The Spark, The Fire, The Ashes: The Park 51 Controversy - Post 9/11 American Identity and Islamophobia

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THE SPARK, THE FIRE, THE ASHES:

THE PARK 51 CONTROVERSY - POST 9/11 AMERICAN IDENTITY & ISLAMOPHOBIA

N.M.R. Bank

A thesis submitted to the faculty at the University of Amsterdam in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts at the Graduate School of Humanities

(History: American Studies).

University of Amsterdam 2016

Student: N.M.R. Bank – 5877873 NathalieBank@gmail.com Advised and Supervised By: Manon Parry George Blaustein Beerd Beukenhorst

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Abstract

In 2009, two developers propose to build an Islamic Community Center on 51 Park Avenue in Manhattan, New York, two blocks away from Ground Zero. By Summer 2010 that which is soon dubbed to become the “Ground Zero Monster Mosque” is world news. The proposed community center is opposed by anti-Islamic organizations, politicians, certain media outlets and a large portion of the American public. This research analyzes why and how the controversy becomes a global media hype, and what the roles of media and politicians play in the debate. This study claims that the answer is threefold. 1) It finds that Muslim representations in America have long been depraved in both media and policy. The attacks on 9/11 were traumatic for many Americans, because of which some feel the need to re-commit their American identity. The Othering of Muslims is a process of finding that identity, as uttering what the Other is also means uttering what the utterer is not. 2) In this landscape media outlets and politicians that oppose the plans use the polarized nature of the controversy to try to sway public opinion in their favor. 3) They employ tactic strategic communications processes by repeatedly linking the community center to 9/11, thus causing anxiety in the traumatized. As such, those with unstable American identities may desire to rid of the source of the anxiety and can be swayed to oppose Park 51.

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Acknowledgments

To write a thesis is not an easy task. I have come to that conclusion again and again throughout my studies. My habit of letting ideas stew in my brain for a week or two before writing way-too-many-words-a-day shortly before deadlines may have worked for papers, but is not a recipe for success come to large research projects like theses. This thesis proved to be the hardest of them all, perhaps due to my passion for the subject. I was unable to put that final period behind the text for all too long. The subject being as intricate and sensitive and important as it is, I for a long time felt I was not doing it enough justice in this document. As such, the project dragged on and on, at times changing shape and direction by the week, at times halting for months at a time. I am responsible for the the content of this thesis, and I let that responsibility get the best of me by never quite being content with it. It was a weight on my shoulders. I am elated that I’ve finally written that last period. Regardless of the fact that the road to get here was less than smooth, I am satisfied with the final result.

As un-smooth roads go, it is hard to walk them alone. Thankfully I did not have to. I had support from my peers inside and outside the American Studies classrooms: Lisanne, Evi and Linda first and foremost. The long library days with Sylvie and Barbara cannot go unmentioned: it was on those days I gave my thesis new direction. Thank you all.

Thank you to Ruud Janssens and Beerd Beukenhorst of the University of Amsterdam for advising me on topic and direction in the early stages of this thesis. Issues surrounding representation of Islam in the west are now a part of my career, so it seems you pointed my nose in a very good direction way back then. Thank you to Colonel Han Bouwmeester of the Netherlands Defense Academy for helping me develop my model of perception management as part of my methodology. It was a thrill to work at the NLDA as a research intern and I am ecstatic that I get to continue doing so as a PhD researcher. Manon Parry, thank you for your supervision in the final stages of this thesis. I am grateful to have been able to call upon your limited time and vast knowledge. Perhaps most importantly, thank you to George Blaustein. You sparked my interest in doing a Masters in your department in the minor American Studies during my Bachelors program, and

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were a wonderful and engaging coordinator of the Masters program. I have learned so many skills and gained so much knowledge during the last leg of my UvA education, and have you to thank for a very large portion of that. Thank you for your dedication to your students and your help in getting to the final version of this thesis.

Michiel, although you were only by my side for the last fraction of the finishing of this document, it has been a privilege to have you there. Thank you for your faith in me. We make a great team and I know we can climb any mountain that our future may have in store for us.

To my opa Wim and opa Piet & oma Rie, thank you for not letting a phone call or visit go by without asking me when I would finally get my ‘papiertje’. To both my Opa’s, who are no longer among us: I am grateful for your support throughout my studies and throughout my life. You both value books, studies and critical thinking, and encouraged me to do the same from a very young age. I am devastated by your passing and regret that you are not here to see me finally get my diploma. I will be sure to clink my glass (or two, or three) with oma in celebration, and will think of you both while doing so. Oma, I hope I’ve made you proud. I got the education that you didn’t have the opportunity to get, and I hope you feel that I have received that privilege with gratitude and grace.

When clinking those glasses, I have no doubt that the two people who are the reason I am who I am will be beside me, raising their glasses as well. Papa and mama, I am finding myself at a loss for words in trying to express my gratitude for your love, support, patience and trust. Instead, I would like to illustrate it with an anecdote. Mamma, you like to recall the story of 7 year-old me asking you what the ‘best school’ was. “Err…that would be VWO,” you answered. But that wasn’t enough for child me. What was the best school after VWO? “After VWO you could go to university.” Still not satisfied, I asked you which particular university would meet my standards. Not knowing that you didn’t have a clue which university was the ‘best university’, you answered to your best knowledge “The University of Amsterdam. That is the best school.” I had made up my mind. “Okay. Then that’s where I’ll go.” Well papa and mama, I went, and I couldn’t have done it without you. Thank you, thank you, thank you.

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Preface

I cannot overstate how crucial representation is to quality of life of minorities. Nor can I overstate the devastating effects derogatory representations, fear mongering, and casually marking the Muslim religious minority as second-rate citizens has for this and future generations of all Americans. When I began writing this thesis, its subject – the Park51 controversy – was certainly of interest, yet not necessarily a pressing matter. In the time it has taken me to complete this document, it has become increasingly urgent.

Current events dictate Islamophobia as a day to day issue on the media agenda, simultaneously latent and manifest. United States Presidential candidate Donald Trump, who is known to build his platforms around bold polarizing statements and a resolute attitude, has made extreme claims about Muslims and American Muslims that leave little to the imagination. His rousing statements clearly grab hold in large American publics as he is the elected Presidential candidate for the GOP. Regardless of whether or not Trump will actually become President of the United States of America1_{, his relative popularity} with mostly low-income, low educated audiences tells us a lot about the power of discriminatory discourse. His rise can be ascertained as a call for change from the American people, some of whom clearly experience frustration and perhaps even desperation at the manner in which the United States have been run to date. Trump’s radical propositions and utterances, dismissing entire population groups like Muslims, but also Mexicans, Veterans, the disabled, Immigrants, and oh, all of womankind, are root of the spectacle that is Trump, and perhaps also the cause. As these hateful utterances gain as much traction as they do, we must conclude that a significant amount of people agree with Trump’s analysis of mankind’s ‘minorities.’

Meanwhile, the Islamic State works to use Islamophobia in its favor. Spreading fear across the globe through warfare at the geographical location of the conflict in Syria and Iraq, and through terrorist attacks in significant Western capitals like Paris2_{, Brussels}3

1_{And I certainly hope not.}

2_{Which has been known as Europe’s cultural capital for many centuries.}

3_{Europe’s and the West’s political capital, housing amongst others the European Parliament and NATO}

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and Istanbul4_{, it uses the power of modern media to disseminate images and messages of} the tragedies to all those with a screen.

Islamophobia continues to grow in the West, seeds that have been planted decades ago through derogatory representations of Muslims in media and policy along with gross mass-misunderstanding of the religion, watered by enemies like the Islamic State and our own politicians and political parties like Donald Trump in the USA, UKIP in the UK, Geert Wilders and the PVV in The Netherlands, and so on and so forth. If these seeds are watered as much that they should grow into further anti-Islamic policies, officially degrading Western-Muslims to second-rate citizenship, those Muslims perhaps do not have a choice but to revolt or to flee to the one place where they are accepted: traditionally majority-Muslim countries and the Islamic State itself.5

Reaching that state of Islamophobia in the West must be avoided at all cost as it goes directly against the democratic values so carefully cultivated. Understanding how Islamophobia is fed is the first step in preventing its spreading across the world. Educating audiences to encourage critical thinking and common sense is the second. This thesis answers that need in a small way. I urgently encourage other researchers, journalists, writers, vloggers, politicians, artists, teachers and the public to do the same.

Drs. Nathalie Bank Breda, The Netherlands 2016

4_{Perhaps not coincidentally also known as the gate between the West and (Middle) East.}

5_{It can thus be concluded that the Islamic States promotes the fear of Islam not only to spread their own}

extremist ideologies, but also to foster the idea of Muslims being banned from Europe and having no place to go but the geographical location of the Islamic State itself.

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3.2.1 Defining the Trigger ... 57 3.2.2 Park 51 Controversy Trigger(s) ... 59 3.3 AGENDA SETTING ... 61 3.3.1 Defining Agenda Setting ... 61 3.3.2 Agenda Setting with SIOA and Turner in the Existing Media Environment ... 64 3.4 PRIMING ... 67 3.4.1 Defining Priming ... 67 3.4.2 Priming Park 51 ... 69

3.5 STRATEGIC NARRATIVES AND FRAMING ... 71

3.5.1 Defining Strategic Narrative ... 71

3.5.2 Defining Framing ... 74

3.5.3 Strategic Narratives and Framing in the Counter Park 51 Debate ... 77

CONCLUSION ... 87

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Introduction

“Those who tell the stories also rule society” -Plato

In July 2009, the ‘SoHo Property’ real estate investment firm bought a former Burlington Coat Factory building on 45 Park Place in Manhattan, New York. SoHo Property, which already owned multiple buildings on the same block, had grand ideas about what the building should eventually become. They envisioned a grand Islamic Cultural Center which would provide, besides prayer space, “a place of peace...of interfaith dialogue.”67 While building plans were being drawn up for the new center, the old building was taken up for use as a prayer space. The already existing mosque on 245 West Broadway in TriBeCa, named Al Farah, was such a popular institute in the community that it was no longer able to serve all the Muslims in the area. Until the proposed Cultural Center is built, the former retail space was given a temporary permit of assembly, under which it was allowed to function as an overflow prayer space for Manhattan’s Muslim community. All the ducks were in a row for downtown New York to receive a brand new community center. However, against initial expectations, the ducks soon fell out of line and the development plans for the center unexpectedly turned into a worldwide controversy.

When reviewing the building on 45 Park Place, it seems logical that Sharif El-Gamal, the chairman and chief executive of SoHo Properties, was developing plans for an entirely new building. The roof was poorly patched up, refrigerators contained long-forgotten lunches, and the building’s 9-year unoccupied state was tangible. The reason for the forlorn condition of the building? On September 11 2001 the staff of the Burlington Coat Factory situated in the building was having its morning meeting in the basement. As the meeting worked through its agenda, the landing gear of an airplane crashed through the roof. It was torn off of either American Airlines flight 11, while flying into the WTC north tower at 8.46 am, or off of United Airlines flight 175, crashing into the WTC

6_{Ralph Blumenthal, “Muslim Prayers and Renewal Near Ground Zero,” The New York Times, n.d.}

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south tower at 9.03 am. The employees activated the emergency alarm system before evacuating the building. It has been empty ever since.8

The history of the building, as well as its vicinity to Ground Zero, makes Sharif El-Gamal’s decision to build an Islamic center notable. First response to the plans, after an extensive December 2009 New York Times article, was primarily positive. Imam Feisal Abdul Rauf, who lead prayer in the overflow prayer space and was the resident Imam of Al Farah, was one of the leaders of the project. He argued the importance of the center’s location to Islam in America when he says it, “sends the opposite statement to what happened on 9/11. We want to push back against the extremists.” Developer El-Gamal agreed, saying “what happened that day, was not Islam.”9_{Initial response from the} neighborhood and city officials was primarily positive. On May 6 2010, local New York newspaper Newsday reported that “no mass opposition to the project has emerged, though some relatives of September 11 victims consider it inappropriate.” Daisy Khan, who was the executive director of the American Society for Muslim Advancement as well as a New York native, said the project is “meant to take the tragedy of 9/11 and turn that into something incredibly positive by creating a vision of how Muslims and non-Muslims can coexist peacefully while rejecting terrorism.”10_{Although this study reveals that not} everybody is entirely on board with the project’s plans, it initially doesn’t seem to have been met with grand opposition, and the intentions of the project leaders appear to be considerate of the role of militant Jihadism played in the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

Nevertheless, the developers, who dubbed the center the Cordoba House, named after the Spanish village of Córdoba in which Muslims, Jews and Christians famously lived together in harmony during the 8th_{to 11}th_{century, soon found themselves in the} middle of a debate that received world-wide attention. After a blog post by radical conservative blogger, and president of American Freedom Defense Initiative and Stop Islamization of America (SIOA), Pamela Geller, major news stations in America started paying attention to the Cordoba House plans. They argued that the plans aim to turn Park 43-51, two blocks down from Ground Zero, into a testament of Muslim culture.11_The Park 51 controversy is born. Although religious leaders in Manhattan were positive about

8_Ibid. 9_Ibid.

10_{Bart Jones, ‘Muslim Groups Plan Islamic Center at Sept. 11 Site’, Newsday, 06-05-2010.}

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the building of the structure, the media’s attention gave a platform to voices that explicitly oppose the plans. Among the opposition were politicians such as Sarah Palin and Mitt Romney. Former Republican House Speaker Newt Gingrich was even quoted to say, “it’s not about religion, and it is clearly an aggressive act that is offensive.”12_{In short, the} development plans did not sit well with all Americans.

Before long, the plans for the Cordoba House became a controversial topic that drew local, national and international attention. Both the opposition as well as the supporters of the plans speak out of religious or political convictions, while the families of 9/11 victims often respond with personal, emotional reasons in support or opposition of the development plans. The media frenzy reaches a climax in August 2010, when a court case trying to stop the developers from building the center was in session. Meanwhile, major political attention was given to the issue due to mid-term elections. Nevertheless, the media attention soon lessens, and although the Cordoba center has so far not been re-built, a temporary version of El-Gamal and Imam Rauf’s vision was opened in September 2012. The issue was never fully settled.

The Park 51 controversy is a peculiar story in American history. Beginning almost ten years after the 9/11 tragedy, the first year of its development plans were peaceful and met with much support and little resistance. Not until radical conservative opinions were voiced on the matter did the media jump on the proverbial bandwagon. What makes this issue so controversial? The idea of wanting to build a community center in Manhattan cannot be the problem, considering the prevalence of multitudinous community centers alone. Additionally, the desire to build a religious community center can also not be the problem, as, like the YMCA, neither the Christian Chautauqua Institute in Upstate New York nor the Jewish Community Centers in New York City face similar resistance. It must therefore be concluded that the particular element that makes these development plans so controversial is the Islamic nature of the center, in combination with its vicinity to Ground Zero.

In order to understand how it is possible Muslims are faced with such struggles almost a decade after 9/11, we must understand the position of the Muslim in America pre-9/11, as well as immediately post-9/11. According to American citizen and Muslim

12_{Michael Barbaro, ‘Debate Heats Up About Mosque Near Ground Zero’, The New York Times,}

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immigrant Hilal Elver, Muslims in the pre-9/11 era were already facing struggles in America.13_{If they wished to acquire citizenship, it was often much more difficult for them} to do so than it would have been for their Western-European equals. Nonetheless, the Muslim minority of America was vast and diverse. It is a group that is “far from homogeneous in their composition and in their attitudes and practices. American Islam is a mosaic of many ethnic, racial and national groups.”14_{This means they were presented} with additional struggles as they needed to overcome different national backgrounds, upbringing, languages, and economic and ideological positions. However, in practice, the group was often divided in two: The African American Muslim, and the immigrant Muslim.

The relationship between native African American Muslims and the immigrant Muslims “has never been easy because of their cultural, educational, and class differences.” The latter created an independent identity from African American Muslims, and they dissociated themselves from one another.15_{As such, concerning discrimination,} both groups have received different forms. The immigrant Muslim culturally had a difficult time assimilating, due to fewer cultural similarities to America than those of European, often Christian or Anglo-Saxon, immigrants.16_{Historically, many Muslims} came to the United States as refugees, or to seek work and a better future for themselves. However, since 2004, although the US has a refugee policy, many Muslims have not been able to come to the US due to a national latent fear of the Islam.17_{According to} Elver, specifically the later waves of Muslim Arabs that have immigrated to the US pre 9/11, have opted to celebrate their Muslim heritage and religion more explicitly, creating an American-Muslim hyphenated identity. Although recent years have portrayed elements of fear of Islam, it’s America’s “positive tendency to religiocity” that allows for these hyphenated identities to flourish.18_{This study argues, amongst other things, that this} is no longer the case. Although the desire from Muslim-Americans to celebrate a

13_{Hilal Elver, ‘Racializing Islam Before and After 9/11: From Melting Pot to Islamophobia’, Transnational}

Law & Contemporary Problems, Vol. 21, Spring 2012, p 122.

14_{John Esposito, ‘Introduction: Muslims in America or American Muslims’, in Muslims on the}

Americanization Path? Oxford UP, 2000, p 3,4.

15_{Kathleen M. Moore, Al-Mughtaribun: American Law and the Transformation of Muslim Life in the}

United States, 1995, p: 43.

16_{Elver, p 126.} 17_{Ibid, p 127.} 18_{Ibid, p 128.}

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hyphenated identity has not lessened, the current American cultural and media landscapes no longer allow for Muslim-American identities.

Before 9/11, anti-Muslim sentiment was already present in parts of American culture. In America’s foreign policy, for example, the United States time and again reasserted their superiority, both politically as well as ideologically, over nations such as Iran in the seventies and Lebanon in the eighties. In fact, Muslims in America became subject of hate crimes after the 1993 World Trade Center bombing in NYC, resulting in the burning and bombing of mosques in several states.19

Edward Saïd, famed for his work on Orientalism and the Other, is one of the few scholars to have studied Islam in America before 9/11. According to Saïd, Arabs in the 1980’s were the only ethnic group in America against whom slanderous utterances could be expressed without objection. A form of permissible racism, as it were. He called the representations of Muslims ‘depraved’, in both mainstream media as well as public opinion.20_{Saïd’s theories on Otherness might have been written in the 1980’s, but they} are still applicable today when considering the position of the Muslim in the United States, as this study claims.

Saïd’s remarks about the representation of Arabs and Muslims in the media are relevant before as well as after 9/11. There is no qualitative difference in the representation of Muslims before or after the tragedy: Muslims and Arabs were almost always presented as backward and violent.21_{However, there is a definite quantitative} discrepancy: although the images remain the same, they become more prevalent and are expressed in a more explicit way after 9/11.22_{Both in fictional media as well as} journalism, the American is portrayed as “the altruistic hero fighting for human rights and freedom.” In this image, the Muslim can only be arranged opposite the image of the hero.23_{Therefore, the overlooking of the Other, in this case the Muslim, cannot be} challenged, because the challenger is never part of the ‘we’. In other words, because the

19_{Elver, p 136.}

20_{Edward Saïd, Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See The Rest Of}

The World, 1981.

21_{Sabine Schiffer, ‘Demonizing Islam Before and After 9/11: Anti-Islamic spin – an important factor in}

pro-war PR?’ Global Media and Communication, nr. 7, 2011: 211-214, p 211.

22_{S. Schiffer and C. Wagner, Antisemitism and Isaomophobia – a comparitive analysis, HWK Verlag,}

Wassertrüdingen: 2009. 23_{Schiffer, p 213.}

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same media images of Muslims and Arabs have been recycled over and over again throughout the years, there is only one possible response to the attacks of 9/11, as “from a Western perspective, the conclusions drawn from the attacks and the arguments advanced in their aftermath seem logical, in the sense that they do not contradict the impressions created over time through books, TV programmes [sic], and public discourse.”24_{Years upon years of images that provided derogatory impressions of Arabs} and Muslims in America are now confirmed by this one act of terror.

Some Evangelicals were quick to respond after 9/11, fast to “blame all Muslims, Arabs, and Middle Easterners for what happened on 9/11…with no distinction between acts and actors.”25_{Within weeks, public opinion surveys revealed that Americans thought} Arab and Muslim Americans should be subject to profiling, surveillance, and interrogation – acts that go against constitutional rights – in the name of national security. Nonetheless, president George W. Bush repeatedly tried to clear the name of Muslims in the United States. He speaks out about the matter as late as October 2006, saying “while the killers choose their victims indiscriminately, their attacks serve a clear and focused ideology, a set of beliefs and goals that are evil, but not insane. Some call this evil Islamic radicalism; others, militant Jihadism; still others, Islamo-fascism.”26_{However, as} domestic policies significantly curtailed the rights of Muslim immigrants, and their lives are put under surveillance, the US foreign policy remains aggressive and frames ‘the war on terror’ around invasion and occupation of countries that are predominantly Muslim.27 In other words, although the United States government seemingly vocalized against superficial anti-Muslim sentiment, it framed the 9/11 attacks as an event that legitimates the war on terror. These contradictory messages create unsettling, uncomfortable feelings between Muslims and Americans, nationally and globally.

It should be noted that this wasn’t the first time an act of violence targeted at the United States has led to racism. However, in the case of 9/11, the racialization that

24_{Schiffer, p 211.}

25_{Anthony Cook, ‘Encountering the Other, Evangelicalism and Terrorism in a Post 9/11 World’, J.L &}

Religion, nr. 5 ed. 1: 2005.

26_{‘Remarks to the National Endowment for Democracy,’ October 6, 2005, in The Public Papers of the}

President of the United States: George W. Bush – 2005, Book II (Washington DC: United States

Government Printing Office, 2009) p 1521.

27_{Mohammed Nimer, ‘Islamophobia and Anti-Americanism: Causes and Remedies’, Amana}

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happened is often latent and is not openly expressed by the government. After WWII, the case was very different. After Pearl Harbor is attacked in 1941, Japanese Americans were openly targeted and discriminated against. Rooted in decades of racial prejudice and economic rivalry, the internment of over 100.000 Japanese-Americans reflected anti-Japanese sentiment on the West Coast. The internment was justified using falsified reports stating that Japanese-Americans helped the Japanese during the 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor. A great injustice of civil liberties, Roosevelt allowed for the military to order for the removal of all first and second generation Japanese from the West Coast of the US. Not until 1982 did the US government offer apologies, and when it did it blamed the Roosevelt Administration specifically for allowing the injustice.28

In comparison, the repression of the civil liberties of Muslims immediately following 9/11 seems minor. However, the fact that the government didn’t explicitly frame domestic policy against Muslims as they had during WWII, doesn’t mean that they didn’t shape public opinion about Muslim-Americans. The Patriot Act as well as Immigration laws were indirectly aimed at Muslim Americans, targeting not only young Arab and Muslim men but also their families. Many were deported, or voluntarily left, fearing xenophobia. The government openly rejected racial profiling or ethnic profiling, but it is nonetheless clear that the Muslim group was most affected by “the government’s domestic antiterrorism strategy.”29_{Following 9/11, both public opinion and indirect} domestic policies revealed that the status of the Muslim-American is threatened, and discriminated against more so than ever before.

More than a decade later, significant changes can be seen in America, both politically and socially. Although immediate response to Muslims after 9/11 in America was poor, the CIA reports that Al Qaeda’s global reach had significantly reduced and media attention shifted from post-9/11 reports on the war on terror, with their implicit anti-Islamic messages, to financial crises and national rising numbers of unemployment. Nonetheless, critics argue that “the media’s portrayal of Islam is one piece of evidence that the Islam and Islamophobia are feeding each other. The widely acceptable fear of Islam means that racialization is viewed as a reasonable way to deal with Muslims.”30

28_{Paul S. Boyer et. al., The Enduring Vision: A History of the American People, 7}th_{edition, international}

edition, Boston, 2011, p 789. 29_{Elver, p 144.}

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This indicates that the racialization of Muslims, and thus the instigation and feeding of Islamophobia, were in fact becoming latent, yet more generally accepted. This also reveals that often in these cases, Arabs, Muslims, Middle Easterners and South Asians are assimilated into a single category, even though they are entirely disparate groups.

Problematics like these become interesting when considering the Park 51 controversy. The event takes place almost a decade after 9/11. As briefly shown here, the explicit discrimination of Muslims in America at this time has significantly decreased. The nation’s attention has shifted from a focus on war in predominantly Islamic nations in the Middle East, to national policies concerning the financial crisis, job opportunity, presidential elections, and more recently, foreign relations with nations such as Russia and North Korea. Nevertheless, the entire nation suddenly gets swept up by a debate about a community center – a Muslim Community Center, specifically – and the true position of the Muslim in America rapidly becomes painfully apparent.

This study is not the first to consider the importance of the Park 51 controversy in uncovering American anti-Islamic tendencies. In Jeanne Halgren Kilde’s article ‘The Park 51/Ground Zero Controversy and Sacred Sites as Contested Space’, she argues that the debate surrounding the development plans, when analyzed, shows that the arguments which were used to prevent its being built so near Ground Zero, often concern a fear of desecration of the Ground Zero site. These arguments, expressed in spatial language, concerning the physical location (such as the length of shadows) of the buildings as well as its presence near a sacred site, and thus a form of spiritual infiltration, “opened up a discursive space for repressive, anti-democratic views to sway even those that believe in religious liberty.”31_{In other words, by avoiding blatantly ignoring the First Amendment} rights to free religion, but instead using arguments expressed in a different, non-religious vocabulary, the legitimate civic membership of American Muslims, and thus their validity as Americans, is questioned.32_{Using ‘respect for feelings’ of the 9/11 victim’s survivors} contradicts their deeply rooted value of freedom of religion, and is therefore worthy of investigation.

31_{Jeanne Halgren Kilde, ‘The Park 51/Ground Zero Controversy and Sacred Sites as Contested Space’,}

Religions, nr. 2, 2011, p 297-311.

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Liyakat Takim approaches the subject from yet another angle. He suggests that the Park 51 controversy is a part of the Muslim-American’s process of finding the place of Islam in American public space.33_{As such, a conflict as this one will be used to stake} claim as a permanent member in the American religious landscape. In fact, according to Takim, the Cordoba plans are in effect a reflection of the entire indigenization process. However, this will not occur without initial ramifications in the Muslim-American’s socio-political lives, as Islam will more explicitly play a role in shaping it.34

Nathan Carlin and Heba Khan explored the psychoanalytical aspect of the controversy. They conclude that the process of protesting and rebelling against Islam in America, is in effect a part of mourning process. Suggesting that the survivors and families of the 9/11 victims are suffering from incomplete cultural mourning, they argue an expression of their loss can be found in their treatment of the Cordoba plans. In fact, they suggest that the absence of a permanent memorial at Ground Zero might in fact exacerbate these emotions. By trying to understand the controversy from a psychoanalytical standpoint, not too different from Kilde’s attempt to explore the discursive place, the reasoning behind the opposition’s arguments becomes both clearer, and more diffuse at once.35

Hilal Elver considered the debate surrounding the development plans to argue that America is regressing in its religious freedom. In comparison to Europe, where Mosques are often built without minarets or housed in basements, America is unconditional in its freedom of religion. It is therefore “rather unusual for there to be such an outcry and nationwide controversy about plans for the…Islamic Center project in New York just prior to the anniversary of 9/11.”36_{She continues to argue that the debate shows the way} in which American society is vulnerable to criticism from abroad, and how quickly Islamophobia can go from being an underlying ideology to an explicitly uttered front, going against the rights offered by the First Amendment. She argues that although the Islamic Center would be protected under court of law, she doubts whether it will hold

33_{Liyakat Takim, ‘The Ground Zero Mosque Controversy: Implications for American Islam’, Religions, nr.}

2, 2011, p 132-144. 34_Ibid.

35_{Nathan Carlin and Heba Khan, ‘Mourning, Memorials, and Religion: A Psychoanalytic Perspective on}

the Park 51 Controversy’, Religions, nr. 2, 2011, p133-131.

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up in “the court of public opinion.”37_{It is this claim that this thesis will take a closer look} at. How does the controversy function within American society and what does it say about the position of Islam in the United States?

Evidently, the debate around American-Muslims in America is thoroughly complicated and has a long history that dates back to the first Muslim Immigrants. Pre-9/11 representations of Muslims in America negatively impact the Islam, and Muslim Americans appear to be second rate citizens. Initial post-9/11 discourse is widely anti-Muslim, both evidenced by media as well as the government’s implicit actions against both the religion as an institute and against Muslims as individuals. However, the media’s and government’s attention soon moves away from debates about racism and religion, and towards debates about the American economy and the financial crisis. Nonetheless, somehow the Park 51 development plans become front page news, and give way to complicated expressions in the public sphere.

As the existing scholarship on the Park 51 controversy reveals the inner workings are complex. Some scholarship has taken to analyze what the event means for the Muslim community, others have set out to try to understand the underlying psychological reasoning the opposition might have, motivating them to protest against the plans. Although this study will build on their scholarship in part, it will attempt to approach the subject from yet another angle.

This study investigates why and how the plans for the Muslim Community Center near Ground Zero in New York City instigates such a tremendous response from media, public and government alike. It is argued that the controversy holds valuable ingredients, such as a reference to 9/11, a physical stake in classically American historic geography, and the polarizing effect of its tendency to take the first amendment into consideration. These ingredients are cleverly applied by the opposition in order to gain publicity for their prospective platforms: be it political, activist or otherwise. These elites that influence discursive environment are in play with media organizations who gain high ratings with such a polarizing controversy. The arguments, both for and against, took hold an American population who may have been traumatized by the 9/11 attacks and who were willing to commit to explicit statements of what America is and isn’t as part of their

37_{Ibid, p 162.}

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personal identification processes. Once these audiences were motivated to respond, the subject of the development plans are given the spark with which it grows out into a wildfire.

Historically, it is accepted that the start of the media frenzy occurs in Pamela Geller’s blog, in which she expresses her opposition to the plans. However, Pamela Geller blogs about many Muslim-related issues that she opposes, so it is worth asking why and how this particular story got picked up by major news outlets. Additionally, it is evident that the controversy plays a role in the platforms of several political leaders, but to what reason? Analyzing the controversy for the mechanisms at work in shaping public opinion about the Cordoba House development plans gives insight in the inner workings of the media’s and politician’s roles in negotiating American identity and a Muslim’s identity within it.

In order to answer the questions raised, this study will set out three sub-questions. First, the investigation sets out to create an image of the position of the Muslim in the United States. What was the canvas of the Muslim’s landscape upon which the controversy was painted? As such, chapter 1 builds on this introduction and further investigates the socio-political role as well as the media representations of the Muslim in America. Chapter 1 stakes the claim that the deprived representations of Muslims in both fiction and non-fiction media, as well as in international policies, have driven Muslims to become less-than-American. The hyphenated American-Muslim identity becomes problematic and is put under stress.38_{Some Muslims answer this stress by actively} searching for their Muslim identities in order to further identify their hyphenated identities.39_{Meanwhile, in Othering expressions about Islam, an Us vs. Them discourse} is prevalent in which the Muslim is marginalized and unable to change the utterances about Muslims. Chapter 1 argues that is in this problematic existence of Muslims and representations of Muslims in America that the Park 51 controversy exists.

Second, the investigation moves towards exploring what exactly happens in the months before and during the controversy, as well as during the aftermath. What is the overarching narrative of the Park 51 controversy? By identifying the groups and opinions

38_{Katherine Pratt Ewing and Hoyler, Marguerite, ‘Being Muslim and American: South Asian Muslim}

Youth and the War on Terror’, Being and Belonging: Muslims in the United States since 9/11, Katherine Pratt Ewing ed., Russel Sage Foundation, New York, NY, 2008: p 85

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that are expressed during the debate, an understanding of the situation is created that allows an analysis of the overall narrative arch of the Park 51 story. Additionally, existing news reports, political speeches, Supreme court cases and polls, among other sources are used to uncover the corpus. In Chapter 2, sources used all directly relate to the American experience of Park 51, though depicting different perspectives. International response is left out of the framework, as it will not aid in answering the question at hand, which specifically wants to find the American birthplace of the controversy.

Chapter 3 introduces a model along which the media controversy as uncovered in Chapter 2 is analyzed. It looks for mechanisms and elements such as triggers, agenda setting, priming, strategic narratives and framing. In doing so, this chapter answers the question of how the controversy managed to work the way it did. It becomes apparent that the opposition of the controversy employed several strategic tactics in order to sway public opinion, and does so successfully.

Using the findings of chapters 1, 2 and 3, the research question is answered. Employing knowledge about the position and representation of the Muslim in the United States of America and the construction of the controversy as further evidence of those findings, this study concludes to explain how and why the controversy was able to function the way it did in the Americam public and political image. It is too blunt to say that the controversy is entirely set up by ‘the media’, but it would be insufficient to claim it has nothing to do with the place the controversy took in the American discursive environment. On the other hand, simply blaming racism or Islamophobia as a state of being instead of a symptom of being is also not sufficient in answering this study’s question. This study makes a nuanced claim about the close ties between national American identity, post 9/11 trauma, the media landscape in America, and the polarizing nature of American politics in explaining the Park 51 controversy.

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1 Muslim in America

The Park 51 controversy’s story isn’t necessarily a linear one. In fact, many actors and motivations have rendered its timeline into a complex narrative. Before the utterances of the opposition can be subjected to further analysis, a thorough understanding of this narrative is not only advisable, but truly necessary. As such, this chapter sets out to explore the beginnings of this complex narrative. Understanding this will be helpful in analyzing the utterances of those who expressed opposition to the development plans. To sum up, this chapter will explore the base on which the complex narrative of the controversy builds.

As such, this chapter starts with an exploration of the presence of the Muslim in Tribeca and America as it exists before and after 9/11, leading up to the controversy. Understanding the intricacies of Islam in America and American media gives insight into the desires for future development of the Muslim community, as well as understanding for the problematic marginalized nature in which Islam in America exists.

1.1 The Socio-Political Position of Islam in America, pre- and post-9/11

This section will go on to explore the presence of Islam in America, and specifically New York City, both pre- and post 9/11. Having an understanding of the presence of Islam in New York City is important in order to understand the context in which opposition to the Islamic community center development plans is later expressed. The development plans were a response to the position of Islam and the Muslim in American society. It will become apparent that there are two important themes. On one hand, this section argues that the 9/11 terrorist attacks lead many Muslims to feel the need to redefine and explore their relationship with their religion. Even though Islam is a minority religion in the United States, there are millions who practice the religion, both pre- and post 9/11. An outline of Islam before 9/11 reveals that its problematic state is by all means not one created solely by the Muslim terrorists that were behind the attacks. Nevertheless, the problematic state of Islam post 9/11 is more public and more visible

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than pre-9/11, and marginalization occurs on multiple levels, both legislatively and socially.

In order to understand representation of Islam and its relation to islamophobia before, during and post 9/11, we must understand the relationship between American Islamophobia and Muslim anti-Americanism. Mohamed Nimer, research director of the American Council of Muslim-American relations, argues that there is a ‘circular effect between Islamophobia and anti-Americanism.’40_{In his example, the 9/11 attacks} triggered ‘the most remarkable anti-Muslim violence in American history’, which in turn triggered attacks in Western cities like London and Barcelona. The 9/11 attacks were preceded by American political acts that can be interpreted as undermining Islamic dominance. Osama Bin Laden, in his ‘letter to America’, explicitly stated that one of the reasons for the attacks are the American support of Israeli occupation in Palestine. Another reason he names occurred before the attacks, in 1998, where Bin Laden names sanctions on Iraq and support of Israel as a reason to ‘kill the Americans and their allies.’41 The context of political and/or violent acts both preceding and following 9/11 give indications for the motivation behind the 9/11 attacks.

Resulting is a scholarly debate. Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon in their book The Age of Sacred Horror that the attacks are purely religious, ‘an act of redemption’ to undermine those that denied the hegemony of Allah.42_{Again others claim political} reasoning. Bernard Lewis in The crisis of the Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror, claims that the attacks are a response to America’s and the West’s pursuit of globalization of the last centuries. Animosity towards the west is partially explained by the decline of the Ottoman empire by the continuous stream of western ideas.43_{Jean Beaudrillard in his} essay ‘l’Esprit du terrorisme’ even goes on to say 9/11 ‘questions the very process of globalization’.44_{This study is not in pursuit to argue for one of these motivations of the} 9/11 attacks specifically. Instead, it means to underline the importance of approaching

40_{Nimer, p 2}

41_{Michael Rubin, ‘Sanctions on Iraq: A Valid Anti-American Grievance?’, Middle East Review of}

International Affairs, December 2001: p 100–115

42_{Daniel Benjamin, Simon, Steven, The Age of Sacred Terror. Random House. 2002: p 40.}

43_{Bernard Lewis, The Crisis of Islam, Random House, 2004}

44_{Jean Beaudrillard, "L'Esprit du Terrorisme," Le Monde, November 2, 2001. Translated by Dr. Rachel}

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the events described in this thesis not as stand-alone, but as interrelated political, cultural and mediated occurrences, motivated by one another and not to be approached from just one angle. That being said, this thesis aims to create an understanding of Islamophobia in America as illustrated by the Park 51 controversy and thus representations and perspectives aiding to answer that question will be considered in this thesis. It would be most valuable for other perspectives to be investigated in further research endeavors.

Prior to 9/11, scholarship spent little attention to Muslim presence in the United States. As explained in the introduction of this study, Muslims in America exists in two different groups, the African American Muslim, and the Immigrant Muslim. The African American Muslim is perhaps more famous in popular culture: people such as Malcom X, Jermaine Jackson and Dave Chapelle have enjoyed a life in the spotlight, albeit in very different capacities. In fact, according to Hilal Elver, the African American Muslim faces very little proscription in America. It is instead the Immigrant Muslim group that is ostracized and has a difficult time assimilating to America. Elver argues that in the pre-9/11 era, a prejudice against Middle Easterners and Muslims reigned, obstructing them in the process of immigration and targeting them with anti-Arab sentiment based on international politics and American foreign policy. She agrees with Edward Saïd that Muslims in America were victim of depraved representations, and must suffer racism.45 According to Elver, the earliest discrimination against Arabs and Muslims can be seen in immigration law. Early discrimination was mainly based on their European, non-Christian, non-Whiteness. In other words, their Otherness. Assimilationist policy was part of American society and culture, and not until the 1970s did the United States abandon these discriminatory policies. However, they remained a tacit policy, “hidden behind U.S. conditions for immigration and naturalization.”46_{An example are the imposed} quotas of immigrants of a certain nation, capping the number of immigrants from the Middle East to a mere 100 a year in the early 20th_{century. Throughout the twentieth} century, anti-Middle Eastern immigrant policies became increasingly existant, the Muslim would remain a minority.47_{The strong Christian core of the American culture,}

45_{Hilal Elver, ‘Racializing Islam Before and After 9/11: From Melting Pot to Islamophobia’, Transnational}

Law & Contemporary Problems, Vol. 21, Spring 2012, p 131.

46_{Elver, p 132.} 47_{Elver, p 135.}

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although recently amended to becoming a Judeo-Christian understanding, continuously underwrites Islamic values as subservient.

Additionally, international politics and American Foreign Affairs policies worked against the integration of Islam into the American melting pot. According to Elver, “the Iran hostage crisis during the Islamic revolution in 1979 and the TWA hijacking in Lebanon in 1985 brought out deep-seated prejudices in American society.”48_For decades, Americans watched and heard how the United States interfered in the policies of Islamic countries, repeatedly claiming their own ideologies to be superior. Polls after the 1993 WTC bombings show that the people of the United States intercepted these discourses, as 43% of Americans at that time thought Muslims were religious fanatics.49 Islam thus becomes an un-American ideology, much like communism during the Cold War. Islamic and Western civilization are continuously rather crudely and simplistically drafted opposite each other, as if the two are competitors.50_{American Foreign Policy} positions their own ideologies as dominant and superior to those of Islamic countries. American immigration policies and negative images of Muslims in (news) media as opposite to Western, perpetuate the impossibility of true integration of Muslims into America’s Judeo-Christian society in the era before 9/11.

Although Elver clearly sees a lot of problems with the state of Islam in the United States in the era before 9/11, positive discourse also exists. For example, prof.dr. Nazeer Ahmed, founder of the online encyclopedia of Islamic history, is more optimistic about the future of Islam in America. In 1988, he published an article in the New York Times, addressing the issue. He argued that although almost 3 million Americans call themselves Muslims in 1988, their impact is not necessarily reflected in the numbers, but instead in the discourse they bring to the American dinner table. He argued that, “Much as America is the melting pot of nations, it is also the melting pot of ideas.”51_{These ideas, like Elver} has also argued, are based on Judeo-Christian values. However, unlike Elver, Ahmed argued that the melting pot was indeed being introduced to the significant presence of

48_{Elver, p 136.}

49_{Peter Steintels, U.S. Muslims, Despite World Spotlight, Focus on the Personal, New York Times, New}

York: 07-05-1993. 50_{Elver, p 137.}

51_{Nazeer Ahmed, ‘Islam Finds its Place in America’, Los Angeles Times, April 9 1988,}

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Islam as another monotheistic faith. Where does Islam fit in the world of ideas of a melting pot culture? Ahmed is a proponent of considering Islam to be a religion of free will. He said, “the Islamic world…has been unable to muster the courage to open itself to political and social processes where its own internal ethos can express itself. Thus, freedom is often muzzled and religious expression stage-managed so that it does not pose a threat to established order.” 52_{In other words, Ahmed argued that the United States, with its} inherent freedom for all, is the perfect place for a Muslim, as it allows for true freedom of expression and choice. As such, according to Ahmed, Islam in America should be open to other religions, and together they must find an ideal state of freedom of conscience and choice.

Meanwhile, this perceived freedom is also the cause of the poor reputation of Islam in America. The political idea of Islam, which often comes from nations that are not open to European sway in order to protect those who are in power, seemingly contradicts the values Muslims say they hold. However, Ahmed is convinced that “in America, Islam will go through two-way osmosis, providing yet another color to the rich spectrum of ideas in the American crucible, and in the process rediscovering its own soul.”53_{Ahmed’s article makes very clear some of the problematic of Islam in America,} as well as many of the obstacles it had to overcome and still has to overcome today. He identifies Muslims themselves as partly to blame for Islamic struggles in the United States before 9/11. They do not open up themselves truly for interfaith discourse, and therefore do not fully practice the freedom of choice that Islam teaches. On the other hand, misunderstandings about the nature of Islam as a religion, as opposed to the political ideologies of Islamic nations, renders Americans uncertain about the ideologies of Islam and its role in American culture. However, Ahmed expresses hope that the Islamic culture will eventually become one of three monotheistic faiths to guide America’s values.

Prior to 9/11, Islam, although arguably marginalized in the United States, nonetheless consist of a significant amount of members. America had over 2100 Mosques before 9/11. The city with the highest amount of Mosques is New York City. Notably, there are two major mosques near the World Trade Center, one of which, Al Farah, is founded as early as the seventies. Additionally, the World Trade Center itself was home

52_Ibid. 53_Ibid.

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to Islamic prayer space, as many Muslims worked in the World Trade Center towers before Jihadists brought them down.

Regardless of the marginalization Muslims suffered in America pre-9/11, Islam is a victim of post-9/11 vilification too. The terrorists that attacked the WTC are portrayed as Jihadi, which lead to a complicated landscape in which Muslims have to work to maintain their already problematic territory in the United States. Both Muslims and non-Muslims described the War on Terror as a ‘War against Islam’.54_{In the struggle for} Muslims to claim space, they face many obstacles that make their position in American society increasingly complex.

First of these struggles are those caused by the straightforward fact that the terrorists behind the attacks are, in fact, Islamic. No matter how much one argues that the acts were not committed out the name of Islam practiced by the average Muslim living in NYC, repeated nomenclature of Islamic terrorists attaches an increasingly negative connotation to being Muslim. A good illustration of the problematic repeated anti-Islamic phraseology is provided by the official 9/11 report published by the 9/11 commission in 2004. The following are a number of excerpts from the report summary:

The enemy is not just ‘terrorism.’ It is the threat posed specifically by Islamist terrorism, by Bin Laden and others who draw on a long tradition of extreme intolerance within a minority strain of Islam that does not distinguish politics from religion, and distorts both.55

The enemy is not Islam, the great world faith, but a perversion of Islam…Our strategy must match our means to two ends: Dismantling the al Qaeda network and, in the long term, prevailing over the ideology that contributes to Islamist terrorism.56

[On how to attack terrorists and their organizations] Root out sanctuaries. The U.S. government should identify and prioritize actual or potential terrorist sanctuaries57

54_{Pratt Ewing and Hoyler, p 85}

55_{‘What to do? A global Strategy.’ The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National}

Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States – Executive Summary.

GovInfo.Library.unt.edu./911: 2004. 56_Ibid.

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[On how to prevent continued growth of Islamist terrorism] Define the message and stand as an example of moral leadership in the world. To Muslim parents, terrorists like Bin Ladin [sic] have nothing to offer their children but visions of violence and death. America and its friends have the advantage –our vision can offer a better future.58

[On how to prevent continued growth of Islamist terrorism] Where Muslim governments, even those who are friends, do not offer opportunity, respect the rule of law, or tolerate differences, then the United States needs to stand for a better future.59

[On how to prevent continued growth of Islamist terrorism] Communicate and defend American ideals in the Islamic world, through much stronger public diplomacy to reach more people, including students and leaders outside of government. Our efforts here should be as strong as they were in combating closed societies during the Cold War.60

These six excerpts represent only a very limited section of the final report. However, they reveal the ambiguity of the report regarding the dangers of Islam as a religion, and illustrate the difficult position in which the United States found itself after the attacks. It is clear the authors of the report attempted to identify only a very small ‘strain’ of Islam as the cause of the attacks, and altogether refrains from calling Islam the problem. However, although they call “a perversion of Islam” the problem, it does not offer any tools to distinguish the perversion from the traditional Islam. The commission moves on to state that the solution is “prevailing over the ideology that contributes to Islamic terrorism.” However, it does not designate the ideology that is to be prevailed, nor does it identify the tactics to achieve the prevailing. Considering only a small, extremist strain of Islam was just found to blame, one might expect that a traditional Islamic ideology might be the one to prevail.

However, it soon clear that the commission has other ideas when it illustrates American ideology as preferable and superior, as can be seen in the last three excerpts. The commission found that the United States “stands for a better future,” and it is their role to enlighten and educate those who are shrouded under the veil of a Muslim government. The standards which are set by the report, which are offering opportunity,

58_Ibid.

59_Ibid. 60_Ibid.

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respecting the rule of law, and tolerating differences, are explicitly vague and can therefore be called upon by the United States government by the drop of a hat.

A third and perhaps most worrying aspect is the likeness of these policies to those taken by the United States in the Cold War era. Most historians will agree that the Cold War Era in America was a time of Anti-Communism, along with unconstitutional McCarthyism. Their drive to spread American ideologies “as strong as they were in combating closed societies during the Cold War” raises questions about an anti-Islamic regime in the post 9/11 era running a parallel to the anti-Communist regime in the Cold War Era. The right to root out “actual or potential” sanctuaries also echoes the throes of McCarthyism and its unsubstantiated arrests. The report presents dangerous tendencies of anti-Islamic ideology.

This study does not aim to criticize the report, but in the paragraph above merely points out the problematic nature of the response to 9/11. Islam as a traditional religion could have been called upon to steer terrorists or at-risk marginalized groups away from Radical Islam, but instead the United States chose to fight through implementation of its own American, western, non-Islamic, Judeo-Christian ideologies. As such, the report is an illustration of one of the small steps taken towards anti-Islamic national attitude in the United States.

Along with these subtle anti-Islamic tendencies, often based on lack of strong definition of radical versus traditional Islam, the United States experienced a period of strong nationalism directly following the attacks. Some of that nationalism is notable in the report analyzed above, as “the American Way” becomes a tool in the fighting of the war. Directly after 9/11, media overflow with heroic stories of United States citizens. Perhaps it is apt to distinguish between nationalism and patriotism, as the two are easily confused but rather different. George Orwell describes patriotism as “the devotion to a particular place and a particular way of life, which one believes to be the best in the world but has no wish to force on other people.” Nationalism, on the other hand, is described as the feeling that your way of life, country or ethnic group is superior to others. Orwell warned that this feeling could lead to a group to impose their way of life on others.61_{From Orwell’s definition one can conclude that Patriotism is healthy and can}

61_{Grant Lyon. ‘Patriotism vs. Nationalism in a Post 9/11 World’. The Huffington Post: September 08}

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be considered a good trait for a nation’s people to have, but nationalism can easily be blind and dangerous. One example of reigning post 9/11 nationalism is the History Channel programming in the weeks following the attacks. They canceled their planned programming and amend it to showing mostly history documentaries about American victories abroad, in which America brought “their freedom” to other nations that are supposedly blinded and in the dark before their arrival. Accordingly, national enlistment for the army rose, with enlisters coming from lower, middle and upper classes alike.62_As we’ve seen, American ideology distances itself from identifying with any form of Islamic ideology. Thus, the wave of American nationalism entailed no Islamic ideologies. This means it becomes increasingly difficult for American-Muslims to be American and Muslim at the same time, as the two become increasingly and explicitly opposed. The American-Muslim hyphenated identity was slowly but surely becoming more problematic.

Simultaneously, American law worked against Muslims, (latently) singling them out as targets with new policies such as the Patriot Law, and amendments to existing laws such as the Immigration law. It was difficult for Muslims to protect their privacy, and it became practically impossible for anyone from a Muslim nation to immigrate to America. The already marginalized religious group was now not only ideologically outcast, but also legislatively outcast.63

As a result of all these legislative and ideological changes, Muslims experienced increased social pressure. They were physically and emotionally abused in public spaces like schools and work, as well as airports. The number of attacks on those of Muslim heritage, or even those who look Muslim, rose exponentially. Even though the White House tried to stifle anti-Muslim acts of violence and oppression through speeches identifying Islam as a peaceful religion, and by reiterating they were not the cause of the attacks, reigning ideological ambiguity and nationalism caused for Muslim communities to remain under constant and oppressive scrutiny.64

The paragraphs above describe a bleak landscape for Muslims in America. It can be concluded that before 9/11, Muslims already exist in a problematic state. They have

62_{Tim Kane. ‘The Demographics of Military Enlistment After 9/11’.}_{www.heritage.com}_{. November 03}

2005. 63_{Elver, 142.}

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always been a marginalized community, victims of discrimination and misrepresentation. The 9/11 attacks affected American Muslims in two ways. On one hand, the attacks made existing anti-Islamic sentiment more apparent, as it is easy for the United States citizens and government to show anti-Islamic behavior. Because of decade-long anti-Islamic conditioning, the step from latent to overt anti-Islamic behavior is a small one. On the other hand, the 9/11 attacks intensify the amount and exercise of marginalization of the group. Root of the anti-Islamic conduct appears to be ambiguity in definition of the Muslim versus Radical Muslim, as well as general misunderstanding about the core values of the Islamic faith.

Nevertheless, Muslims did not shy away from practicing their religion. In the post 9/11 era, especially immediately following the attacks on the WTC, numbers of those attending Muslim services rise. More Muslims go to mosques to practice their faith and confirm their commitment to the religion. As time goes on, the landscape for Muslims becomes decreasingly hazardous as America’s nationalist attitude abates, the wound of 9/11 on America’s soul slowly starting to show signs of healing, and attention paid to wars in Islamic nations curtailed. Nevertheless, understanding of Islam in America does not improve and the negative connotation of the religion does not waver. As such, the nature of Islam in America remains statically problematic, and actions that actively promote the reputation of Islam as a peaceful faith are necessary.

1.2 Muslim in Media

Although it might not seem logical to split up socio-political positions and media representations of Muslims in America, this chapter does so for the purpose of re-connecting the two in the end. It illustrates the exchange process that continuously occurs between representation in the image and position in the real. This section therefore builds upon theory presented in the introduction in order to illustrate the “depraved representation” of Muslims in American media. It then connects this continued representation of Muslims to their socio-political status. This section concludes by posing

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that the depiction and Othering of Muslims in American culture and politics is be a process of the larger ongoing search of finding the ‘American identity’.

The introduction of this study mentions Edward Saïd and his work on Orientalism and the Other. Saïd, a Palestinian-American literary theoretician best known for his 1978 book Orientalism, poses that Muslims in America are represented as the Other, that is, are opposite the Self, or the Us, of the American.65_{In effect, this means that the Muslim} as the Other is excluded from the center of society, and placed at the societal margin for being the Other.66_{This Othering happens through multiple channels, an important} channel being the media. The key takeaway from Saïd’s theory of a study about the representation of Muslims in America is that he calls the representations of Muslims “depraved,” in both mainstream media and public opinion.67

Professor Emeritus of Mass Communications Jack Shaheen agrees with Saïd that depictions of Muslims in American popular culture are in dire need of improvement. For his book Reel Bad Arabs: How Hollywood Vilifies a People, Shaheen analyzes Arab characters in over 900 movies made since the beginning of film technology in 1896. In these movies, Shaheen finds that people are led to believe that all Arabs are Muslims, and all Muslims are Arabs.68_{Beyond that, Shaheen uncovers that the stereotypes laid} upon Muslim or Arab representations are negative, one-dimensional, and narrow-minded. Of the movies reviewed, only 5% contains no villainous Arabs or Muslims. In these movies, the characters debunk stale myths and humanize Arab and Muslim characters at hand. Meanwhile, 95% of movies reviewed hold up the derogatory representations of Muslims and Arabs we’ve come to know.69_{Shaheen goes as far as to} compare the representation of Muslims and Arabs in movies to the representation of Jews in Nazi war propaganda. He states,

There is a dangerous and cumulative effect when ugly screen images of Arabs remain unchallenged. To me, the sheik image parallels the image of the Jew in Nazi-inspired German films. In "Jud Suss" (1940), for example, the Jew was made

65_{‘Otherness’, The New Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought, 3rd edition, 1999: p 620.}

66_Ibid.

67_{Edward Saïd, Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See The Rest Of}