The Last Drop
Setting up a research design for studying the
Scarcity-Violence Nexus in Iraq
A Master Thesis Political Science
International Relations Specialisations Track
by
Lisa Froukje van ‘t Groenewout
10877614
Supervisor: Dr. Robin Pistorius
Second Reader: Dr. Mehdi Amineh
Dedication
For these past few months I have relied on so many people to help me finish this project. Without them, the document in front of you would not exist and I really do not have the words to express the gratitude I feel.
First, I would like to thank my wonderful supervisor, Dr. Robin Pistorius, for all his patience, kindness and understanding. You really helped me lift my thesis from a mere interest to the almost 70 pages it is now. I would also like to thank Dr Mehdi Amineh, for taking time out of what must be a busy schedule to grade it. A special mention goes to Kim Ribbink for her persistent caring.
Second, I want to thank Hanan and Joyce for taking this journey with me. I can’t wait to see the presentations of your theses and the outcomes of your questions.
But above all, I want to thank my family. From my parents, my sister and brother, to my Opa en Oma, Oos en Tante Marleen, for simply being who they are and always inspiring me.
I would also like to thank my dear, dear friends who helped me proofread: Kristel, Katja, Chloe and Lyndsey, and my parents, without whom the spelling and grammatical errors would have contributed to levels of violence in this world all by themselves. Katja especially saved me from certain death by Word flowchart.
As the lack of data has become clear to me while researching and writing this, I must say the real heroes of this thesis are those who went to Iraq to gather all the data and published it for me to use.
Table of Content
List of Maps, Graphs & Tables ... 6
List of Abbreviations ... 6
Chapter 1: Questioning the role of Water Security in Iraq ... 7
Chapter 2: Constructing a framework for researching the role of water security in Iraq ... 10
2.1 Defining Water Security and Scarcity ... 10
2.1.1 Water Security ... 10
2.1.2 Scarcity ... 10
2.2 Scarcity-Violence Nexus ... 15
2.2.1 Historical overview and larger debate ... 16
2.2.2 Schools of Thought on the Scarcity-Violence Nexus ... 17
2.2.3 Debate on the Scarcity-Violence Nexus since the early 2000s ... 20
2.3 Linkages between scarcity and violence ... 22
2.3.1 Food Insecurity Linkage ... 22
2.3.2 Migration Linkage ... 23
Chapter 3: Setting up a methodological approach ... 26
3.1 Selecting Quantitative Research Method ... 26
3.2 Definitions ... 26
3.2.1 Independent and dependent variables ... 26
3.2.2 Actors ... 28
3.2.3 Focus and Timeframe ... 29
3.3 Case Study Iraq: profiling a war torn country ... 30
3.3.1 General and historical overview of Iraq ... 30
3.3.2 Water Security in Iraq ... 31
Chapter 4: Looking for Intermediary Variables ... 39
4.1 Water Security in Iraq 2005-2016 ... 39
4.1.1 Rainfall Data in Iraq ... 39
4.1.2 Tigris and Euphrates & Rainfall Data outside Iraq ... 41
4.1.3 Agricultural Production Data ... 44
4.1.4 Analysis of Data on Water Security ... 44
4.2 Linkage Data: Food Insecurity, Migration in Iraq & Water Security ... 47
4.2.1 Food Insecurity ... 47
4.2.2 Migration ... 52
4.2.3 Discussion Linkages Factors ... 55
4.3 Violence Data ... 55
4.3.1 Uppsala Conflict Data Program ... 57
4.3.2 Iraq Body Count ... 58
4.4 Discussing the Connections ... 60
4.4.1 Food Insecurity ... 61
4.4.2 Migration ... 62
4.4.3 The Scarcity-Violence Nexus ... 62
Chapter 5: Debating the need for more variables ... 65
List of Maps, Graphs & Tables
Name of Figure, Graph, Map or Table Page
Figure 1: Determinants of (a lack of) Water Security 13 Figure 2: Interpretation of positions of the Schools of Thought 20
Figure 3: Independent and dependent variables 27
Figure 4: Water withdrawal per Sector 36
Figure 5: Water withdrawal per Source 36
Graph 1: Rainfall and Temperature in Iraq 32
Graph 2: Average Annual Rainfall over Historical and Future Periods 32 Graph 3: Annual Discharge of the Euphrates at Hit City, 1932-1997 33 Graph 4: Annual Discharge of the Tigris in BCM at Kut City 34
Graph 5: Precipitation in Iraq 41
Graph 6: Rainfall outside Iraq 42
Graph 7: Agricultural Production in Iraq 44
Graph 8: Rainfall Combined 45
Graph 9: Total Crops Combined 45
Graph 10: Average Rainfall Outside Iraq 45
Graph 11: Prevalence Undernourishment 49
Graph 12: Food, Fuel and Consumer Prices in Iraq 1989-2008 50
Graph 13: Food Prices Iraq 2012-2016 51
Graph 14: Food Prices Iraq 2013-2016 with average 51
Graph 15: IDPs in Iraq 53
Graph 16: IDPs leaving due to drought 54
Graph 17: Number of Violent Deaths 57
Graph 18: Number of Civilian Deaths 58
Map 1: Map of Iraq 30
Map 2: Climate Zones in Iraq 32
Map 3: River System Tigris and Euphrates 33
Map 4: Kut Al Hai Weather Station 40
Map 5: Land Utilization in Iraq 42
Map 6: Locations weather stations in the region 42
Map 7: Croplands Affected by Drought 46
Map 8: Food Insecurity in 2005 48
Map 9: IDPs leaving due to Scarcity 55
Table 1: IDPs in Iraq 2009-2016 52
Table 2: Reasons IDPs 55
List of Abbreviations
BCM Billion Cubic Metres
CPA Coalition Provisional Authority ENCOP Environment and Conflict
Project
FAO Food and Agricultural Organisation
IBS Iraq Body Count
IDMC Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
IDP Internally Displaced Person
IOM International Organisation for Migration
IS Islamic State
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration PRIO Peace Research Institute Oslo UCDP Uppsala Conflict Data Program
WFP World Food Program
WHO World Health Organisation WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
Chapter 1: Questioning the role of Water Security in Iraq
In the Iraq Resolution US Congress stated that one of their objectives was to remove Saddam Hussein and promote a democratic government. (2002) Since that resolution, a lot has happened in Iraq. In May 2004, president George W. Bush stated that it was the goal of the United States of America to help Iraq achieve democracy and freedom, and to establish the stability and security that is necessary for that democracy. (Bush, May 2004) Iraq is currently classified as a hybrid regime in the democracy index (2016) and its press is seen as ‘not free’ by Freedom House (2017).
In August 2014 the United Nations (UN) declared a level 3 emergency for the humanitarian crisis – the highest level of emergencies – due to the tens of thousands of people displaced by Islamic State (IS). (United Nations, 2014) In 2016 the UN called on Iraq to prevent a full-throttle sectarian war. (United Nations, 2016) This shows that the goal of the USA to help create a viable, stable democracy in Iraq has not been met. A 2013 study stated that the cost of the Iraq War was over $2 trillion, and could grow to be more than $6 trillion over the next decades. (Trotta, 2013) The costs of the conflicts are not just in monetary terms, as over a 100.000 Iraqi civilians have died since 2003 (Iraq Body Count), as well as thousands of soldiers. (Global Security, 2009)
This shows that the question of how to increase the situation in Iraq is still a current one. Whilst studies and reports often focus on sectarianism, authoritarianism, the war in Syria or other reasons (see fe Fearon, 2007; Hunter, 2014; Khan, 2014) the topic of a lack of water security has had little attention. Yet there is academic literature to suggest that a scarcity of water can contribute to levels of violence, using concepts such as the scarcity-violence nexus. (see Homer-Dixon, 1999; Klem, 2003, Chapter 2.2 The Scarcity-Violence Nexus)
If a scarcity of water can contribute to levels of violence, then improving the water security situation in Iraq might help reduce those levels of violence and improve the situation. There is, however, still ongoing debate on the scarcity-violence nexus, so there is still uncertainty to what extent water scarcity can influence conflict levels. Therefore, this thesis will ask the question: What was the role of water security in the Iraqi conflicts, and how does this fit in the debate on the scarcity-violence nexus?
This question is two-fold, first questioning the role of water security in Iraq and then linking it back to the relevant literature. Chapter 2: Constructing a framework for researching the role of water security in Iraq, will focus on constructing a theoretical framework, by asking itself what some of the key concepts are: water security and scarcity, and by what aspects these concepts are influenced. Chapter 2 will also examine the scarcity-violence nexus, debating its history, the different schools of
thought and the debate since the early 2000s. Next, Chapter 2 will question how a scarcity might contribute to levels of violence by examining two linkage factors: migration and food insecurity.
Chapter 3 will debate on how best to set up a research methodology that can be used to study the role of water security in Iraq. Chapter 3 will select a quantitative approach, identify the independent and dependent variables and visualise the relation between them. Chapter 3 will also discuss relevant actors and set the timeframe from 2005 to 2016. After setting up the theoretical framework and the research methodology, this thesis will return to Iraq in the second half of Chapter 3, by introducing a historical and general overview of Iraq. Chapter 3 will then ask the question of what the general water security situation is in Iraq by reviewing the supply of water, the demand of water and structural issues in terms of access in Iraq. Chapter 3 will conclude that the average water security situation in Iraq is severe as it deals with supply-induced, demand-induced and structural scarcity.
Chapter 4 will ask the main question of how to find the data necessary to study the effects of water security in Iraq. For water security, three variables are chosen: rainfall in Iraq, rainfall upriver from Iraq in Syria and Iran, and agricultural production data.
For the first linkage factor, migration, the number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) is used to describe migration in Iraq. Only a weak correlation between numbers of IDP and agricultural production was found, as well as between IDPs and rainfall in Iraq. No correlation between IDPs and rainfall outside Iraq was found. However, several reports indicate that water scarcity has forced people to leave their homes. The second linkage factor, food insecurity uses two variables to describe the situation. The first intermediary variable is the prevalence of undernourishment. The correlation between rainfall in Iraq and undernourishment is weak, but the link between agricultural production and undernourishment is strong. The second intermediary variable used to describe food insecurity is food prices, though a lot of data is lacking. No correlation coefficient between food prices and agricultural production could be found, and the correlation between food prices and rainfall inside Iraq is insignificant.
The third subsection of Chapter 4 will question the data on conflict levels in Iraq, selecting two datasets to represent the conflicts in Iraq: the Iraq Body Count (IBC) and Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). There is no correlation between the numbers of IDPs and both the IBC and the UCDP, suggesting that in Iraq water scarcity did not lead to increasing levels of conflict through the linkage of migration. The data on food insecurity suggests different outcomes. Though the correlation between undernourishment and the IBC dataset is weak at best and the correlation between undernourishment and UCDP is negligible, the link between food prices and both conflict databases is very strong.
As result of the outcomes discussed in Chapter 4, this thesis cannot give a definitive conclusion on the role of water security in the Iraqi conflicts or what that says about the scarcity-violence nexus, but it does give a methodological approach on how to study the influence of water security in situations with significant gaps in data. It suggests that more data needs to be gathered to form a better picture of the influence water security has had in Iraq, and that the academic literature should include a discussion on how to best study water security when data is missing.
Chapter 2: Constructing a framework for researching the role of water
security in Iraq
The following chapter presents an overview of the issues and concepts used in the thesis, as well as give an overview of the debate that surrounds those issues and concepts, starting with discussing some of the main concepts used: water security and scarcity, and it will discuss some of the possible causes and consequences of a scarcity. The sections after that the overview will focus on the theory behind the scarcity-violence nexus, discussing the theoretical background of the debate, some of the different schools of thought and some of the different possible linkages between scarcity and violence.
2.1 Defining Water Security and Scarcity
The following sections will discuss the concepts of water security and scarcity. This thesis aims to understand what the possible role of water security in the Iraqi conflicts has been and the following sections will help answering that question by discussing what water security entails, and what a scarcity might be.
2.1.1 Water Security
Water Security is defined by the United Nations as the capacity of a population to safeguard sustainable access to adequate quantities of acceptable quality water for sustaining livelihoods, human well-being and socio-economic development; for ensuring protection against water-borne pollution and water-related disasters, and for preserving ecosystems in a climate of peace and political stability. (UN Water, 2013) This concept has four different components: drinking water and human well-being, economic activities and development, water-related hazards and ecosystems. (UN Water, 2013) To have water security thus means one has to have access to enough water to sustain life, enough water to sustain economic activities, be able to preserve ecosystems, and, finally, have protection from water-related hazards, which can include floods, pollution, but also droughts.
As Iraq, the case study this thesis has selected, has a dry climate, it will be focusing mostly on the lack of water security that comes from a scarcity of water, but will otherwise follow the definition provided by the United Nations. The next section will discuss the notion of scarcity, and what possible causes can be.
2.1.2 Scarcity
The previous paragraphs defined the concept of water security and stated this is the definition that will be used throughout this thesis and that there will be a focus on a lack of water security caused by a scarcity of water, rather than a lack of water security caused by abundance of water. The next sections will look at the concept of scarcity and define how it is going to be used in the rest of the thesis.
A scarcity occurs when there is either not enough water to fulfil the four components of water security discussed in 2.1.1 Water Security, when the water present in the area is not of a high enough quality, or both.
2.1.2.1 Types of Scarcity
A discussed in the previous sections, water security has four components: drinking water and human well-being, economic activities and development, water-related hazards and ecosystems. (UN Water, 2013) A scarcity is understood as when people do not have water security due to there either not being enough water or the water is unusable. Water can be unusable for various reasons, for example because it has been contaminated by diseases or other pollutions. However, the concept of scarcity entails more than a definition, and the following paragraphs discuss what types of scarcity can occur, what can be a cause of a scarcity and what some of the possible consequences can be.
Thomas Homer-Dixon argues that there are roughly three types of environmental scarcity: supply-induced, demand-induced and structural scarcity. (1999) He also discusses several factors producing those scarcities.
The first type of scarcity, supply-induced, is caused by a drop in the supply of a key resource. That drop in supply can be a quantitative drop in a certain resource, for example due to a dry period with less rainfall. Supply-induced scarcities can also occur when there is not necessarily a drop in the quantity of a resource, but in the quality of the resource, for example when the water supplies are polluted or infected. (Homer-Dixon, 1999, p. 48)
The second, demand-induced, arises when there is an increase in demand. Homer-Dixon argues that demand-induced scarcity occurs only when the resource is rivalrous, meaning that if one actor uses the resource, the availability of that resource to other actors is reduced. (Homer-Dixon, 1999, p. 48, emphasis in original) An example of this is cropland: a farmer farming on a certain amount of arable land necessarily means there is less land available for other famers to farm on. If there is a very limited supply of arable land, the scarcity is more severe, whereas if there is a wide supply of arable land, the scarcity is small and negligible as it can handle the increasing demands. This also applies to forestland, fisheries, and water. An increased population can lead to an increase in the demand of a certain good and if the supply is unable to grow accordingly, there is a demand-induced scarcity. An increased population in a certain area can lead to an increase in demand for freshwater to drink, clean and cook with. Sometimes resources are rivalrous, but non-excludable, such as high-seas fisheries. In these cases the resources are called open-access or common-pool resources. (Homer-Dixon, 1999, p. 48) Resources often become common-pool resources when property rights are weak or unclear.
The third type of scarcity, structural scarcity, comes from a change in the relative access of different groups to the resource. Some groups will have a disproportionate amount of access to a certain good, whereas other groups have less or no access to the same resource. It is possible for a
group of people to have a lack of water, even though there is enough water for everyone. An unequal distribution can lead to structural scarcity. (Homer-Dixon, 1999) Unequal distribution can be due to differences in wealth, where the rich can afford to buy the resource, but poorer people lack the funds to do so. Geographical differences can also cause structural scarcities, as people in one area have easier access to the resource, whilst other people have more difficulties in accessing.
These three types of scarcities are not necessarily mutually exclusive. It is possible that the demand for a resource goes up as the supply of that resource is dwindling. Certain groups can have little to no access to the resource, but the demand is too high even among the groups that do have some access. A scarcity can be one of the types mentioned above, but it can also fall into all three categories.
Figure 1: Determinants of (a lack of) Water Security provides a reinterpreted overview of the causes of scarcity discussed by Homer-Dixon, loosely specified to the Iraqi case. Figure 1 shows the three types of scarcities. The Supply box has three different types of supply: rainfall, rivers and groundwater. These three are different sources of water for Iraq, though groundwater less so. (See 3.3.2.1 Water Supply in Iraq for discussion of water sources in Iraq) Box two, the demand box, has three different components: the size of the population, water-using technologies used by the population, and how much the resources are used or degraded by the population and/or the industries and technologies. Box 3 has only one component: relative access of different groups, indicating that some groups can have more access to the resource than others, as discussed a few paragraphs before.
Figure 1: Determinants of (a lack of) Water Security
This overview, based on Homer-Dixon’s work, touches upon the most important aspects regarding the three types of scarcity. Supply, Demand, and Structural issues, together, determine whether there is water security, or a scarcity – seen as a lack of water security in this thesis. An arrow indicates that a box influences the quantity and/or the quality of the resource, in this case water security. If the demand is bigger than the supply, there will be a lack of water security and thus a scarcity. If the supply is bigger than the demand, it is more likely that there is water security. This all depends on structural issues as well: it is possible that if there is a sufficient supply of water, but some groups do not have access to it, there is still a lack of water security. In that situation, there still is a lack of water security for those groups, even though in absolute terms there is enough water.
2.1.2.2 Possible sources of Scarcity
The previous parts of this chapter discussed different types of scarcity. The next sections will discuss some of the possible causes of scarcity, based on the work of Thomas Homer-Dixon (1999). He discusses some key factors and how they relate to scarcity. Figure 1 above provides a simplified overview of the types of scarcity discussed by Homer-Dixon and how they relate to a possible lack of water security. Homer-Dixon (1999) discusses several possible causes of scarcity. In terms of supply-induced scarcity, it can come when there is a drop in the quantity of the resource or the quality of the resource. Human activities can factor in this: when a mine is depleted, or when too much waste is being dumped, reducing the quality of a lake and killing fish populations. On a large scale, humans
also have contributed to climate change, causing increases in temperature, precipitation patterns and extreme weather events, rising sea-levels, and other environmental impacts. (Levy, et al., 2017) However, this thesis is focusing on a somewhat lower level and will take the climate and rainfall as independent variables.
Homer-Dixon (1999) argues that there are three key factors in causing too much demand: total human population in the area, the use per capita of each technology available to that population, and the consumption of the resource. (Homer-Dixon, 1999, p. 49) Human population means the size of the population in the area. Use per capita of the technology means how much of the resource is being used by the technologies. If an industry uses a lot of the resource, then this will amount to a higher demand of the resource. By making the industry more efficient, one can reduce the strain on the resource. One can also reduce the consumption/degradation of the resource by making the industry less polluting. In Figure 1, you can see that, amongst others, the population’s use of technology and resource consumption influences the depletion or degradation of renewable resources. As renewable resources are depleted or degraded, it changes the availability of those resources, and that change in availability in turn influences the population, the technology and/or the consumption. At the same time, a depletion or degradation influences ideational factors, which Homer-Dixon defines as institutions, social relations, preferences and beliefs. (Homer-Dixon, 1999, p. 49) Resources can be depleted by overuse, but resources can also be degraded. This can be due to the remaining resources being lower quality, but degradation can also happen as a side-effect of other activities. The pollution of a factory, for example, can also cause degradation in the quality of surrounding freshwater sources.
Besides those three key-factors Homer-Dixon also argues that the ideational factors are particularly important, as “they help determine a society’s vulnerability and adaptability when faced with serious environmental scarcity.” (Homer-Dixon, 1999, p. 51) The ideational factors are unlikely to change quickly, but are rather long-term changes. In essence, the ideational factors describe “the nature of the relationship in a given society between human activity and the scarcity of renewable resources”. (Homer-Dixon, 1999, p. 51)
Though Figure 1 shows the depletion and degradation of resources as an influence to the physical availability of resources, the physical availability can also change due to other factors: a drought for example changes the physical availability of freshwater.
2.1.2.3 Possible consequences of scarcities
The previous section discussed the different types of scarcities and what may cause them. The next section will discuss what these different consequences may be. When scarcity of a resource occurs two patterns of interaction are often recognisable: resource capture and ecological
marginalization. (Homer-Dixon, 1999, p. 73) Resource capture occurs when powerful social groups shift the resource distribution to favour their own group, especially when a depletion or degradation of a resource is combined with population growth. This will lead to an increase in structural scarcity as it can increase the scarcity for poorer or weaker social groups. (Homer-Dixon, 1999) Another common pattern of interaction is ecological marginalization. This occurs when an unequal distribution of a resource combined with population growth forces people to migrate to other regions that are also ecologically fragile. (Homer-Dixon, 1999) This can cause severe environmental damage and chronic poverty in these regions. (Homer-Dixon, 1999)
This shows that both an unequal distribution of a resource and a depletion or degradation of a resource can cause an increase in resource scarcity, and have resource capture or ecological marginalization as a consequence. The two are often interlinked, and Homer-Dixon argues that the one frequently leads to the other. (Homer-Dixon, 1999, p. 78)
Resource capture and ecological marginalization are not the only patterns of interaction that can occur when scarcity emerges, but they are the most common ones according to Homer-Dixon. (Homer-Dixon, 1999, p. 73) These patterns of interaction then cause changes in societies, which can be both positive and negative. Scarcity might for example stimulate people to develop new techniques or invent new methods to deal with that scarcity. On the other side, many of the changes brought about by resource capture and ecological marginalization are not so positive. (Homer-Dixon, 1999) Scarcity of wood can cause people to not cook their food long enough, possibly leading to diseases. There are many other possible consequences that may lead to increased levels of violence, but they will be discussed in another section, as there is still a high level of debate on the validity of these linkages.
In the previous sections, this thesis has discussed what water security is, what scarcity is, what different types and causes of scarcity are, and what some of the consequences of scarcity may be. In the next section, this thesis will address the scarcity-violence nexus, how it fits into a larger debate, what the different schools of thought are, what the current debate looks like and how some scholars describe the link between scarcity and violence.
2.2 The Scarcity-Violence Nexus
To help answer the question what the role of water security in the Iraqi conflicts was and how that role fits in the scarcity-violence nexus, the following segments will examine the scarcity-violence nexus. They will discuss if there is a relation between scarcity and violence, how the debate on the question has evolved over the years and what the different schools of thought argue. Following that, there will be an overview of how a scarcity might contribute to increasing levels of violence.
2.2.1 Historical overview and larger debate
This segment will present the historical overview of the question as to whether scarcity can contribute to levels of violence and discuss how it fits into a larger academic debate. This section will help answering the sub-question of what the scarcity-violence nexus is by discussing how the entire debate emerged. The possible link between scarcity and violence emerged from a larger debate: that of environment and security. (Klem, 2003)
As the topic of climate, climate change and the environment has gained prominence in the academic world over the past few decades, some scholars have studied the possible role between the environment and conflict. There is an ongoing debate on whether or not the environment, for example scarce resources, can be a causal factor of conflict. Some authors argue that excessive exploitation of natural resources has a large potential to cause a conflict, whereas others argue that the natural resources are merely the means through which a conflict manifests itself, rather than a primary cause. (Klem, 2003, p. 9) Others argue that a scarcity of resources can increase cooperation rather than cause conflict. There is also a group of scholars who argue that the environment is not a causal factor in a conflict, but can have an influence in ongoing conflicts. (Klem, 2003)
The question of scarcity and violence is not necessarily a new one. Almost two and a half centuries ago, Thomas Malthus stated that environmental restrictions create limits to population and consumption growth. He argued that outgrowing environmental restrictions can lead to poverty and a breakdown of society. Some of his contemporaries argued that with innovation, conservation, and finding of alternative resources, the supply would allow for development and increased population growth. (Klem, 2003) In essence, these two arguments are still some of the main arguments of the current debate: the finiteness of resources and the human ability to adapt to scarcity are still important questions.
In the 1970s the topic of environment and its possible implications has gained prominence in the International Community. The 1972 Stockholm Conference of the United Nations General Assembly argued that natural resources, wildlife and non-renewable resources must be safeguarded and not exhausted, amongst other principles. Though its Declaration did not link the environment with conflict, it did see environmental issues as a causal factor of poverty. The 1971 Founex Report, on which the 1972 Stockholm Conference was based, called for a broader understanding of development, arguing that environmental dimensions were also part of development. (FOUNEX REPORT, 1971)
The first linkage between the environment and conflict occurred a few years later, when the UN Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, linked security with both development and environmental issues. The commission argued that whilst collective security was the traditional military notion, there was also a common security which encompassed wider dimensions including economy, resource scarcity and environmental degradation. The term common security was replaced by the concept of sustainable development in the 1987 Brundtland Report (Brundtland, 1987)
emphasizing the many linkages between the environment and development, though not the – possible – link between environment and conflict. The Brundtland Report defined sustainable development as “development which meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” (Brundtland, 1987, p. 16)
The end of the Cold War saw an increase in the amount of conflicts across the world and it forced the world to approach conflict from different angles, and include more dimensions in its understanding of conflict. It became increasingly more clear to some that development and conflict are related and the international community should not approach them separately. There are several nexuses that emerged in that period: the nexus between development or development cooperation and conflict. This nexus argues that changing social structures, due to developments, can increase social tensions and contribute to violence. Another nexus is that between violence and development or development cooperation, where conflict has destructive consequences on levels of development and/or development cooperation. Both these nexuses saw environmental dimensions as part of development. (Klem, 2003, p. 11)
The previous paragraph shows that the scarcity-violence nexus emerged from a larger question of environment and security and comes from a conflict studies background. (Klem, 2003) It was from the development-conflict nexus that in the 1990s the scarcity-violence nexus started to emerge. (Klem, 2003) The concept of environmental degradation as a possible major cause of violence conflict and war emerged in the early 1990s. (Baechler, 1999; Broch, 1991; Homer-Dixon, 1991; Lipschutz, 1989; Renner, 1989) Since then it has been the subject of discussion and several different schools of thought have emerged, which will be examined next.
2.2.2 Schools of Thought on the Scarcity-Violence Nexus
In the following sections this thesis will discuss some major schools of thought that have emerged on the scarcity-violence nexus: the Toronto School, the Swiss School, the PRIO School and the Oregon State University School. Each takes different positions on the scarcity-violence nexus and how much influence scarcity has. It is useful to discuss the different paradigms on that nexus, as part of the main question is what the role of water security in Iraq means for the scarcity-violence nexus.
2.2.2.1 Toronto School of Thought
The first school presented is the so-called Toronto School of Thought. It argues that environmental scarcity contributes to violence. The Toronto School, spearheaded by Thomas Homer-Dixon, predicts that an increase in violence will occur in areas where there is a decrease in availability of arable land, freshwater or forest land. (Klem, 2003, p. 13; Homer-Dixon, 1999) The Toronto School takes the distribution of resources as a starting point. Though a resource can be scarce, there are always groups that do have access to it, or do not suffer from negative consequences resulting from
that scarcity. There are other groups though, that suffer disproportionately from a scarcity of a certain resource. This creates an increase in inequality. Homer-Dixon (1999) discussed the notion of an ingenuity gap, a concept that argued that human capacity to innovate is not evenly distributed and some people are more capable of adapting than others. (Homer-Dixon, 1999, pp. 114-124) This can be for several reasons, and Homer-Dixon noted that the groups most affected by ecological scarcity are also those least capable of being innovative. (Homer-Dixon, 1999) This goes against the classical Malthusian notion of scarcity, which argues that the whole world will be challenged by scarcity. The Toronto School instead argues that certain groups suffer more from scarcity than others, thus probably increasing inequality within an area or country. This leads the Toronto School to focus more on violent intra-state conflicts, rather than global conflicts. (Klem, 2003)
2.2.2.2 Swiss School of Thought
In Switzerland, the Environment and Conflict Project (ENCOP) approached the link between environment and conflict from a broader perspective than the Toronto School. (Klem, 2003, p. 13) ENCOP approached the question from a context of development and underdevelopment, discussing the ‘transformation of society-nature relationships’. (Baechler, 1999) It came to the conclusion that environmental degradation can contribute to violent conflict, though the overarching factor is the unequal impact of environmental degradation. The threshold for violence is also largely dependent on other social and political factors, rather than the degree of degradation. (Klem, 2003) It attributes more influence to other contextual factors besides scarcity than the Toronto School, as it argues that whether the threshold for violence passed is dependent on socio-political factors and not on the degree of scarcity or degradation. (Baechler, 1999, p. 24) The Swiss School identifies several different types of conflict and argues that the relationship between scarcity and violence differs with each type.
2.2.2.3 PRIO School of Thought
The Peace and Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO) regards a possible link between scarcity and violence differently. Though they found a weak link between environmental stress and degradation and conflict (Dalby, 2002), they argue that there is not sufficient evidence to support a claim that scarcity and violence are sufficiently linked. (Gleditsch, 1998) Instead, they argue that economic and political variables are much more significant contributors to violence than environmental variables. The PRIO School emphasizes the influence of governance in the link between violence and scarcity, arguing that it is not the scarcity per se, but the lack of governance that is the more important contributing factor. (Klem, 2003) A scarcity can be a problem, but a country with higher levels of governance can mitigate the effects of scarcity, whereas a country with a lack of governance cannot. Thus, the PRIO school of thought argues, a lack of governance is the more influential contributing factor, not scarcity itself.
2.2.2.4 Oregon State University School of Thought
It is important to also mention the Oregon State University in this debate between different schools of thought. While not known for starting a completely new conceptual approach to the issue, Oregon State University used a new methodology, focusing not on case studies, but rather creating a historical database on freshwater conflicts. From this database came some very different conclusions than the previous schools of thought discussed here would have expected: Wolf (see Wolf et al., 2017) argued that scarcity can act as a catalyst of international cooperation rather than conflict. Wolf (2017) argues that water scarcity has never led to an international armed conflict and that water agreements are very resilient.
2.2.2.5 Discussion Schools of Thought on the Scarcity-Violence Nexus
In the previous sections this thesis discussed four major schools of thought on the scarcity-violence nexus. The most substantial difference between the schools is the level of influence they attribute to scarcity, but they are otherwise varied in preferred methodology. All groups use both qualitative and quantitative case studies, though the Oregon State University was amongst the first to also start doing historical analyses. (Klem, 2003)
In Figure 2: Interpretation of positions of the School of Thought the different schools of thought are positioned according to how much influence they believe scarcity has on violence. This is a subjective interpretation of the schools and the level of influence and Figure 2 should not be used to quantify that level of influence. Figure 2 is divided in two parts. The left side of the y-axis indicates that scarcity has an influence on cooperation, whereas the right side of the y-axis indicates the influence scarcity has on conflict, according to different schools of thought. Again, this is a subjective interpretation of the positions of the schools of thoughts regarding the influence of scarcity.
On the left of the y-axis, there is Oregon State University, arguing that scarcity certainly has influence on conflict by increasing cooperation, rather than increasing conflict. For this reason it is placed on the far left. Next to Oregon State University is the PRIO School of thought, arguing that there is not enough evidence that scarcity influences conflict either by increasing or reducing cooperation. The PRIO School argues that contextual variables are far more important than scarcity and that a lack of governance is the main problem. This places the PRIO School between the Oregon State University School on the left side and the Swiss and the Toronto schools on the right. PRIO argues that scarcities could be dealt with if there is a higher level of governance. On the right hand side of the graph are the Swiss and the Toronto Schools. Both believe that scarcity indeed has an influence on conflict, but where the Oregon State University School believes scarcity increases cooperation, the Swiss and Toronto School argue that scarcity is more likely to increase conflict. The Swiss School takes a somewhat broader view than the Toronto School and thus attributes less influence to scarcity and more to other factors. It argues that scarcity can influence levels of violence,
but the level of degradation is does not decide when the tensions turn violent, but rather the other contextual factors. The Toronto School attributes relatively more influence to scarcity on conflict compared to the other schools and thus is on the far right. The Toronto School especially focuses on the unequal impact of scarcity, and that the people who are often affected the most are those least capable of adapting to the circumstances.
Figure 2: Interpretation of positions of the School of Thought
2.2.3 Debate on the Scarcity-Violence Nexus since the early 2000s
The debate has not yet been concluded and there are still several questions the academic community faces: can a scarcity of natural resources be a cause of conflict? Can a scarcity be a cause of increased cooperation between parties in conflict? Can a scarcity influence ongoing conflicts? Or is a presumed conflict of a scarcity really a conflict about something else, as others argue? (Klem, 2003) Since the emergence of the dominant schools discussed in the previous sections, the debate has shifted to include climate change and conflict. (Ide, 2015) Ide (2015) gives an overview of the debate of the past 10 years:
“Despite considerable research efforts, no scientific consensus on the issue has emerged yet. Some quantitative studies suggest a link between low precipitation levels (Fjelde & von Uexkull, 2012; Raleigh & Kniveton, 2012) or freshwater scarcity (Gizelis & Wooden, 2010; Raleigh & Urdal, 2007) and intra-state violent conflict, while others find no significant relationship (O'Loughlin, et al., 2014; Wischnath & Buhaug, 2014) or even a negative correlation between low rainfall/water scarcity and violent conflict within states (Hendrix & Glaser, 2007; Salehyan & Hendrix, 2014; Rowhani, et al., 2011; Theisen, 2008). The same is true for quantitative studies on soil degradation (Hendrix & Glaser,
2007; Raleigh & Urdal, 2007) and deforestation (Etsy, et al., 1999; Theisen, 2008). The findings of qualitative studies are similarly ambivalent. Some authors claim a role for renewable resource scarcity as a cause of violent conflict in certain cases. (Homer-Dixon, 1994; Kahl, 2006; Schilling, et al., 2012), some scholars reject such a link (Adano, et al., 2012; Selby & Hoffmann, 2014) and some provide mixed results (Benjaminsen & Ba, 2009; de Châtel, 2014).” (Ide, 2015, p. 61)
As shown by the previous citation, one of the main topics of debate is still whether or not scarcity influences violence levels. To add to the summary of Ide (2015): Maystadt and Ecker (2014) also argue that there is a causal relation between droughts and violent conflict in Somalia, through the mechanism of the economy, measured by livestock prices. Hendrix and Salehyan (2012) argue that deviations of rainfall patterns have significant impact on both large-scale and smaller-scale instances of political conflict. Bayramov (2017), on the other hand, argues that scarcity has very little influence compared to other variables.
As mentioned previously, the debate has somewhat shifted to focus more on climate change than scarcity alone. In this debate there is a similar division. Levy, Sidel and Patz (2017) argue that climate change, through, amongst others, changes in precipitation levels, is causally associated with collective violence. Hsiang and Burke find “consistent support for a causal association” (2014, p. 39) between climatological changes and conflict, and show that “local rainfall shortages continue to exacerbate violence”. (Hsiang & Burke, 2014, p. 50) Matthew, Halle and Switzer (2002) also stress the influence of environmental problems on conflicts.
Bernauer, Böhmel and Koubi on the other hand argue that environmental changes only increase the risk of conflict under certain conditions. (Bernauer, et al., 2012) Koubi, Bernauer, Kalbhenn and Spilker (2012) find no strong correlation between changes in precipitation and conflict, and neither do Buhaugh and Theisen (2012). Benjaminsen, Alinon, Buhaug and Buseth (2012) also see no strong correlation between a reduction in precipitation levels and conflict. See Scheffran et al (2012) for another overview and summary of the debate.
Though these authors are focussing more on climate change than scarcity alone, most argue that climate change contributes to levels of violence, through, amongst other mechanisms, changes in precipitation levels and extreme weather patterns such as drought. Scheffran, Ide and Schilling (2014) argue that freshwater scarcity, food insecurity, extreme weather patterns and environmental migration are discussed as key processes affected by climate change. (Scheffran, et al., 2014, p. 369) As will be discussed in 3.3.2 Water Security in Iraq, changes in precipitation in Iraq can have serious consequences for the amount of water available to the Iraqis. In short, the debate has, since the emergence of the four schools, shifted to include climate change, rather than focusing solely on influence of scarcity and environmental degradation. The level of influence of various factors is still heavily debated.
2.3 Linkages between scarcity and violence
The previous passages reviewed what the scarcity-violence nexus is, how it fits into a larger debate, what different schools of thought are and what questions are part of the current debate. They have, however, not gone into detail on how scarcity can cause or contribute to violence. The following segments will address some of the ways in which scarcity might influence conflict. Different authors focus on different linkages, and some schools of thought have differing opinions on what potential linkages should look like. The question ‘what the role of water security in the Iraqi conflicts was’ is only relevant if water security could potentially influence conflicts, and the rest of Chapter 2 is dedicated to researching how the one might influence the other.
Before going into with which mechanisms a scarcity could potentially contribute to levels of violence, the next paragraph will first discuss that scarcity itself is not a lone trigger for conflict. A scarcity, according to Homer-Dixon (1999) can lead to ecological marginalization or resource capture, which contributes to economic hardship, which in turn can spur insurgency or rebellion. Other negative effects of scarcity include constrained agricultural and/or economic productivity, migration of affected people, a greater segmentation of society along existing cleavages and disruption of institutions. (Homer-Dixon, 1999, p. 80) Thus, environmental degradation and scarcity in itself may not cause conflict, but it contributes to existing tensions. The effects are often interlinked and sometimes have feedback relationships. (Homer-Dixon, 1999) Though scarcity can contribute to these effects, scarcity in itself, according to Homer-Dixon, is not a sufficient cause for any of these social effects. Rather, scarcity must interact with other factors to cause these effects. (Homer-Dixon, 1999, p. 80) This does not mean that scarcity is unimportant, rather that scarcity “often acts as a deep, underlying stressor of social system, and it produces its effects by interacting with contextual factors unique to the society.” (Homer-Dixon, 1999, p. 81)
The next sections will discuss two mechanisms through which scarcity can potentially contribute to levels of violence. The first is through food insecurity and the second is through migration. Though there are other possible linkages, such as diseases, these two are discussed relatively often. (See fe Scheffran, et al., 2014, p. 369; Hendrix & Brinkman, 2013; Raleigh, et al., 2015; Bellemare, 2015; Smith, 2014; Suhrke, 1993; Reuveny, 2007; 2008 and the reviews in sections 2.3.1 Food Insecurity Linkage and 2.3.2 Migration Linkage) Therefore, these are the two linkages that will be focused upon.
2.3.1 Food Insecurity Linkage
One of the more often discussed linkages between scarcity and conflict is via food insecurity, a factor that is often measured by food prices. Food insecurity refers to a lack of sufficient, safe, nutritious food to maintain a healthy and active life. (FAO, 1996) Food insecurity can either come from a persistent lack generally caused by extreme poverty or from temporary gaps in access to, or
availability of food. (Hendrix & Brinkman, 2013, p. 3) It is possible that due to relative levels of access there is food insecurity for some groups, but not for others. Raleigh et al (2015) argue that there is positive feedback between food prices and violence, that anomalously dry conditions are associated with increased levels of conflict and that decreased rainfall has an indirect effect on conflict through its impact on food prices.
Raleigh et al (2015) argue that “food price is a key indicator because it acts as a local and dynamic measure of scarcity and competition” (Raleigh, et al., 2015, p. 187). Rising food prices can be the result of the restraint on agricultural production in times of scarcity. (Homer-Dixon, 1999, p. 80) Homer-Dixon argues that scarcities often have serious impacts in ecologically marginal rural areas (Homer-Dixon, 1999, p. 83) which may then result in more food insecurity or a rise in food prices. Many poor people spend more than half their income on food, and thus are very vulnerable to rising food prices. This paragraph discussed that it is possible that a scarcity can cause a rise in food prices. Not all scarcities will result in rising food prices, but if it does, there are some mechanisms through which a rise in food prices can contribute to levels of violence, as the next paragraph will discuss.
A relation between rising food prices and conflict has been studied before. Bellemare (2015) has linked monthly global food price data with riots between 1990 and 2011. Smith (2014) has found that sudden, monthly increases in prices of ‘food baskets’ increase the probability of unrest. Hendrix and Brinkman (2013) argue that food insecurity and rising prices are a threat multiplier for conflicts, though they make a cautioning note that acute and severe food insecurity can have a dampening effect on conflict, rather than a strengthening effect. Besides food insecurity, political regimes, institutions and unequal access to food also have important levels of influence. (Hendrix & Brinkman, 2013, p. 2) Hendrix and Brinkman are careful to note that food insecurity can increase social grievances, but it may also hamper the aggrieved parties in their ability to engage in violent conflict, though they do note that in societies with large inequalities it is more likely that food insecurity will be the source of more conflict. (Hendrix & Brinkman, 2013, p. 3) Hendrix and Brinkman (2013) give several reasons how food insecurities might contribute to levels of violence. First, if government responses are politicized, the grievances are likely to rise. Second, food insecurity may create motives for an individual to join an armed civil conflict through material incentives. (Hendrix & Brinkman, 2013, pp. 3-4)
2.3.2 Migration Linkage
Another possible link is migration. Together with food insecurity, migration is discussed more often than other linkages. Reuveny (2008) studies whether or not environmental degradation can cause migration leading to potential conflict in the area migrated to. A UNEP report from 1985 already shows that droughts and land degradation in sub-Sahara Africa have led to movements of peoples (El-Hinnawi, 1985). Other authors see similar results: Jacobsen (1989), Lee (2001), Lassailly-Jacob and
Zmolek (1992), and Otunnu (1992) all see migration flows as a result of environmental degradation or environmental disasters. Wood (2001) adds that these migration flows can be international as well as within nations. Where Swain (1996) and Hugo (1996) mostly look at migration flows as the result of sudden environmental changes, such as droughts, floods or other natural disasters, authors such as Wood (2001), Suhrke (1993) and Reuveny (2007; 2008) include general environmental degradation as
possible causes for migration. Homer-Dixon (1999) also argues that migration is one of the possible
consequences of scarcity. On the other side of the debate Burrows and Kinney (2016) argue that there is still uncertainty regarding when scarcity does lead to migration and more research needs to be done to further establish if migration is one of the mechanisms that link scarcity to violence. However, they do argue that there is the potential to lead to increased migration. (Burrows & Kinney, 2016, p. 454)
Several authors have argued that migration can promote conflict between migrants and residents of the receiving area. (Organski & Organski, 1961; Weiner, 1992) Whilst these authors were not specifically talking about migration caused by environmental degradation or disasters, Reuveny (2008) argues that the same mechanisms apply and that ‘ecomigration’ can promote conflict between migrants and local residents. Reuveny gives several reasons for this: first, migration can burden the area’s economy and resources, increasing competition over jobs and other resources. If the resources in the receiving area are scarce as well, there is greater risk of conflict. (Reuveny, 2008, p. 3) A second mechanism through which migration can add to conflict is because it may upset current ethnic, cultural or religious balances in the receiving area. If there are long-standing ethnic, cultural or religious disputes in the receiving area, this may make that area more prone to conflict promoted by migration. (Reuveny, 2008, p. 3) Homer-Dixon also argues that migration can influence existing cleavages which can then cause a new flow of migration to occur. (Homer-Dixon, 1999, p. 80) The third reason Reuveny (2008) mentions is that migration can lead to tensions between sending and receiving areas, as sending and receiving areas might mistrust or misinterpret intentions. The sending area might resent the receiving area for mistreatments, either real or perceived mistreatments, whereas the receiving area might suspect the migrants of being sent in order to destabilise that area. (Reuveny, 2008, p. 3) The fourth and last mechanism through which migration can contribute to conflict mentioned by Reuveny is that the conflict might follow existing cleavages, where nomads and farmers compete over land or water, or poorer migrants might resent more affluent conditions of the receiving area’s residents. (Reuveny, 2008, p. 3)
In short, various authors (El-Hinnawi, 1985; Jacobsen, 1989; Lee, 2001; Lassailly-Jacob & Zmolek, 1992; Otunnu, 1992; Reuveny, 2007; 2008; Homer-Dixon, 1999) observe that environmental degradation, scarcities or environmental disasters can lead to migration flows. If scarcity has migration as a consequence, migration may then contribute to conflict. Reuveny (2008) gives four reasons for this: migration might burden the receiving area’s economy and resourcing, leading to increased competition; the arrival of migrants might upset existing balances; migration might lead to tension
between sending and receiving areas; and the conflict might follow previously existing fault lines. (Reuveny, 2008, p. 3) Thus, through the mechanism of migration, a scarcity can potentially contribute to levels of violence.
Chapter 2 has examined two main concepts: water security and scarcity. Water security has four main components: drinking water and human well-being, economic activities and development, water-related hazards and ecosystems. (UN Water, 2013) Scarcity is seen as a lack of water security, and there are three types of scarcity: supply-induced, demand-induced and structural scarcity. See Figure 1: Determinants of (a lack of) Water Security for a better overview of the different types of scarcities and their components. Chapter 2 looked also at the scarcity-violence nexus, which emerged in the early 1990s. There are four different schools of thought on this nexus: the Toronto School, the Swiss School, the PRIO School, and the Oregon State University School, which argues that scarcity can lead to cooperation rather than conflict. The current debate on the scarcity-violence nexus is still ongoing, though it has expanded to include climate change. Lastly, Chapter 2 explored two different mechanisms through which a scarcity could contribute to levels of violence: food insecurity and migration.
Chapter 3: Setting up a methodological approach
The previous chapter discussed the theoretical framework of this thesis. This chapter will examine how to research if a lack of water security has indeed contributed to levels of violence, as several schools suggest it might have. This chapter will first discuss the main methodology used, then the parameters and definitions of this research and finally it will go into more detail the case study.
3.1 Selecting Quantitative Research Method
In order to research the scarcity-violence nexus, this thesis will focus on doing a quantitative study of a case study, namely the Iraqi conflicts since 2005. It will compare several statistics to see if there is a statistical correlation between the data on water security and the data on violent conflict in Iraq. A quantitative approach will be used by linking several datasets: rainfall and harvests on the one hand, and violence on the other. It will compare the data to see if there is any significant correlation between them. The main method is statistical comparison and correlation finding. An attempt will be made to see if there is a correlation between water security or lack thereof and violent conflict, however, as discussed in 2.3 Linkages between scarcity and violence, scarcity can contribute to violence through different mechanisms, and this thesis will also attempt to see if there is a relation between scarcity and these mechanisms, and then between the mechanisms and violence.
3.2 Research Definitions
In the following section this thesis will discuss some of the parameters of the research and give some research definitions. It will start with discussing the independent and dependent variables of this thesis, followed by a short discussion of relevant actors. After that this thesis will discuss the focus (conflict in Iraq) and the timeframe (2005-2016) for this study.
3.2.1 Independent and dependent variables
This study has several dependent and independent variables, that will now be analysed. The main question of this thesis is what the role of water security on the conflicts in Iraq has been, and what that means for the scarcity-violence nexus. In general, that means that this thesis will take most data on water security as an independent factor. This is not to say that water security is not dependent on many aspects, as discussed in Chapter 2, but rather that this thesis will focus more on the influence of water security on violence, rather than going into much detail on what has caused a lack of water security in Iraq. For the purpose of the rest of this thesis, water security is seen as an independent variable, which then might influence the dependent factors.
Though research has shown that mankind is contributing to climate change, which influences the weather and thus influences precipitation levels (see f.e. Ali, et al., 2015). However, in this study
precipitation levels are seen as an independent factor that may or may not influence conflict levels, as the influence of local population is unlikely to have greatly influenced climate change during the timeframe. This is one of the reasons why water security can be seen as an independent variable. However, 4.1.3 Agricultural Production Data will argue that agricultural data can also be seen as an indication of water security levels. Agricultural data is dependent on, amongst others, water security, and this thesis will take great care not to rely too heavily on agricultural data.
The previous paragraphs discussed the independent variable of this thesis: water security, though it should be noted that water security is dependent on many factors and has many possible causes (see 2.1.2 Scarcity). The next section will discuss some of the dependent variables.
As discussed in 2.3 Linkages between scarcity and violence, scarcity has different mechanisms through which it might contribute to levels of violence, and the two most mentioned are through food insecurity and migration. This makes food insecurity and migration the first level of dependent variables. In turn food insecurity and migration might then contribute to levels of violence. Violence, in this thesis, is thus the final dependent variable.
Figure 3: Independent and Dependent Variables
In Figure 3: Independent and Dependent Variables the relation between the independent and dependent variables is visualized. The arrows indicate that a factor might help cause another factor, not that they necessarily do so. Changes in supply, demand or structural issues might create a lack of
water security (as described in chapter 2). A scarcity may contribute to migration or food insecurity, which in turn may influence levels of conflict, but these effects do not happen necessarily. Though there are other linkages through which a lack of water security can contribute to levels of violence, these two are the most used. (See 2.3 Linkages between scarcity and violence) The main question of this thesis is thus to research if a lack of water security has influenced food insecurity or migration in Iraq and if those, in turn, have influenced conflict levels.
3.2.2 Relevant Actors
Though the question of who reacted how exactly to a lack of water security in Iraq falls outside the scope of this thesis, it is necessary to mention several key stakeholders that played a role in the water security situation and/or in the conflict situations. Due to the nature of the conflicts in Iraq it is difficult to map out who did what and which group acted in which way. Some relevant actors will be mentioned in more detail in Chapter 3.3 and Chapter 4.3. The following section will discuss some of the general stakeholders.
One of the first stakeholders is the Iraqi government. (Klem, 2003) The government plays an important role in the water security situation in Iraq, as it has been unable to come to concrete agreements with Syria and Turkey regarding the flow of water through the Tigris and the Euphrates. (Al-Ansari, 2013) Irrigation systems are also poorly maintained and pipelines are often leaking. (Abd-El-Mooty, et al., 2016)
Another stakeholder is the private sector. (Klem, 2003) Homer-Dixon (1999) argues that the use of technologies influences the availability of scarce resources. Certain technologies and industries might contaminate water or industries that rely heavily on the availability of water – such as agriculture – use or perhaps overuse the available resources. (Homer-Dixon, 1999, p. 50) Thus, the private sector is a major stakeholder. In Iraq, a significant portion of farms still use inefficient irrigation systems that require more water than necessary. The agricultural sector is the biggest consumer of water in Iraq (see Figure 4: Water withdrawal per Sector, Source: FAO 2008, p 7).
A third actor is the public. Local populations are often the most affected by environmental issues, as they are often dependent on local resources. (Klem, 2003, p. 29) Domestic use of water is also a major consumption source of surface water in Iraq (see Figure 4: Water withdrawal per Sector, Source: FAO 2008, p 7). It is also mainly the people who are afflicted by the linkages described in Chapter 2.3 Linkages.
A fourth actor is the civil society, though it is often hard to describe its role. (Klem, 2003, p. 31) Civil society can play a role by facilitating the inclusion of the population in decision-making. Due to the dictatorial regime of Saddam Hussein, the civil society in Iraq is relatively underdeveloped and not as important as some other stakeholders. This is not to say it should be completely ignored.
The non-state combatant groups, which have emerged in the Iraqi conflicts, form the fifth stakeholder group. Though they fight amongst each other as well as against the state – depending on which group and when – the non-state combat groups have had a definite influence especially in the conflict situations in Iraq. Some reports also argue that they have fought over certain water sources and dams (Shamout & Lahn, 2015), meaning they can also play a role in the water security of local populations.
The sixth stakeholders are international actors. Turkey and Syria especially have had major influences on the water security situation in Iraq by building dams in the Tigris and the Euphrates, as will be discussed later in Chapter 3.3.2.1 Water Supply in Iraq. Though they may not be directly affected by a scarcity in Iraq, the possible consequences of that scarcity can potentially be important to them.
3.2.3 Focus and Timeframe
This thesis focuses on the case of Iraq. Though the Iraq War and following conflicts have been studied extensively by scholars (See Chapter 1), the role of water security seems to be lacking – if indeed there is a role. By reviewing if a lack of water security played a role in these conflicts, this study can add to the literature of the scarcity-violence nexus. The 2003 Iraq War and the following civil wars and conflicts continue to play a significant role in current affairs. With both Iraq and Syria involved in internal conflicts, IS has seen an opportunity to gain power and territory in both countries and managed to hold significant control in the region at one point, though it currently has lost most major cities it once occupied. Studying if a lack of water security may have played a role in the past might bring to light what can be done today to help increase stability in the region and reduce outbursts of violence. Increasing water security alone is unlikely to bring peace to the region, but it can potentially be a step in the right direction.
The Invasion of Iraq started on the 20th of March 2003 when US, UK, Australian and Polish troops invaded Iraq and deposed the government of Saddam Hussein. The invasion lasted until the 1st of May 2003, when US president George W. Bush declared an end to all major combat operation in Iraq. Quickly following the invasion, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was installed as the transitional government until a democratic government could take seat.
On the 30th of January 2005, the first parliamentary elections were held in Iraq since the fall of Saddam Hussein. As a result, the 275-member National Assembly, the new parliament of Iraq, was created. This parliament, and the subsequent government led by president Jalal Talabani, was the first democratically chosen parliament and government by the people of Iraq. Though there were some questions regarding its representativeness, as a majority of the Sunni population had boycotted the elections, it was the first democratically elected parliament of Iraq. As a result, this will roughly be the
