'The Standard of the Caliphate Flutters High...': On Rebel Governance and the Islamic State’s Politics of Legitimacy between June 2014 and July 2015

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‘The Standard of the Caliphate Flutters High…’

On Rebel Governance and the Islamic State’s Politics of Legitimacy

between June 2014 and July 2015

History of International Relations Master Thesis

David Siemen Leenstra 12910465

Supervisor: Dr. Samuël Kruizinga Wordcount: 19.450

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Abstract

In this thesis, I formulate an answer to the question of how the Islamic State represented itself as legitimate ruler in its Western-oriented propaganda outlet between June 2014 and July 2015. As such, this thesis is a contribution to the expanding body of literature on the meaning-generating practices of arguably the most influential non-state actor in the Middle East during the past decade. Building on theoretical insights from literature on rebel governance and legitimacy, I argue that in order to substantiate its claim to legitimate rule, the Islamic State represents a wide range of symbolic, bureaucratic and violent elements of governance strategies in its body of propaganda. The main findings indicate that Islamic State propaganda invokes a set of historical narratives and myths that give meaning to the organization’s contemporary actions. The caliphate is recurrently put on display as a safe state for all Muslims, where safety and prosperity are guaranteed through the proficient rule of the Islamic State. The self-representation of the caliphate as a viable nation-state alternative that is capable of successfully organizing and governing all layers and dimensions of society forms an under-researched, but essential part of the Islamic State’s politics of legitimacy.

Keywords: Islamic State, Rebel Governance, Legitimacy, Propaganda, Dabiq, AlHayat

Media Center

‘Islamic State territorial gains and losses in 2015’

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1_{Information Handling Services, ‘IHS Conflict Monitor 2015’.jpeg Retrieved from: Foreign Policy:}

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Cover image: Still from AlHayat Media Center, ‘Mujatweets 7’ (July 2014) mp4, 01.06 min. Title: Quote John Cantlie in HMC, ‘Inside Halab’ (February 2015) 05.35-05.42 min.

Glossary

AlHayat Life.

Al-wala a’ wa-l-bara a’ Expression referring to ‘loyalty and disavowal’, to love and

hate for Allah’s sake.

Bay’a(h) An oath of allegiance to a leader.

Dinar Newly minted gold coin in the IS monetary system.

Dirham & Fulus Newly minted silver & copper coins in the IS monetary system.

Fahisha Sexual indecency.

Hadd/Hudud Arabic word meaning borders, boundaries, limits. In Islam, it refers to punishments under Islamic law (sharia). under Islamic law (shariah) are mandated and fixed by God.

Ḥadīth Literally means "talk" or "discourse") in Islam refers to what Muslims believe to be a record of the words, actions, and the silent approval of the prophet Muhammad.

Hajj/Hijrah One of the five pillars of Islam: the pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina.

Hakimiyya God’s sovereignty in the political system.

Halab Aleppo.

Jihad Struggle or exerting effort.

Jizyah A tax for non-Muslims.

Kuff’r Disbelievers.

Mujahid Someone who fights in support of Islam.

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Sunnah Refers to the traditions and practices of the

prophet Muhammad, that constitute a model for Muslims to follow.

Takfir The excommunication of other Muslims, banishing them from the faith.

Tawhid the unitary oneness of God.

Ummah Unity of the Islamic World.

Wilayat Province.

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Introduction

At the end of 2013, a militia known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) suddenly became one of the most urgent security concerns of the international community. After rapidly defeating large parts of the Syrian and Iraqi armies, the insurgency controlled roughly a third of the Iraqi and Syrian territories; an area as large as the United Kingdom.2 On June 28th 2014, ISIS – later abbreviated to Islamic State (IS) – declared their conquered territories a caliphate: an Islamic state governed by a Muslim ruler, where Sharia law applies. The rise of the Islamic State in the Middle East was characterized by the adoption of brutal forms of violence against both military opponents and civilian populations. Simultaneously, the organization successfully coordinated terror attacks in Western countries and inspired many so-called lone wolves to commit them. A recent research mapping Islamist terrorism indicates that between 2006 and 2017, the Islamic State and affiliated organizations claimed responsibility for 8.185 terror attacks worldwide, resulting in an approximate of 52.619 casualties.3

Although since late 2019 the movement had lost control of nearly all its territories, the aftermath of five years of its dominant presence in the Middle East is still clearly visible in global politics. For many Asian, European, African and American governments, terrorism inspired by the Islamic State remains the most significant security threat. During its heydays between 2013 and 2016, the organization was capable of mobilizing thousands of young adults to trade their lives in Western countries for seemingly promising futures within the caliphate’s borders. This reflects one of the main differences with many existing terrorist groups, such as its predecessor Al Qaeda: the Islamic State functioned as quasi-state with a sophisticated organizational structure and a certain capacity to govern. While hundreds of journalists and analysts worldwide are interpreting the actions and ideological traits of the movement, accounts depicting the life inside the caliphate are rare and their accuracy remains questionable. At this moment in time, an increasing amount of evidence relating to the organizational structure of the Islamic State is becoming available. The best example is the collection of over fifteen thousand bureaucratic documents that was collected by New York Times journalist Rukmini Callimachi during her work on the frontline in the fight against IS. This collection is currently being digitized for research purposes by the George Washington University.4 Until such

2_{F.A. Gerges, ISIS: A History (Princeton 2016) 226.}

3_{Fondation pour l’innovation politique, ‘Islamist Attacks in the World 1979-2019’ (Paris 2019) 31.} 4_{Rukmini Callimachi, ‘The IS Files’, The New York Times (4 April 2018).}

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material becomes publicly accessible, the majority of researchers seeking to understand the actions and functioning of the IS is bound to first-hand experiences of (former) Islamic State inhabitants, testimonies from defected fighters and digital open-source information. In relation to the latter, a great amount of scholarly literature is devoted to studying the communicative efforts of the organization. After all, the terrorist group is infamous for its well-organized propaganda machine whose productions were characterized by their professional appearance. Islamic State propaganda is notorious for its brutal and graphic, but neatly edited execution videos, which rapidly diffused into Western societies by means of both traditional media outlets and decentralized media channels such as Twitter.

With this thesis, I seek to contribute to the history of the Islamic State by providing a qualitative account of the movement’s representation of reality within the borders of its self-proclaimed caliphate. More specifically, I zoom in on the Western-oriented part of IS propaganda to establish an image of the organization’s representation of the self as viable and just nation-state alternative. Hence, in this answer I formulate an answer to the following main question: how did the Islamic State represent its self-proclaimed caliphate as a legitimate state through its Western-oriented propaganda outlet between June 2014 and July 2015?

To answer this question, I draw upon insights from literature on rebel movements. I aim to contribute to existing research on Islamic State propaganda in several ways. First, the positioning Islamic State propaganda within a rebel governance framework allows for an analysis that seeks justification politics beyond religious ideology. As such, I reject the reductionist, but popular conception that considers Islam to be the movement’s sole source of legitimacy. While it is undisputed that the organization derives its image as legitimate ruler from Islamist interpretations and Quranic references, religion-centered approaches explaining the actions of the movement seemingly have diverted attention from important non-Islamist components of the material, which consequently have remained under-researched. Second, the body of literature on rebel governance is primarily occupied with the ways in which statehood is performed and rule is legitimized within the territory that is under rebel rule. Relatively little has been written about the ways in which representations of governance have been employed by rebelling organizations to justify their actions for audiences residing outside their area of control. With this work, I seek to contribute to rebel movement literature by determining how an insurgent ruler projects an image of legitimate rule towards non-inhabitants of the governed territory.

The first chapter is primarily conceptual in nature. After providing a historiographic account of research on Islamic State and IS propaganda, I proceed to identify six gaps within

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this body of literature. Hereafter, I formulate the main question of thesis covers these underexplored dimensions. In the second paragraph, I discuss the methodological foundations underpinning this research. I present a conceptual framework that discusses notions of rebel governance and legitimacy. Three dimensions of rebel rule are identified: symbolism, civil administration and coercion. The analysis is structured along these three core components. I conclude the chapter by elaborating on the operationalization of this analytic frame and by addressing several limitations of my approach. The second and third chapter form the core of the analysis. The second chapter establishes an image of the symbolic aspects of Islamic State governance, while the third chapter focuses on how the two remaining dimensions of rebel rule are represented: bureaucratic affairs and the adoption of violent means. In the conclusion, finally, I reflect on my principal findings and formulate an answer to the main question.

On a critical note, it may be evident that the examination of these sources is neither exhaustive nor complete. My primary aim in this thesis is determining how different elements of rebel governance are reflected. Hence, the three dimensions of rebel rule that are identified function as the starting point of this analysis. They were operationalized by identifying their main characteristics based on rebel governance studies. With these characteristics in mind, I proceeded to systematically read and view the primary source material. Positioning the propaganda within literature on governance and legitimacy helped me to identify under-researched components of the material. This also means that excerpts from the sources were selected based on what I deemed most significant or representative to illustrate the claims that I make in this thesis. The focus is on the supply-side of propaganda, on the appeals and meanings that are made within this material and the ways in which life within the Islamic State is depicted. This means that I analyze the messages and storylines that are conveyed, not how they are interpreted or received by their audiences. It tells little about the extent to which the organization ran a functioning government or about the actual degree of legitimacy it enjoyed under local populations or among the Western audiences it targeted. Furthermore, it is important to remark that I neither seek to account for radicalization nor for motivations of young Western individuals to migrate to Syria or Iraq or to conduct domestic terrorism. Radicalization is a complex psychological process that is influenced by a large set of variables. The outcome or effectivity of this process depends on a broad set of push and pull factors, local contexts, individual beliefs and assumptions that all vary widely from country to country and from individual to individual. However, while there is agreement among terrorism specialists that jihadist propaganda itself does not explain radicalization, there is general agreement that

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it plays an essential part.5_{A qualitative exploration of Islamic State propaganda may help to} better understand the organization’s appeal.

Chapter 1: Defining the Scope

1.1 Historiography

The rise of the Islamic State from 2013 onwards paved the way for many journalists, think tanks and scholars worldwide to explain the movement’s successes, its military strategies and many other dimensions. Academic research on the movement has been written from the perspectives of a broad array of disciplines, ranging from political and social sciences to linguistics and Islam studies. To demonstrate the relevance of my thesis, it is essential to embed my study within this broad body of literature. I aim to do so, by providing an overview of existing research on Islamic State and more specifically: its propaganda output. I commence with a brief discussion of prominent general works on the terrorist group and proceed with an elaborate outline of existing research on IS propaganda. This historiography exhibits what is currently known and – more importantly – not known about IS propaganda. I identify six under-researched dimensions relating to IS and its communicative output that deserve increased scholarly attention. The main question that I formulate at the end of this paragraph flows from these gaps in existing research.

1.1.1 Exploring the field: Propaganda and the Islamic State

A significant amount of popular works on IS attempted to offer holistic accounts of the movement, for example by describing the movement’s history, its ideology and terrorist characteristics. Weiss and Hassan’s ISIS: Inside the army of terror provides a solid account of the movement, departing from the question where the organization originated and how it could succeed in inflicting the amount of damage it did. Their book traces back the origin of the movement to its ‘founding father’ Al-Zarqawi, its relationship with Al Qaeda and provides profiles of jihadis and foreign fighters.6 A similar broad overview of the organization’s origins can be found in Gerges’ ISIS: A History. His popular-scientific work covers the rise of IS from a more structural perspective, paying particular attention to the pre-conditions in the Middle

5_{S. Cottee and J. Cunliffe, ‘Watching ISIS: How Young Adults Engage with Official}

English-Language ISIS Videos’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 43:3 (2020) 183-207, 186.

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East that enabled the organization’s rapid surge. The author defines the blend of weakened state institutions due to the Arab Spring, the ethnically and politically divided society in Iraq and the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011 as facilitating conditions that allowed IS to become a dominant power in the Middle East.7 Gerges also provides details on the most important ideological traits of the Islamic State, characterizing its worldview as Salafi-Jihadist. In academia and beyond, the positioning of the Islamic State’s ideology in the Salafi-Jihadist tradition is generally agreed upon and it has been thoroughly studied by scholars as Maher and Turner.8 The significance and range of the jihadist ideology, its history and its global appeal have been examined by Brachman, Khosrokhavar, Roy and many others.9

From 2011 onwards, the Islamic State successfully reached tens of thousands of young adults, convincing them to leave their homes behind and seek refuge within the borders of the self-proclaimed Islamic State. It is unsurprising that the movement’s communicative efforts have become a main topic in academic research. Many researchers seek to contribute to solving the larger puzzle of how the organization could succeed in attracting over thirty thousand foreign fighters – and thousands of non-fighters and women – from over a hundred countries.10 The global online mobilization strategy of the organization has received much scholarly attention, for example in Atwan’s technological analysis of the ‘digital caliphate’.11_Similarly, in Weimann's contribution to Foreign Fighters under International Law and Beyond, he uncovers the digital recruitment strategy of the Islamic State, illustrating the complex and sophisticated character of the organization’s online efforts to mobilize collective action.12_The social media networks of Western foreign fighters that played an essential part in this process have been analyzed in great detail by Klausen, who maps the Twitter networks are used to recruit members and to ‘build a transnational community of violent extremism.13 Al-Rawi and Groshek, for their part, paid attention to the technicalities of the ways in which IS has promoted

7_{Gerges, ISIS, 17.}

8_{J. Turner, Religious ideology and the roots of the global Jihad: Salafi Jihadism and international}

order (New York 2014).; S. Maher, Salafi-Jihadism: The history of an idea (Oxford 2016).

9_{F. Khosrokhavar, Inside jihadism: understanding jihadi movements worldwide. (Abingdon 2015).;}

J.M. Brachman, Global jihadism: Theory and practice (Abingdon 2009); O. Roy, Jihad and death: The

global appeal of Islamic State (Oxford 2017).

10_{E. Bakker and M. Singleton ‘Foreign fighters in the Syria and Iraq conflict: Statistics and}

characteristics of a rapidly growing phenomenon’ in: A. De Guttry, A. Capone and C. Paulussen eds.,

Foreign Fighters under International Law and Beyond (The Hague 2016) 9-26, 16.

11_{A.B. Atwan, Islamic State: The Digital Caliphate (Oakland 2015).}

12_{G. Weimann, ‘The emerging role of social media in the recruitment of foreign fighters’ in: A. De}

Guttry, A. Capone and C. Paulussen eds., Foreign Fighters under International Law and Beyond (The Hague 2016) 75-96.

13_{J. Klausen, ‘Tweeting the Jihad: Social Media Networks of Western Foreign Fighters in Syria and}

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itself via Twitter, providing a quantitative analysis of how propaganda disseminated based on a dataset of over 46 million tweets.14

In addition to studies mapping the networks and dissemination of jihadi propaganda, many scholars devoted their time plowing through its concrete contents. Like the rest of the organization’s bureaucracy, the Islamic State media department became increasingly professionalized and was most active between 2014 and 2016. During these years, IS produced thousands of unique pieces of propaganda material, which rapidly disseminated into different societies across the world.15 The body of Islamic State propaganda consists of hundreds of hours of video material produced by a variety of media affiliations and multiple thousands of pages of text found in a wide array of magazines, guides, books and so on.16 Different analysts have studied the organizational structure of the propaganda bureaucracy that was responsible for these efforts. Both Charlie Winter and Daniel Milton identified six sub-divisions working for the Islamic State’s ‘Ministry of Media’ with their own regional foci.17 Alongside these, dozens of regional bureaus were located in at least nine countries throughout the Middle East and North Africa.18 Since I am concerned with analyzing the ways in which life within the Islamic State was represented towards Western audiences, I exclusively pay attention to productions of the AlHayat Media Center (HMC) – the media branch that was primarily occupied with targeting populations in the West. Specifically, I focus on the English version of the online magazine Dabiq and a selection of fifteen HMC video productions that appeared between 2014 and 2015. During this timeframe, twelve of the fifteen issues of Dabiq were released and a several dozens of videos appeared online. The material can easily be accessed via The Internet Archive, a non-profit archive which seeks to build a ‘digital library of Internet sites and other cultural artifacts in digital form.’19

It is important to understand that the HMC productions formed a small part of the IS propaganda corpus. In fact, during a typical week in April 2015, nearly eighty percent of the propaganda outlet consisted of messages produced by regional offices and only fifteen percent

14_A._{Al-Rawi and J. Groshek, ‘Jihadist Propaganda on Social Media: An Examination of ISIS Related}

Content on Twitter’ in: Cyber Warfare and Terrorism: Concepts, Methodologies, Tools, and

Applications (Pennsylvania 2020).

15_{D. Milton, ‘Communication breakdown: Unraveling the Islamic States media efforts’, US Military}

Academy-Combating Terrorism Center (West Point 2016) 21.

16_{Milton, ‘Communication Breakdown’, 21.}

17_{Ibid., 13; C. Winter, ‘’The Virtual Caliphate’: Understanding Islamic State's Propaganda Strategy}

Vol. 25, Quilliam Foundation (London 2015) 14.

18_{Winter, ’The Virtual Caliphate’, 13.}

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of the material appeared in a non-Arabic language, of which six percent in English.20_During the same week, only two of the 123 propaganda messages were produced by HMC.21_While these figures highly vary from week to week and tell us little about the influence, quality and reach of the material, these numbers do illustrate the size and capacity of the Islamic State’s communicative efforts. The professional and institutionalized character of the propaganda outlet indicates that the quest for legitimacy was taken rather seriously. This is further illustrated by a Washington Post article based on interviews with multiple (former) IS adherents in a Moroccan prison.22 Surely, the liability of these accounts remains questionable, but different defectors confirm an image of the IS leadership’s – almost obsessive – occupation with recording and reporting on all of its actions. According to the interviewees, senior media personnel were on the same hierarchical level as military commanders and received seven times the salary of regular soldiers.23

The media department which was responsible for the production of Dabiq consisted of an approximate of one hundred individuals who allegedly worked from a central editorial office near Aleppo.24 The e-magazine was published fifteen times between July 2014 and August 2016. Its length ranges from forty to hundred pages per edition. Its writers state that ‘the mission of HMC is to convey the message of the Islamic State in different languages with the aim of unifying the Muslims under one flag.’25_{In its first edition, published roughly a week} after the caliphate was established, the authors state that the magazine’s mission is to cover the themes tawhid, manhaj, hijrah, jihad and jama'ah, which respectively refer to monotheism, truth-seeking, emigration, holy war and brotherhood among believers.26 Its content is characterized by its strong emphasis on religion, illustrated by numerous references to Islamic writings from the Quran or Hadith and interpretations of these texts by traditional and contemporary Islamic scholars. At the same time, the authors state to provide readers with informative articles and photo reports related to Islamic State matters.27

Dabiq magazine forms a central unit of analysis in scholarly literature on Islamic State propaganda. Tim Jacoby, for example, studied how Quranic writings were presented in the

20_{Zelin, ’Picture or It Didn’t Happen’, 85.} 21_{Ibid. 89.}

22_{G. Miller and S. Mekhennet, ‘Inside the surreal world of the Islamic State propaganda machine’,}

Washington Post (20 November 2015).

23_Ibid. 24_Ibid.

25_{AlHayat Media Center, ‘Dabiq 2: The Flood’ (27 July 2014) 43.}

26_{AlHayat Media Center, ‘Dabiq 1: The Return of the Khilafah’ (5 July 2014) 3.} 27_Ibid.

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magazine, laying bare the selective and one-sided character of their interpretations.28_{In a} similar study on the magazine, Kasan Ubayasiri found that the Islamic State legitimized its existence and its actions by constantly making appeals to the indisputability of Islamic scriptures.29 This image is again endorsed by Mahood and Rane, whose study focuses on the position of Islamism in the magazine. They determine that a range of Islamist narratives and imageries are employed in the magazine in order to construct and molt us-them oppositions between potential adherents and opponents of the Islamic State. Their study finds several master narratives that frequently reappear in the magazine, the most important ones being the reference to Western states or individuals as ‘crusaders’, the adoption of the Islamic concept of ‘jahiliyya’ which refers to non-believers’ state of ignorance, and the ‘hypocrite’ narrative to refer to Muslims who allegedly do not practice Islam the correct way.30 They consider these narratives as powerful tools, because ‘they give [ISIS’] propaganda a degree of legitimacy reinforced by the historical experiences of Islam.’31 Axel Heck comes to a similar conclusion, arguing that IS uses Dabiq to construct a collective identity that is built upon three narratives: the caliphate was found to protect Muslims from Western oppression, IS’s religious interpretation is superior to all others and subsequently, this interpretation needs to be spread across the entire globe.32

Whereas the aforementioned studies are primarily qualitative in nature and focus on the content of the propaganda material and its relationship to Islam, Haroro Ingram takes a more quantitative and conceptual approach. He categorizes Dabiq’s narratives into three functions: value-, dichotomy- and crisis-reinforcing. These narratives arguably serve to offer the reader a competitive system of meaning and they contribute to the construction of in- and outgroups.33 As such, Ingram states, ‘the authors of Dabiq seek to maximise the resonance of its message through a litany of closely interconnected macro- and micro-level levers.’34 While this is an interesting theoretical insight, it raises the question whether Ingram’s belief that this strategy is deliberately pursued is a correct one. As such, the flip side of the author’s quantitative and

28_{T. Jacoby, ‘Islam and the Islamic State's Magazine, Dabiq’, Politics and Religion 12:1 (2019) 32-54.} 29_{K. Ubayasiri, ‘Islamic State’s quest for legitimacy: An analysis of IS media frames in Dabiq}

magazine’, Media, War & Conflict 0:0 (2019) 1-17.

30_{S. Mahood, S. and H. Rane, ‘Islamist narratives in IS recruitment propaganda’, The Journal of}

International Communication 23:1 (2017) 15-35, 24-25.

31_{Ibid., 31.}

32_{A. Heck, ‘Images, visions and narrative identity formation of ISIS’, Global Discourse 7:2-3 (2017)}

244-259, 246.

33_{H.J. Ingram, ‘An analysis of Islamic State’s Dabiq magazine’, Australian Journal of Political}

Science, 51:3 (2016) 458-477, 474.

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theoretical analysis is that the different functions he attributes to IS propaganda and the intentions of the content creators are highly difficult to prove. How the magazine’s messages are interpreted by its readers therefore evidently remains a topic of debate. Another important aspect of the Dabiq is its non-textual dimension. In this regard, Shahira Fahmy provides an analysis of the dominant visual themes found in magazine. She determines that war, utopianism and brutality form the magazine’s three main pillars, respectively representing 53, 24 and 14 percent of the depicted imageries.35 Since visual material has proven to be an often-overlooked component, Fahmy’s research is a valuable one. However, a more qualitative exploration of the magazine’s visual contents would be a great addition to her primarily quantitative account.

Compared to scholarly attention for Dabiq, the amount of literature on AlHayat video and audiovisual productions is relatively small. This body mainly include thematic analyses, such as MacNair and Frank’s research on a set of different HMC film productions. They distinguish seven returning themes that characterize the contents of the different films, which are professional appearance and legitimacy, the image of comradery and inclusivity, physical violence, strength and victory, victimization, recruitment and personal fulfillment.36 The authors find that IS depicts life in the Islamic State as spiritually and existentially fulfilling, while at the same time life in the West is portrayed as secular and immoral.37_{Claudia Àlvares} focuses on both the visual and discursive strategies that IS has employed and establishes an account of how strong us-them dichotomies are forged between the Ummah – the Muslim community – on the one hand and non-believers on the other. She finds that the use of emotions such as anger and outrage is an essential component that helps to reinforce the credibility of the presented narratives.38 Based on their analysis of 62 execution videos, Barr and Herfroy-Mischler suggest that these films contributed to strengthening the Islamic State’s image as a legitimate religious and political authority.From a social psychological perspective, Venkatesh et al. conducted a comparative analysis studying eight execution videos. They found how

35_{S.S. Fahmy, ‘The age of terrorism media: The visual narratives of the Islamic State Group's Dabiq}

magazine’, International Communication Gazette 0:0 (2019) 1-29, 18.

36_{L. Macnair and R. Frank, ‘“To My Brothers in the West...”: A Thematic Analysis of Videos}

Produced by the Islamic State’s AlHayat Media Center’, Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 33:3 (2017) 234-253, 250-51.

37_{Ibid., 246.}

38_{C. Álvares. ‘Mediatising the radical: the implied audience in Islamic State propaganda videos’ in:}

Digitale Medien und politisch-weltanschaulicher Extremismus im Jugendalter: Erkenntnisse aus Wissenschaft und Praxis (2017) 39-58, 52.

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depictions of extreme violence by the Islamic State closely resemble techniques that are used in Hollywood blockbusters.39

Taken together, these works provide a solid foundation to understanding IS’s strategic use of propaganda aimed at the West. However, several dimensions of the material have remained overlooked and deserve further inquiry. First, most of the scholarly research focuses on the textual components of Dabiq, while Zelin found that visual material made up almost ninety percent of the contents.40 Increased attention for Dabiq’s visual elements would help to develop a more holistic image of IS communication. I aim to so, while at the same time I seek to expand the analysis of visual sources beyond Dabiq’s contents by integrating video material as well. Second, existing research on AlHayat video productions primarily consists of broad thematic explorations that particularly pay attention to execution videos, while in fact a small share of the propaganda material has been devoted to depicting violence.41 Third, IS propaganda depart from either quantitative or conceptual approaches. Readers would benefit from a qualitative, source-centered analysis to better understand the narratives and representations of reality that are communicated. Fourth, thematically, research on Dabiq generally remains limited to studying the representation of Islamic texts, approaching the material from a religious or ideology-centered perspective. While I also consider ideology to be an important corner stone, I take a stronger interest in the ways in which ideological components are employed to legitimize the organization’s behavior. Fifth and foremost, little attention is paid to both the representation of the rebel-civilian relationship and to everyday life within the Islamic State borders. The ways in which Islamic State governance and civilian life are represented in the material – both in Dabiq and AlHayat video productions – have remained under-researched, while these elements make up an essential part of IS propaganda. Sixth, while existing accounts do consider propaganda as a tool to enhance legitimacy, no scholar explicitly positions the material in a wider discussion on legitimation processes of non-state violent groups. Since justification and legitimization form core functions of propaganda, analyzing IS communication through a lens of rebel legitimization practices may help to understand some of the choices of IS content creators. Hence, aiming to provide better insight

39_{V. Venkatesh, J.S. Podoshen, J. Wallin, J. Rabah, and D. Glass, ‘Promoting extreme violence: visual}

and narrative analysis of select ultraviolent terror propaganda videos produced by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2015 and 2016’, Terrorism and Political Violence (2018) 1-23.

40_{A.Y. Zelin, ’Picture or It Didn’t Happen: A Snapshot of the Islamic State’s Official Media}

Output’, Perspectives on Terrorism, 9:4 (2015) 85-97, 85.

41_{E.g. D. Milton, ‘Communication breakdown: Unraveling the Islamic States media efforts’, US}

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into these under-researched dimensions of IS propaganda contribution, I formulate an answer to the following main question:

how did the Islamic State represent its self-proclaimed caliphate as a legitimate state through its Western-oriented propaganda outlet between June 2014 and July 2015?

To answer this question, I draw upon theoretical insights from existing literature on rebel movements. In addition to providing a new perspective in methodological terms, I hope to shed new light on two underexplored elements of Islamic State propaganda: representations of statehood and civilian life inside the caliphate.

1.2 Methodological framework

In order to operationalize the main question formulated above, research on rebel groups provides useful insights. In the first paragraph, I provide a definition of legitimacy and unpack the concept by identifying the ways in which rebel groups legitimize themselves. After establishing the importance of governance activities within the repertoires of legitimization for non-state armed actors, I elaborate on the ruling practices of rebel groups by distinguishing three dimensions of rebel governance: bureaucratic affairs and public services, symbolic repertoires and coercion. In the chapters that follow, I provide an analysis of IS propaganda using the rebel governance and legitimacy framework as theoretical lens.

1.2.1 Rebel legitimacy

One of the driving questions behind this study is posed by Isabelle Duyvesteyn in her introductory chapter of the double special issue of Small Wars & Insurgencies on the interplay between rebel governance and legitimacy, namely: ‘how do non-state actors, some of them violent or with a violent past, legitimize themselves?’42 In her quest to answering this question, she adopts Barker’s 2011 definition of legitimacy as a process, namely as ‘an action or series of actions – speech, writing, ritual, display – whereby people justify to themselves or others the actions they are taking and the identities they are expressing or claiming’.43_{Schlichte and} Schneckener, who argue that studying an armed group’s politics of legitimacy is essential to

42_{I. Duyvesteyn, ‘Rebels & Legitimacy; An Introduction’, Small Wars & Insurgencies 28:4-5 (2017)}

669-685, 670.

43_{R. Barker, ‘Legitimacy, Legitimation, and the European Union: What Crisis?’, in: P. Craig and R.}

Rawlings eds., Law and Administration in Europe 157 (Oxford 2003) 163-64 in I. Duyvesteyn, ‘Rebels & Legitimacy; An Introduction’ Small Wars & Insurgencies 28:4-5 (2017) 669-685, 674.

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understand its activities, adopt the Weberian definition of legitimacy as ‘the belief in the justification or the moral validity of a political organization and its activities.’44_{While both} definitions are analytically useful, the latter refers to the way in which outsiders perceive the movement’s actions. Since my focus is on the Islamic State’s strategic use of propaganda and not on its reception by audiences, I adopt the former definition. This is congruent with the conception of propaganda that I employ.

Propaganda is considered ‘the deliberate and systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist.’45_{Jowett and O’Donnell argue that propaganda functions in order to affect} people, so they adopt certain beliefs and attitudes that correspond with the propagandist’s intentions. Additionally, it serves to ensure and enhance the legitimacy of the organization or movement that is propagated.46 In other words, one can assume that all the contents of propaganda are deliberately communicated and serve a strategic purpose. As such, my analysis is inspired by framing approaches in social movement research, which depart from the idea that movement actors are not merely passive carriers of ideas, but signifying agents that are actively involved in the construction of meaning to mobilize support.47 The idea that social reality is manipulated and reinterpreted by – in this case – the Islamic State in order to mobilize and legitimize collective action, is one of the core ontological assumptions underlying this thesis. Hence, this thesis should be considered a qualitative exploration of the Islamic State’s Western-oriented legitimization repertoire.

Schlichte and Schneckener identify eight sources of legitimacy that violent groups draw from to justify their actions. Prior to discussing these sources, the authors elaborate on the complex relationship between violence and legitimacy. Violence in itself may have a justifying function, because it demonstrates a movement’s ability to exert power over civilians and opponents.48 However, when used indiscriminately it may also delegitimize a movement’s actions. So, while on the one hand violence can be considered a source of legitimacy, its use also needs to be legitimized.49 To justify their actions, rebel actors may make use of one or more of the following strategies. First, regarding the discursive claims, rebel actors often

44_{K. Schlichte and U. Schneckener, ’Armed Groups and the Politics of Legitimacy’, Civil Wars 17:4}

(2015) 409-424, 413.

45_{G.S. Jowett and V. O'Donnell, Propaganda & Persuasion (Thousand Oaks 2018) 6.} 46_{Ibid., 315.}

47_{R. D. Benford and D.A. Snow, ‘Framing processes and social movements: An overview and}

assessment’, Annual review of sociology 26:1 (2000) 613.

48_{Ibid., 415.} 49_{Ibid., 416.}

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attempt to align their actions to a particular socio-cultural setting by invoking myth-symbol complexes. This means that armed groups intend to position their struggle within a wider sociocultural context, often emphasizing the historicity of the war they fight. Second, their claims may tap into certain economic, social or political aspirations of a specific community and declare to pursue the same goals. In other words, movements claim to act on the behalf of a larger group. Third, violent actors engage in defining outside threats and actively construct enemy images. They position themselves as the defendants or saviors of a particular threatened community.50

Performance-centered sources of legitimacy refer to how behavioral aspects of rebel groups potentially reinforce legitimacy. First, and most commonly, movements tend to accentuate the military successes of leaders and warriors: their use of violence is framed in a way that it contributes to their charismatic appeal. Second, constructing images of martyrdom and emphasizing the fighters’ readiness to sacrifice themselves may additionally reinforce legitimacy. A third source are personal loyalties and – often patrimonial – relationships of rebel rulers with their followers. Fourth, the authors stress the legitimizing effect that accompanies the execution of governance activities and bureaucratic affairs. Fifth, the organization of formal congresses and meetings also potentially adds to strengthening an image of legitimate rule, since it suggests a degree of professionalization and legality.51_{Naturally, this list of sources of} legitimacy is not exhaustive, nor does it provide a blueprint of strategies that rebel movements may or may not employ. Nevertheless, the conscience that rebel movements seek to justify their actions for others serves as fundamental theoretical point of departure that helps to bring focus to the sources under examination.

1.2.2 Rebel governance

When discussing rebel organizations, one generally refers to ‘consciously coordinated groups whose members engage in protracted violence with the intention of gaining undisputed political control over all or a portion of a pre-existing state’s territory.’52 Traditional approaches in civil war studies perceived rebel groups as military entities that were almost exclusively defined by the adoption of violent means to pursue their goals. In this view, coercion and the threat of violence are commonly seen as the main strategy of insurgencies to force civilians into

50_{Schlichte, ‘Armed Groups’, 417-18.} 51_{Ibid., 418.}

52_{N. Kasfir, ‘Rebel Governance – Constructing a Field of Inquiry: Definitions, Scope, Patterns, Order,}

Causes’ in: A. Arjona, N. Kasfir and Z. Mampilly eds., Rebel Governance in Civil War (New York 2015) 21-46, 24.

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compliance. However, as Stathis Kalyvas already stated in his influential work on civil war: ‘insurgency can best be understood as a process of competitive state building rather than simply an instance of collective action or social contention. (...) State building is the insurgents’ central goal.’53_{In other words, violent rebellion is a more multifaceted and complex undertaking than} the military engagement of insurgent groups: it also includes the organization of society beyond coercive means.

Indisputably, parallels exist between the process of modern nation-state formation during the last centuries and state building efforts of contemporary rebel groups. One may recognize this line of thought from Charles Tilly’s influential work on the process on Western state formation. His typology of nation-states as the result of war and state making enterprises by de facto criminal organizations, holds the essential ontological premise that the nation-state system is not the natural world order.54 Rather, just like other political actors, nation-states are challenged, contested and therefore constantly pursuing legitimacy. In this regard, students of civil war and insurgencies found that rebel organizations deploy strategies comparable to those of nation-states to achieve a similar degree of authority and legitimacy.The academic field of rebel governance is occupied with researching this subject.

Nelson Kasfir defines rebel governance as ‘the organization of civilians within rebel-held territory for a public purpose.’55_{These purposes range from achieving increased civilian} participation in rebellion to the easier extraction of material resources from populations.56 Rebel governance analysts are thus occupied with studying the ruling practices of rebels and the political relationship they hold with civilians during civil war.57 This relationship is often highly fluid and complex and may take on many different forms over the course of time. Within rebel governance literature, three main dimensions of rebel rule can be distinguished. First, the above-mentioned strategy of adopting violent means to control civilians remains one of the primary strategies of insurgencies to organize society. It has been observed that when carried out selectively, coercive techniques can even enhance popular support.58 The two remaining

53_{S.N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge 2006) 218 in N. Terpstra and G.}

Frerks, ’Rebel Governance and Legitimacy: Understanding the Impact of Rebel Legitimation on Civilian Compliance with the LTTE Rule’, Civil Wars 19:3 (2017) 279-307, 283-84.

54_{C. Tilly, ‘War Making and State Making as Organized Crime’ in: P.B. Evans, Dietrich}

Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol eds., Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge 1985) 169-191.

55_{Kasfir, ‘Rebel governance – Constructing a Field of Inquiry’, 24.} 56_Ibid.

57_{Ibid., 42.}

58_{F. Gutiérrez-Sanín, ‘Organization and governance: The evolution of urban militias in Medellín’ in:}

A. Arjona, N. Kasfir and Z.C. Mampilly eds., Rebel Governance in Civil War (New York 2015) 246-264, 260-61.

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forms of governance can be divided into formal and non-formal dimensions of rebel governance. Formal forms primarily relate to matters of bureaucracy and include the structures of civilian administration. One may think of institutionalized forms of security provision, healthcare, education, food distribution, allocation of land, economic regulation, law and justice systems, social safety nets, taxation and so on.59 Third and finally, non-formal forms refer to symbolic aspects of rebel governance. Kasfir argues that rebel movements organize their rule beyond military and bureaucratic structures by paying attention to normative structures of governance as well. Deploying a so-called symbolic repertoire arguably helps to construct a collective frame of reference and a sense of unity among the targeted audience. ‘It is an ensemble form of political communication that functions by linking together the rebel political authority with an intended audience, thereby providing a recognizable blueprint for interaction.’60_{Such a blueprint may consist of two categories of processes: referential symbols} include displays of coercive and bureaucratic power, while condensation symbols are aimed at evoking an emotional response from civilians. This strengthens the degree to which civilians may identify with the causes and aims of the rebel group.61 Examples of the former category are military parades and other military arrangements, but also rituals of bureaucratic government. Examples of condensation symbols are the use of flags, anthems, references to (national) historical figures or events and the use of media to diffuse these symbols into society.62_{Rebel groups often draw upon a set of images of the past that justify their ruling.} These processes are drawn from three sources: first, local themes and motifs embedded within the memories of a specific community; second, recognized or latent nationalist symbols; and third, transnational ideological formations.’63

In sum, three dimensions of rebel governance can be distinguished: the use of coercion and violence, the provision of public goods and services and symbolic activities to enhance a rebel group’s claim to sovereignty. It would be a misconception to assume that these dimensions are clearly distinct from one another. As will become clear, they are fluid and highly intertwined. The adoption of violent means, for example, inherently carries symbolic

59_{E.g. Z.C. Mampilly, Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life during War (Ithaka 2012)}

4; J.A. Stanton, Violence and Restraint in Civil War: Civilian Targeting in the Shadow of International

Law (Cambridge 2016) 30.

60_{J. Githens-Mazer, ‘Locating agency in collective political behaviour: Nationalism, social movements}

and individual mobilisation’, Politics 28:1 (2008) 41-49, 44 in Z.C. Mampilly, ‘Performing the nation-state: rebel governance and symbolic processes’ in: A. Arjona, N. Kasfir and Z. Mampilly eds., Rebel

Governance in Civil War (New York 2015) 74-97, 82.

61_{Mampilly, ‘Performing the Nation-State’, 79.} 62_Ibid.

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value as well, especially when it is dramatized and strategically employed in propaganda. It demonstrates and affects the power relationships between civilians and the rebelling insurgency. Similarly, the provision of public services and the establishment of a bureaucracy also carries symbolic value, because by ‘setting up governments that mimic the form and practices of national governments’ rebel groups fortify their image of legitimate ruler.64_The same applies to security provision and justice systems, for example, which can be considered a part of an organization’s bureaucratic structures, but also as coercive and violent means that help to ensure civilian compliance. The remainder of this analysis is devoted to discussing how and to what extent these different dimensions of rebel governance play a part in Islamic State propaganda.

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Chapter 2: The Symbolic Life of the Islamic State

The Sharia of our lord is light, by it we rise over the stars. By it we live without humiliation, a life of peace and security. Our state was established upon Islam. And although it wages jihad against the enemies, it governs the affairs of the people. It looks after its flock with love and patience.65

The lyrics above make up the chorus of one of the many nasheeds that can be heard throughout invariably all IS propaganda videos. The frequent use of these Islamic songs is a typical example of a recurring condensation symbol that is adopted by the Islamic State. Together with many other components, such as the display of flags, hand gestures, military displays and so on, they form the symbolic repertoire that the Islamic State draws from to performatively justify its claim to sovereignty.66_{After all, ‘governance’, as Mampilly argues, ‘involves not only the} formal structures of a rebel civil administration, but also the symbolic processes that governments deploy to give meaning to their actions.’67_{Rebel groups actively engage in the} adoption of symbolic forms of governance for multiple reasons: it helps potential adherents to identify with the causes of rebellion and it may invoke a degree of legitimacy that symbols bring to nation-states. It is aimed at ‘socializing civilian populations that rebels engage with’, both inside and outside territories under rebel control.68 Symbolic governance is thus less occupied with the practical dimension of ruling and more with the propagation of political authority.69

Propaganda produced by the AlHayat Media Center can be understood as a key element of the IS symbolic repertoire, since its efforts are explicitly aimed at ‘unifying the Muslims under one flag.’70_{The symbolic function of HMC can be studied on at least two levels. First,} the use of propaganda in itself is a defining aspect of the organization’s symbolic repertoire, since it communicates a shared frame of reference to a transnational audience. Second, the qualitative content of the propaganda provides a representation of the symbolic practices of governance that the IS engaged in. Hence, propaganda not just serves as a means to communicate ideological beliefs to create a shared frame of reference for an audience outside

65_Ibid.

66_{Mampilly, ‘Performing the nation-state’, 83.} 67_{Mampilly, ‘Performing the nation-state’, 77.} 68_{Ibid., 84.}

69_{Mampilly, ‘Performing the nation-state’, 79.} 70_{HMC ‘Dabiq 2’, 43.}

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its controlled territory, it simultaneously gives insight into the ways in which a similar shared system of ideas is enacted in symbolic and performative acts in the region under the insurgent’s control.

In this chapter I aim to link these levels of analysis. The first part of the analysis establishes an account of the myth-symbol complexes that are communicated through IS propaganda. It is shown how a set of historical narratives is combined with a particular representation of present-day affairs to define the caliphate as a justified – and inevitable – alternative to the nation-state. These myths include inherent enemy images, which I will also address. In the second part of this chapter, I demonstrate how these myths and enemy images are aligned to symbolic practices of governance within IS territory. I argue that symbolic representations of rebel rule form an important part of IS propaganda since their display helps to reify the socio-historical narrative that the organization discursively sets forth. To substantiate this argument, I highlight three processes of symbolic rule: the establishment of a new currency, the dismantling of physical structures and rituals of liberation and pledging allegiance. These symbolic acts of governance can be understood as public rituals which aim to reinforce the image of Islamic State as de facto religious and political ruler. In the following paragraph, I commence with a brief reflection on the Islamic State’s politico-religious agenda.

2.1 Restoring the Caliphate

2.1.1 Back to the correct state of Islamic affairs

Mampilly argues that employing a symbolic repertoire helps rebel organizations to construct a collective frame of reference for their audience. Both Mampilly and Schlichte & Schneckener highlight the importance of invoking myths of shared history to unify audiences and to legitimize rule.71 Armed groups give meaning to their cause by discursively embedding their actions into a wider historical and sociocultural context.72 A religious ideology like Islamism offers groups a broad symbolic system that is used as a source to unify potential adherents under a single banner.73_{The following excerpt from Al-Baghdadi’s caliphate declaration} speech – that was published in the first edition of Dabiq under the ‘breaking news’ header – illustrates this unifying potential:

71_{Schlichte, ‘Armed Groups’, 414.; Mampilly, ‘Performing the nation-state’, 91.} 72_{Schlichte, ‘Armed Groups’, 414.}

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Raise you head high, for today – by Allah’s grace – you have a state and Khilafah, which will return your dignity, might, rights, and leadership. It is a state where the Arab and non-Arab, the white man and black man, the easterner and westerner are all brothers. It is a Khilafah that gathered the Caucasian, Indian, Chinese, Shami, Iraqi, Yemeni, Egyptian, Maghribi (North African), American, French, German, and Australian. (…) Their blood mixed and became one, under a single flag and goal, in one pavilion, enjoying this blessing, the blessing of faithful brotherhood.74

Evidently, the belief in Islam is propagated as the primary form of social classification that binds followers of IS, while the significance of other social identity categories such as nationality, race and geographical origin is attenuated and put up as subordinate. The central position of the organization’s religious ideology throughout its means of communication is widely acknowledged in academia. In his work on the history of Salafi-Jihadism, Shiraz Maher defines the ideology as a political religion.75 He identifies five key elements of contemporary Salafi-Jihadist movements. Tawhid, refers to ‘the unitary oneness of God; the core component of Islam’76 Hakimiyya emphasizes ‘the rule of Allah and his sovereignty in the political system.’77_{Al-wala a’ wa-l-bara a’, refers to ‘loyalty and disavowal’, that is to love and hate} for Allah’s sake.78_{Jihad, which ‘literally and linguistically means to struggle or exert effort,} although it has a legal meaning which relates to combat and fighting.’79 Takfir, finally, is used to describe the ‘excommunication of other Muslims, banishing them from the faith.’80_{At the} core of Salafism is the conception that the ‘perfect life is realised only by reviving the Islam of its first three generations.’81 The second component of the ideology, jihadism, in the Salafi-Jihadist interpretation refers to the means to achieve this goal, namely ‘the physical struggle in the cause of god.’82_{As such, jihad is the obligation to fight against those who are in the way of} establishing an Islamic society. Essentially, the Islamic State strives to reify the past by structuring the society according to an image of the seventh century reality. In Gerges words: ‘the world according to IS is frozen in time and space, incorporating the rules and laws of seventh-century Arabia into the twenty-first century.’83 Naturally, the organization’s ideology

74_{HMC, ‘Dabiq 1’, 7.}

75_{S. Maher, Salafi-Jihadism: The history of an idea (Oxford 2016) 27.} 76_{Ibid., xx.} 77_{Ibid., xvii} 78_{Ibid, xx.} 79_{Ibid., xviii.} 80_{Ibid., xx.} 81_{Ibid., 7.} 82_{Ibid., 32.} 83_{Gerges, ISIS, 24.}

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is a highly complex system of different meanings and interpretations. However, perceiving it as a political religion that is aimed at restructuring all dimensions of society along religious fault lines is essential to understanding why the most dominant myths and symbols revolve around the strong rejection of other political ideologies. This inherently makes all Western political systems fundamentally incompatible with the Islamic State’s ideal of state-structure. Consequently, the enemy images and threats that are defined include both political ideologies, as well as states, and organizations that represent them. An article in the second edition of Dabiq illustrates how different ideologies have resulted in Islamic decline, arguing that due to ‘baathism, secularism, liberalism, democracy’:

we no longer find the state of Islamic affairs that existed in the generations of sahabah [followers of the Prophet] (...) nor in the generations of the rightly guided Khalifa (...) nor in the generations of those who lived during the jihad against Persia and Rome, the conquests of Sham [Syria], Iraq and Khurasan, and the emergence of Muslim reign and its expansion to Al-Andalus in the west during the era of the Umawiyyin.84

In other words, the ideas accompanying current-day political systems have diverted the Islamic world away from the correct state of Islamic affairs. According to IS, the main threat of these ideas seems to lay in the colonialist, nationalist and secularist ambitions that have motivated Western states to interfere in the Middle East. Throughout IS propaganda, particularly nationalism is targeted and defined as the main obstacle that prevents the restoration of a unified Muslim society.

The foreword of the eighth edition of Dabiq explains that nationalism ‘empowered apostasy in the Muslims’ lands, divided and conquered the Muslim peoples, and defended the crusaders’ lands from offensive jihad.’85_{It is set out to be the overarching ideology that} represents all ‘the Kufri and Shirki ideologies that were brought to the Muslim world by the crusaders: Sykes and Picot.’86 In the famous clandestine Sykes-Picot agreement from 1916 these respectively English and French diplomats divided the Middle East into different spheres of influence among the colonial powers they represented. This historical event is a principal illustration of wrongful Western interference that IS frequently recalls in its body of propaganda. Not only is the nationalist state system thus incompatible with the organization’s

84_{HMC, ‘Dabiq 2’, 10.}

85_{AlHayat Media Center, ‘Dabiq 8: Shari’ah Alone Will Rule Africa’ (5 July 2014) 4.} 86_Ibid.

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internationalist ideal of establishing a transnational Islamist society, nationalism simultaneously embodies the historical colonialist domination of the West over Muslims. The strong denial of nationalism – and related -isms such as secularism, capitalism and liberalism – forms an essential part in the propagation of its historical narrative of illegal Western colonialist presence in Muslim lands.

2.1.2 A History of Oppression

The dominant myths and historical narratives that IS invokes in propaganda have been identified by multiple scholars. Heck, for example, argues that IS derives its identity from the historical oppression of Muslims by the Western world.87 Mahood and Rane also state that by continuously referring to Western states as crusaders throughout the material, IS ‘capitalises upon the historical injustice of the Crusades in order to legitimise its social and political vision.’88_{This frame of past and present Western domination over Islamic lands is a common} thread that runs through the organizations propaganda. The myth-symbol complex – that is the sociohistorical context in which IS positions its cause – is dominated by historical narratives that emphasize the continuous Muslim struggle for freedom from Western oppression.

Dabiq’s first issue – carrying the self-explanatory title ‘The Return of the Khilafah’ – extensively reports on the newly proclaimed state. It announces a new era ‘for those generations that were drowning in oceans of disgrace, being nursed on the milk of humiliation, and being ruled by the vilest of all people, after their long slumber in the darkness of neglect’.89 This image of Muslim humiliation is continuously invoked, and the historicity of the jihadi struggle against this injustice is repeatedly emphasized. The twenty-minute film ‘Honor is in Jihad’ that was released in June 2015 provides viewers with a history of the Balkans, describing the region as ‘frontier for the Muslims, the new shield against crusading Europe’.90_{The first scene shows} an animation that resembles a military battle between Arab and European crusader armies in the Dark Ages and situates the current jihadi struggle within the same fight. It is illustrative for the way in which past struggles and historical injustice for Muslims are connected to the contemporary cause of the movement.91

The video provides a historical account of the Islamic decline in the Balkans and the Western oppression of Muslims in the region, that paved the way for the creation of nationalism

87_{Heck, ‘Images, visions’, 246.} 88_{Mahood ‘Islamist narratives’, 24.} 89_{HMC, ‘Dabiq 1’, 3.}

90_{AlHayat Media Center, ‘Honor is in Jihad’ (June 2015) mp4, 00.00.37 – 00.00.43 min.} 91_{Ibid., 00.00.30 – 00.01.07 min.}

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and secular states. Blame is attributed to the international community – or ‘the church of secularism: the UN’ – for organizing the genocide and slaughter of Muslims in Bosnia.92_The narrative is supported by historical footage of the genocide in Srebrenica and the military invasion of Iraq.93 The 2003 American invasion is framed as one of the most recent attempts to commit genocide on Muslims, which would not be accepted by the Muslim people. The consequence was the establishment of the caliphate by the Islamic State, which is described as the natural result of violent oppression against Muslims in the past.94 A similar historical account is provided in the 55-minute documentary-like film ‘The Rise of the Khilafah: The Return of the Gold Dinar’.95 The introduction of the film consists of high-quality animations of medieval battlefields fused with images of modern warfare.

And now, in this sky, and in this time, the sounds of clanging swords of arrows set soaring transformed into the thunderous roars of the flames of war. Striking terror in the hearts of the Kuffar, the first blow to their Satanic financial system, pulverizing the twin idols of capitalism.96

An animated arrow that is shot by a medieval Arab fighter shifts shape into the airplane that pierces the first of the two Twin Towers. The visual and discursive link that this image establishes can hardly be less subtle: the battle between Muslims and crusaders never ceased and is still being fought today. In the video, the September 2001 World Trade Center attacks are defined as a turning point in the jihadi struggle that marked the beginning of an era of Western and – most significantly –American decline. The narration continues to describe the humiliation of the United States after they intervened in Afghanistan and Iraq, supported by visual footage displaying American casualties and destroyed military equipment.

Jihad is continuously presented as a defensive measure against Western violence. The justification of the Islamic State’s actions that is established in propaganda is built around the origin myth that the state was proclaimed in order to protect a threatened community. As IS spokesman Al-Adnani stated in one of his speeches: ‘O Americans, and O Europeans, the Islamic State did not initiate a war against you, as your governments and media try to make

92_{Ibid., 00.08.05 – 00.08.11 min.} 93_{Ibid., 00.08.10 – 00.08.43 min.} 94_{Ibid., 00.13.34 – 00.14.15 min.}

95_{AlHayat Media Center, ‘The Rise of the Khilafah: The Return of the Gold Dinar’ (October 2015)}

mp4.

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you believe. It is you who started the transgression against us, and thus you deserve blame’.97 With the establishment of the caliphate, the goal of unifying the threatened Muslim community and the creation of a last resort for Muslims worldwide was finally achieved.

The IS was now for the world to see, courts were established, prayer was being enforced, hudud were being implemented, people were invited to do good, the zakat was being collected and distributed, light glowed from the mujahideen, who were soft toward the believers and harsh against the kuffr.98

The narration is supported with images of cheerful IS fighters with their children, while the video continues to that a safe and prosperous life is possible for anyone that finds oneself within Islamic State borders. By establishing the caliphate, IS created a safe zone where Muslims from all over the world could enjoy a secure live under Islamic State protection. In the last chapter, I will pay further attention to the representation of civilian life in IS propaganda. First, I link between the discursive and the behavioral by focusing attention to three symbolic governing activities that performatively help to reinforce the Islamic State’s image of a legitimate ruler.

2.2 Governing symbolically

2.2.1 The Return of the Gold Dinar

One of the most apparent examples of a symbolic governance is the establishment of the Islamic State’s own currency in its controlled territory. It was announced in the fifth issue of Dabiq and further clarified in the documentary-like film ‘The Rise of the Gold Dinar’.99 The video provides a detailed economic-historical account of the evolution of the global monetary system, tracing the current financial system back to commodity trade and describes its evolution all the way up to the current neo-liberal model of capitalism. It is then stated that precious metals have historically been the main means to conduct trade in all major societies. In this tradition, the seventh century Islamic State was no exception: ‘when trade flourished, and the caliphate was rapidly expanding, its rulers minted gold, copper and bronze coins.’100

97_{AlHayat Media Center, ‘Dabiq 4: The Failed Crusade’, 8-9.}

98_{AlHayat Media Center, ‘Flames of War’ (September 2014) 00.05.35 – 00.05.49 min.; Hudud is the}

Arabic word for boundaries and refers to the penalization of the most severe crimes under Sharia law. The Zakah is an annual charitable donation that Muslims are obliged to make.

99_{AlHayat Media Center, ‘Dabiq 5: Remaining and Expanding’ (21 November 2014) 8.; HMC,}

‘Return of the Gold Dinar’.

'The Standard of the Caliphate Flutters High...': On Rebel Governance and the Islamic State’s Politics of Legitimacy between June 2014 and July 2015