Explaining China’s evolving position in the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change
An application of socialization theory
29 July 2016
Master thesis by Jan Sluyterman Supervisor: dr. Julia Bader Graduate School of Social Sciences
Table of contents
Introduction ... 4 1. Literature review ... 6 The conundrum of China and the Paris Agreement ... 6 Realism and liberalism ... 8 Realism ... 8 Liberalism ... 9 China in UNFCCC ... 10 China as a ‘responsible power’ ... 12 China’s identities and alliances in climate negotiations ... 12 China as a developing country ... 13 China as an emerging power ... 13 Contribution to the literature ... 14 2. Socialization theory ... 16 Definitions of socialization ... 16 Two types of socialization ... 17 Logics of socialization ... 18 Socialization mechanisms ... 18 Social rewards and punishments ... 21 Expectations ... 21 Case selection ... 23 The agent-principle dichotomy in UNFCCC ... 24 4. Operationalization and methodology ... 26 Assumptions ... 26 Operationalization of hypotheses and variables ... 26 Observables ... 27 Methodology: process tracing ... 29 Data sources ... 29 Limitations of the research ... 30 5. Empirical analysis ... 32 5.1 China in Copenhagen ... 32 China during COP 15 ... 33 China’s response to Copenhagen criticism ... 37 Findings ... 39 5.2 China and International Consultation and Analysis ... 41 The MRV/ICA discussion ... 41 A BASIC alternative to MRV ... 41 The ICA discussion in Cancún ... 42 Findings ... 44 5.3 China’s position on climate finance ... 46 The Green Climate Fund ... 46The South South Cooperation Climate Fund ... 47 Praise for the South South Climate Cooperation Fund ... 49 Findings ... 51 5.4 China’s position on the legal status of a new climate regime ... 53 The issue of legal status in Copenhagen ... 53 Legal status discussions at COP 16, Cancún ... 54 COP 17 in Durban: cautious moves towards a legal outcome ... 55 The legal standing of the Paris Agreement ... 56 Findings ... 59 6. Conclusion ... 61 Part 1: China in Copenhagen ... 61 Part 2: China and International Consultation and Analysis ... 61 Part 3: China’s position on climate finance ... 62 Part 4: China’s position on the legal status of a new climate regime ... 62 Reflection and implications ... 63 Bibliography ... 65 Earth Negotiations Bulletin ... 78 Terms and abbreviations ... 81
Introduction
Over the past two decades, China’s position in international climate politics has changed dramatically. Especially between 2009 and 2015, there have been clear shifts in China’s foreign climate policy. While China has been perceived as a major obstructionist at the Copenhagen summit of 2009, it was praised for its ambition and leadership around the 2015 Paris Summit. This is not only a matter of perspective. On important issues such as the legal standing of a new climate framework, external review mechanisms, and finance, China’s position has significantly altered between 2009 and 2015. In order to understand these change, and the motivational factors underpinning them, this thesis asks the following research question: ‘how can we explain changes in China’s position in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change?’ China became the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases in 2007, when it surpassed the United States in terms of absolute emission levels (Vidal and Adam 2007). China is therefore an essential actor in global efforts to halt climate change. As such, China is of great importance to concerted international climate action. Until the 2000s, China’s role in climate negotiations was largely characterized by its status of developing country. As such, China has never been formally obligated to climate action of any form. The 1997 Kyoto Protocol only requires mandatory climate action of developed countries. As China became increaslingly seen as an emerging major economy after 2000, responsible for a large share of annual global greenhouse gas emissions, this image changed. Many held China responsible for the disappointing outcome of the 2009 Copenhagen conference: a non-binding agreement, lacking specific universal emission goals and review mechanisms. In subsequent years, not only at annual Conferences of the Parties (COPs) to UNFCCC, but also on bi- and multilateral occassions such as the quarterly ministerial meetings of the emerging economies Brazil, South Africa, India and China (BASIC), China sent mixed signals. On the one hand, China appeared to be more constructive than it had been during the Copenhagen summit, for example by supporting an external review mechanism for climate action. On the other hand, China remained insistent on the binary division between developed countries and developing countries, which had been established in the so-called Annexes of the Kyoto Protocol. Multiple paradoxes nothwithstanding, in 2015, China finally agreed on a new climate regime for all countries, with the inclusion of universal emission targets for 2020 and 2050, which China had previously resisted. The Paris Agreement, which was struck between all ‘Parties to the Convention’, was adopted unanimously, and thus has legal status in the UNFCCC process.
The Paris Agreement puts an end to the rigid and outdated binary division between developed and developing countries as envisioned by the Kyoto Protocol, and as pursued by China until 2015. The Paris Agreement also formalizes external review mechanisms, which were long seen by China as an infringement of its autonomy and sovereingty in the field of climate change. Before and after Paris, China was widely praised for its initiative in setting up a South South Climate Cooperation Fund, with the aim of financially supporting developing countries. All this contrasts starkly with China’s role and position in Copenhagen in 2009. However, many of the changes in China’s foreign climate policy do not seem to be sufficiently explained by material factors, or by domestic motivations. China has no financial incentive for supporting a new agreement, since it has excluded itself from receiving any external funding for combating climate change. As China consequently repeats in statements, its status as a developing country should give priority to economic growth, while commitment to international climate action is seen as inhibiting economic growth. Furthermore, since the mid-2000s, China has greatly increased its domestic climate action, while it has consistently resisted outside commitments. Why, then, did China come to consent to the Paris Agreement? In contrast to explanations that view international climate politics through a realpolitik lense, and are often focused on domestic and economic drivers of climate policies, this thesis argues that the answer for China’s behaviour lies in social mechanisms at play in the interaction between China and other Parties in UNFCCC. The thesis shows that there is strong evidence of backpatting and opprobrium effects present, and that status maximization plays a role. Further, it finds evidence for effects of social liking between China and Brazil, India and South Africa. The thesis starts with an analysis of the existing literature on China and UNFCCC. This includes a brief analysis of China’s dual identity in UNFCCC as developing country and major emerging economy. Then, the thesis proceeds with an outline of socialization theory as a theory of International Relations, and an operationalization of socialization theory for the case of climate negotiations. The empirical analysis, then, consists of four parts. Firstly, it analyses the impact of opprobrium on China’s position after the Copenhagen summit. Secondly, it looks closely at changes in China’s position on external review mechanisms, under the influence of Brazil, India and South Africa. Thirdly, China’s initiative on climate finance is scrutinized. Lastly, the empirical analysis reconstructs China’s change in position towards a legally-binding, non-divisive climate agreement.
1. Literature review
China has been the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases since surpassing the United States in 2007 (Vidal and Adam 2007). Since, it has only further increased its annual emission levels of greenhouse gas. (WRI 2014).1 Furthermore, China’s size and influence in the Group of 772, as well as its position as the world’s largest emerging economy and the world’s most populous country, make it a key country in global climate negotiations (Kasa et al. 2008; Walsh et al. 2011: 266; Gupta and Wong 2014: 709-710). In sum, a climate deal lacking China’s commitment would be ‘pointless, and a mere symbolic effort’ (Castro et al. 2014: 116; Yu and Zhu 2015: 63). China’s involvement in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change dates back to the establishment of the institution in 1992 (UNFCCC 1992). China’s participation in the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development, also known as the Rio Conference or the Earth Summit, marked a new era of international environmental participation for China’s central government (Gong 2011: 162). The conundrum of China and the Paris Agreement As China’s domestic climate situation is of obvious importance for international climate action, it makes sense to look at domestic factors in order to explain China’s foreign climate policy (Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2015: 507; Gong 2011; Conrad 2012). However, when looking at the latest round of negotiations of the UNFCCC, which took place in Paris in December 2015, one must conclude that some particular features are at odds with China’s domestic and economic interests.
1. The Paris Agreement is the first universal, legally binding climate accord in the history of UNFCCC.3 It requires climate action by all so-called Parties to the Convention, although climate action by the least developed countries will be dependent on support by developed countries. As such, the Paris Agreement differs significantly from its 1 It is important to note that in terms of per capita emission levels, China still ranks behind the United States, the European Union, Japan and the Russian Federation, to name a few. However, its per capita emission levels exceed those of fellow emerging economies like Brazil or India, and is slightly higher than the world’s average (WRI 2014). 2 The Group of 77 (or G77) is a political coalition of the world’s developing countries, and is the largest negotiation bloc in UNFCCC. The G77 was established in 1964, and today consists of 134 countries. Prior to the 1992 UN Conference on the Environment and Development, the G77+China coalition was formed. 3 The Paris Agreement will be legally binding after at least 55 countries, representing 55% of global greenhouse gas emissions, have ratified the Agreement. In many cases, this requires national legislative bodies to confirm the Agreement.
predecessor, the Kyoto Protocol, which only assigned mandatory climate action to the world’s developed countries (Kyoto Protocol 1997).4
2. It follows that China is no longer dismissed of obligatory climate action. While China has actively pursued domestic climate action since the mid-2000s, it has also been actively resisting any legally binding international commitments. Hence, its commitment to the Paris Agreement is a remarkable change vis-à-vis its earlier aversion of climate commitments. Indeed, China has mostly opposed binding commitments in the past (Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2015: 506).
3. While the Agreement’s predecessor, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, makes a clear, binary distinction between developed countries and developing countries in a so-called Annex division, the Paris Agreement no longer refers explicitly to distinct categories of countries. This is very significant, as China’s main pillar under its foreign climate policy has been the differentiation of responsibilities between developed and developing countries for the past twenty-odd years. It has been argued that ‘the Kyoto Protocol has become symbolic of China’s vision, not because the instrument itself is of key importance, but because it tangibly implements its interpretation of the principle of differentiated responsibilities’ (Hallding et al. 2011). 4. Among other measures, the Paris Agreement puts in place a review mechanism for national climate action. In short, this entails that all Parties make their climate efforts available for review by external organizations, in particular the UNFCCC secretariat and the United Nation’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. China has long been unwilling to be subject to external review mechanisms, as this would entail a breach of its sovereignty.
5. China’s position on environmental policy has consistently prioritized economic development, whether or not in a sustainable fashion, over environmental issues (Gong 2011: 162-163; Economy 2004: 96). Commitment to the Paris Agreement can be seen as a self-constraining measure to economic development, and hence stands at odds with China’s long-heralded prioritization of economic development.
6. China does not stand to benefit from the new climate regime in terms of money transfer. During COP15 in Copenhagen, Chinese Premier Wen stated that “China would never compete with developing countries for even a single cent of financial support”. (Zhao et al., 2009; Hallding et al. 2011: 24, 29). On the contrary, the Chinese government has announced to provide financial support for developing countries in meeting their mitigation and adaptation targets.5 Hence, financial incentives such as claims to mitigation funds cannot explain China’s commitment to this Agreement. 4 Countries that were subject to mandatory action under the Kyoto Protocol are listed in an Annex to the Protocol. This so-called Annex 1 includes OECD-countries as well as former Soviet Republics. 5 Notably, China announced to contribute $3.1 billion by 2017 to a newly established climate fund for South-South cooperation, topping the United States’ pledge to the Green Climate Fund of $3 billion by a slight margin (WSJ 2015).
Changes and paradoxes in China’s foreign climate policy are reflected in academic literature, which in many cases recognize China’s domestic climate efforts, but do not predict China’s commitment to an international agreement as it did in Paris. For example, Hurrell and Sengupta argue that ‘there is every reason for China to go low-carbon, but not necessarily - at least in the very near future – to commit itself to an international agreement’ (Hurrell and Sengupta 2012: 175). Similarly, Gong states that ‘while China is taking concrete steps domestically to fight climate change, this does not mean that it will agree to other nations monitoring it or international agreements binding it’ (Gong 2011: 174). Furthermore, China’s consent to abandon the binary division of developed and developing countries in the Paris Agreement was clearly not foreseen by all. For example, months before China in fact did so, it was argued that ‘China clearly does not intend to put an end to the historical ‘Berlin Wall’ climate divide between developing and developed countries’ (Carafa 2015: 14). If anything, literature’s inability to predict China’s consent to the Paris Agreement indicates that this consent has been not a matter of course. It also indicates that many contributions, although adequately explaining China’s behaviour up to the Paris Conference of 2015, do not accommodate the policy changes described above.
Realism and liberalism
In the following, I briefly address the shortcomings of IR theories oriented on domestic explanations or material gains as explanatory variables for China’s behaviour in the case of international climate negotiations. Following that, I propose that socialization theory might provide a solution to the theoretical questions of the above outlined conundrums. Climate change will pose major questions for any system or stance in political philosophy, through the sheer scope and scale of its implications. Few such traditions were set up with environmental, inter-generational or global concerns at their core, or even at their margins (Calder 2011: 153). For realism and liberalism, the decision to join or not to join an international institution is the result of detailed calculations of the relative costs and benefits of participating in and complying with these institutions (Li 2010: 351). Thereby, both theories take as the starting point the self-interested utility-maximizing behaviour of states (ibid.). Realism There is a general consensus among observers of China’s foreign policy that China’s behavior can often best be described as realpolitik (Kobayahsi 2003: 146; Johnston 2008: 78). Realists maintain that institutions are basically a reflection of the distribution of power in the world (Mearsheimer 1995: 7). Institutions are based on the self-interested (rational) calculations of the great powers, and they have no independent effect on state behaviour (ibid.).
Classical realism principally turns to power-maximizing rationales underlying interstate relations as the primary explanation for states’ behaviour. Translated to international climate
negotiations, power is first and foremost a function of emissions ((Victor 2011: 9; Purdon 2014: 311). As the challenge of global climate change implies an absolute global carbon ceiling for greenhouse gas emissions, negotiating climate action can essentially be seen as a zero-sum game. As such, China and the United States are the most powerful countries on global warming because they have the largest emissions and thus the greatest ability to inflict global harm and avoid harm through their actions However, China’s behaviour in the latest rounds of UNFCCC negotiations is hardly compatible with this world view. It has agreed to self-constraining measures reining in economic growth, infringement of its autonomy in addressing climate change, and subjected itself to external monitoring.6 These observations give realists a hard time in explaining how either China or the US have given in to a self-limiting commitment to an international, legally binding agreement. Indeed, the United States’ abstention from ratifying the Kyoto Protocol, or China’s obstruction of the Copenhagen conference, is much easier explained from a realist point of view than China’s commitment to the Paris Agreement (Christoff 2010: 637; Hovi 2010).7 One could counter that the ultimate objective of the climate regime is to avoid the adverse effects of climate change, and that this is imperative for power maximization. However, this is not a falsifiable premise, and is essentially more of a collective action argument than a reference to realism. Traditionally, scholars have argued offering material side payments or sanctions to counter collective action problems, and make defection undesirable, is the criticial solution to freeriding. But the offering of side payments and sanctions is itself a collective action problem (Li 2010).
Furthermore, for neorealism, socialization can go only in one direction – towards the convergence of behaviour around realpolitik norms (Johnston 2008:6). Yet, there are sufficient and substantively interesting deviations from neorealist claims: cases of norm-conforming behaviour in the absence of obvious material threats or promises. (Finnemore 1996; Johnston 2008: 6). In this thesis, I argue that China’s commitment to UNFCCC is such a case. Liberalism Instead of emphasizing power-maximizing rationales, liberalism principally turns to domestic factors driving a states’ external policies. As such, liberal theory rests on a “bottom-up” view 6 Furthermore, it has challenged its own key premise that economic growth should be prioritized over environmental concerns at all times. By doing so, it has risked incomprehension by its domestic constituencies, who in majority view climate change as responsibility of the West, and who on average are primarily concerned with wealth increase and poverty eradication (Lo 2010). 7 with Xi Jinping saying that “China cannot rely on extensive development and strong stimulus to achieve its targets” (South China Morning Post 2016). See also Minstry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 2014: ‘space is getting more and more limited for the investment-driven, scope-expanding and export-oriented development pattern.’
of politics in which the demands of individuals and societal groups are treated as analytically prior to politics (Moravcsik 1997: 517). Thus, liberalism argues that state-society relations are the independent variable in causal claims explaining states’ behaviour in international relations (idem).
However, it appears that China’s citizens give much more priority to economic growth than to environmental protection (Lo 2010: 1015). Economic growth and job creation are seen as vital for preserving social stability and the political legitimacy of China’s leadership (Hallding et al 2009: 88), even though this picture might be gradually changing (SCMP 2016). And even though China has set out to modernize its economy, anything that might undermine the objective of social stability and economic development is viewed with intense suspicion (Hallding et al. 2009: 88). Lastly, the Chinese public remains firmly behind the state’s defence of national autonomy in formulating responses to climate change (Lo 1012; Gong 2011: 173; Calder and McKinnon 2011: 91).
This makes it hard to explain shifts in China’s foreign climate policy on liberal premises. China diverges from its developed counterparts in the sense that global climate change has not created major internal conflict that could lead to domestic political instability (Lo 2010: 1017). I do not argue here that liberalism is essentially unsuitable for explaining authoritarian, non-democratic regimes. Rather, I argue that domestic factors are unlikely explanations for China’s commitment to the Paris Agreement, nor explain the larger picture of gradual shifts in China’s foreign climate policy since 2009. China’s climate change discourse appears to be characterised by a passive form of political coherence (ibid).
In conclusion, as domestic and economic explanations cannot fully explain China’s changing position in UNFCCC, it appears that realist and liberal premises may not fit a theoretical explanation. At the very least, such explanations would imply a sudden change of insight with the Chinese leadership, for which is no evidence. Therefore, this thesis turns to external, non-material factors to explain China’s behaviour in UNFCCC. China in UNFCCC There is no consensus on the influence of outside pressure on China’s domestic policies and general position in climate negotiations. Some authors argue that ‘China has been notoriously resistant to outside pressure attempting to influence its policies, particularly in regards to the UN, thus such outside pressure is not likely to be a major deciding factor for China about whether or not to participate in a global climate change deal (Walsh et al. 2011: 267). Diametrically opposed, it is argued that ‘adjustments to China’s position typically come only in the face of significant external pressure, particularly from developing countries’ (Stalley 2013: 1). An increasing fragmentation of climate coalition blocs has significantly altered the negotiation landscape since Copenhagen. For much of the past 20 years, climate change has been widely
understood through the prism of North-South relations, and framed in a way which foregrounds the problem of global inequality. This picture has come under increasing challenge (Hurrel and Sengupta 2011: 480; Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2016: 2).8 It has become harder for emerging powers to rally support among developing countries in climate negotations, leading to further fragmentation in the climate regime (idem: 474). 9
Multiple publications have discussed the role of Brazil, South Africa, India and China at the Copenhagen conference, either prior to the summit or in hindsight (Bidwai 2009; Hallding et al. 2010). At Copenhagen, these four countries played a key role in influencing the conference’s outcome (Hallding et al. 2011). This illustrates the changing nature of climate negotiations, as the conferences of Copenhagen, Cancún, and more recently the Paris Conference of the Parties, have shown a very different balance of power than, for instance, the 1997 Kyoto round (Hurrell and Sengupta 2012: 463; Roberts 2011: 776).
The binary distinction between developed countries and developing countries, as materialized in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, has actually widened the gap between industrialized and developing countries in climate negotiations (Castro et al. 2014). Following this argument, there is a significant degree of path dependence in the climate regime (idem; Hurrell and Sengupta 2012). However, if this is the case, it yields the question how Parties have come to agree on accord that leaves out any formal, categorized differentiation between countries for the first time in UNFCCC’s history.
Due to this fragmentation, the precise influence of emerging economies in the UNFCCC climate negotiations, and on China’s position in UNFCCC, remains unclear. Looking at the bigger picture of UNFCCC, literature adresses the broader phenomenon of coalition building in the climate regime in general, for example through the lense of bargaining theory (Capparós and Péreau 2013) or by studying the effects of the institutionalization of country groupings within UNFCCC (Castro et al. 2014).
Alternatively, many contributions focus on the U.S.- China relations as an explanation for changing dynamics in UNFCCC (Shum 2013; Carafa 2015; Cheng 2015). In a similar fashion, it is suggested that China-EU relations are at the core of China’s climate position, and therefore of a successful global climate framework (Carrapatoso 2011: 193; Men 2014). Furthermore, some accounts put Sino-Indian relations central in understanding China’s negotiation position, as the importance of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) is both at the core of the UNFCCC and most strongly advocated by those two countries (Walsh et al. 2013: 272).
A major problem with those accounts focusing on bilateral explanations is that China has
8 Roberts provides a list of sub-groups to the G77+China group, counting up to thirteen different and sometimes overlapping coalitions (Roberts 2011: 770).
proven to be far more cooperative at the bilateral level than it has been at the multilateral level. (Kobayashi 2003: 147). It follows that even though bilateral climate agreements have been struck, this does not necessarily explain how and why this has had a positive impact on multilateral agreements such as those in UNFCCC. Furthermore, if bilateral relations are put forward as an explanatory variable, it is still an open question what factors have caused the respective actors to become more sympathetic towards one another. Arguably, similar problematization arises as in the case of China and UNFCCC.
China as a ‘responsible power’
The ‘responsible major power’ discourse emerged in the 1990s (Johnston 2008: 146). Initally, it referred simply to China’s traditional Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence10 and the preservation of friendly bilateral relations. However, over time it began to embody notions of appropriate major power behaviour that would lead to greater involvement in multilateral institutions, and a more active role in helping design the rules and norms of these institutions (idem: 148). A further impression of China’s foreign policy doctrine is given for example in the White Paper on China’s Peaceful Development, which was published in 2002 (State Council 2002). The White Paper formulates China’s core interests ‘state sovereignty, national security, territorial integrity and national reunification, China’s political system established by the Constitution and overall social stability, and the basic safeguards for ensuring sustainable economic and social development’ (Breslin 2013: 623). Thereby, it is important to note that few states are associated more closely with the protection of sovereignty than China (Muller 2010: 35). The field of climate change is but one of multiple policy fields in which China has made concrete steps to strengthen its image as a responsible power, next to humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping, for example. It is also argued that international image plays an important role in China’s decision to participate in arms control negations and cooperation because Chinese leaders “are concerned to project an image of a responsible major power” (Johnson 1998; Zhang, 2003: 120). China’s identities and alliances in climate negotiations Enhancing China’s international image and elevating its international stature are important goals of China’s foreign policy (Zhang 2003: 118-119). Particularly noteworthy are calls for the People’s Republic to become a ‘responsible power’ by assuming a more constructive, leading role in global governance (Yeophantong 2013: 330; Foot 2001). Just as how China conceives of and acts upon its duties and obligations as a major power will have an impact on global 10 China introduced its Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence at the 1955 Bandung Conference for formerly colonized states. They include respect for national sovereignty and territory, non-agression, peaceful co-existence, cooperation for mutual benefit, and non-interference.
governance, so its perceived roles in global governance will influence the definition of its responsibilities at both the domestic and international level (idem: 332).
Simultaneously, coalitions play a significant role in UNFCCC negotiations (Capparós and Pereau 2013: 70). A constant throughout the process has been that coalitions have been formed between northern or between southern countries (ibid.). In pursuing an agenda for (responsible) change, China’s leaders have constructed a range of relationships with different types and groups of states. These range from very loose common positions with others to more formalized sets of alliances and institutionalized collaborations. (Breslin 2013: 616). Wei and Fu argue that China holds four simultaneous identities, and that this results in a mix of integrative and distributive strategies depending on the audience and the specific issue being addressed. Of these four identities, two are especially of interest in the climate regime:11 China as a developing country Like other developing states, China has significant socio-economic problems to deal with, and it has been subject to colonization and oppression by western Great Powers. This identity manifests itself for example in the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation where, in keeping with a long-held identity as leader of the Third World, China is prepared to take a leadership role (Breslin 2013: ; Wei and Fu 2011). China’s identity of developing country is often emphasized in statement by China in COP negotations, as well as in speeches by Chinese leaders and submissions by China to UNFCCC. In this regard, China emphatically associates itself with the G77, which is the group of developing countries and the largest negotiation bloc in UNFCCC meeting (Economy 1994; Kobayasi 2003: 154). China as an emerging power In this role, China looks for ‘alliances of the dissatisfied’ with other distributive-minded states. Breslin gives the example of BRICS, but in the case of climate politics, India, South Africa and Brazil fit this image (Brütsch and Papa 2013: 327). The BASIC alliance faces the difficulty of balancing between developing countries’ interests in eonomic growth, the demands of particularly vulnerable countries, and various pressures from developed countries.
The question of whether China should prioritize and emphasize global conformity and responsibility, or instead to articulate divergence and perhaps dissatisfaction, continues to be at the heart of Chinese debates over what the country’s global role should be in the future. (Breslin 2013: 621). Roughly, one could say that in climate negotiatons, there is a continuous
11 Wei and Fu list two other identities, Breslin (2013) adds a fifth one: China’s identity of UN Security Council member, China as a quasi-superpower and China as a regional power. These identities, although of importance, are of less direct relevance for this thesis.
appeal for both paths. As initiatives by the likes of Tuvalu, the Alliance of Small Island States, the Least Developed Countries and also the European Union seek to move beyond the often frustrating and slow negotiation process, China cooperates most closely with South Africa, Brazil and India. Contribution to the literature
This thesis aims to contribute to the existing literature by using socialization theory for explaining changes in China’s foreign climate policy since the 2009 Copenhagen Conference. Research to climate negotiations through the lense of socialization theory is mostly done prior to 2015, and thus does not include an analysis of COP 21. For example, Castro et al. look at UNFCCC negotiations from a socialization perspective, but do not focus on China’s position (Castro et al. 2014). Belis and Kerremans do look at the effects socialization mechanisms on China’s foreign climate policy, albeit in the context of the bilateral EU-China relation (Belis and Kerremans 2014). Other accounts of the effects of socialization mechanisms on China’s foreign policy focus on trade regimes (Kent 2002), non-proliferation regimes (Johnston 2008), or human rights regimes (Tao 2015).
Earlier research has sometimes dismissed socialization theory as a useful framework for understanding China’s foreign climate policy. For example, Terhalle and Depledge dismiss socialization theory because ‘continued economic growth is key to the security of China’s regime, so concerns relating to domestic social stability and poverty reduction clearly also played into China’s decision [to obstruct the Copenhagen Accord]’ (Terhalle and Depledge 2013: 578). Hence, they argue, the 2009 Copenhagen conference provides ‘a fitting empirical case that illustrates the fallacy of the theoretical arguments surrounding socialization.’ However, as I have explained above, these arguments prove to be problematic when extended to rounds of negotiations in UNFCCC after Copenhagen.
Thus, this thesis aims to contribute to the existing literature as follows:
1. Socialization theory has been deployed previously to explain China’s engagement in international institutions (Johnston 2008; Li 2010). However, to the author’s knowledge, socialization mechanisms have not yet been tested specifically to China’s position in international climate institutions. 2. Insofar as socialization theory as been applied to the climate regime, it has not done so with a specific focus on China. Furthermore, earlier research to China’s position in UNFCCC has at times been dismissive of socialization theory, for reasons that stand at odds with China’s apparent position in the latest rounds of climate negotiations. 3. Insofar as socialization has been used either to address Chinese foreign climate policy or international climate negotiations, this is often done so prior to the Paris Agreement of December 2015. As the Paris Agreement is UNFCCC’s most significant and concrete achievement since the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, it provides an interesting and relevant
case for testing socialization hypotheses.
4. Climate change negotiations have become a priority in international relations. As multiple authors have argued, this provides an opportunity to China’s leadership for image building. This observation provides a chance to connect socialization mechanisms at work in China-UNFCCC dynamics with changes in China’s broader foreign policy doctrine.
The next chapter proceeds with a more detailed discussion of the foundations and expectations of socialization theory. Thereby, it conceptualizes the main premises of socialization theory in the context of international climate negotiations. After that, the methodology section proceeds with operationalizing hypotheses and observables for emperically analyzing socialization effects in UNFCCC.
2. Socialization theory
In this chapter, the theoretical foundations and expectations of socialization theory are discussed. It argues why socialization theory is a good fit to explain China’s behaviour in international climate negotiation, and what we should expect from it. Subsequently, it operationalizes four mechanisms for observing social influence in the case of China in UNFCCC. This chapter draws strongly on the seminal work Social States: China in International Institutions by Alaistair Iain Johnston, and on the 2010 article Social Rewards and Socialization Effects by Li Xiaojun. Definitions of socialization Socialization theory argues that in the absence of material gains, states can nevertheless be compelled to join international institutions, or to commit to international agreements through social mechanisms. The driving factors for this behaviour lie in the socializing effects of international institutions, and the social rewards that they bring (Li 2010). International institutions in this sense become ‘sites of socialization wherein non-material considerations supplement or replace instrumental calculations (ibid.).’
Hence, instead of material incentives such as economic gains, opportunities for increasing military power, or sovereignty claims, non-material (dis)incentives are the explanatory variable in socialization theory. As explained in the literature review, China’s commitment to UNFCCC can not be fully explained by looking solely at domestic factors, or at absolute or relative material gains. Therefore, this thesis turns to non-material motivational factors behind China’s engagement in the international climate regime. The research question this thesis therefore poses is: Can socialization mechanisms in climate negotiations explain China’s commitment to a new climate regime? The concept of ‘socialization’ in the literature is defined and used in various ways. This easily leads to confusion as to what is exactly meant with socialization. Commonly, socialization is thought of as being directed at novices in the international system, and as the ‘internalization’ of ‘values’ (Risse 1997: 16). This thesis uses Checkel’s definition of socialization: ‘Socialization is a process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community’ (Checkel 2005: 804; Li 2010: 351). This definition leaves space for both consciously calculated and subconscious social behaviour. In addition, and borrowed from Johnston, I define the net effect of socialization as:
‘a function of the characteristics of the environment interacting with the characteristics of the agent in an ongoing tight feedback relationship, mediated by a foreign policy process’ (Johnston 2008: 27). This definition of socialization effects puts emphasis on the social environment on the one hand, and the subject of socialization (the agent) on the other hand. In the empirical analysis, the ‘environment’ is defined as ‘Parties involved in UNFCCC climate negotiations’, while the agent is, obviously, ‘China’.12
Furthermore, Johnston’s definition of socialization effects emphasizes the centrality of interaction between agent and environment. This emphasis makes process tracing a suitable method for researching socialization mechanisms, at which I will come back in the next chapter. The emphasis on interaction also implies that socialization processes do not necessarily work one way, as is indicated by the phrase ‘ongoing tight feedback relationship’. Indeed, it is not hard to imagine China having a strong influence on peer countries or peer groups in climate negotiations, due to its centrality in the climate regime as the world’s most populous country and largest emitter of greenhouse gases, and its unofficial status as leader of the G77. Two types of socialization Both Checkel and Johnston distinguish two types of socialization. The first type is conscious role playing, replacing conscious instrumental (material) calculation. In the second type, which is less rational, agents adopt the interests (or even the identity) of the community of which they are a part. Here, ‘taken-for-grantedness’ replaces conscious instrumental calculation (Checkel 2005: 804; Johnston 2008: 21-22).
It follows that socialization theory does not dismiss the rationality of actors in the international system per se; rather, it leaves space for explaining behaviour by both rational and non-rational factors. Therefore, socialization theory is not dismissive of IR theories that put rational choice central; however, it can provide possible explanations in case such theories fall short (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 888). Furthermore, it is important to note that although socialization mechanisms focus on non-material factors, the theory does not dismiss material factors per se. For example, in their 2014 study, Belis and Kerremans argue that material incentives provided by the EU contributed discernably to the internalization of climate change norms in China (Belis and Kerremans 2014: 543).
12 Here, I’d like to adhere to Pichamon Yeophantong’s remark that ‘by referring to ‘China’, I am aware of the risk of reifying China as a monolithic actor. To engage in unpacking the ‘China-black box would, however, take this article beyond its intended scope. I therefore ask that readers bear with this abstration’ (Yeophantong 2013: 330).
Logics of socialization
Socialization implies that an agent switches from following the logic of consequences to the logic of appropriateness (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 888; Johnston 2008: 16). This appropriation is sustained over time, and independent of a particular structure of material incentives or sanctions (ibid.; Li 2010: 352).13 When looking at the UNFCCC’s legal standing since its conception in 1992 until present day, which is a sustained period of time, this applies very well. Although certain agreements are legally binding, they are not enforceable. This means that even if states agree to cut their emission levels, no material rewards or punishments can currently be distributed by their peers in case of success or failure.14 Nevertheless, there might be strong non-material incentives (or disincentives) to behave according to common norms. In line with remarks that socialization is not necessarily dismissive of rational choice theory, it is important to note that “logics of appropriateness” do not trump “logics of consequences” in all cases (Johnston 2008: xxvii). In that sense, socialization theory seeks to move beyond the dichotomy between constructivist and rationalist approaches (ibid.). Socialization mechanisms In order to derive testable hypotheses on how individual agents are socialized in international institutions, it is necessary to first specify the mechanisms that connect normative structures at the international level with agent behaviours at the unit-level (Li 2010: 352). In Johnston’s account of socialization theory, three mechanisms are central: ‘mimicking’, ‘social influence’, and ‘persuasion’. These three mechanisms are not mutually exclusive. However, for reasons I will explain below, mircoprocesses of ‘social influence’ are most likely to be observed in the case of China’s position in UNFCCC. Therefore, the empirical analysis will focus on observing the effects of social influence. Consequentially, I explain social influence in more detail than the other two socialization mechanisms. In order for the reader to have an impression of the total array of socialization mechanisms, mimicking and persuasion are also briefly discussed. Mimicking
Mimicking is a social mechanism that rests basically on the ability to copy appropriate behaviour. Therefore, mimicking is commonly attributed to novices in a given environment, 13 Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) point out that norms of appropriateness may evolve over time. For the sake of simplicity, this thesis assumes that the norms of appropriateness prevalent within UNFCCC are rather constant. The norms that are taken as point of reference in this thesis are outlined on page 26.
14 This, however, might change in the future. Although no reinforcement mechanism of the Paris Agreement is currently in place, it is not unthinkable that such a mechanism adressing compensation or liability is included in future negotiations (Ohdedar 2016: 5).
for example newly independent states such as South Sudan in the international system. Although Li makes a strong argument for China being a relatively new player in the bigger picture of international institutions in the post-WW2 period, one cannot sustain the argument that China is a novice to UNFCCC. In this particular case, China has been a member right from its earliest beginning at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.15 Therefore, the empirical analysis does not focus on mimicking as an explanatory variable in the case of China’s behaviour in UNFCCC negotiations.
Persuasion
Persuasion (or normative suasion) is a process through which agents actively and reflectively internalize new understandings of appropriateness. Persuasion involves changing minds, opinions and attitudes about causality and effect in the absence of overtly material or mental coercion (Johnston 2008: 11). However, preferences are difficult to observe, as are changes in them (Johnston 2008: ibid.). What appears to be a change in preferences may instead be a change in strategies. Thus, it is safer and easier to either assume preferences or to deduce them from some prior theoretical assumption about the nature of the actor (Frieden 1999; ibid.). Social influence Social influence as a socialization mechanism rests on the the distribution of social rewards and opprobrium. Generally speaking, social influence can be observed as ‘pro-normative behaviour being rewarded with social and psychological markers from a reference group with which the actor believes it shares some level of identification’ (Johnston 1998: 47). Thus, social influence rests on the ‘influenced’ actor having at least some prior identification with a relevant reference group (idem: 25). Social influence comes in the form of ‘mediated normative influence’, e.g., ‘I believe the answer is X, but others said Y, and I don’t want to rock the boat, so I’ll say Y’. (ibid.).
So how does social influence actually work? It encompasses a number of sub-processes: backpatting (praise), opprobrium (shaming), social liking, and status maximization (Johnston 2008: 20). I discuss the four of them below.
Backpatting is a benefit incurred from being seen as a cooperator or an active pro-social member of a group. An actor receives recognition, praise, and normative support for its involvement in a given process. Backpatting can reaffirm an actor’s self-evaluation, its self-
15 Even before Rio 1992, China was engaged in global environmental politics, for example at the 1972 Stockholm Environmental Conference (Gupta and Wong 2014: 705). In contrast to negotiations on protecting the ozone layer, in which developed countries set the agenda from the outset, China ensured its participation in the climate change regime from the very beginning (Kobayasi 2003: 163; Allan and Dauvergne 2013).
categorization as a high-status actor, with concomitant payoffs for self- and public legitimation (Johnston 2008: 91).
Opprobrium carries social costs, namely a denial of the prior status and prestige of the actor as well as psychological ones, namely a denial of the actor’s identity as one deserving of backpatting. Opprobrium can be concretely defined as ‘shaming, shunning, exclusion and demeaning, or dissonance derived from actions inconsistent with role and identity’ (Johnston 2008: 79).
Status maximization and image concerns play a central role in socialization theory. There are several motivations for states to seek status-maximization in the international arena (Johnston 2008: 83-84): • Status comes along with power, wealth and deference, and vice versa • Status is an instrument through which to elevate reputation and image. • Status may be considered a good in and of itself When the latter is the case, joining or adhering to a group becomes a source of recognition. It is important to note that in a way, status maximization is similar to rationalist framework of utility maximization for material benefit. Both are strategic calculation (Checkel 2005). Thus, status maximization must be seen as a conscious form of socialization. Adequately put, China’s concern to preserve a favorable international image as a responsible major power is a critical variable determining the cost-beneft analysis behind international cooperation (Johnson 1998: 560). Earlier research suggests that the degree to which China’s leadership upholds and bolsters China’s international image is of particular importance to the regime (Cummings 200: 63; Johnston 2008: 98). Social liking typically means that an individual experiences a sense of comfort interacting with others with whom she/he is perceived to share traits. Put differently, ‘one should be more willing to comply with the requests of friends or other liked individuals’ (Cialdini 1984). Social liking will increase with more exposure, contact, and familiarity. Therefore, when looking at social liking in the context of international relations, social liking is closely related to alliances within the international system.
One problem with social liking in international institutions is that it can be difficult to distinguish whether an actor agrees with a ‘liked’ actor on the basis of shared material interests, strategic considerations, or because of social liking. One way to make a compelling argument for social liking is to systematically exclude alternative factors for aligned behaviour of two actors.
Social rewards and punishments
Social rewards include ‘psychological well-being, status / image, and a sense of well-being derived from conformity with role expectations’ (Johnston 2008: 25, 63). As mentioned above, social punishment or opprobrium includes ‘shaming, shunning, exclusion and demeaning, or dissonance derived from actions inconsistent with role and identity’ (ibid.). With regard to social rewards, there are a few important points to make. To start with, social rewards are relatively cheap to create (Johnston 2008: 188; Li 2010: 373), since they are of non-material nature. Furthermore, they are infused with immense value, especially to status-sensitive countries like China (ibid.). As climate change has become one of the top priorities in global governing institutions, it seems plausible that China is sensitive to acknowledgement of its importance in this field.16 Secondly, these rewards and punishments are social because only groups can provide them, and only groups whose approval an actor values will have this influence (ibid.) Thus, social influence rests on the “influenced” actor having at least some prior identification with the social environment at hand. This is certainly the case for China in UNFCCC, as it represents all UN member states. Expectations If one or more of the microprocesses of social influence are at work, one should expect to see the following effects (Johnston 2008: 94-95): 1. Commitments to participate and join power-constraining institutions taking place in the absence of material side payments or threats of sanctions; 2. Arguments for joining or participating to a certain regime, stressing backpatting and image benefits, and opprobrium costs; 3. Initial bargaining positions, if stuck to, will put the state in a distinct minority, isolating it from the cooperating audience or reference group. Thus, commimtments to pro-social behaviour will be made only when it is clear that non-commitments will be highly isolating.
As argued in the literature review, the first expectation is certainly met. The second expectation will be subject of the empirical analysis. The third expectation actually points to a counterfactual argument, namely: what if China were the only one of 194 participating Parties not committing to the Paris Agreement? To this, I will come back in the last section of the empirical analysis. 16 Climate change is not only discussed within UNFCCC. Apart from bi-and multilateral dealings which reflect a high degree of importance of the issue, such as the 2015 China-US climate deal, the issue is being discussed in fora such as the G7 (formerly G8), the G20, the Major Economies Forum, BASIC countries’ quarterly meetings, to name a few. However, in such fora, climate change is but one of multiple major issues. Furthermore, these bodies lack UNFCCC’s legislative authority. This is not a one-way mechanism: UNFCCC is the primary body for climate negotiations partly due to the fact that China (and of course other countries) adhere to UNFCCC as the sole legitimate body for climate negotiations.
Necessary conditions for social influence
Two conditions are necessary for observing socialization mechanisms in international institutions: 1. There must be an intersubjective normative consensus about what ‘good’ behavior looks like, even if the status seeker does not ‘internalize’ or sense that this behavior is obligatory. 2. There must be a forum or institution that makes adhering to ‘good’ behavior a public, observable fact. 3.
For assessing the first necessary condition, we should look back to the constitutional documents of UNFCCC, in which the Convention’s ultimate objectives and principles are lined out. Article 2 of the 1992 Convention states that
The ultimate objective of this Convention is (...) stabilization of greenhouse gases in the atmospohere at a level that would prevent dangereous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Further principles include that • developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change; • specific needs and special circumstances of developing country Parties should be given full consideration; • Parties have a right to, and should, promote sustainabale development;
• Parties should protect the climate system in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.
These principles can be safely assumed to be the Convention’s most cited and most important principles. When refering to the norms of UNFCCC, it is these principles that are indicated. For assessing the second necessary condition, it suffices to observe that UNFCCC’s annual Conferences of the Parties (COPs) provide public venues for climate negotiations. The transparency of UNFCCC processes is enhanced by the publication of its minutes and notes, appointments of functionaries, online publication of Parties’ submissions to the Secretariat, commentaries by monitor organizations, summaries of meetings, et cetera. Furthermore, UNFCCC’s meetings are not limited to its COPs; so-called Working Groups tasked with specific themes or topics in negotiation positions tend to meet additionally once or twice a year outside the context of the COP. Technical and diplomatic preparatory meetings tend to take place prior to COPs, of which the 2010 Tianjin meeting hosted by China is an example. Of those additional meetings, minutes, notes and submissions are also published online through the UNFCCC website.
Hence, a states’ ‘good’ behavior in UNFCCC can be witnessed by its peers within UNFCCC as well as by external observers and the general public. This implies that there is plenty of opportunity to single out free riders or defectors. Indeed, there are examples of this available.17 Perhaps superfluously, one should note that were the second necessary condition not met, there would be no opportunity for the distribution of social rewards, which would make any non-material incentive to act according to an institution’s norms inherently irrelevant. Case selection Of course, institutions are not the only social environments in IR in which socialization occurs. In fact, any constellation of states and/or non-state actors in an international organization is a conducive environment to socialization mechanisms. Simultaneously, at the domestic level state agents and principals are exposed to a wide variety of socialization experiences and interactions within their own states. However, the degree to which institutions are conducive to socialization differs per case. A more concrete categorization of international institutions includes the following parameters: • form of membership: small and exclusive, or large and inclusive? • is the authoritativeness of members equally allocated?
• decision rules: are proposals adopted by unanimous vote, consensus, or majority vote?
• mandate of the institution: to provide information, to deliberate and resolve, or to negotiate and legislate;
• the degree of autonomy of agents from their principles.
Microprocesses of social influence, like backpatting, opprobrium, social liking and status maximization are more likely to occur when institutions are large and inclusive; when the authoritativeness of its members is equally allocated; when decisions are made by majority; and when the autonomy of agents to their principles is low (Johnston 2008: 32). UNFCCC fits this categorization of an institution conducive to socialization mechanisms, although not completely unambiguously. UNFCCC is large and inclusive, which maximizes the accumulation of social status markers, and the authoritativeness of its members is indeed equally allocated, at least formally.18 17 For example, the opprobrium Australia received when it announced to lower its ambition (Clark 2014). Or, more recently, the finding that all Parties’ Intended Nationally Determined Contributions combined do not amount to the universal targets set by the Paris Agreement. 18 In practice, of course influential countries such as China or the United States may have more means to exert their influence than for example Luxemburg or Uganda. Nevertheless, the 2009 Copenhagen Accord was not adopted due to a group of smaller countries’ discontent
Contrary to the ideal picture framed by Johnston, decisions in UNFCCC are made by consensus and not by majority vote. However, the main obstacle with this, namely that majority vote enhances consistency effects, seems not to be too much of a problem. In general, Parties to UNFCCC tend to be quite consistent in their position even without a majority vote system. Because of this, deviations from earlier positions are remarkable, and relatively easy to observe. This is a main premise of this thesis Within international organizations and institutions, the participating / cooperating audience is relatively large. This is certainly the case for UNFCCC, with its 194 participating Parties to the Convention. Although the opportunities for free riding are greater – given the number of potential cooperators – the scrutiny of each player is more intense and state behaviour is often more transparent than in bilateral relationships, due to the rules of these institutions. (Johnston 2008: 91). Thereby, although free riding might be easy for insignificant emitters, chances that China demonstrates freeriding behaviour and get away with it unnoticed are slim, as China is by far the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gas. The agent-principle dichotomy in UNFCCC Socialization concepts sound very much as if borrowed from human psychology.19 States as unitary actors do not mimic, are not influenced by backpatting or opprobrium, and are not “persuaded” (Johnston 2008: 95). Moreover, states as unitary actors do not participate in institutions. Rather, state agents do: diplomats, decision makers, analysts, policy specialists, non-governmental agents of state principals, and so on (ibid.). However, generally speaking, the state is often subject to antromorphilization. Much analysis of international diplomacy relies on antropomorphic metaphors (O’Neill 1999: 11-16; Johnston 2008: 96). Wendt goes as far as saying that ‘for most people most of the time, states are people too’ (Wendt 1999: 215). Or, to phrase former French minister Laurent Fabius: ‘States are no cold monsters’ (Chassany 2015). This isomorphization of the state with the so-called ‘national in-group’ works both ways. Praise and criticism of the collective is personalized by decisionmakers.20 IN UNFCCC, on the one hand, agents seem to be very close to their principals, with a low degree of autonomy. Illustratively, at the 2009 Copenhagen UNFCCC summit, China’s chief 19 Socialization theory has its roots in human psychology research in the 1960s and 1970 (Johnston 2008: 44). 20 For example, Qu Geping, at the time head of China’s State Environmental Protection Agency, argued in internal discussions in the State Council that China would have to participate in efforts to protect endangered species because otherwise China would be criticized as ‘stupid, backward and savage,’ haring the ‘Chinese people’s image’. He expressed personal frustration with the ‘pressure’ he felt whenever he attended international conferences because of the stories about Chinese eating wild animals (Qu 1990: 195. in: Johnston 2008: 97).
negotiator reportedly walked out of meetings to make phone calls to his principals (Lynas 2009). At major UNFCCC summits, heads of states personally attend meetings. When assumed that heads of state are the ultimate principle, and for the moment leaving out of consideration that heads of state in turn may be held accountable by domestic institutions or constituencies, the agent-principal dichotomy resolves in these cases to a degree that is is no longer a relevant distinction. Hence, it is unlikely that agents divert strongly from their principals in high-profile meetings. Nevertheless, as UNFCCC conferences are held annually at the so-called Conferences of the Parties to the Convention (COPs), with additional intermediary conferences organized throughout the year, country delegates end up spending considerable amounts of time in each other’s company. Especially during technical or preparatory sessions, which are of a less high-profile nature than the actual COP summits, there seems to be a more autonomous position for state agents in UNFCCC. This enhances chances that praise and criticism of the collective is personalized by its delegates / decisionmakers.21 Thus, the picture is mixed.
21 For example, Qu Geping, at the time head of China’s State Environmental Protection Agency, argued in internal discussions in the State Council that China would have to participate in efforts to protect endangered species because otherwise China would be criticized as ‘stupid, backward and savage,’ haring the ‘Chinese people’s image’. He expressed personal frustration with the ‘pressure’ he felt whenever he attended international conferences because of the stories about Chinese eating wild animals (Qu 1990: 195. in: Johnston 2008: 97).
4. Operationalization and methodology
In the following, the relevant concepts from the theoretical chapter are operationalized into workable hypotheses and observables. I then introduce process tracing as a suitable methodology for testing these hypotheses. Assumptions The empirical analysis rests on a set of assumptions. 1) States behave similarly in open negotiations as in talks behind closed doors. This is mainly relevant for the analysis of BASIC statements, as there is no verification possible between their open statements and negotiations behind closed doors. In the case of UNFCCC, formal sessions are open to the public, although informal sessions and so-called indaba sessions are not often recorded. In instances where secondary sources indicate that relevant remarks have been made during such informal sessions, I include those remarks in the analysis. 2) Individual representatives can be equated with country preferences. I have elaborated on this point in the theoretical chapter, under ‘The agent-principle dichotomy in UNFCCC’ (Castro et al. 2014; Johnston 2008; Li 2010).
3) Openly expressing support for another country’s position indicates closeness in terms of negotiating position. As the analysis is based on a comparison between country positions through document analysis, this is a central assumption for the overall empirical part. If China repeatedly supports Brazil in UNFCCC sessions, this I regard as an indication that China is more open to Brazilian statements and suggestions than to a less-supported country.
4) Closeness between actors in terms of negotiation position equates to stronger susceptibility to socialization effects.
Operationalization of hypotheses and variables
The research question of this thesis asks how we can explain China’s commitment to an international, legally binding climate regime. As we have seen in the previous chapter, of the three social mechanisms outlined by Johnston, ‘social influence’ is the most likely candidate in the case of China and UNFCCC. Therefore, the empirical analysis focuses on evidence of social influence.
Main hypothesis: ‘Mechanisms of social influence at work within UNFCCC negotiations can explain China’s behaviour in UNFCCC.’
In this hypothesis, the dependent variable is China’s behaviour in UNFCCC. This behaviour refers to China’s eventual commitment to the Paris Agreement, but also includes other facets,
such as consenting to external monitoring. More generally, it refers common UNFCCC norms as stated on page 22.
The independent variable is ‘mechanisms of social influence’. In order to test these mechanisms separately, I formulate hypotheses for each of them: H1 (backpatting): ‘China receives recognition, praise and normative support for its involvement in the UNFCCC process, when acting according to UNFCCC norms and role expectations.’ H2 (opprobrium): ‘China is subject to shaming, shunning, exclusion and demea-ning, or cognitive dissonance, when it acts inconsistently with UNFCCC norms and role expectations.’ H3: (status maximization): ‘China actively seeks to maximize its status and boost its international image in UNFCCC’.’
H4: (social liking): ‘China shows affinity with particular countries or country groupings in UNFCCC.’ Observables The above hypotheses are operationalized into the following observable phenomena. Backpatting
Praise for China’s engagement in UNFCCC, and for commitment to specific arrangements (either domestic climate action or adherence to international agreements), should be able to be observed as praise by • peer Parties or alliances of Parties • UNFCCC functionaries, for example the Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC • UN officials, for example the UN Secretary General • monitor organizations, NGOs, external observers • domestic and/or international media commentaries
Backpatting can occur either within or without the context of UNFCCC. For example, the European Union can praise China’s commitment to a new climate framework in the context of the European-Asian Summit. Although in this example the remark is not made within the context of UNFCCC, such praise would be an indicator of backpatting in the context of UNFCCC, and thus relevant for the empirical analysis. The best evidence for backpatting is praise by third Parties, explicitly addressing commitments to UNFCCC agreements, pledges to do so, or concrete initiatives on behalf China.
Opprobrium
Observing opprobrium encompasses evidence of shaming, shunning, exclusion and demeaning, or cognitive dissonance. The sources of such opprobrium can be the same as the sources listed above under ‘backpatting’.
Status maximization
Evidence of reference to China’s behaviour in UNFCCC, either by Chinese state actors or by external actors. For example, China might refer to its positive contributions in working towards a new climate regime in order to raise its image as a responsible power. Signposts for status maximization depend on the sort of status that is pursued. In the case of China and UNFCCC, there are multiple signposts one would expect, which correspond with different images China seeks to project. The following are observables for status maximization: • References to China’s status of developing country • References to China’s constructive role • References to responsibility As discussed in the theory chapter, there are several motivations for status maximization and image projection. Depending on the pursued image, one expects certain language and action. For example, if China wants to enhance its reputation among developing countries, it is likely to refer to its own status as a developing country and to promise financial assistance. If the aim is a more general enhancement of its status as responsible power, one would expect references to China’s domestic climate action. Social liking
Certain diplomatic statements can be indicative of social liking. As mentioned in the theoretical chapter, social liking is closely related to alliances in international negotiations. One should expect the following phrases (and synonymous phrases) to suggest social liking: • to ‘support’ • to ‘associate with’ • to say [something] ‘with’ • to ‘speak on behalf’ of • to ‘agree with’ another country / group of countries
However, in order to know if social liking is a factor, one should pay attention to the reservations made in the theoretical chapter. Due the multiple alliances between Parties in UNFCCC in which China is engaged, features of social liking are likely connected to :
