The Influence of Political Messages On The Vote In A European Union Referendum Campaign : an Experiment With Italian Youth

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MA Erasmus Mundus Master

Journalism, Media and Globalisation

(joint degree)

The Influence of Political Messages On The Vote In A

European Union Referendum Campaign: An Experiment

With Italian Youth

by

Anna Elena Maria Ferrari

Student ID: 11300310

Master’s Thesis

Graduate School of Communication

Master’s programme Communication Science

Supervisor/Examiner: mw. dr. P.H. Sheets Thibaut

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Abstract:

The recent recurrence of EU related referenda has raised questions about the media and political communication effects on voting behaviours. In particular, many concerns stem from the rise of populism across Europe. This study explores the effects of certain communication cues on the voting behaviors of young Italians in case of referendum on the euro currency, taking into

consideration their personal knowledge and interest in the topic of the referendum. Participants in the experiment (N=233) were randomly assigned to a news article, which had been modified for the purpose of the experiment, containing expert and populist cues or no cues at all, and after they were asked to fill a questionnaire. This study showed that the majority of Italian young people are against leaving the euro currency and even against having a referendum on it. When exposed to specific cues, participants seemed to be more likely to follow the expert rather than populistic argumentations. The study concludes with a discussion about the implications of the results for political communication and the role of the media in referendum campaigns, in the context of a media system such as the Italian one. A final broader reflection on the participatory function of direct democracy and its meaning for future EU-related referenda across Europe is provided.

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Introduction:

The present research takes inspiration from the most recent referenda held across Europe, focused on topics of European integration and the current rise of populism, which could affect, with communication messages, the voting behaviors of citizens. It touches on the level of correct information and knowledge required to the citizens to take a real participatory role in democracy (Strömbäck, 2005).

Scholars have considered referenda as important for the involvement of citizens in EU democracy, to help the creation of a common European identity as well as to overcome the

democratic deficit the EU is often accused of (e.g. Hug 2003; Meyer 1999; Scharpf 1997, Schuck & de Vreese, 2011). According to the Elaboration Likelihood Model, the level of knowledge and interest is a pivotal factor in voters’ resistance to persuasion. In particular, cues are especially followed when involvement is low because people with minimal knowledge lacks the tools to differentiate strong from weak arguments, while when people are knowledgeable about an issue, they are difficult to persuade, while (Perloff, 2010).

Relatively little research focus on the youngsters and direct democracy. Thus, this research aims to contribute to fill the gap. Such target is particularly important because young people are the newest cohort of voters and are going to see the effects of current political decisions for the longest time. This study would also like to add up-to-date knowledge on voting attitudes in a EU member State, such as Italy, with a high experience with referenda and a polarized pluralist media system with high political parallelism in the media (Hallin & Mancini, 2004).

Therefore, I studied, through an experiment, the effects of certain communication cues on the voting behaviors of young Italians in case of referendum on the euro currency, taking into consideration their personal knowledge and interest in the topic of the referendum.

Theoretical Section

Direct democracy and citizen’s participation

In the general discourse, ‘democracy’ has a positive connotation because it is a way of government that allows citizens to elect their governors and change them every specific cycle of years without causing a revolution every time. However, there are different types of democracy and,

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while direct democracy is considered by some the most democratic of all, it is still only one among other types of democracy and it is worthy to reflect on the pros and cons of such system.

In particular, direct democracy is a form of democracy in which the electorate votes on issues which, in traditional representative democracy, parliament votes on (Budge, 2008). However, also representative democracies can have occasions to experiment direct democracy: through the referendum tool.

Referenda have the potential to enhance legitimacy of a political choice because of the collective participation to that choice and the enhanced sense of political efficacy and engagement among citizens (eg: Schuck & de Vreese, 2011; Closa, 2007; Bowler and Donovan 2002; Fishkin 1995; Mendelsohn and Parkin 2001). Political participation, in fact, means a deep interest in politics and civic society, which leads a citizen to be well-informed and take related actions, whose degree and frequency depend on his/her level of interest and enthusiasm (see Dalton, 2008; Donovan and Karp, 2006). Stimulating citizen participation in political decision-making has been often

considered as an effective way to address problems such as political apathy (eg; Schuck & de Vreese, 2011, p. 181). Moreover, some scholars have considered referenda as important for the involvement of citizens in EU democracy, to help the creation of a common European identity as well as to overcome the democratic deficit the EU is often accused of (e.g. Hug 2003; Meyer 1999; Scharpf 1997). “Since the European Parliament is the only EU institution which is directly and democratically elected, national referendums are of special importance and one of the few

opportunities for citizens to directly engage in EU politics” (Schuck & de Vreese, 2011, p. 199). Referenda have been particularly frequent recently in Europe (Schuck & de Vreese, 2011). The nature of the most recent referenda and elections in Europe is particularly interesting because they were not only focusing on national issues, but in many of them, citizens of member States of the European Union were called to vote on EU related issues. Some recent EU related referenda, in particular, failed on the pro-EU side of the issue at stake, being the outcome about denying further EU integration, or the exit from the EU membership overall or the rejection of some EU

immigration policies (Denmark in 2015, The Netherlands in 2016, United Kingdom in 2016; Hungary in 2016, although it did not reach the quorum). These occasions, together with the recent referendum on the reform of the Constitution in Italy in 2016 have been the events that made me start reflecting on the efficacy of such a tool for democracy.

In this regard, media influence is interesting to investigate because “news is the key source of information about politics and the economy for a majority of citizens in Western democracies” (de Vreese, 2009, p. 191; see also Bennett & Entman, 2001; Dalton, 2002; de Vreese & Semetko, 2004). In fact, EU citizens have continuously reported TV news and newspapers to be their most

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important source of information for European political matters, alongside a rising use, over the years, of the Internet (e.g. European Commission, Eurobarometer 40 years, 2013), and also their most important information source during referendum campaigns (e.g. Jenssen et al. 1998). Moreover, media can be influential in providing cues for the public on what to think about referenda (Schuck and de Vreese, 2011).

In an EU context, studies have shown how the tone of news coverage can affect voting behaviours in referenda towards the issue at stake (de Vreese and Semetko 2004b) or citizens’ support for further enlargement (e.g. de Vreese and Boomgaarden 2006; Maier and Rittberger 2008). The debate is to what extent and how the media do so (Reeves et al., 2016).

One central question is what kind of information and information quality can influence voting behaviours. In fact, the participatory model intended by direct democracy requires also a good level of political engagement from the people and well-functioning role of the media as able to provide voters with correct and not-biased information (Ferree et al., 2002; Strömbäck, 2004). When the sufficient and correct amount of information fails to form the citizens’ opinions, then it is when the problems with direct

democracy starts and when the risk of manipulation might kick in, which is linked to the role of the media and of campaign messages. In facr, the most beautiful characteristic of direct democracy, which is giving back the whole power of decision in the hands of the people, is also potentially a double-edged sword, because the voters might become easily the target of populist manipulation. In fact, in direct democracy, voters can be confronted with difficult decisions on complex issues with long-lasting effects. These complex issues might actually need specific preparation and a deep understanding and the people might not have this kind of knowledge, as it happens in many cases. Some scholars warned that the use of referendums could open the door to populism (Dalton et al. 2001) and foster political intolerance (Sartori, 1987) because of the polarisation of political discourse (Schuck and de Vreese, 2011).

The persuasive power of populism

In this study, I decided to take into consideration the diversity of language of populist versus expert actors, so the exposure to populistic style news versus expert style news.

Populism is conceived of as a political style manifesting proximity of the people, while at the same time taking an anti-establishment stance and underlining the (ideal) homogeneity of the people by excluding specific population segments (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007).It is relevant because right-wing parties in Europe are using it and it is concerning because of the divisive ideas, often anti-EU and even racist one, they apply it to, especially simplifying complex issues in a manipulated way (Garlinska, 2017). The power of persuasion lies in how it talks to the gut of the people (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007)

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Moreover, some studies have found that lower levels of interest, motivation and education are related to higher levels of referendum approval (Schuck & de Vreese, 2011). If it is so, therefore one could wonder whether there might be a risk of easily manipulating a dissatisfied electorate on the real topic of the referendum. The risk of manipulation lies, in particular, in the fact that such electorate is not particularly skilled in political topics and might not have the best tools to think independently. Some previous studies discovered that political knowledge contributed to more elaborate responses to news (e.g. Price, Tewksbury, and Powers, 1997). This potential manipulation, coming from news and information messages, might then lead the people to be influenced, in the moment of voting, by other issues than the single one at stake in the referendum. If so, it might be legitimate to raise serious questions on the efficacy of the referendum tool as an instrument of democracy.

The Elaboration Likelihood Model: cues and information processing in persuasion

Focusing on the process by which people can be affected by messages, the model of the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM theory) presents some interesting points of inspiration.

According to ELM theory, cues are pieces of information in the stimulus (for example, a news or a message) that are processed peripherally or used to make a simple inference about the merits of the advocated position. They are supposed to be especially followed when involvement and knowledge of the person exposed to the stimuli is low. According to the ELM, among the factors influencing message processing are, in fact, personal involvement and the ability to process the message. When people are knowledgeable about an issue, they process information ‘centrally’, which means

carefully and skillfully and they are difficult to persuade (Petty and Cacioppo, 1984). In addition, a key to understanding is, according to the ELM theory, the degree to which the issue touches on an individual’s strong attitudes, values, or ego-entrenched positions. In politics, central processing frequently leads to reinforcement or strengthening of existing attitudes. “By contrast, people with minimal knowledge on a topic lack the background to differentiate strong from weak arguments. They also may lack confidence in their opinions. They use peripheral processors, more susceptible to persuasion in most situations” (Perloff, 2010, p. 141).

Related to the topic of political campaigns, a large numbers of voters process political

information peripherally, if they do it at all. Petty and Cacioppo (1984) state that such voters accept a message because a credible source recommends it. The question is what kind of source they would evaluate as credible. In fact, low-involved voters often rely on these cues and can be swayed by superficial appeals, such as hearing the “right” word in a slogan. They will proceed with

endorsement without much further information (Perloff, 2010). This raises difficult questions about the role communication in contemporary democracy. It is important to bear in mind that human

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beings are not objective thinkers. If so, voters and the media have the responsibility to protect themselves from being taken in by peripheral persuasion messages of political actors, because there lies the danger of voters’ manipulation.

Research question and hypotheses

Given the theory used for this topic, especially the ELM and the manipulation danger in populist messages and the type of support for the referendum tool, the following hypotheses were

formulated:

H1: Participants would follow more the populist cues than expert ones.

H2: The level of knowledge would be a moderating effect on the persuasive effects of the message cues.

H3: Combining the two hypothesis above, people with low knowledge would fall more often for populist cues than for expert ones.

H4: People with no political positions and politically disengaged are more supportive of the referendum tool.

RQ: How voters respond to different types of information cues within persuasive messages about referenda?

Method:

As research method, a survey experiment was conducted online. Advantages of this method include the possibility to establish causality and strict control (Babbie, 2005). An online experiment was useful because I could reach my young target audience. In addition, data show that for young Italians, the internet also compares to the way they get their news – online1.

Experiment Design

Participants were exposed to one of three different versions of a short article with political messages (length between about 315 and 428 words). The basic text of the message was identical – it

1_{In particular, among online users, social media have grown significantly as a source of news between}

2013-2016, making it now above 50%. Facebook is on top of the networks used weekly for news, respectively with 54% among all users and 62% of Italians under 35 years old. Digital News Report 2016, Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism. See also the 50th_{Censis (Centro Studi Investimenti Sociali) Report on the social situation of the}

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discussed a hypothetical upcoming referendum on leaving the Euro currency and returning to the Lira, and presented information in favor of leaving the Euro. The topic chosen for the referendum was EU-related because of multiple reasons. First of all, the recent referenda taking place in Europe, although at national level, have been often EU related (e.g. the Danish referendum in 2015, the ‘Brexit’ in 2016, the Hungarian referendum in 2016, the Dutch referendum in 2016)2_{. Secondly, in} general, election campaigns in Europe have seen the rise of Eurosceptic and populist parties

(Dzurinda 2016; Rooduijn 2015). These populist parties are generally against the EU, promoting the leaving of the EU itself (Ruzza, 2009), or in the Italian case, if not to leave the EU in itself, at least to leave the euro currency, therefore moving backwards on the integration path (Franzosi & Salvati, 2015). Italy is a country with a high experience with referenda, with a total of 72 since 1946,

although only one was specifically about the EU (in 1989, about the mandate of MEPs).Historically Italy has been a very pro-EU country. However, things have changed in the perception of Italians. Especially since the start of the economic crisis in 2008, the popularity of the EU has decreased. In fact, while more than half of the Italians (56.8%) expressed faith in the European Union in 2000, only one third (33.5%) did so in 2013 (Demos.it data3). This context therefore provided a credible context for the proposed referendum in this study, and in particular facilitated a comparison between the populist cues of interest and alternative cues. In the experimental messages, the basic text included accurate data from the Eurobarometer report (Standard Eurobarometer/European Commission, 86, Autumn 2016) and a position paper by Prometeia, a financial consultancy company specialized in risk management4_{. This information showed the general willingness of a} proportion of Italians to consider leaving the Euro, as well as a professional assessment of some of the benefits of such a move in the short-term.

In two versions of the message, additional information was manipulated to present different forms of cues to participants. In the “populist” version, the basic article was complemented by subtle cues in the headline and the name of the sponsoring group that indicated right-wing populist

2_{On a technical level, the Italian Constitution so far does not allow for such a referendum. In fact, art. 75 Const. so far}

does not allow for an abrogative referendum on “authorization or ratification of international treaties”. Italy adhered to the euro currency through the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, therefore, a referendum is in principle not admissible. The solution would be to call for a consultative referendum, meaning a referendum whose result is not binding for the Government and Parliament in charge. It would be achievable through the introduction of a Constitutional Law that changes that part of the Constitution. This situation had only another precedent in 1989: Italy had a consultative referendum on the opportunity to strengthen the political role of the European Parliament.

However, this would need a very strong majority of the proposing groups in the Italian Parliament.

Therefore I decided to choose to propose a referendum on the euro because although at the moment is not close to happen, it is anyways not totally unlikely. Also, it is a topic that can be easily exposed to populist arguments and it is about an issue, such as the currency, whose use everybody experiences, although we different levels of understanding.

3_{Demos 2015 report, ‘Gli italiani e lo Stato’.}

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leanings, such as the “Italians for Italy”. Additionally, there was a statement of an alleged proponent of the referendum, a fictional character, presented as leader of the related pro-referendum group (“Italians for Italy”), and presented as being close to Beppe Grillo, the leader of the populist 5 Star Movement. The 5 Star Movement in fact promoted the idea of having a referendum on the euro, especially in the past5. The statements of this fictional politician were drawn from actual political interviews, not only from the 5 Star Movement, but also from other right-wing parties such as Lega Nord and Silvio Berlusconi’s group, lending the manipulation more credibility6_.

In the second, “expert” version of the article, these populist cues were changed to represent expert business cues, meant to simulate an expert financial position on the topic—while still promoting the same pro-referendum position. In this condition, the referendum was promoted by another invented but credible character, a professor from a fictional group of associated universities (“Academics for Change”) and collaborator with the Bocconi Economics University, which is a famous Italian university for economics studies. This condition was meant to contrast with the populist one, to still offer elite cues but have them be relevant to the topic, from a clearly expert source—this contrasts with the populist cues, which are less topically relevant and instead capture the anti-elite, nationalist sentiments played upon by right-wing populist movements in so many current debates (Dzurinda 2016; Rooduijn 2015). Thus, there were three versions in total: a control condition, the populist cues version, and the expert cues version. For the full text of the three versions of the articles, see the appendix.

Procedure

Participants were randomly assigned to a control condition (N=70), a populist condition (N=73) or an expert condition (N=90).

. After the article, participants filled in the post-test questionnaire. The first question was how they would vote (to keep or leave the euro); two open questions followed to assess why they would vote that way, and then a battery of closed questions assessed their attitudes toward the article and toward the topic of the euro referendum more generally, as well as their perceptions on the Italian

5_{See on Beppe Grillo’s blog “out of the euro. Hot to exist the euro currency”}_{http://www.beppegrillo.it/fuoridalleuro/}

The recent “5 Star book of the citizens for Europe”: http://www.movimento5stelle.it/parlamentoeuropeo/libro-5-stelle-dei-cittadini-per-europa.pdf , March 2017, also lauching again the idea of a euro currency referendum. The position of the 5StarMovement towards the EU had also some sudden shifts, in some moments taking softer tones and claiming that there is no intention to abandon the EU tout court: ‘MS5 Doesn’t Want to Leave Europe and the EU anymore’, Francesco Zaffarano, 24/06/2016, Lastampa.it, last retrieved on May 11 2017. http://www.lastampa.it/2016/06/24/italia/politica/il-ms-ha-cambiato-idea-e-non-vuole-pi-il-referendum-per-uscire-dalleuropa-pi0QFlJ5LwZoOXkqUcdxnL/pagina.html. See also: Franzosi & Salvati, 2015.

6_{Italy’s Power Player, Shane Smith talks to Silvio Berlusconi about Trump, Putin, and European politics, Vice News,}

April 21, 2017 https://news.vice.com/story/shane-smith-talks-to-silvio-berlusconi-about-trump-putin-and-european-politics

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economy. A manipulation check item assessed whether participants correctly recalled the name of the sponsoring group in the message; results showed that 38,2% (N=89) of participants did not correctly recall, while 61,8% (N=144) did so. Next, demographics followed because some studies have recorded that gender, age and level of educations can be significant demographics indicators for explaining support for European integration (Claes de Vreese, 2004, p. 198). Finally, some last questions were asked on their general interest in politics and attitudes towards referenda in general, and the one on the euro in particular and degree of support for the Italian political parties who are currently in the Parliament (see appendix). These items served as moderators in the study.

Upon completion of the questionnaire, there was a debriefing, explaining to participants the purpose of the research, the manipulation and their random assignment to one version of the article and some clarification on what information was constructed and what was real, as well as that such referendum was not planned for this summer.

The study took place from 6th May 2017 until 15th May 2017. Participants did not receive any compensations.

Sample

The sample was drawn from young Italians between 18 and 35 years old. 18 is the start of the voting age; then I put the barrier to 35 years old. One reason is that I needed to pin down the focus on a specific group, and young voters are a group still relatively little explored. Moreover, young people represents the voters who will live the consequences of a referendum for the longest time. Also, I wanted to take the threshold for the oldest ones a bit high, because in Italy is common that people with age until 30 are still in the fluid passage from education to employment and until 35 are achieving a more solid position.

Age was measured by a single item, asking respondents their age (M=26.19, SD=3.17).

Participants were recruited through social media, in particular through the personal networks of the researcher on Twitter and Facebook. Therefore, in the distribution of my experiment there might be a risk of having a filter bubble effect, ending up with a non-representative sample.

Statistics from my sample showed that, out of the 232 participants who answered the question about their political ideology, 28% said they had no political leaning, 25,8% chose centre-left and 25% chose left, hence in the political leaning the majority belongs to the left-wing range. Of the rest, 9% chose centre-right, 5,2% centre, 4,7% right, 1,7% far left and 0,4% far right. Education-wise, the sample was very well educated (9.9% participants had education until high school, 70.4% until bachelor and Master degrees, 17.6% higher academic titles). In particular, by using my personal network of relatively engaged young people, there was a risk that those people not used to reading

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and getting informed about these issues are under-sampled; this is exactly the category who can be most affected by the low quality information cues in case of political campaigns, having less capacity for critical understanding (Perloff, 2010; see also the cognitive mobilization theory in Schuck & de Vreese, 2011). While this, if anything, provides a more challenging audience for my experiment, I did my best to broaden the sample out to include a wider variety of participants—both those more politically engaged and less. In particular, I wrote privately to each and every one

among my Italian contacts between 18 and 35 on Messenger and Whatsapp and asked them also to share with family, friends and partners. I wrote to about 280 people. This strategy did seem to work, at least somewhat: although the responses might be partially skewed, I was able to successfully breaking the filter bubble and obtain a variety of sample and answers.

Tools for the analysis

A ‘message attitude’ variable to test the level of interest was composed of six items referring to the provided information in the article (persuasive, misleading, informative, biased, neutral and

populist) and ranged from 1 to 7 (M=3,36 , SD=1,22).Cronbach's alpha is 0.824, which indicates a high level of internal consistency for our scale with this specific sample.

In the control condition, the mean message attitude was 3,3 on a scale from 1-7 (SD 1,19). In the populist condition, the mean was 3,21 on a scale from 1-7 (SD 1,30). In the expert condition, the mean message attitude was 3,52 on a scale from 1-7 (SD 1,20). These three means did not differ significantly, according to a one-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), F(2,221) = 1,37, p = .257. This means that the three messages were perceived as equally persuasive/biased. This helps ensure that what differences we see in the dependent variables are not due to message quality itself. The variable on the level of knowledge was computed by combining two items reflecting general political interest (previous knowledge on the issue of the referendum and how often participants follow news on Italian economy), its score ranging from 0 to 1 (M= 0,60, SD=0,23 ).

Data Analysis

A total of 233 participants (N=233) completed all steps in the study.

231 answered the question on how much knowledge they thought they had on the issue of the referendum on a scale from 0 (=none) to 6 (a lot). Of these 231, 51,5% chose level 4 and above, 22,7% chose level 3, 24,9% chose level 0, 1 and 2, therefore there is a good accumulation of participants with a medium/high knowledge on the issue.

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The first hypothesis of the study expected that participants would follow more the populist cues. Among these 233, 79,8 % voted to keep the euro, while 20,2% voted to leave it.In order to test this hypothesis, a Chi-Square analysis was run, comparing the percentage of votes to leave the Euro by message condition. Condition-wise, the percentage of leaving the euro currency were 14,3% for those in the control condition (N=10), 12,3% in the populist condition (N=9) and 31,1% in the expert condition (N=28; (χ2_{= 10,98, p=.004 with df = 2).}

The next hypothesis was that the level of knowledge would be a moderating effect on the persuasive effects of the message cues.

A series of logistic regressions was conducted to examine the independent and combined effects of political interest (using the ‘interest’ variable) and article condition on vote choice. In order to do so, dummy variables were computed to represent each of the categories (expert dummy, populist dummy and control dummy).

Table 1 Logistic regression analysis on the combined effect of political interest and condition types

Expert Populist Control

Parameter (exp) S.E P Parameter (exp) S.E P Parameter (exp) S.E P Coefficient of Dummy -1.07(.343) .872 .219 -.355(.701) .872 .219 1.49(4.42) .986 .132 Coefficient of Interest 2.70*(14.85) 1.114 .015 1.97(7.19) 1.114 .015 3.03***(20.8) .867 .000 Coefficient of Dummy -.162(.851) 1.514 .915 2.23(9.31) 1.514 .915 -1.62(.20) 1.72 .348 Nagelkerke’s pseudo R² .153 -116 .107

Table 1: exp refers to the exponentiation of the slope parameter B that is interpreted, * p< 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001

This logistic regression analysis of the effect of political interest and article condition, as predictors, on the outcome of the vote choice did not give significant findings: Therefore, the hypothesis that the level of interest was not a predictor in any of the condition groups was not confirmed. Also the hypothesis that people with low knowledge would fall more often for populist cues than for expert ones was not confirmed. The coefficient of interest was significant in the expert and in the control condition, while it was not in the populist one.

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Even though the conditions’ effect was not significant, I wanted to see the results of the levels of interest in percentages, compared to article condition and vote choice.

Another way to examine these interactions is to analyze the effects of the cues on vote choice, at three levels of political interest—low, medium, and high. The interest variable was recomputed, based on levels of knowledge (< 0.48; >0.48 and < 0.69; > 0.69), to reflect three levels of political interest and knowledge. The lowest level 1 (N=63) corresponded to 27% of the total participants, level 2 (N=69), corresponded to 29,6% of the total, and level 3 (N=99), corresponded to 42,5%.

Within the lowest level of interest (level 1), the most votes to leave the Euro—thus, in the direction of the message—occurred in the expert condition (48%); this means nearly one half of respondents with low political interest who received the expert cues voted in the direction of those cues. This can be compared to 28,6% of leave votes in the populist condition and 12,5% in the control condition. A Chi-Square test was conducted to see whether these differences were

significant. A significant association was found between the vote and the conditions in this group ( χ2(2)= 7,35, p=0.025 ). This suggests that the expert cues were the most persuasive for low-interest respondents. However, these results must be regarded with caution because in some cells only a very few participants were available for this analysis (total votes to leave the Euro across the three conditions at this knowledge level was N=19).

At the middle interest level, the patterns shift slightly, but no significant differences emerged from the Chi-Square tests. Whereas 35% voted to leave in the control condition, 29,2% did so in the expert condition and only 8% in the populist condition (χ2_{(2)= 5,29, p=0.071). Again, this analysis} is troubled by small sample size – only 16 people voted to leave the Euro in this group. The

marginal significance here is impressive, but z-tests suggested that no group significantly differed from another.

Finally, at the highest level of interest, 10 people voted for leaving the euro. Of these 10 people, most were from the expert condition group (20%), then from the populist condition (6,1%) and no one was from the control condition (0%). A Chi-Square test showed a significant association between voting and conditions in this group ( χ2(2)= 7,83, p=0.02). Again, we have a very small sample size, but the effects here strongly suggest that the expert cues are the most persuasive— among both low and high knowledge voters. In no case was the populist cue particularly persuasive, thus providing no support for the initial hypothesis.

A Pearson’s correlation ( r ) data analysis was run between level of interest/knowledge, ranging from 0 to 1 (M= 0,60, SD=0,23) and education, ranging from 1 to 7 (M=3,78 , SD= 1,10 ).

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The Pearson’s r data analysis revealed a positive correlation, r = .303, statistically significant (p=0,00), hence suggesting that people with higher level of education reported higher level of political and economic interest and knowledge related to the subject of the referendum7.

The third hypothesis that people with no political positions and politically disengaged are more supportive of referenda. The findings showed that those who did not have a political leaning,

interpreted as disengagement sign, composed 28% of the participants, but overall a large majority of participants across the whole spectrum of political ideologies (91,4%) said that referenda are

important to them, expressing strong support, while 3,4% judged them neither important or irrelevant and for 5,2 % they were not important. Thus, also the third hypothesis could not be proved. However, regarding the specific support for a referendum on the euro currency, the result flips in the opposite direction: out of 233 answers, 65.7% is against the idea of having one, 11,2% is neither against nor in favor, 22,3% is in favor.

Because the hypothesized interaction effects did not emerge, I took a step to explore how pertinent respondents found the comments (which were one important manifestation of the expert and populist cues) in the articles. The variable ‘pertinent’ had a range from 1 to 7 (M=3,64 ,

SD=0,60). A one-way ANOVA was conducted to compare the three conditions on the pertinent

comments outcome, which revealed a significant effect of the conditions on the outcome (Mcontrol=4,42 (SD=1,20) vs. Mpopulist = 3,68 (SD=1,40) vs. Mexpert =2,98 (SD=1,40); F(2,228) = 16,42, p = .000.) Post hoc comparison using a Bonferroni test correction indicated that the mean scores differed significantly between all three conditions. Specifically, we see that the control condition had the highest mean pertinence rating, followed by the populist condition and then the expert condition.

Because I wanted to test the influence of an article promoting only one perspective and the impact of populist vs expert cues, I asked the participants how much people find that a) the article was helpful to determine how to vote and b) whether the article made them change their mind on how to vote. The variable ‘helpful’ had a range from 1 to 7 (M= 5,24, SD=1,56). The second variable ‘mind-changing’ had a range from 1 to 7 (M= 5,87; SD=1,4). A one-way ANOVA was conducted to compare the three conditions on the article rated as ‘helpful’ outcome, which revealed a significant effect of the conditions on the outcome (Mcontrol=5,43 (SD=1,60) vs. Mpopulist =5,53 (SD=1,42) vs. Mexpert = 4,9 (SD=1,60); F(2,225) = 4,441, p = .013). Post hoc comparison using

Bonferroni test correction indicated that only the mean score difference between populist condition and expert condition was significantly different. Specifically, we see that the populist condition had

7_{The same models as above run with education as a moderator also showed no interaction/moderation effects. See}

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a higher mean for the article as ‘helpful’ rating than the expert condition.A one-way ANOVA was conducted to compare the three conditions on the article rated as ‘helpful’ outcome, which revealed no significant effect of the conditions on the outcome (Mcontrol=5,91 (SD=1,36) vs. Mpopulist =5,97 (SD=1,36) vs. Mexpert = 5,75 (SD=1,541); F(2,223) = .517, p = .597). Post hoc comparison using

Bonferroni test correction indicated that there was no mean score significantly different among groups. These findings will make clearer sense when confronted with the content analysis of the open questions to participants. At this point, however, it is possible to say that participants considered the information provided in the articles of little help in deciding how to vote and

consistently across all the conditions denied that such information made them change their mind on how to vote in case of a referendum on the euro currency.

Given the lack of hypothesized effects, I turned to the open-ended questions posed to

respondents, probing them for the basis of their vote choice. An informal, but detailed analysis of all the answers (N=175) was conducted, looking for patterns across the three conditions. 4 general clusters of answers emerged from this analysis: either a rejection of the message as

biased/insufficient for a vote choice (bias); a statement that no information in the article was relevant to them (none); a statement that their previous ideas on the topic were the basis of their vote (previous attitude); or an acknowledgment of the short-term benefits mentioned in the article as the most interesting part they had read.

Of these 175 comments, 13.71% (N=24), said that they found the article biased, only providing one view and that they would need more information before making a vote. 15.42% of comments (N=27) said that they already had pre-formed personal ideas on the topic, no matter which kind of articles they got. 13.14% of comments (N=23) pointed out as relevant information the fact that Italy would have advantages from the exit of the euro in the first two years, but among these, 78.26% (N=18) were skeptical, saying that it is a short term of period and after it there is no indication in the article of what would happen. Finally, 51 comments, corresponding to 29.14%, wrote that ‘none’ of the information in the article was relevant to them. These findings helps to understand the lack of significant results earlier, because the comments showed how most rejected the article and only 13% of the total thought something was relevant, but just to say that they were still skeptical about the future situation without the euro.

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Discussion

The present research aimed at studying the effects of populist and expert cues on voting behaviors in case of referendum, and in particular, a referendum related to the European Union integration in the Italian context and focusing on young voters. This study showed that the majority of Italian young people in the experiment are against leaving the euro currency and even against having a referendum on the euro currency, even when exposed to articles who, although in different ways, are promoting the leave side. The study put an assumption into the literature to an empirical test.

The first hypothesis of the study expected that participants would follow more the populist cues. This hypothesis was not confirmed: overall, the condition group that registered the highest number of ‘leaving the euro’ votes was the expert condition.

The second hypothesis was that the level of knowledge would be a moderating effect on the persuasive effects of the message cues. Such expectation was drawn on the ELM theory and assumed that people with low knowledge are easier to persuade than people with high knowledge, therefore people with low knowledge are more likely to vote accordingly to the information with particular strong cues they are exposed to (Perloff, 2010).

A logistic regression analysis of the effect of political interest and knowledge, and article condition, as predictors, on the outcome of the vote choice did not give significant findings: the level of interest was not a predictor in any of the condition groups. However, the coefficient of interest was significant in the expert and in the control condition, while it was not in the populist one. A crosstab comparison with frequencies and percentages confirmed that participants with low interest and knowledge in the topic of the referendum tended to follow more the indications given by the expert (and to vote accordingly), compared to the populist and control condition. Thus, the third hypothesis, that people with low knowledge would fall more often for populist cues than for expert ones, was also not confirmed. This result could be interpreted as a good sign for Italian democracy, because it means that young people, even with low level of knowledge, still rely more on the expertise of someone who seems prepared on the topic than on people with no specific preparation and title, actually rejecting populist rhetoric instead of falling for it. These results has to be taken with caution, as there were numerically more people in the expert condition that in all the others.

In addition, more people voted to leave the euro currency in the lowest level of interest and knowledge in the referendum subject than in the other levels. The higher the level of interest and knowledge, and the fewer people were voting to leave the euro currency. This result is in line with previous studies showing that knowledgeable citizens are more likely to be more supportive of EU

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enlargement plans (De Vreese, 2004). In line with the ELM theory on persuasion (Perloff, 2010), it suggests that people with higher levels of political knowledge and individuals offering a more elaborate evaluation of the issue were more likely to reject the messages in the articles and have a critical independent thinking.

Thus, it is cautiously concluded that the Italian young voters are resistant to strongly sided political messages in their voting behaviors, especially the ones with high level of knowledge and interest in the subject. When there is an influence, it seems stronger among who has low knowledge and anyway they tend to follow more an expert than a populist.

The fourth hypothesis that people with no political positions and politically disengaged are more supportive of referenda (Schuck & De Vreese, 2011)could not be proved. In fact, those who did not have a political leaning, interpreted as disengagement sign, composed 28% of the participants, but overall a large majority of participants across political references (91,4%) expressed strong support for the referendum as a democratic tool. However, the majority (65,7%) was against the idea of having a specific referendum on the euro currency. These results suggest that when considering support for referendum as a democratic tool, the subject and the time in the specific case might determine a very different level of support. These findings are linked to the studies on democratic systems and the role of the media for democracy (Strömbäck, 2005) and with further investigation could have important implications for the quality of democracy in its participatory dimensions, if the goal is to allow people to express their political preferences through the referendum tool (Dalton& Anderson, 2011).

The implications of this study touch upon the meaning of democracy and the role of campaign messages. Many participants rated the articles overall as biased and one sided, no matter which version they were exposed to. From the comments, it emerged that the lack of a different perspective in the same article made them suspicious and less willing to trust its message.

Moreover, in the comments, many participants showed to have pre-formed ideas (being them either very pro-EU or against it). Indeed, the fact that the euro currency is a corner stone of the European Union integration process can easily become an issue of ideological matter. The tendency to lean on political ideology, however, seems to suggest that the cues they would be exposed hardly mattered, because these information would have no or poor influence on their voting behaviors. These

findings about participants’ resistance to the message and self-reliance are in line with the classification of Italy as a polarized pluralistic media system (Hallin & Mancini, 2004),

characterized by high political parallelism, commentary oriented and politically polarized media outlets. This is also in line with the latest findings on trust in the media in the Italian context:

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(Digital News Report 2016, Reuters Institute). This result might suggest that news are not really playing a role in the public sphere. This result is problematic because in all democratic theories it is deemed that information and exchange of opinion is central (Strömbäck 2005). This reflection suggests, for future implications in Italian media, that a stronger effort to raise citizens’ trust is needed and perhaps a solution lies in a more objective approach to political news. This study may also provide some useful information for the campaign communication strategy of political actors, related to the way they communicate certain proposals to the citizens.

The results of this study, however, have to be interpreted with caution because they could be slightly skewed regarding the selection sample, as illustrated in the methods section. Probably my sample was too educated and interested over all. A more complete study with more sources, staff and time span to make an experiment on national scale would reach a better level of

representativeness. Another limit of this study us that it is tailored on a kind of referendum – on the euro currency- that it is difficult to happen (although not impossible) for reasons linked to the Italian constitutional law (which does not allow any referendum on international treaties matters). Thus, those who know about this constitutional limit might end up being disengaged from the experiment, without paying attention to the message cues. This limit however could confirm the result that those with high level of knowledge are resistant to these type of cues. Moreover, a more equal number of participants would be needed for stronger conclusions, in particular in the

distribution between left-wing and right-wing groups, in the level of education groups and in the condition groups.

Previous research has explored the relationship between political messages and voting

behaviours and did it in the context of a EU related referendum (Schuck & De Vreese, 2011), as well as reflected on the quality of direct and participatory democracy in relation to the media (Dalton& Anderson, 2011). This study wants to represent a contribution to such academic debate. In particular, the application of the ELM and the HSM theories, as well as the combination of an experimental design with manipulation in the stimuli, a survey questionnaire and an added content analysis of the open questions is quite original in the field of political communication, voting behaviors and young people in the Italian context. This is especially true in relation with the focus on the young target group in this historical moment. This study is a merely a first exploration of media effects on voting behaviors in relation to direct democracy tools and limited to the Italian context and to young people, therefore only tentative conclusions are appropriate. In particular, it seems particularly important to explore populistic messages because of the present risk of rise of populism in the European Union context, which endangers the European project itself. Only a true open confrontation of the diversity of political opinions and the reasons behind them can help a true

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comprehension of the phenomenon and outcomes of recent referendum. Perhaps it could even inspire ways to tackle populism and give an effective alternative to those who might be tempted by it. Opening to a wider reflection at EU level, an interesting further research could explore the media and political messages contribution to an European public sphere and to voting behaviors in the context of other EU member States, in case of EU-related referenda. However, these results might give hope about resistance of the EU citizens against populist messages and the preference, although deteriorated, for the European Union solution rather than for the nationalistic one.

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Appendix

Three versions of article condition: control, populist and expert CONTROL

Following the recent series of referenda across Europe on the EU, it’s plausible that a similar referendum will occur in Italy in the coming years. A number of political groups are already pushing for a referendum on leaving the Euro currency and returning to the Lira. Below is some information produced by the group Citizens for Democracy, explaining its position. Please read the information carefully; I would like to ask you a few questions about your opinions on the topic afterward.

Leaving the Euro: The Right Choice

Italians are less certain about the euro as currency than ever before. Since the start of the economic crisis in 2008, the popularity of the EU in Italy has decreased. In fact, according to Demos polls, while more than half of the Italians (56.8%) expressed faith in the European Union in 2000, only one third (33.5%) did so in 2013.

Furthermore, according to the latest Eurobarometer report, only 32% of Italians had a positive image of the EU in 2016. 86% think that the situation of the Italian economy is bad and only half of Italians support a European economic and monetary union with one single currency, the Euro.

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To keep the Euro or leave it? Returning to the Lira will give Italians more control over their country, it’ll attract foreign investors and buyers to purchase more Italian products at affordable prices, and will boost the Italian economy.

Prometeia, a financial consultancy company specialized in risk management, shows that there would be definite advantages in the first two years after leaving the Euro.

Leaving the euro currency and going back to the Lira would not mean leaving the European Union as well. Also other countries like Sweden, Denmark and Czech Republic are EU member States, but retain their national currency.

The Italian people may soon be called to decide. What do you think is the better solution? To leave the Euro and return to the Lira, or stay?

Word count: 325

POPULIST

Following the recent series of referenda across Europe on the EU, it’s plausible that a similar referendum will occur in Italy in the coming years. A number of political groups are already pushing for a referendum on leaving the Euro currency and returning to the Lira. Below is some information produced by the group Italians for Italy, explaining its position. Please read the information carefully; I would like to ask you a few questions about your opinions on the topic afterward.

Leaving the Euro: The People’s Choice

Italians are less certain about the euro as currency than ever before. Since the start of the economic crisis in 2008, the popularity of the EU in Italy has decreased. In fact, according to Demos polls, while more than half of the Italians (56.8%) expressed faith in the European Union in 2000, only one third (33.5%) did so in 2013.

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Ludovico Pisanelli, leader of Italians for Italy, who has been working with Beppe Grillo and the 5 Star Movement on the issue, states: “We want a future without austerity. It is time to take back control of our country and decide how to make Italy great again. We need less taxes, less State, less Europe, with more help for those who need it, and more safety for all relating to the dangerous problem of immigration. This is what the Italian people want. The referendum on the euro is a first step in this direction”.

Words: 419

EXPERT

Following the recent series of referenda across Europe on the EU, it’s plausible that a similar referendum will occur in Italy in the coming years. A number of political groups are already pushing for a referendum on leaving the Euro currency and returning to the Lira. Below is some information produced by the group Academics for Change, explaining its position. Please read the information carefully; I would like to ask you a few questions about your opinions on the topic afterward.

Leaving the Euro: The Intelligent Choice Italians are less certain about the euro as currency than ever before. Since the start of the economic crisis in 2008, the popularity of the EU in Italy

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has decreased. In fact, according to Demos polls, while more than half of the Italians (56.8%) expressed faith in the European Union in 2000, only one third (33.5%) did so in 2013.

Professor Michele Fornari, leader of Academics for Change (grouping up a number of university economic faculties) and collaborator with the Bocconi economic University, states: “Leaving the euro could help the recovery of the economy and of productivity. Italy would regain sovereignty on the currency, and could decide to devaluate it. This would be beneficial because a devaluated Italian currency makes it more attractive for foreigner purchasers to buy Italian products, therefore boosting Italian economy. Moreover, Italy would once again be able to make its own national decisions about the debt, about supporting small and medium-sized enterprises, and whether to spend more on welfare.”

Words: 428

Questionnaire

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I am going to ask you some questions on the article your just read. Please read

carefully.

Considering the article you just read, and if a referendum were to be held next month,

how would you vote in this referendum?

- To leave the euro

- To keep the euro

How sure are you of that vote choice?

Not at all (0) -extremely sure (6)

Please explain a bit about why you would vote that way. What do you base your vote

on?

(open question)

What information in the article did you find most relevant to your vote choice?

(open question)

To what extent do you think the following terms describe the article you just read?

Not at all (0), to very well (6)

Informative, Misleading, Well-balanced, Biased, Neutral, Populist

Reading the article, how pertinent do you think that the comments of the people

quoted were on the issue of the euro?

Totally pertinent, Pertinent, Somewhat pertinent, Little pertinent, Not pertinent, Not

pertinent at all, I don’t remember any comment in the article

Which of the following groups was mentioned in the article you just read?

Citizens for Democracy

Italians for Italy

Academics for Change

People against the Euro

None of the above

Don’t know/don’t remember

Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following

statements.

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The article helped you determine how to vote:

The article made you change your mind on how to vote:

Strongly agree, Agree, Somewhat agree, Neither agree or disagree, Somewhat

disagree, Disagree, Strongly disagree

Before reading this article, how much knowledge would you say you had on the topic

of the referendum?

none at all (0), to A lot (6)

How likely do you think it is that the exit of Italy from the euro would have negative

consequences with regard to:

1. Your own personal future

2. Your friends’ future

3. The future of Italy

Very likely

Likely

Somewhat likely

Neither likely or unlikely

Somewhat unlikely

Unlikely

Very unlikely

How would you judge the situation of the Italian economy

- Thinking about the whole country?

- thinking about your personal situation?

Totally bad

Bad

Mainly bad

I don’t know

Mainly good

Good

Totally good

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Now I am going to ask you just some brief questions about yourself.

Please enter your current age, in years: ___

Gender

Male

Female

I identify myself differently

Education level. If you are still attending, select the one that you are currently

attending. If you are not studying, select the last education certificate that you hold.

Middle School Certificate

High school certificate

University Bachelor student

University Master student

Post-Master studies

PhD student

Post-doc researcher

Occupation status

Employed

Unemployed

Student (no job aside)

Student (with job aside)

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Please, state your political position

Far right

Right

Central-right

Center

Central left

Left

Far left

Don’t have any

Now I am going to ask you the final questions about your general level of interest in

politics.

Do you follow news on the Italian economy?

Every day; Not everyday; but more times in a week, About once a week; Less than

once a week, but once or two times in a month; Never

People choose to vote or not for all sorts of reasons. Sometimes they intend to vote

in a particular election but then something comes up that prevents them.

-How often would you say you tend to vote in elections in Italy?

- How often would you say you tend to vote specifically in referendums in Italy?

Never, Sometimes, Most of the time, Always

Would you go to vote on a referendum on the euro next month at your municipality

even if you had to pay 5 euros to participate?

Yes

No

How important is direct democracy to you? (note: Direct democracy is a form of

democracy where citizens participate directly in the decision-making process,

debating and voting on political initiatives. Representative democracy is, instead, a

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form of democracy where political decisions are taken by the elected politicians who

represent the citizens).

Not important at all, Little important, Neither important or unimportant, Somewhat

important, Extremely important

To what extent do you support the idea of holding a public referendum on the euro?

Strongly against, Against, More against than in support, Neither in favor or against,

More in support than against, In support, Strongly in support

How much do you support the following political parties or groups?

-5 Star Movement

-Lega Nord

-Forza Italia, Il Popolo della Libertà, Berlusconi Presidente

-Partito Democratico

-Civici E Innovatori

-Fratelli d’Italia. Alleanza Nazionale

-Scelta Civica

-Democrazia Solidale - Centro Democratico

-Articolo 1- Movimento Democratico e Progressista

-Alternativa Popolare, Centristi per l’Europea, Nuovo Centro Destra

-Sinistra Italiana, Sinistra Ecologia e Libertà

Not at all (0), to strongly supportive (6) and I don’t know

Regression analysis on education:

A logistic regression was conducted to examine the combined effect of level of education and article condition, as predictors, on the outcome of the vote choice. The dummy variables expert, populist and control, as used above, were used also in this situation. The education variable was also used, ranging from 1 to 7 (M= 3,78), SD= 1,10).

A first logistic regression was conducted to examine the combined effect of education and expert condition (using the dummy expert variable), as predictors, on the outcome of vote choice.

A test of the full model against a constant only model was statistically significant, indicating that the predictors as a set reliably distinguished between voters leaving and keeping the euro ( χ2_{= 23,02,} p< .001 with df = 3).