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SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE DRC:
Is rape used as a weapon of war against both men and women
between 1996 and 2009?
Beatrijs Bijl 10596852
beatrijscabijl@live.nl Bachelor Political Science Word count: 9221
First reader: Mw.dr. J. (Jana) Krause
Second reader: Mw. dr. N. (Nel) Vandekerckhove June 25th 2018
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Table of contents
INTRODUCTION
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HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT IN THE DRC
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
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CONCEPTS AND OPERATIONALIZATIONS 7
RAPE AS A WEAPON OF WAR 9
RAPE AS A POLICY AND RAPE AS A PRACTISE OF WAR 11
EVIL RAPES AND LUST RAPES 13
DIFFERENT PERPETRATORS 14 RAPE OF MEN 15
METHOD
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DATASET 16ANALYSIS
29
CONCLUSION
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DISCUSSION 24BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Introduction
On November 30th 1999 the United Nations Security Council enacted resolution 1279. With this resolution the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) started, after the country suffered from a civil war since 1994. The social construction that arose during wartime is a reason why sexual violence during the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) became so widespread, although prior to the conflict the DRC already had a problem with sexual violence (Eriksson Baaz and Stern 2010: 43). In July 1999 there was a signing of a ceasefire agreement, where the United Nations initially would be an observer of. In the resolution that followed the mandate of MONUC was expanded to the supervision of the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and additional tasks (UN.org 2009). The conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is one of the longest and most violent ones in the region and after years of the peacebuilding mission it was renamed on the first of July 2010 with resolution 1925, to reflect a new phase reached in the conflict. From that time the mission was called the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) (Ibid.).
During the change, there has been significant progress in the conflict, but the East of the DRC is continuously having conflicts, humanitarian crises and human rights violations, such as sexual and gender-based violence (unmissions.org 2018). Since the DRC is
sometimes called the ‘rape capital of the world’, rape is widespread and frequently during the conflict (Baaz & Stern 2009; europarl.europa.eu 2014). Many armed groups engage
themselves in rape against civilians, and both women and men suffer from the sexual and gender-based violence (Christian et al. 2011). As rape is a crime against humanity stated by the International Criminal Court, this widespread and frequent appearance of sexual violence is a problem. And even though the United Nations Security Council adopted six resolutions and the Declaration of Commitment to End Sexual Violence in Conflict (Krause 2015), which was endorsed by 122 countries, sexual violence is still ongoing (un.org 2018).
Because sexual violence is so widespread, frequent and ongoing the social relevance of this thesis is high. This thesis will examine whether sexual violence is used as a weapon of war and who the victims are of this sexual violence. Many victims of sexual violence don't report what has happened to them, and raising awareness about the topic might increase the numbers of reports. As sexual violence is a crime against humanity stated by the International Criminal Court, the massive amount in which it happens should be reduced. The scientific relevance is not as high as the social relevance, but because this thesis is focused on both men
4 and women it fills a gap in the literature. Also there is an increasing recognition among scholars that also men can be the victims, as well as perpetrators, of sexual violence (Krause 2015: 3). Many scholars have written about sexual violence against women, and specifically in the DRC because it happens on such a large scale. But the thing scholars see with women is that they find it really hard for multiple reasons to report what has happened to them and following literature about the rape of men, men find that even more difficult. Because of this the numbers of reported sexual violence in the DRC are probably much lower than the actual cases, and writing about the subject will hopefully help to bring this number up to its actual amount.
In this thesis I will examine the massive amount of sexual violence in the eastern region of Kivu in the DRC by state armed groups, targeted at both men and women. I will do this using the following research question: ‘’Is sexual violence used as a weapon of war on
both men and women in the DRC during the UN peacebuilding missions from 1996 until 2009?’’. I will argue that rape is used as a weapon of war against women, but not against men
according to the data of the Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict dataset (2013). Members of the DRC armed forces (FARDC) are one of the main perpetrators: between 2010 and 2013 half of the cases reported can be attributed to the army (europarl.europa.eu 2014). Rape being used as a weapon of war is a complex matter and I will compare the data about the prevalence of rape, which indicates if rape is used as a weapon of war, with the theory in what way rape could be used as a weapon of war. Only focusing on rape being always a weapon of war, and excluding men as victims is counterproductive, because it will undermine not only the
protection of women against sexual violence, but also men’s (Krause 2015: 5). Therefore, this thesis will look into the different form of sexual violence against civilians and if rape is used as a weapon of war when stating it is a practice of a policy of rape. Because of this
comparison I argue that rape is not used as a policy of war, but as a practice and therefor rape is not always used as a weapon of war. Instead, rape is used as a form of ‘self-pay’ for the combatants, and when used as ‘evil rape’, it could be used as a weapon but there is no certain way to state so.
In this thesis I will first give an overview of the conflict in the DRC and the two missions by the UN. After this I will give different conceptualizations and
operationalizations, which help in the understanding of sexual violence and the mandates by the UN. Next, I will explain the critiques on the narrative of ‘rape as a weapon of war’ and the meaning of this narrative, complemented with a theory of two ways in which rape could
5 be used as a weapon of war by state actors. After this I will explain the method I have used in the thesis, namely a case study in combination with a literature study. In my analysis I will explain more in depth why rape is used as a weapon of war against women, and not against men and why. Last, I will conclude my findings and give recommendations for further research in the field and the shortcomings of my thesis.
History of the conflict and peacebuilding mission overview
In 1994 Rwanda, a neighboring country of the DRC was entangled in a civil war and
genocide. Because of this genocide, the population of the Hutus fled out of Rwanda into the Eastern region Kivu in the DRC, then called Zaire, where the majority of the population were Tutsis. In 1996 a rebellion started in the region and the forces led by Kabila, a rebel leader, fought against the army of President Mobutu with the aid of Rwanda and Uganda. In 1997 the forces of Kabila took the capital city of Kinshasa and renamed the country the
Democratic Republic of Congo
(unmissions.org 2018). The next phase in the conflict had a lot of countries who were involved. In 1998, a rebellion movement started in the Eastern region of Kivu and within weeks the rebels seized large parts of the country. Even though the countries of Angola, Chad, Namibia and Zimbabwe promised military support to president Kabile, the rebels maintained their grip on the Eastern parts of the country. Rwanda and Uganda supported the rebel movement against president Kabila and eventually the UN Security Council called for a ceasefire and the withdrawal of foreign forces. The UN also urged countries not to intervene in the DRC’s internal affairs (Ibid.). In 1999 the ceasefire was signed between the DRC and five regional states (Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Rwanda and Uganda) that were part of the conflict. This ceasefire was the start of the UN mission MONUC in the region, which was initially to observe the ceasefire and the disengagement of the forces involved. It was also meant to maintain a liaison with all parties involving the ceasefire (Ibid; UN.org 2009).
6 For about ten years the MONUC mission operated in the DRC, and on July 1 2010 the mission changed into MONUSCO. The original mandate was established with resolution 1925 to reflect the new phase reached in the DRC (unmissions.org 2018). In this new mandate, the UN peacekeepers were authorized to use all necessary means to carry out the mandate. One of the key points of the mandate was to protect civilians, humanitarian
personnel and human rights defenders under imminent threat of physical violence. Also, the mandate was used to support the government of the DRC in its stabilization and peace consolidation efforts (Ibid.). In 2013 new waves of conflict in the eastern part of the DRC were threatening the overall stability and development of the country. Because of this, the Security Council adopted a new resolution, 2098, in order to create a specialized
‘’intervention brigade’’ on top of the troops already active in the DRC. The main goals of this special brigade were to neutralize armed groups and reducing the threat posed by armed groups to state authority. They were also responsible for civilian security in eastern DRC, and to make space for stabilization activities (Ibid.). In 2014 both the ‘’intervention brigade’’ and the mandate were extended, because the conflict was still going on (Ibid.). Although the UN tried to come up with an exit strategy to leave the country, its situation was not good enough to do so. Because of this the mandate was extended again in 2016, stating that the
humanitarian situation remained of great concern, as well as the delays in the preparation of the DRC for their presidential elections of November of 2016 (Ibid.). Once again, the
mandate was extended in 2017 because of the poor humanitarian conditions and the ongoing conflict.
Additional to the mandate and its extension, there have been many resolutions
complementary to the mandate. The first resolution that was adopted was the United National Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) in 2000. It deals with all issues related to women, peace and security, what makes it one of the most important resolutions. The resolution focuses on the impact of wars specifically to women and the way a lasting peace could be build (Ibid.). The resolution called for special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, in particular rape and other forms of sexual violence (Ibid.). The purpose of this resolution is to help not only individuals, but also NGOs, governments and international organizations that advocate women’s inclusion in all parts of the peacebuilding process. It also urges states to put an end to impunity, and to prosecute those responsible for crimes against humanity, including those relating to sexual violence against women and girls (Ibid.).
7 the Security Council (SC) adopted another resolution on sexual violence, in the context of the massive and widespread sexual violence perpetrated by armed groups in the DRC. In 2008 the SC urged all parties within armed conflicts to stop acts of sexual violence against civilians. This resolution, that was unanimously adopted by 36 UN member states, contains the call for immediate action for the protection of ‘’civilians, inter-alia, women and girls from all forms of sexual violence’’ (Ibid.). ‘’Women and girls are particularly targeted by the use of sexual violence, including as a tactic of war to humiliate, dominate, instill fear in, disperse and/or forcibly relocate civilian members of a community or ethnic group’’(UNSCR 1820). The resolution is seen as one of the most important ones on the matter of gender-based violence (Ibid.). The next year, in 2009, resolution 1888 was adopted. This resolution emphasized that civilian and military leaders had the responsibility, consistent with the principle of command responsibility, to ‘’demonstrate the commitment and political will to prevent sexual violence and to combat impunity and enforce accountability’’ (UNSCR 1888: preamble).
Theoretical Framework
Conceptualizations and operationalizations
Before I can analyze the situation in the DRC, I need to conceptualize and operationalize different concepts. This is because some of them are contested concepts and some of them are too broad and need to be narrowed down.
For the concept of rape I will use the definition of Elisabeth Wood, who defines rape as: the penetration of the anus or vagina with any object or body part of any body part of the
victim or perpetrator’s body with a sexual organ, by force or by threat of force or coercion, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment, or against a person incapable of giving genuine consent (Wood 2009: 133). Rape is seen as a crime against humanity and I will
therefore use the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) definition of crimes against humanity. The ICC defines crimes against humanity as: murder and attempted murder; torture; rape;
sexual slavery; inhuman acts; persecution; forcible transfer of population, attacking a
civilian population; destroying property; and pillaging (ICC 2018). For the concept of sexual
violence I will also draw on the definition of Elisabeth Wood, stating that sexual violence is:
a broader category that includes rape, sexual torture and mutilation, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, enforced sterilization, and forced pregnancy (Wood 2009: 133). The reporting
8 of rape, especially those of males, is likely to be less reported than other cases of sexual violence in most settings (Ibid.).
Wood (2009) also claims that not in every conflict rape is used as a weapon of war, and that in the conflict where groups engage in the use of sexual violence there are stronger grounds for holding them responsible. The most common explanation for wartime rape is that rape is a strategy of war, particularly of ethnic cleansing (Idem: 132). Because rape is not being used in every conflict, rape during wartime is not inevitable and therefore groups that do engage in sexual violence could be held more responsible (Ibid.). The reasons why sexual violence does or does not occur are to be classified as: leadership strategy, military hierarchy, individual combatants, and small-group dynamics and ‘’primary group cohesion’’ (Wood 2009: 137-138).
The other concepts that I will use are Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and Protection of Civilians (PoC). R2P is a global political commitment signed in 2005 by all the member states of the UN. Its four key concerns are to prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. The primary responsibility to live up to R2P lies with the state itself, but when the state is unable or unwilling to fulfil its responsibility, or is itself the actual perpetrator of crimes or atrocities, the international community can intervene in a diplomatic, humanitarian or other way to protect the civilians (un.org 2005).
PoC is a mandate by the UN which applies to peacebuilding missions of the UN and is implemented in the DRC. It has multiple principles, but the two most important ones are: protecting civilians is the primary responsibility of governments and peacekeepers with a mandate to protect civilians and have the authority and responsibility to provide protection within their capabilities and areas of deployment where the government is unable or
unwilling to protect. Just as with R2P the United Nations can intervene in multiple ways. One way is diplomatic, by among other things engaging in dialogue and political advocacy, but peacekeepers are also allowed to take action to provide physical protection, and by using force if necessary. Mission personnel are also engaged in building the capacity of national authorities to promote and respect human rights, prevent and respond to violence against children and sexual and gender-based violence (peacekeeping.un.org 2018).
Rape as a weapon of war
The reason why rape occurs during conflict is complex and dynamic, and stating that there is ‘’one’’ reason why rape happens during conflict is a false conception (Krause 2015:19). On
9 the narrative of ‘rape as a weapon of war’ has been much criticism by many feminist and conflict researchers (Eriksson Baaz and Stern 2013; Marks 2014; Krause 2015). The critique can be divided into two parts. First, the discourse risks that women and girls are only seen as victims of sexual violence, where other forms of sexual violence than rape are excluded (Krause 2015: 23). Second, a misunderstanding of the way armed forces are organized can lead to thinking that every armed group has a functioning command control. This would lead to thinking that rape is always used as a strategic means (Ibid.). This paper does not assume that rape is always used as a weapon of war, but will look at the data and see if it is used, and when so, who is targeted. When analyzing an armed group, research has shown that
leadership and recruitment patterns are crucial factors in the mitigation of the use of sexual violence (Krause 2015: 15). They are also major explanatory factors of the escalation and restraint of sexual violence in armed conflict (Idem: 18). Therefor I will first explain what ‘’rape as a weapon of war’’ means, then how leadership in the army causes rape to be a practice or a policy and how within the army of the DRC different kind of rapes are distinguished.
Paul Kirby (2012) states that rape is used as a weapon of war. Wartime sexual violence can be seen as a social act marked by gendered power. Wartime sexual violence can be seen in three modes of explanation: instrumentally, unreason and mythology (Kirby 2012). Sexual violence is ‘widespread and systematic’ and ‘a tactic of war’ (Idem: 798). The idea that rape is a weapon of war comes from a feminist point of view (Idem: 799). Who are seen as the victims of wartime sexual violence can be conceptualized in different ways, and for this thesis the view of the feminist social constructionists are used. This view states that both men and women can be victims, and to measure this, femininity and masculinity can be used in the context of the conflicts (Idem: 800; Krause 2015: 12; Skjelsbaek 2001: 215). Kirby’s three modes give a diverse explanation of why rape is used as a weapon of war, and the reasons why to use it.
For the instrumentalist mode because it is the most effective tool for the aims pursued. The aims are almost always economic and it helps maintaining a certain kind of material power (Idem: 808). For unreason rape is used as a weapon of war because ‘’it is the result of desire and fear faced by perpetrators in brutalizing situations of affect and trauma’’ (Idem: 809). This mode is a more individualist mode, focusing on the perpetrator self instead of a more collective purpose of using rape as a weapon of war. In the mode of unreason there is a difference between wartime rape as ‘private’ desires (such as lust) and ‘public’ events (such
10 as the overall destruction of war) (Ibid.). For mythology, ‘’rape is a weapon of war because it is selected as appropriate behavior by a social group which sets the self-understandings of perpetrators’’ (Idem: 811). Group behavior is important in this mode, because wartime sexual violence is a form of political power, distinguishing some as legitimate and other as
illegitimate through rules and norms of the group (Ibid.). Wartime sexual violence is overall seen as social behavior, structural, persisted and functional (Idem: 816). Because it is so widespread and frequent, it seems to be calculated and effective during wartime. Therefore, it is not possible that it is not a part of a political scheme and because of this you can state that it is used as a weapon of war (Idem: 816; Skjelsbaek 2001: 115).
Cohen (2013) explains in her article why rape occurs during civil war. In her article she finds evidence that the recruitment mechanism is associated with the occurrence of wartime rape. Moreover, rape is used to create unit cohesion and a weak state and insurgent contraband funding are also factors that contribute to wartime rape by rebel groups (Cohen 2013; Goldstein 2003). Rape is thus not used as a weapon of war, opposed to what Kirby states. When a conflict has a lot of wartime rape, it can have severe consequences for the post conflict peace and reconstruction of the country (Idem: 461). The causes of rape can be divided into three sets of arguments: opportunism/greed, ethnic hatred, and gender inequality. This arguments support the explanation for the variation of rape during civil war, namely combat socialization. Armed groups use wartime rape as a socialization tool. This is because combatants groups that recruit new members through oppression, for example through
abduction or forced enlisting, need to create a coherent group (Wood 2017: 10). The cohesion is unlikely to form spontaneously due to their violent addition to the group (Cohen 2013: 464). Rape, and especially gang rape, creates bonds of loyalty within groups of forced fighters (Idem: 461; idem: 475-476). ‘’Perpetrating gang rape and boasting about single-perpetrator rape are effective methods for creating and perpetuating cohesion’’ (Idem: 465). Wartime rape is a form of violence that is primarily targeted at women (Idem: 462). Also gang rape is far more common in wartime than in peacetime (Idem: 463). She uses the DRC as an example, where before the war rape was mainly committed by one perpetrator in private; the rape that happens during the war is shocking to the population because of its brutal nature, multiple perpetrators and public nature (Idem: 464). Because of gang rape, perpetrators get a higher status and a reputation for being though. The social processes in gang rape are vastly different from the ones committed by an individual. The rape by a single person is often more driven by personal sexual desire (Ibid.). Just as individual and gang rape
11 differ, it is also more likely that rape during wartime is commitment by individuals who would not rape during peacetime (Ibid.). Whether rape during a conflict will become widespread and frequent depends on the way in which recruitment goes and the variation in the internal social cohesion of different armed groups (Idem: 465). For example insurgent groups, where wartime rape is associated with state collapse. This is because weak
institutions and lack of enforcement of the law creates the opportunity for perpetrators to act (Idem: 476). One argument Cohen makes, is opposite of the argument Kirby makes. Cohen states that ‘’high levels of wartime rape may not be part of a military strategy - it may not be an overt ‘’tool’’ or ‘’weapon’’ of war - but instead serve to bond recruits together’’ (Ibid.).
Rape as a policy and rape as a practice of war
Elisabeth Wood (2017) makes a distinction in het article between rape as a policy and rape as a practice of war. When rape by an armed organization occurs frequently, it is often said to be a strategy of war. But some cases of conflict-related sexual violence, especially rape, are better understood as a practice. This means that the sexual violence has not been explicitly adopted as organization policy but is nonetheless tolerated by commanders (Wood 2017). Rape by commanders during armed conflict is recognized as war crime and a crime against humanity. This achievement was largely driven by the narrative that when rape occurred frequent during war, it was a strategy on the part of armed actors (Idem: 2). This narrative has had much critique, as stated above, but was also very successful, for several reasons: it is sometimes true, it emphasizes that rape is a part of warfare, not only the perpetrators but also commanders should be prosecuted, and commanders could possibly be persuaded to end the wartime sexual violence (Ibid.). But to state that an organization is using rape as a strategy is very hard to determine, and is in more cases presumed than observed. The conventional usage of rape as a strategy or ‘’weapon’’ of war states that an armed organization must have
purposefully adopted the policy (Ibid.). Instead of the rape as a policy, rape could be seen as a practice; which means that the sexual violence is driven from ‘’below’’ and tolerated from ‘’above’’, rather than purposefully adopted as policy. Rape can be seen as a practice when commanders do not order, authorize, or otherwise promote the sexual violence, but neither do they effectively prohibit it (Idem: 2-3). Rape as a practice includes both opportunistic rape, which is rape for private and individual motives, but also rape driven by social interactions among combatants (Idem: 3). In the face of loneliness and fear, and the brutalities and conditions of war, combatants have strong incentives to conform to the expectations and
12 behavior of their peers even when this violates the policy of the organization (Idem: 6). During active deployment in an armed conflict, the preferences and norms of a combatant about sexual violence may evolve over time due to the suffering, witnessing, and wielding of violence in the conflict (Ibid.). Some of these preferences change into a kind of pleasure in the rape of civilians and may develop into a ‘’need’’ to be increasingly cruel (Idem: 7). A study in the eastern DRC showed that 44 percent of the combatants agreed ‘’a bit’’ or strongly that it can be satisfying to harm others and 8 percent that attacking others was sexually arousing.
Individual motivations can be categorized into three types: individual private preferences, the response to unit social dynamics, and compliance and obedience to the commander’s authority (Ibid.). The commander has three ways in which he can respond to the use of sexual violence by its combatants. He can choose to promote the violence act as organization policy, to tolerate its occurrence, or effectively prohibit the sexual violence through punishment or norms against it (Idem: 8). Sometimes a commander can promote a pattern of sexual violence for a different reason than a strategic one. In some cases the sexual and reproductive lives of the combatants can be organized, where an organizational and sometimes political purpose is served instead of a strategic one (Ibid.). Another reason why a commander tolerates sexual violence by its combatants is because the commander either will not or cannot effectively prohibit it from happening (Idem: 9). This could be because the commander cannot impose his prohibition, even if he would prefer to, because he has no control over his combatants, cannot control rape in particular, or has some control but
dedicates those resources to other issues (Ibid.). Whether rape occurs as a practice depends on the private preferences of combatants, the unit social dynamics of the armed force, and the toleration of the commander (Ibid.).
There are two conditions under which rape as a practice is likely to occur frequently. In the first place, at least some combatants must have a preference for rape. In the second place, unit social dynamics that generate participation must happen through pressure to conform or coercion (Idem: 11). A practice of rape occurs mostly in situations where the organization recruits from a society in which rape and other sexual abuse is already frequent. Because unit social dynamics within units are such an important part of rape being a practice, gang rape is likely to be frequent (Idem: 11-12). Rape is more likely to occur as a practice if combatants are not paid and cannot realize their ideal masculinity or if the organization recruits forcibly (Idem: 12; Baaz and Stern 209). To make a distinction between rape as a practice or as a policy is very difficult. ‘’Evidence that rape is a practice stems immediately
13 from the absence of evidence that it is a policy and evidence that it is tolerated by at least some commanders’’ (Wood 2017: 14). It is also possible, as is happening in the DRC, that although the leadership of the FARDC does not order or condone sexual violence, battalion-level commanders engage in abuses for strategic purposes. In organizations with very weak institutions, the commander might not even know what the policy is of the leadership (Ibid.). If combatants perceive that rape is authorized and not only tolerated, they are more likely to engage in the rapes (Idem: 15). During conflict, rape doesn't need to be seen as an
organizational policy to be frequent; some patterns of rape during conflict are better understood as a practice (Idem: 16).
Lust rapes and Evil Rapes
Baaz and Stern explain the reason why soldiers of the armed government group FARDC (Armed Forces of the DRC) rape in the DRC, which is not raping as a weapon of war but gives other explanations to the complexity of wartime sexual violence. The FARDC is responsible for a large number of the sexual violence that is committed by armed men, but it is extremely difficult to make an accurate estimation. They asked the soldiers why rape occurs, and they make a distinction between ‘’lust rape’’ and ‘’evil rape’’ (Baaz and Stern 2009: 495). These rapes are committed by both government forces and members of rebel groups (Ibid.). The differences between the two rapes are that one is essentially sexual, because the rape happens because of the male libido; while the other is not about sexual desires, but is an expression of anger and rage that the soldiers have (Ibid.). Being a soldier makes you masculine, and in the interviews a picture of a macho male, who was a potential violent soldier whose sexual desire is barely controllable came forward (Idem: 507). The main reason the soldiers gave for the sexual violence was poverty and suffering during wartime. Because there is a very weak cohesion between the commanders and combatants in the FARDC that commanders fear revolt by their subordinates, and this is why there is a widespread rape of civilians (Wood 2017: 10). The most common form of rape was the ‘’lust rape’’, because even some of them see the ‘’evil rape’’ as something bad, and something you should not do to satisfy their needs (Baaz and Stern 2009: 508). The ‘’lust rapes’’ occur because a man must release sexual tension, which is hard to do during wartime because of poor distribution of resources (no money to hire a prostitute) and organization of the military (not being able to go home to their wives on furlough). Because men have sexual needs they can’t control, rape is sometimes defended and allowed (Idem: 509). But they also state that
14 rape is bad and forbidden, both in military and civilian life (Idem: 512). The ‘’evil rapes’’ were given their names because of the level of brutality and the intend behind the rape. The perpetrators of evil rapes feel the need to destroy, instead of fulfilling their sexual needs (Idem: 510-511). This need to destroy comes from the suffering and frustration that accompanies the war and the trauma the war gives them (Idem: 511-512). There was no evidence found that rape is organizational policy: none of the soldiers who were interviewed state that rape had been ordered or authorized. In the context of the FARDC, rape can be seen as a practice in an informal form of compensation that is broadly tolerated by commanders (Wood 2017: 10).
Different perpetrators
In the conflict in the DRC multiple actors engage in sexual violence. As stated earlier, the FARDC (Armed Forces of the DRC) is responsible for many of them. In the year of 2008 the International Rescue Committee reported having assisted over 40,000 rape survivors since 2003 in the province of South Kivu alone. In 2006 the UN reported 27,000 assaults (Harvard HI and Oxfam 2010: 6). In 2007 40 percent of all in the sexual violence was committed by this state organization (Baaz and Stern 2009: 497). Several international organizations have reported observations from the rape survivors in eastern DRC, and collectively they describe the extraordinary brutality of sexual violence in the DRC (Harvard HI and Oxfam 2010: 6). Medécins Sans Frontières (MSF) reported that sexual violence was clearly linked to ‘’warring parties’’ and occurred in such a systematic way that it is wrong to think of it as a side effect of war. The widespread rape has become a defining characteristic of the war in the DRC (Idem: 6-7; MSF 2004; Goodwin 2004). All the women who were interviewed in the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative and Oxfam International (2010) report were asked who their
perpetrator was. Just over half of all perpetrators, with 52 percent, were identified as being armed combatants. Another 42 percent were identified as ‘’assailants’’, but after analysis of their patterns of violence, the evidence strongly suggests that these groups are also armed combatants. This means that the sexual violence in eastern DRC is largely militarized (Harvard HI and Oxfam 2010: 2). Trying to specify responsibility more precisely is very difficult, because at this time in the conflict there were over 20 armed groups and all these groups were known to rape women (Idem: 34-35). The FARDC was a group that was mentioned often, and we can state in combination with the data that they were responsible from a great amount of the sexual violence (Ibid.).
15 forces of the DRC in the years 1996 until 2009. I will only take into account the state actors, because it is the primary responsibility for the state to protect its civilians against sexual violence and violation of their human rights and state forces are significantly more likely to commit sexual violence than insurgent forces (Krause 2015: 15; Cohen 2013; Cohen and Nordås 2014). I will also only analyze state actors because when the state is not capable or not willing to protect, the international community, in this case the UN should protect them. Even though there has been a peacekeeping mission in the DRC for multiple decades, there is still evidence that rape still occurs.
Rape of Men
Researching sexual violence against male civilians is a very difficult matter, because of stigma, shame, and the perceived impunity of the perpetrators. Very few victims report their assaults. This is even worse for men than it is for women, and the percentage of males that report their assault is even much lower than the percentage of women (Peterman et al. 2011). Moreover, during war murder can follow after rape and in such cases the story is buried with her or less frequently, him (Ibid.). Sexual violence against men is something that has not been researched that much (Wood 2017) and to approach the problem of sexual violence more broadly, studies should be expanded beyond the rape of women and include the rape of men (Peterman et al 2011). In conflicts were the sexual violence against men has been properly investigated, ‘’male sexual violence has been recognized as regular and unexceptional, pervasive and widespread, although certainly not at the rate of sexual violence committed against women’’ (Sivakumaran 2007: 259). Because of this reasons, this thesis will also try to research the rape of males with the knowledge that there are data and evidence limitations.
Method
I will examine the research question: ‘’Is sexual violence used as a weapon of war on both men and women in the DRC during the UN peacebuilding missions from 1996 until 2009?’’ and argue that the data shows that rape is used as a weapon of war, but the theory shows that a different explanation is more logical. I will research this with a case study of the
Democratic Republic of Congo and the use of a literature study. The amount of sexual violence that happens to women, and in some years against men, is very high in some years of the conflict, while I argue that not even all the incidents of sexual violence are reported
16 due to different reasons. This is sometimes because the victims feels ashamed, do not know where to go to report the crime or the victim is murdered after the rape (Harvard HI and Oxfam 2010: 7). Rape is very stigmatized in the Congolese culture and the country is a challenging environment to work in. Because of this little systematic research has been done on rape and on rape as a weapon of war (Ibid.). I will compare the literature to the Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict dataset and see if the arguments made in the literature stroke with the data found in the different reports about the DRC. The analysis will focus on the sexual violence against men, the gang rapes and the years with a prevalence of three, meaning that the sexual violence is massive and rape is used as a weapon or a tool. In the analysis will be given possible answers for the reasons why this happens during the UN peacekeeping, where one of its focus points is to protect civilians from sexual violence. Also will the analysis focus on why it is possible that rape is not used as a weapon of war, even though the dataset says it does. After the conclusion, in the discussion, there will be given alternative explanations for my findings and further recommendations for policy around the subject.
Dataset
For my research I have used the data provided by the Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict (SVAC) dataset (SVAC 2013). This dataset collected data from the years 1996 until 2009 in the Eastern Kivu region of the DRC. It uses the same operationalization about rape and sexual violence as described in the theoretical framework above. The dataset is probably not a display of reality, and many data is lacking, so the exact amount of sexual violence will be much higher (Harvard HI and Oxfam 2010: 7; Peterman et al 2011). Still, this dataset can be used to create an image of the sexual violence in the DRC. The used data is data by armed state forces and this dataset includes reports of conflict-related sexual violence. These reports are annual reports from the US State Department, annual and special reports by Human Rights Watch, and annual and special reports from Amnesty International. In this dataset the armed conflict actors that are used are: government/state military, pro-government militias, and rebel/insurgent forces (Ibid.). The dataset covers the conflict in the DRC from the years 1996 until 2009 and covers rapes of both men and women. The definition of sexual violence in the dataset is the same as used in this thesis, namely the definition used by the International Criminal Court with the addition of same of Elisabeth Wood’s concepts (Idem: 7). The
definition that is used includes male victims with a special proxy, making it a very useful for the analysis. All the acts that are used in the dataset are physical, verbal use of sexual
17 violence is not included (Ibid.).
Prevalence
3 (massive) sexual violence is likely related to the
conflict. It is described as massive and the actor used sexual violence as a weapon or tool of war. 1000 or more incidents reported
2 (several/many) sexual violence is likely related to
the conflict. It is described as widespread and frequently. 25-999 incidents reported
1 (some) sexual violence is likely related to the
conflict. There were reports. 25 or less incidents reported.
0 (no reported sexual violence) a report was issued
for a country in a given year, but there was no mention of sexual violence related to the conflict
-99 (Missing) both no report and no information
Table 1. Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict dataset (2013)
For the amount of sexual violence, the dataset uses the variable of prevalence (Idem: 10). The prevalence is categorized into five groups. Three being a massive amount of sexual violence. The perpetrator used sexual violence as a ‘’weapon’’ or a ‘’tool of war’’. For the sexual violence to be coded into the group of three, 1,000 or more incident or victims of sexual violence should be reported (Ibid.). The second group, with prevalence number two has a widespread account of sexual violence and it happened frequently. For this group, 25-999 incidents of victims of sexual violence should be reported (Ibid.). The group called one has some incidents of sexual violence, but most of the numbers did not meet the requirements for the second group. These are reports of incidents of sexual violence or victims less than 25 (Ibid.). The forth group, called zero, is when there is no report of sexual violence. This does mean that there was a report for countries in a given year, but nowhere in the report were cases of sexual violence found (Ibid.). The last group is coded as -99 and is used when data is missing. This is for when there is no report or no information (Ibid.). For the three sources that are used for their reports, multiple answers came up. All three sources had data for all the years, but the prevalence group differs between the three sources in the same year. What is striking, is that in the reports of the US State Department only prevalence 1, 2 and 3 occurs. In both the Human Rights Watch reports and Amnesty International reports, some years have the prevalence zero (SVAC 2013). The year with the most reports of sexual violence is 2008, where in the reports of the Human Rights Watch the prevalence in 2, and in both the US State Department and Amnesty International reports the prevalence is 3. Overall the prevalence of
18 3 is used six times, which shows that sexual violence is massive and used as a weapon or a tool of war (Ibid.).
US
STATE HRW A I Male Gang Population Form of violence
1996 1 1 0 0 1 Tutsi Rape 1997 1 1 1 0 0 Tutsi Rape 1998 2 1 2 0 0 Tutsi Rape 1999 1 1 0 1 0 0 Rape, sexual torture 2000 1 2 0 0 1 0 Rape 2001 1 0 1 0 1 0 Rape 2002 1 1 0 0 0 0 Rape 2003 1 2 0 0 1 0 Rape 2004 3 0 3 0 1 Tutsi Rape 2005 1 2 1 0 1 0 Rape 2006 3 2 3 0 1 -99 Rape 2007 1 2 1 0 1 0 Rape 2008 3 3 2 0 1 0 Rape, sexual slavery
2009 2 1 2 1 0 Hutu Rape, sexual
torture, sexual slavery, sexual mutilation Table 2. SVAC dataset (2013)
After determining that the perpetrators of the sexual violence were coded one, and thus State actors, the next step is to look if the sexual violence was used selectively. If so, this must be explicitly described in the source. One stating that the sexual violence was selectively shows that for four years (1996-1998 and 2004) sexual violence was selectively targeted at Tutsi’s, whereas for 2006 there was no information and in 2009 the Hutu’s were selectively targeted (SVAC 2013). For the variables nationality, religion and age there was no information about the selective targeting. Another variable was the selective targeting of victims of sexual violence based on the assumed or real collaboration with a fighting party. For most of the years there is no data available, but for 2006 the selective targeting was at rebels and in 2009 the selective targeting was at the Mai Mai (an insurgent group) and the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) (an armed rebel group) (Ibid.). Another selective targeting is the one of ‘’other’’. The victim targeted is explicitly named in the reports. For most years there is no information about the other selective, except for 2004 where prostitutes were selectively targeted (Ibid.).
19 Two important variables in the dataset are male and gang. Male states when there is sexual violence against males in the reports on the degree of 0 (none), 1 (some, many), and 2 (significant). For most years there is no sexual violence reported against males, except for the years 1999 and 2009 where the degree is 1 and some/many incidents of sexual violence against men are reported (Ibid.). For the variable gang it is defined as gang if the reported sexual violence was perpetrated by two or more individuals at the same time or location. These degrees vary from 1 if the previous criteria are found in the reports and 0 if not. In contrast to the reports of male victims, gang rape is found in almost every year in the dataset. The years 1996, 2000, 2001 and 2003-2008 have reports of gang rape in their sources
(Ibid.).
The last section in the dataset shows the form of sexual violence that has been used by the armed conflict actor. The forms include (and are limited to): rape, sexual mutilation, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, forced sterilization/abortion, and sexual torture. Sexual violence forms by actors that are not defined as actors in the dataset are not included. There can be more than one form of sexual violence occurring in one year, so the form variables are not exclusive (Ibid.). In most years, there was only the reporting of rape but in the years 1999, 2008 and 2009 there was rape and something(s) else reported. In 1999 there was sexual torture next to rape, in 2008 there was sexual slavery next to rape, and in 2009 there was sexual torture, sexual mutilation and sexual slavery next to rape (Ibid.).
Analysis
When we look at the Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict (2013) dataset, we see that there are forms of sexual violence every year between 1996 and 2009. Although the different reports from the US State Department, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International give different prevalence’s for different years, the overall outcome is that rape is happening widespread and frequent by armed state forces (SVAC 2013).
The first variable for the analysis is male. Only in the years 1999 and 2009 there are reports of incidents where the victim is male. In these years the prevalence’s given by the different reports are: 1, 1, 0 for 1999 and 2, 1, 2 for 2009. Because there is no prevalence of 3, there is no indication that rape is used as a weapon of war against men. Also, there is no indication that there were forms on gang rape in the years 1999 and 2009, but something that does stand out is the fact that in both years there were other forms of sexual violence besides
20 rape. In 1999 there were also reports of sexual torture and in 2009 there were also reports of sexual torture, sexual mutilation, and sexual slavery. The dataset does not cover if this is targeted at men, but apart from 2008 in no other year there have been reports of other forms of sexual violence besides rape. Because of this, one could argue that these forms of sexual violence are targeted also at men. The reason that there are only two years with reported incidents with a male victim could also mean that men feel ashamed to report sexual violence (Ibid; Christian et al 2012). The percentage of men reporting their assault is much lower than women because of the stigma and shame that comes with suffering from sexual violence (Peterman et al. 2011). But even though the percentage of men who report their assault is very low, the sexual violence against men is regular, unexceptional, pervasive and
widespread, but at a lower rate than the violence committed against women (Sivakumaran 2007).
The dataset also states that rape is not used as a weapon of war against men, because in the years that there is evidence of male victims, the prevalence is not high enough to be a weapon of war. Another reason why it might not be a weapon of war is because sexual violence is not used as a policy but as a practice in the DRC (Wood 2017). This is because the sexual violence is driven from ‘’below’’ and tolerated from ‘’above’’. The leadership of the state armed forces in the DRC is very weak, and for the commanders it is better to tolerate the sexual violence than to actively prohibit it because the combatants would not listen to the commander, and his own position would be in danger (Ibid.).
Prevalence 3 shows if rape is used as a weapon, or a tool of war. Only in the years 2004, 2006 and 2008 there are reported incidents of such nature. The prevalence in 2004 is 3, 0, 3, the prevalence in 2006 is 3, 2, 3 and the prevalence in 2008 is 3, 3, 2. This means that in these three years, rape is used as a weapon of war on women in the DRC according to the dataset. In 2008 there is also another form of sexual violence, namely sexual slavery, which could be used as a weapon of war (SVAC 2013; Kirby 2012; Cohen 2013). As stated above with men, rape can be seen as a practice of war instead of a policy by the state armed forces. But still, you could argue that combatants use rape as a weapon of war, even though it is not a policy forced from the leadership of the state armed forces. Many combatants and even commanders, don’t even know the policy of the leadership of the state armed forces and rape is sometimes seen as ‘’self-pay’’ because the combatants don’t get enough from their
commanders and the leadership (Wood 2017). State armed forces are poorly equipped and because of this the organization of the army lacks furlough and the soldiers feel emasculated, rape is an ideal weapon and one that is difficult to match (Harvard HI and Oxfam 2010: 37:
21 Baaz and Stern 2009). Also the soldiers make a distinction between ‘’lust rapes’’ and ‘’evil rapes’’. The evil rapes are an expression of anger, where the goal is to harm the victim, and it mostly ends with murdering the victim. These could be seen as a weapon of war, because of its brutal nature, but it is difficult to proof because the motives are individual (Baaz and Stern 2009). Features of the conflict have also contributed to the success of rape as a military strategy, because efforts of the FARDC have been weak in defending the civilians. Also, community members have not taken up arms to defend themselves. The war in eastern DRC is a war where armed forces direct their violence on civilian populations rather than on another military group (Harvard HI and Oxfam 2010: 37-38).
Another variable, gang rape, is something that is reported in most of the years of the conflict. Apart from 1997, 1998, 1999, 2002 and 2009 every year has incidents of gang rape. Gang rape can contribute to group cohesion for the military, which could be an explanation of why gang rape is such a frequent occasion (Baaz and Stern 2009). What is something that stands out is that in both years that there are reports of sexual violence against men, there are no incidents of gang rape reported. As gang rape is a tool to create group cohesion, it is striking that there are also incidents of gang rape in the years where rape is not used as a weapon of war according to the data. This while military rape in the region is marked with a predominance of rang rape. Almost 60 percent of the victims of sexual violence interviewed at Panzi Hospital described gang rape (Harvard HI and Oxfam 2010: 2). Another reason why there is such a high number of gang rapes could be because of the weak institution of the FARDC, and the way in which gang rape is an effective method for creating and perpetuating cohesion within the units (Cohen 2013: 465). When combatants engage in gang rape, they get a higher status and a reputation for being tough, something that most members of the FARDC feel like they have lost (Idem: 464; Baaz and Stern 2009). In this way, gang rape is not a weapon of war, a strategy or a policy, but more a practice served to bond groups together (Cohen 2013: 476; Wood 2017).
During the years of the SVAC dataset, the UN peacebuilding mission in the DRC was named MONUC. In 2010, a year after the data ends, the mission was renamed into
MONUSCO, with an added mandate and resolutions. At the beginning of the MONUC mission, sexual violence was not a priority for the peacebuilding mission. It started when a ceasefire ‘’stopped’’ the brutal civil war in the DRC, but after the intervention of the UN the conflict had other waves of violence and is still ongoing as of today (un.org 2009). In October 2000, Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security was adopted (UNSCR 1325). This mandate shows that the UN addresses the sexual violence problem in the DRC, but the
22 dataset shows that during the years after the mandate rape is still widespread and frequent. Sexual violence is being acknowledges and addressed, but resolution 1325 didn’t help in the decline of rape in the DRC.
In 2008, which was a year with a lot of sexual violence in the country, resolution 1820 was adopted. With this resolution the UN explicitly asked all parties to stop
immediately with the use of sexual violence during conflicts, and thus the conflict in the DRC (securitycouncilreport.org 2008). But as we can see in the data, the sexual violence against civilians kept happening despite of the R2P and PoC. After this resolution many other resolutions like this followed, and in 2010 there was a Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict established (Krause 2015: 8). This shows that the sexual violence in the DRC is widespread, frequently and ongoing. Because the DRC is called the ‘’rape capital in the world’’, these resolutions also show the problem with sexual violence in the country and the ways in which the UN tries to stop the sexual violence. But what is striking, is that there is no mentioning of men in the short explanation of the resolution, even though incidents of sexual violence where men were the victims were already reported nine years earlier and the rape of men is also widespread and regular (Sivakumaran 2007).
Conclusion
In this thesis I researched the question ‘’Is sexual violence used as a weapon of war on both
men and women in the DRC during the UN peacebuilding missions from 1996 until 2009?’’
and I found that there is a multidimensional answer to this question. This is because of the data and theory, and the fact that the data lacks the ‘’real numbers’’ of the prevalence of sexual violence against both men and women. Because data is very hard to gather in the DRC and its conflict and victims of sexual violence often don’t report their assault or don’t survive their assault the rape estimates are not much more than a highly educated guess (Peterman et al 2011). Still, the analysis of the Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict (2013) dataset shows that rape and other forms of sexual violence in the DRC are widespread and frequent. The dataset shows that rape is not used as a weapon of war on men, and only on women in the years 2004, 2006 and 2008. This is a bit of a blunt statement, and the theory shows that there are possible other explanations than the fact that rape is used as a weapon of war.
An explanation of why there are only two years in which sexual violence against men found in the reports could because men report their assault lesser then women or alternative
23 explanation could be because men are more often murdered after the sexual assault. This doesn’t mean that sexual violence against men is not widespread and frequent, although in lesser extent than the sexual violence against women. The reason why gang rape is reported so often is because this helps build group cohesion in the units of the FARDC. The FARDC is a military organization with weak institutions, and the commander often doesn’t have much influence on its subordinates so by perpetrating gang rape, the bond within units becomes stronger. Because of this weak vertical relationship, sexual violence is more of a practice than a policy within the FARDC. Taking everything into account, you can state that rape is
probably not used as a weapon of war. Because it is not ordered from ‘’above’’, but driven from ‘’below’’ and tolerated from ‘’above’’ rape is used as a practice with different motives for individuals and units within the FARDC. This doesn’t mean that rape totally isn’t used as a weapon of war. The ‘’evil rapes’’ could be seen as a weapon of war, with individual
motives, because their goal is to harm the victim severely with almost always death as a result. But because rape is not ordered, and not a policy, it is not used as a weapon. Discussion
This thesis has multiple limitations in both data and evidence for reason already previously stated. Because of this, there could be alternative explanations for the analysis made in this thesis. In this thesis, the data that has been focused on was sexual violence perpetrated by state armed forces, the FARDC. In some years of the conflict in the DRC there are more than 20 different armed forces, which makes this analysis only a very small part of the entire conflict and makes it hard to form generalizing statements about the sexual violence and the use of rape as a weapon of war. Rape could be used as a weapon of war by other armed forces but you cannot state that for sure.
Also, because the data is only about the province of Kivu, generalizing to the entire conflict is very hard. However, Kivu is the most violent region so empirical evidence from this province would probably be more severe than other regions. Because the dataset only has certain years in which they have gathered data and the conflict is still ongoing, it is hard to find trends in the sexual violence over the years and make generalizing comments about the entire conflict.
Sexual violence has gotten more attention in the last two decades with international organizations such as the UN. In the part of the conflict not covered by this thesis more work is being done to prevent and protect. This is something that should keep happening, even in a broader sense. Much more research should be done in the region about sexual violence, both
24 targeted at men and women. A better understanding of the prevalence and the massive
problem should help build awareness about the problem and therefore making the best solutions. Once better research has been done, the UN could be more actively involved in the solutions and mandates, and make sure that perpetrators will be stopped. And hopefully someday these solutions will put an end to the widespread and frequent use of sexual violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
25
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