External Intervention in Post-Civil War Democratization: a Theoretical Approach To The UN in Sierra Leone and Angola

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By Tanguy Babled S1594192

2018

Submitted to:

Dr. Nicolas Rodriguez Idarraga University Lecturer and Professor

Leiden University

Thesis submitted in partial requirements for the fulfilling of

Master of Arts in International Relations Specialization in: Global Conflict in the Modern Era

Words: 15,000

EXTERNAL INTERVENTION IN

POST-CIVIL WAR

DEMOCRATIZATION:

A THEORETICAL APPROACH

TO THE UN IN SIERRA LEONE

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Acknowledgments:

I would like to thank Dr. Nicolas Rodriguez Idarraga for his help and his guidance in writing this thesis. Without his help, this research would have lacked a consistent structure and final

argumentation.

I would also like to thank my parents, Francesca and Emmanuel, for their continuous support throughout my studies. I will never be able to thank them enough.

Thank you to my roommates, Brandon, James and Joost, which have made this year a great experience and have helped me in developing a consistent way of thinking.

Thank you to the BBNFZIMU group, which has given me laughter and love when I needed them most.

Thank you Sarah for being the greatest Geordie that I have ever met and the greatest oie gooie quesadilla.

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Abstract:

The main aim of this research will be to analyse the factors, presented theoretically, which have made the United Nations one of the prime actor responsible for democratization globally. Through the use of Madhav Joshi’s theory on post-civil war democratization and the election analysis framework provided by the United Nations Development Program, this research will seek to answer the question: how has the UN favoured the ground for democratization in post-civil war situations?

It hypothesises, by applying Joshi’s theory, that the UN presence is fundamental for the creation of post-civil war democratization, because of the various, positive incentives it gives to the warring parties and the population. Furthermore, it seeks to prove how the absence of the UN in a country, which theoretically would have the factors to democratize, tends to bring that country to autocracy.

The research will first lay an extensive analysis of the literature present in academia

surrounding the subjects of civil war, post-civil war elections, and democratization. By doing so, it provides an overall understanding of the situation in the present of intra-state conflict and

subsequent missions. The methodology proposed is a single-case study, with the UN at its centre. This is because a single case study gives the opportunity to seek to explain numerous different theories connected to one single unit, and, in doing so, would prevent confusion and over-explanation. Narrowing the scope in this way will provide a thorough understanding of the UN practice and the theory surrounding its actions. However, to prevent over-narrowing the scope, without therefore giving any meaningful contribution to academia, this research will apply the theory explained in the methodology to two sub-units in which the UN led different interventions: Sierra Leone and Angola. Subsequently, it will give a more case-based analysis which will provide, in greater detail, an answer to the research question.

The importance of such a question lies in the necessity to analyse intra-state conflict, which has become the deadliest form of large-scale violence. Further, it is important to understand how issues in a post-conflict situation, which is an extremely volatile environment, can be addressed best and expand the knowledge on the ways in which to implement democratization in war ravaged countries.

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The hope of this thesis is to provide new ground to analyse UN missions and, in the future, possibly understanding the importance of such actors in the face of post-intrastate violence.

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List of Abbreviations:

AFRC Armed Forces Revolutionary Council ANFREL Asian Network for Free Elections APC All People’s Congress

CAPEL Centre for Electoral Promotion and Assistance CCP Credible Commitment Problem

DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

ECOMOG Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States

EMB Electoral Management Body

FNLA National Liberation Front of Angola LPA Lomé Peace Accord

MONUA United Nations Observer Mission in Angola MPLA Movement for the Liberation of Angola NEC National Election Commission

OAU Organisation of African Unity RUF Revolutionary United Front SLPP Sierra Leone People’s Party TTD Transition Toward Democracy UCDP Uppsala Conflict Data Program

UNAMSIL United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone UNAVEM United Nations Angola Verification Mission UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNEA United Nations Electoral Assistance

UNITA National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola UNOMSIL United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone

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External Intervention in Post-Civil War

Democratization: A Theoretical Approach to

the UN in Sierra Leone and Angola

1. Introduction:

The situation that follows a civil war is an incredibly complex and hard subject to study that has, in one way or another, puzzled numerous academics and policymakers. The end of a civil war usually presents an economy in shambles, deep ethnic and social cleavages, a failed State, lack of any form of representation and accountability, on top of a high number of casualties. In academia, there is a growing number of scholars who are taking divergent directions on how to study post-civil war situation. While some, such as Kaye and Béland (2010), prefer to focus on the ethnic and social dimension, others (Tschirgi:2004) believe that the economy is what plays the biggest role and it must therefore be studied and, in practice, restarted as soon as the war has ended. A third

approach assumes that the most important subject to study is how to rebuild the State and the political scenario as to give the best stability for the upcoming years of (possible) democratization (Newman:2002).

Peace-making, peace agreements and elections tend to ensue a violent conflict. Whether it is a civil war, an inter-state conflict or a non-State based war, the follow-up usually consists of

creating a base for peace. This can be done by bringing all the parties together to discuss peace and concord an election to give the chance to everyone to compete and win their representation

legitimately, instead of through violent means. Elections play an important role in peace making since they are considered to be a method by which peaceful resolutions can be achieved

(UNSSC:2011). The ideal situation is that all the parties agree to run peacefully and the losing candidate conceives defeat and engages in legitimate opposition. Unsurprisingly, this is seldom the case. It is unusual that elections run smoothly, without violence or discrimination, and the losing parties gracefully agree to be part of the opposition. It is difficult and complex to pin down all the factors that would determine a peaceful outcome of elections following wars. Among the ones studied, some factors include timing of the elections (Brancati & Snyder:2013; Letsa:2017), how to inform an electorate that has undergone heavy war-related misinformation (Richmond:2010), prevention of fraud (Aksu:2003) and how to defend the electorate from possible repercussion. By

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analysing too many cases, it is easy to fall into the trap of unattainability, therefore reaching the conclusion that it is impossible to know exactly which factors work in a post-civil war election. There are many different cases with many different outcomes. To name a few in sub-Saharan Africa only, Liberia moved from a country devastated by war to a democracy, Angola, after a planned election in 1991, fell back into worse violence than it had before and others kept elections all the while becoming a competitive authoritarianism, such as in Rwanda following the 1994 genocide. Studying some conflicting cases is however fundamental to reach some sort of understanding around the puzzle that is post-civil war election.

Foreign agencies, in post-civil war elections, have played significant roles in term of oversight and control over the escalation of violence. Agencies such as the Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL), the centre for Electoral Promotion and Assistance (CAPEL) and the Carter Center play a significant role in today’s implementation of monitoring missions in countries throughout the world. The biggest foreign agency, the UN, has had a role in guaranteeing democracy in numerous countries and its role has gathered many praises as well as criticisms.

This research will analyse the puzzle as to why a country turns to authoritarianism or fall back into violence while others successfully transition into a democracy, following the first elections that they undergo. From such puzzle, research questions that can emerge are several however this research will focus on the following. How has the UN favoured the ground for

democratization in post-civil war situations in sub-Saharan Africa?

The importance of such research stem from different reasons. First and foremost, civil war has become the deadliest form of large-scale violence, overtaking the role that once pertained to interstate wars. According to Gleditsch (2014), since the end of WWII, while 29 interstate wars have been registered, 119 civil wars occurred until 2002. The more thorough the knowledge over civil wars and its consequences, the more it will be possible to prevent or at least partially solve complex problems that spur from them. Secondly, post-civil war situations are arguably the hardest and most volatile environments that can exist, since they stress enormously the social, political, financial and ethnical situation of a country. Therefore, they are the most fragile and unstable settings in today’s world. Thirdly, the ability to understand how to implement some form of democratization, through elections especially, has shown that there is a way to create democracies throughout the world, however flawed, in contrast to the trend of authoritarianism sweeping the political world (Plattner:2015).

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The gap in the literature is evident when it comes to analysing context-specific cases. There is no consistent research that takes into consideration two sub-Saharan countries where the UN has had a mission, especially with the case of Sierra Leone and Angola. By avoiding statistical analysis, which is relatively common, this research will contribute heavily in the research of the two sub-units taken into consideration.

It is important to mention that this study does not believe that the UN is a purely peaceful and unbiased organization, but only that it has the political instruments necessary to convince different countries to acquire a democratic system after a civil war. This is because it is clear the the UN possess its own agenda, with liberal values and is therefore biased towards implementing its own political project of liberal democracy.

This research will argue that foreign agencies are one of the main reasons that have

guaranteed a smooth run of elections while the lack of thereof can be attributed to the lack of such presence. The correct implementation of elections is indissolubly related to the presence of a foreign agency overseeing the process, as such the UN case study will be taken into account and its history in the two countries of Sierra Leone and Angola. These two countries can demonstrate the argument quite solidly. In Sierra Leone, after the end of the civil war in 2002, the presence of the UN was extremely thorough, with the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) being one of the largest missions ever enacted by the organization up to that point (Adebajo &

Keen:2007). By overseeing the majority of the electoral process, the UNAMSIL ensured a stable continuum of democracy. After the mission moved out of the country, the democratizing process has continued up until today (Sävström:2018). Since 2002, when the first elections were held, Sierra Leone has seen several peaceful transfers of power, through democratic electoral processes (ibid.). The other case is Angola. The Angolan civil war also ended in 2002 but unlike its regional

neighbour, it refused to have the UN managing and monitoring the elections, which were in turn organized by the elites of the country (Soares de Oliveira:2011). Angola is nowadays one of the most illiberal countries of sub-Saharan Africa, with a huge disparity in wealth and with its dominant party, the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) dominating the political scene and every election since the end of the war. It is important to point out that local elites can be either helpful or damaging for the democratization process and the UN needs to reach out to them if they want democratization to occur. There are examples, such as Colombia, Argentina and Chile, where the elite did play a role in improving the political situation and even encouraged the political

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transition to democracy. However, in the Angolan case, local elites have clearly been damaging in the democratizing process, as it will be shown in the upcoming chapters, as well as damaging to other countries such as Rwanda. In this case, the current president, Paul Kagame, has been in power since the year 2000 and will likely continues its tenure until its constitutional limit, in 2034 (Aislinn Laing:2017).

Finally, it must be made explicit that this research has a primary focus on the sub-Saharan Africa, which makes it limited in its geographical scope. That is, the UN have acted differently in other regions of the world and this research can be useful mostly to research in the region analysed.

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2. Literature review:

2.1 Post-civil war: what makes a civil war?

Before asking anything about post-civil war, it is fundamental to answer to question itself of what is a civil war. Civil war is an armed conflict of which the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) best states as ‘[an armed conflict is] a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year’. A civil war follows this definition; the only major difference is that battle-related deaths are not 25 but 1,000 per calendar year (Themnér:2013). This strict definition of civil war undoubtedly avoids fuzziness in the term itself, by giving a ratio/time understanding of a conflict. However, following Sambanis teachings, it is important to understand that such strict definitions and the subsequent coding of civil war has always found difficulties in differentiating between numerous different forms of political violence (Sambanis:2004). To put it simply, it is hard to understand when some form of political violence equates to civil war while others do not. The UCDP’s definition can be definitely criticized. For example, according to this explanation, the fight between the Mexican drug cartel and the State of Mexico could be called an armed conflict since there are arguably more than 25

battle-related deaths between the government and non-State actors each year. If they fall into the

UCDP definition, then they should be qualified as such. However, this research will base its definition on the UCDP, since it is one of the only and most authoritative definitions which has a strict and solid-enough explanation of the term.

The academic consensus over civil war is relatively straightforward when compared to the one regarding post-civil war situations (Nkurunziza:2008). The only definition that would find consensus throughout the community is ‘[a post-civil war situation is] the development following the end of a civil war’, while the definition of the ‘end of a civil war’ is disputed. It is argued that the end of the civil war is reached when peace agreements are accorded or one of the faction has militarily eliminated the other (Wallensteen:2015). However, it is not necessary that all violence is over, since it is impossible to determine what is civil war-related violence and what is not.

Post-civil war situations are extremely complex and maintaining a (relatively) peaceful environment after years of war is incredibly difficult (Hoddie & Hartzell:2010). The situation can

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be extremely volatile and falling back into violence can be the likeliest outcome. After all, civil wars tend to pin against each other relatives, neighbours and friends. The contentiousness of such environment is largely thought to be responsible for the failure of the transition toward democracy (TTD)1 (Joshi:2013). The problem of distrust between the citizens is a very present problem (Wong:2016). There are numerous issues relating to the economy, most notably the government’s fiscal balance, which is likely geared towards spending on the military and lacks of investment and of economic rules to fix the local economy and enter in the global one (Imai & Weinstein:2000). Infrastructures are usually ravaged during a civil war, limiting the connections such as between the centre of the country and its periphery (Hoeffler:2000) and with relations of neighbouring countries, which might have to be rebuilt from scratch. Due to these factors, among many others, the

population faces a high risk of criminality, instability and return to conflict. Not everything is lost, however. A study from the World Bank has shown that, if the peace is established, in the future, there will be a more concrete chance that the country will recover and eventually improve its situation through economic and political development, as well as health and education successes and institutional progress (Chen:2008).

Critically, however, civil war is must be seen as a very depoliticizing term, since it removes the political character of the war itself. It is important to look at the term civil war in a critical manner to have an overarching view of the issue. This kind of conflict are always political and this must be taken into account during any type of analysis. Furthermore, by using this term, researches might only look at the civil war or the consequences they entail. It is important to engage in an analysis of what happened before a civil war and what are the political motivation of the parties to engage in the war in the first place. This could include economic grievances, colonialism, ethnic cleavages and so on. Therefore, even though this research will not necessarily analyse the history of colonialism in the two countries, it is important to stress that further research must take this into account.

2.2 Post-civil war elections: an overview of a fundamental practice

Post-civil war situations, with all their complexities, exemplified early on, are where post-civil war elections need to take place. It is no surprise then that they tend to be extremely risky. For

1_{The TTD is conceptualized here following Joshi’s account as a ‘process that incorporates many attributes from partial democracies} but not necessarily a full-fledged democratization after a civil war’ (Joshi:2013)

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example, the victor of the elections may use their power to dismantle the institutions of democracy and the subsequent fear of marginalization by the other parties may create incentives to return to war (Joshi:2013). The losing coalition may refuse the results, and by calling the elections rigged, may call its part of the electorate to fight against the winning coalition (Newman:2014). There is heavy contentiousness also before the elections even start. Cleavages, that have been deepened during the conflict, may resurface, with the parties possibly appealing to an ethnic or political sense of belonging (Cederman:2012). Furthermore, the ‘winning’ coalition of a war may still have enough political power to gather support and create an uneven playing field for upcoming elections, that it could then more easily win (Schubert:2010).

What are, more precisely, post-civil war elections? Since elections in themselves are not an undisputed term (defined by the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) as ‘a formal and organized choice by vote of a person for a political office or other position’ (OED:2018)), one way to begin to define post-civil war elections is through their objectives. Kumar states that post-conflict elections need to be able to transfer power to a government which has been previously elected through a fair and democratic process and ensure that the upcoming government will engage its power for the benefits of the country’s reconstruction (Kumar:1998). Furthermore, post-civil war elections are also the first step to begin any process of democratization (Kumar:1998) and to promote

reconciliation between former warring parties. Kumar’s objectives are indeed extremely positive, when faced with the above-stated contentiousness of elections.

However, post-civil war elections have several problems, highlighted by the academia. First and foremost, they can be one of the prime causes for the resurface of violence. It happens often that parties running against each other in the elections were the ones previously in conflict (Manning & Smith:2016). Keels highlights quite precisely that the problems emerging from post-civil war elections arise from two sides. The first is related to factors associated with the post-civil war itself (for example, destruction of infrastructure, political distrust, ethnic and social differences, economic issues and the high death toll that often follows a war). The second comes from the post-civil war arrangements, that often fail come to agreements which can satisfy all the warring parties, and therefore lead them to undergo elections peacefully (Keels:2017). Reilly rightfully contributes to the analysis by stating that this kind of elections have the fundamental result of highlighting societal fault lines (Reilly:2003). Post-civil war elections may also bring the population to legitimize an arguably authoritarian leader. Stedman (2012) eloquently explains that “[post-civil war election] may entrench and provide electoral legitimacy to authoritarian parties who continue to

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rely upon coercion” Another fundamental and infinitely debated problem regards when to hold the elections. There is an argument in favour of holding elections much later after the end of the war, because early elections arguably are more likely to rekindle past sentiments and conflict, due to the recent end of the war (Brancati & Snyder:2012). Brancati & Snyder also argue that there must be conditions, such as peacekeeping, judiciary institutions to oversee the process and a significant effort of demobilization in order to mitigate the risk of violence. However, Flores states that, in practical term, the policymakers have started to hold increasingly early elections because they give the advantage of having a legitimate government and reducing the cost of international missions (Flores & Nooruddin:2012).

A factor that will be taken into account is the credible commitment problem (CCP). In game theory, a credible commitment problem is “a situation in which people cannot achieve their goals because of an inability to make credible threats or promises” (Experimental Economics

Center:2006). In this case, the CCP refers to the inability of a party to make a credible commitment to its opposition and therefore creating a clash in democratic governance. When there is CCP, it is likely that it will affect the longevity of democratization since the opposing, or losing party, in an election prefers to re-enter armed conflict than to accept the rival as the winner of the elections (Joshi:2010). The UN helps mitigate such problems, as will be explained later on, which is one of the factors that make it one of the main provider of democratizing strategies and democratization as a whole.

Looking at the two cases which will be described later, shows that through Sierra Leone holding elections the same year as the end of the war in 2002 (Kandeh:2003), the country was led towards democratization. On the other hand, Angola waited several years to hold its elections in 2008, with the MPLA arguing that it was to ensure peaceful elections, leading to the consolidation of power of the dominant party (Schubert:2010). Therefore, it is difficult to determine which time and way is the best for scheduling elections, due to contrasting cases.

2.3 Democratization: a how to guide?

Problems with elections are therefore glaring. Before exploring what factors play a

democratizing role and in turn go in the main subject of the thesis, foreign agencies, it is important to determine several concepts. First of all, democratization must be introduced and there is no

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harder task. Bellin stated that “democratization is so complex an outcome that no single variable will ever prove to be universally necessary or sufficient for it.” (Bellin:2004, 141). Following Huang account, democratization is loosely a “process in which a state moves closer to a system that guarantees full procedural and substantive rights, regardless of whether the move is along the electoral dimension, along the substantive dimension, or along both dimension […]” (Huang:2016, 25). Contrastingly, [autocratization is] any degree of movement toward a system of limited political pluralism and limited rights and in which the central leadership exercises power within formally ill-defined limits.” (ibid. 25). This definition, however long, shows that democratization does not necessarily lead to liberal democracy but it moves a certain country closer to democracy as an umbrella term (therefore including several strands of the ruling system). So, if a country reaches some sort of reforms, however small, it is still undergoing, to some extent, democratization. Democratization is therefore understood to be a gradual and evolving process that could have possible setbacks and reversals. This processual definition of democratization is the one that will be used throughout the research. This is because the primary focus of this research is to look at regime change, through elections rather than looking at whether a regime will become a liberal democracy or an autocracy following the war. From this definition, the research characterizes democracy as a system that guarantees full procedural and substantive rights.

Following this introductive definition, one can question, following the literature, what factors play a role in creating results which lead to democratization? Reilly (2002) believes that power-sharing government are the likeliest way of creating democracies, because of their tendency towards sustainment of democratic institutions. It also provides platform for multiparty coalition and for a proportional representation, which, according to Reilly, tend to be fairer, more transparent, intrinsically representative of minorities and can give a voice to every vote cast (Reilly:2002).

Differently, Paris (2004) theorises that a fundamental factor is patience. As explained earlier, it is likely that elections spur contentiousness that might in turn lead to violent ways of competing in politics. This possibly results in elections which create the opposite of what is wished, which is a democratically elected government. Paris suggests therefore the most important action to undertake is to foster proper commitments to democratic ideals and to push for the creation of more stability, possibly not derived uniquely from the warring parties (Paris:2004).

The academia also takes an interesting look into political leaders. These analyses are important because they give insight into the way in which leaders campaign and how the voters are

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likely to choose. Furthermore, once the leader is established, it is also possible to determine in what way the government will continue, to a certain extent. There is a consensus that, if the leader is more moderate, the likelihood of a country reaching a partial or even full democracy is higher. An important outlook comes from Batty (2015) which shows that, when leaders are reaching out across ethnic lines, then the country will tend to reach a more solid democratization. The opposite also holds that, when leaders seek to exploit ethnic lines or appeal to their own ethnic groups for votes, promising to further the interest of that given group, the resurgence of violence is more likely (Batty:2015). On the same argument, Reilly (2003) argues that playing the ‘ethnic card’ is the easiest and quickest way to harvest votes, because it appeals to the inherent identity of a group. If the leader has a hard-line position over issues regarding ethnicity, religion or any form of identity politics, it will, in the future, promote more violence and cleavages (Reilly:2003). When it comes to regarding political leaders, according to the academia, it is fundamental to try and promote those who will not try to exploit ethnic lines, but, in turn, will reach across them and, possibly, try to reach a proportional election or a multiparty coalition. Another factor, usually discussed, is the demilitarization of politics. In a civil war, it is probable that the incumbent government has become severely and actively militarized to counter the opposing faction(s) and therefore the military’s influence must be reduced, for the possibility of more successful elections. The argument presented by Lyons (Stedman:2002) proposes that, once institutions and norms which transform the structures present in wartime to post-war ones are in place, then there will be a spike in trust and security. Demilitarization must therefore be a focal point to address when planning any kind of elections, as to avoid having the military overseeing or controlling the post-election process that, in turn, could lead to disastrous and non-democratic outcomes.

2.4 Foreign agencies: protecting democracy?

The above-mentioned factors include valid evidence to sustain their cases, however, it is important to remember Bellin’s account that “democratization is so complex an outcome that no single variable will ever prove to be universally necessary or sufficient for it” (Bellin:204, 141). A variable which is usually understudied in academia even though it is argued that is of ever-growing importance in post-civil war elections are foreign agencies or organizations. This research takes into account such importance, by highlighting in what way foreign agencies influence positively the democratization of a country after a civil war, with particular regards to elections whilst taking into account limitations for improvement.

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Organizations which have roles in observing and monitoring elections, known as Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs) have different origins. They can be regional organization, such as the African Union, the Organization of American States, the Organization for Security and

Co-operation in Europe and the Commonwealth Secretariat. They can be smaller NGOs such as the Carter Centre and the National Democratic Institute. They can be built at the local level, such as the Free and Fair Elections Networks, formed in Pakistan, by more than 40 civil society organizations. Finally, they can also be global, such as the United Nations.

It is important to highlight what EMBS are, before dwelling into the impacts of these organizations. As defined by the Electoral Knowledge Project, EMBs are responsible for electoral management, independently from the institutional framework in place. Their purpose is to manage some or all the elements which are considered fundamental for a fair conduct of democracy. Essentials core to this management are to determine who can or cannot vote, the observation and validation of electoral participants, such as candidates and political parties, to conduct polls, to count the votes and to tabulate such votes (Aceproject:2018). While this simplified definition may not include all the work of an EMB, it aims to highlight its importance and responsibility, both legally and practically, for the creation of an electoral environment. EMBs are not exclusively established during post-conflict votes. EMBs can be both national and international, with the former including civil societies and governmental services, while the latter includes UN missions, regional organizations and NGOs.

The organizations named above have, through the years, made several improvements to their programs, albeit to certain failures (Tuccinardi:2008). The electoral assistance provided by these foreign agencies can range from an observational role, such as the assessment of an election’s fairness, to a deeper level, including legal and logistical advice, poll worker training and civic education (Binder:2009).

Foreign agencies, which have oversight on elections, have been growing in number for different reasons. First, if a respected NGO in the global sphere finds an election to be respectful of human rights, free, fair and transparent, then the winners of such election will have a stronger mandate to rule over their countries (Merloe:2015). Nonpartisan monitoring has the power to assess a country’s election in a methodical and reliable way and they can reduce significantly the occurrence of fraud

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in polling stations (Levitsky & Way:2002; Calingaert:2006; Chand:1997). Furthermore, through a statistical analysis, Kelley (2012) explicitly shows that monitored elections, where the UN, NGOs or civil society organizations were present, are more democratizing than the unmonitored one. Such organization can assess relatively well the nature of the elections, albeit with some disagreements, and they can provide a remarkable advantage for political change towards democratization, through an increase in turnover and electoral advice to politicians (Kelley:2012, 155).

Foreign agencies have, therefore, in the past, shown that they have a strong commitment to the process of democratization, whether they are a small non-partisan group or a group sponsored by international organizations. However, it is true that the above hinted disagreements may be

problematic, because they cause cleavages which politicians of a given country can exploit for their own advantages (Kelley:2012). It is no wonder, therefore, that the foreign agency with the highest success rate is the most centralized and wealthy one, the UN.

2.5 The UN: improved democracy protection

While the previous organizations have had several positive cases of electoral assistance, the United Nations is, unsurprisingly, the organization that has been involved in the most cases.

According to Joshi (2010), the UN missions undoubtedly helped to establish and sustain peace in post-civil war situations. Through a statistical analysis, he shows that “UN missions increase the probability of democratic transition by decreasing the survival time by almost 167.015% compared to those cases where the UN does not get involved in terminating the conflict and establishing peace and security” (ibid. 90). Furthermore, a research by Wilcox (2014) shows that UN peace operations, in general, bring about greater improvements in post-civil war repression and human rights

violations. This undeniably puts the UN at the forefront of this study and explicitly entails that the way in which it handles its cases is one of the most effective. Following Joshi’s account, the UN missions that lead to democratization the most are the ones which have a strong mandate, such as multi-dimensional peacekeeping missions, which are aimed to restructure institutions, whether they are social, political or economic (Joshi:2010). Halff’s contribution (2017) states that the UN support is a great source of legitimization as it can provide fundamental basics to EMBs.

The United Nations Electoral Assistance (UNEA) programs are the primary way in which the UN provides electoral assistance. It generally follows three tracks: election management (which

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is the most important) mediation/electoral framework and capacity development for non-State actors (Lührmann:2016).

There has been a growing number of requests for electoral assistance received by the UN showing its appreciation and trust by its member states (Ludwig:2004). The UN is most reputable for being able to engage former rivals in the institution building process, whether they won through military victory or peace agreements. It also has the power to push the international community to threaten economic sanctions against defectors and traitors of the peace agreement, a power that many other, smaller, foreign agencies do not have (Walter:2002, 42).

The UN has also two basics advantages over other organizations, that might lure military victors or antagonists into actively seeking their help. First, the logistics of elections are extremely expensive and therefore international support can help to decrease both election-related costs and managerial problems (Lührmann:2016). The wealth of the UN puts it at a significant advantage over other, smaller organizations, which might not have as many resources. Secondly, the authority represented by the UN puts it on such a pedestal that its mere presence can increase electoral credibility and, by extension, international credibility (ibid.).

2.6. Sierra Leone Historical Background

Sierra Leone’s history in elections has been extremely complex with the country having decade-long civil wars and continuous political stability since its independence in 1961 (Fall & Hounkpe:2012). While initially having democratic elections, between 1961 and 1967, the country suffered coups quite regularly. Elections then became a way to polarize ethno-regionalist groups, with the ruling of the All People’s Congress (APC) dominating politics, after winning the elections in 1967 against the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) (Harris:2014). Between 1968 and 1991, leaders Siaka Stevens first and Joseph Momoh after would dominate the country until 1992, when Momoh was overthrown in a coup, during the start of the civil war. The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) invaded Sierra Leone from Liberia in 1991 (ibid.). In 1996, the first elections were held still in a time of war and. In the same year, the Abidjan Peace Accord were intermediated by the

Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and signed by the recently-elected president Ahmad Kabbah and the leader of the RUF, Foday Sankoh. The peace agreement failed almost immediately when Sankoh refused to honour the agreement, exemplifying how complicated it is for actors in war to

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abide to peace agreements while violence is still rife. Therefore, the resuscitated group of the RUF, under the name of Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), staged a coup against president Kabbah, who went to exile. The war resumed the following year but finally stopped after forces from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) intervened to bring the AFRC to the table to attempt new negotiations. This created the Lomé Peace Accord (LPA), in 1999 (ibid.), from which the United Nations Mission to Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was established.

2.6.1 UNAMSIL: initial struggles with peacebuilding

UNAMSIL is widely considered, throughout the international community, a success story of democratization, even though it faced complicated challenges when it was first established. The UN presence in Sierra Leone started in 1998, with the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL). Under international law, this mission was prevented from intervening in any way, with the use of weapons (Adolfo:2010). In 1999, UNAMSIL was established with the official goals of: “[assisting] the efforts of the Government of Sierra Leone to extend State authority, restore law and order and further stabilize the situation progressively throughout the entire country, and to assist in the promotion of a political process, leading to a renewed disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme.” (Miller:2013, 21). The UN aimed to target more broadly the issues of security, legitimacy, capacity, prosperity and humanity through the multidimensional mission (ibid.). The initial efforts of UNAMSIL were incredibly difficult. The initial authorization provided for 6.000 troops, half of what the mission of ECOWAS, the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), was providing. Further, once ECOMOG left the country, in 2000, the RUF took advantage of this weakness by kidnapping 500 UN peacekeepers. The UN was therefore forced to ask the warlord Charles Taylor to mediate with the RUF to gain their release (World Peace Foundation:2017). After this near-implosion, the UN Security Council agreed to increase UNAMSIL troops to 17.500 units, the maximum attainable capacity, becoming the largest ever mission financed by the UN. The increase in the amount of troops provided everyday security to the population of Sierra Leone (Curran & Woodhouse:2007). UNAMSIL managed to enforce a so-called ‘negative peace’. The implementation of securitization provided the creation of

development activities, rebuilding of infrastructure, provision of medical care, free school supplies, food and clothing, which eventually fostered the end of the civil war in 2002 (Ibid.). Once the war ended, UNAMSIL began to engage in peacebuilding by creating the three pillars: security,

governance and justice. Security, earlier mentioned, would include increased security provided by the military forces of the peacekeepers. Governance would revolve around elections and the

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attached oversight. Justice would provide the recreation of a police and court force (Alfonso:2010). Furthermore, thanks to an overall increase in the wealth of the UNAMSIL project, the mission deployed itself forcefully throughout Sierra Leone, in order to create quick-impact and income-generating developments as to provide jobs to the highly unemployed youth (ibid.). Furthermore, to counter its initially negative image, fuelled by its inability to prevent violence against civilians during the early hours of the mission, UNAMSIL created a new communication and information strategy, through presence in radio and print. After several months, the radio set up by UNAMSIL became the most important source of information of the majority of the population, hence giving a solid ground of the mission to affirm its legitimacy in implementing peacebuilding.

2.6.2 UNAMSIL and elections: reaping the fruits

Alongside several actions undertaken to improve the general welfare of the population, UNAMSIL also created, with the help of government agencies, the National Election Commission (NEC) and the UNAMSIL Civilian Police. It is important to note that the NEC is an EMB created through the help of the UN (Conteh et al.:2012). During the period following the official

peacebuilding, in January 2002, the UN began to train and help the NEC and the Sierra Leonean administration, to prepare and arrange elections (Kumar:2010). The NEC followed the UN guideline of registration and supervision. UNAMSIL assisted in the registration of more than two million voters and created offices in every electoral region for safe monitoring of the process, while also assisting international election observers (Olonisakin:2008). The elections were largely

peaceful, and they were deemed free and fair by both the European Union and the Commonwealth (ibid.). During the elections, the UN provided security in high-risk areas and gave logistical support, such as obtaining ballot boxes and communication devices.

2.7 Angola: A different story

2.7.1 Angolan Historical Background

Angola emerged from Portuguese colonial rule in 1974, after an independence war fought between the Portuguese colonizers and three groups, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA) and the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA). The leaders of the three parties met in 1975 to form a

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government however a month after, civil war between the groups erupted (Staeger:2013). Further, foreign aid came in light of the cold war, with the MPLA receiving the help of the USSR and Cuba, UNITA receiving support from South Africa and the FNLA receiving troops from Zaire and the United States (ibid.). However, in less than a year, the MPLA managed to acquire an enormous amount of power, by pushing out the other two parties of the most populated areas of the countries. Throughout the 1980s, UNITA waged a guerrilla warfare against the then-established MPLA government and attempted to disperse the Angolan army by scattering throughout the territory (Weigert:2011). The continuous aid coming from the polarized actors of the cold war extended the civil war for much of the 1980s, with the US shifting its aid from the FNLA to UNITA. When the cold war entered its concluding phases, so did the civil war in Angola began to start looking for alternative mean besides war. The government decided to undergo peace talks mostly because the USSR began to withdraw their support from Angola, amongst other communist countries

(Staeger:2014).

2.7.2 Angolan Missions: failure after failure

While the UNAMSIL can be termed an interesting and positive story of UN mission in a post-war torn country, the same cannot be said about its presence in Angola, which was minimal and irrelevant. Unlike UNAMSIL, which started in the late 1990s, the UN missions in Angola have been several, starting in 1989. The first one, United Nations Angola Verification Mission I

(UNAVEM I), happened during the end of the cold war and was aimed at dismissing a number of Cuban military personnel in the country. It was a mission at the request of the government of Angola, the US and South Africa (Thomashausen:2002). This first mission worked between 1989 and 1991, the 50.000 units’ personnel were discharged under the supervision of the Chief Military Observer (CMO) and two different officers, appointed jointly by Angola and Cuba (Dzinesa:2007). However, the mission was strictly limited to the withdrawal of the foreign troops and could in no way work to ease the tensions created by the Angolan government’s actions, for example

redeploying other foreign military personnel in new ‘non-military’ missions (Thomashausen:2002). During the UNAVEM I period, UNITA and the government received continued supplies and support and thus was not encouraged in any way to disarm (ibid.).

After the first mission was completed, which aimed to de-internationalize the conflict (by removing external aid) between the MPLA and the rebel UNITA, the UN oversaw the Bicesse accords, which intended to create a cease-fire supervised by the two parties, start a demobilization

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process of both UNITA and the MPLA forces and the creation of the Joint Political-Military Commission (CCPM) which should have overseen the peace process (Fortna:2003). This peace agreement was the first one to give the responsibility to implement accords exclusively to the belligerents themselves, with the UN having only a role as a supervisor (Ibid.). One of the main problem with this accord was that it was one-sided and thus demobilization was unbalanced, with UNITA having to disarm while the government did not have that obligation (Thomashausen:2002). The mission that should have observed the process, which aimed to demobilize 150.000 troops, form a new national army, extend government authority to the whole country and implement voter registration in just 16 months, was UNAVEM II (Dzinesa:2007). The financial allocation to the mission was only $132 million for a country of 12 million people, alongside the deployment of 350 military observers, 126 police observers and 400 poll monitors (Fortna:2003). Compared to Sierra Leone’s 17.500 military deployment, these numbers are very limited, considering that Sierra Leone had around 5 million people in 2002 (World Bank:2017). The role of UNAVEM II was therefore incredibly limited, only being able to monitor the ceasefire and observe elections under

arrangements previously agreed by the Angolan parties. Right before the elections, 63% of the government forces and 15% of UNITA forces still were not demobilized (Thomashausen:2002). The two parties both believed that they could win the elections and pushed for them to happen as soon as possible. Elections took place in 1992, and the MPLA won. Therefore, UNITA took up arms as soon as the leader, Jonas Savimbi, realised they had lost (Fortna:2003). UNAVEM II was deemed a massive failure and withdrawn that same year.

Following a new stalemate in 1993, the UN Special Representative, Alioune Blondin Beye, convinced the two forces to convene for a new peace agreement. While the government forces (then the MPLA) wanted UNITA to withdraw from 60% of the country and disarms the majority of its army, UNITA demanded a serious role in the central government, a strong autonomy and the disbandment of the state riot police (Knudsen et al.:2000). In 1993, a general agreement was reached on the characteristics for actions. Re-establishing a ceasefire and the demilitarisation of UNITA military forces was at the forefront of the agreement. Then, the demilitarization of civilians and the completion of a united Angolan armed force could have ensued (Dzinesa:2007; Knudsen et al.:2000). The mandate was too weak to affect the overall political situation. The Lusaka Protocol was signed in 1994 and it enjoyed success during its early years, with the recreation of

infrastructures and the upholding of the ceasefire. In the Lusaka peace agreement, the entire

responsibility for the supervision, control and verification of the ceasefire and the DDR process was allocated exclusively to the UN. This became known as UNAVEM III, established in 1995. Then

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the much-smaller mission of the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) replaced UNAVEM III in 1997. UN’s optimism was at the basis of such decision, as well as at the basis of the termination of MONUA scheduled for the end of 1997. Furthermore, financial considerations played a significant role in these decisions. Since UNAVEM III costed $1 million a day, the UN preferred to avoid the financial burden of the mission by making it much smaller (Dzinesa:2007). This led to the re-emergence of military strains and by 1999 the presence of MONUA in the country was almost nothing. The Angolan government insisted in terminating MONUA, and the UNSC did so in the resolution of 1229. The subsequent small UN office in Angola (UNOA) remained for six months to contribute to peace and regional security (ibid.). However, the UN presence in the country significantly diminished after the MONUA mission, leaving the autocratic MPLA

government to fight against Savimbi and UNITA. Savimbi died in 2002, at the hand of the MPLA army, and the government declared peace a few months later (Weigert:2011). Since then, no major civil war has taken place within the country’s border. However, the MPLA is still the party in power and Dos Santos, the president of Angola since the death of Neto in 1979, gave his power to Joåo Lourenço, who won the Angolan legislative election in 2017 (Schubert:2018). The UN in Angola was an utter failure and its continuous attempts to intervene with a medium to small mandate jeopardized the possibilities of its success.

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3. Methodology: Single Case Study

While the previous chapters provided an extensive literature of the matters that will be discussed further ahead, this chapter is fundamental in providing methodological ground to this thesis. As shown in the literature review, the UN will be the main focus of the study, making it the single case used to tackle the question of how can foreign agencies positively influence the process of democratization and an electoral system after the end of a civil war. Single case studies provide research whereby, instead of looking across units, one single units’ pieces of evidence is analysed. As explained by Toshkov, “the analysis is within rather than across cases” (2016, 285).

Furthermore, by taking into account Yin’s (2009) differentiation, it is important to stress that this research will not be a holistic case study, therefore including only a single unit of analysis, but also will including two different sub-units. By units here is intended, following Gschwend and Schimmelfennig (2007), the abstract entity which is studied, in this case the United Nations. Sub-units are minor level of analysis which directly relate to the unit. The sub-Sub-units are extremely important in this case, especially with regards of the missions in Sierra Leone and Angola, where the structures and the different ways of implementing the missions will be analysed. Specifically, Yin separates between total system, intermediate units and individuals (ibid. 45). This research will emphasize the United Nations as a whole, with regards to its involvement in post-civil war electoral missions and will include different intermediate level sub-units which are directly connected to the previous. Therefore, it will not include the category individuals but exclusively the previous two.

Additionally, this thesis will follow the theory by Joshi (2010), mentioned earlier and explained in detail later, on post-civil war democratization and its influential factors. The focus of this research will however, focus less on the general understanding of ‘democratization’ to look more in depth into the elections which follow the UN mission. It will then connect the framework offered by the UNDP in order to orderly determine the moves of the UN during post-civil war situations and how they connect to Joshi’s theory. It will then use the two frameworks to separately analyse the two sub-units, Angola and Sierra Leone, to understand in what way the first became a failure while the second, a success.

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3.1 Why a single-case study?

One reason behind choosing a single-case study lies mostly in the availability of data with regard to UN missions, whereas interventions led by other external forces (such as States) or agencies (such as regional organizations or NGOs) lack a comprehensive amount of information. Furthermore, a comparative study of UN post-civil war elections-related missions would difficult due to the high number of differences between missions and thus their incompatibility. Comparing Sierra Leone to the Central African Republic could be a feasible option, because the missions are similar, however the Central African Republic is still in the midst of its civil war. Finding similar countries that have undergone similar missions led by the UN in a similar time period to test post-civil war elections is extremely complicated, especially due to the nature of post-post-civil war elections themselves, that need to conform to the setting of a given country. This research aims to firstly explore the UN, as a foreign agency, and examine its strategies and frameworks in creating the environment for elections. Secondly, it will discuss in what way these strategies and frameworks have applied in the two sub-units and in what way it has positively influenced one while negatively influencing the other.

By analysing the UN as a single-case study, and including two missions as sub-units, the research gains several advantages. First, it removes the risk of a research which rests on inadequate literature which would provide incomplete information in the discussion and overall conclusion. Secondly, it includes two diverse missions which have had a completely different impact on the country where they were implemented (or just partially, in the case of Angola) but are still useful in demonstrating the necessity of a third party arbitrator and making the UN as the strongest

candidate. Thirdly, this single-case study provides the opportunity to explore a relatively under-studied field, the UN possible influence in post-civil war elections in sub-Saharan Africa. Finally, the single case study can provide ground for further research by applying the theory analysed to other foreign agencies, especially regional and sub-regional, which are upcoming and, in some cases, thriving, throughout the world.

3.2: Joshi’s theory: factors in movement toward and away from democracy

Joshi analyses thoroughly in what ways different factors shape the movement of post-civil war countries towards democracy in both his PhD thesis and an article in the same year (2010). The

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main conclusion of both the studies suggest that there are three ways in which a conflict can end: rebel victory, government victory or negotiated settlement. These three ending can determine in what way the balance of power is established which is, he argues, the most important factor to keep peace between former protagonists. Arguably, a negotiated settlement are the easiest ending from which a country can democratize, because it puts the actors in a more symmetrical position of power. A negotiated settlement tends to give ground for power-sharing arrangements that can reduce fear of uncertainty and can pressure each actor away the credible commitment problem (CCP). Joshi advances two conditions that explain in what ways stability can occur in a post-civil war balance of power. The first is a third-party intervention during the civil war, usually a military one, which can skew the balance of power from one side or the other. The second condition, which is very important, is the introduction of UN missions in post-war countries. This part of the theory is the most relevant to the analysis. The UN works in different ways: as a buffer between former protagonists, by creating post-war reconstruction projects, such as DDR and infrastructure rebuilding and especially by providing technical assistance in post-conflict elections. These functions performed by the UN build confidence between the previously-fighting actors and can create an environment for political dialogue.

Joshi argues that negotiated settlement, of the three above-mentioned endings, is the one most likely to bring the government towards democratization (and therefore elections). They are often the result of a military stalemate (as explained in the Angola’s chapter in the literature review), since, when these occur, no one actor can win yet both actors are still paying the costs of the conflict. To reach an agreement towards the creation of democratization and to implement free and fair elections, a negotiated settlement must resolve the CCPs connected to the agreement of stopping the fighting and eliminating the fear for future war renewal. This is possible through power-sharing, whether it is political or military. What this does, Joshi argues, is provide safety to the actors involved and it will push them to commit to institutionalize democracy and respect the outcome of the ballots. If the actors believe that, in democratic elections, they can win some seats even without winning an outright majority, the balance of power can be kept and the CCP limited. This part of the theory, regarding a negotiated settlement, is important since the attempts by the UN to implement elections in this thesis both spur from different negotiated settlements, working in Sierra Leone but not in Angola.

The two conditions mentioned above, UN intervention and negotiated settlements, to provide a balance or a skew in the balance of power must be expanded, upon in how differently

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they can influence post-civil war democratization and elections. A third-party military intervention is likely to further civil war, since it is unlikely to skew the balance of power to a point in which one party can take over the other. Biased military intervention, which are the most common kind of third-party interventions, can limit the chances of a negotiated settlement. More parties mean more actors to appease in a negotiated settlement, more actors with vetoing power and because the party which is supported by the third party intervener will have more resources they will be less likely commit to a settlement. One example of this, explained earlier, is the intervention of Cuba and the USSR in Angola in 1975, who supported the MPLA. The second condition is an important factor likely to lead to democratization after a civil war and it is the United Nations Missions. Such missions should also happen in conjunction with the first condition, therefore during or after a negotiate settlement has been discussed or accepted. The general objectives of these missions is to protect human rights, enforce the settlement’s arrangements and oversee the following

reconstruction. By also serving as a buffer between former antagonists, the UN creates an

environment which can solve looming CCPs. The UN’s authority to engage each actor in the peace process and by having the power to increase the defection costs from peace agreements makes it a formidable foreign agency in preventing civil war violence to reoccur and to lay the ground for post-civil war elections. There is a positive relationship between UN peacekeeping forces presence and local capacity and the promotion of democracy. This relationship, it is argued, is likely

correlated to the UN mission power to establish a political order and to establish state capacity following post-war elections. Joshi points out a fundamental point during this part of the theory: the mandate of the UN influences enormously in what way it will bring democracy, and if it will do so successfully. Usually, the mandate is an agreement between the UNSC and the parties in conflict if the mandate is weak, due to poor resources, then the likelihood of creating post-civil war elections and subsequent democratization decrease immensely.

The extensive explanation of the Joshi’s theory lays the ground to understand the role of the UN in post-conflict democratization and elections, emphasising how UN peace missions increase the possibilities for a peaceful transition to democracy after a civil war, depending on its mandate. This thesis will show, through the two sub-units, that this theory is indeed correct in arguing so.

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3.3: Framework of missions’ analysis: using the UNDP “Elections and Conflict Prevention: a guide to Analysis, Planning and Programming

Joshi’s theory provides the strongest theoretical ground to argue in favour of the argument that the UN, as a foreign agency, is the best organization to create post-civil war elections after a civil war in a given country, and that the lack of a strong mandate jeopardizes the UN’s ability to act. This chapter highlights the United Nations approach to electoral management support through the description provided by the UNDP’s “Elections and Conflict Prevention: a guide to Analysis, Planning and Programming”. This chapter is necessary because it provides a normative insight on how the UN believes its mission should be implemented, what strategies they tend to use and how the time framework applies. Later in the thesis, this chapter will be connected to the actual practice of the UN in electoral assistance, with special regards to the two sub-units.

The UN has been operating electoral support for its member states since the beginning of its history and, since 1991, it started crafting centralized policies, for electoral support (which were previously decentralized). The foundations for UN of electoral activity or assistance are divided to fine parts, as explained by Halff (2017). The first states that UN intervention in election is provided with due regard to the sovereignty of a State. Therefore, it can only happen upon invitation from a State or if the UNSC creates a mandate for it. Secondly, the UN ensures that the intervention is case-specific and tailored to the situation. Thirdly, assistance must be carried out impartially and objectively, and must recognize that the responsibility of elections belongs to the state exclusively. Fourth, assistance must happen with the idea that there is no single model of democracy. Finally, the leadership role in ensuring coherence across the various UN entities that might engage in electoral assistance are to be overseen by a system-wide focal point. Therefore, the leadership assesses states’ needs, decides which electoral assistance and by which UN entity it has to be provided. These points are clearly an ideal to how the UN operates its assistance but are not exactly how they actually operate. However, they are the official foundations given by the UN and must be taken into consideration.

In chapter three, Planning of the UNDP guide, is the most useful for our future analysis. The guide distinguishes between coordinating approaches, working throughout the electoral cycle and

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The first part, coordinating approaches, refers to how the UN should act when coordinating support with other international organizations and donor countries. In it, there must be anelectoral monitoring, to prevent the idea of ‘stolen elections’ and to ensure legitimate elections. ‘Integrated’ UN missions, which are large-mandate missions, encompass security, human rights,

democratization efforts and try to implement these in a ‘common country-level plan’ and an ‘on-the-ground set of processes for coordination’ (UNDP:2009, 26). Therefore, to ensure a successful electoral on-the-ground mission, the UN must be willing to accept aid from donor countries and to coordinate work on elections with regional organizations and especially NGOs. By doing so, not only electoral violence is preventable, but legitimate elections can be achieved.

The second part, the electoral cycle, refers to the time-frame applied by the UN. The UNDP guide argues that it is important to see elections as processes rather than events. This timeframe approach highlights that elections events are only one part of the process (elucidated in Fig. 1 below, from the UNDP guidebook) and that this process must aim to reduce the costs of elections and, eventually, to an increased trust in governance and the electoral process. Free, fair and non-violent elections eventually will increase trust in good governance and lead to progressive democratization.

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Finally, the third part of Chapter 3, Highlighting values and principles, refers to the necessity for cohesion-building, such as increased social infrastructure for peace and the empowerment of electoral officials. There must be enough social cohesion so that citizens and politicians alike abide to the pre-established rules of the elections. The idea of values and principles is particularly tricky after a civil war, because there is a great distrust in the political class and among the citizens and differing views on what the united values should be. It is however an

achievable objective, through the increase of so-called ‘procedural fairness’, that will be analysed in the discussion section.

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4. Discussion:

This chapter will be divided subsequently. It will start by looking at the UN, as a third party intervener, and its power of democratization throughout the world through the summarization of data available. This will look at the UN more globally, at the interventions in Africa and the specific coding of Angola and Sierra Leone. This will give both a general overview of the UN as the most important and successful democratizing force while, at the same time, providing a narrower and precise point of view on the region of interest. After doing so, it will explain in what way Joshi’s theory applies particularly well in these cases, giving both theoretical and statistical grounding to the single-case study.

4. 1 The UN around the world: short summary of the data

Following the Institutions and Election Project dataset (Regan & Clark:2016) and cross-referencing it with the diplomatic interventions and civil war (Regan et al.:2009), it is observable that diplomatic interventions by the UN have had some sort of benefits on the development of democratic institutions, in the mission highlighted by the datasets. The Regan et al. dataset from 2009, however, takes into account 80 different UN diplomatic intervention in several States (including Cyprus, Guatemala, El Salvador, Angola and so on) but it stops at the year 2000,

therefore it expresses the importance of UN diplomatic intervention to a limited extent. However, a useful paper by Lührmann (2016), which looks at data around 217 elections outside established democracies (and supported by UNEA), supports the notion that the UN is the most helpful organization in helping with establishing democratic tools. Through a statistical analysis, it is shown that this occurs because of the scope of its missions and the quantities of missions deployed. Furthermore, data provided by Steinert and Grimm (2015) allows one to infer that, in post-war torn states, the UN presence is beneficial in peacebuilding mission and the overall democratization of a country.

Focusing more on the sub-Saharan region, Sousa’s dataset (2015) highlights how the UN has been by far the most ‘used’ organization to intervene in the region following a civil war and, as shown in tab. 1 taken from the article, when the UN deployed missions, they would exceed or match the non-UN missions almost every year since the end of the cold war.

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This demonstrates that, all the non-UN missions’ combined do not match the amount of UN missions deployed. In Sousa, non-UN mission include regional organization, multilateral

organizations and NGOs (Sousa:2015). Furthermore, the UN has had more than double the amount of interventions per every intervention type than the second one on the list (the African Union). As presented on Tab. 2, regional and sub-regional organization have had fewer interventions. At the same time, the interventions led by the UN are also almost double the one of State interveners (with France atop, with 53 interventions, shown in Tab. 3).

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Tab. 2 from Sousa (2015) – Top 10 Nonstate Interveners per Intervention Type