UNIVERSITEIT VAN AMSTERDAM
The power of foreign
support
The effects of external resources on the
organizational structure of the Palestine Liberation
Organization
Katelijne Blom 10674748
Supervisor: Dr. L. Seymour Second Reader: Dr. J. Bader
19 June 2015
Master thesis Political Science, specialization: International Relations
Index
Introduction ... 2
A principal-agent perspective on patronage ... 4
Patronage and fragmentation ... 6
1. The number of organizations ... 7
2. The degree of institutionalization ... 8
3. Power distribution ... 9
Research Design ... 12
The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) ... 14
1. The start of the Palestinian movement and the rise of the PLO: 1964-1967 ... 15
2. The aftermath of the Six-Day War: 1967-1969 ... 19
3. Arafat’s takeover and Black September: 1969-1973 ... 21
4. Fatah’s dominance: 1973-1982 ... 26 5. A hegemon’s rise: 1982-1993 ... 29 Alternative explanations ... 35 Conclusion ... 39 References ... 42 Appendix 1. ... 47
Introduction
Few if any civil wars throughout history have been fully domestic in the sense of being fought exclusively by actors subordinate to the same state authority (Kalyvas & Balcells 2010). Almost invariably, civil wars draw in outsiders pursuing a variety of agendas. Patronage has proven to be an easy way for sponsors to gain control over a conflict happening outside their borders. The most common form of sponsoring is state support, but diaspora and other non-state support such as religious and human rights organizations, refugees and wealthy individuals are also known to subsidize armed groups (Byman et al. 2001).
Syria is an example of a civil war in which external powers provide multiple rebel groups with weapons, materiel and money in order to pursue their own policy goals (Hughes 2014). Although the rebels differ in strategy, struggle for power and suffer from coordination problems, they all ultimately fight to overthrow the Syrian Ba’ath regime. Despite their shared goal, the opposition cannot seem to agree and can be considered fragmented (Pearlman 2014; Pizzi 2013). Question is whether foreign support has added to the chaos. Do the agendas of the involved external actors hamper coordination among rebel factions and do their resources influence power struggles? This thesis will look at the effects of foreign money and supplies on warring intragroup dynamics further, and will argue that it can lead to increased fragmentation.
The effects of both direct and indirect outside interference have not been discussed thoroughly in the present literature. Civil wars are usually regarded as intrastate conflicts even though external actors are more often than not involved (Salehyan, Gleditsch & Cunningham 2011; Salehyan, Siroky & Wood 2014). Internal processes of civil war cannot be fully understood without looking at their involvement and thus these dynamics should be intensively studied in order to unravel the ways external actors shape the course of civil war. Previous research has discovered that foreign support is not only known to lengthen a conflict, make it more difficult to resolve and increase inter-rebel fighting, but it is also thought to increase human rights violations (Cunningham 2010; Fjelde & Nilsson 2012; Regan & Aydin 2011; Salehyan et al. 2011; Salehyan et al. 2014; Schultz 2010).
Another shortcoming of most literature on civil war is that many consider the warring groups as unitary while they are often internally divided and do not share interests as is
conventionally believed (Beardsley & McQuinn 2009; Pearlman & Gallagher Cunningham 2012). The Free Syrian Army (FSA), a Syrian rebel group, consisted of multiple factions and kept on spreading, Pakistani rebel groups followed similar routes in fighting the government by splintering and the Ugandan Lord Resistance Army also fragmented into smaller groups in order to avoid defeat (Themner & Wallensteen 2013). Recent studies have argued that fragmentation is key to understanding conflict dynamics (Bakke, Cunningham & Seymour 2012). And although more and more research is focused on dynamics within rebel groups, there is still much to discover.
This thesis aims to contribute to a better understanding of conflict dynamics by focusing on the effects of external influences on internal structures, specifically external support on the dynamics within an armed group. Within existing research there is a great divide on the impact of resources on groups in general. On the one hand many scholars claim that resources are fuel for resilient rebellion, but others link resources to increased indiscipline, fragmentation and criminalization (Byman 2013; Staniland 2012). I examine whether foreign support increases the degree of fragmentation within a group. Although foreign support comes in different forms, I look at the most common forms of material support: money, arms and supplies (Byman et al. 2001; Hughes 2014; Mumford 2013). Money is a powerful instrument as it can be used to buy weapons and pay off combatants. Additionally, it can be used for bribery and propaganda. Arms and materiel are useful, although groups can often also steal or buy necessities (Byman et al. 2001).
Based on principal-agent theory I will discuss a patron-armed group relationship in order to see how these various forms of sponsoring can cause fragmentation. There are three dimensions of fragmentation that I take as the dependent variables of interest: 1. the number of organizations, 2. the degree of institutionalization and 3. the distribution of power (Bakke, Gallagher Cunningham & Seymour 2012). I ask how sponsorship leads to an increase in organizations within a group and how the wishes of a principal can impact the degree of institutionalization. Additionally, I assess how principals can alter the balance ofpower and consequently contribute to increased fragmentation.
The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was founded in 1964 with the purpose of regaining the Palestinian territory that was given to the Israelis. Since its establishment, the
started out with the goal to liberate Palestine through armed struggle. Now, it is recognized by many as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. The PLO consists of numerous organizations that recognize different individuals as their leaders and is known for lacking control over its factions.
Based on the case study it can be concluded that foreign support has the ability to indeed increase fragmentation. The findings of this study have several implications. It illustrates that that foreign support can tear apart a group and worsen the conflict. External sponsorship also has the power to increase (violent) competition between groups and prompt infighting, leading to an increase in human rights violations. In addition, relations between sponsors can also worsen and increase unrest. The findings suggest that sponsors have to be extremely careful with their support. The only way in which it seems that foreign support can increase cohesiveness, is in the case of a collective principal supporting the group in order to help it achieve their goal, not that of the principal. However, as long as the sponsor does not push for structures and self-sufficiency, a group will likely become extremely dependent on external support, which lead to questions on the overall effectiveness of sponsoring.
The research will develop itself as follows. The first section will provide an overview of the existing literature on both fragmentation and foreign support and will combine the findings in order to develop several hypotheses. The second part will focus on the PLO and test the hypotheses, followed by a conclusion in section three.
A principal-agent perspective on patronage
The principal-agent (PA) perspective is often used to unravel civil war dynamics. PA theory focuses on the delegation of tasks by principals to agents. Principals hope to reduce costs while gaining from the relationship as agents are thought to be more efficient due to their knowledge and expertise (Byman & Kreps 2010). However, information asymmetries and divergent interests can make a PA relationship problematic. Selecting competent agents that share a principal’s interests is hard, and after delegating it is difficult to monitor and control a situation. Agents can use this lack of oversight and strategize in their advantage (Moe 1984). This often means deviating from their principal’s preferences, which leads to suboptimal outcomes from a principal’s perspective (Stein 1982). In the case of multiple principals with different preferences, agents can use this to their advantage by trying to negotiate more favorable terms (Moe 1984; Salehyan 2010). In the case of a collective principal that consists
of multiple actors, for instance an international organization, overcoming the collective action problem is the biggest issue. All actors have to agree before action is taken and after that chances are that not all are committed to the cause (Nielson & Tierney 2003).
The relationship between a foreign sponsor and an armed group can be seen as a PA relationship. The delegation of tasks to armed groups (A) to fulfill a sponsor’s (P) policy goals is a common feature of conflict. Delegating warfare is seen as risk-free, less costly and the perfect opportunity to avoid the use of violence and casualties (Salehyan, Gleditsch & Cunningham 2011). During the Cold War the two superpowers provided their proxies, ranging from rebel groups to terrorists and warlords, with arms, training and money to influence and increase the chances of their preferred strategic outcome. Post-Cold War, the use of armed groups as proxies is still common, although nowadays multiple principals are often supporting one group (Byman et al. 2001; Hughes 2014; Mumford 2013). Their agenda can vary from weakening an enemy or preventing a certain political situation to ideological expansion. In some cases principals decide on sponsoring groups in order to keep the group dependent on foreign funds and intentionally weaken it by hindering effectiveness (Byman & Kreps 2010; Cunningham 2010; Hughes 2014; Mumford 2013). A downside to delegating is that principals have to give up autonomy and thus risk agency losses, deviated actions due to conflicting interests and not having full information on their agent’s activities (Byman & Kreps 2010; Byman 2013; Mumford 2013; Salehyan, Gleditsch & Cunningham 2011). However, the social contract that binds an agent to its principal is bound to decrease some of the autonomy and amount of control a group leader has over the situation.
Depending on a principal’s interest and available opportunities sponsors seek either cohesive or fragmented proxies. If domestic objectives are similar to the agent’s main objective and it is critical for the sponsor that its agent succeeds, principals will most likely prefer to delegate to a promising cohesive group. However, if a principal’s objectives are different from the agent, it is more likely that they will prefer a more fragmented group in which one of the organizations matches their interests best and is most likely to help. In the case of multiple principals with the same aims, they will also most likely seek to delegate to a cohesive group. When multiple principals with different aims seek involvement, they will prefer more fragmented groups in order to be able to have as much influence as possible. No matter the conditions under which a principal’s decides to delegate, a PA relationship can affect the
Table 1. Predicted patterns of delegation
Number of principals Objective Delegate to
fragmented/cohesive group
One Similar to agent Cohesive
Multiple Similar to agent Cohesive
One Different from agent Fragmented
Multiple Different from agent Fragmented
Patronage and fragmentation
There is little consensus among scholars on the concept of fragmentation and armed conflict. Consequently, fragmentation has been defined and measured in many different ways. This study will use a conceptualized version of fragmentation that combines all these previous interpretations into one encompassing multi-dimensional framework. This framework links fragmentation to a set of empirical indicators and measures that gives an indication of the degree of fragmentation or cohesion within movements (Bakke, Gallagher Cunningham & Seymour 2012). Building on principal-agent theory, I will analyze how foreign support can impact fragmentation.
The framework developed by Bakke et al. explains the within-group dynamics of political movements engaged in armed struggles against the state. The collective identity that characterizes such groups is usually determined by ethnic, tribal, clan, lingual or national features. With that identity comes a set of collective goals that all members of the group at least claim to actively pursue. In addition to pursuing these collective interests, the involved actors also contest over personal interests (Bakke, Gallagher Cunningham & Seymour 2012). To pursue a common goal and simultaneously pursuing personal interests seems inherent to all group dynamics, which makes the framework applicable to groups other than separatist movements as well.
By looking at the dynamics within the designed structure and the potential of foreign support to influence these, several hypotheses will be developed to be able to analyze whether foreign support can alter the degree of fragmentation within an armed group. According to the
framework, groups fragment or cohere along three dimensions, with all the different dimensions interplaying along the way.
1. The number of organizations
The number of organizations is defined by the amount of active groupings that operate on behalf of the group they represent. A cohesive group has all involved organizations act in their name and in pursuit of the collective aims. Members show signs of effective cooperation and coordination, answer to the same highest command authority and follow the same rules. Fragmented movements consist of organizations divided on their movement’s collective goal and show signs of competition and pursuing organizational interests by using the group’s collective identity. Such organizations often listen to a variety of leaders that they consider the highest authority and have their own organizational structures (Bakke, Gallagher Cunningham & Seymour 2012).
Actors claim to be motivated by causes such as ideology or political rights (Akcinaroglu 2012; Lujala 2010; Pearlman & Cunningham 2012). However, the ultimate goal of an armed group is to survive and maximize political and material outcomes (Beardsley & McQuinn 2009; Fjelde & Nilsson 2012; Weinstein 2007). Resources play an important part in a group’s survival. They shape a group’s organizational structure and attitude, and enable it to achieve their goals (Fjelde & Nilsson 2012; Weinstein 2007).
It can be expected that foreign support leads to shifting goals and changing directions. Especially since external support is an easy way for a group to secure its income and lucrative resource deals are known to contribute to opportunist behavior (Weinstein 2007). If a principal asks their agent to divert from the group’s original goal in exchange for resources, it is probably willing to do so as soon as this proves to be beneficial. This can lead to dissatisfaction among other group members and rival leaders who could refuse to adapt to the new general direction. This can either cause organizations to distance themselves from the group’s main identity or lead to the development of new visions and organizations.
The strings principals attach to their support can endanger coordination. The demands of a principal usually divert from an agent’s primary interest. For an agent it thus becomes hard to honor not only their delegator’s wishes but also stay true to their own (Byman & Kreps 2010; Cunningham 2010; Hughes 2014; Mumford 2013). This complicates the coordination of
tasks. The more principals, the more preferences and demands, and the more difficult it becomes to foster consensus within an armed group, leading to splintering over the conditions attached to foreign support.
The preferences and demands of a principal will lead to more active organizations as these will likely alter the direction of a group. It can be expected that the more sponsors are involved with different interests and demands, the more active subgroups appear.
Hypothesis 1: The more sponsors involved, the more organizations within a group.
2. The degree of institutionalization
The degree of fragmentation is also determined by the extent to which a movement is institutionalized. The more institutionalized, the more likely it is that the movement and its organizations are coordinated and cohesive. An institution provides groups with the rules they need to follow, structures their behavior and constrains groups and individual members of their autonomy if necessary. The rules of institutions can both be formal and informal and consist of norms, routines, traditions and customs. The stronger the institution, the easier these rules can be successfully enforced upon its members (Bakke, Gallagher Cunningham & Seymour 2012).
Resources shape success, organizational structures and attitudes. A group with a very beneficial resource strategy that costs little effort but generates much profit is often irresponsive to the interests of locals (Beardsley & McQuinn 2009; Byman 2013; Salehyan, Siroky & Wood 2014; Wood 2014a; Wood 2014b). Actors that do count on local populations for support, tend to care for their communities through the provision of public goods (Beardsley & McQuinn 2009; Weinstein 2007). This type of resource extraction requires institutions and organizational structures (Tilly 1993). As armed groups start out a conflict relatively weak, external support can strengthen a group’s position and increase their chances of defeating the enemy (Akcinaroglu 2012; Regan 2002; Salehyan, Gleditsch & Cunningham 2011; Salehyan, Siroky & Wood 2014; Staniland 2012). However, these lucrative resource deals also make a group vulnerable and dependent (Fjelde & Nilsson 2012). It can be expected that external support leads to disbelief among groups that they need to develop strong institutions to function as support finds them. As this causes them to heavily rely on sponsorship it can be expected that their focus will lie with maintaining relations with its
outside supporters instead of on developing institutions and with that risk becoming trapped in a vicious circle.
By accepting a principal’s support, an agent gives up some of its autonomy. Principals delegate based on self-interest and pursuing own agendas. These can vary from wanting its agent to flourish, to keeping it weak and dependent on foreign funds and by that hinder its effectiveness (Byman & Kreps 2010; Cunningham 2010; Hughes 2014; Mumford 2013). A group dependent on external support needs to adjust to its principal’s preferences in order to secure a resource influx (Salehyan, Gleditsch & Cunningham 2011; Salehyan, Siroky & Wood 2014). This could lead to enhanced institutionalization, for instance when a principal urges its agent to focus on unification and discipline. However, in the case of multiple sponsors delegating to the same agent no state can effectively restrain its agent. Under these circumstances, the group is never fully dependent on just one state, which leads to a decrease of influence on their delegate (Salehyan, Siroky & Wood 2014).
Support can also hamper institutionalization. First, by undermining an agent’s attempts to structuralize. Second, in cases where multiple principals delegate to different subgroups. This leads to a loss of ability of the armed group to coordinate action and control its sub factions. Attempts to build overarching institutions could prove to be more difficult as all agents have to answer to the rules and preferences of their individual principals. This could lead to the refusal of subgroups to follow the overall guidelines in order to secure their private external resource influx.
Hypothesis 2: The preferences of foreign supporters influence the degree of institutionalization: where their objectives align with the recipient, institutionalization will increase; where their objectives diverge, they will undermine institutionalization.
3. Power distribution
The distribution of power is the last dimension that can cause or prevent fragmentation. When power is dispersed across several organizations within a movement, it can be considered as fragmented. In case one dominates the rest of the movement, chances of fragmentation are slim. Power is hard to measure, but it ultimately comes down to actor A being able to make actor B act in a way it would not have done otherwise. Determinants of power are material
resources, size, popular support, ideology, public opinion and legitimacy (Bakke, Gallagher Cunningham & Seymour et al. 2012).
Power and the distribution of it are important in determining a group’s structure, actions and outcomes (Krause 2013; Sinno 2008). The hierarchal position of a group drives behavior and is determined by its strength and capabilities to realistically challenge the strongest organization for predominance. Ultimately, groups are self-interested in wanting to ensure survival and maximize strength (Krause 2013). In the previously discussed framework resources, size, popular support, ideology, public opinion and legitimacy are seen as hugely influential when it comes to defining an armed group’s strength (Bakke, Gallagher Cunningham & Seymour 2012). Other studies have argued that territorial control, a haven where the group can train, that provides them with recruits and a sense of identity and legitimacy or access to international borders play a crucial role in determining capacity and victory (Byman 2013; Buhaug, Gates & Lujala 2009; Christia 2012). Nevertheless, since the focus lies with fragmentation, this section will mostly look at the indicators provided by the framework.
Foreign support complicates relations with the local population and can lead to less focus on organizational structures (Beardsley & McQuinn 2009; Byman 2013; Salehyan, Siroky & Wood 2014; Wood 2014a; Wood 2014b). This could lead to fewer recruits, popular support and a negative public opinion. And although states can provide their agents with legitimacy and increase their credibility among international actors, it can also lead to a decrease in national credibility and erosion of local and international support, especially in cases of corruption or diverting from their national identity (Byman et al. 2001; Byman 2013). In some countries hatred of foreigners is so strong, that it can hinder recruitment and financial support (Byman 2013). Thus it can be expected that foreign support can negatively impact factors like size, popular support, ideology, public opinion and legitimacy and in that way reduce a group’s overall power, making them more dependent on their principal.
Hegemonic groups with one significant organization have a structure that enables the dominant group to cement its position as a hierarch, reduces counterproductive violent mechanisms both externally and from within, and increases the chances of coherent strategies and credibility. Groups with multiple significant organizations are internally competitive systems and can shift hierarchal positions quickly by challenging the dominant group (Krause
2013). In a centralized group these challenges are more easily opposed (Krause 2013; Pearlman 2011; Sinno 2008). Resources are important for actors that wish to restructure. Those that control the resource inflow gain some leverage in modifying organizational structure to increase their influence of to achieve other goals or even completely reshape it (Sinno 2008). Resources facilitate control and thus it can be expected, depending on whom the foreign support is given to, that it can alter the distribution of power.
Patrons are most likely to delegate to agents that are most able to fulfill their wishes (Salehyan, Gleditsch & Cunningham 2011). This often means delegating to a leader that is friendly towards a principal’s goals, regardless of his actual position within a group (Byman 2013). Sometimes principals are thought to purposely increase rivalry between commanders through delegation (Byman & Kreps 2010; Hughes 2014). Thus depending on the principal’s preferences, foreign support can empower subordinate organizations and increase its capabilities to overthrow the dominant organization or increase the concentration of power and provide the dominant organization with instruments to maximize its strength. In an already fragmented group a sponsor’s actions are likely to have more impact than in a hegemonic one.
Especially in the case of multiple principals it can be expected that all seek to maximize their influence in order to ensure their preferred outcome. Exogenous power shifts are known to lead to preemptive measures by opponents due to the lack of transparency and uncertainties it causes (Debs & Monteiro 2014; Driscoll 2012). The involvement of one or more external actors makes acquiring the correct information even more complicated (Cunningham 2010; Regan & Aydin 2011). It can be expected that the involvement of multiple principals leads to mutual competition and distrust and thus to principals delegating towards different organizations within the group in order to secure their position and by that diffuse power.
Hypothesis 3: Depending on a principal’s interests, foreign support can alter the internal balance of power: it can either increase power diffusion by delegating towards rivals or cohesion by delegating towards the dominant commander within a group.
Figure 1. How foreign support can cause fragmentation from a PA perspective
Research Design
To test the hypotheses above, I will conduct a single case study on the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). After the Palestinians refused to acknowledge United Nations Resolution 181, which would divide Palestine into a Jewish and Arab state, war broke out between Jews and the Arabs. The Jewish side quickly got the upper hand and in 1948 declared the state of Israel. Hundreds of thousands of Arab Palestinians had to flee the country. This catastrophe, known as al-nakba, led to the establishment of the PLO. Its goal was the liberation of Palestine and the destruction of Zionism. Of the Palestinian movement, the PLO can be considered most prominent and was recognized as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people for decades. The group has been known for having many organizations (see appendix 1. for the most prominent organizations) and receiving a lot of foreign support, specifically from Middle Eastern countries. It is known for its internal rivalries, shifting directions and the hosting of autonomous groups under its wings. As a result, the PLO’s degree of fragmentation fluctuated. Its shifting nature and external resource inflow make the PLO a suitable case to study.
To analyze whether foreign support influences the degree of fragmentation, the dependent variable – fragmentation – is broken down on a scale from unified to fragmented. The concentration or dispersion of power, strength or weakness of the institutions and the number of organizations determine the variation of the DV. Not only a group’s degree of fragmentation can vary, it can also experience different types of fragmentation over time. For
Foreign Support
1. Differences in interests can lead to diverting from the collective goal of a group and increase the number of organizations
2. Preferences and demands inEluence the rules and thus alter the
degree of institutionalization 3. Delegating to rival organizations within a group can enable internal
power struggles
example, a group that is poorly institutionalized can still have a high concentration of power and few organizations, making it fragmented but mostly on the institutional level. Bakke et al. (2012) developed a triangle model to highlight the variation in and the degree of fragmentation. This model will be used to place the PLO on the scale and see how foreign support influences the DV. In addition, I control for geographical dispersion and preexisting social networks. The effects of these DV’s on fragmentation will be discussed in the alternative explanations section.
Figure 2. Illustrates extreme fragmentation on all dimensions (Bakke, Gallagher Cunningham & Seymour 2012: p. 273)
The history of the PLO contains several periods during which the group’s fragmented or cohesive structure was highly visible. For each of these periods the three processes through which foreign sponsors potentially contributed to fragmentation or cohesion will be traced in order to test the three hypotheses. Besides looking at the dynamics within the PLO, I will also briefly discuss Fatah, Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), Hamas and the Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM) as all four either became part of the PLO at a later stage or developed ties that had a significant influence.
The research methodology is process tracing. Evidence will be gathered from primary and secondary sources varying from history books and biographies to official PLO documents in order to identify the steps through which foreign support impacted fragmentation. The problem with researching foreign sponsoring is that despite the many speculations on
numbers, there are very few official financial records accessible to the public. The PLO case is no exception. However, the involvement of different countries in the Palestinian case cannot be denied and the fact that this case has been extensively studied in the past makes the PLO one of the more suitable cases. In comparison to others, much is known about when the PLO and its organizations received what type of support from whom.
The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
Middle Eastern countries have a history of political turmoil, regional rivalry and war (Nassar 1991; Rubin 1994). Many countries fought each other or built alliances only to switch sides as soon as this proved to be in their interest. In 1947 the United Nations drew up Resolution 181 in order to divide Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab state. While Israel accepted the partition, the Arabs refused. This decision led to great destabilization in the Middle East (Laffin 1982; Nassar 1991). The Arab-Israeli war erupted soon after. Israel took over the Palestinian territory and Jordan annexed the West Bank. With nowhere to go, 700.000 Arab Palestinians found themselves displaced. Many ended up in refugee camps set up in different Arab states that showed very little interest in helping them to resettle permanently and fix the refugee problem. Demoralized and angry, Palestinians were focused on plotting revenge for years leading up to 1964 (Rubin 1994: p.1). With the establishment of the PLO, the struggle for the establishment of the Palestinian state officially began. The group did succeed in getting the United Nations (UN) to recognize the Palestinians right to self-determination and got granted observer status within the UN (Amour 2013: p.147), yet the Palestine-Israel conflict remains unresolved to this day. Table 2. shows a quick overview of the evolution of the PLO with regard to the degree of fragmentation. In the following sections, the different periods will be discussed in detail. Per period it will be examined how the group became fragmented or cohesive and how foreign support contributed to this.
Number of organizations
Power distribution Institutionalization
Table 2. The degree of fragmentation over time: the evolution of the PLO
Period Number of organizations (more - fewer) Degree of institutionalization (weak - strong) Power distribution (dispersed - concentrated) Overall degree of fragmentation (highly fragmented – cohesive)
1. Intermediate Weak Intermediate Fragmented
2. More Weak Intermediate Highly fragmented
3. More Weak Dispersed Highly fragmented
4. More Intermediate Intermediate Fragmented
5. Fewer Strong Concentrated Cohesive
1. The start of the Palestinian movement and the rise of the PLO: 1964-1967
The PLO was produced by the Arab League, designed to stay in control of the Palestinians. From the start, it was very dependent on its sponsors, which contributed to the PLO’s fragmented nature during this period as is shown in figure 3. The PLO’s institutions started out weak and remained that way. The different preferences and demands of the foreign sponsors and their desire to keep the PLO weak were of influence on this lack of institutional development (H2). The PLO’s number of organizations increased somewhat after the ANM and the PLF merged into the group. Both were sponsored by outside supporters and it can be argued that foreign support at least indirectly contributed to an increase in organizations (H1). While Arab states did compete for control over the Palestinians and attempted to disperse power by delegating to rivals (H3), pre Six-Day war this was mostly done to agents outside the PLO such as Fatah by Syria.
The absence of territory since 1948 had left the Palestinians dependent on the region. As a result, Arab states were extremely sensitive towards any Palestinian political activity and tried to isolate the Palestinians, both physically and legally, from their own populations. Any emergence of political organizations with an explicit Palestinian character was prohibited (Sayigh 1997: p.18-19). Nasser of Egypt stated in 1956: “The Palestinians are useful to Arab states as they are. We will always see that they do not become too powerful” (Laffin 1982: p.172). The Egyptian president, whose country dominated the region, feared he was losing control over the Palestinians and initiated the establishment of the PLO (Shemesh 1984: p.108).
The Palestinians were a determining factor in Arab interstate relations (Nassar 1991). As the group posed security as well as territorial threats it is not surprising that states were interested in controlling them. While all claimed to put up a front against Israel and said to be in favor of pan-Arabism (Rubin 1994), the Arab countries seemed to have different motives to approve the establishment of the PLO (Podeh 1993; Shemesh 2004). The League appointed Ahmad Shuqayri to establish foundations for organizing the Palestinian people (Sayigh 1997: p.19; Shemesh 2004: p.17). As a result, The PLO was founded in 1964. Its goal was the liberation of Palestine with the help of the Arab League (Nassar 1991).
It is said that the only reason that states agreed, was to be able to use Palestine as a puppet in their interstate rivalry (Laffin 1982: p. 131; Nassar 1991: p.116; Rubin 1994: p.7). Jordan feared a Palestinian entity as a large number of the Jordan population consisted of Palestinians. Lebanon and Saudi Arabia worried that the Palestinian refugees would endanger their shaky internal security, and Syria strongly opposed Israel (Nassar 1991). Despite these different motives, all wanted to prevent the Palestinians from gaining influence and were intent on keeping them under wraps by pretending to give them a voice through the PLO. In reality, however, they were still excluded from Middle Eastern politics (Sayigh 1997: p.19). The Arab states’ preferences to keep the PLO weak are reflected in its lack of development. Although he was not ordered to do so, Shuqayri began to organize the PLO inspired by state institutions (Sayigh 1997: p.19). The group consisted of a number of bodies and had its own Charter, a ruling parliament, the Palestine National Council (PNC), an Executive Committee (EC) and Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) (Rubin 1994; Sayigh 1997). The EC consisted of members handpicked by Shuqayri and had the final say on all of the PLO’s activities (Laffin 1982;Nassar 1991).
Despite insisting on being the legitimate actor to exclusively rule over the Palestinians, the PLO did not have its own organizations under control. The PLA was dominated by the Arab League and was used to fight their battles, and Shuqayri and the EC were considered subservient to the Arabs (Pearlman 2011: p.71; Shemesh 1984: p.122). Shuqayri himself has even stated that the PLO was subordinate to the policies of the Arab states and was constrained by their conditions. Unless he would agree with their suggested policies, the leader would lose the PLO (Shemesh 1984: p.122). Additionally, PLO members did not let themselves be restricted and were divided on the course of the PLO (Krause 2013). While some of its resources came from taxes paid by the Palestinians, most came from the League and Arab governments (Krause 2013; Nassar 1991). Thus, it seems that institutions were not only weak, but also that the PLO’s very existence depended on the Arabs.
The League never pushed the PLO to develop the institutional structures it developed in the beginning, this happened at Shuqayri’s own initiative (Pearlman 2011: p. 65). As the quote by Nasser showed, states were intent on suppressing the Palestinians. Requiring the PLO to institutionalize would have the opposite effect. There is little indication that the League required the PLO to improve its weak structures in return for their support, they only seem to have undermined institutionalization by setting unwanted conditions (H2). The following is an example of that. Jordan hosted the PLO under very specific conditions and made sure that the decisions made by the PLO would reflect Jordan’s preferences (Shemesh 1984: p.127). The country also refused the PLO’s request to have the ability to train its own people in order to be able to properly respond to Israel’s threat. Jordan feared that the PLO would create a separate army and closed PLO headquarters in response (Nasser 1991). This shows that the PLO’s dependence on its sponsors and their preferences to keep its agent weak, undermined the PLO’s institutional development (H2).
Unhappy with the hold of the Arabs over the PLO, Palestinian guerillas launched from the bottom up. These were much more popular among the Palestinians (Pearlman 2011: p. 65). The ANM, PLF and Fatah began gaining ground around the same time the PLO started to operate. All sought to destroy Israel and competed to become the sole representative of the Palestinian people (Krause 2013). While the PLO’s tactic was to remain diplomatic (Rubin 1994), the others were known for their military approach. The ANM, led by George Habash, was a pan-Arab revolutionary movement. It had strong ties with Egypt and mostly carried out irregular violent attacks ordered by president Nasser (Laffin 1982: p.34). It received training,
from the Syrian army established the PLF. It was led by Ahmad Jibril and also carried out guerilla attacks (Laffin 1982; Pearlman 2011; Rubin 1994). Syria provided the PLF with arms and training (Pearlman 2011). Fatah, under Yasser Arafat’s lead, also had ties with the Syrians and received material support from the country (Pearlman, 2011). Despite the alliance, Fatah’s attitude towards solving the Palestinian case through armed struggle was nationalist (Laffin 1982; Rubin 1994).
Palestinians had either ended up in UNRWA refugee camps or villages all over the Middle East. Most lived in isolated refugee camps that suffered from low investments. Camp societies were built and differed per camp (Kimmerling & Migdal 2003). Palestinian lives were in the hands of their host states and the UNRWA and the PLO did little to change this. Consequently, the group enjoyed little recognition from the population. In contrast, the guerrillas received much more praise and recruits (Pearlman 2011).
In fear of losing control due to the growing popularity of the guerillas, particularly Fatah, and growing criticism on his inaction, Shuqayri welcomed the foreign backed initiatives ANM and PLF in order to answer to the call for a more violent attitude. Under the PLA, he let them establish the commando “Heroes of the Return” (Amour 2013; Pearlman 2011; Rubin 1994). As a result, the number of active organizations within the PLO increased (H1). As it was Shuqayri who feared for his position and welcomed the merger, the influence of foreign sponsorship on this can be questioned.
Fatah started attacking Israel and growing as an organization only after receiving support from Syria. By supporting Fatah the country wanted to “rub Nasser’s nose in the mud of Palestine” (Pearlman 2011: p. 66). Egypt and Syria had strong differences in opinion when it came to the Arab-Israeli conflict with the latter propagating taking up arms and criticizing Egypt for its lack of military action (Shemesh 2004: p.14). It is likely that Syria deliberately sponsored the PLO’s biggest opponent in order to increase its influence on the Palestinians and decrease Egypt’s power over the region. ANM and PLF were empowered by outside supporters as well. Thus, it can be argued that foreign support at least indirectly contributed to an increase in the number of organizations (H1).
Within the League member states continuously criticized each other’s support for the PLO and tried to outbid each other (Pearlman 2011). This competition over the Palestinians did lead to attempts to disperse power by delegating to rivals in order to seek personal gain (H3).
Yet, pre Six-Day War this was mostly done to agents outside the PLO such as Syria’s support to Fatah. Although power was slightly dispersed due to the unwillingness of PLO members to listen to the EC and the lack of control over the PLA, power within the PLO was mainly in the hands of the EC and thus in the hands of the Arab League. As the powerless and unpopular PLO acted as their puppet, all patrons likely felt little need to change this. During this period foreign support mostly helped with empowering actors who would later come to play important roles in the PLO such as Habash (ANM, later PFLP) and Arafat (Fatah). 2. The aftermath of the Six-Day War: 1967-1969
After the Six-Day war, the image of the League was severely damaged. As a result, states became more concentrated on acting separately from the regional body. They also increasingly focused on gaining individual control over the PLO through sponsorship, which led to a further increase in fragmentation as is shown in figure 4. Several organizations were installed, and with that the number of active organizations increased (H1). As some were fully dependent on sponsorship and acted out its principals’ demands, power became increasingly diffused (H3). This dependency on external sponsorship undermined PLO institutions (H2). Although factions still did not follow PLO guidelines, little attempts were made to change this by developing better institutions. As a result, the PLO remained poorly institutionalized.
Figure 4.
The Six-Day War severely reduced Arab power and revived Palestinian Nationalism. After Israel had defeated Egypt’s, Syria’s and Jordan’s armies, faith in the strength of Arab states
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slackness and conspiracy” (Rubin 1994: p.13). Fatah’s claim that the Palestinians should take matters into their own hands became widely accepted (Pearlman 2011). This newly restored belief in Palestine led to many changes. Palestinian organizations became less focused on cooperating with the Arab League. Consequently, Arab states became increasingly focused on acting separately from the League and sought control over the Palestinians in different ways. Before 1967, Arab states mostly disagreed on how to restrict the PLO. After the debacle they did so by offering support to different factions and creating their own proxies (Sayigh 1997; Pearlman 2011). This shift in attitude led to a significant rise in the number of active PLO organizations. A PLO member stated: the PLO consisted of organizations that were “Palestinians in name only, for in reality they were extensions of the Arab parties they represented” (Pearlman 2011: p.69).
The Heroes of the Return, an ANM organization and the PLF joint forces and established the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) under Habash’s lead. The PFLP was formed in Syria and has enjoyed patronage from Iraq, Syria and Libya. All three organizations wanted to oppose Egypt’s dominance over the PLO (Badger & Cafiero 2014; Rubin 1994). The goal of the PFLP was to ‘rechannel history into its proper course’ (Rubin 1994: p.31). This shows that the organization had very different ideas for the PLO and indicates a lack of consensus caused by Egypt’s dominance (H1).
Due to growing tensions within the PFLP, it splintered into the Marxist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command (PFLP-GC) in 1968, and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) in 1969. The DFLP was formed with Iraq’s and Libya’s support. The PFLP-GC was established with the help of Syria and cooperated with the IRA, Baader-Meinhof group and the Japan’s Red Army (Kimmerling & Migdal 2003; Rubin 1994). Additionally, both Syria and Iraq established their own PLO organizations, Sa’iqa and the ALF respectively (Pearlman 2011).
The principals’ different preferences led to the establishing of several PLO (proxy) organizations. Through their agents, the principals attempted to increase their control. As all pursued a different set of goals and listened to different authorities, it can be said that foreign support definitely contributed to an increase in the number of organizations as was expected (H1). Especially the placement of proxies ALF and Sa’iqa confirm the hypothesis. The motives for the PFLP to split up seem to be based on ideological grounds. However, the
organizations were established with the help of external sponsors, which could indicate that foreign support enabled the split but it is hard to tell whether it would have happened regardless.
What can be argued is that the increase in organizations caused a notable shift in power distribution. The newly established PLO factions all had their own leaders who acted autonomously from the executive body. As at least some were fully sponsored by foreign actors and heavily relied on their resources for power, H3 can be confirmed. By supporting rival factions, principals sought increased control over the PLO. The establishment of these new organizations that were completely subordinate to its sponsors undermined the PLO’s ability to effectively control them. External support is likely to have hampered any potential institutional progress during this period (H2), although there is little evidence that the PLO tried to develop its institutions.
Egypt, Syria, Jordan and some Gulf states began to openly support Fatah by providing them with logistical and military aid and lifting sanctions (Sayigh 1997: p.20). It is argued that the countries did so in order to recover their credibility after the debacle against Israel (Pearlman 2011: p.69). Their support provided Fatah with opportunities to carry out armed attacks and expand significantly. The Six-Day war had also led the population to believe that Palestine should take their national struggle into their own hands, which led to more support for armed tactics and a surge in active Fedayeen guerillas (Pearlman 2011). Fatah’s surge in popularity among the Palestinian population its increasing influence within the organization left the PLO worried (Israeli 1983; Laffin 1982; Rubin 1994). After criticism from increasingly dominant Fatah that PLO remained dependent and without adequate leadership, Shuqayri resigned. A new interim leader was quickly appointed (Rubin 1994). By supporting Fatah and allowing it a margin of freedom on their grounds, Arab states that had previously supported the PLO, now undermined the group’s growth by empowering its rival.
3. Arafat’s takeover and Black September: 1969-1973
Egypt, Fatah’s biggest supporter, enabled it to seize control of the PLO and with that the number of organizations increased (H1). While PLO members rejected the group and its ideas, Arafat managed to officially become the new chief and Fatah became the leading faction. Splinter organizations emerged due to this lack of consensus. Thus, foreign support
led to an even further increase in the number of organizations (H1). Several within the PLO started to battle their new leader. This rebellion caused unrest in host country Jordan. Unable to control the rebelling factions, war broke out between Jordan and the PLO. In an attempt to end the clashes, Arafat officially distanced itself from organizations such as the PFLP. Unimpressed, the rebels continued fighting. This can be attributed to external support. Rebelling factions received training, weapons and money from more radical Arab states such as Syria. The latter opposed Jordan’s moderate stand and engagement in talks with Israel’s ally the United States. This indicates that sponsorship enabled internal rivalry and diffused power (H3). Arafat tried to increase coordination by installing several bodies within the PLO in order to decrease fragmentation and secure his position as a leader, but as predicted, the subsidizing of different organizations by various sponsors made this next to impossible (H2). During this period, despite slight institutionalization, the PLO was more fragmented than ever before as can be seen in figure 5.
Figure 5.
Most Arabs had started to become more lenient towards Fatah after Israel had defeated them during the Six-Day war (Sayigh 1997). The guerilla group had become popular for its armed strategies and had earned overall respect (Sayigh 1997: p.20). This was a far cry from the many that had opposed and fought the group, especially Egypt (Laffin 1982; Nassar 1991). Syria had always been Fatah’s main supporter, but when the country had tried to use their aid as a way to control and tried to dispose Arafat, it switched sides and formed an alliance with Syria’s biggest opponent Egypt (Laffin 1982). Fatah managed to seize control over most
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Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan and Lebanon and began to gain influence within the PLO as well. After a short period with an interim leader, the group claimed power over the PLO (Hilal 1993).Their ties with Egypt helped them to officially take over and establish Arafat as the new leader. It is said that Egypt enabled this move in order to divert attention from their earlier defeat by Israel and restore its damaged reputation (Israeli 1983; Laffin 1982; Rubin 1994).
Arafat began to restructure the PLO. The Charter was revised and much emphasis was put on the institutional framework. As a result internal dynamics changed. The group’s pan-Arabic image was traded for Palestinian nationalism. This irritated both outsiders and insiders (Israeli 1983; Laffin 1982; Rubin 1994). As the PLO still had little power over the PLA, Fatah established its own PLO battalions. Additionally, Arafat convinced different guerilla factions to join the PLO and granted them autonomy. They could maintain their own structures, programs and alliances (Pearlman 2011). With this increase in organizations, power became even more diffused. Due to Egypt’s support, Fatah was able to seize control and install multiple nationalist guerillas, in spite of the PLO’s pan-Arabic image, thus it can be said that foreign support led to an increase in the number of organizations (H1).
Arafat installed coordinating and democratic bodies in an attempt to manage this fragmentation (Pearlman 2011). However, as one PLO member stated: “It was practically impossible to unify the commando organizations when each of them was supported and subsidized by one or another Arab country whose causes and quarrels they espoused” (Pearlman 2011: p.72). In an attempt to create cohesion, consensus decision-making became the norm. During Council meetings, attendants from all the different factions had to agree on the suggested policies before they could be officially implemented. Smaller factions frequently misused this to their advantage, which led PLO leaders to keep many of the negotiations in secret. Moreover, to ensure its power, Fatah seated mostly loyalists seated in council (Pearlman 2011). The results of Arafat attempts to structuralize were minimal, and the PLO remained poorly institutionalized. Control over all factions was impossible due to a lack of consensus, and the many foreign sponsors supporting different organizations with different goals made this increasingly hard (H2).
were all established with an eye on political value, rather than on what the community needed (Hilal 1993: p.53). The established insitutions were mere extensions of politics and focused on propagating Fatah (Sayigh 1997: p.25). As a result, most bodies were financially dependent on the PLO (Hilal 1993: p.53). Despite becoming more involved with the population, the PLO did not focus on extracting resources from them (Sayigh 1997: p.24). This indicates that the PLO still heavily depended on Arab states for funding and became even more so by building these new organizations that could only function with the help of external resources. Sponsorship led to a lack of focus on effective institutionalization as predicted.
Despite Fatah’s growing popularity among Arab states and the Palestinian population, within the PLO, prominent members were not open to its ideas. None of the more powerful let themselves be controlled by Fatah even after it became the leading faction. An example of this lack of control and internal rivalry is Black September. Soon after Fatah’s takeover, violence erupted between the PLO, mainly PFLP and DFLP, and the Jordan army (Palestine Liberation Organization 1971). Jordan, who had been hosting the PLO, grew tired of its increasingly dominant presence and of the guerillas violating their laws. The latter strained their budding relationship with the US and other Western countries (Sayigh 1997; Palestine Liberation Organization 1971). The PLO, in turn, felt threatened by Jordan’s peace talks with Israel and alleged alliance with the Americans. Israeli reprisals on Jordan soil added fuel to the fire. The Israeli attacks resulted in both Jordanian and Palestinian casualties. Jordan felt its security was threatened, and the PLO felt the Jordan laws hindered them from taking revenge (Palestine Liberation Organization Research Center 1971).
While early clashes ended in agreements between Arafat and King Hussein of Jordan in attempts to reign in the guerillas, PLO organizations refused to listen. Among them was Fatah’s biggest rival the PFLP. Despite the newly established rules for PLO presence in Jordan (Nassar 1991), Fatah’s pleads to the guerillas to stop fighting, and mild sanctions such as suspending it from a coordinating PLO body (Pearlman 2011), the PFLP blew up hijacked planes on Jordan soil. Consequently, the fighting spiraled out of control and became the civil war known as Black September. Both Arafat and Hussein called for ceasefire, but these were ignored (Krause 2013; Palestine Liberation Organization Research Center 1971). When the PLO and Jordan eventually managed to settle, the PDFLP, leftist Fatah and PFLP opposed and continued the fight.
As the PLO was uncontrollable, Jordan decided to act. King Hussein stated in a speech at the beginning of the war: “We shall deal with any attempt to undermine our national unity with whatever means are necessary” (Palestine Liberation Organization Research Center 1971: p.29). While Jordan had sought control by making agreements with its agent and enforcing new rules (H2), the country soon realized it was pointless as the PLO was unable to control its factions. This shows that while the principal attempted to influence the PLO’s structure and was able to do so by making agreements, the involvement of multiple principals all seeking to gain from their relations with the Palestinians by empowering different factions made this impossible. In 1972, Jordan managed to force all guerillas outside their borders and banned the PLO (Rubin 1994; Sayigh 1997). The expulsion from Jordan left the PLO severely weakened, both militarily and politically.
Even though the PLO had distanced itself from the rebelling factions, they were still able to battle Arafat’s leadership. This could indicate that external resources played a big part in the strength and functioning of these organizations. During the Jordan war, Iraq, Syria and Algeria openly backed the Palestinian commandos militarily and Libya halted their 9 million dollar annual fee to Jordan (Palestine Liberation Organization Research Center 1971). Thus, it is very likely that external support empowered those organizations significantly (H3). Motives for these principals to support the opposition could have been that Jordan had been engaging in talks with the United States, which the more radical Arab states such as Syria and Libya opposed. In addition, Fatah’s PLO also began to lean towards diplomacy, and it seems that the more radical principals sought to discourage this by supporting the PFLP.
Fatah also experienced internal divides due to disagreements on strategy and personal bitterness. These divides led to the establishment of the sub-organization the Black September Organization (BSO). BSO, operationally but not organizationally autonomous, was driven by Arafat’s increasingly moderate stand. The sub-faction was responsible for many international attacks on civilians, among them the kidnapping and murder of Israeli athletes during the Olympics in Munich (Pearlman 2011). BSO deeply relied on external support. The Palestinian diaspora provided them with recruits, safe houses and resources and Egyptian intelligence services provided them with training. Libyan and Algerian embassies in Europe also helped the PLO-faction. Diplomats smuggled weapons and provided them with the needed passports
measures as their actions threatened his diplomatic image. He managed to terminate the organization by assigning its leaders new positions within the PLO. Nevertheless, this example also shows support for some of the hypotheses as foreign resources both enabled the splintering of Fatah (H1) and empowered the BSO (H3).
4. Fatah’s dominance: 1973-1982
The PLO settled in Lebanon after being expelled from Jordan. During this period, Fatah was able to seize most control and became increasingly focused on improving the PLO’s internal structures. The Arab region had begun to act more lenient towards Israel and was increasingly open to negotiating peace. These developments were reflected in PLO structures. Arafat was aware of the preferences of external actors for stability in the region and showed willingness to alter both institutions and the PLO’s collective goal in order to secure Arab and UN support (H1 & H2). As a result, financial assistance for Fatah soared. This allowed the leading faction to control the PLO to a greater extent (H3). The increasingly moderate image irritated several rival organizations. Together they formed the Rejectionist Front. The Front acted separately from the PLO and boycotted its plans for years. The more radical Arab states that continued to reject Israel supported them. Their sponsorship prevented Arafat from seizing full control (H3). Regardless, power became less dispersed and new institutions were built and with that, as is shown in figure 6., the degree of fragmentation decreased to some extent.
Figure 6.
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The PLO had expected help from its allies during the war in Jordan, but no one truly stepped in to help (Nassar 1991). After the defeat, the PLO settled in Lebanon and began to focus on structure and bureaucracy in an attempt to restore its damaged reputation (Sayigh 1997). Black September had left Fatah as the undisputed leading organization of the PLO (Sayigh 1997: p.26). Fatah became even more focused on promoting itself as the only legitimate representative of the Palestinians. They entered Lebanese camps and established courts, imposed taxes and recruited young men. UNRWA school curriculums were altered and it was determined that focus should lie with propagating the Palestinian revolution and military trainings. Fatah also began to build additional service and administrative organizations. Most were run by Fatah members and funded by Gulf States. Eventually Fatah tried to increase power outside camp borders as well and infiltrated Lebanon. The latter to the country’s dismay (Kimmerling and Migdal 2003).Despite Fatah’s growing dominance among the population, the faction was unable to control all PLO organizations. The tumultuous period full of violence that followed eventually ended in the PLO’s expulsion from Lebanon in ’82. The PLO was severely weakened both military and institutionally. Especially the hardline factions had lost all military power (Kimmerling and Migdal 2003; Pearlman 2011).
Nevertheless, Fatah managed to book some results during its time in Lebanon. Arafat was predominantly focused on maintaining an image that was responsive to Western and Arab standards (Rouleau 1983). In addition to the West, the Arabs were beginning to lean towards acknowledging Israel as well. Arafat was aware of this and in fear of being left behind, it seems that he became increasingly focused on diplomatic tactics. The PLO leader had realized that he would be able to gain more through moderate than military strategies and could not afford to lose them as partners. This was a far cry from his focus on armed struggle and the destruction of Israel and thus it can be said that Fatah, and with that the PLO, diverted from its goal in order to adapt to the preferences of external actors. This shift in directions led to an even bigger lack of consensus within the PLO (H1).
In order to increase his credibility as a political actor, Arafat focused on improving PLO institutions. He installed a ten-point program in 1974, with which he showed that the PLO was not merely focused on armed struggle. The program was designed to streamline the Palestinian Revolution and relieve internal tensions. It enabled both PLO hardliners and moderates to remain loyal to their beliefs, while being flexible enough to consider other
after, in 1976, the PLO became a UN representative and an official member of the Arab League. Moreover, the international community increasingly began to recognize the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinians (Pearlman 2011). To become a member of the UN, a state has to live up to several demands, among them was being able to carry out every obligation stated in the Charter (Charter of the United Nations n.d.). While the PLO did not become a full member, it did become a representative. It is very likely that the group had to prove its ability to be able to carry out UN obligations and therefore tried to better its institutions. This indicates how important external actors were to the PLO, and how their preferences and demands were of influence on the group’s increase in institutionalization (H2).
The result of the shift towards diplomacy was that patronage from the Gulf States swelled (Amour 2013; Krause 2013; Nassar 1991; Sayigh 1997). This massive influx of assistance did lead to a lack of focus on self-sufficiency (Sayigh 1997: p.23).However, Arafat’s obsession with independence from Arab control led him to make deals with various governments, which allowed him to never fully depend on just one country (Sayigh 1997: p.25). It is believed that Arab states donated 250 million dollars per year. Saudi Arabia gifted the PLO 40 million per year in the hopes that it would help Arafat reign in the rebels (Rubin 1994). The Soviet Union, Syria, Iraq, Egypt, the Arab League, Algeria, Yemen, Pakistan, Libya, China, East Germany, North Korea and Iraq also provided arms, money and training (Golan 1986; Israeli 1983; UCDP 2011).
Fatah-PLO leaders were in charge of distributing these resources (Sayigh 1989). This enabled Arafat to seize more control by buying people’s loyalty (Pearlman 2011). As one PLO council member stated “membership reflected the dominance of Fatah on the Palestinian scene” (Rubin 1994: p.77). Considering the amounts of money the organization received from foreign supporters that wanted to prevent conflict escalation, it can be said that patrons helped Arafat decrease power dispersion (H3). Most Arab states were becoming more open to negotiating with Israel (Quandt 1986: p.370), and Arab economies were flourishing due to new oil discoveries (Quandt 1990). It could be that for the first time principals preferred peace as this would be beneficial for the whole the region. A stable PLO, now a member of their League, would ease much of the unrest. This could explain the extensive support for the dominant faction within the PLO instead of sponsoring rival factions as states had previously done.
Despite these institutional developments and Fatah’s growing dominance, coordination remained a problem. Arafat was unable to force the 10-point agreement on the radicals and as focus began to lie with diplomacy instead of armed struggle even more, hardliners within the PLO were outraged. The newly established program should have decreased tension, but had the adverse effect. PFLP, DFLP, ALF and others established the Rejectionist Front that would act independently from the PLO for years to come and would be responsible for many attacks on Israel (Amour 2013, p.148). Iraq and Libya immediately pledged support for the rejectionists. Libya began rewarding the DFLP with 1 million a month (Pearlman 2011). In addition, the Front received support from Algeria, Yemen, Syria, Cuba and Algeria and offered them economic support, weapons and training (UCDP 2011).
Over the years, the Front continuously criticized Fatah and tried to boycott their plans to form alliances with former enemies Jordan and Egypt (Pearlman 2011: p.76). During the Lebanese civil war the Front also undermined ceasefires after being ordered by Iraq to sabotage it (Pearlman 2011: p.87). Additionally, Leftist Fatah members, Sa’iqa and the PFLP-GC all closely tied to Syria, began rejecting Arafat’s tactics (Amour 2013; Pearlman 2011). The fact that the rejectionists were able to function for that long without PLO support can be attributed to patronage. They predominantly received support from principals that opposed either the United States or the moderate stand of Arab countries and the PLO against Israel. Their resistance prevented Fatah from gaining full control of the PLO. As external sponsorship enabled Arafat’s rivals to boycott him, it can be said that foreign support diffused power (H3). The different preferences of the more radical external actors also undermined Arafat’s attempts to institutionalize (H2). During the PLO’s time in Lebanon, Arafat had agreed that the group would only attack Israeli targets in coordination with the Lebanese army. Several factions largely ignored this. While this indicates that Lebanese support came along with a set of demands in order to discipline its principal (H2), it also shows that the involvement of principals supporting the anti-Fatah organizations made effectively constraining the PLO as a whole impossible.
5. A hegemon’s rise: 1982-1993
The civil war in Lebanon left the PLO isolated from the outside world. It had lost its territorial base and many PLO members were displeased. Some external actors both supported and
