Hate, Fear and Neo-Imperialism
A research into the failure of the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process
Master Thesis in International Relations: Global Conflict in the
Modern Era
Leiden University
By Maurits Foorthuis
S1263498
Supervisor: Dr. L. Milevski
June 29th, 2018
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“The only solution to the conflict would be if we could invent a medicine that would kill all Azeris”
3 Table of contents Introduction………..4 Literature review………6 Theoretical framework………..9 Methodology……….12 Timeframe 1………..15 Timeframe 2………..25 Timeframe 3………..31 Timeframe 4………..37 Conclusion………42 Appendix 1………..44 Bibliography………45
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Introduction
Nagorno-Karabakh is an autonomous province in Azerbaijan of which, up until 1988, the majority of inhabitants was Armenian. During the Soviet period, the Christian Armenians felt discriminated against by the Muslim Azeri’s, and as such, in 1988, they demanded permission to the Azeri Soviet authorities to merge with the Armenian Soviet Republic. The Azeri authorities refused, which led to demonstrations and clashes in the fertile province of Nagorno-Karabakh. The clashes escalated into a full-scale war between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1991, resulting in Armenia occupying most of Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as parts of its neighboring provinces. Currently, Armenia occupies around twenty percent of Azeri territory (Brown, 2002: 67). Nagorno-Karabakh has declared itself independent as the ‘Republic of Artsakh’, however it operates de-facto as an Armenian autonomous province. Throughout the history of the conflict, Russia has operated as a mediator between the fighting parties, successfully resulting in a ceasefire reached in 1994. The ceasefire froze the conflict, but despite various mediation efforts, the conflict remains frozen today. However, despite the ceasefire, minor clashes erupt between the Armenian-backed armed forces of Nagorno-Karabakh and the Azeri army on almost a monthly basis (The Economist, 2013). In April 2016, these clashes escalated into a four-day war, resulting in dozens of casualties on both sides of the conflict, both soldiers and citizens (The Economist, 2016). As it was the case in 1994, in 2016 it was again Russia who managed to broker a ceasefire. However, despite repeated diplomatic interventions, Russia has failed to create a lasting sustainable peace between the two nations.
Azerbaijan and Armenia have, despite participating in several peace negotiations with each other, not been able to reach a sustainable peace agreement either. Throughout the course of the conflict, there have been several important peace conferences in which both countries participated. The most important peace conference took place in 2001 in Key West, Florida. However, none of these conferences have led to any significant change in the status quo of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. This master thesis will examine why that is so, looking both at local actors as well as at Russian interests in the region. The research question of this master thesis will be:
“In what way has a peaceful solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict been obstructed by local actors and/or by Russia’s lasting influence in Armenia and Azerbaijan?”
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Russia’s influence in the southern Caucasus will be examined with the help of neo-imperialism. In order to examine the level of obstruction by local actors, the symbolic politics approach will be used. The local actors that will be researched in this master thesis will be Armenia, Azerbaijan and the unofficial government of the so-called ‘Republic of Artsakh’.
The scope of this master thesis is limited to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and its impact on Armenia and Azerbaijan from 1988 to 2016.
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Literature review
The question ‘In what way has a peaceful solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict been
obstructed by local actors and/or by Russia’s lasting influence in Armenia and Azerbaijan?’ can
be answered in different ways. There is a debate going on amongst scholars about whether it is mainly the Kremlin who obstructs and obstructed a peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, or whether it is mostly local populations, governments and elites who are the obstructers. In order to examine the different points of view in this debate, a literature review of the debate will be conducted. This literature review will be grouped according to the two different stances in the debate. First, literature from scholars who believe that Russia is the main obstructer of a peaceful solution will be reviewed. In the second part of this literature review, scholars who believe that it is mainly local actors who are to blame for the obstruction of a peaceful solution to the conflict will be reviewed.
One answer to the research question would be that Russia is obstructing a peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, for it is not “genuinely interested in a resolution” of the conflict (Nixey, 2012: 4). James Nixey argues that the mediation efforts as made by Russia are meant to increase Russian leverage over Armenia and Azerbaijan, not to reach a peaceful solution to the conflict. Nixey uses the fact that Russia refuses to install an international peacekeeping mission in Karabakh, and instead opts for installing a Russian peacekeeping mission, as an argument to support his claim. He argues that Russia wants to install Russian troops in Nagorno-Karabakh in order to increase its influence in the region. Nixey draws the conclusion that Russia is interested in maintaining the current status quo. Furthermore, he argues that Russia is not interested in an escalation of the conflict due to its interests and investments in the region.
British professor Mary Kaldor describes in a book on oil wars how, during the Azeri-Armenian war from 1988 to 1994, Russia was very involved in the conflict. She describes how Russia was supporting the Armenian army while at the same time was setting up Azeri brigades in order to fight in Nagorno-Karabakh. Furthermore, she describes how Russia set up self defence forces, which included Russian mercenaries (Kaldor et al., 2007: 170). Kaldor argues that the conflict was likely “manipulated for political purposes” (Ibid: 172). She describes how in Azerbaijan, radical anti-Russian nationalists were defeated and replaced by pro-Russian communists as a result of the conflict. When the pro-Russian government was installed,
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Azerbaijan joined the Commonwealth of Independent States. Kaldor argues that Russia obstructed all the peacekeeping efforts in order to maintain their influence in the region. A second motivation for Russia to obstruct a peaceful solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is, according to Kaldor, the Azeri (conflict-related) blockade of Armenia. The blockade makes Armenia very dependent on Russia, which is in the interest of Russia. The main reason as to why the conflict has not been resolved yet, Kaldor argues, is because Armenia and Azerbaijan are rentier states. Armenia is very dependent on the Armenian diaspora in both Russia and the USA. Azerbaijan on the other hand is very dependent on the oil market. Since Russia has a great influence on this market, it gives Moscow leverage over the country. Furthermore, both Armenia and Azerbaijan are very dependent on Russian military assistance, giving Russia all the more reasons to obstruct the peace process in Nagorno-Karabakh. Nona Mikhelidze argues that Russia maintains a “stable instability” in Nagorno-Karabakh and exploits the conflict to maintain its influence (Mikhelidze, 2010).
On Russian influence in the Caucasus, Alexander Mansourov argues that Russia’s foreign policy under president Putin can be explained with the help of neo-imperialism (Mansourov, 2005: 151). According to Mansourov, Russia makes use of the divide-and-rule tactics in order to “undermine the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of its neighbors and to solidify imperial control over the former Soviet lands” (Ibid: 160).
A second group of scholars argue that it is not Russia who is obstructing the peace process in Nagorno-Karabakh. According to these scholars, local elements are responsible for the continuation of the conflict. Thomas de Waal, arguably the most prominent scholar on the Karabakh conflict, seems to think this is the case. When in April 2016 the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict erupted once again, Western leaders blamed Russia for provoking the conflict. De Waal however very much doubts that Russia was responsible for the April 2016 war (New York Times, 2016). He argues that Armenia and Azerbaijan were to blame for the recent outbreaks of violence, not Russia. According to De Waal, it is mainly Azerbaijan who breaks the ceasefire, for it is very much unsatisfied with the status quo. De Waal also emphasized that the Kremlin recently came up with a new peace plan to solve the ongoing conflict.
The significance of the Russian peacekeeping efforts is something that is also emphasized by Yoko Hirose and Grazvydas Jasutis. Both authors argue that, although the conflict might not
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have frozen without the ceasefire agreement negotiated by Russia in 1994, the involvement of foreign actors only further complicated the conflict (Hirose and Jasutis, 2014).
Scholar Stuart Kaufman believes that, especially during the first years of the conflict, the obstruction of a peaceful solution is mainly to blame to the local populations on both sides of the conflict. Using the symbolic politics approach, Kaufman describes the outbreak of the conflict to a “fundamental clash between an Armenian myth-symbol complex focused on fears of genocide and an Azerbaijani one emphasizing the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Azerbaijani republic” (Kaufman, 2001: 49).
Vicken Cheterian disagrees with Mary Kaldor and her view of Russia being the main manipulator behind the conflict. In his book concerning the outbreak of the war in Nagorno-Karabakh, Cheterian describes the Russian soldiers who were present in the conflict zone as hungry and leaderless soldiers who were mainly fighting in order to earn some money (Cheterian, 2008: 130). Cheterian notes how the soldiers were fighting on both sides of the war, which according to him shows that the Russian authorities had no control over these men.
This master thesis will continue the debate concerning the obstruction of a peaceful solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. This literature review allows this master thesis to build on existing literature, and thereby ‘standing on the shoulders of giants’.
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Theoretical framework
In order to provide a theoretical framework to the answer of the research question, two different theories will be used. The first theory, the symbolic politics approach, will only be used to explain the behavior of local actors during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The second theory, neo-imperialism, will only be used to explain Russia’s behavior concerning the conflict. Neo-imperialism will not be used to explain the behavior of local actors and the symbolic politics approach will not be used to explain Russia’s behavior.
In order to be able to answer the research question, one must first understand the outbreak of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Therefore, in order to research whether or not and in what way local actors have been obstructing a peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the symbolic politics approach will be used. Although this approach is widely seen as “vague and unscientific” (Kaufman, 2001: 204), scholar Stuart Kaufman disagrees with this opinion and instead decided to research the approach in more detail. In his book Modern Hatreds –
The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic Wars (2001), Kaufman questions whether or not there are
“widely believed myths that justify ethnic hostility… Are fears cast in terms of a threat of group extinction? Are hostile attitudes widespread, and do they take the form of a drive for political dominance?” (Ibid, 204). In this master thesis I will show that the symbolic politics approach, although not thoroughly developed yet, fits the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as a glove. Although the symbolic politics approach lacks a clear definition, Kaufman describes the approach as a model according to which “the critical causes of extreme ethnic violence are group myths that justify hostility, fears of group distinction and a symbolic politics of chauvinist mobilization” (Kaufman, 2006: 47). An example of such a group myth that would justify hostility and fears of group distinction is the Armenian Genocide, conducted by the Turks on the Armenian people in 1915. According to Kaufman, every ethnic group has a different “myth-symbol complex” (Ibid: 50), which identifies what binds the ethnic group together in terms of a shared culture or history. When the circumstances allow for ethnic violence to happen, group myths such as the Armenian genocide can ignite fear or hatred, which in turn can lead to ethnic violence. Group myths can lead to ethnic violence both from a bottom-up approach as well as through a top-down approach. From a top-down approach, group myths can “make mass hostility easy for chauvinist elites to provoke and make extremist policies popular” (Ibid: 47). Group myths however do not always need to be abused by elites
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in order to lead to ethnic violence. From a bottom-up approach, charismatic individuals can encourage people to commence ethnic violence, with the local elites trying to stop such violence from happening.
The symbolic politics approach expects an actor to generically behave in a very emotional and non-constructive way towards ‘the enemy’. According to the symbolic politics approach, “emotions, not rational calculations, motivate people to act” (Ibid: 51). These emotions are often negative emotions, such as hate and fear, and they lead to people or governments setting their priorities according to these emotions, by for example prioritizing security over wealth. Furthermore, the myth-symbol complexes make it that actors find it very difficult if not impossible to make compromises over certain issues. Thus, the expected generic behavior of actors who are driven by a myth-symbol complex is to behave in a very non-constructive way.
The symbolic politics approach fits within the parameters of social constructivism, for the approach assumes group myths to be socially constructed. In this master thesis, the symbolic politics approach as described by Kaufman will be used in order to try to understand local actors in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh and their level of obstruction of the peace process in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
In order to measure the Russian influence in the southern Caucasus, neo-imperialism will be used. Neo-imperialism allows one to measure the influence a global power has over a developing country. The theory has been mainly developed by Ghana’s former president Kwame Nkrumah in order to explain the influence and involvement of the former colonial powers on the African continent. Although these former colonial powers no longer possessed colonies in Africa, they still maintained control over most resources in their former colonies (Nkrumah, 1965). Neo-imperialism is mainly associated with Africa, however (former) colonial powers have been accused of conducting neo-imperialist policy on different continents as well. Capitalism is considered to be an important factor of neo-imperialist theory, for most neo-imperialistic behavior seems to be driven by capitalist motivations. However, capitalism is not the only driver behind neo-imperialistic behavior, for “there are many other social, political, ideological, and cultural aspects of neo-imperialism” (Hadland, 2012: 469). The definition of neo-imperialism that will be used in this master thesis is the one as provided by Adrian Hadland, namely “a populist label for the considerable influence wielded by a country
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or region over a less developed region” (Ibid: 483). In practice, neo-imperialistic actors are great powers who have influence over less developed countries by having leverage over such countries. This leverage can be achieved by for example having troops stationed in the country, by investing heavily in the country, by owning access to the country’s resources or by being an important trade partner to the country. A different way of having leverage over a country is the threat of force. An example of this would be a great power threatening to intervene in a developing country unless the developing country acts in accordance with the great power’s wishes. The influence a great power has over a developing country can thus be measured by researching to what extent the developing country pursues mainly certain policies that are in the interest of the great power involved.
The generic behavior one can expect from a great power who behaves in accordance with neo-imperialism has certain characteristics. One can expect such a great power to be very much involved with the domestic politics of a smaller country on which it has influence. Other characteristics are having soldiers stationed in the smaller country, investing heavily in the country, forcing the country to conduct policy in accordance with the interests of the great power, trying to be the sole influencer of the country and owning the small country’s resources. In essence, neo-imperialism is about a great power heavily influencing a less developed country, regardless of the country’s wishes.
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Methodology
As this master thesis looks into Russian obstruction of a peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as well as local obstruction of a peaceful solution, the research conducted for this master thesis will be a between-case analysis. Furthermore, process-tracing will be used to conduct research for this master thesis. Process-tracing will allow the research to be conducted on the hand of a historical narrative, a rich description of events and a content analysis. This will allow this master thesis to describe the bigger picture of what happened in Nagorno-Karabakh. With the help of process-tracing, the observable implications of both theories used in this master thesis can be tested to the case studies.
The research outline will consist of four different timeframes. In the empirical part, Russia’s behavior towards the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict will be researched during these four different specific timeframes. Furthermore, research will be conducted into possible local obstruction of a peaceful solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict during these four different timeframes.
The first timeframe to be examined will be the outbreak- and the first years- of the Nagorno-Karabakh war. The outbreak and the beginning of the conflict took place during the break up of the Soviet Union, namely from 1988 to approximately 1992. First, the Kremlin’s initial response to the Nagorno-Karabakh war will be examined. Furthermore, local events and behavior of the indigenous populations of the Autonomous Oblast Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia and Azerbaijan will be researched in order to understand to what extent these events and this behavior contributed to the outbreak of the Nagorno-Karabakh war.
In the second chapter of this master thesis, the Russian attempts at negotiating a ceasefire in the months leading up to the actual ceasefire of 1994 will be discussed. The contribution of the local populations and elites to the ceasefire will also be researched and discussed. In the third chapter, the Russian response towards the conflict around the period of the failed peace negotiations in 2001 will be discussed. Again, local contribution and/or obstruction to and of these negotiations will also be discussed. This will allow this master thesis to research the Russian and the local willingness to achieve a peaceful solution to the conflict.
In the final timeframe the Russian response to the conflict around the time of the April 2016 war between the Armenian backed Republic of Artsakh and Azerbaijan will be researched.
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Local actors will also be researched in order to understand the local behavior during the 2016 war.
By researching the possible obstruction of a peaceful solution by Russia and by local actors during four different limited timeframes, a comprehensive image of the obstruction of a peaceful solution throughout the years can be constructed. This is relevant in order to understand the Russian approach towards the conflict throughout the years, and to understand the Armenian and Azeri approach towards the conflict throughout the years. In each timeframe, the description of the historical narrative will be guided by the theoretical framework. An attempt will be made to analyze and explain every action committed by Russia with the help of neo-imperialism, and every action committed by a local actor with the help of the symbolic politics approach. The analysis is needed in order to understand if the actors’ behavior matches the behavior one would expect from the theories, for a certain expected generic behavior is associated with neo-imperialism, and a different expected generic behavior is associated with the symbolic politics approach. This allows the reader of this master thesis to fully comprehend each actors’ behavior, its consequences and the motivations behind it.
Every action committed by one of the actors researched will be analyzed in order to determine to what extent these actions were a contribution to or an obstruction of a peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict during the specific timeframe researched. If an actor behaved in a cooperative way, it will be acknowledged. If an actor’s behavior led to the failure of negotiations, it will be concluded that the actor obstructed a peaceful solution during the specific timeframe researched. It can be so that both Russia as well as local actors contributed to the failure of peace negotiations, and thus obstruction of a peaceful solution, during a specific timeframe researched. It can also be the case that either Russia or one or more of the local actors obstructed a peaceful solution.
Behavior that is considered as obstructing a peaceful solution can be very diverse. Examples of such behavior would be ignoring a ceasefire agreement, refusing to accept a reasonable peace plan but also proposing a ridiculous and unacceptable peace plan. In order to reach a peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the cooperation of all actors involved is
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needed. Thus, if one or more actors decides not to cooperate, their behavior can also be considered as obstruction.
The sources that will be used in this master thesis will be mainly academic literature, such as books and scholarly articles. In some occasions, articles in quality newspapers will be used in order to describe specific events. The sources will mostly be used to either find evidence on Russian provocations of the conflict and obstruction of the peace process or, on the contrary, evidence of Russian attempts at reaching a peaceful solution. The same will be done concerning the local obstruction of the peace process. An attempt will be made to either find evidence on local provocations of the conflict and obstruction of the peace process or on local attempts at reaching a peaceful solution.
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Timeframe 1: the outbreak of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
If one aims to explain the events resulting in the outbreak of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with neo-imperialism - in the case of Russia - and with the symbolic politics approach in the case of the local actors, one must first determine what behavior might be expected from these actors. When considering Russia as a neo-imperialist power, one might expect it to grab onto its influence on Armenia and Azerbaijan and to impose its will on both countries. Neo-imperial characteristics such as controlling the countries’ natural resources and stationing troops in the countries are tools that are meant to influence these countries. When aiming to explain the behavior of local actors with the help of the symbolic politics approach, one might expect the actors to fear and hate each other. Furthermore, one might expect the actors to make emotional, non-rational decisions and not to be willing to cooperate with each other.
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
The Nagorno-Karabakh region has a long, gruesome history of conflict. The area has been claimed by and ruled by different ethnic groups for centuries. The name of the region perfectly demonstrates its diversity: “Nagorno” is Russian for “mountainous”, “Kara” is Turkish for “black” and “Bakh” is Persian for “garden” (Rasizade, 2011: 72). The conflict between the Azeris and the Armenians is at least a century old, with violent years followed by peaceful years. Nagorno-Karabakh has historically been a region in which the majority of the population was Armenian, but it has had an Azeri minority for a long time. Stalin incorporated the oblast (province) into the Azerbaijani Socialist Soviet Republic, but gave it the status of an autonomous oblast. During the Soviet era, the ethnic conflict was successfully suppressed by the Soviet authorities, with the exception of a few violent clashes in the 1960’s. The Azeri Soviet authorities encouraged Azeri farmers to move to Nagorno-Karabakh, resulting in an increase of Azeri’s in the region. With the arrival of Gorbachev’s Glasnost and Perestroika (openness and reform) movement in the 1980’s, a limited amount of free speech was allowed in the Soviet Union. This led to the Armenian population of the Autonomous Oblast of Nagorno-Karabakh, which at the time was part of the Azerbaijan SSSR, demanding the Azeri- and Armenian Soviet authorities to “reunite” Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia. This demand was done on February 20, 1988. At the time, around 75 percent of the population of Nagorno-Karabakh was Armenian and around 23 percent was Azeri (Ibid: 77). The Azeri population lived mostly in the city of Shushi, which is located on a hilltop overlooking Stepanakert, the region’s
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capital. Three days after the Nagorno-Karabakh authorities demanded the merger with Armenia, a large Azeri crowd from the Azeri town of Agdam marched towards the Armenian town of Askaran, which is the first Armenian town on the border of Nagorno-Karabakh. The crowd destroyed properties of Armenians in villages on their way to Askaran, and the confrontations that followed led to the death of two Azeri protesters (Ibid: 78). The confrontation of February 23, 1988 is widely seen as the beginning of the current Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. As a result of the Askaran clash, the Armenian population in the Azeri town of Sumgait on the Caspian coast suffered from a pogrom, which again resulted in several pogroms in Armenia and in Azerbaijan. In the wake of forced deportations of the Armenian population in Baku and of the Azeri population in Armenia, the Autonomous Oblast of Nagorno-Karabakh declared itself independent on the 10th of December 1991. When the
Soviet Union ceased to exist on December 31 of that same year, Azerbaijan and Armenia commenced a full-scale war in Nagorno-Karabakh.
The Kremlin’s response to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
In the winter of 1987-1988, when Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh first began to address the issue of reunification with Armenia, it seemed as though the Kremlin did not oppose such a reunification. On several occasions, Armenian members of the Politburo who were very close to Gorbachev made public statements in favor of the accession of Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia (Geukjian, 2012: 132). Furthermore, when the only Azeri member of the Politburo, future Azeri president Haidar Aliyev, was removed from the Politburo in 1987 it led the Armenians to believe that Gorbachev was willing to adhere to their demands. As it turned out however, the Kremlin opposed the Armenian plans for reunification with Nagorno-Karabakh. When the supreme council of Nagorno-Karabakh officially demanded a reunification with Armenia in February 1988, Moscow refused to adhere to their wish. In the days following the declaration of unification, a pogrom took place in the Azeri coastal town of Sumgait, which had a large Armenian minority. The pogrom, allegedly conducted by the local Azeri’s, had left 32 Armenians dead with another several hundred Armenians wounded (Ibid: 150). As a result of the pogrom and the many demonstrations in both Armenia and Azerbaijan, the Kremlin decided to send in the Red Army. Demonstrations were forbidden until further notice in both republics and Soviet tanks entered Yerevan. According to Ohannes Geukjian, Gorbachev could
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have stopped the conflict here by adhering more autonomy to Nagorno-Karabakh instead of sending in the army and ignoring the Armenian demands. (Ibid: 151).
Sumgait
The pogrom of Sumgait was a turning point in the Karabakh conflict. Most scholars seem to agree that before the pogrom, the conflict could have been solved if some of the Armenian demands would have been fulfilled. The pogrom commenced on the 27th of February 1988
and lasted for three days. As the pogrom is widely considered to be the turning point in the Karabakh conflict, it is important to take a closer look into the events of the final days of February 1988.
Although he lacks a so-called smoking gun, Russian scholar Igor Nolyain argues in a 64-page article on the Sumgait massacre that the pogrom was orchestrated by the KGB. By conducting interviews with witnesses and by researching official reports and newspaper articles written on the Sumgait pogrom, Nolyain wrote down a chronological order of the events that took place during those three days in February 1988. According to Nolyain, the KGB sealed of the city of Sumgait on the 27th of February 1988. The KGB blocked all roads leading to the city,
thereby sealing off the city effectively and all public transport to and from the city had stopped working (NolyIain, 2007: 64). Step two was to cut off all communication in the city. All the phone lines were dead in Sumgait, making it impossible to make a phone call from and to the city. The cutting off of communication lines was a known KGB tactic, which was also used during the pogrom in Baku in January 1990 (Ibid). Step three was to replace the local police by ethnic Russians, in order not to be disturbed by the local police. Finally, criminals from nearby prisons were transported to the city in buses. During their bus-trip, these criminals were handed food and vodka, and upon arrival at the bus-terminal of Sumgait, they were handed lists of addresses of Armenian families. This is when the rioting started, the criminals went to the Armenian neighborhoods and commenced the pogrom. It is possible that on their way to the Armenian neighborhoods they managed to mobilize some of the local ethnic Azeri’s, but this remains unclear.
Although Noylain supports his claims with witness reports, he lacks a smoking gun. However, it is quite obvious that the Soviet authorities are covering up at least parts of what happened during the Sumgait pogrom. For instance, in Pravda articles on the pogrom (Pravda was the
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main Soviet newspaper at the time), it is mentioned that local police and local militias were present during the pogrom but did not manage to stop the murdering. The army was only sent to Sumgait to stop the killings on the first of March 1988, so three days after the pogrom had started. Furthermore, it was said that the perpetrators were around 50 to 60 ‘hooligans’ armed with knives and bats (Ibid: 88). It is hard to believe therefore that the local police and militias, who were outnumbering these hooligans and who were armed with guns, were unable to stop the massacre for three days.
Vicken Cheterian argues that the Sumgait massacre might have been part of the ‘active measures’ technique of the KGB (Cheterian, 2008: 110). Active measures, or ‘aktivnyye meropriyatiya’ in Russian, is a code name for “clandestine operations designed to extend Soviet influence and power around the world” (Bittman, 1985: 43). Among active measures are the discrediting of opponents, the spreading of disinformation or propaganda but also provoking conflicts between nations or peoples. Active measures are considered to be a follow-up of Soviet policy whereby disinformation is mostly used (Kraghs and Asberg, 2017: 779). In the case of Sumgait, one could argue that the pogrom fits within the concept of active measures. The KGB would provoke a pogrom and afterwards put the blame on local Azeri’s from Sumgait. A possible motive for such a provocation could be that Armenia would seek Soviet protection from the Azeri’s, for Moscow was afraid that Armenia would become too independent.
Whether or not the Sumgait massacres were part of a KGB plan to hold on to Armenia or not, the plan backfired, and Moscow lost its hold on the Caucasus bit by bit. If the massacres were organized by the KGB, it might have been that the KGB operated independently, without Gorbachev’s knowledge. What is clear at least is that in the weeks and months following the pogrom, Moscow tried to manage the conflict by arresting several people who were allegedly responsible for the pogrom. The trial seemed much like a farce however, and it did not satisfy the Armenian demands for justice, while at the same time it encouraged Azeri nationalism with Azeri’s demonstrating in defence of the Sumgait ‘heroes’ (Cheterian, 2008: 111). In the meantime, the Sumgait pogrom changed the Armenian mobilization around the Nagorno-Karabakh problem from a mobilization within the Soviet Union to a mobilization that was openly hostile against the Soviet authorities (Ibid: 122). Moscow gradually lost its control over
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Armenia and the Armenians started preparing both for independence as well as for a war with Azerbaijan.
Russian peacekeeping attempts
Before the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict escalated into a full-scale war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the Kremlin made several attempts on de-escalation of the conflict. In 1988, in the wake of the Sumgait pogrom, the Kremlin replaced Boris Kevorkov, the ethnic Armenian leader of the Nagorno-Karabakh oblast who was loyal to the Azeri authorities, by diplomat Abdul-Rahman Vezirov (Ibid: 114). This measure took the economic and political power in Nagorno-Karabakh away from the Azeri authorities. Furthermore, Arkadi Volsky was appointed as the official representative of the USSR Supreme Soviet in Nagorno-Karabakh. Volsky had made a career earlier as an advisor on industrial issues to the Kremlin. Volsky’s job was to ease the tensions in the region by increasing its industrial capacities. In order to do so, the Kremlin had provided him with 400 million rubles to spend on the development project. The project however failed, for, according to Mikhail Gorbachev, the Azeri authorities in Baku “were distributing the monies from the centre according to their own wishes, with only a small part reaching the intended recipients” (Gorbachev, 1996: 334). In the meantime, the conflict was slowly moving towards a full-scale war. Therefore, Volsky declared the state of emergency both in the Nagorno-Karabakh oblast as well as in the neighboring Agdam district. Volsky installed a regiment of Red Army soldiers in Karabakh, however, he failed to do more than just freeze the conflict. In November 1989 Gorbachev fired Volsky and gave the power over Nagorno-Karabakh back to Baku, thereby restoring the old situation (Cheterian, 2008: 115). It is widely believed that Gorbachev gave the authority over Nagorno-Karabakh back to Baku in order to punish Armenia for becoming too independent. Although Armenia was not officially independent until September 1991, it pursued a policy of independence from Moscow since 1989. Azerbaijan on the other hand was very much dependent on Moscow and very much a part of the Soviet Union up until its independence in 1991. It was not until the failed coup in Moscow in August 1991 that the Kremlin became more favorable to Armenia than it was to Azerbaijan.
A final attempt at reaching a peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was made by Russian president Boris Yeltsin in September 1991. Yeltsin flew to Stepanakert in order to negotiate between the Armenians and the Azeri’s from Karabakh. Yeltsin’s mediation led to
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the Zheleznovodsk Declaration (Cheterian, 2008: 145). The declaration created a fragile peace, which lasted for about six weeks, until Armenian forces shot down an Azeri helicopter in November of that same year. The helicopter was transferring Russian and Kazakh diplomats, as well as Azeri government officials who were busy implementing the declaration. The shooting down of the helicopter meant the end of peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Full-scale war
The final hope for peace was the 366th motorized infantry regiment stationed near
Stepanakert. In 1991, this final remaining regiment of the Soviet army was ordered to keep the fighting sides apart in order to prevent a full-scale war. This was not an easy job, for the Soviet soldiers were often under attack from both the Azeri side as well as the Armenian side (LA Times, February 29, 1992). However, as a result of the Armenian and Azeri independence, the Soviet army started to retreat from Nagorno-Karabakh in November 1991. The retreat was completed in February 1992 (Cheterian, 2008: 129). In November 1991, a full-scale war broke out between Armenia and Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh. With the 11,000 Soviet troops who were stationed in between the Azeri’s and the Armenians gone, nothing withheld both parties in going to war with each other. The Armenians first attacked the airport of Stepanakert and the village of Khojali that lay next to it (Ibid: 128). Khojali was an Azeri populated village, and when the Armenian soldiers conquered the village they committed a massacre amongst its population.
In May 1992, the Armenian forces managed to take Shushi, the former capital of Nagorno-Karabakh. Shushi was the main Azeri-populated town of Nagorno-Karabakh, and its geographical position is very strategic. Shushi lies on the only road connecting Karabakh to Armenia, and it is situated on a hill from where it is easy to overlook and bomb Stepanakert. The battle of Shushi only took two days, despite the large number of Azeri troops defending the town. The reason as to why it was so easy for the Armenians to conquer Shushi was because there was a power struggle going on in Baku. With the entire country in chaos, the Armenian army managed to conquer most of Nagorno-Karabakh in only a matter of time. The fall of Shushi came on a very inconvenient time for the conflict’s mediators. In 1992, Iran was trying very hard to reach a ceasefire agreement between the fighting parties. However, every ceasefire agreement negotiated by Iran lasted usually no longer than a couple of days
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(Ibid: 146). The Iranian mediators did manage to get the Armenian and Azeri presidents to sit at the same table. However, these negotiations had to be canceled, for hours after the start of the negotiations the news of the fall of Shushi broke. According to Vicken Cheterian, this was a massive blow to the image of the Armenian president, for he “seemed either to have no control over the ethnic Armenian troops fighting in Karabakh, or to be determined to give a blow to Iranian mediators” (Ibid).
Why were local actors so passionate about going to war?
In order for an ethnic conflict to occur, the conditions have to allow such an event to happen. In his article The security dilemma and ethnic conflict: toward a dynamic and integrative theory
of ethnic conflict, Tang explains the emergence of ethnic conflict in a situation in which a
central authority disappears and is replaced by chaos and anarchy (Tang, 2011: 530). Barry Posen calls this disappearance of a central authority “emerging anarchy”, which is often associated with the collapse of an empire (Posen, 1993: 27). This situation fits very well into the Nagorno-Karabakh ethnic conflict. In 1991 the Soviet Union collapsed, therefore the Soviet authorities disappeared in Nagorno-Karabakh, creating a chaos which allowed the ethnic conflict to fully commence.
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict can be seen as a typical example of the symbolic politics approach. The Armenians considered Nagorno-Karabakh as their historical homeland and wanted it to be a part of Armenia again. This fits within the ‘widely believed myths’ narrative as described in the theory. The pogrom of Sumgait brought back unpleasant memories of the Armenian genocide of 1915, which provoked fear among the Armenian population. The Armenians felt that their only chance of both getting Nagorno-Karabakh back as well as the survival of the Armenian people was to fight the Azeri’s over it. The death of Azeri protesters in Agdam in 1988 reminded the Azeri’s on the other hand of historical examples of pogroms against Azeri’s in Armenia (Kaufman, 2001: 58). Furthermore, the Azeri’s felt threatened by the Armenian sense of nationhood, which was much stronger than the Azeri one. The loss of Nagorno-Karabakh was portrayed as a “mortal threat to the nation’s existence” (Ibid), hence it was essential for Azeri nationhood that Nagorno-Karabakh remained a part of Azerbaijan. According to Stuart Kaufman, who founded the symbolic politics approach, the conflict erupted due to a clash between the Armenian ‘myth-symbol complex’, which was based on fears of a new genocide, and an Azeri myth-symbol complex based on the “sovereignty and
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territorial integrity” of the new Azeri republic (Kaufman, 2001: 49). Therefore, Nagorno-Karabakh became essential for both the Armenians and the Azeri’s. It was essential to have Karabakh join Armenia for the Armenians in order to prevent an ethnic cleansing or, even worse, a genocide of the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh. For the Azeri’s, keeping Karabakh as a part of Azerbaijan was essential for their new country and its territorial integrity. The way Kaufman describes it, each country “defined dominance in Karabagh as vital to its national existence, and saw the other side’s aspirations as constituting a threat of group extinction” (Ibid).
Russia’s role in the war
There is a debate amongst scholars concerning the significance of the Russian influence during the height of the Nagorno-Karabakh war from 1992 to 1993. It is clear that during these war years, Russian soldiers and Russian weapons were present on both sides of the war, fighting even each other. There are several ways to look at this Russian presence in and around Nagorno-Karabakh. Thomas Goltz, a scholar from the Institute of Current World Affairs in New Hampshire, sees a large Russian hand in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Goltz believes that Russia used the conflict to exert influence on both Azerbaijan and Armenia (Goltz, 1993: 98). Again, it is difficult to find a smoking gun for his allegations, but as a prove he uses the example of six Russian soldiers who were arrested by Azerbaijan while on a patrol in Nagorno-Karabakh. The soldiers were convicted of being mercenaries and were sentenced to death by an Azeri court (Ibid: 99). The six soldiers were marked as deserters by Russia, claiming Russia was not aware of the current whereabouts of these soldiers. Goltz argues that this is unlikely, for they had been ‘missing’ for over a year whilst being part of a unit of special forces, a unit which is very valuable to Russia and unlikely to go missing. Furthermore, these soldiers were only listed as deserters once they had been arrested by Azerbaijan. Goltz sees in this story and several similar stories a prove of the Russian hand during the war years.
Vicken Cheterian explains the existence of Russian soldiers and Russian weapons on both sides of the conflict in a different way. According to Cheterian, Goltz is wrong in his assumption that the war over Nagorno-Karabakh was mainly Russia’s fault. In the wake of the breakdown of the Soviet Union, several former Soviet bases in the Caucasus were deprived of food and funding (Cheterian, 2008: 149). These bases were often located in an isolated area, and in order not to starve, most soldiers sold weapons to local militias or were hired as mercenaries.
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The fact that Russian soldiers were fighting on both sides of the conflict therefore does not mean that Moscow was controlling these soldiers. In 1991 and 1992, Russia was as much in a state of chaos as most former Soviet republics were, and Moscow was not able at all to have any control of its soldiers outside of Russia. The way Cheterian says it, “Seeing a conscious, manipulative “hand” behind this is a wild act of imagination” (Ibid). Cheterian adds to that that “If anyone had seen Russian soldiers in those days, completely abandoned by their leadership, having no orders, not even knowing who their superiors were, often without food and protection and – most important – noted their participation on both sides of the war, he would have found it hard to believe that Russia’s Defence Ministry had any grasp of, still less a plan for, the Caucasus military developments” (Ibid: 130).
Although the Russian influence on the Sumgait massacre is debatable, there are clear signals that Russia has at least tried to hold on to its role as the “main influencer” in the region. Especially in the final years of the existence of the Soviet Union, the Kremlin has interfered with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The Kremlin has tried at first to ease the tensions by changing the leadership of the Autonomous Oblast of Nagorno-Karabakh. However, when Armenia became more and more independent of Moscow, the Kremlin gave the authority over Nagorno-Karabakh back to Baku, thereby re-installing the old situation. The Russian interference in Nagorno-Karabakh continued even after Armenia and Azerbaijan became independent. Yeltsin’s attempts at reaching a ceasefire in September 1991 can be seen as an example of it. Other examples of Russian soldiers participating on both fighting sides of the conflict cannot be regarded as Russian influence over the region, for these soldiers fought for whoever was ready to pay them, whether it was the Armenians or the Azeri’s, and without any control from Moscow.
Up until September 1991, Armenia and Azerbaijan were still a part of the Soviet Union. Therefore, we can only start researching Russian influence with the help of neo-imperialism after September 1991, for neo-imperialism aims to explain the influence a great power has over a different nation. Since there are no signs that Russia has aimed to conduct any influence over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict after the failure of the ceasefire in November 1991, neo-imperialism does not seem to fit Russia’s role in the first years of the conflict. Instead, it can be concluded that Russia did not have a big role to play from the start of the war in November 1991 up until the start of the ceasefire negotiations in 1994.
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Obstruction of a peaceful solution
When studying the history of the outbreak of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict through the lens of the symbolic politics approach, one might expect the local actors to be driven by emotions and not to be willing to cooperate with each other. This is precisely what happened in the early years of the conflict. From this chapter, it can be concluded that a peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict from 1988 to approximately 1993 has been mainly obstructed by local actors. These actors behaved precisely in a way the symbolic politics approach would expect them to behave. Due to the Armenian myth-symbol complex of the Armenian Genocide and due to the Azeri myth-symbol complex of its national identity being linked to its territorial integrity, both ethnic groups hated and feared each other. Furthermore, both countries were not willing to cooperate with each other at all. Armenian soldiers have blocked a peaceful resolution on several occasions, first by shooting down the Azeri helicopter in 1991, thereby ending the ceasefire agreement as negotiated by Yeltsin. Secondly by capturing the city of Shushi during peace talks held in Teheran. These actions have made peace talks impossible, although it is not clear whether or not the Armenian soldiers undertook these actions deliberately in order to obstruct the peace process. The Azeri authorities have also not been behaving in a constructive way during the years leading up to the conflict. By fueling nationalism amongst its population concerning the Nagorno-Karabakh province, they made it very difficult for the Azeri people to accept a compromise concerning the future of Nagorno-Karabakh.
During the first years of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Russia did not entirely behave in a way one would expect from a neo-imperialistic power. Although there are rumors about Russian provocations in the years leading up to the conflict, they are almost impossible to prove. Furthermore, it could be expected from a neo-imperialistic great power to hold on to soldiers stationed in the region. However, Russia pulled back its soldiers stationed in Nagorno-Karabakh. It could be argued that Russia tried its best to be a neo-imperial power during the first years of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, but it was too weak to be one.
Concerning a Russian obstruction of a peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, no hard conclusions can be made, for rumors about Russian provocations of the conflict are difficult to prove and for Russia has still tried to solve the conflict during its first years.
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Timeframe 2: negotiating the 1994 ceasefire agreement
After Yeltsin’s failed attempt to negotiate a ceasefire in 1991 and Iran’s failed attempt in 1992, there had been three other attempts at negotiating a ceasefire, of which only one was successful. First, in August 1992, Kazakh president Nursultan Nazarbayev commenced an attempt at reaching a ceasefire in Nagorno-Karabakh. However, as Nazarbayev feared a Russian intervention in the newly founded independent state of Kazakhstan, he put an emphasis on respecting one’s territorial integrity (Mooradian and Druckman, 1999: 710). This emphasis made that Armenia considered Nazarbayev to be biased, and it was therefore not so eager to cooperate with his negotiation attempt. The attempt therefore failed after a short while.
The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), (which changed its name to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in 1995), also made an attempt on reaching a peace agreement in Nagorno-Karabakh. In January 1992, both Azerbaijan and Armenia joined the CSCE (Laitin and Suny, 1999: 158). In the summer of 1992, a CSCE-delegation visited Nagorno-Karabakh for the first time. The delegation was led by John Maresca, the US ambassador to the CSCE. The visit led to the CSCE organizing a peace conference on Nagorno-Karabakh in the Belarusian capital Minsk, which again led to the birth of the so-called Minsk Group (Ibid). The purpose of the Minsk Group was to reach a peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and in order to do so they met several times on several occasions. On multiple occasions, they were close to reaching a ceasefire agreement, however they never managed to successfully reach one. There are several reasons as to why the CSCE failed in reaching a peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. First of all, although Russia was and still is a part of the CSCE and the Minsk Group, it conducted its own ceasefire negotiations in Nagorno-Karabakh and was not very cooperative with the CSCE. A second reason was the reluctancy of some local actors to cooperate with the CSCE.
The war continues
Despite the peace negotiations, the Nagorno-Karabakh war continued to be a full-scale war during the first half of the 1990’s. In April 1993, Armenian troops managed to capture large parts of the Azeri Kelbajar province, which lies outside the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. The capture of Kelbajar turned thousands of Azeri’s into refugees, who fled both to
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Iran and to unoccupied Azerbaijan (Ibid: 159). Throughout 1993, the Armenian troops were very effective and continued to win one battle after the other. In July 1993, they managed to capture the Azeri city of Agdam, which lies just outside of the Nagorno-Karabakh border. Agdam used to be a city of 150.000 inhabitants. When I visited the city in January 2018, it had no inhabitants other than some lone cows, and almost every building in the city was destroyed. Based on what I saw during my visit, it can be concluded that the city of Agdam and dozens of neighboring villages are permanently uninhabitable: the scale of destruction is enormous.
Failed attempts at reaching a ceasefire
In 1993, several attempts at reaching a ceasefire had been made. Some of these attempts were successful in reaching a ceasefire, however they lasted a week at best. In October 1993 for example, a ceasefire had been reached between the Azeri’s and the Armenians. The ceasefire lasted for a week, for the Armenian troops launched an attack on the Zangelan province, which lies south of Nagorno-Karabakh between Karabakh and the Iranian border, just a week after the ceasefire had been agreed upon. The Zangelan province was, just like the Kelbajar province, an ethnic Azeri and mainly homogenous province (Ibid: 161).
In 1993, the main parties responsible for peace negotiations were the Russians on the one hand, and the CSCE on the other hand. Within the CSCE, it was mainly the Americans who pushed for peace negotiations. Although Russia was, and still is, a part of the CSCE, several direct sources claim Russia largely ignored its role within the CSCE (Ibid: 160). In a February 1993 speech, Russian president Boris Yeltsin stated that Russia had a right to intervene in the former Soviet Union. He stated that “the time has come for the appropriate international organizations to grant Russia special powers as the guarantor of peace and stability on the territory of the former Soviet Union” (Ibid: 159). Hence, in 1993, Russia started behaving as a neo-imperialistic power, for they felt entitled to interventions in their sphere of influence. In the light of Yeltsin’s speech, Russian negotiator Vladimir Kazimirov pushed for a Russian peacekeeping force in Nagorno-Karabakh. However, most other parties to the negotiations favored an international peacekeeping force, in which the Russians could have a role. US ambassador to the CSCE Maresca saw Russia’s push for a Russian peacekeeping force as an obstruction of the CSCE negotiations. Maresca offered Kazimirov seven conditions for a peacekeeping force that included Russians, however Kazimirov largely ignored Maresca’s
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words. Maresca later claimed the Russians deliberately chose not to cooperate with the CSCE in order to “ensure that their own proposal would be understood by the parties to be the only game in town” (Geukjian, 2014: 69). Maresca called the Russian behavior “bad faith”.
The reason as to why the CSCE was not effective in reaching a sustainable ceasefire agreement was not only the non-cooperation of Russia. The local actors were not very fond of the CSCE and its actions either. When the Italian temporary chair of the CSCE Raffaelli stated that the Karabakh Armenians should not be part of the negotiation process and thereby expecting them to just accept the outcome of the negotiations, the CSCE lost the confidence of the Karabakh Armenians (Mooradian, 1996: 402). The Karabakh authorities publicly declared their loss of faith in the CSCE. When at the same time the Russians made progress in their ceasefire proposal, it was clear that the efforts made by the CSCE would not be fruitful.
A ceasefire at last
In February 1994, Vladimir Kazimirov finally managed to broker a ceasefire between the warring parties. The ceasefire agreement was formally signed on May 12, 1994 (Laitin and Suny, 1999: 161). Although the ceasefire did not solve any of the problems in Nagorno-Karabakh, it was at least effective in freezing the conflict. Despite occasional ceasefire violations, the frontline has not significantly moved ever since the ceasefire had been signed. Following the signing of the ceasefire, the CSCE criticized Russia’s actions during a meeting in Austria as being “unilateral and excluding the CSCE” (Ibid: 162), which led to the Russian representatives walking out of the meeting. However, the Russian plan worked, for the Russians were the only ones who had been successful in putting a halt to the fighting.
Russian malign intentions?
The Russian strategy to reaching the ceasefire agreement is still rather controversial. Throughout 1994, Russia has been trying to install a Russian peacekeeping mission in Nagorno-Karabakh, and wanted the CSCE excluded from such a peacekeeping mission (Blank, 1995: 370). The CSCE however refused to recognize a Russian-only peacekeeping mission. Azerbaijan was also against a Russian peacekeeping mission, which according to author Stephen Blank would only be installed in order to have Russian leverage over Azeri oil (Ibid). Thus, in September 1994, a coup d’état was instigated against Azeri president Haider Aliyev. Aliyev survived the coup, but he blamed Russia for being the main instigator behind it. The 1994 coup
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was not the first time Russia was accused of interfering in Azeri matters. In 1993, during the Nagorno-Karabakh peace negotiations, Russia proposed to then Azeri president Elchibey to deploy a Russian peacekeeping force in Nagorno-Karabakh. In return, Russia would give back all the land Azerbaijan had lost during its war with Armenia. Elchibey refused, and was overthrown in a coup d’état just weeks after refusing the deal. According to Blank, this coup also had “Russian fingerprints on it” (Ibid: 372).
This sort of Russian behavior can be explained with the help of neo-imperialism. Russia wanted Azerbaijan to behave in a way that would reflect Russian interests. When Azerbaijan refused to do so, coups were instigated in order to replace the Azeri president with a more pro-Russian president.
A different question that arises when studying Russian involvement in Nagorno-Karabakh is its role in the Minsk Group and in the CSCE. Why would Russia participate in such organizations when it refuses to cooperate with them? One answer to this question could be that Russia’s plan had been to infiltrate these organizations in order to prevent them from taking measures against Russia’s interests. This can be interpreted when looking at an article written by Yeltsin’s advisor Migranyan, who wrote: “Russia faces numerous problems, both abroad and with other newly independent former Soviet Republics. It cannot afford to be constrained when its own interests do not coincide with NATO’s or with those of the Partnership for Peace” (Ibid: 374). Thus, Russia demanded to be left alone when dealing with the former Soviet Republics.
Russia’s behavior towards the CSCE also fits within the parameters of neo-imperialism. By excluding the CSCE, Russia aimed at becoming the sole great power to have influence in the Caucasus. It can therefore be concluded that Russia’s behavior in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh around the time of the signing of the ceasefire can be explained with the help of neo-imperialism. It is more problematic to draw a conclusion concerning Russian obstruction of the peace process during this specific timeframe, for it can be open to interpretation. Yes, Russia obstructed the CSCE peace process, but it did however manage to create a ceasefire agreement. In practice, this means that it was Russia who managed to stop the fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh, although Russia did so in order to defend its own interests in the Caucasus.
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Local behavior towards the ceasefire agreement
When the ceasefire was signed in May 1994, the Armenian and Azeri Ministers of Defense and the commander of the ‘Nagorno-Karabakh army’ promised to reach a conclusion in the peace negotiations no later than September 1994 (De Waal, 2010: 166). Unfortunately, no conclusion in the peace negotiations has been made as of today. This is mostly due to the fact that Armenia and Azerbaijan both have very different goals concerning Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia wants to maintain the status quo as was put in place with the ceasefire agreement. In order to do so, the Armenians have constructed a state in Nagorno-Karabakh and the other occupied Azeri provinces. This state, called the Republic of Artsakh, has all institutions an independent state requires and has democratic elections. In order for the status quo to remain in place, Armenia has shown its interest in welcoming peacekeeping missions, whether they are Russian or international. By maintaining the status quo, the Armenians hope that history will eventually acknowledge the Armenian victory. The narrative of the “heroic Armenian victory that will eventually be confirmed by history” (Ibid: 163) is something that can often be seen on the official Armenian state television. This narrative can be explained with the symbolic politics theory. The myth of the “heroic Armenian victory” is something that needs to be protected in order for it to be ratified by history. The emotional aspect of the heroic victory and with that the loss of the lives of the martyrs who died for this victory makes it that this victory needs to be preserved. On top of that, the Armenians hope that, as long as the Artsakh Republic will be a strong state with strong institutions, it will be difficult if not impossible for Azerbaijan to regain their lost territories.
The Azeri side has very different goals concerning Nagorno-Karabakh. The Azeri’s want to keep the ceasefire line as a temporary line. In order to do so, it emphasizes it is still at war with Armenia. In the narrative of Azeri state television, the Nagorno-Karabakh war is a “tragic occupation of Azerbaijani land that will one day be reversed” (Ibid). This narrative can also be explained with the symbolic politics theory. The “tragic occupation” myth became a myth associated with the birth of the independent nation of Azerbaijan. The myth fueled and fuels nationalism in Azerbaijan, and the Azeri government does its best to keep the myth as alive as possible. This narrative led to the fact that the Azeri side has blocked CSCE presence in Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan does not want a peacekeeping mission because it does not
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want the ceasefire line to become a new border (Ibid: 167). Azerbaijan sees the ceasefire line as one of the few points in which it has leverage over Armenia.
Obstruction of a peaceful solution
One would expect an actor behaving in accordance with neo-imperialism to aim to be the only actor having influence in a certain region of its interest. Hence, in the period leading up to the ceasefire agreement of 1994, Russia behaved precisely in a way one would expect from a neo-imperialist power. Russia made sure it was the only power able to influence the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which is why the ceasefire had been brokered by the Russians. By not cooperating with the CSCE, Russia made sure they were the only foreign power influencing the peace process in Nagorno-Karabakh. Although Russia behaved in its own interest rather than in the interests of the local actors and although it obstructed a CSCE solution to the conflict, Russia did manage to reach a ceasefire. It can therefore not be concluded that Russia obstructed a peaceful solution to the conflict in 1994.
The reason as to why the ceasefire did not develop into a sustainable peace agreement is because Armenia and Azerbaijan behaved as expected according to the symbolic politics approach. Both countries defended their policies with narratives that can be explained with the symbolic politics approach. Armenia and Azerbaijan both have very different interests concerning the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Armenia wants the status quo to remain the way it is and Azerbaijan wants the ceasefire line to be temporary. Although the local actors did agree to reach a ceasefire agreement, Armenia and Azerbaijan did obstruct a sustainable peace in the region.
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Timeframe 3: the failed peace negotiations of 2001
Throughout the remaining years of the 1990’s, the conflict had been rather frozen, with a few minor clashes erupting every now and then. In January 1997, the US, France and Russia co-charged the OSCE Minsk Group. The three powers cooperated in a very constructive way with each other, which led to several peace proposals being made by the OSCE.
The first peace proposal made by the OSCE in 1997 was called the “package proposal” (Faty Zadeh, 2003: 22). The proposal, made in May 1997, consisted of two separate agendas. The first agenda was aimed at putting an immediate end to the armed conflict. The first part of the proposal therefore included the withdrawal of troops, the installment of an international peacekeeping force, the return of displaced persons and the re-opening of communications between Armenia and Azerbaijan (Ibid).
The second agenda was aimed at determining the status of Nagorno-Karabakh. The agendas were kept separate on purpose in order for Armenia and Azerbaijan to be able to negotiate the agendas separately. Unfortunately, the package plan failed, for Armenia refused to withdraw troops from Nagorno-Karabakh before its status was determined.
The Armenian refusal to accept the package plan fits within the parameters of the symbolic politics approach. It can be argued that Armenia did not want to withdraw its troops before making sure that Nagorno-Karabakh will be an independent country, or at least not part of Azerbaijan. When looking at the symbolic politics approach, it can be argued that the Armenian Genocide plays a role in the Armenian refusal to withdraw its troops. Fear of Azeri hatred might have led to the Armenian government fearing a slaughter amongst the Armenian inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh. It can therefore be argued that the group myth of the Armenian Genocide is a plausible explanation for the Armenian refusal to withdraw its troops from Nagorno-Karabakh.
The ‘step-by-step approach’
After the failure of the first peace proposal, a new plan was presented by the OSCE in September 1997. This time, the idea was to negotiate each topic that was presented in the first agenda of the May proposal step by step. Hence, the withdrawal of Armenian troops, the installment of a peacekeeping mission and the return of refugees would be negotiated one by one. The issue of the status of Nagorno-Karabakh would be dealt with in a later stage.
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Although both Yerevan and Baku accepted this proposal, the Karabakh Armenians were against it, for they refused to risk Nagorno-Karabakh to be a part of Azerbaijan once again (Ibid).
The behavior of the Karabakh Armenians can also be explained with the help of the symbolic politics approach. Again, it is likely that the group myth of the Armenian Genocide plays a role here. The Karabakh Armenians did not want to risk Nagorno-Karabakh to be a part of Azerbaijan again, for this would allow Azeri soldiers and angry Azeri citizens to come to Nagorno-Karabakh. It is likely that the Karabakh Armenians feared ethnic violence once again when becoming a part of Azerbaijan again.
What was most surprising about the reception of the second OSCE peace plan is the fact that then-Armenian president Ter-Petrosyan accepted the proposal. Ter-Petrosyan allegedly realized that the unilateral secession of Nagorno-Karabakh from Azerbaijan would not lead to a sustainable peace agreement. As a result of Ter-Petrosyan’s pragmatic views concerning the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, he lost the support of the Armenian parliament by the end of 1997. Ter-Petrosyan lost the 1998 elections to hardliner Kocharian, who indefinitely rejected the OSCE peace proposal (Ibid: 23).
The ‘common state approach’
In November 1998, the OSCE made a third proposal to the conflicting parties. The proposal mentioned a so-called “common state approach”, which would incorporate Nagorno-Karabakh into Azerbaijan (Ibid: 24). In the proposal, concepts such as autonomy were not mentioned, for these terms were considered to be too sensitive. It was however not clear what the role of Nagorno-Karabakh within Azerbaijan would be. It could be interpreted in a way that Nagorno-Karabakh would just be an autonomous province of Azerbaijan, but it could also be interpreted in a way that Nagorno-Karabakh would be an independent nation within Azerbaijan. The common state approach is a concept that is intended to be as vague as possible. The philosophy behind the concept is that, due to its vagueness, the warring parties will have to negotiate with each other in order to discuss the concept. The common state approach is a Russian invention, which was created as a solution for the Moldovan and Georgian breakaway provinces of respectively Transdnestria and Abkhazia. In these countries, the breakaway provinces have interpreted the approach as becoming a separate, independent
