Power, politics and security regimes: A comparative analysis of policing in New York City and Chicago

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Christiaan Mulder, BSc

Power, politics and security regimes

A comparative analysis of policing in New York City and Chicago

Master thesis, June 4, 2017

Supervisor: Dr. E. Devroe

Second reader: Drs. C. Nagtegaal

Leiden University, the Netherlands

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Preface

The completion of this master thesis resembles the end of the master Crisis and Security Management at Leiden University (the Netherlands). After I obtained a bachelor’s degree in Political Science, I made the decision to switch to the field of Crisis and Security Management. From the beginning of this master, I am fascinated by the roots of crime and policing in general. Since the start of my bachelor’s degree I am associated with a local political party in Leiden, of which I became a board member in September 2016. This was also the time that I started the course on ‘Governance of Crime and Social Disorder’ by Dr. Elke Devroe. My practical experiences in politics were, for the first time, connected with security policies and policing during this course. Soon after, I decided to write my thesis on policing in metropolitan areas. Combining my political experiences with theoretical insights, I am confident that this thesis is the master piece of my academic career. I hope that my experiences from my previous master ‘Public Sector Management’ and this master leads to a doctoral degree in the future.

I am grateful that I had the opportunity to write this thesis at one of the best universities in the Netherlands, with an inspirational and experienced supervisor while surrounded by supporting friends and family. Therefore, I would like to sincerely thank my supervisor Elke Devroe for all her inspiring insights and feedback, the second reader for reading my thesis, my friends and family for their support, and the staff of the faculty of Governance and Global Affairs for facilitating the thesis process.

I hope you will enjoy reading this thesis. Leiden, June 2017

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1 I

NTRODUCTION

For a long time the nation-state has been at the center of the policing function. The recent decades witnessed an enormous proliferation of non-state actors in the security field. This pluralization of the police function reshaped the role of the traditional nation-state and gave more responsibilities to both non-state and local entities (Devroe & Terpstra, 2015: 235). However, this does not mean that the influence of the state eroded; rather the state now shares its right of sovereign legal and political power with sub-national governments, international obligations, supranational forms and multinational conglomerates (Loader & Walker, 2001: 10). In current academic literature, a lot of attention is paid to the last three levels, while the national level is often neglected. This is interesting because on the sub-national level, metropolises have become a pivotal player in shaping public policy because of improved mobility of goods, services and labor (Devroe et al., 2017: 4). Metropolises influence both security priorities of other localities and priorities on the nation-state level. As a result, metropolises become ‘nodal points’ in a ‘world urban system’ where the responsibilities of the provision of security are shared by multiple entities (Castells, 1996; King 1997).

Therefore, this thesis will focus on sub-national policing and analyze security priorities and measures in two U.S. metropolitan areas: New York City and Chicago. Since the 9/11-attacks, security priorities in both New York City and Chicago have become more visible. In New York City, former Mayor Giuliani famously introduced ‘zero tolerance policing’, while Police Commissioner Bratton presented a computer system, named Computer Statistics (CompStat). CompStat was founded by the NYPD in 1994 and features ‘up-to-date computerized crime data, crime analysis and advanced crime mapping as the basis for regularized interactive crime strategy meetings which hold police managers accountable for

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specific crime strategies and solutions’ (Eterno & Silverman, 2010: 427). On the other hand, in Chicago, security priorities are often related to policies that focus on bringing back homicide rates, while current Mayor Emanuel’s main focus is to bring down the possession of weapons in the ‘windy City’. But, the question remains how these security priorities come about and to what extent the two metropolises have political agency and discretion to tackle major security issues. These security priorities are analyzed by using the work of Stone (1989) about security priorities in Atlanta. Another question that needs attention is to what extent there is, on a comparative ground, divergence or convergence between the two metropolises. Both metropolises operate under one national system; thus, comparing both metropolises gives insight into the explanatory factors that explain divergence or convergence. This leads to the following research question:

To what extent is there convergence or divergence between the security agendas in New York City and Chicago, and how can this be explained?

This thesis is theoretically relevant for two reasons. First, by analyzing the sub-national level, this thesis distinguishes itself from trends of ‘Europeanization’ (Bigo & Guild, 2005), ‘neo-liberalization’ (Wacquant, 2001), ‘securitization’ (Hallsworth & Lea, 2011), ‘plural policing’ (Jones & Newburn, 2006) and ‘responsibilization’ (Garland, 2001). Although these trends are acknowledged, the main focus will be on the sub-national level. As noted, the impact of sub-national systems, and more specifically metropolises, is often neglected in current academic literature. Thus, by introducing metropolises in the subject of security, this thesis gives a more comprehensive view on the pluralization of the policing function. Second, within academic literature there is need for comparative insight into the differences in policing between metropolises. Or as Devroe et al. (2017: 23) note: ‘the underlying assumption [of comparative policing research] is that differences in policing in metropolises in the same nation-state reflects the elbowroom of metropolitan areas to develop their own policing policy, in spite of one and the same national context.’ As a result, this thesis fits in the ongoing research project on comparative policing in the European context, the ‘Policing European Metropolises Project’ (see Ponsaers, et al., 2014; Devroe et al., 2017). This thesis extends the current ‘Policing European Metropolises Project’ as it includes, for the first time, non-European metropolises.

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This thesis also has societal relevance. Understanding how security priorities come about gives insight into the origins of certain policy ‘discourses’ in the two metropolises. This understanding can help both citizens and governors with influencing security priorities. Is it for example true that the mayor’s political affiliation impacts security priorities? Or is it just the metropolitan police that is the most dominant actor? Furthermore, comparative insight into the differences between metropolises can highlight strengths and weaknesses of policies that work in a similar setting. On the other hand, understanding the nation-state’s impact on security priorities in metropolises explains the amount of political discretion metropolises have. In unsecure times like these, with extremist politicians in office, it is important to distinguish between boundaries of responsibilities. President Trump said for example that ‘if Chicago doesn’t fix the horrible “carnage” going on, 228 shootings in 2017 with 42 killings (up 24% from 2016), I will send in the feds!’ (Wagner & Berman, 2017). Mayor Emanuel of Chicago responded that it would work together with the federal government, but does not feel anything for Trump’s populism (Wagner & Berman, 2017). Thus, by identifying how security priorities in Chicago and New York City come about, it gives insight into the manifestation of politics (of power).

This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents the thesis’ theoretical framework. More specifically, concepts of ‘circuits of powers’, ‘standing conditions’ and ‘urban regimes’ will be theorized. In the third chapter, the thesis’ methodology will be discussed. In particular, the main focus will be placed on the operationalization of the variables and research methods. Chapter 4 will examine the security regimes of New York City and Chicago. Hereafter, in Chapter 5, a comparative overview of the security regimes is presented. This thesis ends with a conclusion and suggestions for future research in Chapter 6.

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2 T

HEORETICAL

F

RAMEWORK

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U

RBAN

R

EGIMES IN

C

ONTEXT

To identify and explain security priorities in metropolises it is important to analyze how governance arrangements come about. Therefore, this chapter will present a comprehensive analysis of theories about the origin of governance arrangements (Section 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3). Also, this chapter will analyze different security regimes in the context of metropolises (Section 2.4). Furthermore, the concept of ‘circuits of power’ and ‘standing conditions’ will be assessed (Section 2.5). This chapter concludes with a ‘funnel’ of which the theory of this thesis is built on (Section 2.6). 2.1 The foundations of urban regime theory

Governance arrangements in metropolises are often called urban regimes. The concept of ‘urban regime’ is developed by Clarence Stone and put forward in his book ‘Regime Politics: Governing Atlanta 1946-1988’ that was published in 1989 (see Stone, 1989). The puzzle of Stone’s research was to explain why in Atlanta racial polarization was not central in the period after the Second World War, as it was in other parts of the United States (Stone, 1989: 11; Van Ostaaijen, 2010: 24). He studied the politics of Atlanta from 1946 to 1988. This period was interesting because since 1946 the black community was granted suffrage; as a result, the governors of Atlanta needed to take into account these new voters. Stone (1989: 6) describes urban regimes as ‘the informal arrangements by which public bodies and private interests function together in order to be able to make and carry out governing decisions.’ Although the concept of urban regime is based on Atlanta, it can be used to analyze how governance arrangements come about in other communities. Or as Stone (1989: 256) describes: using urban governance ‘would be a fruitful starting point in the study of other communities (…) as “urban regime” is an illuminating concept.’ However, Stone was not the first that defined the concept of urban regime – something that Stone also acknowledges. Authors like Elkin

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(1987), Reed (1988) and Fainstein and Fainstein (1983) put forward related concepts. What these authors have in common is that the concept of ‘urban regime’ helps by analyzing social and political change in sub-national entities like metropolises.

The roots of urban regime trace back to literature on international relations, which introduced the idea that by ‘mutually beneficial cooperation’ more and better governance arrangements could be created (Van Ostaaijen, 2010: 24). For example, in 1975, Ruggie already described a regime (in the international context) as ‘a set of mutual expectations, rules and regulations, plans, organizational energies and financial commitments, which have been accepted by groups of states’ (cited in Van Ostaaijen, 2010: 24). However, by no means there is agreement within the academic community about the definition of what a regime entails. As discussed, Stone (1989) contributed to the development of the definition of regime in the local context of Atlanta. He concluded in his research that an urban regime has several characteristics: a regime is based on informal arrangements; is stable and has access to institutional resources; and, is empowering (Van Ostaaijen, 2010: 25-26).

First, urban regimes are the result of (mostly) informal arrangements between institutional and individual actors that are surrounded by a government (Van Ostaaijen, 2010: 26). These informal arrangements form and origin outside existing governance structures. Second, the informal coalition needs to be stable and have access to institutional resources to implement an urban regime. In the case of Atlanta, an informal coalition emerged because the business elite possessed resources, while the black community possessed electoral power (Van Ostaaijen, 2010: 26). This example shows that urban regimes are often the result of necessity, as opposed to formal governance structures. Thirdly, an urban regime must be empowering, because without working together the aims of the different parties could not be met. Thus, the question existentielle is based on mutually beneficial cooperation and trust. This is related to what Stoker (1995: 60) describes as what an ‘effective regime’ should poses: ‘first possession of strategic knowledge of social transactions and a capacity to act on that knowledge; and second, control of resources that make one an attractive coalition partner.’ In other words, both resources and informal relations are at the core of an urban regime. The next section will highlight the characteristics of an urban regime in more detail.

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2.2 Pluralism and the elements of an urban regime

Theoretically, the concept of urban regime is often linked to the concept of pluralism, but they are not the same. Thus, before an assessment can be made of the elements of an urban regime it is important discuss the differences. Urban regime differentiates from the classic form of pluralism that originated after the introduction of universal suffrage (Stone, 2005: 311). In a narrow sense, universal suffrage only lead to control of those who are elected in office. Or as Stone (2005: 311) puts it: ‘even if ideal conditions existed so that citizens were able to exercise rigorous oversight of all top officials through an ample array of ballot choices, the authority of government has only a limited writ.’ In other words, in an urban regime elected officials are only one part of the emergence of a particular regime; while, there are many other factors that also impact which regime is central in a metropolis. Another way that the concept of urban regime and classical pluralism differentiate is that classical pluralism only focuses on the idea that there are different ‘centrifugal forces’ that lead to a (mostly unstable) coalition (Stone, 2005: 311). In contrast, Stone (2005: 312) argues that there are indeed centrifugal forces but that there are always established relationships that ‘are not easily pressured into adopting a new line of action.’ Thus, the idea of classical pluralism that there is an open market of bargain and resources is accepted by urban regime theorists; but in contrary to classical pluralism, it does not necessary mean that it leads to change of an urban regime – as there are established relationships. Change is possible in an urban regime, but often it is a gradual and a long-lasting process (Stone, 2005: 312). Thus, in the eyes of urban regime theorists, while universal suffrage lead to the inclusion of many different eligible voters, it did not lead to an ‘open en penetrable’ political system (Stone, 2005: 312). Governing arrangements are the result of different competing groups, but these groups form in a ‘system of social stratification’ that is characterized by social and economic inequalities (Stone, 2005: 312).

But how do these governance arrangements look like? There are two important works that describe the characteristics of an urban regime: Mossberger and Stoker (2001), and Stone (2005). Table 1 summarizes how both authors characterize urban regimes. What both authors have in common is that a regime should include nongovernmental entities, such as businesses or local community groups. Also, there is a strong focus on shared resources by all participating

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members. It may be that a local government is the main funder of the regime, while, other members might bring in other kinds of resources (e.g. social, cultural, symbolic or technological resources1_{). Closely linked to this, all members of the} regime should identify themselves with parts of the coalition agenda. Another specification is that an urban regime is not an ad-hoc agenda, rather it is a ‘longstanding pattern of cooperation’ (Mossberger & Stoker, 2001: 829). Interestingly, other authors (Kantor et al., 1997; Pierre, 2005; Van Ostaaijen, 2010) have argued that private participation is not essential in an urban regime. Consequently, it should not be considered as a strict criterion of what an urban regime is.

Table 1 The characteristics of an urban regime

Mossberger and Stoker (2001: 829)

• Partners drawn from government and nongovernmental sources, requiring but not limited to business participation.

• Collaboration based on social production—the need to bring together fragmented resources for the power to accomplish tasks.

• Identifiable policy agendas that can be related to the composition of the participants in the coalition.

• A longstanding pattern of cooperation rather than a temporary coalition. Stone (2005: 329)

• An agenda to address a distinct set of problems.

• A governing coalition formed around the agenda, typically including both governmental and nongovernmental members.

• Resources for the pursuit of the agenda, brought to bear by members of the governing coalition. • Given the absence of a system of command, a scheme of cooperation through which the members of the governing coalition align their contribution to the task of governing.

Another point of criticism on the concept of urban regime is that it does not incorporate non-local/developments, as the main focus is placed on the local level (Van Ostaaijen, 2010: 48). As illustrated by the ‘Policing European Metropolises Project’, policing functions are impacted by a wide variety of ‘multiple, intersecting and internal’ security fields (Devroe et al., 2017: 13). For example, metropolises in the United States are impacted by the local, state, national and global level (see Figure 1). These security fields ‘help to identify, characterize

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and explain significant divergences in policing strategy’ (Devroe et al., 2017: 13). First, the global level is the most abstract level that influences security priorities. This may be for example a dominant economic (e.g. neoliberalism or Marxism) or criminological paradigm (e.g. penal welfarism or penal populism) that is prevalent in the Western world. On the national level, the constitutional setting (e.g. federal or unitary state) and the national police system (e.g. historically diverse, territorially divided or unified national systems2_{) is likely to impact the security priorities within} a metropolis. The 50 states of the US also impact security priorities. This level is closely linked to the constitutional setting. For example, the state has the ability to fund decentralized entities. Also, the different states’ courts have the legal ability to influence security priorities (e.g. check if local law is in accordance with state law). Unexpectedly, the metropolitan level is the most important determinant of security priorities. Indicators that can be distinguished are the role of the mayor (e.g. weak vs. strong), discretion of the town council (e.g. low or high), demography (e.g. homogeneous or heterogeneous population), level of inequality (e.g. low or high) and crime statistics (e.g. most prominent crimes). These examples show the importance of the different security fields and its impact on security priorities within metropolises.

Figure 1 Security fields (Devroe et al., 2017)

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2.3 Urban regimes

The urban regime theory, as explained above, results in four distinctive types of urban regimes: the maintenance regime, the development regime, the middle class progressive regime and regimes devoted to lower class opportunity expansion. These types ‘vary in the difficulty of the governing tasks their policy agendas call for’ (Stone, 1993: 18). The regimes are based on the government structure, party system and national policy of the US. As a result, they cannot be used for cross-national comparison (Stone, 1993: 18). The first three regimes are often present in American cities. The underlying idea of the typology – and more broadly the urban regime theory – is that policy change is not only about capturing the elected office, but more the result of resource allocation (Stone, 1993: 18). Thus, the typology helps to identify which form an urban regime takes place. The following urban regime types can be identified:

• Maintenance regimes do not lead to a major policy change. This regime can be qualified as a status quo regime, as it does not try to change established social and economic realities (Van Ostaaijen, 2010: 30). As a result, no significant involvement of private actors is necessary because resources are allocated from the public sector. Practically, maintenance regimes are often prevalent in small geographical areas where the elected officials are often friends or family from each other.

• Development regimes are concentrated on policy change and are often related to change in land use. They tend to have a lot of private involvement and are often aimed at social and economic change (Stone, 1993: 19). A developmental regime does often lead to controversy and there is as little as possible public involvement. Also, the elites in a locality with a development regime are often very strong and responsible for the coordination with private actors.

• Middle class progressive regimes are focused on making a locality attractive for investments, not only by improving economic conditions, but also by environmental protection, historic preservation and affordable housing (Stone, 1993: 19; Van Ostaaijen, 2010: 30). Often the mandate in a progressive regime is aimed at monitoring the elite. Therefore, it needs broader support from both the private sector and citizens.

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• Regimes devoted to lower class opportunity expansion pay little attention to economic conditions; rather it aims to improve transportation, opportunities for business and home ownership, enriched education and job training (Stone, 1993: 12). It focuses on improving the lives of citizens, but is therefore also highly dependent on citizen involvement itself.

Figure 2 presents the different regimes’ citizen, private and elite involvement and focus on economics.

Figure 2 Level of focus in urban regimes Maintenance regimes

Development regimes

Middle class progressive regimes

Lower class opportunity expansion regimes

2.4 Security regimes

Building upon knowledge from policing dispositions (see Chapter 3) and urban regime types, it is possible to distinguish different security regimes that are present in metropolises. These security regimes help to identify and explain different security priorities within a metropolis; as opposed to the previous urban regime types that categorize a broader governance agenda. Based on the work of Devroe et al. (2017: 310), there are five distinct security regimes:

• Maintenance regimes are aimed at maintaining a, ever present, criminal justice policing disposition, despite severe criticism about its limitations (Garland, 1997; Devroe et al., 2017: 310). The main orientation in a maintenance regime is the offender, which is often already known to authorities. Little attention is paid to the victim (e.g. reconciliation) or the environment (e.g. improving surroundings to limit crime).

• Developmental regimes combine a strong focus on a criminal justice agenda with forms of risk management orientated towards known criminals, and it aims at reducing opportunities for victimization that are prevalent in certain

Elite involvement Citizen involvement High Low High Low Focus on economics Private involvement

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criminogenic environments (e.g. ‘at risk’ groups and prolific offenders) (Devroe et al., 2017: 310).

• Reformist regimes are characterized by a reformed criminal justice agenda where the emphasis is placed on reconciliation between offenders and victims without going through the criminal justice system (Devroe et al., 2017: 310).

• Transformative regimes contain a criminal justice agenda where the aim is a peripheral concern – as opposed to a core concern – with both social and restorative justice objectives. These objectives are aimed at ‘reducing crime and reordering public safety through policies oriented towards the environmental conditions that produce offending, victimization and civil unrest, in particular, gross social and economic inequalities and the exclusion of social groups from effective political participation’ (Devroe et al., 2017: 310).

• Failed regimes are characterized by a different set of rival policy agendas that undermine the stability of the governance regime.

Figure 3 presents a schematic overview of the level of focus in the four distinct security regimes.

Figure 3 Level of focus in security regimes Maintenance regimes

Developmental regimes

Reformist regimes Transformative regimes

2.5 Policing strategies: politics matter

To this point in this thesis, the power of politics has not been at the foreground of the debate on (security) urban regimes. Yet, politics and power play a crucial role in the formation and operating of security regimes. The ‘circuits of power’ framework of Clegg (1989) makes a distinction between three kinds of power that can be found in policing strategies: causal, dispositional and facilitative power (Devroe et al., 2017: 11). These forms of power always run in ‘circuits’ - like an electronic

Focus on criminal justice Risk management High Low High Low Offender orientated Environment focus

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power circuit. First, casual power of policing strategies is an overt form of power that concentrates on the micro level (such as elected mayors, ministers of interior and the chief police officers) (Clegg, 1989: 214). Causal powers are realized by ‘standing conditions’, ‘which policy actors necessarily inhabit and which enable or constrain their capacity to advance particular policing agendas’ (Devroe et al., 2017: 11). Standing conditions can be explained by the classical definition of what power entails: ‘A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do’ (Dahl, 1957: 202-203). According to Clegg (1989: 83) standing conditions exists when ‘A belief on the part of a B that an A would challenge any power attempt by B may well be sufficient reason for B not to try to exercise power against A with respect to some issue.’ These forms of informal power, in contrast to a more realistic version of power, are often present in security regimes where governance is arranged hierarchical. It is likely that standing conditions generate competitive tensions and interests within a particular security regime (Devroe et al., 2017: 216). Practical examples of standing conditions are constitutional-legal powers, financial and organizational resources, intelligence and data. Second, dispositional power (also called ‘social circuit of power’) “establishes the meaning of, and membership in, policing strategies oriented around ‘criminal justice’ agendas and/or those of ‘risk management’, ‘restorative justice’ or ‘social justice’ (…) policing dispositions’’ (Devroe et al., 2017: 14). This form of power is more covert and is the result of social relations. Lastly, facilitative power is the result of ‘the technologies of production and discipline, which can disrupt or help consolidate particular policing strategies’ (Devroe et al., 2017: 11). Examples of facilitative powers are mass migration, economic crises and technological innovations. In conclusion, the formal and informal powers that shape policy agendas show that politics of power matter. Especially, in policy plans, which will be the main focus of this thesis, there is often a lot of tension and covert political activity. When different parties have to unite and work together, circuits of power are at play.

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2.6 Problem situation

The theories discussed in this chapter all emphasize the importance of the sub-national level in analyzing governance arrangements. Also, in this thesis the metropolitan level of analysis will be placed central. Figure 4 presents a schematic overview of the theoretical foundation of this thesis, the ‘theoretical funnel’ (Devroe, 2016).

Figure 4 The thesis’ theoretical funnel

The theoretical funnel reads as follows. This thesis is based on the urban regime theory of Stone (1989). Based on this theory it is possible to distinguish different regime types that are dominant in U.S. metropolises. Most importantly for this thesis are security regimes in which the policing strategies and measures can be found. These policing strategies and measures are often put forward in policy plans by a coalition. This thesis analyses these policy plans in the context of metropolitan areas. A metropolitan area is ‘a formal local government area compromising the urban area as a whole and its primary commuter areas, typically found around a city with a large concentration of people (i.e., a population of at least 100,000)’ (Unicef, 2002). On the other hand, the United Nations argues that a metropolitan area should have a population of at least 500,000 (United Nations, 2016).

Researching metropolitan areas is important because they become increasingly essential in ‘the constitution of “global” security threats and policing responses’ (Devroe et al., 2017: 4). Because of the ‘glocalisation’ of the policing function, metropolises become a pivotal player in shaping public policy and become

Urban regime theory ↓

Urban regime types ↓

Security regime types ↓

Policy plans ↓ Metropolises

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an important focus in current comparative social research. As discussed, this thesis extends current research by examining if the urban regime theory of Stone (1989) is also applicable to other U.S. metropolises than Atlanta. Also, the ‘Policing European Metropolises Project’ shows that within the 22 European metropolises included in the research, risk management is the most predominant regime (for all regimes see Section 3.3). This thesis examines whether the focus on risk management is also the prevalent focus in the context of U.S. metropolises. Although I am aware, that this area is not yet studied (or included in the ‘Policing European Metropolises Project’), this may give clues for further comparative research between metropolises in Europe and the US. Furthermore, this thesis hypothesizes that security agendas in metropolises are (mainly) influenced by ‘circuits of power’. These informal (e.g. reasoning and pressure) and formal (e.g. elected mayors or the chief police officers) forms of power impact the security priorities as all actors within an urban regime try to enforce their own interests. Circuits of power will be ‘red line’ that guides this thesis.

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3 M

ETHODOLOGY

The methodology of this thesis will be presented in this chapter. This thesis uses a multiple holistic case study design to explain and compare the security priorities in New York City and Chicago, and link them back to the theoretical framework that is presented in the previous chapter. In Section 3.1 the research question and sub-questions are examined. Hereafter, the independent and dependent variables are operationalized (Section 3.2). The research design and methods are discussed in Section 3.3 and 3.4, respectively.

3.1 Research and sub-questions

As seen in the introduction, the following research question guides this thesis: To what extent is there convergence or divergence between the security agendas in New York City and Chicago, and how can this be explained?

This research question is explanatory, as it seeks an answer on how agenda setting - because of a specific process - comes about. The main research question seeks for processes of divergence and convergence and contains a comparative element. To answer the main research question, I distinguish seven sub-research questions (based on questions from the ‘Capstone’):

(1) Is there a regime that can be characterized as an urban regime? (2) What are the stated security priorities within the metropolises?

(3) How do the security priorities relate to the broader municipal agenda? (4) Is there convergence or divergence with the former plans?

(5) What dispositions can be identified by using the diagnostic toolbox? (6) On which security regime(s) are the security priorities based?

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The first sub-question asks Is there a regime that can be characterized as an urban regime? This question is based on the characteristics of an urban regime as explained by Stone (2005) and discussed in Chapter 2. To answer the main research question, it is necessary to identify if there is an urban regime in the first place. If not, there is no need to further investigate the security priorities. However, the pre-research phase of this thesis already identified that there is indeed an urban regime in both metropolises. The main security priorities can be found in the mayoral and policing plans within the metropolises. Thus, this question only concentrates on the existence of an urban regime, in later sub-questions the specific characteristics of a security regime will be examined.

The second sub-question is What are the stated security priorities within the metropolises? This is the most basic and fundamental question. To examine how security priorities can be explained, it is necessary to study what the stated priorities are within the security field. These may be explicit security priorities (e.g. stated goals) or more implicit (e.g. policing practices). Based on this question it is possible to further differentiate between policing and security goals. It may be for example that there are differences between the chief police officers and the mayor about the stated security priorities.

The third sub-question that supports the main research question is How do the security priorities relate to the broader municipal agenda? In contrary to all other sub-questions, this sub-question widens the initial scope of the main research. It is more analytical in the sense that it gives a richer view of how the security priorities fits in the broader urban regime. Security goals are often connected to other goals within an urban regime, such as social, economic and cultural goals. Thus, by identifying the characteristics of the broader urban regime, it may give insight in the emergence and explanation of the security goals.

The fourth sub-question states: Is there convergence or divergence with the former plans? As discussed, the mayoral and policing plans are the main focus of this thesis as they help to identify stated security priorities. As a result, this sub-question analyzes whether there is convergence between the current and former plans. Both the chief police officer and mayor are bound to a certain time that they are elected in office. Thus, it is likely that security priorities also change. Also, identifying the former plan gives insight into the continuation of an urban regime and how change in office may explain the current security priorities. The time frame that is used in

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this thesis is from 2007 to 2017. This is based on the last elected term of the former mayor and the elected term of the current mayor.

The fifth sub-question is What dispositions can be identified by using the diagnostic toolbox? This sub-question examines the security strategies as they are formulated in the policy plans and fits them within the theoretical toolbox that is based on different etiological criminological theories (Devroe et al., 2017). The toolbox categorizes different criminological clusters of etiological theories and forms an operationalization table that provides a frame to classify different strategies (stated measures).

Question six and seven build further upon the results of sub-question five. First, sub-question six asks: On which security regime(s) are the security priorities based? This sub-question examines, based on the different security regimes as discussed in Chapter 2, which security regime is prevalent in the two metropolises. This security regime gives insight into possible explanatory factors that explain convergence or divergence. Then, sub-question seven examines: Is their convergence or divergence between the cases? This sub-question examines whether the security regimes in New York City or Chicago shows elements of divergence or convergence.

Figure 1 gives a schematic overview of the research goals, research questions and cases. As illustrated in the overview, the first research goal is to identify the security priorities, corresponding research questions (1 to 3) for both case A (New York City) and case B (Chicago). The second research goal, explaining strategies linked to the stated security priorities, is connected to research question 4 to 6 and applies to both case A and B. Comparing case A and B, in research goal three, is associated with the concluding research question 7.

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Figure 1 Research goals, research questions and cases 3.2 Operationalization

In this section, the operationalization of the key concepts of this thesis will be discussed. With operationalization is meant ‘the translation of more or less abstract characteristics to observable phenomena that are related to the studied social system or phenomena within a specific place and time frame’ (Swanborn, 1981: 189, translated from Dutch). The research seeks for an explanation, based on empirical data, for both policy priorities in the broader security field and proposed strategies (measures) in the plan. Different explanatory context variables will be taken into account like the size of the metropolises, the police organization, the political constitutional setting and the influence of lobby groups and/or citizen participation on the agenda setting. As stipulated we assume that the ‘circuits of power’ are of most influence in convergence or divergence between the cases. In the next sections the concepts of urban regime and ‘circuits of power’ are operationalized.

Research goal 1: Identifying security priorities Sub-question 1 (Existence of an urban regime) Sub-question 2 (Stated security priorities) Sub-question 3 (Place within broader

urban regime)

Case A (New York City)

Research goal 2: Explaining security priorities Sub-question 4 (Convergence or divergence former regime) Case B (Chicago) Sub-question 5 (Main dispositions) Sub-question 6 (Security regime) Research goal 3: Comparing security priorities Sub-question 7 (Explanatory factors) Case A and B (New York City and

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3.2.1 Urban regime operationalization Based on the work of Stone (1989), there are four characteristics (variables) that explain the emergence of an (security) urban regime: an agenda of distinct problems, a governing coalition, resources and a scheme of cooperation. These characteristics help to assess whether there is a governance arrangement that can be characterized as an urban regime (sub-question 1). For each variable, I distinguished several indicators that empirically measure the existence of an urban regime (see Figure 2).

Figure 2 Urban regime operationalization overview

First, the agenda of distinct problems can be operationalized as the duration (e.g. ad-hoc or continuing), goals and aims (e.g. short or long term), solutions (e.g. many or few) and subjects (e.g. only security or also non-security issues) of a particular governance arrangement. Second, the governing coalition may explain the security priorities within an urban regime based on the group of participants (e.g. heterogeneity or homogeneity), community involvement (e.g. low or high) and the strength of the mayor (e.g. strong or weak). On the other hand, the level of resources that is available to execute the urban regime also explains which priorities Theoretical foundation Characteristics Indicators

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are set. Indicators that can be used are: allocation (e.g. which actor contributes what resources?), distribution (e.g. which actor gets what resources?) and the division between economic and non-economic resources (e.g. what are the main resources that are used?). Lastly, the scheme of cooperation is an important explanatory factor. Several indicators can be distinguished: formality of the arrangements (e.g. formal or informal), responsibilities (e.g. who bears which responsibility?) and layers of policy formulation (e.g. norms or procedures).

3.2.2 Circuits of power operationalization

The main hypothesis in this thesis is that ‘circuits of power’ explains how security regimes come about. As discussed, three circuits of power can be distinguished: causal, dispositional and facilitative power. Each circuit of power has its own set of indicators that identifies which form of power is at play. Figure 3 gives a schematic overview of these indicators based on the work of Clegg (1989).

Figure 3 Circuits of power operationalization overview

First, causal power can be identified by the specific public or private function that an actor has within a security regime (e.g. police chief officer, mayor, business leader or citizens’ advocator). Also, political party affiliation can be seen as an important form of causal power that impacts security regimes. Politicians act within a particular party’s discourse and ideology. It may be for example that within a party the main focus is on risk management or zero tolerance policing. It is likely that this predominant discourse also affects the behavior of individual party affiliates within a security regime. This is closely linked to the second circuit of power, dispositional power. An individual is not only impacted by the party’s dominant discourse but also by the dominant discourse within the security regime.

Circuits of power (Clegg, 1989) Causal power Dispositional power Facilitative power •Public/private role

•Political party affiliation • Dominant policing view • Etiological discourse • Policing technologies • Mass migration • Terrorist attacks

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This dominant view establishes the meaning of, and limits membership, regarding policing dispositions. Existing members of a security regime have the power to include or exclude new members. This (covert) dispositional power thus limits the membership of an urban regime. Also, the dominant etiological discourse (about crime) establishes the meaning of, and limits membership, regarding policing dispositions. Thus, I expect that dominant policing views and etiological discourses are the main indicators that identify and shape dispositional power within a security regime. Lastly, facilitative power within security regimes are likely to be impacted by policing technologies, flows of mass migration and terrorist attacks. These external processes impact security regimes and lead to often unpredictable and uncontrollable power.

3.2.3 Diagnostic toolbox operationalization

To answer research question five and six, the diagnostic toolbox of Devroe et al. (2017) is used (see Table 1).

Table 1 Diagnostic toolbox (source: Devroe et al., 2017)

Disposition

Rules of Meaning and Membership

Orientations Populations Objectives

Of fe nd er Vi cti m En vir on m en t Prim ary Se co nda ry Te rtia ry So cia l se rv ice Pu bl ic or de r Cr im e red uct io n Criminal Justice X X X X Restorative Justice X X X X X X Social Justice X X X X X X

Managing the Risks of Opportunities for Crime

& Disorder X X X X X X X

Managing the Risks of Offending Careers X X X X X X

The toolbox provides a classification - based on knowledge of etiological criminological theories - of proposed ‘strategies’ in policy plans, where the crosses refer to the results of 22 EU metropolises. The toolbox uses the idea of ‘dispositions’. This is ‘a type of power, more specifically, the “rules of meaning and membership” that organize social actors, admitting those willing and able to adhere to these rules into membership of the organization in question, whilst excluding

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those neither able nor willing to adhere to these rules’ (Devroe et al., 2017: 306). In other words, these dispositions give an actor the ability to either be included or excluded from a regime. This idea is based on the dispositional power of Clegg (1989) that was discussed in the previous section. If an actor does not adhere to the rules of meaning and membership, it will not be able to participate in a regime. Furthermore, the toolbox is based on two intellectual traditions. First, arguments in policing dispositions about the rules of meaning and membership are centered on orientations, populations and objectives (Devroe et al., 2017: 306). Second, the rules of meaning and membership are related to concepts of prevalent policing discourses (e.g. justice and risk management) in the US. These can be summarized as follows (Devroe et al., 2017: 306):

Rules of Meaning and Membership

• Orientations: the orientation of the different policing dispositions, classical and positivist criminological traditions are often offender orientated, while the victimology movement focuses on the victim and victimization. On the other hand, the Chicago school’s focuses on the environments within cities that generate problems of offending and victimization (Devroe et al., 2017: 306). • Populations: the target population can also lead to competing security

priorities. This category is based on the distinction in epidemiology and public health policy, between primary populations, entire population, secondary populations, a victimized or offending social group and tertiary populations, known victims and offenders (Devroe et al., 2017: 306).

• Objectives: policing dispositions can be further analyzed by the different objectives: to reduce crime, to maintain public order or to deliver social services. Metropolitan policing dispositions

• Criminal justice: metropolitan policing that is concentrated around ‘the enforcement of criminal law by supporting the prosecution and sanctioning of offences against this law’ (Devroe et al., 2017: 308). It thus only focuses on crimes that are already committed.

• Restorative justice: metropolitan policing that is concentrated on ‘the negotiation of reparations between offenders and victims and through a deliberate attempt to circumvent the criminal justice process, and can be considered as a means of diversion’ (Devroe et al., 2017: 308). Often

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non-state actors (e.g. churches or community mediators) are included in this process.

• Social justice: metropolitan policing that is concentrated on social and economic policies that tackle crime related issues. It concentrates on the roots of crime (aetiological), and believes that crime is the result of social or political exclusion (Devroe et al., 2017: 308).

• Managing the risks of opportunities of crime and disorder: metropolitan policing that ‘anticipates risks through such measures as reducing the situational opportunities for crime and prudential advice and inducements enabling citizens to take responsibility for reducing their own risk’ (Devroe et al., 2017: 308). This is a proactive form of policing and anti-aetiological.

• Managing the risk of criminal careers: metropolitan policing that is concentrated on early interventions aimed at preventing offending careers. Also, it focuses on desistance programs for prolific and priority offenders. As such, it is proactive and based on aetiological thinking (Devroe et al., 2017: 308). 3.3 Research design

The research design of this thesis is qualitative in nature, as the research aims at explaining stated security priorities and their proposed strategies in New York City and Chicago. A qualitative analysis is used because the analysis only consists of two cases, tries to understand relationships, and analyzes text and discourses; this is as opposed to quantitative analysis, where there are a lot of cases and observations, the aim is to prove relationships and concepts are concrete and measurable (Swanborn, 1981: 40). As this thesis tests and extends current theories (Stone, 1989; Clegg, 1989; Devroe et al., 2017) the main approach is deductive (also called theory-testing). As discussed, the knowledge gap that justifies this empirical research is to provide information on the application of Stone’s (1989) urban regime, based on data in Atlanta, to other American cities. On the other hand, this thesis extends current research of the ‘Policing European Metropolises Project’ that is based on 22 EU metropolises. This thesis does not try to generalize to all American cities. Rather, it aims to draw conclusions based on the uniqueness of the two cases. Also, as Stake (2000) points out, it is not an automatic process to generalize a strict defined research area to a wider research area. Neither is generalizability necessary when enough attention is paid to the uniqueness of a case (Stake, 2000; Devroe, 2012).

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This thesis will use a case study design. In general, a case study can be defined as ‘the in-depth investigation of one or more cases, for the contact with the “observable reality” of the real human being or a concrete situation’ (Swanborn, 1981: 61, translated from Dutch). More specifically, Yin (2009: 57-60) distinguishes four case study designs: a single embedded, a single holistic, a multiple embedded and a multiple holistic case study design. This thesis uses a multiple holistic case study as I include more than one case and the purpose is to compare the variability between two cases on one unit of analysis. By including two cases a process of replication can be used to test existing theories based on the findings of both cases (Yin, 2009: 60). Compared to single case studies, ‘the evidence from multiple cases is often considered more compelling, and the overall study is therefore regarded as being more robust’ (Yin, 2009: 53). Also, this aims of this thesis are closely linked to the characteristics of a case study: ‘the nature of the case, particularly its activity and functioning; its historical background; its physical setting; other contexts, such as economic, political, legal and aesthetic, other cases through which this case is recognized; and, those informants through whom the case can be known’ (Stake, 2002: 447). One of the advantages of a multiple holistic case study is that by analyzing different types of sources the data can be validated which gives a richer overview of the ‘whole’ researched subject (Devroe, 2012: 122). A potential pitfall of a multiple holistic case study is that ‘the nature of the case study may shift, unbeknownst to the researcher, during the course of study’ (Yin, 2009: 52). One could counter this pitfall by being aware that research questions or sub-questions change during the study – and change if necessary. Yet, a multiple holistic case study is the most appropriate research design for this thesis. Important to note is that the main focus is on the meaning, discourse and context of the security priorities. As a result, this thesis fits within the constructivist research tradition.

In a multiple holistic case study design the cases require to be chosen (Stake, 2002: 450). The two cases in this thesis, New York City and Chicago, can be classified as metropolitan areas as both cases have a population of more than 500,000. The cases are chosen based on a purposive sampling technique. The justification of the two cities in this study is based on a most different systems design (Yin, 2009). The crucial differences between New York City and Chicago are presented in Table 2. First, there are remarkable differences between New York City and Chicago with regard to population (8,406,000 vs. 2,719,00), ethnicity

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(White: 44.6% vs. 31.7%, Black: 25,1% vs. 32.4%, Hispanic: 27,5% vs. 28,9%, Asian: 11.8% vs. 5.4%), budget of the mayor ($77.7 vs. $7.84 billion), crime rates (2.14% vs. 3,92%), inequality rates (top 1%: $2,156,193 vs. $1,388,095, bottom 99%: $54,985 vs. $54,239) and police capacity (36,600 vs. 12,244). However, both cities have one crucial similarity: the political party affiliation of the mayor. Both mayors are affiliated with the Democratic Party. Based on Clegg’s (1989) theory, party affiliation is expected to be a significant determinant of convergence or divergence. Thus, this thesis uses a MDSD design to analyze whether party affiliation indeed leads to convergence – which would be expected based on Clegg (1989) – or leads to divergence – which I expect because both metropolises are so diverse.

Table 2 Most Different Case Study Design

Overall differences Case A: New York City Case B: Chicago

Population 8,406,000 2,719,000

Ethnicity: White, Black, Hispanic & Asian

44.6%, 25,1%, 27,5%, 11.8% 31,7%, 32,4%, 28,9%, 5.4%

Budget of the mayor $77.7 billion $7.84 billion

Crime rates: (murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, property crime, burglary, larceny and motor vehicle theft (combined, as % of population).

2.14% 3,92%

Inequality rates Average income top 1% Average income bottom 99%

$2,156,193 $54,985

$1,388,095 $54,239 Police capacity: police officers (data

from 2011)

36,600 12,244

Crucial similarity

Party affiliation of the mayor Democratic Party Democratic Party

(Source: Newsday, 2015; Economic Policy Institute, 2017; Neighborhood Scout 2017)

3.4 Methods: triangulation of methods

The methods that are used in this thesis combines (1) document analysis with (2) desk top research and (3) media analysis. The use of document analysis is justified for this thesis as it concentrates on the ‘stated’ security priorities. It analyzes what is written about security priorities and how they can be explained. The advantage of

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Vertical analysis: -Document analysis (OneNYC and NYPD’s Action Plan) -Desk top research

-Media analysis

Vertical analysis:

-Document analysis (Public safety

strategy plan and policing plan) -Desk top research

-Media analysis

Policing dispositions:

same methods as above

using document analysis is that it is unobtrusive and can be used without the help of participants and it offers a high degree of transparency (it is replicable) (Robson, 2002: 358). A disadvantage of document analysis is that the document’s purpose may be different that the research’s aims (Robson, 2002: 358). This may lead to a weakened internal validity, as it does not measure what one wants to measure. Therefore, also desk top research is used to analyze what else is written about the security priorities (triangulation). More specifically, the advantages of desk top research are that it is low in cost and easy to access. Also, the inclusion of secondary resources may give extra clarification of primary sources. Disadvantages are that information may be outdated, incomplete, biased or opinionated.

The first step in the document analysis was collecting and reading as much as available information regarding security priorities in both New York City and Chicago. For New York City, its security priorities are stated in seven important documents. First, in 2015, New York City’s current Mayor De Blasio announced his mayoral plan called ‘OneNYC’. This plan addresses all long-term challenges in the city and offers a vision of how New York City should look like in 2040. Second, the New York City Police Department’s (NYPD) ‘Plan of Action’ and five other policing plans also give a rich overview of the different security priorities within the city. For Chicago, the ‘comprehensive public safety strategy plan’ of current Mayor Emanuel outlines the main security priorities. In contrary to New York City, there have been a lot of press releases by the Mayor’s office regarding his plan. Therefore, press releases between 2012 and 2016 will also be used in the analysis of the security priorities. In Figure 4 a schematic overview of the research design and methods is presented.

Figure 4 Schematic overview of research design and methods

Concept ‘Security priorities’

Case A: New York

City

Case B: Chicago

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4 A

NALYSIS AND

R

ESULTS

Security priorities have to date received little attention within the context of U.S. metropolises. This chapter will present the analysis and results of New York City and Chicago. The analysis of New York City will be central in the first part of this chapter. More specifically, New York City’s security regime (Section 4.1), security priorities (Section 4.2) and measures (Section 4.3) will be examined. In section 4.4, New York City’s security dispositions will be analyzed by using the diagnostic toolbox of Devroe et al. (2017). In the second part of this chapter, Chicago’s urban regime (Section 4.5) and security priorities (Section 4.6) will be examined. Also, the security dispositions will be identified (Section 4.7) and analyzed (Section 4.8).

Part 1: New York City’s analysis and results

4.1 The security regime of New York City

Since the attacks of 9/11, security has been at the foreground of many political debates in New York City. While the effects of the 9/11 attacks are still visible, a lot of other issues surfaced. As this thesis focuses on security regimes and not on individual policies, it is important to identify if there is a set of policies that can be identified as an urban (security) regime. As such, this section gives an answer to sub-question 1: Is there a regime that can be characterized as an urban regime? As discussed in Chapter 2, a urban regime is characterized by: (1) ‘an agenda to address a distinct set of problems; (2) a governing coalition formed around the agenda typically including both governmental and nongovernmental members; (3) resources for the pursuit of the agenda, brought to bear by members of the governing coalition; and, (4) given the absence of a system of command a scheme of cooperation through which the members of the governing coalition align their contribution to the task of governing’ (Stone, 2005: 329). All four characteristics can be found in New York City’s security agenda.

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First, New York City’s security agenda addresses a distinct set of problems including tackling crime, bridging the police/community divide, keeping offenders out of the judicial system and improving victim services. Second, there are a wide variety of actors involved in the regime: the NYPD, the mayor, the Manhattan district attorney, public oversight bodies, social service agencies, private contractors, individual community members, community leaders (including faith leaders, mothers of murdered children, schools, ex-offenders, and others) and victim service organizations (NYPD, 2015; 2015a; 2015b; 2015c; 2015d). These actors work together to address complex security issues within the regime. Furthermore, these actors all bring in resources, whether this is in the form of financial, social, cultural, symbolic or technological resources3_{. Financially, the} regime is funded by the NYPD, Mayor De Blasio and Manhattan District attorney Cyrus Vance (NYPD, 2015: 9). Lastly, the regime has a scheme of cooperation which outlines the responsibilities of the individual actors. For instance, there are different neighborhood-focused work groups where the NYPD and community actors work together to include communities ‘in how they are policed’ (NYPD, 2015: 4, 15). Based on Stone’s (1989) four characteristics of what an urban regime entails, the security agenda in New York City can thus be classified as an urban security regime.

4.2 New York City’s security priorities

The first part of this analysis gives an answer to sub-question 2: What are the stated security priorities within the metropolis? It examines the key security priorities that are stated in the mayoral plan ‘One New York: The Plan for a Strong and Just City’ (OneNYC). Thereafter, the key security priorities and dispositions (measures) will be analyzed by examining five policing reports. These reports are a coproduction of Mayor De Blasio and Police Commissioner of New York City Bratton. The last report that will be examined is the ‘NYPD Action Plan’ that is published by the NYPD.

3_{I am aware that in his initial work Stone (1989) only focused on financial resources. However, bringing in}

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4.2.1 Security priorities in ‘OneNYC’ The first set of security priorities can be found in the mayoral plan of De Blasio ‘OneNYC’ that was published in 2015. In New York City, under Local Law 84 (2013), every mayor is obligated to publish it long-term vision on issues governing the city. The plan ‘envisions how the physical city should be shaped to address a range of social, economic, and environmental issues while building on New York City’s strengths’ (De Blasio, 2015). The mayor’s office of Sustainability shares the responsibility of implementation with the mayor’s office of Recovery and Resiliency (De Blasio, 2015). An annual progress report is published at the end of each year. The security priorities are stated in the second section ‘Our Just and Equitable City’. De Blasio’s goal is to ‘continue to be the safest, and will have the lowest rate of incarceration, with a criminal justice system that leads the nation in fairness and efficiency’ (De Blasio, 2015: 150). There are four initiatives that reflect the security priorities within the plan.

The first initiative aims to ‘reduce crime and unnecessary incarceration’ (De Blasio, 2015: 150-1). Crime should be reduced and jail population lowered by tackling crime before it begins. According to the plan, this will lead to less overpopulated prisons and less crime. To further lower the jail population, the initiative focuses on bringing back the unnecessary incarceration rate. The second initiative intents to ‘build sustained neighborhood engagement to employ fairness as a crime reduction tool’ (De Blasio, 2015: 153). New York City’s poorest neighborhoods are disproportionately affected by crime and violence. Also, the confidence in the government is the low in these neighborhoods. Therefore, this initiative focuses on building sustained neighborhood engagement because citizens ‘are more likely to obey the law when they believe those who are enforcing it have the legitimate authority to do so’ (De Blasio, 2015: 153). The aim is to bring back trust in the neighborhoods where crime and violence rates are the highest. The third initiative aims to ‘use criminal justice data-driven strategies to improve decision making and reduce crime and unnecessary incarceration’ (De Blasio, 2015: 154). According to the plan reducing crime is only possible – in today’s world – when the whole criminal justice system can use the most advanced data-driven strategies and technologies. According to the plan, it both enhances better decision making and leads to more effective policing. The fourth and last initiative aims to ‘ensure all victims of domestic violence have access to a shelter and necessary services’ (De Blasio, 2015: 154). Domestic violence is one of the biggest problems in

Power, politics and security regimes: A comparative analysis of policing in New York City and Chicago

Christiaan Mulder, BSc