1
The Limits of Humanitarianism?
Comparing the European Neighbourhood Policy in Egypt and Tunisia in the wake of the Arab Revolts
The Fight for Tahrir Square: February 4, 2011 World Press Photo
Master Thesis Political Science – International Relations Our changing global economic order
Student: Marieke Haagh
Supervisor: Professor G.R.D. Underhill Amount of words: 20.323
2
Abstract
This study aims to understand how democracy promotion efforts of the European Union have varied in the cases of Egypt and Tunisia after the Arab Revolts in 2011. To this extent, it argues that distinct regime dynamics of the two particular cases have resulted into contrasting trajectories after the revolutions. In particular, Tunisia was an open reality for the EU and the established democratic system provided the EU with a good basis to work. On the contrary, Egypt forced the EU to deal with restored authoritarianism and therefore the EU’s external action has been limited. In particular, the country illustrated the stability-democracy dilemma the EU is engaged with. Subsequently, this study illustrates that the instruments of the EU are part of ‘the problem’ of its efforts in development cooperation. In addition, this study illustrates that the EU has continuously prioritised its security interests.
3 Table of Contents Abstract p. 2 Table of Contents p. 3 List of abbreviations p. 5 Introduction p. 7 1.1 Introduction p. 7
1.2 Democracy promotion in Egypt and Tunisia p. 8
1.3 Country-specific factors p. 9
1.4 Methodology p. 11
1.5 Structure of the thesis p. 13
Chapter 2: Theoretical framework p. 14
2.1 The context of global development cooperation p. 14
2.2 Cooperation as a strategic interaction p. 15
2.3 EU foreign policy in the Arab world p. 17
2.4 Democracy-stability dilemma p. 17 2.5 Regime dynamics p. 18 2.5.1 Political liberalisation p. 19 2.5.2 State capacity p. 20 2.5.3 Interdependence p. 20 2.6 Conclusion p. 22
Chapter 3: The institutional framework of democracy promotion p. 23
3.1 The origins of democracy promotion p. 23
3.2 Democracy promotion: a multifaceted policy p. 23
3.2.1 The linkage model p. 24
3.2.2 Political dialogue p. 25
3.2.3 The leverage model p. 25
3.3 Democracy promotion: an incoherent policy? p. 26
4
3.3.1 The 2011 ENP p. 28
3.3.2 The 2015 ENP p. 28
Chapter 4: The EU and the MENA region prior to the Arab revolts p. 30 4.1 The EU’s historical engagement with the MENA region p. 30
4.2 EU-Tunisia relations up to the revolts p. 31
4.3 EU-Egypt relations up to the revolts p. 33
4.4 Origins of the revolts p. 34
4.5 The response of the EU p. 35
Chapter 5: The case of Tunisia p. 37
5.1 Political Liberalisation p. 37
5.2 State Capacity p. 40
5.3 Interdependency p. 42
5.3.1 Socio-economic interdependency p. 42
5.3.2 Political and security interdependency
Chapter 6: The case of Egypt p. 45
6.1 Political Liberalisation p. 45
6.2 State Capacity p. 50
6.3 Interdependency p. 52
6.3.1 Socio-Economic Interdependency p. 52
6.3.2 Political and Security Interdependency p. 54
Conclusions p. 56
Bibliography p. 59
5 List of abbreviations
AA Association Agreement AMU Arab Maghreb Union
AP Action Plan
CSFP Common Security and Foreign Policy DCFTA Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area EEAS European External Action Service
EEC European Economic Community
EMAA Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement ENP European Neighbourhood Policy
ENPI European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument
EU European Union
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
HR/VP High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy HRW Human Rights Watch
IMF International Monetair Fund ISIL Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant ISSG International Syria Support Group MENA Middle East and North Africa NGO Non-Governmental Organisation ODA Official Development Assistance PLO Palestinian Liberation Organisation
SAAP Support to the Association Agreement and Action Plan SCAF Security Council of Armed Forces
UAE United Arab Emirates UN United Nations
6 ‘We really wonder: where is the role of the United States and the
European Union and all of the other international forces that are interested in the security, safety and well-being of Egypt? Are the values of freedom and democracy exclusively exercised in your countries but other countries do not have the right to exercise the same values and enjoy the same environment? Have you seen the scores of millions of Egyptians calling for change in Tahrir? What is your response to that?’ (General el-Sisi in the Washinton Post, 5th of August 2013)
7 Introduction
The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is a peculiar region. Prior to the Arab revolts this region seemed relatively stable and this stability suggested adequate societal support for the autocratic regimes that characterised regional governments (Bromley, 2014). Therefore, the uprisings that unfolded in December 2010 in Tunisia took most observers including political scientists, economists and policy makers, by surprise (Gause, 2011; Bellin, 2012; Bromley, 2014). Inherently, hopes for a third democratisation wave quickly spread to the Western world. Now, more than six years later the region is characterised by fragmentation, insecurity and fragility (Youngs, 2013). Since these revolutions escalations of conflicts have taken place in the region, as seen in Syria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen and in other countries authoritarianism has restored (e.g., Egypt, Bahrain) or had never left the country (e.g., Jordan, Lebanon). Furthermore, the region faces on-going economic mismanagement, crony capitalism and rising unemployment all over again (Schumacher, 2015). It is only Tunisia that has been viewed as an outlier and in the country a significant transition to democracy has been established (Freedom House, 2016).
It was unforeseen that the changes in this region would intensify the interaction of so many international and (new) regional actors. The European Union (EU) is among the most important. The different political landscape in the MENA region has shaken the grounds of the relations between the EU and its southern neighbourhood (European Commission, 2011). Since these uprisings, new challenges and tendencies have emerged that altered the relationship between the EU and the Middle East. The Arab uprisings led to significant population movements and security threats due to new conflicts, upon which the European Union and the Middle East are struggling to find solutions (Youngs, 2013). The war in Syria led to massive numbers of refugees on the move of whom are mostly being sheltered in the region and in particular, in the main receiving countries Lebanon (1), Jordan (2) and Turkey (3) (UNHCR, 2016). Yet, a small percentage (roughly 10%), is trying to reach Europe with Germany as the main receiving country (UNHCR, 2016). Consequently the migration issue is high on the political agenda in Europe. In the MENA region most of the region’s particularly young population (half of its population is below 26 years old) is affected by devastating economies, conflicts and dictatorships (Hoorn, 2017). Ultimately, the crises in Europe have created new approaches towards the Middle East as the disintegrating Eurozone is facing rising nationalism, concerns over irregular migration and terroristic attacks (Seeberg, 2017).
8 Therefore, the uprisings and consequential developments have reshaped the Middle East and correspondingly have changed its relationship with the EU. The aim of this thesis is to shed light on this changing order in a crucial region, by analysing the cooperation between the EU and its southern neighbourhood as to understand its outcomes.
1.2 Democracy promotion in Tunisia and Egypt
Ultimately, the protests that started in Tunisia and Egypt, the subsequent outbreak of the civil war in Libya and the accompanying mass protests in Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Jordan, Syria, Yemen, Bahrain and Oman, suggested that previous literature on resilient authoritarianism was incorrect (Schumacher, 2011). This literature had argued that the Middle East had a unique ‘robustness’ of authoritarianism, due to the coercive capacity of the regimes and international support and financing they acquired (Bellin, 2004; Hinnebusch, 2006). Meanwhile, it was argued that international democracy promotion in the Mediterranean had not been successful (Bicchi, 2006; Gillespie, 2006; Cavatorta and Durac, 2009; Pace, 2009; Seeberg, 2009). Research had suggested that democracy promotion only marginally had contributed to the outbreaks of the protests and even had supported the autocratic regimes (Cavatorta and Durac, 2009; Schumacher, 2011). The EU acknowledged this. As Štefan Füle, the former European Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy, explicitly stated in a speech to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the European Parliament straight after the onset of the revolts:
‘Europe was not vocal enough in defending human rights and local democratic forces in the region. Too many of us fell prey to the assumption that authoritarian regimes were a guarantee of stability in the region. This was not even Realpolitik. It was, at best, short-termism and the kind of short-termism that makes the long term ever more difficult to build’ (Füle, 2011: 2).
Therefore, the revolts highlighted that there is a need to understand the outcomes of the cooperation on democracy promotion with the European Union and its Mediterranean partners (Hüllen, 2015). As it follows, these outcomes on democracy promotion play out differently in every country included in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).1 For example, as the
cooperation on democracy promotion with Tunisia before the Arab Spring was extremely difficult, after the revolts the country accounts for the most successful cooperation with the EU
1 In the MENA region: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine (not recognised
9 (Hüllen, 2015). Moreover, it has been argued that the EU distinguished Tunisia from Egypt, providing higher assistance for a longer period to Tunisia, while Egypt’s development-related needs are in fact higher (Schumacher, 2016: 3). Literature has suggested that domestic factors in the MENA region account for these variations (Bellin 2004; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2009; Volpi, 2012; Kausch, 2013). Meanwhile, it has been argued that the focus of analysis is mostly on the European Neighbourhood Policy itself and not on how it responds to particular country cases (Kausch, 2013; Zardo, 2017). This debate has been extensively discussed and often the democracy promotion efforts of the EU have been criticised. However, the interactive nature of agreements has not been addressed properly (Zardo, 2017: 76). The internal dynamics and behaviour of the recipient countries influence the relation and determine the policy outcomes importantly. This is particularly relevant since the ENP has in recent years become more focused on co-ownership (European Commission, 2015a). Therefore, this thesis addresses the following question: how do regime dynamics relate to the variation and outcomes of cooperation on democracy promotion between the EU and its partners in the Mediterranean after the Arab revolts?
To respond to the research question, this study will use two cases that are appropriate to address this question. In this regard, this study will analyse the two cases of Egypt and Tunisia and compare the outcomes in relation to democracy promotion with the EU and link these to the different regime dynamics of the countries. These two countries have been primary targets of the European Neighbourhood Policy in its southern neighbourhood and both have engaged with the EU profoundly (İşleyen, 2012). Both countries were the first countries upon where the Arab revolts initiated. Furthermore, both countries have security-stability aspects the EU tries to deal with; both have migration issues, both have known a volatile transition process and economic instability (Hamzawy, 2015; Zardo, 2017). However, the distinct internal dynamics of these two countries led to contrasting trajectories after the uprisings. While Egypt forces the EU to deal with the ‘restored authoritarianism’ problem all over again, Tunisia is a case of how does the EU help democratic governance become stable. Therefore, each case tests different problems and tensions in the ENP and ultimately will contribute to our understanding of the ENP in the Mediterranean.
10 Since the 1990s the EU started to promote democracy outside its borders by implementing this in its foreign policy towards the Mediterranean (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2009). To this extent, the EU’s foreign policy in the MENA region has ever since been about influencing the regional environment in order to create a favourable environment for pursuing the EU’s goals and interests more easily. At the same time, the EU has relied on a cooperative approach by using soft power means, implying a certain voluntarism of its partner country to comply with the conditions of cooperation (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2009). The results of cooperation therefore depend on negotiating and joint-decision making processes with its partner country (Fearon, 1998).
However, the MENA region forces the EU to deal with multiple dilemmas. In particular, the EU faces a dilemma between providing democratic assistance and consequently the potential of destabilising the country, which can result in counteracting the EU’s security interests in for instance, energy supply or tackling migration challenges (Schlumberger, 2006; Bulut Aymat, 2011; Hüllen, 2015). Therefore, the ambitions of the EU are largely determined by the different dilemmas presented in each partner country. Consequently, as being caught up in multiple dilemmas and relying on a cooperative approach, the (successful) cooperation on democracy promotion, human rights and the rule of law has not extensively been defined by the goals of the EU. On the contrary, the successful cooperation has been largely defined by partner country-specific factors and their willingness of cooperation (Hüllen, 2015).
In this study, the framework of Vera van Hüllen will be used to analyse the different regime dynamics that ultimately shaped the variation in cooperation. Van Hüllen studied the relationship between regime dynamics and the results of democracy promotion with its Mediterranean partners in the 1990s and 2000s. In particular, she argued that i) the degree of political liberalisation, ii) state capacity and iii) interdependency shaped the preferences of both the EU and the target country (Hüllen, 2015: 10). Ultimately, the combination of these factors shaped the strategic choices of the actors involved and therefore the resulting outcomes and quality of the cooperation on democracy promotion.
Briefly, these factors suggest that first; the degree of political liberalisation determines whether the political agenda of the regime is in line with the democracy promotion agenda of the EU. Secondly, the state capacity or the limitations to it, determines whether the recipient country is in need for external support. Lastly, political/security and socio-economic interdependency define the strategic importance of the target country for the EU and ultimately shape the negotiating power of the actors involved (Keohane and Nye, 1977; Kausch, 2013).
11 Against this backdrop, this study will argue that the (successful) outcomes of cooperation on democracy promotion depend largely on partner country-specific factors rather than the implementation of the EU’s variety of instruments for democracy promotion. For instance, these instruments largely rely on the engagement of the authoritarian regimes, which cannot be expected from these regimes when it comes to the cooperation on democracy, human rights and the rule of law. As a result, this study will argue that the instruments of the EU are therefore an essential part of the ‘problem’. Ultimately, the different regime dynamics and developments have shaped the preferences of the actors involved and contributed to the different outcomes on democracy promotion.
The case of Egypt confronted the EU with multiple dilemmas while on the contrary, Tunisia accounts for a ‘successful’ cooperation on democracy promotion (EU official, 2017). In particular, the military that largely defined politics in Egypt after the revolutions has challenged the EU by executing highly repressive governance, expanding its power in various sectors of society (Roll, 2016). In addition, Egypt as a strategically important political player in the region and being economically dependent on other countries in the region than the EU has left the EU with a limited negotiating power. Consequently, the EU, while relying on soft power instruments, has largely continued to financially support the dictatorship. Subsequently, the quality of cooperation on democracy promotion with the EU has been falling short.
On the contrary, Tunisia, as transitioned into a functioning, if precarious democracy has been assertive about its position in the world and in particular with the EU (Zardo and Cavatorta, 2016). The ability of Tunisia to put into place a democratic system provided the EU with a unique basis for cooperation in the region. Nonetheless, its institutionally volatile transition process after the revolutions together with its economic weakness, led to the need for external support (Zardo, 2017). The EU, as being the largest development assistance donor in the country, has willingly fulfilled this role (OECD, 2016). However, this ultimately shaped the negotiating power in favour of the EU, which is illustrated in the current agreements on tackling the challenges of migration.
1.4 Methodology
This study focuses on two contrasting cases of the application of the ENP to MENA partner countries. Subsequently, the study employs a case study methodology that includes both within-case analysis of each selected within-case and a cross-within-case comparison. It has been argued in the
12 literature that this kind of analysis provides the most robust support for the causal mechanisms identified in response to the research question (Bennet and George, 2005).
John Gerring argued that a case study is an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger set of units (Gerring, 2004: 341). The purpose of this kind of research is to gain in-depth knowledge about the subject of investigating and about the causality mechanisms that are taking place (Gerring, 2004). In this research a case study approach will be used to study the policy making process of the EU and the regime dynamics of the two countries in order to seek and understand the causality. Moreover, through within-case analysis the internal dynamics of the specific cases can be exposed, which will achieve high conceptual validity.
In this research, the cases are a study of the EU’s foreign policy in the Middle East upon which this study will examine how the cases will fit in the literature. Additionally, this study will conduct a cross-case comparison. In this regard, this study will analyse the two cases of Egypt and Tunisia and compare the outcomes in relation to democracy promotion with the EU and the different regime dynamics of these countries. As aforementioned, both countries have contrasting trajectories after the revolts. Therefore, each case tests different problems and tensions in the ENP and ultimately will contribute to our understanding of the ENP in the Mediterranean.
The actual method to be applied to each of the cases is process tracing. Process tracing is the analysis of evidence on processes within a case in order to test or develop hypotheses about the causal mechanisms taking place in the particular case (Bennett and Checkel, 2015: 7). Therefore, it is the central method for within case analysis and aims to make assumptions about causal explanations of that case (Bennett and Checkel, 2015: 2). Additionally, process tracing reveals a sort of chain of events within a case. In particular, it constructs a causal chain by identifying the causal mechanisms that determine the decisions of actors and outcomes made (Kincaid, 2012: 70). In this regard, it reveals the actors preference formation, by linking the context to preferences and motivations. Subsequently, preferences will be linked to choices made and therefore the expected or unintended outcomes.
By using a variety of data that consists of primary and secondary sources, this study will establish the causal mechanisms and chains that lie behind the cooperation. In doing so, this study can establish in how far the proposed theory on the ENP in the Mediterranean are evident in the cases and use a variety of data to come to a suitable answer for the proposed research
13 question. The gathered data will be from policy documents of the EU, reports from Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), European think tanks as FRIDE, speeches, basic indicators, statistical data, interview transcripts and newspapers. Moreover, a literature study will be conducted by on the one hand, using literature on external European governance and on the other hand, using case-specific literature from Middle Eastern studies.
In addition, I will conduct an expert interview with an EU official in Brussels. The interviewee is a Desk Officer of the European External Action Service (EEAS) for the European Commission and responsible for Tunisia.2 In particular, she works on the basis of the Association
Agreement (AA), which the EU signed with Tunisia and on the different fields and specific dossiers of the EU-Tunisia relations. The aim of this interview is to interpret to what extent she agrees on my analysis and expand the analysis with her contribution.3
1.5 Structure of the thesis
This thesis will try to understand how the same policy goals and norms on democracy promotion since the Arab Revolts were deployed across the two cases of Egypt and Tunisia and how this led to contrasting outcomes. Therefore, the rest of the thesis will be structured in the following
matter.
The next chapter will develop a theoretical framework that underpins the empirical analysis. This chapter will elaborate on global development cooperation in general and strategic choice theory behind international development cooperation. In addition, this chapter will elaborate on regime dynamics as the independent variable of this study and the specific aspects that will ultimately shape the specific analysis of this study. In the third chapter an institutional and contextual framework of EU’s foreign policy will be provided. In particular, the origins of democracy promotion together with the multiple instruments deployed by the EU regarding democracy promotion will be discussed. Furthermore, this chapter will illustrate the incoherency of these instruments and illustrate the evolution of the framework of democracy promotion.
In the fourth chapter a short background will be provided on the historical engagement of the EU with the MENA region. In particular, the strategic interests of the EU with the MENA region before, during and after the Cold War will be discussed. In addition, the EU’s engagement with the two particular cases up to the revolts will be debated together with the
2 The interviewee granted permission to publish her opinions in this thesis, however wished to remain
anonymous.
3 The EU delegation in Egypt and Tunisia, as well as EU officials in Brussels responsible for Egypt, did
14 origins of the revolts and the EU’s response. Henceforth, a complete picture of the relevant literature on the EU’s foreign policy in the MENA region has been discussed, together with the particular engagement of the EU with the two country cases prior to the Arab revolts.
Consequently, in chapter 5 and 6 the analysis will be conducted. These chapters will bring the analytical framework and the empirical data together. In particular, these chapters will link the regime dynamics distinguished by the discussed factors in chapter 2 and developments of the particular cases of Tunisia and Egypt in the wake of the Arab revolts to the European Neighbourhood Policy. The last chapter will round up the debate and provide for the conclusions.
Chapter 2: Theoretical framework
In its implementation of democracy promotion outside its borders, the EU largely exercises soft power that involves no coercion or negative conditionality for its recipient countries. Therefore, the EU’s pursuit on external democracy promotion depends largely on the preferences by the recipient countries and their willingness on cooperation with the EU. This is why the relation on democracy promotion between the European Union and its southern neighbours can be understood in the context of theories of international relations on cooperation, specifically in a strategic framework.
This chapter will highlight this aspect by providing a theoretical background of why countries have strategic considerations for global development cooperation and analyse the EU’s democracy promotion in a strategic choice framework. Ultimately, this chapter will elaborate on the independent variable ‘regime dynamics’ and discuss the factors that shape the variety of outcomes on cooperation on democracy promotion with the EU (dependent variable).
2.1 The context of global development cooperation
The EU engages in democracy promotion and therefore, in Official Development Assistance (ODA). Consequently, the action of the EU in the MENA region can therefore more comprehensively be understood in the context of global development cooperation. In particular, the EU has a prominent role in this context, as it is the world´s largest donor of ODA (EUneighbours, 2017a). To this extent, member states are supposed to follow and co-ordinate the EU’s strategy on ODA assistance.
15 In this part of the study, I will introduce some insights in the debate on development cooperation and the different sorts of motivations behind ODA assistance that show similarities with the more strategic views on international cooperation theory, as they will be discussed in the following sections.
The question: ‘Does foreign aid really work?’ is still being asked since foreign aid started to develop in the 1940s. This question illustrates that foreign aid is a highly complex subject and that its impact is still quit unknown (Riddel, 2007). This has led to the fact that ODA, which involves development and emergency aid provided by official donors including state and local governments, has been constantly changing (Riddel, 2007: 19). Throughout history, the motivations for ODA have differed constantly. Notably, foreign aid is influenced by humanitarian and development considerations. However, foreign aid is also determined by political, commercial and strategic interests of its donors (Riddel, 2007: 358). For example, after 9 /11 the implementation of foreign aid became part of a wider political agenda.
Moreover, it has been argued that in recent years there has been a paradigm shift in foreign aid and development cooperation from an aid effectiveness paradigm towards a development effectiveness paradigm (Mawdsley et al, 2014: 30). This has been the result of increasing pressures of commercial and national interests. Consequently, it has been argued that there has been a renewed focus on poverty reduction via promoting good governance, rather than poverty reduction by providing money (Mawdsley et al, 2014: 28). Therefore, the focus has shifted towards economic growth and investment and therefore enhancing productivity as the main driver of development and reducing poverty. For instance, there has been a focus on building infrastructure and on the extension of the role of the private sector. In addition, there has been a focus on increasing integration of foreign aid with other policy areas such as trade and migration (Mawdsley et al, 2014). Furthermore, it has also been argued that along with these new developments, the traditional aid donors like the EU and the United States are having an even greater focus on redefining their own role in the changing development landscape. With the rise of emerging powers and therefore new actors as development partners, the traditional donor countries are more focused on building partnerships and coordination with these new actors rather than providing foreign aid to third countries (Mawdsley et al, 2014: 35).
2.2 Cooperation as a strategic interaction
Given that ODA is linked to broader foreign policy concerns, the provision of foreign aid involves important strategic considerations. Furthermore, the implementation of democracy promotion depends not solely on the EU’s willingness to promote its rules outside its borders; it
16 depends on voluntarism of the target country and therefore its willingness of cooperation on democracy promotion (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2009). As a result, the outcomes of cooperation are determined by the results of negotiations, bargaining and joint decision-making processes between the two sides (Fearon, 1998). This implies a strategic interaction between both actors involved. This was already recognised by Kenneth Waltz in 1959, when he argued that international outcomes are always the product of choices made by more than one actor (Waltz, 1959). Likewise, Morton Kaplan used game theory to capture this strategic interaction (Kaplan, 1957). Game theory is a part of behavioural relations and can explain the dynamics behind cooperation. Within this theory, it has been argued that the outcome of cooperation is the result of the strategy defined by the preferences of both actors and therefore one needs to consider each other’s preferences in order to pursue its own strategy and action (Lake and Powel, 1999). However, with respect to democracy promotion, the two actors are not equal as one is the sender of democracy promotion and the other one is the receiver (Hüllen, 2015). This leads to the idea that there is a wider variation in outcomes of the cooperation as it is not simply ‘yes’ or ‘no’ engagement with each other. The sender of democracy promotion can be persistent or indifferent to the following of its rules, while the receiver can actively engage in cooperation or rather be selective and dictate its own terms (Hüllen, 2015: 17).
Within strategic choice theory, actors are defined by its preferences and its preferred outcomes depend on how other actors behave. Consequently, each actor must take the actions of the other into account (Lake and Powell, 1999). Within rational choice theory it has been argued that the strategic preferences of actors are based on its fixed interests and depend on rational cost-benefit calculations (Ibid). However, in realist theory and international political economy literature, it has been argued that its interests are formed by the actor’s self-interest in survival (Waltz, 1979). Nonetheless, in the context of ODA, survival interests for the donor countries are seldom at stake. In particular, ODA is about influencing the regional or global environment to make survival less of a problem and generally to create a favourable environment that makes pursuing interests and goals easier. Furthermore, this does not mean that norms and identities cannot be acknowledged in strategic considerations (Scharpf, 1997). The EU’s norms on democracy promotion can be based on humanitarian reasons, as well on their reasons of self-interest in stability. However, these are also considered in rational decision-making (Hüllen, 2015).
Consequently, the EU’s engagement in the MENA region can also be seen as an attempt to influence the regional environment to promote the EU’s interests and prosperity through better relations with its MENA partners.
17 2.3 EU foreign policy in its neighbourhood
In the external relations of the EU, the promotion of democracy was introduced as one of its objectives in the 1980s and was implemented in its foreign policy in 1992 with the Treaty of Maastricht (Hüllen, 2015). Therefore, traditionally the EU’s role in foreign policy has been defined as being a civilian opposed to a military power (Duchêne, 1972). In 2002, it was Ian Manners who altered these visions by arguing that we may best conceive the EU as a normative power (Manners, 2002). By normative power EU, Manners argued that the EU seeks to redefine international norms in its own image (Manners, 2002: 252).
However, many scholars have argued that the EU goes beyond this normative power and pursues a realist agenda in the Middle East. It has been argued that the EU does not live up to these norms or that norms disguise the underlying interests as stability and security (Pace, 2009). Therefore, it has been argued that the EU acts as a realist actor in normative clothes (Pace, 2009; Seeberg, 2009). For instance, the ENP Action Plans (AP) for the EU’s partner countries in the southern neighbourhood, illustrate that the EU’s geostrategic and target countries’ political interests are predominantly present (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2013: 15). According to Michelle Pace, the EU has inherent paradoxes in its push for its own norms in the MENA region (Pace, 2009). She argues that EU member states are risk averse; they prefer to increase stability in its neighbouring countries instead of building a democracy (Pace, 2009).
2.4 Democracy-stability dilemma
Still, the European Union has increasingly sought cooperation since the 1990s on democracy promotion with the Middle East. Since the EU’s external governance can be defined as an attempt to transfer the EU’s rules of the game and policies beyond its borders, to a certain degree the EU’s external action has been guided by normative considerations (Lavenex, 2004: 684). Additionally, its governance has not only consisted of exporting rules, but also about extending integration dynamics in the sense of creating joint regulatory structure (Lavenex, 2008: 943). Therefore, the ´hypocrisy´ of the EU as argued by Gillespie and others, can be explained that in its formation of preferences the EU engages in strategic considerations (Gillespie, 2006; Pace, 2009). To be explicit, the EU faces a dilemma whether to strive for stability or democracy.
When it comes to the MENA region, the EU’s ideal of implementing democracy is accompanied by the EU’s competing foreign policy objectives (Zardo and Cavatorta, 2016). In particular, the EU not only wants to implement democracy, it does not want to harm its own interests in security, stability as well prosperity in Europe (Hüllen, 2015). Therefore, by
18 demanding cooperation on democracy promotion in a context of authoritarian regimes, the EU has the potential of destabilising the country and therefore harm its own interests in security like energy supply and economic welfare. In sum, in the MENA region the nature of the regimes forces the EU to face a trade-off between promoting democratic governance (with largely soft power means) thus potentially destabilising authoritarian governments and ‘traditional´ security and stability issues that lead to engaging dictatorships. By promoting democracy, the EU can enable protests, instability and conflicts in the regime that therefore bring the EU’s interests in its own security in danger. In the literature, this has been defined as the democracy-stabilisation dilemma the EU faces when it comes to policy making (Youngs, 2004; Bicchi 2006; Schlumberger, 2006; Zardo and Cavatorta 2016).
Since the origins of external democracy promotion, the EU has been confronted with dilemmas in the MENA region. In particular, each country presents the EU dilemmas created by the inherent dynamics of this partner country. Together with the cooperative approach the EU engages with, this is why the EU varies in its implementation of democracy promotion. For example, some countries as Morocco started early with implementing programmes of the EU while others remained reluctant (Hüllen, 2015). This provides evidence that the internal dynamics of the partner countries play an important role in generating different outcomes as these dynamics affect the costs and benefits of cooperation on democracy and human rights, shape its partners choice of strategy and that of the EU. Therefore, this study will argue that country-specific factors account for the variation in EU democracy promotion. In the following section, it will be argued which factors shape the preferences of actors involved and therefore the resulting outcomes of cooperation.
2.5 Regime Dynamics
In the MENA region the nature of regimes is mostly characterised by repression and authoritarianism. Additionally, it has been argued that this region is resistant to democratisation processes (Bellin, 2004). Hence, this is defined by the possibility and the willingness of the authoritarian regimes to block any democratic initiative. In particular, a small coalition group, who limits access to resources as land and capital for its society, leads the state. Yet, on the contrary, it lets the elite profit from activities as trade and commerce (North, Wallis et al, 2009: 30). This type of state rules its territory by deriving legitimacy from its elite and by repressing and excluding its society. This robustness of authoritarianism is most often combined with international support and the use of a monopoly on violence (Bellin, 2004). Therefore, the cooperation with the EU on democracy promotion can endanger the autocratic survival of these
19 types of regimes. In particular, this ultimately can change domestic politics. Furthermore, this implies that political reform will only be materialised when the incentives are high enough (Zardo and Cavatorta, 2016). Subsequently, in an autocratic regime the preferences of the regime to cooperate with the EU depend largely on the elites willingness to cooperate.
This section will discuss that this has been largely defined by the openness of the regimes’ institutions and the regimes’ institutional capacity. Additionally, interdependency characterises the relationship on cooperation. Hereof, this study suggests the following as the factors that determine preferences and shape the willingness of regime and therefore define the choice of strategies involved in the cooperation. These factors are: i) the degree of political liberalisation in the recipient country, ii) the state capacity in the recipient country and iii) the interdependency of the recipient country towards the EU (Hüllen, 2015: 10).
2.5.1 Political Liberalisation
The first variable that accounts for variation in the cooperation on democracy and human rights is the degree of political liberalisation the target country possesses. This involves the degree of openness of the regime. North, Wallis and Weingast have argued that a modern state is a state with an open access order (North, Wallis and Weingast, 2009). Although most states globally are natural states, an open access state is a state with a high degree of political liberalisation. On the contrary, a natural state is a state ruled by a small elite upon which society has a limited access to resources. In such manner, the transition from a natural state to an open access state includes the change of the economy to open access to markets and competition. Yet, it also includes a change in the polity, with greater political participation for citizens, impersonal political rights and transparent institutions (North, Wallis and Weingast, 2009: 2). In sum, political liberalisation illustrates the civil and political liberties of the society (Brynen et al, 1995: 3). The degree of political liberalisation can explain the variation in cooperation with the EU as autocratic regimes seek regime survival. In this regard, political reforms to democracy can empower citizens and opposition groups and therefore has the ability to bring about domestic change in politics. This can ultimately endanger the survival of the dictators as their authority can waver. On the contrary, the more the regime is open, the more its survival strategies are in line with the EU’s demands and therefore, the ruling establishment is more willing to cooperate.
Operationalisation:
The degree of political liberalisation in the particular cases will be studied by using a variety of sources as reports from NGO’s, progress reports of the EU, interviews and a literate study.
20 Furthermore, this factor will be measured by using data from the Freedom House Index. The Freedom House Index, has measured indicators as political pluralism and freedom of press, in each country globally and due to its comparative assessment it has created a freedom index for each country (Freedom House Index, 2016). Another variable that will be used as a measure for political liberalisation is the World Bank Governance Indicator for ‘voice and accountability’. This indicator captures the perceptions of the citizens in their freedom of civil rights. For example, it includes their perceptions on freedom of expression, able to participate in selecting their government and freedom of association (World Bank, 2017a).
2.5.2 State Capacity
The second variable that accounts for the variation in the cooperation on democracy is the state capacity of the target country. In particular, this means to what degree the state has the capacity and monopoly to legitimately use force and govern effectively. In this regard, state capacity can be broadly defined as the ability of state institutions to effectively implement official goals (Sikkink, 1991: 11). Therefore, it includes the (legitimate) institutional strength or vulnerability of the state. In addition, North Wallis and Weingast have argued that a modern state and therefore a high degree of state capacity, the military and police forces are subject to the control of the political system and must also be constrained to illegitimately use violence. This is contrasting with a natural state (North, Wallis and Weingast, 2009: 22).
Consequently, for autocratic regimes limitations to state capacity and therefore institutional instability can undermine the regime’s survival. This ultimately forces the autocratic regime to seek external support for its regime survival.
Operationalisation:
The governance indicators ‘government effectiveness’ and ‘political stability and absence of violence/terrorism’ provided by the World Bank: can give an indication of the institutional capacity of the two respective cases (World Bank, 2017b). For example, the indicator government effectiveness illustrates the societies perception on the quality of public services, independence from political pressure and the credibility of the government’s commitment (World Bank, 2017b). In addition, this factor will be measured by a document study on case-specific literature, policy documents, newspapers and interviews.
21 The last factor that accounts for the variation in the cooperation on democracy and human rights is the degree of (a)symmetric interdependence between the EU and its partner country. Dependence implies that the options of a state are either determined or significantly affected by external forces (Keohane and Nye, 1978). Interdependence simply refers to mutual dependency in world politics, implying situations characterised by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries (Keohane and Nye, 1977: 8). Keohane and Nye have argued that interdependency increases the probability of cooperation among states. Yet, it also exposes a source of power as countries involve in asymmetric interdependencies and therefore have leverage on one another (Keohane and Nye, 1977). Therefore, asymmetric interdependency not determines the (non) cooperation on democracy promotion. Interdependence characterises the relation of cooperation by defining the strategic importance of the actors involved. Subsequently, asymmetric interdependency can be seen as a power shaping factor or a negotiating power (Kausch, 2013: 13). This negotiating power can be in favour or disfavour of the EU. In addition, literature has suggested that higher interdependency or asymmetric interdependency in favour of the EU increases the effectiveness of democracy promotion (Schimmelfennig and Lavenex, 2015).
In this study, socio-economic interdependency will be distinguished from political and security interdependency as they both influence the outcomes of cooperation differently. In this regard, this study will combine political and security interdependency as they are highly intertwined with each other.
2.5.3.1 Socio-economic interdependency
Socio-economic interdependency involves the interdependency both actors have on economic aspects as trade, aid and Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs). Amongst others, this will be measured by using data from the World Bank, the OECD and the European Union (Eurostat). In this regard, trade balances, ODA partners and foreign direct investors will be measured. However, in this respect, not all trade or investment can be treated equally. In particular, it depends what industries are involved as for instance, trade in oil is more important than tourism. Moreover, investments by EU companies can be more important than trade with the EU.
2.5.3.2 Political and Security interdependency
Political interdependency includes to what extent both sides are of strategic political importance to each other. Among others, this includes the dependency on a country that provides for stability in the region or for instance, acts as a mediator in a conflict.
22 The notion of security interdependency is a relatively new concept defined by Peter Seeberg (Seeeberg, 2017). In the latest review of the ENP was argued that the European Union together with its partners in the Middle East should build together to a safer environment (European Commission, 2015a). Together, they should tackle the security matters and solve the many crises of the common region, upon which they both have interests in solving (European Commission, 2015a). This points to the direction of increased interdependency on security between the EU and the Middle East and therefore greater commonalities of interests. Therefore, this factor includes phenomena as the migration crisis, the emergences of strong non-state actors as Daesh, terrorism and the on-going conflicts that have consequences for both sides of the Mediterranean (Seeberg, 2017).
Political and Security interdependency will be measured by using a variety of data from International Organisations as the United Nations (UN) on for example, migration flows. Moreover, it can be measured by a document study of newspapers, speeches, academic literature, interviews and policy documents on the particular cases.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter has illustrated that development assistance is linked to broader foreign policy considerations and therefore is linked to strategic considerations. To be specific, democracy promotion of the EU has been an strategic attempt of influencing its regional environment to make pursuing of its own interests easier. However, the EU’s interests are affected by the different regime dynamics of each partner country and are based on the willingness of the partner country itself. In this study, the configuration of the factors: political liberalisation, state capacity and interdependence will ultimately be used in the analysis to define these dynamics and shape the variety in outcomes of cooperation. Furthermore, this analytical framework will be used throughout the thesis to understand that strategically considerations of both sides have continuously shaped the policy decision-making process of the EU together with the interaction with its partner country. In addition, these strategically considerations have led to the fact that regime dynamics have largely defined the outcomes of cooperation on democracy promotion. Therefore, this framework will be used to understand the EU’s action prior to the Arab revolts, as well as the EU’s differentiation after the Arab revolts in the specific country cases. However, first, the next chapter will illustrate how strategic considerations have shaped the evolution of the institutional framework of the EU’s external democracy promotion.
23 Chapter 3: The institutional framework of democracy promotion
Since the theoretical framework on the EU’s cooperation with its southern neighbourhood has been discussed, this thesis will now turn to the institutional and contextual framework of the EU’s foreign policy in the Mediterranean. First, this chapter will discuss the origins of democracy promotion that can be traced back to the 18th century. Second, this chapter illustrates that the
instruments of the EU’s foreign policy have largely remained the same and that literature suggests that these are incoherent in its use. Third, this chapter will argue that although its overarching principles are based on the promotion of democracy, human rights and rule of law, literature has suggested that it continuously has been perceived as a pragmatic policy with a dominant focus on stability and security aspects (Seeberg, 2017).
3.1 The origins of democracy promotion
The policy of democracy promotion can more comprehensively be understood in a historical perspective. To a certain extent, democracy promotion has been derived from democratic peace theory that gained accuracy in the 1970s (Mullin, 2010: 538). This theory, derived from the ideas of Immanuel Kant and his perpetual peace theory argued that democracies are less likely to go to war with each other and that democracies are also judged to be more political stable internally (Kant, 1795). Moreover, this theory was accompanied by the ideology of economic liberalisation (Mullin, 2010). In the 1990s with the fall of the Soviet Union and its ideology, viability of Western liberalism was established. This ideology based on the principles of democracy and economic liberalism became the core values of the EU upon which its foreign policy is based (Mullin, 2010: 538). Subsequently, in the 1990s the EU envisioned that the external promotion of democracy and human rights should be applied globally and therefore, it started to reform its foreign policy towards its Southern neighbourhood (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2011; Hüllen, 2015). The Barcelona Process that was established in 1995, integrated these provisions and for the first time the relations between the EU and the Mediterranean were being defined (Henökl and Stemberger, 2016). The established declaration was based on the aim to secure political stability, security, economic and cultural cooperation with the overarching principle of a joint commitment on promoting democracy, human rights and the rule of law (European Commission, 2004: 3).
24 From its origins in the 1990s, external democracy promotion has been a multifaceted policy (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2011: 886). In particular, democracy promotion in the MENA region comprises all direct, non-violent activities to strengthen and support democracy (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2011: 888).
In this regard, the EU tries to create a democracy through multiple instruments rather than through one strategic vision (Hüllen, 2015). The EU has argued that it places its focus on democratic institutions and elections, economic development, support for civil society, political dialogue and conditionality (European Commission, 2013a). In particular, the EU largely relies on the use of soft power. Subsequently, literature has suggested that Europe places an emphasis on diplomacy, cooperation and the rule of law (Kagan, 2002). It was Robert Kagan who argued that this use of soft power is due to the fact that Europe has not the military power to do otherwise and therefore has developed ideals regarding the morality of power (Kagan, 2002: 5).
Although the framework of democracy promotion has developed overtime, the EU has since its origins, largely relied on the same ‘soft power’ instruments (Behr, 2012; Bouris and Schumacher, 2017). Within these instruments several mechanisms can be distinguished: the linkage model, political dialogue and the leverage model. In this section, the most important instruments together with the different mechanisms will be discussed.
3.2.1 The linkage model
In this regard, the focus on socio-economic development has been the oldest instrument the EU has engaged with when providing democratic assistance. In the literature this has been defined as the linkage model (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2011: 890). This model consists of a bottom-up approach by enabling and empowering societal, non-governmental actors to initiate democratisation processes (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2011: 890-891). This instrument, derived from the ideology of economic liberalisation, is based on the EU’s principle that socio-economic development brings about and/or sustains democracy (Lipset, 1960). The EU argues that pro-market economic reforms and economic integration will foster the democratisation process in autocratic regimes (Cavatorta and Durac, 2009). They argue that socio-economic development and engagement will lead to political developments, which will shake autocratic foundations. Specifically, socio-economic development will lead to new independent powers that can demand political reform (Cavatorta and Durac, 2009: 27).
The direct instruments the EU enhances for fostering economic development are for example, direct material or educational support. This involves the funding of direct money to pro-democratic civil society organisations or the financing of several types of infrastructure
25 (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2011: 891). The indirect way of the linkage model includes the intensifying and increasing of trade relations, investment relations and of increasing development aid. This resulted in the fact that the EU offered Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements right after the Arab revolts (European Commission, 2013).
3.2.2 Political dialogue
The second mechanism that can be distinguished is political dialogue. Since the 1990s, the EU has sought to negotiate with its partners in the Mediterranean on matters regarding democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Hereof, the EU institutionalised the Euro- Mediterranean Association Agreements (EMAA) with its partners to address matters of common interests (European Commission, 2017a). In these Agreements the EU established guidelines on democracy promotion and in addition concluded dialogues and meetings with its partners (Hüllen, 2015). With the creation of the ENP, the extent of political dialogue increased with it. In particular, the ENP further institutionalised political dialogue by creating Association council meetings and human rights subcommittees (Hüllen, 2015: 67).
Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements Source: European Commission (2017)
3.2.3 The leverage model
The third mechanism that can be identified is the leverage model (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2011). In the leverage model the EU uses conditionality in order to bring about political change
Country Status Date Signed Entry into Force Algeria Signed April 2002 September 2005 Egypt Signed June 2001 June 2004 Israel Signed Nov 1995 June 2000 Jordan Signed Nov 1997 May 2002 Lebanon Signed June 2002 April 2006 Morocco Signed Feb 1996 March 2000 Palestine Signed Feb 1997 Interim Agreement July 1997
Syria Initialled December 2008 Tunisia Signed July 1995 March 1998
26 in the state institutions of the target regime (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2011). Consequently, this model implies democratic assistance through direct cooperation with state officials (Hüllen, 2015: 62). During the 1990s the principle of negative conditionality was integrated in the EU’s foreign policy. In particular, the EU argued that it would take appropriate action if its partner countries would fail to meet the demands. However, the EU continuously favoured the use of positive conditionality and in 2000, this became integrated in the framework. In the literature this mechanism has been identified as the carrot and stick approach (Schimmelfennig and Scholtz, 2008; Hüllen, 2015). In this perspective, the EU holds a ‘carrot’, yet it does not carry a big ‘stick’ (Youngs, 2001: 192).
In this model, the EU sets the conditions for political transition to democratic institutions and rewards the target regime with for example, financial aid, technical assistance, institution building or trade agreements. This was visible in the revised European Neighbourhood Policy after the Arab Spring. In this revised framework, the EU enhanced the ‘more for more’ principle, which meant that the more political reform the recipient countries would undertake, the more they would get (European Commission, 2011). These positive incentives were labelled as the three M’s: money, markets and mobility. The EU argued that it would offer fuller economic integration for partner states into the EU market. This went hand in hand with €1 billion of financial assistance to the region and more access to the EU’s labour markets, all on the condition of implanting political and social reforms (Ibid).
3.3 Democracy promotion: an incoherent policy?
These instruments have been used throughout the EU’s foreign policy up until today. However, literature has suggested that these instruments are inconsistent, have not adjusted appropriately and moreover, that these instruments have evolved around vague concepts (Behr, 2012; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2011; Bouris and Schumacher, 2017).
Regarding the linkage model, literature has suggested that the EU’s support for civil society has been particularly modest and has excluded large sectors of civil society by for instance, only including secularist organisations that are linked to the partner country’s government (Youngs, 2001; Schlumberger 2006). In addition, regularly, autocratic regimes condemn the external support of civil society as that it interferes with their domestic politics. Therefore, most often the EU has prioritised its strategic and economic interests with its partner country over supporting civil society (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2011: 900).
Regarding the leverage model, historically the main leverage was the prospect of EU membership. However, in the MENA region this incentive is ineffective, considering there is no
27 prospect of membership (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2011). In addition, the EU is not willing to promise accession for countries in transition like Tunisia. Furthermore, the conditionality aspect together with the instrument of political dialogue are based on the cooperative approach and therefore imply an engagement of the partner country. However, when it comes to autocratic regimes, active cooperation on democracy promotion, human rights and the rule of law can often not be expected (Hüllen, 2015). This is particularly the case with strong autocratic regimes as complying with the EU’s conditions on democracy, can relate into a threat to their regime survival. Furthermore, this set of instruments points also to a ‘one size fits all’ approach and therefore the EU is neglecting the fact that each country reacts differently on the EU’s instruments and has different needs (Bicchi, 2006).
In addition, it has been argued that the EU kept on financially supporting the autocratic regimes although political reform was not being implemented (Schumacher, 2015).
As aforementioned, the literature has suggested that contradictory objectives are at the heart of this multifaceted policy (Zardo and Cavatorta, 2016: 1). On the one hand, the EU wants to promote socio-economic development and democratic governance. On the other hand, it does not want to provoke instability by destabilising dictatorships and harm their security and economic interests. Furthermore, the EU is also preoccupied with the dilemma of engaging political Islam (Bulut Aymat, 2011). Historically, political Islam has been perceived as a threat to Western Liberalism (Mullin, 2010: 538). However, with the revolutions and therefore Islamist parties coming into power, the EU faced a dilemma whether to engage with these new Islamist Parties.
In particular, the literature has suggested that the aspects of security and stability have continuously been at the core of the EU’s foreign policy. In the next section, the evolution of the ENP illustrates this debate.
3.4 The evolution of the ENP
From 2003 onwards the framework of Euro-Mediterranean relations was being placed under the European Neighbourhood Policy (European Commission, 2004: 2). The ENP was launched in 2004 and was an answer to the EU´s Eastern enlargement of 2004-2007 and therefore the emergence of new borders (European Commission, 2004; Bouris and Schumacher, 2017). Consequently, the ENP was created as being an alternative to accession (Schimmelfennig and Scholtz, 2008: 188). The object of the ENP was to link the neighbouring countries in the east and the south of the European borders to Europe by economic integration and therefore to create a stable neighbourhood. It has been argued that these policies were fuelled by anti-Islam
28 sentiments, due to for instance; the 9/11 attacks (Seeberg, 2017). This can be seen in official documents during this time, upon which the risks of terrorism were being emphasised. For example, it was argued that terrorism was a growing strategic threat to Europe (European Council, 2003).
3.4.1 The 2011 ENP
Therefore, before 2011, this ENP was led by pragmatism, which led as aforementioned to the tacit support for authoritarian regimes (Seeberg, 2013). The revised ENP in 2011 was mainly launched to adjust to the Lisbon treaty and was being framed that it was necessary due to the Arab uprisings and to the new emerging challenges this created (Bouris and Schumacher, 2017). In the Lisbon Treaty was argued that the ENP had to be a more effective foreign policy. In addition, the EU argued that a lack of deep democracy was a unifying factor in the region (Bouris and Schumacher, 2017). Therefore, they argued for a change in action, as its focus on political stability had resulted in support for the regimes (Füle, 2011). The EU argued that they wanted to establish deep democracy by focusing on free and fair elections, freedom of association, free press and also the promotion of a thriving civil society by supporting organisations and NGOs (Füle, 2011).
However, it was argued that this ‘enthusiasm’ after the Arab revolts quickly went back to the old approach (Zardo and Cavatorta, 2016: 13). Moreover, the EU kept on relying on the same instruments as it had used before the uprisings. For instance, the EU placed a focus on socio-economic development. For example, the EU offered Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs) and Action Plans (Aps) (Bouris and Schumacher, 2017: 16). They continued with the implementation of neoliberal policies and economic integration, upon which has been argued that this had intensified the problems rather than tackling them (Bouris and Schumacher, 2017: 17). Additionally, as they proposed the principle of ‘more for more’, the EU argued that it would use negative conditionality. However, developments have shown that the EU has been reluctant in using this type of conditionality (Balfour, 2012a; Bouris and Schumacher, 2017). Furthermore, in the revised ENP came forward that the EU would include civil society and place them at the centre of decision making, Yet, as aforementioned, this remained largely impossible due to the incoherency of this mechanism (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2011). For instance, many authoritarian regimes banned the external support of NGOs (Bouris and Schumacher, 2017). To this extent, it seemed that the EU’s economic and security interests continued to have the upper hand in the revised ENP.
29 3.4.2 The 2015 ENP
This was even more emphasised with the ‘new’ ENP. The new ENP was implemented in 2015 and was driven by emerging security challenges and in particular by the conflicts in the regions and the relation migration crisis. The 2015 ENP has been based on stabilisation, co-ownership and differentiation (European Commission, 2015a). In particular, stabilisation has been described as the most urgent challenge and therefore it has been argued that it resembles the original ENP (Schumacher, 2016). In the 2015 ENP was argued that the EU should address all sectors that are sources for instability and that it should focus on socio-economic development, the different needs of its neighbours and that it should focus more on the interests of the EU itself and the EU’s partners (EUneighbours, 2017b). In addition, a special focus was placed on migration by focusing on the protection of refugees and the control of regular and irregular migration (Seeberg, 2017). Moreover, conflict prevention, counter-terrorism and anti-radicalisation policies lay at the basis of this new ENP (Seeberg, 2017).
Consequently, the debate on democracy and stability took a more dramatic turn as scholars have argued that the EU or at least some member states have returned to ‘geopolitics as exclusion’ in world affairs (Mead, 2014; Youngs, 2015; Duke, 2016).
Richard Youngs, however, moderated this debate for the EU as he argued that the European Union is not an actor that fits into a classical geopolitical context. Still, he argued that the EU has been increasingly concerned about its own strategic interests (Youngs, 2015). Its dependency on the Middle East on migration issues, commercial ties, energy needs, counter-terrorism and foreign aid policies have paved the way for a new approach upon which migration, stability and crisis management seem to be the main objectives. It was Thobias Schumacher who has underlined this. He argued that over the last couple of years a new narrative has been adopted. Instead of viewing the European neighbourhood as the ring of friends, its southern and eastern neighbourhood have been labelled as ‘the ring of fire’ (Schumacher, 2016: 1-2). The revised ENP was being implemented a few days after the terror attacks in Paris. It seemed that the main points of the new ENP were connected to these attacks and to other terroristic attacks that recently happened in Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq and Egypt (Seeberg, 2017: 3). Ultimately, this revision revealed the dominant interests in security and stability of the EU.
In this chapter the institutional and contextual framework of the EU has been debated. This chapter has illustrated that the instruments in which the EU tries to promote democracy are part of the problem of ‘successful’ promoting democratic assistance in autocratic regimes. In particular, this is due to the fact that the EU has been engaged in the stability-democracy
30 dilemmas the MENA region has presented to the EU. However, the evolution of the institutional framework of the ENP has illustrated that the focus on security and stability aspects have dominated the policies since its origins. The next chapter illustrates this in the particular countries of Egypt and Tunisia prior to the Arab revolts. Subsequently, the next chapter will include the EU’s engagement with the two authoritarian regimes up to the revolts and extent briefly on the origins of these revolutions and the accompanied response of the EU, before this study will continue to the actual analysis.
Chapter 4: The EU and the MENA region prior to the Arab revolts
The aim of this study is to understand how the same EU policy goals and instruments have led to different outcomes in the two cases of Egypt and Tunisia after the Arab revolts. So far, this study has discussed that the cooperation on democracy promotion with the EU is defined by the preferences of the actors involved that ultimately shape the strategic interaction and the resulting outcomes of cooperation. In this regard, the outcomes of cooperation are largely defined by regime dynamics in the MENA region. In addition, this study has discussed that the EU instruments of promoting democracy are a part of the problem, as they are incoherent in promoting democracy and have prioritised stability continuously. Therefore, to understand the full picture, the preferences of the actors involved prior to the Arab revolts need to be defined. Additionally, this can give insights into what extent the EU has changed its policies after the Arab revolts.
In this chapter, a brief background will be provided on the EU and its historical engagement in the MENA region prior to the revolts. To this extent, the strategic interests of Europe towards the MENA region during the fall the Ottoman Empire, the cold war and post-cold war will be discussed. Moreover, this chapter will introduce the two cases of Egypt and Tunisia and elaborate on their relations with the EU up to the Arab revolts. This section will further briefly elaborate on the different preferences of both the EU and the regimes, which shaped the outcomes of cooperation up to the revolts. Furthermore, the origins of the revolts will be discussed together with the dilemmas these events presented for the EU in both cases.
