihood of

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capture will be higher and rebellion will be less likely, If the state is capable of accommodating grievances via institutionalized channels, such as redistribution, the granting of autonomy rights, or the incorporation of dissident movements within the party system, then the motivation for violent rebellion will be lessened and conflict will be less likely according to Hendrix (2010:273). We see that Hendrix (2010) gave a double role to the capacities of the state for the start of civil wars. The state may create opportunities to rebel because of the lack of capacities, but the state may also give shape to grievances which works as a strong motive to rebel. Strong motives and good opportunities should work as a lethal cocktail for civil conflict. The role of the capacities of the state may give therefore another view in explaining the onset of civil wars. As previous literature (Fearon and Laitin, 2001) did give importance to state

capacity, it was not further developed. Hendrix (2010) developed a more proper model in explaining civil wars through state capacities but made different choices in operationalizing state capacity. By using the data of Hanson and Sigman (2013), this should give a deeper understanding of state capacities and explain the interaction between state capacity and civil wars more clearly. Therefore his thesis will be asking: to what extent do state capacities

influence the outbreak of a civil war? The research question is going to be answerd by

analyzing a two dimensional model. On the one hand, the lack of state capacties may create power vacuums within states and create therefore the right condition to rebel and on the other hand the lack of state capacities may contribute to growing grievances within society by not being able to provide a certain level of economic wellbeing. This leads to the following hypotheses:

H1a - State’s with low levels of state capacities should create better opportunities to rebel since the constraints are low.

H1b – State’s with weaker coercive capacities should create better opportunities to rebel since constraints are low.

But since the state is theorized as the upholder of society and supporter/guider of the economy, it is also of importance to look at that aspect and how this interacts with grievances. State capacities are theorized as being essential for the implementation of policy (Hanson ans Sigman, 2003). But if the state lacks in such capacities, it should correspond to lesser control, guidance and support of society and the economy. This may give shape to grievances such. The literature (Fearon and Laitin ,2003., Thies, 2007) did find a significant relationship between income levels and the outbreak of civil wars. But market failure and inequality may also be present when the state is not able to act. Thus when there is a lack of state capacities, this would lead to low levels of per capita income and more economic inequality and therefore higher risks on the outbreak of civil conflict. But such grievances should not be sufficient in order to successfully rebel and start a civil war. Following the reasoning of Gurr (1993) and Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug

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(2013), group mobilization is evenly important if the economic grievances should be used as grievances for an uprising. Group identification results in more coherent movements and may help in consolidating a successful rebellion. As the literature claims, individual grievances are not enough to rebel but if grievances are group based, then this should result in more action. But the bad economic wellbeing is not necessarily group focused, but poverty and economic inequality may increase societal cleavages since individuals may rely more on their kind and their ethnic community due to the already established societal network. Following this logic, the risk on the outbreak of a civil war should be higher if there are grievances such as poverty and economic inequality in more fractionalized states. Thus, due to the lack of state capacities, economic

grievances should occur and therefore there should be a higher risk on the outbreak of civil wars if societies are more fractionalized. This gives shape to the hypothesis:

H2a - State’s with low levels of state capacities are less able to penetrate society and control and support the economy and therefore poverty and economic inequality should occur more and increase the chance of the onset of civil wars.

H2b – State’s with low levels of state capacities and who are more ethnic and religious fractionalized, are more prone to the outbreak of civil wars due to the increasing social tension due to increasing levels of poverty and economic inequality.

H2c – The administrative capacities of a state are of more importance for upholding the economy and penetrating society, in order to see the risk on the outbreak of civil wars.

The purpose of this study is to establish whether state capacity decreases the probability of the onset of civil wars. It will be tested whether there is a relation between state capacity and the civil war outbreak and if there is a relationship between economic grievances and civil war outbreak. This is being tested with different control variables in order to give a deeper

understanding of this topic. This research is of importance since state capacity is a research topic that is still in development and this research can contribute to the field with the use of the new dataset of Hanson and Sigman (2013). By analyzing the role of state capacity, this may help in policy decisions on whether to invest or not to invest in the capacities of the state. In order to implement policy, the politicians are dependent on a strong bureaucracy, repression forces and extractive capabilities and therefore this dissertation may contribute on broadening the view on state capacities and its role within society.

The upcoming chapter will discuss and review the contributions of other researchers to this field. The third chapter will focus on the theoretical framework and the different

hypotheses regarding the connection between state capacity and the outbreak of civil wars. The variables and their interaction will be discussed further in the fourth chapter. Chapter four will

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describe sources of data and quantitative methodology. Chapter five presents results, and chapter six provides the conclusion. Ultimately, this study finds that there is no significant evidence that state capacities, as measured by its administrative, coercive and extractive capacities, is associated with higher risks of the outbreak of a civil war or that state capacities increase the risk of the outbreak of a civil war via economic grievances.

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2 The Literature

This chapter will consider different subsets of literature on the causes of civil wars and state capacity. The first section of this literature review will look at research that is done on the causes of civil wars and will highlight the importance of the variable state capacity within the debate. The second section of this literature review will review the relevant previous

scholarship related to the position of state capacities in the analysis of civil wars.

Causes of Civil Wars

Large N studies of researchers such as Collier and Hoeffler (2002) and Fearon and Laitin (2001) tried to answer the question, what are the factors that determine civil wars. Collier and Hoeffler (2002) developed a ‘greed-grievance’ model in which greed is formulated as the argument that rebels are motivated by the desire to enhance their financial situation and grievances are formulated as issues related to group identities and the hardship that certain social groups have endured. Fearon and Laitin (2001) state that the risk of civil war can be explained by the conditions that favor rebellion and not the ethnic or religious fractionalization of a country. But on the other side of the debate, researchers such as Gurr (1993) and Reynal-Querol (2002) focus on the political issues that influence the incidence to insurgent behavior. Gurr (1993:166-167) has the theoretical assumption that protests and rebellion by communal groups are jointly motivated by deep-seated grievances about group status and by the pursuit of certain political interests. This is the start for mobilization according to Gurr and can be

interpreted as the ‘glue’ that holds on the individual agents within protest and insurgent movements(1993). Gurr (1993) finds political mobilization of great importance in order to understand communal protest. But the question is, how should such a communal group mobilize and by which means is this possible? Certain political entrepreneurs are needed to articulate certain grievances but one might even say that their needs to be in the first place awareness amongst the group members. As Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug (2013:37-38) make the notion that communal protest based on certain grievances start with the idea of a communal group. The discussion that analyzes civil war is focused on the probability of civil conflict. Do underlying motivations matter or are economic benefits the cause of civil conflict. The motivation of a group may be seen as crucial in maintaining group coherence and thus rebelling successfully. But as Fearon and Laitin (2003) found in their research that the opportunity seem to be of more importance. The right conditions foster rebellions as Collier and Hoeffler (2002) found in their research. Collier and Hoeffler (2002) gave shape to an interactive dynamic between ‘preferences for rebellion and ‘constraints on rebellion’. This dynamic on the causes of rebellion gave shape to the mechanism that is central to this thesis. The constraints on rebellion can be interpreted as constraints, such as: how to finance a

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rebellion or how to operate within a certain territory to create a strategic advantage. An

example of a strategic advantage is a mountainous area according to Fearon and Laitin (2002). Collier and Hoeffler (2002) state that, if there are strong preferences to rebel, there also should be strong constraints on rebelling. Collier and Hoeffler (2002) found that factors that increase the military or financial viability of rebellion correlated with more instances of conflict than factors leading to grievances. A constraint on rebellion may be the capacity of the state. Weak states that are not able to react against a rebellion create no constraints for rebellious

movements. Fearon and Laitin (2001) assume that insurgencies should be favored in countries with financially, organizationally and politically weak central governments. And therefore it is important to analyze the role of the state in rebellions since the capacities of the state may be a variable that can help in understanding the chance of civil conflict.

Collier and Hoeffler (2002) and Fearon and Laitin (2001) look at civil wars from an economic point of view. The assumption that materialistic gains are necessary to motivate individuals in order to participate in a civil war does not tell the whole story. Besides

materialistic objectives that an indiviual may have, non-materialistic objectives should matter unless non-materialistic objectives such as political or cultural rights.Feelings of discontent about a situation play also a crucial role in the civil war literature. The role of grievances are theorized by researchers such as Gurr (1993), Blattman and Miguel (2010), Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug (2013). The importance of grievances may not be dispatched from the civil war discussion even if the ‘ greed’ interpretation of Collier and Hoeffler (2002) and Fearon and Laitin (2001) tried to do so. One may even interpret the the ‘greed’ motivations of rebels as an expression of economic grievances such as poverty or economic inequality. Researchers such as Collier and Hoeffler (2002) and Fearon and Laitin (2001) look at the notion of civil wars without looking at the complexity that society offers. Blattman and Miguel (2010:18) take economic inequality as an example that shows that the unequal distribution of resources can generate material incentives for a reletively poor group to seize control of the state. Thus certain motivations can be interepreted as greed but also as a grievance. To solely focus on materialistic incentives for the analyzation of civil wars seems therefore incorrect. Collier and Hoeffler (2002) started from the assumption that materialistic gains are the main motive but gaining small economic benefits through war, while the risk of death is high, seems irrational. Are there no other ways to quickly gain economic benefits with lesser risks? And are the

individuals not aware of such options and are they not aware of the great risks that war brings? It is important to note that Fearon (2007) tried to answer the question, how small and lightly armed guerrilla groups, with little chance of capturing political power are fighting and are able to survive. If the rebels are after pure materialistic gains, would they not have thought about the risks of waging a war and their ability in truly capturing the state? The logic of Collier and Hoeffler (2002) and Fearon and Laitin (2001) seem a bit simplistic. But not only the logic of

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their argument is a bit simplistic, so is their choice of variables. Both researches use certain proxies for grievances and state strength that are not sufficient in explain the true notion of those variables. The lack of theorization causes partly the results of their research. An example is the choice of using the ethnic and religious fractionalization of the country as a proxy for grievances. The assumption is that ethnic and religious fractionalized states are more prone conflict but the mechanism is not clear since differences amongst the population are not

reasons for violent behaviour. The fractionalization of the population in different groups should matter if it would result in inequalities or perceived inequalities based on group identity. As Cramer (2002) critiques the conflict literature for its tendency to use reduced forms of empirical relationships without looking at the underlying relationships between economic, social, and psychological factors. By looking only at motivations that are based on ‘greed’ or the opportunity structure of rebellions, one may overlook the importance of group coherence in order to succesfully rebel. Since rebel groups are large, self-sustaining organizations,

understanding which ‘glue’ holds them together is of great importance. This shows again the complexity and diversity of the subject.

The literature on civil wars is divided on the motivations of individuals who partipcate in civil wars. Issues related to commitment problems and participation problems look at the indivual motivations. When and how are individuals motivated to participate and commit to a party in the civil war. Material incentives to motivate are given in many collective action models (Blattman and Miguel, 2010:14). Incentives such as wages, opportunities to loot, promises of future reward, or physical protection from harm but also that seizure of the state can give an solution for economic inequality (Blattman and Miguel, 2010:14). But this kind of reasoning sheds no differences between rebels and mercenaries. Another view on individual motives is given by researchers such as Gurr (1971), who claimed that men are quick to aspire beyond their social means and therefore quick to anger which leads to frustrations and might result to violent action. Blattman and Miguel (2010) relate these feelings to poverty, income inequality and unmet economic expectations and are better desribed as grievances. But how are feelings of relative deprivation or grievances related to violent behaviour? Individualistic feelings of grievances are not enough and group based grievances seem more likely to result in violent behaviour. In order to mobilize a group on feelings of deprivation, the group as a whole needs to have the perception that it is deprived. Government policy towards certain groups may help in establishing these kind of feelings but government failure of disability to penetrate society may contribute to the exclusion of certain groups by stronger groups within society.

Cederman, Weidman and Gleditsch (2011:478) look at the importance of political and economical grievances and how this relates to civil wars. The opportunity structure literature has overlooked the notion of grievances and focussed to much on logistical and power-related

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conditions such as low state-level, per capita income, weak state institutions and peripheral and inaccesible territory as explanation for the risk on civil wars according to Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch (2011:478). As mentioned earlier, the relative deprivation theory connected grievances with conflict and that collective violence was a reaction to frustrations stemming from unfulfilled aspirations. But this did not explain the linkage between

individualistic frustrations and group based violent action. Gurr (1993) began to study ethnic minorities and extended his theory towards the reactions of ethnic minorities towards state-imposed disadvantages and discrimination. Gurr found that ethnic grievances contribute to collective violence via ethnic mobilization. Blattman and Miguel (2010:27) explain that the costs of organizing a rebellion and collective actions are lower within ethnically homogenous groups and may be therefore work as an explanation for ethnic mobilization. Another

explanation has to do with inequalities that coincides with ethnic or other politically salient cleavages (Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch, 2011). Emotions do not automatically trigger violent behavior and under the right institutional circumstances, problems can be sought through peaceful means. Without resources and any form of organization, anger alone can do little to challenge powerful defenders of the status quo. The classical collective action problem of the free-rider problem show that collective action cannot be taken for granted, especially where the costs incurred by volunteering individuals may be be high (Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch, 2010:482). Armed conflict poses acute risks to members of rebel organizaitons and there is no guarantee that staying away from violence is safer, but collective action

theorists did find evidence that individuals are often more than willing to invest in costly punishment of free riders and norm violators (Cederman, Weidmann and Gledisch, 2011: 482., Blattman and Miguel, 2010:18). The notion of fairness and grievances are salient in individual decision making, and there is even lab evidence that individuals have a taste for punishing social norms violations and are willing to incur nontrivial private costs to do so (Blattman and Miguel, 2010:18). Fighting against injustice as a reason to rebel is able to work next to the ‘greed’ motives. Researchers such as Gates (2002) and Simpson and Macy (2004) showed that collective identities such as ethnic groups may facilitate collective action. Pre-existing social networks may provide organizational structure at the micro-level that can be used to overcome free-riding and result in collective action. This brings us to the notion of horizontal inequalities. Horizontal inequality theorists define horizontal inequalities as inequalities in economic, social or poltical dimensions or cultural status between culturally defined groups. The idea begins with ethnic groups that find themselves in radically different situations for various historical reasons. Where as some ethnic groups came out on top the geo-political game, other were conquered early on, and therefore lost out in the compettion for wealth and influence (Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch, 2011:480). The political dimension entails locked or limited access to central decision-making authority within the state. The economic dimension taps the distribution of wealth among households. The social dimensions measures groups’

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uneven social acces such as education and societal status. The cultural dimension captures group-level inequalities with repspect to cultural politics and symbols, including national holidays and religious rights (Blattman and Miguel, 2011: 480). The role of ethnic groups or other collective identities should contribute to overcoming the free-riders problem and helps in establishing an organization easier because of the existing network between members of the group. Following the ideas of Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch (2010:481), they argue that objective political and economic asymetries can be transformed into grievances through a process of group comparison driven by collective emotions and that such grievances trigger violenc collective action through a process of group mobilization. The link between horizontal inequalities and grievances are hard to make since grievances are intersubjectively perceived phenomena. Following the relative deprivation theory, the perception of the situation matters. Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch (2011:481) try to construct a plausible mechanims connecting structural asymmetries with collective violence. They claim that before grievances can be acted upon, they need to be cognitively linked to social identities through

self-categorization. The salience of ethnic distinctions varies over time and from case to case but once groups indentities become salient, members of the involved groups are prone to make social comparisons that hing on the distinction between in-group and out-group categories (Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditisch, 2011:481). Social comparisons and intergroup

evaluations are far from emotionally neutral and explain also the countless testimonies of the emotional escalation processes leading to the outreak of collective violence. Rational thinking and the calculative thinking process may have a less prominent place in the thoughts and perceptions of group members. The perception of injustice may work as a powerfull tool for mobilization and especially if the group network is already in place. Horizontal inequalities contribute to grievances amongst group members as theorized and help in further mobilization and violent action. As Emirbayer and Goldberg (2005) state that emtional ties and investments are a potential source of power in their own right alongside social-structural sources of power. The perception of injustice generates grievances that serve as a tool of recruitment. Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditisch (2011:482) follow this logic and see inequality not only as a

grievance factor but also as a source of mobilization. But perceived grievances are in one way or another caused by certain realities. Failure of the state may be the cause or delliberent policies of the government may be at the root of such grievances or the lack of capabilities to have a true grip on society, which may lead to certain inequalities based on group identities as Azam

(2001) and Murshed (2002) explain over the situation in African states.

The literature on civil war has looked at a variety of possible explanations for why governments and insurgents may resort to violence against one another. As mentioned earlier, some researchers highlight the role of grievances as underlying motives for insurgency or protests. Grievances rise from issues such as poverty or economic deprivation, ethnic exclusion,

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lack of political rights and civil liberties, or frustrated aspirations or a gap between the actual social and economic status of actors and their expectations (Gleditsch and Ruggeri, 2010). Other researchers emphasize conditions that can help in facilitating mobilization among potential insurgents, including the role of private benefits or incentives from conflict and the role of state strength in increasing the costs of protests and deterring potential insurgents from launching violent attacks. Gleditsch and Ruggeri (2010) look at at how democracy, state

strength and the notion of political opportunity structures can influence civil war and insurgent violence. Gleditsch and Ruggeri (2011:300) measure state strength through the changes of leadership and the likelihood that leaders will be vulnerable to challenges from contenders seeking political power or concessions. Their measurement of the political weakness of a country has shown that it has a negative effect on the risk on civil conflict. Gleditsch and Ruggeri (2011) work on the idea that dynamic changes in state weakness or political

opportunities can encourage mobilization and thus increasing the risk on civil wars. Civil wars do not originate in a vacuum and potential insurgents are likely to consider their anticipated prospects of achieving something by resort to violence thus one would expect weaker states to be more likely to become targeted, either because the insurgents have an opportunity to seize political power directly through toppling the government, or because weaker governments that are vulnerable to challenges from other competitors will be more likely to offer some form of accommodation to insurgents (Gleditsch and Ruggeri,2011: 301). Gleditsch and Ruggeri (2011) contribute to the opportunity structure literature by looking at the political weakness of a state. Political weakness or changes do influence the strength of the state because there is no

government to effectively respond to insurgents but political instability would then create not only for insurgents a chance but also other societal forces or the military. Coups should be more prone in countries with a higher change of leadership. Or should the toppling of the government be more prone if there are some societal issues created or caused by the state or the lack of state involvement? So this does not tell us everything about state strength and its relationship with the outbreak of civil conflict. State strength can also be measured through the ability to react and this will contribute to the civil war literature.

Another part of the scientific discussion on the onset of civil wars focusses on regime type and regime instability. The literature that analyzes the relationship between regime type and civil war shows an interesting relationship but fails in finding a true relationship between regime type and civil war. They theorize that institutionally consistent democracies and

authoritarian states experience fewer civil wars than intermediate regimes (semi-democracies) (Hegre et al., 2001:33). The logic behind this is that semi-democracies are partly open yet somewhat repressive which should invite protests, rebellion and other forms of civil violence since repression should lead to grievances that induce groups to take action, and openness allows them to organize and engage in activities against the regime (Hegre et al., 2001:33). But

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Fjelde and De Soysa (2009: 6) correctly state that many researchers have used regime type to measure state capacity and found that semi-democratic regimes correlate with the highest risk of conflict, apparently because they combine inadequate capacity for repression with

insufficient ability to accommodate opposition through institutionalized channels. Regime type may be a correct explanatory factor for the outbreak of civil conflict but the capacities may in the end count since Fearon and Laitin (2001) concluded that the opportunity to rebel is of more importance than the grievances that are evoked by regimes. State capacities may be able to explain the inadequate capacity for repression and the insufficient ability to create or uphold institutionalized channels. The lack of capabilities, such as a decent bureaucratic force or not enough tax revenues to accommodate such a state system may give a clearer explanation why semi-democracies have a higher risk for civil war.

The literature that looks at the relationship between the state and civil wars overlap in stating that the ‘state’ and civil society are crucial in understanding why state capacities are of importance in explaining civil war. The literature (Milliken and Krause, 2002., Hendrix, 2010) tries to explain the role of the state in a ‘karma’ like fashion. If the state does not offer the right politico-legal framework for economic growth and development, than their citizens would feel less connected to the state and may demand certain ‘rights’ or ‘entitlements’ from the state. This may lead to protests and with the right conditions for a toxic cocktail; it may even lead to a violent insurgency. The failure of the state to offer can have multiple causes. One is that the state deliberately refuses, even if it possesses the capacity to uphold society. This may lead to a rebellious expression of grievances but if the state possesses enough force, than a rebellion would be less likely to succeed. Another alternative is that the state does not have the capacity and capabilities to uphold society and society will therefore react by organizing in groups with the aim to take power at the center or in a region, in order to change government policies. The capacity of the state works therefore as a dual mechanism. It may create opportunities to rebel but also enforces grievances, which may help in mobilizing for a rebellion.

Fearon and Laitin (2001: 27) concluded in their research that the prevalence of internal war in the 1990’s is for the most part the result of a steady accumulation of protracted conflicts since the 1950’s rather than a sudden change associated with a new, post-Cold War

international system. Decolonization from the 1940’s through the 1970’s gave birth to a large number of financially, bureaucratically, and militarily weak states. These states have been at risk for civil violence, almost entirely in the form of insurgency, or rural guerrilla warfare according to Fearon and Laitin (2001:27). Fearon and Laitin (2001:28) also found that the conditions that favor insurgency are in particular poverty, since it favors rebel recruitment. Fearon and Laitin (2001) confirm the importance of the state within the debate on civil wars

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and therefore it is of importance to analyze the role of the capacities of the state on the onset of civil wars.

The literature that looks at the causes of civil wars is divided. Collier and Hoeffler (2002) look at the constraints and analyze civil wars through economic benefits. Fearon and Laitin (2001, 2003) find that the opportunity to rebel is in the end the most significant predictor for the outbreak of civil conflict. This does not diminish the role of group identities but it shows that the strategic advantages are of more importance. Grievances and strategic advantages such culminate in a lethal cocktail for civil wars. A determinant for civil conflict that may contribute to the research on the outbreak of civil wars is state capacity since Fearon and Laitin (2001) found it an important determinant for civil conflict. Therefore the next section will continue to analyze the literature on the state, the state capacities and the relationship with outbreaks of civil wars.

The State and State Capacity

This section will try to establish an overview on the literature that focusses on the state, the capacities of the state and the importance of the role of state capacities in the debate on civil wars. The main question that is central in this section is: what is the importance of the state and why is it of importance in relationship to the outbreak of civil wars.

Earlier research has looked at societal causes and political-economic causes of civil war, but why should state capacity matter for the incidence of civil war? The modern nation state is interpreted as the center of decision-making and regulation (Evans, 1995). The state creates the framework that regulates and supports the economy; the state tries to exert the rule of the law and should be there to increase or to uphold the welfare of its inhabitants. The capacity to regulate and support the economy and the state’s legal and fiscal abilities create a foundation for successful state policy (Besley and Persson, 2010: 1). Since the state regulates, controls and supports the economy, the state is crucial in understanding the political economy of conflict. But the state may also be of great importance for society and certain societal relations. The infrastructure of a state is defined through its capacities and these capacities are important determinants for civil war according to Fearon and Laitin (2003). As Fjelde and De Soysa (2009:6) formulate that a state’s inability to penetrate society and regulate social interaction reduces the cost of insurgency for would-be rebels, and that weak states are poor at

counterinsurgency. So weak state capacities can be interpreted as a cause for the onset of civil war since it helps in reducing the constraints on rebels.The failure of state control, support and guidance can be seen as an opportunity to rebel according to Fearon and Laitin (2001) and Collier and Hoeffler (2002), since the opportunity is crucial in order to successfully rebel. But failure of the state to truly provide, uphold and support society may result in societal tensions

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between groups within society. As mentioned earlier, ethnic and religious fractionalized countries may be more prone to more societal cleavages if the state does not or is not able to provide. Collective identities contribute to stronger mobilization and people may organize based on kinship or ethnicity within society in order to get certain security and economic stability if the state lacks in upholding and supporting society (Azam, 2001). Questions that are of importance for this dissertation are; what if the state lacks in capabilities. What effect should this have on the opportunity to rebel? And what effect should this have on society and the risk of the outbreak of violent behavior and civil wars?

The state and its capacities and capabilities are part of a larger debate in which different interpretations give shape to the understanding of the state. The clearest definition of the state and which is largely accepted, is the definition that is given by Max Weber. Weber (1968) describes the state as a community that claims authority on legitimate use of force over a given territory. The monopoly on the legitimate use of force is a central attribute of the state. Weber (1968) also makes the notion that if there is an administrative staff that can uphold the use of force in the enforcement of its order, this will contribute to the existence of the state. The administrative staff (bureaucracy) and the police/military become part of a larger

understanding of the state according to Weber (1968). Weber gives the state power an

autonomous position since politics is in the understanding of Weber; the sharing of state power between various groups and therefore political leaders become those who wield the state’s power. Researchers such as Theda Skocpol and Peter Evans place the state in a more autonomous position. Evans (1995) looks at the state as an autonomous power within the community. According to Evans (1995), the state is the center of power. Skocpol (1985) goes a step further and identifies agents within the state and assumes that these state actors are to an important degree autonomous. Within the state apparatus there seems to be a struggle of power and influence. Skocpol (1985) does conclude that in the end the states controls the means of force and is therefore able in creating autonomy from society and impose its own preferences on society. But the state is built up out of different political institutions and its ‘workforce’. In order to implement policies, the state is dependent on its repressive forces and its bureaucratic forces since they implement policy. Without revenues the state is also

powerless and therefore the taxation forces may play a role within the state. State power may be centralized in the political sphere but in order to implement policy it is dependent on these different forces. The next section will focus more on these instrumental parts of the state and how it is discussed in the literature

What are the instrumental parts of a state? Weber’s (1968) notion of a state is of great importance because he looks at the state and its attributes as instruments for power, namely the bureaucracy and police/military. The bureaucracy and the police/military become ‘The

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Machine’, that is the tool of politics in order to uphold order and to uphold society. Politicians may change, but the ‘Machine’ will remain. It is even assumable that whole regimes will change, but certain knowledge, social capital and state infrastructure should survive large changes. Weber’s (1968) focus on the bureaucracy and the police/military as central to the state is a good starting point. According to Tilly (1990) governments invest in revenue-raising

institutions. The bureaucracy and the repressive forces can be interpreted as part of the revenue-raising institutions. According to the literature (Besley and Persson, 2009, 2010) taxation is crucial in developing a ‘strong and developed’ state. The question is, how the government can effectively implement such policies. The focus is on how the state can be capable in regulating economic and social life. There is no focus on how the state ought to do, since every country has varying relationships with social groups and have different views on what the correct way on governance is. Hanson and Sigman (2013) give a clear understanding of what the basic components of the state are in order to carry out the functions that is seen required for contemporary states. Hanson and Sigman (2013) make a distinction between the extractive, coercive and administrative capacity as basic components of a state. The extractive capacity of the state is at its core, the capacity to raise revenue. Hanson and Sigman (2013:4) state that raising revenue is a critical function of the state and it encompasses a particular set of capacities that are foundational to state power. States must have the wherewithal to reach their populations, collect and manage information, possess trustworthy agents to manage the

revenue, and ensure popular compliance with tax policy according to Hanson and Sigman (2013:4). Hanson and Sigman describe the coercive capacity as the state’s ability to preserve its borders, protect against external threats, maintain internal order, and enforce policy (2013:4). This relates to the notion of the state according to Weber (1968) in which the state possesses the monopoly on the legitimate use of force within its territory. Hanson and Sigman (2013:4) do acknowledge that coercion is not the only way in maintaining order and evoke compliance from the population but it represents a key aspect of the ability of states to survive and implement policies. The administrative capacity is a broader dimension that includes the ability to develop policy, the ability to produce and deliver public goods and services, and the ability to regulate commercial activity (Hanson and Sigman, 2013:4). Following the Weberian tradition, the importance of autonomous and professional bureaucracies that legitimize the authority of the state, manage complex affairs, and ensure efficiency, including the control of corruption are necessary for a state (Hanson and Sigman, 2013:4). These three components of a state are hard to look at apart from each other since they intertwine but they still give shape to the basic tools of a state. The three dimensions of state capacity are essential to each other in order to contribute to the abilities of the government. Hanson and Sigman (2013:3) developed these dimensions further in such a way that it focuses on the core functions of the state and avoids conflation with other concepts in interests. Their theory of Hanson and Sigman (2013) is based on the theorized ‘infrastructural capacity’ of Michael Mann. Mann (1984:113) looked at

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the state with its infrastructural capacity. Mann (1984) saw this as the capacity to penetrate civil society and to implement political decisions. Hanson (2012:6) states that the notion of infrastructural capacity has two key elements, namely the authority the state has within its territory which is the capacity to maintain order and enforce the law and the administrative capacity to develop, fund, and carry out policies. Hanson and Sigman (2013:2) continue this minimalist approach and state that state capacity is the ability of state institutions to effectively implement official goals. As Fukuyama (2004) states that government’s policy choices are different from the ability to truly implement these policies. This is in line with Evans (1992) who claimed that weak states are not able to provide the basic requirements of a modern economy. The ability to act is necessary for economic activity, economic growth, security, public good provisions and the rule of law. If the government does not posses capacities to implement policy, it will have an impact on society. The implementation of policy, stability, infrastructure and public services are crucial for a state to prosper and in order to do so, the government needs to have the ability to implement such policy.

The main problem of defining and operationalizing state capacities, is trying to grasp the different aspects of the state. Researchers like Fearon and Laitin (2003) try to

operationalize state capacity with GDP per capita but they do not offer direct evidence on why state capacity should be measured trough the general proxy of GDP per capita. GDP per capita may give answers on certain state income, but not how it is spend. The general finding on the economic wellbeing of its citizens does not reflect the strength of the state apparatus. It is assumable that wealthier states have a more developed state apparatus but authoritarian states, which are not necessarily wealthy, have also a strong developed state apparatus in order to stay in control. The best example is North Korea, where poverty levels are high but the state is effectively organized with the necessary coercive forces. Thus GDP per capita is not able to represent state capacities and it seems that it should be used as a measurement of the economic wellbeing of the citizens. Another issue is that state capacity is not a single subject. It has

different dimensions such as the coercive, administrative and extractive dimensions and GDP per capita should therefore not be representative for the whole spectrum of state capacities. Fjelde and De Soysa (2009:8) conceptualize state capacities predominantly in one dimension, the extractive dimension. By focusing on the extractive capacities of the state, and less on the other dimension of the state capacities, they are less able to show a complete picture on the interaction between state capacities and civil wars. Hanson and Sigman (2013) seem to be a step further in developing an operationalized variable on state capacity. By including the different dimension of state capacity and by using multiple datasets on the coercive, administrative and extractive capabilities of the state, they are closer in operationalizing a general combined measurement that is purely focused on the state’s infrastructural power. They avoid concepts such as good governance, institutional quality since they represent and

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relate to the political organization of decision-making processes. They want to know to which extent states are capable of implementing policies, separately from how policy priorities are chosen and the extent of citizen control over elites.

The literature on state capacity and the onset of civil wars is not very broadly debated since the scholarly world does not agree on how state capacity should be defined and where to start. Some literature (Thies, 2005, 2007., Lieberman, 2002) on state capacity and civil war is predominantly focused on the fiscal sociological approach in order to measure state capacity. Lieberman (2002) tries to encompass the state capacities in to one dimension of the state, its extractive capacities. But the organizational and coercive capacities are equally important. Without revenues, the state’s bureaucracy may not able to work but without any organizational power and coercive strength, the extractive capacities should not be really present. Thies (2005:463) concludes that in Latin America, civil wars did reduce the state’s extractive

capabilities and reducing the state’s power. But this does not tell us about the initial strength of the state and its capacities and the onset of civil war. The onset of civil wars may be explained by the initial strength and even decrease the strength during and after the conflict. In another article, Thies (2007) made measurements of state capacity that focus on what Hanson and Sigman (2013) try to avoid, namely good governance and the decision making process. Thies (2007) his research therefore does not look at the capabilities to implement policies but tries to include policy choices in their model by looking at government expenditure and relative

political capacity.

The three dimensions, as theorized by Hanson and Sigman (2013), are hard to entangle from each other but this shows only the great importance of it. The three dimensions are the ‘infrastructure’ of the government. They can be interpreted as the ‘working tool’ of the

government as explained earlier. The three dimensions are interrelated and mutually support each other. Extractive and coercive capacities are likely prerequisites for higher levels of administrative capacity but a high level of extractive capacity requires at least some level of administrative capacity. Coercive capacity requires revenues and administrative reach into society (Hanson and Sigman, 2013:5). These dimensions carry each other in order for the government to implement policy. But the dimensions do have their each importance and that’s why it is also important to analyze their role individually in relationship with the onset of civil wars since they have different functions for society. The coercive capacity relates directly to the states ability to preserve its borders, protect against external threats, maintain order and enforce policy. This means that high coercive capacity should increase constraints on rebellious groups since the state does posses the ability to act. But as mentioned earlier, the coercive capacity is nothing without the extractive and administrative capacities since they support the coercive capacities of the state by helping in the shape of organizing its force and having

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funding’s to do so. In this mind thought, the opportunities for rebels grow and constraints decrease with weaker state capacities. But weaker state capacities may also have an impact on grievances since civil wars are not without a reason. The ‘greed’ model that is developed by Collier and Hoeffler (2002) criminalizes every form of civil disobedience without looking further at motivations. Thus by rejecting these assumptions, we come to the point that

grievances and group mobilization theories do matter. If the state fails in providing, grievances are expected to grow amongst the population. The state is theorized by having the ability to support and uphold society and also the economy. If the government fails to do so, it will have an effect on society. Murshed (2002) and Azam (2001) show that economic factors are of importance in the start of civil wars. State failure in providing security and a minimal level of public goods, helps in relying more on kin and less on the state and this helps in enforcing social cleavages in fractionalized states which may culminate in conflict. Here we see two elements that are important in analyzing the role of the state for the establishment of

grievances. First of all, the economic deprived living standards and second, the societal impact that it may have on fractionalized societies if people need to rely on their kin or ethnic groups in order to uphold their living standards. Azam (2001) did found that low levels of public good provision have a negative effect on the occurrence of violent political events. This may be interpreted as the lack of will within the government to provide, but also as the lack of capabilities to provide. The lack of capabilities to implement public good provision may culminate in more grievances amongst the population. This would not immediately mean that civilians will act with violent behavior, but protests will grow. If society is ‘forced to be

organized’, based on different group identities, this may contribute to more social cleavages. Azam (2001) claims that excluded or discriminated groups are more prone to act in order to get what they ought to search for. Under the right conditions this will culminate in violent protests. If the state lacks in capacities to act, if there is the geographic terrain to operate in guerrilla warfare ways, financial means to uphold a rebellious movement, this will all contribute to the risk on the outbreak of civil conflict. Thus the lack of state capacities to act may create an opportunity to rebel, but the lack of capacities may also culminate in the failure of the state to provide for its citizens. The assumption is that a state that lacks the administrative capacities and extractive capacities, will be lesser able to act in necessary. Poverty may be the result of low state capacities and economic inequality may grow if the state is not able to react on market failure (Krueger, 1990:1). Krueger (1990) gives the example of government decisions made in the 1970’s and 1980’s, where developing states made wrong policy choices and this resulted in economic downturn. The centrality of the government remains important in analyzing the economy. The failure of policy resulted in economic downturn. Following this logic, we can assume that if the state does not posses the capacities to implement policy (good or bad), this may also result in economic downturn since the government does not posses the capabilities to act on market failures or other economic growth issues. The importance of the state in

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providing economic growth through ‘social overhead capital’ and infrastructure are crucial for economic development (Krueger, 1990). This shows that the will to act is not enough to do so, the ability to react on issues is also important in order to uphold the economy and society and therefore reducing or preventing the growth of grievances which may culminate in violent conflict if the right conditions are present.

Multiple researches have stressed the importance of the state involving the economy and development. The economists analyze the role of the state in relationship to conflict, by looking at the how the state protects and enforces property rights (Sandler, 2000). The idea is that failure of protecting and enforcing property rights can have profound consequences on economic activity and growth. Sandler (2000:723) claims that if people have to spend some of their resources guarding their possessions and the fruits of their labor, this will result in fewer resources for productive activities. Economists seem to see the state as the force that prevents anarchy and upholds the rule of law. If the state fails in reducing anarchy, upholding the security of its citizens and businesses, this will result in lesser incentives to produce since there is a lack of security. It is true that the state, helps in enforcing property rights but this is one aspect of the role of the state on the economy and is not applicable for non-liberal economies. Nafziger and Auvinen (2002) analyzed how economic decline, income inequality, pervasive rent-seeking by ruling elites, a reduced surplus to threaten the survival income of a large portion of the population, a weakening state and competition for control of mineral exports contribute to emergencies that result in human-made crises in which large numbers of people die from war and state violence. According to Nafziger and Auvinen (2002:153), economic regress and political decay brings relative deprivation or at least the perception by influential social groups that injustice is present due to growing discrepancies between what they expect and get. But how can the state seen as the starting point of grievances and opportunities to rebel? The role of the state is crucial in upholding the economy and society in explaining the risk on civil conflict. As Nafziger and Auvinen (2002:155) explain that economic stagnation intensifies the need for economic adjustment and stabilization. Non-adjustment of the economy may lead to greater social damage since it may lead to poverty and economic inequality and these phenomena affect the feelings of relative deprivation and spurs social discontent, which contributes to the mobilization for collective violence. Especially if society is fractionalized and thus this may increase societal cleavages since people may organize based on their collective identity (Nafziger and Auvinen, 2002., Azam, 2001). But social discontent is also linked to the lack of public good provision next to poverty, economic inequality,

discrimination, political exclusion, human rights abuses or lack of political rights.

Discrimination, political exclusion and lack of political rights seem to be the result of policy choices and not necessarily the lack of the state and have therefore a less prominent place in this research. The lack of state capacities, the ability to penetrate society, contributes to social

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discontent. If the government wants to uphold society, wants to adjust the economy if

necessary, or if it wants to provide public good provision, it needs to have the right ‘machine’ to do so, namely the state apparatus as mentioned earlier. A government is paralyzed without a working bureaucracy, sufficient revenues and coercive forces in order to force changes on to society or establish the secure and safe conditions to contribute to society.

The literature on civil wars and state capacity is divided on how to interpret state

capacity. Therefore this dissertation tries to add more to the discussion by using the recent data of Hanson and Sigman (2013) on state capacities in relationship to the outbreak of civil wars. The data of Hanson and Sigman (2013) is chosen since it encompasses multiple dimensions of the state. The state cannot be reduced to just one dimension. Therefore by analyzing the outbreak of civil wars with the theorized distinction made by Hanson and Sigman (2013) and by using their data, this dissertation may add some insights on the subject. But since their data is a combined measurement, the use of other data that highlight the three dimensions will also be used to answer the research question. The lack of state capacities may help in decreasing constraints on rebels but the lack of state capacities may also result in societal grievances that contribute to the motivation to rebel. The lack of state capacities may be the cause of the perfect cocktail for civil wars since the state lacks in coercive forces in order to react, but the lack of state capacities may also be the cause of the rebellious movement if it lacks in providing economic stability, welfare, security and public goods for its citizens. The literature found that economic wellbeing indicators are the best correlated with the onset of civil conflict and therefore these indicators will be used in the analysis. The next section will discuss the theoretical framework and the hypotheses that are being tested.

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3 Theory & Hypotheses

In this section, the linkage between state capacity and civil wars will be theoretically developed. There are two types of mechanisms that will be tested in this dissertation. On the one hand, there is a causal mechanism that relates state capacity with a positive impact on the onset of civil wars. This mechanism focusses on the opportunity side of the discussion. This is a basic analysis of the ability of the state to implement policy and react with its coercive forces on violent behavior. The second mechanism looks at the causal mechanism that focuses on the role of state capacities on the establishment of economic grievances, through economic wellbeing indicators, and the impact on the onset of civil wars. The mediating role of the grievances may shed more light on the relationship between state capacity and the outbreak of civil wars. These mechanisms are being translated in the different hypotheses.

The literature review has shown that scholars disagree what motivates individuals to rebel and how they are able to do so. The ‘greed-grievances’ debate focuses on what matters in order to rebel. Do material gains matter or non-material objectives? Fearon and Laitin (2001) and Collier and Hoeffler (2002) conclude their research that the material gains and the strategic opportunity matters more than the perceived political and economic grievances in order to rebel successfully. The starting point of this dissertation is the claim that both matter for the risk on the outbreak of a civil war. In order to overcome the problems relating to mobilization and overcoming the free-riders problem, collective identities and ideologies combined with the grievances are crucial in order to mobilize and organize efficiently and thus increasing the risk on the outbreak of a civil war. The literature continues by analyzing how strategic advantages increases the risk on civil wars. The opportunity structure literature looks at strategic advantages for successful warfare but as grievances can also be viewed as part of the opportunity structure of civil conflict. Without grievances one ought to suspect that

mobilization will be harder if a common ideology is not present. But the question that needs to be answered is, how state capacities relate to such issues and thus the increasing the chance on the outbreak of a civil war. This dissertation will look at the relationship between state

capacities, the opportunity that it can create and how it can increase grievances, thus increasing the risk on civil wars.

The starting point of the theoretical framework is the central role of the state in society and how this relates to civil wars. As Fjelde and De Soysa (2009:6) formulate that a state’s inability to penetrate society and regulate social interaction reduces the cost of insurgency for would-be rebels, and that weak states are poor at counterinsurgency. So weak state capacity can be interpreted as a cause for the onset of civil war since it helps in reducing the constraints on rebels.The failure of state control, support and guidance can be seen as an opportunity to

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rebel according to Fearon and Laitin (2001, 2003) and Collier and Hoeffler (2002), since the opportunity is crucial in order to successfully rebel. But failure of the state to truly provide, uphold and support society may result in societal tensions between groups within society. As mentioned earlier, ethnic and religious fractionalized countries may be more prone to more social cleavages if the state does not or is not able to provide. Collective identities contribute to stronger mobilization and people may organize based on kinship or ethnicity within society in order to get certain security and economic stability if the state is not able to provide. Following the theoretical framework of Hanson and Sigman (2013), the ability to implement policy shows the strength of the state without looking at the political institutions. The lack of state capacities, the ability to penetrate society, contributes to social discontent. If the government wants to uphold society, wants to adjust the economy if necessary, or if it wants to provide public goods, it needs to have the right ‘machine’ to do so, namely the state apparatus. A government is paralyzed without a working bureaucracy, sufficient revenues and coercive forces. The ‘limbs’ of the government are the state capacities and without the state capacities it is assumed that social discontent may grow since the state is not able to provide for society(Fukuyama 2004., Hanson and Sigman, 2013., Hanson, 2012).

The inability of the state to penetrate society can be caused because it does not have the rights means to do so. Hanson and Sigman (2013) identified those means as the coercive, extractive and administrative dimensions. The state apparatus is compromised out of the coercive, extractive and administrative capacities. The instruments that a government possesses helps in implementing its policies, therefore the analysis of the state apparatus through its coercive, extractive and administrative abilities seem to be an important

explanatory for the start and the opportunity to rebel. As Fearon and Laitin (2001) claimed that weak states are more at risk of the outbreak of a civil war. But state capacities fulfill different roles in this dissertation. First of all, state capacities can be directly be linked to the risk on the outbreak of civil wars. Weak state capacities create lesser constraints on rebellious movements and thus create an opportunity to rebel. Following the opportunity structure logic, it is

assumable that the risk on the outbreak of civil conflict may be higher. Secondly, weak state capacities may contribute to the inability to penetrate society with consequences such as weak poverty and economic inequality. By analyzing the strength of the state apparatus, this

dissertation tries to highlight the importance of a well functioning state within the debate.

State Capacities

In order to answer the research question, there needs to be a coherent view on what state capacities are and what their roles are within society, in order to make the link the risk of the onset of civil wars. This dissertation looks at the state as the central institution within society. The state is interpreted as the center of decision-making and regulation (Evans, 1995). The

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state creates the framework that regulates and supports the economy; the state tries to exert the rule of the law and should be there to increase or to uphold the welfare of its inhabitants. The state imposes upon society but also interacts with it. Thinkers such as Hobbes brought us to subjects on security, stability and safety for people living in a certain territory. In order to live safe and secure in an otherwise anarchic system, we need to be ruled and governed. This way of reasoning about the state remains central in the debate. Max Weber theorized the state as a community that claims authority on legitimate use of force over a given territory (1968). Hobbes wanted safety and security against the ‘anarchic’ situation in which he lived. The state can provide security and safety but also economic stability. The modern state gives shape to the environment in which society lives. Without disregarding civil society, a well-developed state remains the organizational center of society. Trying to define the state is a hard and messy thing to do. From an economist perspective, the modern state provides the basic requirements of a modern economy: policy stability, enforcement of contracts, infrastructure, and public services (Hanson, 2012:6). But from the perspective a human rights activist, the state is there to protect its citizens. Mann theorizes the state as a differentiated set of institutions and personnel, embodying centrality, in the sense that political relations radiate outwards from a center to cover a territorially demarcated area over which it exercise a monopoly of

authoritative binding rule-making, backed up by a monopoly of the means of physical violence (1984:112). But in order to do this all, the state needs to be able to penetrate society, to secure its borders and to create stability. In order to do so, the state needs a ‘working force’ as mentioned in the literature review.

Weber (1968) makes the notion that if there is an administrative staff that can uphold the use of force in the enforcement of its order, this will contribute to the existence of the state. The administrative staff (bureaucracy) and the police/military become part of a larger

understanding of the state according to Weber (1968). Weber gives the state power an

autonomous position since politics is in the understanding of Weber; the sharing of state power between various groups and therefore political leaders become those who wield the power of the state. Hanson and Sigman (2013) give a clear understanding of what the basic components of the state are in order to carry out the functions that is required for contemporary states. Hanson and Sigman (2013) make a distinction between the extractive, coercive and

administrative capacity as basic components of a state. The extractive capacity of the state is at its core, the capacity to raise revenue. Hanson and Sigman (2013:4) state that raising revenue is a critical function of the state and it encompasses a particular set of capacities that are foundational to state power. States must have the wherewithal to reach their populations, collect and manage information, possess trustworthy agents to manage the revenue, and ensure popular compliance with tax policy. Hanson and Sigman describe the coercive capacity as the state’s ability to preserve its borders, protect against external threats, maintain internal order,

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and enforce policy (2013:4). This relates to the notion of the state according to Weber (1968) in which the state possesses the monopoly on the legitimate use of force within its territory. Hanson and Sigman (2013:4) do acknowledge that coercion is not the only way in maintaining order and evoke compliance from the population but it represents a key aspect of the ability of states to survive and implement policies. The administrative capacity is a broader dimension that includes the ability to develop policy, the ability to produce and deliver public goods and services, and the ability to regulate commercial activity (Hanson and Sigman, 2013:4). Following the Weberian tradition, the importance of autonomous and professional

bureaucracies that legitimize the authority of the state, manage complex affairs, and ensure efficiency, including the control of corruption, are necessary for a state (Hanson and Sigman, 2013:4). The importance of the three dimensions of state capacity lays in the interaction

between the three dimensions as mentioned in the literature review. In order to understand the mechanism between state capacities and the onset of civil wars, the capacities will be analyzed as a whole but also separately on the risk of the onset of civil wars. This is done in order to understand the mechanism between state capacities and the risk of civil war outbreak.

The assumption is that states with weaker capacities are more prone to the outbreak of civil wars. This understanding is mentioned through out the civil war literature but the logic and behind this mechanism is not further developed. Collier and Hoeffler (2003) make the notion that constraints on individuals are an important part of the analysis of civil wars. The ability to successfully rebel is determined through the ‘preferences for rebellion and constraints on rebellion (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002). Collier and Hoeffler (2002) gave shape to an

interactive dynamic between ‘preferences for rebellion’ and ‘constraints on rebellion’. Collier and Hoeffler (2002) found that factors that increase the military or financial viability of rebellion correlated with more instances of conflict than factors leading to grievances. State capacties can also seen a constraints on rebellions. If the state has the means to respond to violent behavior, it should therefore work as a constraint on the possible outbreak on violent. Following the logic of Collier and Hoeffler (2002), groups should think twice before they wage war if the state capacities are high since the state is able to surpress the rebellion. The

theoretical assumption that is based on the research of Collier and Hoeffler (2002) and Fearon and Laitin (2002), follows the logic that, low state capacities should create the right condition to rebel, the middle levels of state capacities should be slightly lower and high levels of state capacities should be the best in constraining conflict because of the means that they possess. Therefore the first hypotheses are:

H1a - State’s with low levels of state capacities should create better opportunities to rebel since the constraints are low.

State capacities and civil wars : do state capacities matter for the outbreak of civil wars?