'Necessary evil' or explicit enemy? Russia in Dutch foreign policy before and after MH17

ENEMY?

RUSSIA IN DUTCH FOR E IGN POLICY DISCOUR SE B EFOR E AND A FTER MH1 7

MA Thesis

Julie Westerweel – s0954470

MA International Relations: International Studies

Leiden University

July 2015

Supervisor: Dr. M. Bader

Word Count: 9803

2

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction 3

Part I 5

1. Context 5

2. Theory and Methodology 13

Part II 17

3. Spatial Identity 18

4. Temporal Identity 22

5. Ethical Identity 25

6. The Dutch Self 28

Conclusion 30

Bibliography 31

3

INTRODUCTION

On Monday, 15 June 2015 experts of the Dutch National Police and Defence started a new investigation in Eastern Ukraine. With assistance from Belgian, Ukrainian,

Australian and Malaysian teams, they will search for evidence of what happened to flight MH17, a passenger aircraft that crashed on 17 July 2014 close to the village of Hrabove, in the Donetsk Oblast (NOS, 2015). The Dutch Safety Board expects to present a final report on the cause of the crash within a year of the event (Rijksoverheid, 2015). Within days of the incident, numerous media outlets were speculating or claimed to have convincing evidence that the airplane was shot with a BUK missile system that was supplied to the pro-Russian separatists in control of the Donbass region by Russia (The Guardian 2014; Stone 2014; Tharoor 2014).

Russia has denied direct involvement ever since, and several reports that stressed the fact that the missiles were shot from Ukrainian (and not pro-Russian separatist) controlled territory have been published. On 13 may 2015 for example, Novaya Gazeta published the results from an investigation by anonymous Russian military experts, which stated that flight MH17 was shot down by a BUK missile system that was located in an area that was then controlled by the Ukrainian army (Novaya Gazeta, 2015). The present thesis analyses Dutch parliamentary debates before and after the downing of flight MH17 in order to answer the question: how did Russian identity in Dutch parliamentary documents change after the crash of flight MH17? The answer to this question might seem obvious: a passenger aircraft with 298 people on board, of whom 196 Dutch citizens, was shot by what was very soon believed to be a Russian missile system. There are numerous examples of studies into the construction of Selves, Others and enemies in response to a crisis situation (Merskin 2004; Steuter & Wills, 2009; Flanagan, 2004) . However, in the cases these works analyse, it became clear very early who was responsible for the crisis situation: the ‘Arabian world’ in the analyses of Merskin and Steuter and Wills, the Germans in Flanagan’s study. In the case of MH17 however, the Dutch government until this day does not know whether Russia was – albeit remotely – responsible for the attack. The media might be convinced, Dutch government officials have to wait for the outcomes of the one-year investigation by the Security Board before coming to conclusions.

4

This thesis is divided into two parts. The first part provides the background information for the analysis. In chapter one, an overview of the context is presented: the situation in Ukraine, the crash of flight MH17, Dutch policy towards Russia and the composition of the Dutch parliament and government in the studied period. The second chapter

outlines poststructuralist theory and methodology and the materials analysed. Part two contains the analysis: in three chapters, Russian identity in Dutch parliamentary

documents before and after MH17 is examined. Chapter six then provides insights to the Dutch ‘Self’ that is articulated in the documents before concluding in chapter seven.

5

PART I

1. CONTEXT

This chapter provides an overview of the context in which this research is situated. The first part gives a short introduction of the Dutch political system and the composition of the government and the House of Representatives in the documents analysed. After that, Dutch policy towards Russia is broadly characterised. The second part focuses on the situation in Ukraine, starting from the refusal to sign the Association Agreement with the EU in November 2013 and via the downing of flight MH17 to the present.

1.1 DUTCH POLITICS

This section provides an overview of the functioning of Dutch politics in general and the composition of the coalition and the House of Representatives in the documents

analysed. After that, Dutch politics towards Russia are characterised.

1.1.1 DU TCH PO LICY T O WARDS RUSSIA

Russia and the Netherlands have a long history of bilateral relations in which trade and innovation hold a central position. In the past decennia, the relations between the countries have been broadened and deepened: in addition to the intergovernmental relations, Dutch and Russian companies, cultural institutions, educational and academic institutions and societal organisations have developed close ties (Ministerie van

Buitenlandse Zaken, 2015). Although both countries’ foreign affairs websites stress similar aspects of the bilateral relation, there are some notable differences: while Russia focuses on bilateral meetings, Dutch investments and cooperation in the field of energy, the Netherlands pays more attention to its policies within a normative, European Union (EU) framework: initiating a constructive dialogue about democratic values and human rights are among the priorities (Ministerstvo Inostrannych Del Rossiyskoy Federatsiy, 2011; Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, 2015).

However, the Netherlands does consider European cooperation valuable only when national approaches do not lead to the optimal promotion of the Dutch interests, a view that fully applies to Dutch policies towards Russia (Casier, 2013: 121). The focus on

6

moral issues has never interfered with the defence of Dutch business interests: although controversial issues in Russia are recognised and talked about, Dutch politicians have traditionally considered these issues not important enough to form an obstacle for economic cooperation. The Dutch attitude towards Russia has generally been very pragmatic: commercial interests have been valued over ethical issues. The Netherlands is Russia’s second trading partner, accounting for 9.7 percent of the trade in goods. Moreover, the Netherlands is the most important cumulative foreign investor in Russia. Dutch companies are also very active on the Russian energy market. Gasunie has a nine percent stake in the Nord Stream pipeline project, Royal Dutch Shell owns 40 percent of Sakhalin II (Casier, 2013: 122-124).

In recent years however, the Dutch public and politicians have often publicly

condemned Russian foreign and domestic policies. Russia’s stances on the war in Syria, the policies towards its LGBTQ citizens and the violations of human rights are amongst the issues that have been addressed in statements and in bilateral talks with the Russia’s leaders (de Volkskrant, 2014; Nu.nl, 2013). Even during the Dutch-Russian ‘friendship year’ 2013, several incidents troubled the bilateral relations: the arrest of a Russian diplomat in The Hague, the abuse of a Dutch diplomat in Moscow and the issues with the Arctic Sunrise, a Greenpeace ship under Dutch flag, have all had effects on the Dutch political debate (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, 2014: 8-9).

1.1.2 DU TCH PARLIAME N T AND GO VER NMEN T

In the period of the documents that are analysed (November 2013-June 2015), a coalition cabinet with seven ministers from the VVD (People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy) and six from the PvdA (Labour Party) was in power. Mark Rutte (VVD) was Prime Minister, Lodewijk Asscher (PvdA) was Deputy Prime Minister. Frans

Timmermans (Pvda) was Minister of Foreign Affairs from the cabinet’s instalment in November 2012 until 17 October 2014, when he left to become the First Vice-President of the European Commission and a European Commissioner in the Juncker Commission. His fellow Labour Party member Bert Koenders took over his position (Rijksoverheid, 2015).

The Dutch cabinet reports to the House of Representatives, the Tweede Kamer (Second Chamber), one of the two chambers of the Dutch Parliament. The 150 members of this

7

House are elected directly by the Dutch voters and represent them during one cabinet term. Its main duties are co-legislation and checking that the government carries out its work properly. Moreover, this House plays an important role in policy making. MPs “have the right to propose bills themselves, or to amend bills proposed by the

Government. By motion they can ask the government to take action on a certain issue, or they can give their opinion on the policies of the Government. Ministers and State

Secretaries must inform the House of Representatives adequately. MPs have the right to ask questions of the members of the Cabinet and to call them to account” (Tweede Kamer, 2015).

In the period analysed, the composition of the House was as follows:

8

The parties other than VVD (conservative liberalists) and PvdA (social democrats) were SP (Socialist Party), CDA (Christian Democratic Appeal), D66 (Democrats 66, social-liberalist), PVV (Party for Freedom, national social-liberalist), ChristenUnie (Christian Union, Christian-social), GroenLinks (GreenLeft, green liberalism), SGP (Reformed Political Party, Christian right), PvdD (Party for the Animals, animal liberation), 50PLUS (representing the interests of those aged 50 and older), and seven independents. The House’s Permanent Committee on Foreign Affairs consists of 26 members of parliament.

1.2 THE UKRAINE CRISIS

The ‘Ukraine crisis’ is an umbrella term for the situation in Ukraine that emerged in November 2013, when the Yanukovych government suspended the preparations for an Association Agreement and a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement with the European Union in order to “fully analyse the impact of the planned agreement on

industrial production and trade with Russia” (Radio Free Europe, 2013). This paragraph outlines the events most relevant for this study as described in several media outlets.

1.2.1 CR ISIS IN KIEV , EU ROMAIDA N

In response to this decision, thousands of protesters gathered in the Kievan

Independence Square in December. In January 2014, the Ukrainian parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, passed harsh anti-protest legislation. Violence between the riot police and the protesters peaked on 18 February, when some 88 people were killed and hundreds were wounded (CSIS, 2015). Three days later, the Yanukovych government and the opposition reached a settlement agreement in which stated that a national unity government would be created by March. Early presidential elections were called and the 2004 Ukrainian constitution was re-adopted. Russia was among the countries that mediated this agreement. US Secretary of State John Kerry afterwards expressed the hope that Russia would join the global community in supporting Ukraine’s new political situation and that Moscow would respect the country’s “sovereignty, territorial integrity and democratic freedom”, to which Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov responded that the opposition effectively seized power in Kiev and relied on violence mostly (DipNote, 2014).

9 1.2.2 AN NEXA TIO N OF CR IMEA

The Euromaidan protests inspired unrest in the Crimean peninsula, where ethnic Russians constitute the majority of the population. An announcement for a referendum came on 27 February. This referendum would focus on the widening of the authority of the autonomous republic of Crimea and would not address secession from Ukraine, although in the announcement it was stressed that the Crimean Parliament was the only remaining legitimate authority in the peninsula, and that the new government’s

commitment to Crimea was questionable (CSIS, 2015). The next day, new pro-Russian Prime Minister of Crimea, Sergey Aksyonov took office and strategic locations on the peninsula were seized by unidentified armed men (The Standard, 2014). Russia initially denied involvement of its Black Sea Fleet, but later admitted troops had moved into Crimea.

On 6 March, the Crimean Parliament agreed to secede from Ukraine. A

referendum on the status of the peninsula was scheduled for 16 March. Russian officials were quick to back the decision of the Crimean people in case they wanted to join the Russian Federation. On the same day, US and EU officials started preparing sanctions against Russia. The American sanctions implied visa bans and asset freezes, the EU sanction plan consisted of three steps: 1. halting G8 summit preparations and visa-free talks with Russia, 2. visa restrictions, asset-freezes and cancellation of the Russia-EU summit, 3. further economic measures (RT, 2014). The Crimean parliament declared independence on 11 March, and on 16 March Crimea voted to join Russia. US and EU sanctions on Russian officials came into force the next day, as Putin recognized Crimea as a sovereign state and prepared its unification with Russia (CSIS, 2015).

1.2.3 DO NBASS

While the laws that formally admitted Crimea to Russia were signed, pro-Russian protests started in the eastern Ukrainian city of Donetsk. As these rallies continued and spread to Kharkiv, Luhansk and Odessa, international sanctions on and condemnation of Russia intensified: Russia was expelled from the G8, NATO suspended its cooperation with the country and multiple world leaders summoned Putin to move back Russian troops from Crimea and the Ukrainian border (CSIS, 2015).

10

In early April 2014, pro-Russian protesters stormed government buildings in Donetsk, Luhansk and Odessa, declaring independent republics and asking Russia to send ‘peacekeepers’. By 14 April, government buildings had been seized in ten cities.

Photographic evidence of Russian military presence in Eastern Ukraine was published in the New York Times (see below) six days later (New York Times, 2014).

Screenshot from New York Times website.

Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov stated that defending the rights of Russian citizens in eastern Ukraine was in accordance with international law (RT, 2014). Several days later, Russian troops along the Ukrainian border started military exercises, described by Defence Minister Shoigu as a direct response to Kyiv’s ‘war machine’ and planned exercises by NATO (BBC, 2014).

Over the next month, new sanctions that targeted Putin’s inner circle and Russia’s defence industry were imposed by the US and the EU. Donetsk and Luhansk held

referenda on their statuses, of which the outcomes were respectively 89 and 96 percent in favour of “self-rule”. On 19 May, Putin for the second time in two weeks ordered the withdrawal of Russian troops from the border with Ukraine. Western organisations did not believe this (CSIS, 2015).

11

By the end of May, Russia had pulled back most of its troops from the border. In early June however pro-Russian separatists opened a corridor through which Russian fighters and supplies could be brought from Russia (Tavernise & Ponomarev, 2014). Russian officials insisted the movements were in reverse: thousands of Ukrainians were fleeing the violence from the government in Kyiv and sought asylum in Russia (CSIS, 2015). On 12 June, Russian tanks were reported to cross into Ukraine in the Luhansk region. One week later, the military renewed its build-up along the border. The Ukrainian army cleared seventeen villages in eastern Ukraine on 4 July and continued to march

east. Meanwhile, EU and US officials discussed further sanctions on Russia.

1.2.4 CRA SH OF FLIG HT MH17

On 17 July 2014 at 16.15h Air Traffic Control lost contact with flight MH17, a Boeing 777 operated by Malaysian Airways, flying from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur. The first press release came from Reuters, citing Interfax: “Malaysian passenger plane crashed in

Ukraine near Russian border – Ifax” (Reuters, 2014). Shortly after this first release, it became clear that the plane had departed from Amsterdam. By the end of the day several international media reported that the aircraft was likely to have been downed. Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte gave an official statement, in which he expressed his shock and condolences to the relatives of the passengers and crew. American Vice President Joe Biden in a statement in Detroit said the aircraft had “apparently […] been shot down. Shot down, not an accident, blown out of the sky.” (CNN, 2014).

The next day, the missile system with which the aircraft possibly was shot, was said to have been smuggled to Russia. In the afternoon, the first OSCE observers arrived at the crash site. During a press conference, Prime Minister Rutte said that it looked like an attack and that the culprits would be chased and sentenced (NOS, 2014).

On Saturday 19 July 2014, France, Germany and Poland called for an immediate

ceasefire in Ukraine. The Ukrainian government in Kiev accused pro-Russian separatists of the removal of 38 bodies from the crash site, and Malaysian Airlines published a passenger list. On Sunday 20 July, the Ukrainian counterespionage agency claimed to have convincing evidence that Russia supplied the separatists with the missile system. The UN Security Council considered a resolution condemning the downing of the

12

passenger aircraft. The separatists found both black boxes and planned to transfer these to the international community. The Netherlands was appointed as the international coordinator in the investigation of the disaster. In an interview with CNN US Secretary of State Kerry says there is evidence the separatists shot down the aircraft with a Russian missile (CSIS, 2015).

1.2.5 JU LY 2014 – JUNE 2 015

The aftermath of the downing of flight MH17 for the Netherlands was largely

characterised by the investigation into the responsibility and the repatriation of the victims. In the meanwhile, the situation in Ukraine remained unstable: In 5 September a cease-fire was announced in Ukraine following meetings between representatives of the Ukrainian government and pro-Russian separatists in Minsk. Russia withdrew its troops from Ukraine, but by the end of September, the cease-fire strained. Ukraine and the separatists voiced mutual accusations.

In November 2014, NATO claimed Russian troops entered Ukraine, and more peace talks yield no results. On 30 January 2015, the Minsk peace talks are cancelled (CSIS, 2015). On 12 February Russian, Ukrainian, German and France leaders reached a new cease-fire agreement, Minsk II. However, due to continuous violence in Eastern Ukraine, group talks that were meant to push forward on the implementation of these agreements, ended on 7 July 2015 without any firm results (CSIS, 2015).

13

2. THEORY & METHODOLOGY

The first section of this chapter outlines the theoretical framework which the analysis builds on and attempts to add to. The second part introduces the corresponding

methodology: discourse analysis. In the third section the choice of materials is justified and the operationalisation of the methodology is explained.

2.1 POSTSTRUCTURALIST THEORY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The analysis in chapters three to six can be situated within a poststructuralist tradition. Poststructuralism is more of a critical attitude than it is a theory in the ‘traditional’ sense: it challenges assumptions previously taken for granted and dominant representations (Campbell, 2013: 225). Its ontological and corresponding epistemological assumptions differ from those of rationalist and constructivist theories on various levels.

Poststructuralists hold on to an ontology of social construction instead of materialism. Epistemologically, this means reality is social and subjective rather than material and ‘knowable’ and that understanding behaviour in the context of a socially constructed world is the aim, rather than measuring and explaining behaviour. Reality is only accessible through categories, knowledge about this reality is a product of one way of categorizing it. Furthermore, the way in which the world is understood and represented is historically and culturally specific and contingent (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002: 5). While rationalist theories hold on to an ontology of causal relations and therefore focus on analyzing causal relationships and separating independent variables,

poststructuralism views the world as built of mutually constitutive relationships and analyses these. Lastly, rationalist theories build on an ontology of continuity and universality and aim to create universal laws and theories, whereas poststructuralism discerns a heterogeneity in time and space and attempts to understand developments in a discursive context (Warnaar, 2015).

2.1.1 DISCOURSE

Language has a crucial position in poststructuralist (discourse) theory. It is not merely a reflection of a pre-existing reality: there is no reality beyond discourse, discourse itself is material and social practices are fully discursive, ‘real world’ entities such as the

14

representations and practices through which meanings are produced, identities

constituted, social relations established, and political and ethical outcomes made more or less possible” (Campbell, 2013: 216).There is no single general system of meaning, but a series of systems or discourses, wherein meanings differ from discourse to

discourse. Discursive practices maintain and transform discursive patterns, and it is this maintenance and transformation that is studied (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002: 12).

Discourses, moreover, are not isolated. ‘Discursive struggle’ is a key concept in poststructuralist theory: different discourses struggle with one another to achieve hegemony, that is, to fix meanings of language in their particular way (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002: 7). It is this notion that connects discourse to power and the political: the production of meaning is a crucial in the stabilisation of power relations. Through this production of meaning, power relations become naturalised and so much part of

common-sense that they cannot be questioned. The aim of a poststructuralist analysis is then to explore how a reality is created so that it appears objective and natural

((Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002: 32-33).

2.1.2 FOREIGN P OLICY

In using this framework for the analysis of foreign policy, the main concern is the constitutive relationship between ideas and practice, between representations of identity and foreign policy. This relationship is best described by Lene Hansen, who states that “[f]oreign policies need an account, or a story, of the problems and issues they are trying to address […] Foreign policies are legitimized as necessary […] through reference to identities, yet identities are simultaneously constituted and reproduced through formulations of foreign policy. Policies require identities, but identities do not exist as objective accounts of what people and places ‘really are,’ but as continuously restated, negotiated, and reshaped subjects and objects.” (2006: xiv).

An important note is however that identity has no causal effect on policy. While politicians often present the adoption of a foreign policy as based on a particular representation of identity, poststructuralism’s emphasis on the ontological importance of discursive practice prevents the separation of the two ‘variables’: identities are produced and reproduced through foreign policy discourse, and there is no identity prior to and independently of foreign policy (Hansen, 2006: 23).

15 2.1.3 IDEN TITY

Identities are thus articulated as the reason why policies should be enacted, but they are also (re)produced through these very policy discourses. Foreign policies “ascribe

meaning to the situation and construct objects within it, and in doing so they articulate and draw upon specific identities of other states, regions, peoples and institutions as well as on the identity of a national, regional, or institutional Self”(Hansen, 2006: 5). Identity in this regard is understood to be discursive, political, relational and social: there are no identities outside of discourse, identities do not exist as ‘culture’, identities are always giving through reference to something they are not and they are constituted within and through a collective terrain (Hansen, 2006: 6).

This conceptualisation of identity implies that there is always a ‘Self’ and an ‘Other’ in foreign policy discourse. But the construction of identities is not merely a series of juxtapositions between a Self and a radically different or threatening Other: identity can be found in different dimensions, that is, spatial, temporal and ethical. Hansen (2006: 42-45) extensively describes these categories: understanding identity as spatially constructed means that it is relationally constituted and involves the construction of boundaries and thereby a delineation of space. In political discourse, this identity is articulated through constructions of other countries or regions, but also through constructions of abstract political spaces, boundaries and subjectivities, such as

‘barbarians’, ‘women’, ‘humanity’ and ‘the people’ . Temporality is a second dimension of identity that is articulated in foreign policy: themes such as development,

transformation, change and repetition are constructing this temporal identity. This aspect is articulated particularly in relation to the Self: does the Other have a temporal identity similar or different from the one of the Self? And: is the Other capable of

transformation (getting ‘closer’ to the Self?). Analysing constructions of ethical identity focuses on representations of ethics, morality and responsibility, examples are

‘humanitarian’ interventions and a war as ‘genocide’.

2.2 METHODOLOGY

From the abovementioned theoretical framework follows a methodology that focuses fully on discourse, and in particular the construction of identities within this discourse.

16

To answer the question how Russia’s identity in Dutch foreign policy has changed after the downing of flight MH17, a poststructuralist discourse analysis is employed as method, with a focus on the three dimensions of identity construction as mentioned in the previous section.

The analysis focuses on “dominating or hegemonic discourses, and their structuring of meaning as connected to implementing practices and ways of making these intelligible and legitimate”(Carlsnaes, 2002: 446). In order to analyse these underlying assumptions, representations of Russia’s spatial, temporal and ethical identity in Dutch parliamentary documents are analysed.

2.3 MATERIALS

This research focuses on parliamentary documents. A total of 60 documents have been analysed: reports of parliamentary debates, letters from the government to the House of Representatives, draft bills and resolutions. All documents have been retrieved from www.overheid.nl, a website that provides information on the government organisations of the Netherlands. The documents were found by searching for the words ‘Ukraine’ and ‘Russia’ in the title of parliamentary documents (a search for these words in the whole document lead to more documents than would have been possible to discuss within the scope of this thesis). The documents come from two periods of time: 20 November 2013 (when Yanukovych refused to sign the AA with the EU) until 16 July 2014 (one day before flight MH17 crashed), and 17 July 2014 until 24 June 2015. Moreover, all documents included in ‘File MH17’ are analysed.

The choice to analyse parliamentary documents is based on two considerations: firstly, foreign policy is extensively discussed in these documents, and articulations of identities are quite explicit. Secondly, as the House’s function is to represent the Dutch public, the MPs’ statements might provide insights into the general Dutch opinion on these matters, while the letters from the Dutch government that are analysed provide the official Dutch foreign policy standpoints.

17

PART II: ANALYIS

The questions answered in this analysis are thus: how do discourses emerge through the deployment of spatial, temporal, and ethical identities?

The parliamentary documents about Russia largely build on two conflicting discourses: that of Russia as a backward ‘superpower’ that is responsible for the situation in Ukraine, and that of Russia as a partner and member of international organisations that needs consulting in exactly that situation in Ukraine.

These discourses, call for different responses and policies to the country; the first calls for securitisation and, the Netherlands being a country that despite its pragmatism identifies as a normative power within an EU framework, ‘stopping Russia’ on moral grounds. The second identity then constitutes and is constituted by the idea that dialogue in an international setting is the best approach. A quotation from foreign minister Timmermans from a general consultation of the parliament on 4 March 2014 is exemplary of the tension between the two views. In answering the questions about the government’s opinion on the ultimate line that Russia can cross in Crimea, Timmermans explains: “That is exactly the problem in this matter, because on the one hand, we really explicitly state that it is unacceptable what the Russians have done. […] military

personnel that takes to the streets and that takes over power in a foreign country. That is, of course, completely unacceptable. That is one side of the case. The other side of the case is that you do need those same Russians to get out of this complicated situation. So where to draw the line?” (Kamerstuk 21501-02 no. 1369).

18

3. RUSSIA’S SPATIAL IDENTITY

This chapter looks into articulations of Russia’s spatial identity in the three sets of documents.

3.1 20 NOVEMBER 2013 – 16 JULY 2014

The construction of Russia’s spatial identity before MH17 is linked mostly to the divide between ‘east’ and ‘west’: Russia and the EU. The approach to this spatial distinction is dual and contradictory: on the one hand, the general opinion of both the Dutch

government and the MPs is that acting upon the idea of a distinction between ‘east’ and ‘west’, Russia and the EU, is counterproductive and does not benefit the difficult

situation in Ukraine. An argument in this line is for example expressed in a letter from Timmermans to the House of Representatives, in which he states that Ukraine on 22 February 2014 did not make a “choice between the European Union or Russia” but a “choice that in time must lead to a more stable and prosperous country. That will serve the interest of Ukraine itself, European Union ánd Russia” (Kamerstuk 21501-02 no. 1340, emphasis in original). Caution of making a ‘hard divide’ between east and west is moreover often linked to a temporal identity of both the EU and Russia: whenever the divide between east and west is mentioned, it is often accompanied with cold-war references to a “race of spheres of influence” or a “power struggle” (Kamerstuk 21501- 02 no. 1387; Handelingen Tweede Kamer 2013-2014 57).

On the other hand MPs and the government continuously assume that a distinction between east and west does indeed exist and is a crucial factor to keep in mind when approaching the situation in Ukraine. This belief is expressed explicitly, for example when MP Van Roon (PVV) in a general consultation on 20 March 2014 states that “Russia’s behaviour demonstrates clearly that orthodox Eastern Europe has a different world view and a different experience of history than the West” (Kamerstuk 21501-02, no. 1378). But more often this belief comes to the fore underlying

argumentations about Ukraine’s future ‘between east and west’, between two different influences. Under rhetorical constructions such as “Ukraine as a bridge between east and west”(Timmermans, Kamerstuk 21501-02 no. 1878) lies the idea that Russia and the European Union indeed are two completely separate entities.

19

Another aspect of Russia’s spatial identity is found in references to the country’s position towards international organisations. On the one hand, it is implied that Russia is part of the ‘international community’, of which the Netherlands is a member as well. This identification calls for a more inclusive attitude towards Russia, the acceptation of Russia as equal and a rational party in international consultations and moreover a crucial partner in solving the troubles in Ukraine. Russia is frequently mentioned implicitly in statements about the meetings between “all parties” that are necessary in order to de-escalate the situation in Ukraine (Kamerstuk 21501-02 no. 1358). On the other hand, Russia is spoken of in terms of its violations of internationally valued

principles, agreements and rights. Exemplary is Timmermans’ statement of March 2014: “This is truly a flagrant, flagrant violation of all legal instruments we have built up after the end of World War II to ensure stability on the European continent […] If Russia continues to carry out this policy, this will have severe long-term consequences for the relations on the European continent and for the relation between the European Union and Russia” (Kamerstuk 21501-02 no. 1378).

3.2 FILE MH17

In the second set of documents analysed, Russia is identified spatially mostly in relation to the investigation of the crash site: it is a member of the group of countries involved. Both government officials and MPs at first take a rather pragmatic stance: the status quo in Eastern Ukraine is accepted in order for the bodies of the victims to be found and for as much evidence as possible to remain untouched. All countries involved, including Russia, are to make entrance of the crash site possible.

On the other hand, a letter on 24 July the government informs the House of Representatives that the incident has caused a ‘moment of watershed’ between the Netherlands and Russia. Russia’s spatial identity is increasingly linked to that of the separatists in eastern Ukraine; Russian arms supplies to the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, activities around the Ukrainian-Russian border and Moscow’s direct influence on the separatist groups are often discussed by both government

representatives and MPs. In a letter to the House on 27 July 2014 the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Safety & Justice write that many of the separatists leaders have the Russian nationality, and that Russia therefore has a great influence on the

20

groups (Kamerstuk 33997 no. 3). Moreover, the linking of Russia to the separatists creates the image of the country as isolated internationally: it is stressed throughout multiple documents that ‘the West’, ‘the EU’, ‘the US’ or ‘the UN’ repeatedly urge Russia to use its influence on the separatists to de-escalate the situation, admitting implicitly that Russia is the only entity that is able to get through to the separatists (Kamerstuk 33997 no. 13, 17, 24).

Russia’s criticism of the investigation of the crash site as being biased adds to this international isolation: the country criticised the preliminary report by the Dutch Safety Board because this report did not mention a Ukrainian warplane that would have been near flight MH17 and the report would not be transparent, and it called for a meeting of the UN Security Council. No other member of this Council however shared the critique (Kamerstuk 33997, no. 24).

3.3 17 JULY 2014 – 24 JUNE 2015

In the third set of documents analysed, Russia’s spatial identity is further linked to the separatists in Eastern Ukraine. Answering MPs’ questions about Russian support to the separatists Foreign Minister Koenders in late January 2015 states for example: “I think that from the beginning of the crisis in Ukraine we have seen barely disguised Russian interference, like for example the green men in Crimea. Russia supplies the separatists with all kinds of things, from supplies and weapons to heavy equipment and vehicles. The border between Russia and the separatist territory is not effectively monitored. […] we have indications that heavy Russian weapon systems on separatist territory, possibly close to the front lines, are operational. I also do not exclude the possibility that limited numbers of Russian troops are active in eastern Ukraine” (Kamerstuk 21501-02 no. 1463).

Linking Russian identity to separatist identity and vice versa does not however always happen this explicitly. Very often it is more subtle: by emphasising the fact that Russia and the separatists have the same interests in the situation in Ukraine, by

frequently mentioning Russia and the separatists as one entity in the conflict. Ukrainian president Poroshenko “met the most requirements of both the separatists in eastern Ukraine and Russia” (Kamerstuk 21501-20 no. 909) when he presented his 14 point peace plan in June 2014, the “separatists and Russia” undermine the Minsk protocol

21

(Kamerstuk 34000-V, no. 35), the “increased activity of the Russians and the separatists” in January 2015 (Kamerstuk 21501-02 no 1463) make clear that an alleviation of the sanctions is out of the question, “Russia and the separatists do not accept that the line of contact forms the base of the withdrawal of the troops” (Kamerstuk 21501-02, no 1463), “the EU has gradually increased the level of the sanctions on Russia and the separatists” (Kamerstuk 34116, no. 6), and “the crash of flight MH17 occurred in a context of a conflict that would not have escalated without intensive and active Russian support for the separatists” (Kamerstuk, 34000-V, no. 69).

A second way of spatially identifying Russia is as a power over Eastern Europe. Russia’s power over its ‘neighbouring countries’, the ‘former Soviet states’ or the

‘Commonwealth of Independent States’ (CIS) forms the basis for caution in the debate on the Association Agreements with Moldova and Georgia. Moreover, MPs point to the ‘frozen conflicts’ with Russia around the EU-borders when considering the possible implications of such an Agreement with Ukraine (Handelingen Tweede Kamer 2014-2015 70).

Russia is moreover believed to develop its own ‘block’ against undesirable presence in its sphere of influence: this started with the creation of the CIS and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, and is now focused on the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Eurasian Economic Union. The country furthermore protects its sphere by means of the Putin doctrine: a “doctrine that is incorporated in a law accepted by the Duma on the deployment of troops in foreign countries. […] In the recently issued new Russian military doctrine, NATO and NATO enlargement is considered the most important threat” (Kamerstuk 34000-V no. 69).

22

4. RUSSIA: TEMPORAL IDENTITY

This chapter looks into articulations of Russia’s temporal identity in the three sets of documents.

4.1 20 NOVEMBER 2013 – 16 JULY 2014

The construction of Russia as temporally other is in the first set of documents visible mostly in references to the country as holding on to ideals of past times in terms of the situation in Ukraine. In a parliamentary debate on 20 February 2014 for example, MP Ten Broeke (VVD) refers to Russia as claiming to be entitled to its neighbour country on historical grounds. In advising “peaceful coexistence” (a term popular during the cold war) as a solution and referring to spheres of influence in his further argument, he further creates a cold war-like setting (Handelingen 2013-2014, no. 57, 3).

The assumed wish of Russia’s leaders to return to the Soviet Union plays an important role this aspect of otherness. Sjoerdsma (D66) when discussing the possibility of diplomatic solutions after the annexation of Crimea refers to a statement by Putin in which he said that the collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest tragedy of the

twentieth century (Kamerstuk 21501-02 no. 1369). Ten Broeke (VVD) in this debate too refers to Putin’s wish to restore the Soviet Union. Later he links the situation in Crimea to the other ‘frozen conflicts’ in Europe: “It makes me think of the other “frozen conflicts” we have with the Russians over Transnistria, Abkhazia and South-Ossetia.” (Kamerstuk 21501-02 no. 1369). He then continues to argue that unlike the Soviet Union, Russia cannot ignore international rules and financial and economic laws (Kamerstuk 21501-02 no. 1369).

From this ‘Soviet recreation’ narrative follows the idea of a strategic ‘master plan’: according to several MPs, Putin is elaborating to restore the Soviet Union by creating and maintaining unrest at the European borders; the Eurasian Union is part of this plan (Kamerstuk 21501-02 no. 1378).

Another aspect of Russia’s temporal identity is found in references to the country’s history and its role as catalyst for the current actions. Especially in debates about the annexation of Crimea this is often emphasised. While answering the MPs’ questions about the situation in Crimea and the sanctions, Foreign Minister Timmermans for

23

example extensively places the recent events in a historical context of a Soviet threat to Ukraine: “Ukraine is pictured in exactly the same way the maps were made in the Second World war: dark red with swastikas inside. […]Can the House imagine that terror strikes you to the heart when your country until 1991 has been part of the Soviet-Union,

[…]when a part of your country has been annexed by Russians who did not live there before – I am talking about the Baltic States now – and you hear this from Moscow now?” (Kamerstuk 21501-02 no. 1378). He refers to Putin promising to fight for the interests of Russian-speaking people worldwide.

4.2 FILE MH17

In file MH17, Russian temporal identity is linked mostly to concepts of repetition and continuation: despite sanctions for Russian interference in Crimea, despite the incident with flight MH17, Russia is suspected of continuing arms deliveries to the separatists in Eastern Ukraine and Russian troops again move towards the Ukrainian border. Both government officials and MPs stress the fact that the chance of change in this situation is small. For example, in a general consultation on 29 August 2014 Prime Minister Rutte states: “We already put sanctions in place because of Crimea. […]We are now talking about sanctions arising from the destabilising of Eastern Ukraine. If Russia would cease to do that, no sanctions are needed. Then we of course must ask each other – but this is more surmised – how big that chance is.” (Kamerstuk 33997 no. 12)

Several MPs in further debates support this view: they urge the government to really consider further and wider sanctions as soon as possible, as they do not believe Russia has until that point changed its behaviour enough, and do not think that it will in the future. Omtzigt (CDA) for example voices this opinion on 29 August: “If I remember correctly, the Foreign Ministers met on 16 July. That is when the sanctions would be elaborated. The impression should not emerge that what Russia has done already, including the total and completely illegal annexation of Crimea, does not lead to further escalation. Then Europe does not show that it is serious. Then the threat emerges that Russia will provoke a next incident somewhere else. What will now remain of the proposals that were on the table then?” (Kamerstuk 33997 no. 12). This view is at first linked to the notion that Russia, by causing unrest in Eastern Ukraine, is at least to consider partly responsible for the downing of the passenger flight. However, in a later

24

document, both MPs and government officials emphasise the fact that until the investigation into the culpability for the incident is finished, no action can be taken against anyone, and that the sanctions that are installed on Russia thus are not related to MH17(Kamerstuk 33997 no. 14).

4.3 17 JULY 2014 – 24 JUNE 2015

In the third set of documents analysed, Russia’s temporal identity, that is ‘behind’ the identity of the Dutch Self, is articulated through references to its Soviet past as well: this past is cited as explanatory for the country’s difficulties with the situation in Ukraine, but also for the situation in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova and Georgia. In this period moreover the idea that Russia has a backward view of geopolitics and old-fashioned moral standards within its national borders is especially visible in

argumentations about the possibility of EU and NATO expansion. Several MPs and the government subscribe to the fact that “Russia, over 25 years after the fall of the wall, continues to view every form of rapprochement of the former Soviet countries with NATO as a threat to its own strategic interests” (Kamerstuk 34000-V no. 69).

Another aspect in this set of documents is repetitiveness and a lack of improvement in the situation in Ukraine: Russian troops and material remain on Ukrainian territory and no effective border controls have been reinstalled (Kamerstuk 34116 no. 4). The focus in this period however is more on the wish to end the situation in Ukraine: Russia needs to stop what it is doing in Ukraine. The Minsk protocols prompt hope at first, but as Russia continues its actions in Ukraine, the call for change re-emerges.

In this period the Russian presence is accepted more as the ‘status quo’: it is not, as in the first set of documents, talked about explicitly that Russia’s actions and presence in Ukraine are unacceptable and illegal, but rather they are accepted as the new point of departure towards the termination of the situation in Ukraine. Excessive events such as the resurgence of violence around Mariupol in late January 2015 are discussed, but the focus increasingly shifts to change (Kamerstuk 21501-02 no. 1463). This implies that Russia’s temporal identity is articulated increasingly in terms of reactions to the

sanctions: are these effective yet? How have these influenced the Russian economy? Do the sanctions inspire a change in policy already?

25

5. RUSSIA: ETHICAL IDENTITY

This chapter looks into articulations of Russia’s ethical identity in the three sets of documents.

5.1 20 NOVEMBER 2013 – 16 JULY 2014

The ethical aspect of Russia’s identity at first comes to the fore in discussions on human rights within the Russia’s national borders. Ten Broeke (VVD) for example rhetorically asks the Foreign Minister whether Russia among China, Cuba and Saudi Arabia has been elected into the UN Human Rights Council because of its excellent track record in that department (Kamervragen 2013-2014, 665). In a general consultation on 30 October, several MPs voice their concerns about the violations of these rights by Russia. The Netherlands donates approximately €600.000 to Russia for this terrain, and MPs in the light the bilateral talks between the countries’ Foreign Ministers ask to pay attention to for example “the stricter legislation on NGOs, the bending of the concept of ‘high treason’, the many prisoners of conscience and the involvement of the Russian police and security forces in tortures and forced disappearances (Kamerstuk 33750-V no. 46). Several MPs moreover stress issues such as legislation against homosexuals and the forced

resettlements of Sochi inhabitants for the Olympics in February 2014 (Kamerstuk 33750-V no. 46).

After the unrest in Crimea starts, Russia’s ethical identity is articulated increasingly in statements about the country neglecting its international responsibilities: ignoring agreements and refusing to honour existing treaties. Timmermans in a letter on 2 March 2014 states that “Russia should appeal to international mechanisms that were put in motion in order to address these issues […] By deploying troops or threatening to do so, Russia threatens the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine, inciting escalation instead of de-escalation. The cabinet strongly condemns these developments.”

(Kamerstuk 21501-02 no. 1340). On the other hand, it is stressed that Russia has a “special responsibility for peace, security and stability in Europe” (Kamerstuk 21501-20 no. 840).

26

5.2 FILE MH17

The Dutch politicians in the documents clearly have difficulties defining an unambiguous ethical identity for Russia. Russia’s ethical identity is first linked to the country’s

responsibility to provide free access for the investigators onto the crash site: the country must use its influence on the armed groups in the area of the crash site and is strongly urged to halt its troops in the border territory. Putin in a telephone conversation promised Rutte that he would try to make unimpeded access possible, MPs repeatedly question this commitment. Rutte counters the doubts while answering MPs’ questions about the establishment of a ten kilometre-zone within which both Ukraine and the separatist are not allowed to use violence on 29 August: “I have been on the phone with Vladimir Putin six times now and we have constantly talked about this. There is also progress; and not only due to my calls, but also because the Russians I assume see that a terrible disaster happened here and that they have a special responsibility concerning the separatists”(Kamerstuk 33887 no. 12).

On the other hand, Dutch politicians are focusing on appointing a culprit, and Russia is an obvious target. This is explained as: not necessarily because the MPs

explicitly think Russians downed flight MH17, but because of the geopolitical situation. A statement by MP Segers (ChristenUnie) clarifies the tensions between different

articulations of Russia’s ethical identity: “[the sanctions on] Russia are, at least in this period, partly presented in the context of the downing of MH17, which is very

complicating. For our first priority, the retrieval of the bodies, we need Russia’s co-operation and approval, but simultaneously the EU today gives a signal in the form of the announcement of new economic sanctions. Many will not see those as separate from MH17” (Kamerstuk 33997 no. 14).

The tension is further elaborated in the debate about the Dutch priorities: articulations of Russian identity depend largely on whether the Netherlands wants to focus more on the investigation and the safety of the evidence and the bodies, or on sanctioning Russia for its actions in Eastern Ukraine. Several MPs are critical of the government’s ‘soft’ attitude: they mention Russia’s continuing support for the separatists and media reports that ‘proof’ that flight MH17 was indeed downed with missiles from a Russian BUK system and call for severe reaction from the government (Kamerstuk 33997 no. 27, no. 30). In response, the government repeatedly points to the

27

fact that the investigation will take a long time and that no sanctions or actions will be considered that affect the culprits until it is clear who they are.

5.3 17 JULY 2014 – 24 JUNE 2015

In the third set of documents, the MPs use increasingly strong language when talking about Russia. The country is referred to explicitly as hostile: Russia “simply stole two parts of Georgia” (Handelingen Tweede Kamer 2014-2015 70), the “arbitrary attacks of Russian rebels on civilians in Mariupol are probably equivalent to war crimes”, Russia is a “sponsor of terrorism” and “Putin acts dumb and plays the holy innocent” (Kamerstuk 21501-02 no. 1463).

These statements seem to be based on two aspects of Russia’s ethical identity. First, the Russian responsibility for the situation in Ukraine and the country’s denial of this responsibility: Russia places the responsibility with Ukraine (Kamerstuk 34000-V no. 35). In August 2014, sanctions are extended: from then on they apply to all persons and entities that support or make profit from “Russian policy-makers who are responsible for the annexation of Crimea or the destabilisation of Eastern Ukraine” (Kamerstuk 21501 no. 902). Russia is considered responsible for direct support to the rebels in Eastern Ukraine, Russia is responsible for non-complying the Minsk protocols, Russia is, in short, the “one single responsible” for the fact that the situation in Ukraine is

constantly deteriorating (Kamerstuk 21501-02 no. 1463).

The second articulation of Russia’s ethical identity is linked to the country’s willingness to cooperate, not only the investigation on the crash site, but in terms of its energy relations with Ukraine as well: Ukraine is, despite the geopolitical situation highly dependent on Russian gas and is moreover an important hub in the gas supply to Western Europe. Russia has to be politically willing to facilitate strategic and coherent energy politics with Ukraine, but doubts are cast regarding the chances of this

28

6.THE DUTCH SELF

In order for this analysis to be complete, representations of the Dutch Self in the

documents cannot be overlooked. As was stated in chapter two, identities do not exist in themselves, they need an Other, or in this case: a Self. This chapter presents an overview of representations of the Self’s identity; not in merely in order to stress how much it differs from the Other’s identity, but in order to provide an understanding of the differences and to explore how this identity changed as well. Like in the previous

chapters, the spatial, temporal and ethical identity of the Netherlands in the three sets of documents is analysed.

SPATIA L ID EN TITY

Throughout all three sets of documents, the Dutch identity is strongly linked to a Western, European identity. The Netherlands’ membership of several international organisation is mentioned very often, as is the fact that policies are or have to be situated within a European context. Moreover, the Netherlands is often referred to as taking initiatives within these international organisations, for example the initiative for the EU to provide medical care in Kyiv, the call for close cooperation with Russia and the US (Kamerstuk 21501-02 no. 1339).

After 17 July 2014 the focus is on cooperation, even the strongly Eurosceptic parties support every form of European cooperation in Ukraine. ‘The Netherlands’ then also is given a new identity, as the country where the bodies of the victims have to be repatriated to and as the country that takes the leading position in the investigation.

TEMPORA L ID EN TITY

The Netherlands’ spatial identification as western and European is linked to a temporal identity that is clearly ‘ahead’ of Russia: both MPs and the government repeatedly emphasise that Russia is a neighbour, that the focus must be on cooperation and dialogue and that the Netherlands does not believe in backward ideas such as the separation between East and West, spheres of influence and a tug-of-war between Russia and the EU. In terms of the situation in Ukraine, the Dutch politicians focus on

29

change mostly: all parties involved have to come to a solution through dialogue as soon as possible.

ETHICA L ID EN TITY

The ethical aspect of the Dutch identity is articulated implicitly mostly: in general, both the government and the MPs are convinced that the Dutch policies are for the best and that values held by the Netherlands are universally valued. This last idea comes to the fore mostly in urging Russia to do the ‘right thing’. In the first set of documents, this is visible mostly in the idea that Russia needs to be sanctioned for its interference in another country’s domestic political situation: this violates certain key values the Netherlands strongly builds on, such as territorial integrity and sovereignty. However a rather pragmatic stance exists as well: the Netherlands can stand for its values, but especially the oppositional parties warn for the effects that interference in the situation in Ukraine might have on Dutch (energy) relations with Russia (Kamerstuk 21501-02 no. 1369).

In ‘File MH17’, Dutch ethical identity is linked mostly to the responsibility for the

investigation of the crash site. Both MPs and the government frame the Netherlands as a collective victim of terrorist actions and emphasise the shock the incident has caused for the whole country. On the other hand, the Netherlands is very soon established as an authority in the investigation, that has a big responsibility in hunting down the

perpetrators and prosecuting them. The government strongly emphasises that this has to happen in a transparent, thorough and unbiased manner and according to

international standards and regulations (Kamerstuk 33992 no. 16).

Another aspect of the Dutch ethical identity that is visible in all three sets of documents is a very strong emphasis on the willingness to do whatever it takes to achieve a goal, whether that goal is stabilisation and de-escalation in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine in the first set of documents, unimpeded access to the crash site and repatriation of the victims in the second set of documents or the termination of the situation in Ukraine in the third set of documents. The most preferred means by which this goal is to be achieved is dialogue: sanctions are only an option when dialogue does not work.

30

7. CONCLUSION

In the introduction, the research question was posed: how has Russian identity in Dutch parliamentary documents changed before and after MH17? Because in the days after the crash media outlets were certain Russia was responsible for the crash and because of the Russian involvement in the developments in Ukraine after 17 July 2014, the expected answer might have been that the Dutch MPs and government officials built increasingly on discourses of Russia as hostile, an enemy, a threat. The analysis in chapters three to five has however demonstrated that this was not the case. Instead, it has demonstrated that Dutch politicians built on the same two competing discourses throughout all three sets of documents analysed, although language gets increasingly strong as the results of the investigation are not presented and unrest in Eastern

Ukraine remains. The first discourse is that of Russia as a ‘necessary evil’, a country that is needed to solve the situation in Ukraine and facilitate the investigation of the crash of flight MH17, the second is the discourse of Russia as a backward, stubborn, isolated power that is responsible for the situation in Ukraine and thereby for creating the context within which 193 Dutch citizens were killed. The tension between these discourses is linked to articulations of the Dutch Self: whenever the Netherlands is considered a power within a European framework that holds on strongly to

international agreements and values, the latter discourse about Russia is employed, but whenever the politicians focus on goals they want to achieve (be it repatriation of the victims’ bodies or the termination of the unrest in Ukraine), the discourse of Russia as a member of the international community and a partner in dialogues is employed more. A possible explanation for the lack of change in discourses about Russia in the

parliamentary documents might be that the Dutch Security Board’s report about the cause of the crash of flight MH17 has yet to be published. Although especially

oppositional parties in the last period analysed increasingly assume Russia is responsible, government and coalition parties restrain from this assumption. More research into Dutch foreign policy discourse about Russia after the publication of the report would be very interesting.

31

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BBC. (2014, 24 April). Russia orders exercises after Ukraine moves on separatists. Retrieved from: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-27138300.

Campbell, D. (2007). Poststructuralism. In T. Dunne, M. Kurki & S. Smith

(Eds.) International relations theories: Discipline and diversity (203-228). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Casier, T. (2013). Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. In: M. David, Jackie Gower & Hiski Haukkala (eds.) National Perspectives on Russia: European foreign policy in the

making? London and New York: Routledge, p.118-130.

Centre for Strategic & International Studies. (2015). The Ukraine Crisis Timeline. Retrieved from: http://csis.org/ukraine/index.htm#19.

CNN (2014, 18 July). Biden: MH17 apparently shot down. Retrieved from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IHhyACz_ci0.

Dienst Communicatie Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal (2015). Zetelverdeling

Plenaire Zaal. Retrieved

from: http://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerleden/zetelverdeling-plenaire-zaal

DipNote (2014). Secreatary Kerry Speaks With Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov About the Situation in Ukraine. Retrieved

from: http://blogs.state.gov/stories/2014/02/23/secretary-kerry-speaks-russian-foreign-minister-lavrov-about-situation-ukraine.

Flanagan, J. C. (2004). Woodrow Wilson's" Rhetorical Restructuring": The Transformation of the American Self and the Construction of the German Enemy. Rhetoric & Public Affairs, 7(2), 115-148.

The Guardian. (2014, 20 July). MH17: The evidence against Russia. Retrieved

from: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/20/mh17-evidence-against-russia Hansen, L. (2006). Security as practice: discourse analysis and the Bosnian war. Routledge. Jørgensen, M. W., & Phillips, L. J. (2002). Discourse analysis as theory and method. Sage. Merskin, D. (2004). The construction of Arabs as enemies: Post-September 11 discourse of George W. Bush. Mass Communication & Society, 7(2), 157-175.

32

Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken. (2014). Terugblik Nederland-Ruslandjaar

2013.

http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/brochures/2014/06/11/terugblik-nederland-ruslandjaar-2013.html. Ministerstvo Inostrannych Del Rossiskoy Federatsiy. (2015). Rossiysko-Niderlandskie Otnosheniya. Retrieved from: http://new.mid.ru/maps/nl/?currentpage=double. The New York Times. (2014, 20 April). Ukraine Provides Evidence of Russian Military in Civil Unrest. Retrieved

from: http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/04/20/world/europe/ukraine-provides-evidence-of-russian-military-in-civil-unrest.html?_r=0.

NOS (2014, 18 July). Rutte: onderste steen moet boven. http://nos.nl/artikel/676517-rutte-onderste-steen-moet-boven.html.

NOS. (2015, 15 June). Nieuw opsporingsonderzoek MH17 in Oost-Oekraine. Retrieved from: http://nos.nl/artikel/2041617-nieuw-opsporingsonderzoek-mh17-in-oost-oekraine.html.

Novaya Gazeta (2015, 13 May). It was Buk-M1. Retrieved from: http://en.novayagazeta.ru/politics/68386.html

Nu.nl. (2013, 13 September). Ook Rutte hekelt Syrië-brief Poetin. Retrieved from: http://www.nu.nl/politiek/3574918/rutte-hekelt-syrie-brief-poetin.html. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (2013, November 21). Ukrainian Parliament Votes Against Tymoshenko Laws. Retrieved

from: http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/263166/376636_en.html.

Reuters (2014, 17 July 2014). Malaysian passenger plane crashes in Ukraine near Russian border – Ifax. Retrieved

from: http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/17/ukraine-crash-airplane-idUSL6N0PS57720140717

Rijksoverheid. 2015. Betrekkingen Nederland-Rusland. Retrieved from: http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/betrekkingen-met-nederland/rusland.

Rijksoverheid. (2015). Bewindspersonen. Retrieved

33

Rijksoverheid. (2015). Oorzaak en onderzoek vliegramp. Retrieved

from: http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/vliegramp-mh17/oorzaak-en-onderzoek-vliegramp.

Russia Today. (2014, 6 March). ‘Visa bans, asset freezes are next’: Europe announces three step sanctions against Russia. Retrieved from: http://rt.com/news/europe-russia-visa-bans-246/.

Russia Today. (2014 23April). Lavrov to RT: Americans are ‘running the show’ in Ukraine. Retrieved from: http://rt.com/shows/sophieco/154364-lavrov-ukraine-standoff-sophieco/.

Sabel, P. (2014, 8 February). Gesprek met Poetin: Rutte maakt wel een terecht punt. De

Volkskrant. Retrieved from:

http://www.volkskrant.nl/dossier-kabinet-rutte-ii/gesprek-met-poetin-rutte-maakt-wel-een-terecht-punt~a3593154/. Steuter, E., & Wills, D. (2009). Enemy Construction and Canadian Media Complicity. Global Media Journal – Canadian Edition, 2 (2), 7-24.

Stone, J. (2014, 23 July). Buk Missile That Shot Down Flight MH17 Hidden In Russia After Plane Crash, Rebel Commander Admits. International Business Times. Retrieved

from:http://www.ibtimes.com/buk-missile-shot-down-flight-mh17-hidden-russia-after-plane-crash-rebel-commander-admits-1637172.

Tavernise, S. & Ponomarev, S. (2014, 4 June). Border Guards in Ukraine Abandon Posts. The New York Times. Retrieved

from: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/05/world/europe/rebels-in-eastern-ukraine-capture-government-posts.html?_r=1.

Tharoor, I. (2014, 20 July). The evidence that may prove pro-Russian separatists shot down MH17. The Washington Post. Retrieved

from:http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/07/20/the-evidence-that-may-prove-pro-russian-separatists-shot-down-mh17.

Tweede Kamer. (2015). House of Representatives. Retrieved

from: http://www.houseofrepresentatives.nl/house-representatives.

Warnaar, M. (2015). Powerpoint Poststructuralism (PowerPoint slides). Retrieved from https://blackboard.leidenuniv.nl/webapps/blackboard/execute/content/file?cmd =view&content_id=_3155305_1&course_id=_153614_1.

34

Watts, J., & Stewart, W. (2014, 28 February). Ukraine: Russia accused of ‘armed invasion and occupation’. The Standard. Retrieved

from: http://www.standard.co.uk/news/world/ukraine-russia-accused-of-armed-invasion-and-occupation-9160923.html.

35

APPENDIX

NOVEMB ER 2013 -JULY 20 14

Date Type Topic ID

1. 2 December 2013 List of Questions and Answers Russian UN-membership

Aanhansel handelingen Tweede Kamer 2013-2014 665

2. 3 December 2013

Letter from Government

Budget 2014 Kamerstuk 33750-XVI no. 75 3. 18 December

2013 Letter from Government Food Safety Kamerstuk 26991 no. 391 4. 20 February 2014 Report of a General Consultation Situation in Ukraine

Handelingen Tweede Kamer 2013-2014 57-3

5. 19 February

2014 Letter from Government Council General Affairs and Council Foreign Affairs

Kamerstuk 21501-02 no. 1332 6. 21 February

2014 Letter from Government Council General Affairs and Council Foreign Affairs

Kamerstuk 21501-02 no. 1339 7. 2 March

2014 Letter from Government Council General Affairs and Council Foreign Affairs Kamerstuk 21501-02 no. 1340 8. 3 March 2014 Letter from Government Council General Affairs and Council Foreign Affairs Kamerstuk 21501-02 no. 1342 9. 4 March 2014 Report of a General Consultation Council General Affairs and Council Foreign Affairs

Kamerstuk 21501-02 no. 1369 10. 5 March

2014 Resolution Council General Affairs and Council Foreign Affairs Kamerstuk 21501-02 no. 1348 11. 5 March 2014 Report of a General Consultation Developments in

Ukraine Handelingen Tweede Kamer 2013-2014 59-8 12. 7 March

2014 Letter from Government Council General Affairs and Council Foreign Affairs Kamerstuk 21501-20 no. 840 13. 12 March 2014 Letter from Government Council General Affairs and Council Foreign Affairs

Kamerstuk 21501-02 no. 1358 14. 13 March

2014

Resolution Council General Affairs and Council Foreign Affairs

Kamerstuk 21501-02 no. 1353 15. 13 March

2014 Resolution Council General Affairs and Council Foreign Affairs

Kamerstuk 21501-02 no. 1354 16. 18 March

2014 Resolution European Council Kamerstuk 21501-20 no. 846 17. 18 March

36 Netherlands and Russia 18. 13 April 2014 Letter from Government Council General Affairs and Council Foreign Affairs Kamerstuk 21501-02 no. 1368 19. 16 April 2014 Letter from Government

NATO Kamerstuk 28676 no. 201 20. 25 April

2014 Questions and Answers Russian desire to abandon treaty Aanhangsel Handelingen Tweede Kamer 2013-2014 1799 21. 13 May 2014 Resolution Council for

Transport, Telecommunication

and Energy

Kamerstuk 21501-33 no. 476

22. 23 May 2014 Letter from Government Council for Transport, Telecommunication and Energy Kamerstuk 21501-33 no. 483 FILE MH17

Date Type Topic ID

1. 21 July 2014 Report of a Technical Briefing

Air Crash MH17 Kamerstuk 33997, no. 11 2. 24 July 2014 Letter from

Government

Air Crash MH17 Kamerstuk 33997, no. 1 3. 25 July 2014 Report of a

General Consultation

Air Crash MH17 Kamerstuk 33997 no. 12 4. 27 July 2014 Letter from

Government

Air Crash MH17 Kamerstuk 33997 no. 3 5. 28 July 2014 Report of an

Official Briefing Air Crash MH17 Kamerstuk 33997 no. 13 6. 29 July 2014 Report of a

General Consultation

Air Crash MH17 Kamerstuk 33997 no. 14 7. 1 August

2014 Letter from Government Air Crash MH17 Kamerstuk 33997 no. 7 8. 11 August

2014 Report of an Official Briefing Air Crash MH17 Kamerstuk 33997 no. 18 9. 14 August

2014 Letter from Government Air Crash MH17 Kamerstuk 33997 no. 10 10. 27 August

2014

Letter from Government

Air Crash MH17 Kamerstuk 33997 no. 16 11. 29 August

2014 List of Questions and Answers Air Crash MH17 Kamerstuk 33997 no. 17 12. 9 October

2014

Letter from Government

Air Crash MH17 Kamerstuk 33997 no. 20 13. 13 October

2014 List of Questions and Answers Air Crash MH17 Kamerstuk 33997 no. 21 14. 15 October Report of a Air Crash MH17 Kamerstuk 33997 no. 24

37 2014 General Consultation 15. 27 October 2014 Letter from Government

Air Crash MH17 Kamerstuk 33997 no. 22 16. 13 November

2014 Report of a General Consultation

Air Crash MH17 Kamerstuk 33997 no. 27 17. 18 December

2014 Letter from Government Air Crash MH17 Kamerstuk 33997 no. 26 18. 3 February

2015 List of Questions and Answers Air Crash MH17 Kamerstuk 33997 no. 30 19. 5 February

2015 Report of a General Consultation

Air Crash MH17 Kamerstuk 33997 no. 36 20. 14 April 2015 Letter from

government

Air Crash MH17 Kamerstuk 33997 no. 38 21. 23 April 2015 Debate Information

Position Dutch government MH17

Handelingen Tweede Kamer 2014-2015 80 no. 14

17 JULY 2014 – 24 JUNE 2015

Date Type Topic ID

1. 6 August 2014 Letter from

Government European Council Kamerstuk 21501-20 no. 902 2. 11 August 2014 Letter from

Government European Council Kamerstuk 21501-20 no. 903 3. 15 August 2014 Letter from

Government

European Council Kamerstuk 21501-20 no. 904 4. 26 August 2014 Letter from

Government Board of Agriculture and Fishery

Kamerstuk 21501-32 no. 799 5. 29 August 2014 List of Questions

and Answers European Council Kamerstuk 21501-20 no. 909 6. 7 October 7

2014 Letter from Government Council of Transport,

Telecommunication and Energy

Kamerstuk 21501-33 no 507

7. 13 November

2014 Letter from Government Adoption of the Budget Statements of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for 2015

Kamerstuk 34000-V no. 35

8. 19 November

2014 Resolution Adoption of the Budget Statements of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for 2015

Kamerstuk 34000-V no. 23

9. 1 December

2014 Appendix of ‘Handelingen’ The embargo on arms imposed on Russia, The French

Aanhangsel Handelingen Tweede Kamer 2014-2015 712