The political and economic difficulties in the Economic Partnership
Agreements
Case study on the political-economic premises of the EU-Cameroon Economic Partnership Agreement
Tom Tetteroo 11148063 26-06-2020 Master thesis Political Science, Specialisation: Political Economy Dhr. Dr. S. Rezaeiejan
1 Table of contents
1. Introduction ... 3
2. Literature review ... 7
2.1 Introduction ... 7
2.2 The historical dimension ... 7
2.3 The economic dimension ... 9
2.4 The political dimension ... 11
2.5 Conclusion ... 12
3 Theoretical framework ... 13
3.1 Introduction ... 13
3.2 Conceptualising the research question ... 13
3.3 Robert Cox, expanding notion of Theory: ... 14
3.3.1 Cox’ pressure triangle ... 14
3.3.2 Hegemony ... 16
3.3.3 Moravscik’s three variants ... 17
3.4 Concluding remarks ... 21
4. Methodology ... 21
4.1 Introduction ... 21
4.2 Type of study ... 22
4.3 Independent and dependent variables ... 23
4.4 Indicators ... 24
4.5 Data sources ... 28
5. Analysis... 29
5.1 Hegemonic momentum ... 29
5.1.1. Congruence of three forces in world system ... 29
5.1.2 The role of China ... 30
5.2 The system of Cameroon... 32
5.2.1 Ideational arena ... 32
5.2.2 Commercial arena ... 35
5.2.3 Representative arena ... 38
5.2.4 Domestic conclusions ... 40
5.3 The system of the Economic Partnership Agreements ... 40
5.3.1. Ideational arena ... 41
2 5.3.3. Representative arena ... 43 6. Conclusion ... 45
3 1. Introduction
On February 29th 2020, the EU and joint states of the African, Pacific and Caribbean, have
decided to postpone the deadline for further economic negotiations to December the same year (Muchira, 2020). These economic negotiations are the negotiations that would lead to the Economic Partnership Agreements, contracts for a long-term economic relationship between the European Union and the ACP countries, as the joint states of Africa, the Caribbean and Pacific are called (European Commission, n.d.). In the words of the European Union themselves, these agreements are created to promote sustainable trade and development (idem). Due to the lack of consensus in the negotiations for the EPA’s, the already existing Cotonou Agreement is extended until the end of 2020. The negotiations of the Economic Partnership Agreements between the EU and its former colonies, are continuing since the beginning of this Millennium (idem). They are created to be the formal embodiment of the economic and political relations between the block of the European Union and the block of the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, in continuation of earlier agreements. Of the three ACP regions, the most relevant actor for this research is Africa. Having the biggest amount of countries, as well as population and economic value, it is the most prominent block within the ACP. Africa is also the group of countries within the ACP that has the most voice, and the most attention of literature. Furthermore, it is impossible to have any generalisation of Africa towards the Caribbean and the Pacific because of their cultural, social, geographical, economic and political differences with the other blocks in the ACP. Although the three are acting as a whole, it does not mean that research should see them as a whole. The act of them combining their forces is merely a negotiation strategy of the three blocks, it doesn’t provide a scientific basis for external validity between the blocks (Flint, 2009, p. 81). Although difference between countries within the African block can be big as well, this thesis will provide outcomes that are exemplary for the relationship with many African countries. It does so by analysing the case of Cameroon, one of the few singular countries to have signed the agreement and started implementing it (European Commission, n.d.). Cameroon has a history of economic hardship, but a history of rapid economic growth as well. Furthermore, the political landscape is complicated and diverse, but stable throughout decades (McGrew, 2016, pp. 6-8).
The Economic Partnership Agreements are the latest official big step in the contracted relations between Europe and Africa. The official description of the European Commission notes that the EPA’s “(..) are WTO-compatible agreements, but go beyond conventional free-trade
4 agreements, focusing on ACP development, taking account of their socio-economic circumstances and including co-operation and assistance to help ACP countries benefit from the agreements.” (European Commission, 2020) The general aim for these contracts is “(…) promoting ACP-EU trade – and ultimately contribute, through trade and investment, to sustainable development and poverty reduction (idem).
Although these Agreements were set to be signed by the end of 2007, they are still in different stages of development (idem). The history of the Agreements shows that the preceding contracts have been cause for political and economic tension. The development of contractual relationship between European countries and the ACP countries is therefore interesting to consider, when noting that more than a decade after the initial deadline for signature it is still the minority of the countries that have signed the EPA’s. It The Economic Partnership Agreements resolve around a series of contracts between the European Union and African countries, united in Regional Economic Communities (idem). The basis of these contracts comes from the historical relationship between Europe and its colonies and is an economic relationship that is based on the alleviation of import and export taxes (European Commission, n.d.). However, as will be further clarified in the literature review, over the 50 years since first instalment these contracts gradually transformed in a political relationship as well. The lengthy history of the Agreements originates in colonial relations between European and African states and evolved from economic Lomé contracts into the more political Cotonou contracts (Gruhn, 1971, pp. 244-245). The colonial heritage is one of the multiple factors that have been complicating and challenging the further steps in the relationship. Considering the fact that these contracts involve almost 100 countries, which are influenced not only economically, but also on political, social and cultural dimension, it is understandable that a lot has been said about them. The EU is for most of the Regional Economic Communities the most important trading partner by volume of goods traded, constitution up to more than 50 billion euro in accumulated export and import values (Zamfir, 2018, p.5). The economic potential, however, is combined with high levels of political sensitivity, built up throughout the history of the contracts. The president of Ghana called one of the former contracts "(…) a new system of collective colonialism which will be stronger and more dangerous than the old evils we are striving to liquidate” (Zartman, 1971, p. 244). Given the magnitude of this project and the ambitious objectives it has, against the heavy critique it endured over the last decades, it is important to determine what forces have been constituting the key difficulties that the Agreements face today.
5 This research will therefore focus on how and why this success has been limited so far, and what the economic and political factors were to cause the current position the Agreements are in now. It does so by examining the interaction of the EU-Cameroon EPA with the political and economic environment in Cameroon. By analysing the situation of a state where the contracts are implemented, it will examine whether they have caused a situation that the other African states have been afraid of. The EPA’s will be proven to be the intersection between economics and international politics, which will be represented in the three fields of focus in the analysis. As this research tries to describe the subject of EPA’s from a political economic perspective, the tendency is to go towards simplifications of reality. This does not mean that this research does not want to take in account the social and cultural, and even environmental dimensions that could be of great influence. However, the aim is to assess how the primarily economic body of the EPA’s is best to function, and what obstacles are needed to overcome to have a successful cooperation that benefits the ACP countries in the first place, but the EU countries as well. Therefore, the choice for economic and political focus is merely to have a clear cut field on which the following question could be answered:
“What are the main political and economic difficulties in the relationship between the EU and ACP countries, in the light of the EU-Cameroon EPA’s?”
Cameroon has ratified its Economic Partnership Agreement with the European Union in July 2014. This ratification is an exception to most of the African countries which did not accept the terms of the ratification. Reports and studies on the effects of the implementation of the EPA in Cameroon, previous to the ratification, showed concerning economic risks for the African state and for its future economic position. Regional economic integration, as well as revenue due to lack of competitiveness would risk severe damage (South Centre, 2013). It is argued that Cameroon did ratify the Agreement, based on coercive economic behaviour of the European Union. (ibid, p. 4-5).
To answer the central question, the case of Cameroon will be examined on its political and economic landscape. This thesis examines what the political and economic implications are as a result of the implementation of the Economic Partnership Agreements in Cameroon. It does so by considering the historical context of how the political and economic landscape in Cameroon have been constituted. Cameroon is one of the few cases that singularly signed the Agreement, thus providing data for the influence of the Agreements. The time period for the actual analysis will be from the period shortly prior to the signature and implementation process, roughly from 2004, until as recent as possible. Most of the sources provide data until
6 2017, which therefore is the end of the researched period. Furthermore, from the end of 2017, the anglophone separatist movement turned into violent conflict, providing a possible disbalancing influence in the results of Cameroons political economic environment (Browne, 2019). The relevance of this thesis lies in the holistic approach to both potential political and economic fallacies of the process of negotiation and implementation of the Economic Partnership Agreements. Through the case of Cameroon, the effects of the EPA’s themselves, but also of the process towards signature can be examined, and related to the economic power discrepancy that exists between the European Union and ACP countries.
First, the context from the literature in historical, economic and political perspective will be given and elaborated on. In each of the three dimensions, there is a discussion on the main topics within the dimension, constituting debates on the most elaborated subjects within the dimensions. The debates in the literature review will show which aspects of the topic of EPA’s have been researched, and which fields the literature has not been diligent enough about. What follows from this is the gap that needs to be filled in by this research, showing the academic relevance of this thesis. The literature review will be followed by the theoretical framework that is going to be applied on the analysis, consisting the combination of two main writers. Robert Cox and Andrew Moravcsik are being combined to form concepts that constitute a constructivist view on the research topic, combined with influence of liberal theory. This combination will therefore examine both power relations, as tangible political and economic outcomes. The methods section will explain how the analysis will be executed in the form of a case study. It will show the indicators that are attached to the theoretical concepts, and explains why a case study is the most relevant for this research. Furthermore, the used data sources will be justified, as well as the type of data sources that they function in. Then, the first part of the analysis will be about examining the political and economic obstacles that are could be determined. The second part of the analysis would be the projection of these obstacles on the case of Cameroon, which has singularly signed an interim Economic Partnership Agreement with the European Union (European Union, 2020). The aim of this research is not so much to see what the technical fallacies of the Economic Partnership Agreements have been. Instead, it tries to scrutinize if the agreement with Cameroon has led to a situation that reluctant African countries have been afraid of.
7 2. Literature review
2.1 Introduction
This literature review will shape a logical view on what the most important research is in the field of Economic Partnership Agreements and from which points of view these pieces of literature are written. To do this, the review will show the literature on the broader EU-ACP relationship in economic and political perspective. The review therefore distinguishes three main dimensions that are relevant for this thesis: the historical dimension, the economic dimension and the political dimension. The political and economic dimension are the core dimensions to be analysed, the historical dimension is of key relevance to the theoretical perspective of this thesis, as the theoretical framework will clarify. In this review, the theoretical perspectives of the existing literature will be categorized, to show the different views within the three dimensions. This is done through showing the academic debate within each of the three dimensions, revealing the central topics and the theoretical scope of the scholars discussing the topics. Furthermore, this categorization will show the strong points in the literature, as well as the weaknesses, for the debates often overlook important aspects. The three fields are interrelated in the literature, which makes it complicated to have strict division between the dimensions. Categorizing them is therefore important, to be able to understand where this thesis can fill in the gap of the existing literature, and thus where the academic relevance of this thesis lies.
2.2 The historical dimension
The historic dimension is mainly characterized by the unbalanced relations between the EU and the ACP countries. In this dimension, it is important to take a relevant starting point that makes the historical period both inclusive enough and brief enough. The best starting point to take here is the period of decolonization. This particular period differs per country, but the colonial aspect is what defines the ACP countries as a group, and is of great influence in the relationship with the European countries which would later form the EU. It is therefore that the characteristics of this period make for the right start for examining the historical relations. Both the skewed colonial power relations, as the first period of actual agency of the ACP countries constitute this period. This makes it the first historical period to have two parties in the negotiations, and therefore two serious parties that have preferences and obstacles. As Timothy Barraclough phrased it: “Never before in the whole of human history had so revolutionary a
8 reversal occurred with such rapidity. The change in the position of the peoples of Asia and Africa and in their relations with Europe was the surest sign of the advent of a new era, and when the history of the first half of the twentieth century (…) comes to be written in a longer perspective, there is little doubt that no single theme will prove to be of greater importance than the revolt against the west” (Barraclough, 1964, p. 164). The colonial legacy defined the interests of the European countries for the rest of the history until today, whereas the revolt shows the deviance of the ACP interests towards the Europe.
Within the parameters of this historic perspective, there is a number of scholarly groups that have different views on what the influence of history has been on the EU-ACP relationship, and vice versa. The first idea towards historical influence is the notion that the colonial ties have shaped the further characteristics of foreign policy. This notion primarily goes for the EU actors, because the first contracts after decolonization are characterized by the unilateral agency of the European countries. The influence has been made visible by Schieder et al. in the difference between German and French policy. Germany held a much lower profile on foreign relations with the ACP countries, because of their lack of colonial relations. France, on the contrary, advocated for much broader policy towards the ACP countries within the European Union (Schieder et. al., 2011, p. 470-472). The foreign relations of Germany and France reflected the influence of colonial policy on their policy after decolonialization.
But not only the differences within the European Union show the influence of the colonial era. Scholars often use the dissatisfaction of the African countries as example for the view that the change since the colonial era has not been substantial. The economic relationship in the decades after independence was considered by many African leaders as being: "(…) a new system of collective colonialism which will be stronger and more dangerous than the old evils we are striving to liquidate." (Zartman, 1971, p. 244).
There is a second group of scholars within the historical perspective that have a different vision on the history of the EPA’s. This group points out the reversed motion of development in the EU relations with the ACP countries, seeing the deteriorating position of the ACP countries since the 1960’s. Mareike Meyn argues in her work that over the decades, the new contracts “(…) did not, however, kick start economic development in the ACP countries. Many of these mostly African countries actually experienced a reversal in development gains, as socio-economic indicators declined and unilateral preferences failed to initiate a change in the EU-ACP trade structure. EU-ACP countries’ share of total EU imports has more than halved in the past 30 years and is still heavily biased towards a few primary products, with fuels and minerals the
9 major revenue earners (Meyn, 2008, p. 516)”. Meyn primarily points towards the fact that with the shift from the Yaoundé Treaty into the Lomée Convention, and later the Cotonou agreement, the general economic effect seems to have the opposite direction of what these agreements were implemented for (idem). This reverse economic development correlates to the deteriorating political position that Stephen Hurt et. al. argue. They note that the negotiation of the Lomé convention has been relatively successful for the ACP countries, creating satisfying results for the group of countries. However, in the negotiations of the following agreements the negotiations were less successful for the ACP countries, and they saw their agency shrinking (Hurt et. al., 2013, pp. 4-5). Scholars like Meyn and Hurt emphasize the paradox of the European discourse of development on the one hand, and the declining agency of the ACP countries on the other side. This group of scholars therefore hints towards the origin of the political difficulties in the damage to the trust relation, due to the feeling of a lack of agency, combined with false promises about development.
2.3 The economic dimension
The economic dimension is perhaps the most directly involved dimension in the EPA contracts. As the core of the contracts resolve around trade, this dimension is the first one that both the EU and the ACP countries look at. It is therefore that the existing literature on this dimension needs to be narrowly scrutinized. First it is important to show the economic implications of the EPA’s that the literature points out. Since the WTO regulations, only the Least Developed Countries could be entitled to preferential trade regimes that would grant them free market access. The Economic Partnership Agreements, however, would offer free market access through reciprocal Free Trade Agreements. Least Developed Countries are convinced to join the Economic Partnership Agreements as well through the instability of the Everything But Arms provision that already grants them free access. In other words, the EPA’s are presented as Free Trade Agreements with a certain degree of stability for ACP regions (Kohnert, 2015, pp. 142-143).
In the literature there are several different views towards the economic relations between the EU and the ACP countries. The first view is that the ACP countries are trapped in a relationship with the EU that only benefits the latter. The official report of the EU-Cameroon interim EPA states that there is a liberalisation of imports of EU products that are high-end and thus not produced in Cameroon itself (European Commission, 2020). Here lies one of the concerns coming from the literature: the position of African countries in the Global Value Chain. The
10 position in the Global Value Chains can be of great relevance for the overall economic position of the country. Although being a big contributor to economic growth, research shows that for different cases the result has been that the impact of EPA’s have not been significant (Woolfrey and Bilal, 2017, p. 26-27). In order to be able to move up the value chain, African states need to have improvement on public institutions to support the allocation and implementation of investment (idem). Ilorah and Ngwakwe note that trade liberalisation could damage existing trade policy in Africa, thus only damaging the African markets instead of helping them (Ilorah and Ngwakwe, 2015, pp. 326-327). “There are therefore concerns that African exporters and producers could end up worse off as a result of the EPAs, especially as their gains from the EPA-inspired FTAs are bound to be limited. These exporters and producers will lose a significant market share to their more technologically equipped EU counterparts, negatively affecting the intra-African trade as well.“ (idem). African markets are simply not competitive enough to compete with the European markets, lacking assets like skill and infrastructure. The consequence is that African producers only lose market shares to European producers, that could offer cheaper and more sophisticated products (ibid, p. 327).
The second view on the economic relations is the view that the EPA’s could be a positive influence, if the concerning costs would be compensated in one way or the other. Karingi et. al. conducted a study in 2005 that quantitively examined the economic effect of the EPA’s on African economies. This study, written before the actual implementation process, was therefore predicting the effects. The scholars argued that the EPA’s would come with huge adjustment costs, and risks for African trade (Karingi et. al., 2005, p. 26-27). However, when a significant amount of policy would be improved, and therefore the intra-African trade is able to develop enough, there is basis for optimism. The writers note that supply markets could be competitive enough and that the alleviation of trade barriers could compensate fore the costs, and make the EPA’s beneficial for the African countries (ibid, pp. 27-28). A similar research shows mixed results in two African countries, showing potential revenue losses compared to tariff and welfare revenues. The conclusion of this estimation is that the losses and revenues could balance each other out, but that revenue losses are considered to be more threatening than that the perception of welfare gains is rewarding (Milner et. al., 2005, pp. 345-347). Borrmann and Busse furthermore argue that development of the ACP countries requires proper institutions, on which the EPA’s could facilitate the aid of the EU to ACP countries (Borrmann & Busse, 2007, pp. Effects could therefore end up beneficial, but the high costs are a big obstacle for African countries to implement the EPA’s. It is notable that a number of researches with similar results
11 exist, and that they are written in the years before or the beginning of the implementation, roughly from 2004 until 2008. Related to the case of Cameroon, the literature shows an importance for the forestry industry. This industry is the second most prominent industry of Cameroons economy, the highest contributor in its export, after crude oil. Other prominent industries are cash crop agriculture, and precious metals (OEC.world).
2.4 The political dimension
The political dimension causes debate within the literature as well. There are several grand topics to be found that the different scholars debate about. The first and main topic is the idea that there is an imbalanced discrepancy in power between the EU and the ACP on political aspect. This means that the ability to exert political power is disproportionally higher at EU side than it is at ACP side. The first view within this discussion argues that the EU uses its political power position to enforce policy upon the ACP block.
On the political aspect, the ACP countries always felt a power imbalance with EU countries, and the EU as a whole. It is therefore that the countries agreed in 1973 to negotiate as one block, at the point that the negotiations for the Lomé Convention started (Flint, 2009, p. 81). This feeling of power imbalance resonates through the literature, and a part of the literature argues that the EU uses this power to force contracts upon the ACP countries. As Dick Kohnert points out, the EU threatens the African communities to lift the trade preferences when the Africans don’t meet their deadlines for the signing of the Economic Partnership Agreements (Kohnert, 2015, p. 141). As the African countries are in a more dependent position than their European counterpart, this level of pressure is considered by Kohnert as misusing its power position (idem). This power imbalance is thus visible when looking at the economic figures. ECOWAS states in West Africa for example, are much more dependent on export towards Europe, than the other way around (ibid, p. 142). The view towards the European party in the negotiations is quite outspoken with this group of scholars, condemning the actions of the Europeans. Flint goes as far as calling the actions of the EU in bad faith when forcing the African states to sign, and proceeds to talk about Africa suffering economically from this (Flint, 2009, p.89-90). The EU forces policy onto African states through its power position, primarily to server their own goals. As Ilorah and Ngwakwe point out, the highly advocated trade liberalisation is in some African country only destructive for the market (Ilorah and Ngwakwe, 2015, pp. 326-327). “Apparently, the EU does not see these policy measures by the purpose they are meant to serve on the African continent but rather by how such measures could affect EU exports.” (idem).
12 The second view within the discussion sees the lack of power at the ACP side as determinant for the outcomes of the negotiations. On the other side of the pressure on EU-side, is the struggle of the African countries in the economic regions. In the case of the ECOWAS in West-Africa, the struggle of the countries to form their position in the negotiations was problematic. Partly due to the fact that this organisation never negotiated a free trade agreement before, they were not able to come out as a strong political block against the EU (Weinhardt, 2019, pp. 61-62). This problem is a recurrent one in the rest of Africa as well, for the governance in many African states is proven to be difficult. This difficulty lies in aspects like high-intensity of conflicts, but also in sheer geographical aspects like the high percentage of rural population on vast amounts of square kilometres (Draper, 2007, p. 5).
2.5 Conclusion
From the literature review, the first conclusion that can be drawn is that there is a power discrepancy between the EU and African countries. The EU is more powerful than the African countries separately, but more powerful than the countries united in the ACP as well. Furthermore, the African countries, with Cameroon in particular interest, have been influenced by the former colonial relationship with European countries. Cameroon has been under colonial administration of two powers, which influenced both the political landscape of Cameroon, as the economic development. The current political economic relationship between the European Union and the ACP countries is compromised, the literature points out, due to the history of the relationship. The compromised relationship leads to possible problems in the implementation of the EPA’s.
13 3 Theoretical framework
3.1 Introduction
The theoretical framework of this article will be a combination of critical constructivist and liberalist perspective. This combination derives from the interaction of reality and ideal situation. The constructivist theory used in this thesis portrays the influences that shape the relations between the EU and ACP as it is now. However, to examine which aspects of this relationship are problematic, the liberal theory that is used in this thesis, is necessary. The liberal theory that is used, is an effort to restate classical liberalism. As seen from the literature review, there is a number of other dimensions that influence the relationship of the EU and the African Countries. The complex relationship therefore should be considered through a much broader and more sophisticated lens than that of classical liberalism. The restatement of liberalism as liberal theory by Andrew Moravscik creates a connection between the constructivist view and an ordinal scale on which state policy can be measured. This theoretical framework uses a combination of the ideas of Robert Cox and Andrew Moravscik as basis for this more sophisticated view. The first section will point out the main arguments of Cox in his world-famous piece: “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory” (Cox, 1982). In the following section, the ideas of Cox will be combined with the ideas of Andrew Moravscik.
3.2 Conceptualising the research question
The two main concepts of this research derive from the research question: political and economic. The intersection of these two dimensions constitutes the core of the research topic. Economic contracts are constituted through a process of negotiation between the European Union and African countries. The concept of economy in this research focusses on the macroeconomic impact of the EPA’s in ACP countries. As the economic relationship between the EU and ACP countries is the focus of this research, the economic sector will focus on trade. This trade is considered as bilateral, based on the idea that the European Union is acting as one economic actor, which has a bilateral agreement with the case of study, Cameroon. The concept of political is defined in this research as interstate relations, with the influence of political actors within these states. Political difficulties could therefore arise in the government of Cameroon, but could arise in the civil society, or corporate society as well. The theoretical scope of this research combines the economic and domestic influence with state behaviour, making the term
14 political more holistic than in a realist or institutionalist view (Moravcsik, 1997, p. 524-533, Cox, 1981, pp. 138-139).
3.3 Robert Cox, expanding notion of Theory:
Investigating the intersection of the political and economic dimension requires a holistic approach that is able to give outcomes on both dimensions. In 1982, critical scholar Robert Cox wrote his influential essay “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory” (Cox, 1982). In this piece, he contested the positivist idea that the conventional scholars until then had: the fact that theory is objective. Cox argued that “(…) (t)heory is always for someone and for some purpose.” (ibid, p. 128). With this idea he implied that theory should be seen as something that is not just independently existent. Moreover, theory serves one of multiple purposes and one needs to be aware of what purpose the theory is serving. In this way the theory can be assessed on its full intention, the reader knows where the theory comes from (idem). Cox distinguishes two main purposes of theory: the problem solving theory and the critical theory. The importance of this distinction lies in the fact that the conception of theories is being expanded towards a more epistemic level. The problem solving theory looks at institutions and social patterns as a given structure, in which certain factors that do not align must be improved (ibid, pp. 128-129). A quick application to the topic of this research would give a theory that tries to see the shortcomings within the EPA’s that cause trouble, independently existing within the broader playing-field of the EU-ACP relationship. However, critical theory takes a step back, and examines the underlying structures that shape this broader field, and how they came into being (ibid, p. 129). This first important step in thinking makes the ideas of Robert Cox fitting for the character of this research. It relates the characteristics of the EPA’s in Cameroon to the broader environment in which they exist. This broader environment is examined through a theoretical mechanism in Cox’ work. The next section will clarify how this mechanism of interacting pressures works.
3.3.1 Cox’ pressure triangle
The core of Cox’ influential work about social forces in international relations lies in a triangle of interaction. As clarified in the section above, Cox tried to expand the classic conception of processes within a set environment towards an examination of that environment itself. This environment can be seen as a system or structure of pressures. In this structure of pressures,
15 Cox constitutes three main categories of forces: Ideas, institutions and material capabilities. These forces interact on reciprocal basis with each other, through pressure. This means that ideas, for example, don’t unilaterally determine what material capabilities there are in a state. Rather, it has influence on how these capabilities are shaped, as much as the material capabilities influence ideas as well (ibid, pp. 135-137). This applies for all three of the forces within the system, they all have a reciprocal pressure on each other. The system that these forces are interacting in, are not to be seen as the whole world, Cox argues: “The historical structure does not represent the whole world but rather a particular sphere of human activity in its
historically located totality” (ibid, p. 137).
Cox translates this pattern of interaction into the context of International Relations, and creates the same triangle, but with more suitable typology of forces. He recreates the triangle with social forces, forms of state, and world orders (ibid, p. 138). All three forces can be seen as coming from a constant struggle between “(…) dominant and emergent rival structures.” (idem). It is not Cox’ intention to copy all the characteristics of the forces of the first model on this second model (ibid, p. 139). However, the two models show a lot of similarities. Cox himself phrases it as follows: “Considered separately, social forces, forms of state, and world orders can be represented in a preliminary approximation as particular configurations of material capabilities, ideas and institutions (…). Considered in relation to each other, and thus moving towards a fuller representation of historical process, each will be seen as containing, as well as bearing the impact of, the others” (ibid, p. 138).
The social forces are linked to ideas, where contesting social forces compete with each other to become dominant. As Cox describes it in an academic interview, these social forces are transnational in nature: “I saw shared interests with similar groups across borders as well as solidarities within states.” (Schouten, 2009, p. 3). Social forces, therefore, are national and
16 transnational groups of actors that represent ideas about state representation and socio-economic policy. The forms of state could be linked to the idea of material capabilities. The matter in which a state could form “productive and destructive potentials” is related to how the state materializes its power and how the characteristics of the state are shaped. These characteristics are influenced by social forces, that compete for the dominance of their political and economic ideas. Then, finally, the world order can be linked to institutions. As mentioned above, Cox spends a substantial part of his article to the notion of hegemony, and sees institutions primarily as tools to establish and maintain a hegemony. The world order in his view is also dominated by the concept of hegemony. He states that there is a situation with a hegemony, and a situation without hegemony in the world order (Cox, 1981, pp. 138-139). World orders can be seen as institutionalisation of the interaction of social forces. The dominant power becomes hegemony, which is searching to maintain this with its material capabilities, the form of state. The link between forms of state and material capabilities, however, is weaker than the other two. This can be seen in the context that Cox gives about the model after he presents it. He gives the example of industrial workers as social force, that stimulated the form of a new form of state in economic nationalism and imperialism. This new state led to the fragmentation of the world economy and a more conflictual phase of international relations, which was a new form of world order (ibid, p. 138). The example shows that the two models do not fit one on one. It is the reciprocal relationship between the three forces that is at the core of Cox’ model. Three main elements have direct interaction, and sometimes even indirectly through the third one (ibid, p. 139). All three fields of force have their own internal competitions, in which there is battle to have the dominant position (idem). These battles happen transnational, through networks in multiple countries, but also within countries (Schouten, 2009, p. 3). The space in which this interaction takes place, is defined by Cox as a system. A system could be a state, as well as a transnational space of international relations. In this research, the systems that will be analysed are the state of Cameroon, and the EU-Cameroon relations. Both are considered to be a system in which all three forces, translated in the three arenas of Andrew Moravcsik, interact with each other (Moravcsik, 1997, p. 524-533).
3.3.2 Hegemony
Hegemony, as Cox argues, is founded in the congruity of the three force fields in the triangle. His approach seeks hegemonic stability in the “(…) fit between a configuration of material power, the prevalent collective image of world order (..) and a set of institutions which administer the order with a certain semblance of universality (…)” (Cox, 1981, p. 139). This
17 notion of hegemony seems to be inspired by the works of Antonio Gramsci and his Cultural Hegemony. The idea that hegemony has an important social element, is one of the pillars of Gramsci’s work (ibid, pp. 163-164). The stability of a hegemonic order is created in the combination of economic and political situations, which are accepted as universal. The relationship therefore between the EU and the ACP countries, the case of Cameroon in particular, is influenced by the political and economic environment that both blocks exist in. The influence is reciprocal, which means that the EU and ACP countries influence the environment as well. The approach of Cox allows to explain both the existence and the decline of a stable hegemonic position on a more inclusive basis than state power alone (ibid, p. 139). The implied hegemonic position of the EU in the history of its relations with the ACP countries, and the difficulties in the agreements of the EPA’s could therefore be put in a new light through this more inclusive approach. Cox argues that hegemony is granted through inclusive behaviour as well, in addition to material power.
Cox notes that institutions can be chosen by the stronger party, but they should be chosen to serve the interests of the weaker party as well. In choosing to do this, the stronger party will gain more legitimacy from the weaker. Cox argues that these institutions could play an important role in this kind of concessions that the stronger party makes: “Institutions may become the anchor for such a hegemonic strategy since they lend themselves both to the representations of diverse interests and to the universalisation of policy.” (Cox, 1981, p. 137). In the end, the stronger party itself could gain from the legitimacy that has been won. Institutions could therefore secure the position of dominance, by earning the respect and legitimacy of the weaker parties. The hegemonic position is based on legitimacy, only then the policy of the hegemonic institutions are considered to be universal.
3.3.3 Moravscik’s three variants
To be able to measure the abstractions in the theory of Cox, this thesis combines it with the theory of new variants of Liberal Theory by Andrew Moravscik. The theory of Cox points out pressure fields that compete for dominance, but fails to provide the next step. After Cox talks about hegemonic and counter-hegemonic structures, the question remains which exact points within the system have led to the less dominant actor to propose different ideas. Moravcsik provides these points in his article, through pointing out on which fields the conflict of ideas would arise, and when collaboration turns into conflict. He furthermore shows what the result is of the forces that lead to collaboration or conflict at state level. With this translation of Cox’
18 triangle, we can therefore see what the indicators are for weakness of the EPA’s when looking at Cameroons national political economy. He presents three variations of liberal theory, that reflect the three forces in the second triangle of Cox (Moravcsik, 1997, pp. 525-533). Moravcsik’s describes three core elements his view on liberalism, when describing his three variants of liberal theory: “Each rests on a distinctive specification of the central elements of liberal theory: social demands, the causal mechanisms whereby they are transformed into state preferences, and the resulting patterns of national preferences in world politics.” (ibid, p. 524). This view on international relations has distinctive similarities with the vision of Cox, especially considering the following citation of Moravcsik: “Taken by themselves, they do not define a single unambiguous model or set of hypotheses, not least because they do not specify precise sources of state preferences. Instead they support three separate variants of liberal theory (…) Each rests on a distinctive specification of the central elements of liberal theory: social demands, the causal mechanisms whereby they are transformed into state preferences, and the resulting patterns of national preferences in world politics.” (idem). Moravcsik makes the distinction of the three new variations of liberal thinking as follows:
Ideational Liberalism, Identity and Legitimate Social Order
This type of liberalism is focussed on the notion of domestic social identities that determine state behaviour. Social identities and the values attached to it are the core force that shape the foreign policy of states. These identities are built up out of a set of preferences that is shared with other members of the same identity group, concerning what the provision of public goods must be (ibid, p. 525). They therefore exert pressure on forms of government, for they have demands on how public goods must be organized. A more right-winged form of state, for example, would envision a smaller part of public goods, and beliefs in more autonomy for the private sector. The social identities form the basis for legitimacy of creation and implementation of policy. Moravcsik elaborates on the pressure from social identity that shape foreign policy: “Foreign policy will thus be motivated in part by an effort to realize social views about legitimate borders, political institutions, and modes of socioeconomic regulation.” (idem). Because legitimate borders are less relevant to this research, the focus lies in the representation of social forces in political institutions and socioeconomic regulation. These are the concepts that determine the overlapping concept of legitimacy, and provide the basis for conflict in negotiations when negatively affected, and collaboration when positively affected. Within International Relations, the compatibility of views between countries about national legitimacy
19 determines whether conflict or collaboration is more likely (Moravcsik, 1997, pp. 525-528). Moravcsik describes this arena as the “(…) configuration of domestic social identities and values as basic determinant of state preferences, and, therefore, of interstate conflict and cooperation.” (Moravcsik, 1997, p. 525). Conflicting notions of human rights, for example, could negatively affect the economic collaboration between states. Social identities is the primary concept, which Moravcsik defines as the idea of showing legitimacy for certain institutions that adhere to these social identities. “Foreign policy will thus be motivated in part by an effort to realize social views about legitimate borders, political institutions and modes of socioeconomic regulation.” (idem). In this analysis, legitimate borders are less relevant, due to the economic character of the study, hence political institutions and socioeconomic regulation are the relevant dimensions.
Commercial Liberalism, Economic Assets and Cross Border Transactions
With this variation, the leading force in international relations is the international economic market (ibid, pp. 529-530). Moravcsik actively denounces the association with the liberalist ideal of free trade and trade liberalisation. The core principle of commercial liberalism is the “(…) interaction of the aggregate incentives for certain policies and obstacles posed by domestic and transnational distributional conflict.” (ibid, p. 528). It is the topic of distribution of assets that shapes the behaviour in international relations, according to this type of liberalism. The interaction and playing field of the global market is strongly related to the world order. The systems of the EU, Cameroon and the EU-Cameroon EPA are the arenas for this thesis, and the question is how the distribution of economic assets is balanced. Domestic pressure towards liberalisation or protectionism determines whether the EU and Cameroon are inclined to have conflict or collaboration in this arena. Economic liberalisation is representative for collaboration in this research, given the liberalist nature of the EPA contracts, and is based on aggregate gains of trade. However, commercial liberalism argues that these aggregate gains, and thus collaboration, could be disturbed by two protectionist incentives. The first incentive is created in a situation of domestic rent-seeking, which is caused by a difference in actors that account for the costs of national policy, and actors that enjoy the benefits of national policy (Ibid, p. 529). The quest for personal welfare through rent-seeking behaviour is at the expense of aggregate welfare, and is related to lack of competitiveness, monopolism and undiversified sectors or factors (idem). The second pressure is through imperfectly competitive international markets, caused by increasing returns to scale, high fixed costs, surplus capacity and highly
20 concentrated sources of supply. These factors create an oligopolistic market, in which firms seek protection from governments to compete or enter the market. The resulting damage to interstate collaboration is caused by the inherent economic damage for other economies, through predatory dumping or unfair competition (idem). The result is an environment that pressures against interstate economic collaboration.
The commercial arena of the analysis will focus on the economic parameters of the environment as incentive for collaboration or conflict. This means that political parameters are considered to be based on economic interests that derive from the economic environment.
Republican Liberalism, Representation and Rent Seeking
This particular type of liberalism has as central focus the way in which the demands of the other two types are transformed into state policy. Moravcsik sees a central role in who’s social preferences are best politically represented, and if there is an institutional bias (ibid, p. 530). This bias will lead to skewed representation of groups, which will invoke rent-seeking behaviour. Rent seeking behaviour is seen as behaviour that is particular beneficial for a small group within a system, but the system as a whole loses from it. Certain types of institutional arrangements in countries can foster this rent-seeking behaviour, Moravcsik argues (idem). It is therefore important that the form of state is arranged in such a way, that representation of social groups is done fairly: “(…) the more unbiased the range of domestic groups represented, the less likely they will support policies that impose high net costs or risks on a broad range of social actors.” (idem). One of the three systems that this thesis researches however, apart from the European Union, is an international economic relationship. It is therefore important to look at international rent-seeking behaviour. Moravcsik elaborates on this behaviour in terms of imperialism (ibid, p. 532). As this arena defines what the representation is of the preferences of the two other arena’s, rent-seeking behaviour would be policy that generates gains for European economic actors, but invoke risk or damage to the political economic environment of Cameroon (idem). Powerful domestic groups pressure for illiberal commercial policies, as Moravcsik argues, and could be applied to the system of the EU-Cameroon relations and contracts. Analysis of this arena in the EU-Cameroon EPA system is therefore concentrated on policy that would benefit the European economy, but generates “(…) inefficient, suboptimal from the aggregate perspective (…)” (ibid, pp. 530-531).
21 The three types have characteristics that connect them to the three forces in the model of Robert Cox. Furthermore, the three types form arenas for collaboration and conflict, and attach concepts to determine whether there is political and economic basis for Cameroon to be in conflicting position with the EU, or collaborative. The arenas therefore form the translation between the interacting forces of Robert Cox, and measurable, ordinal environments which can be analysed through indicators.
3.4 Concluding remarks
To summarize the theoretical framework, the mechanism of Cox is going to be central to this research. This mechanism is the mutual interaction between social forces, forms of state and world orders. The weakness of Cox’ mechanism is the fact that it is too abstract to analyze. Moravcsik provides similar theoretical concepts, which are more concrete. The theory of Moravcsik therefore provides a basis for measuring which indicators are showing sufficient or insufficient policy. The focus of this theory is the way in which political actors can materialize their preferences (COX), and where the environment is created to do this in a cooperative or in a coercive manner (MORAVSCIK).
4. Methodology
4.1 Introduction
In the methodology section, first the choice for case study as type of study will be explained, followed by the clarification of the independent and dependent variables, which lead to two hypotheses. Then, the concepts of the three fields of Moravcsik are operationalised to indicators, and subsequently the data sources for the indicators will be explained. The design will provide a replicable mechanism that will answer the central research question: “What are the main political and economic difficulties in the relationship between the EU and ACP countries, in the light of the EPA’s?” As the theoretical framework already pointed out, this research is examining more than just the level of the problem solving theory. Instead of looking for the flaws within the EPA’s themselves, it is important to look at the broader perspective of the EU – ACP relations as well. The analysis will therefore be applied to three systems of forces.
22 First the system of the European Union will be analysed, followed by the system of Cameroon. These ‘domestic’ analyses form the basic premises for the power relation and preferences of both economic actors in the system of the EU-ACP relations.
4.2 Type of study
The type of study that is used for this research is a qualitative case study. There is a number of reasons why the case study is the best method for this research. Primarily the case study is chosen to have an in depth analysis on the case. The interrelated character of the dimensions that are examined in this study makes it impossible to reduce the level of analysis to a quantitative study on a large number of cases. Moreover, the theoretical perspective of this research does not allow for separating the dimensions that are being examined. It is the combination of the historical, political and economic dimensions that create the triangle of interaction that is the theoretical centre of the analysis. Case study analysis fits to these characteristics as it is suitable for research where contextual conditions are either relevant for the study, or impossible to separate from the phenomenon (Baxter, 2008, p. 545). The embeddedness of the EPA’s in the further EU-ACP relations makes it impossible to separate the former from the latter, and simultaneously makes the contextual conditions relevant. As the historical perspective has relevance for this research as well, it is impossible to have a large N, the magnitude of the research would make it unrealistic to conduct in the limited time space. With using the case study as design, external validity is an important aspect to discuss. There are several strategies that can enhance the external validity, which should be followed to make a case study a credible research. Triangulation is a core strategy to ensure that the results of the analysis are valid (ibid, p. 555-556). This strategy normally consists of using multiple methods of research to create a check on the results of the first method. However, triangulation could also be used through the examination of multiple data sources, or theories (Heale & Forbes, 2013, p. 98). In this research, triangulation will mostly be used in the form of multiple data sources. These data sources will combine quantitative data with qualitative evaluation of this data, therefore reinforcing each other.
The case that is being used for this research is the political and economic environment of Cameroon. Cameroon has been one of the few African countries to have signed and partially implemented the Economic Partnership Agreements. This case therefore is one of the few cases that provides political and economic evidence on the effects of the EPA’s. Furthermore, Cameroon consists of a stable provision of statistics during the last decades, making it a reliable
23 source for analysis. Reports on predictions of the effects of the EPA between the EU and Cameroon have shown high potential risks for Cameroon. Considering the dates of interim agreement and ratification ,among other EU behaviour, the assumption could be made that Cameroon signed the contracts under economic pressure of the European Union (South Centre, 2013, Sepos, 2013, p. 269-274). Cameroon did not sign the Agreements based on exceptional economic benefits, compared to other African states. These characteristics make Cameroon a suitable case to analyse whether the EPA’s are creating economic and political environments that African countries do not want to sign up for.
4.3 Independent and dependent variables
The basic mechanism of this research resolves around the congruency of the three core elements of Robert Cox’ triangle. As he argues that there is a hegemonic situation, or hegemonic ‘momentum’ when all three are reinforcing each other, all three must prove to work together. This research first tries to find out whether the EU has lost a position of hegemonic momentum in the EU-ACP relations. These relations are the system that Cox uses for his analysis, and thus constitutes the field in which the mechanisms of interaction work. The examination of the loss of a hegemonic position is the basis for the further analysis, as this constitutes the current position of the relations between the EU and the ACP countries. Hence, this part of the analysis will answer the following sub-question:
Has there been a position of hegemonic momentum by the European Union, and has it been lost?
Once is ascertained that the current environment for the EPA’s has come from the loss of hegemonic momentum, it is possible to examine the exact fields that have caused this loss, and thus the fields that cause conflict between the preferences of the EU and the African countries. The dependent variable in this first part of the analysis is the loss of hegemonic momentum, which is potentially caused by at least one of three independent variables. These three variables are the social forces, the forms of state or the world order.
However, to examine which variable was causing the loss of hegemonic momentum, and the fields of conflict, the second part of the analysis will use the case of Cameroon. As clarified in the section above, Cameroon is one of the few singular countries that has signed the contract, making it one of the few cases in which it is possible to research political and economic influences of the EPA contracts. This part of the analysis examines the political differences of
24 the Cameroon in the preceding years of the signature and implementation of the contracts, and the Cameroon after. In this way the possible negative influences of the EPA that could cause African countries not to sign will be highlighted. The second part of the analysis therefore answers the following question:
What are the causes for conflict in the situation of lost hegemonic momentum, according to the theoretical perspectives of Robert Cox and Andrew Moravscik?
The answer to the research question is provided through the test of two hypotheses, considering hegemonic position. After testing the hypotheses, the analysis shows where the difficulties for the Economic Partnership Agreements are.
H1: There has been a hegemonic momentum, with the Anglo-European region as hegemon,
which has been lost.
H2: The loss of this hegemonic momentum is caused by situations of conflict, rather than
collaboration, in the three arenas of Moravcsik, resulting in political and economic difficulties for the implementation process of the Economic Partnership Agreements.
4.4 Indicators
The research that is conducted in the first part of the analysis is based on the concepts of Cox’ triangle of social forces. The answer to the first hypothesis will be an explorative and introductive analysis, prior to the case study. It is therefore more general and less extensive than the second, and main part of the analysis. The second part of the analysis is the case study that will be conducted through the concepts of Andrew Moravcsik. These concepts are based on his three variants of liberal theory, and each variant represents an arena in which conflict or collaboration could arise. The construction of the analysis is to examine the theoretical concepts in both the ‘domestic’ system of Cameroon and the system of the relations between the Cameroon and the European Union. Analysing these two systems allows to examine whether the domestic political and economic environment of Cameroon have been arenas for conflict or for collaboration with the policy of the EPA’s. Furthermore, by analysing the system of EU-Cameroon relations, the implementation of the EPA’s could be examined through the three arenas in the international system of these relations. Cameroon and the EU-Cameroon relations are analysed as systems, as have been described in the theoretical framework, in which the three arenas of Moravcsik are exercising pressure on each other. In the study, the European Union is
25 examined as an autonomous entity, rather than a group of European states. This choice is based on the fact that the European Union practices a common foreign policy towards Cameroon (European Commission, n.d.). The Economic Partnership Agreement, furthermore, is signed between the European Union on the one side, and Cameroon on the other side (idem). Given that the political and economic intentions of the European Union are expressed in the EPA, the construction of its arenas is not relevant for this research. The analysis will first examine the three arenas in Cameroon, followed by the three arenas in the political economic relationship between Cameroon and the European Union. This construction will systematically examine the pressures that reveal the political and economic problems with the EPA policy. It will show if the EPA has the influence on Cameroon that is reason for the other African countries not to sign the contracts.
4.4.1 Ideational arena
The first arena is the one of Ideational liberalism. The measurable question is in how far the hegemon in a system has been able to gain legitimacy on the basis of its political institutions and socioeconomic regulation. The unit of analysis in this field, based on the concept of ‘social views’, will be the citizens of Cameroon, both in the system of Cameroon, as in the system of EU-Cameroon relations. Because Cameroon is the case of analysis in this research and considered to be the ‘weaker’ party, the influence on the Cameroonian citizens is most relevant. March and Olsen describe the concept of political institutions as a set of rules to represent the general norms and values of a society, which legitimize political actors through behavioural rules and the capacity of purposeful action (March & Olsen, 1996, p. 249). Political institutions “(…) create rules regulating the possession and use of political rights and resources.” (idem). The legitimacy of political institutions therefore will be measured through feelings of political freedom or trust and political representation, being purposeful usage of political rights and resources. Low levels of conventional political behaviour among citizens show general lack of trust in political representation and in political freedom. The feelings of freedom or trust, combined with conventional political behaviour therefore are indicators for legitimacy of political institutions. The second step is to analyse the legitimacy of socioeconomic regulation. This is measured through the citizens perception about their own living conditions, relative to the country’s economic conditions, and the perception on corruption. In this way the legitimacy on the allocation of resources is analysed, and therefore the legitimacy of socioeconomic regulation.
26 As the theoretical framework pointed out, in the field of International Relations, premises for conflict or collaboration arise from compatibility in views of national legitimacy. Therefore, conflict is more likely when the views on national legitimacy differ between the EU and Cameroon. If the legitimacy on EPA related fields of the Cameroonian policy is negatively affected by the implementation of EPA policy, this interaction has been cause for conflict. Secondly, Moravcsik describes that governments could seek an international environment of support for their domestic preferences (Moravcsik, 1997, p. 527). The government of Cameroon could search for international support in domestic measures, which provides opportunities for legitimacy for the European Union.
4.4.2 Commercial arena
The second arena for conflict or collaboration is the one of commercial liberalism. In this type, the interaction and obstacles of distribution of assets is the primary concept. The state policy is based on “(…) market incentives facing domestic and transnational economic actors.” (ibid, p. 528). According to Moravcsik, the willingness for trade liberalisation is created when “(…) strong competitiveness, extensive intra-industry trade, or trade in intermediate goods, large foreign investments and low asset specificity internalize the net benefits of free trade to powerful actors, thus reducing the influence of net losers from liberalization.” (ibid, p. 529). Free trade is therefore beneficial for firms and states that could adhere to the qualities mentioned above, but will damage those that do not meet them. Furthermore, the theoretical framework described two mechanisms that cause protectionist behaviour in international trade. First, difference in allocation of costs and benefits of economic policy leads to behaviour that is not based on the principle of aggregate gains. This difference could arise in national economic systems, but in international economic systems as well. In addition, imperfectly competitive international markets, caused by increasing returns to scale, high fixed costs, surplus capacity and highly concentrated sources of supply lead to protectionist behaviour of states.
The analysis of this arena examines only the economic dimension that cause protectionist behaviour, and therefore looks at allocation of costs and benefits of the economic policies of the European Union and Cameroon, and of the policies in the EPA policy that shapes the economic relation between the EU and Cameroon. Furthermore, the analysis of this arena examines whether the industries that are the most important for Cameroons economy, are imperfectly competitive. It does so by analysing whether there is a combination of increasing returns to scale, high fixed costs, surplus capacity and highly concentrated sources of supply
27 for both the EU and Cameroon. Combined with the absence of the incentives for trade liberalisation these indicators show in which ways the commercial climate for both Cameroon and the EU-Cameroon relations are positive or negative for trade liberalisation.
4.4.3 Representative arena
The third arena for conflict or collaboration is republican liberalism. This type shows the way in which the preferences of the other two arenas are aggregated into policy. Moravcsik describes that “(…) (t)he key variable in republican liberalism is the mode of domestic political representation, which determines whose social preferences are institutionally privileged.” (ibid, p. 530). This institutional privilege is out of balance “(w)hen political presentation is biased in favor of particularistic groups”, thus “capturing” government institutions (idem). The result is systematically passing on costs to others, and “(…) inefficient, suboptimal policies from the aggregate perspective.” (ibid, p.530-531). These indicators are similar to the ‘difference in allocation of costs and benefits of national policy’ in the commercial arena, but differ on the focus of analysis. The indicators in the ideational arena are measured through legitimacy provided by citizens, whereas the indicators in this arena are measured through efficiency and effectiveness of institutions. In the domestic system of Cameroon, the institutional representation is contributing to collaboration when there is no or relatively low levels of institutional inefficiency. The representation and institutional privilege in the light of the collaboration between the EU and Cameroon are the domain of international political representation, as the political influence of European negotiators determine the details of the contract as well. As clarified in the theoretical framework, Moravcsik expands his notion towards international representation through the influence of uncompetitive foreign investors and traders (ibid, p.532). If there is a bias towards these foreign parties in the political representation of the EPA negotiation process, the EPA as institution is being “captured” (ibid, p. 530). When this happens, Moravcsik writes, (…) the result is likely to be inefficient, suboptimal policies from the aggregate perspective (…)” (ibid, pp. 530-531). This suboptimal result stems from “ (…) systematically passing on the costs and risks to others (…)” (ibid, p. 530). These costs and risks could take the form of waste dumping in other countries, or other social or environmental risks that firms on the one side of the negotiations inflict on the other party in the negotiations. The indicators therefore of this arena are uncompetitive foreign investors, and suboptimal policies leading to inflicted risks and costs by European firms to Cameroon.
28 4.5 Data sources
The data that is being used is a combination of primary data and secondary data. The primary data is taken from economic databases covering statistics of the political legitimacy and economy of Cameroon and of the international relations between the EU and Cameroon. In the ideational arena, the data is provided by the AfroBarometer database. This database is constructed on the basis of surveys among the citizens of African countries, from which this research uses the surveys from Cameroon. The AfroBarometer provides data from 2011, when Cameroon joined the 5th round of surveys, until 2018. The sources for the commercial arena are
primary data from various sources, showing the relevant parameters of the Cameroon economy. These sources consist predominantly of academic literature that consists primary data about the economy of Cameroon, as well as interpretation of these numbers. In addition, the interim-contract of the Economic Partnership Agreement between Cameroon and the EU is used for the analysis of the representative arena, as it is the institution in the relationship between the EU and Cameroon. The sources will be accompanied by qualitative studies that clarify and support the primary data, to put the results in perspective.
