Seeking inclusivity in water governance : contestation and collective action around Jakarta's 'great sea wall'

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SEEKING INCLUSIVITY IN WATER GOVERNANCE:

CONTESTATION AND COLLECTIVE ACTION AROUND

JAKARTA’S ‘GREAT SEA WALL’

Jakarta’s ‘great sea wall’ (access to photo granted by Hannak Ekin)

Anna Linders 9/1/2018

Supervisor: Gerben Nooteboom Second reader: Margeet Zwarteveen

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University of Amsterdam Graduate School of Social Sciences Master in International Development Studies

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Abstract

Large-scale water and development projects have the tendency to strengthen inequalities and processes of exclusion and marginalization. In Jakarta, a Dutch-Indonesian coastal protection plan creates environmental degradation and social injustices for the local fishing communities. However, little is known about how governance projects affect the vulnerability of the urban poor and how civil society responses can empower the marginalized. By integrating (urban) political ecology and social mobilization theory, this thesis aims to unravel the effects of a multilevel water governance project with respect to winners and losers, and analyses how processes of urban governance and inequalities are produced and challenged. Based on 10 weeks of fieldwork in Jakarta; interviews with officials, civil society organizations and local fishing communities, this thesis shows the major obstacles to participation and inclusion of the fishers in the NCICD. First, the NCICD is embedded in a depoliticized discourse through which the local socio-economic context and civil society voices are obscured and legitimacy for the project is sought. Second, both Dutch as well as Indonesian stakeholders avoid ownership of the NCICD, which hampers the adherence of inclusive principles. Third, uneven distributions of power, rights and access create processes of marginalization and impede small-scale fishers from participating in decision-making processes. This thesis concludes that (1) NCICD is a product of uneven distributions of expertise, voice and authority, which is driven by Dutch efforts to promote the NCICD, and close ties between public and private actors, and economic aspirations in Indonesia. Moreover, (2) civil society efforts empower fishers in the short-term, increase public pressure and slow down decision-making, but lack democratic legitimacy and fail to claim political space to foster inclusivity. The author proposes that (3) civil society can strengthen inclusivity by politicizing its confrontational approach to one that is responsive to the interests of the fishing communities and broader public, and engages in political brokering. The NCICD consortium should re-balance their interests in business and development and include civil society voices in the design of the NCICD. The author hopes such bottom-up and top-down implications can foster inclusive water governance that suits the context-specific environment.

Key words: social injustice; urban inequalities; water governance; social mobilization; collective action; inclusive governance

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Acknowledgements

The writing of the thesis has been a long and intensive process. It has opened up my eyes to new insights, knowledge and issues, of which still much is to be discovered. I would like to greatly thank my supervisor, Dr. Gerben Nooteboom, for his support, advise and enthusiasm throughout the whole process. Our discussions and his engagement sparked my motivation and strengthened the connection to broader academic and social debates. I also would like to thank Hari Nugroho for his helping hand and warm support prior and during the fieldwork. Many thanks to Giacomo Galli from BothEnds who brought me in touch with contacts in Jakarta and helped me by discussing the issues and providing feedback. I am grateful to all the CSOs to give their time and share their opinions. I highly value the openness and time of the fishers to share their opinions, laughter and struggles. A big thank you to Heidy for helping me in the field and brainstorming on approaches and content. Lastly, I want to thank my parents, friends and Benjamin for their support, laughter, and distraction during bad and good moods.

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List of Figures and Tables

Figure 1: Reported floods in 2007 and 2013, Jakarta 14

Figure 2: Three phases of the NCICD 16

Figure 3: NCICD as proposed in the 2014 Masterplan 17

Figure 4: Research location and the planned reclamation in North Jakarta 40

Figure 5: Dutch actors involved in the NCICD-2 49

Figure 6: Division of tasks of the triangular cooperation of the NCICD-2 49

Figure 7: The presentation of the NCICD in the masterplan of 2014 50

Figure 8: NCICD icon 58

Figure 9: Pluit city, one of the 17 planned islands 59

Figure 10: Slum area and slum are with flood map overlay 67

Figure 11: Poster at a demonstration against the reclamation in 2016 68

Figure 12: Son of fisherman helps the trapped boats behind the embankments, Kali Baru 71

Figure 13: Fisherman sitting in his boat behind the embankments, Kali Baru 72

Figure 14: The planned embankment area, Kali Baru 72

Figure 15: Fishers are cleaning gear along the urban gardening financed by developers 84

Figure 16: The streets in Kamal Muara that were painted by NCICD developers 85

Figure 17: Demonstration at the Dutch embassy in Jakarta 95

Figure 18: Demonstration of fishing women at the Women’s March Jakarta 96

Figure 19: Interrelation of collective action arena’s 103

Figure 20: Civil society efforts to strengthen inclusivity and empowerment 112

Table 1: Loss of fisheries income due to land reclamation 70

Table 2: Overview of the potential of civil society efforts 104

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List of Abbreviations

CSO Civil society organization

CPR Common Pool Resource

FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United States IWA International Water Ambitions

KNTI Indonesian Traditional Fisherfolk Union

MoU Memorandum of Understanding

NWP National Water Partnership

NCICD National Capital Integrated Coastal Development

OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development ODA Official Development Assistance

PPP Public-private partnership

KIARA People’s Coalition for Fisheries Justice LBH Jakarta Legal Aid Institute

RCUS Rujak Centre of Urban Studies SJBC Safe Jakarta Bay Coalition

SP Solidaritas Perempuan

UPE Urban political ecology

UPC Urban Poor Consortium

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Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1 Background to the Study

“Viewing the city as a process of continuous, but contested, socio-ecological change … unlocks new arenas for thinking and acting on the city. The tensions, conflicts and forces that flow with this process through the body, the city, the region and the globe show the cracks in the lines, the meshes in the net, the spaces and plateaus of resistance and of power” (Swyngedouw & Kaika, 2000: 567 in Kaika & Swyngedouw, 2012: 96).

Indonesia’s capital, Jakarta, is challenged by severe flood risks related to a rising sea level and rapid land subsidence. It is one of the many cities all over the world that faces water and climate change-related challenges and necessitates integrated governance approaches. As a result of heavy floods in 2007, the Indonesian government asked the Dutch government and water sector to provide a plan to improve Jakarta’s coastal regulation and flood defence. In 2014, a consortium of Dutch ministries and water engineers in collaboration with Indonesian stakeholders proposed the National Capital Integrated Coastal Development (NCICD) to create a flood-safe and prosperous Jakarta (NCICD, 2014). The billion-dollar public private-partnership (PPP) envisions a prestigious project of which the construction of onshore embankments, artificial islands and a 32-km outer sea wall are just a few examples.

However, the project, which is also presented as ‘the great sea wall’, is heavily contested; critics state that the project does not offer an integrated solution and creates new social and ecological problems for the city (Win, 2017). There are three types of floods in Jakarta. The first is caused by insufficient storage capacity of the drains to capture rainwater; the second is river-flooding, “floods caused by the overtopping of rivers and canals in the event of high discharges upstream”, and the third type of floods consists of “floods from the sea caused by insufficiently tall dikes” (Thompson, 2018: 13). Although the NCICD claims to offer an integrated approach to water insecurity and urban development, the plan mainly deals with the third type of flooding. Besides the NCICD not addressing the other interrelated causes of flooding, the sea wall and the connected artificial islands will negatively affect the livelihoods and welfare of fishing communities living along the Jakarta Bay through

environmental degradation and issues of access to land and sea. Especially, small-scale fisheries will carry most of the negative consequences (Bakker, Kishimoto, & Nooy, 2017). At the same time, the NCICD is aligning to the values of private actors and Indonesia’s aspiration for economic development by supporting real-estate development to the detriment

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of small-scale fisheries and the urban poor (Batubara et al., 2018; Colven, 2017). Moreover, local stakeholder such as the fishing communities have had few possibilities to participate in decision-making processes of the NCICD (Bakker et al., 2017). This contrasts the Dutch development and water agenda that pursues stakeholder participation, inclusive development and claims to be pro-poor (ibid.), and Indonesian citizen rights of participation. This is not specific to Jakarta; large-scale infrastructure projects such as the NCICD predominantly affect the environmental and social justice of the marginalized groups by privileging certain voices and interests over others (Anguelovski et al., 2016: 340-41).

Such processes of deprivation and exclusion can be understood in light of literature around water governance and development projects. Governance efforts to reduce

vulnerability to environmental hazards or bring development are interwoven with power and politics and can increase urban inequalities and injustices (Anguelovski et al., 2016: 333; Batubara, Kooy, & Zwarteveen, 2018; Hellman, Thynell, & van Voorst, 2018; Van Voorst &

Hellman, 2015).1 They are, namely, “embedded in the very institutions and development

processes that reproduce uneven risk exposure” (Anguelovski et al., 2016: 333) and that use urban space as part and partial of capitalist development (Batubara et al., 2018: 6). The incorporation of non-elected experts and private actors such as Dutch water engineers to deal with environmental challenges further complicates governance settings (Kaika &

Swyngedouw, 2012: 100). It pluralizes the state and may strengthen a policy that “empowers business elites and [negates] issues of democracy and accountability” (ibid.). Moreover, literature shows how flood management (Batubara et al., 2018: 2; Colven, 2017; Padawangi & Douglass, 2015) and development projects (Ferguson, 1994; Li, 2007) have the tendency to depoliticize the causes and consequences of the policy issue at stake. This depoliticization is a process of utilizing technical arguments and obscuring the local socio-economic context to seek support for a governance project. For example, arguments emphasizing the urgency of the water insecurity and natural acts such as climate change are repeatedly used to explain the implementation of the NCICD. This raises the question to what extent key socio-political aspects that relate to the flood management, such as different land use due to urbanization and capital development, entitlement and income issues and the consequent widening of the social divide in Jakarta are included in the design (Batubara et al., 2018; Colven, 2017; Padawangi & Douglass, 2015).

1_{Governance efforts focused on environmental hazards or development are referred to with multiple names such}

as climate change adaptions, risk-mitigation, large-scale infrastructure or development projects (i.e. Hellman et al., 2018; Yarina, 2018.)

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Struggles and contestation arise as a response to governance strategies that foster processes of entitlement of some and exclusion of others (Anguelovski et al., 2016; Bakker, 2000; Castro and Heller, 2009; Olivera and Lewis, 2004 in Kaika & Swyngedouw, 2012: 100). In Jakarta, civil society organizations (CSOs) and fishing communities are organizing themselves as a response to the looming environmental and social consequences of the NCICD and the lack of inclusion. The Safe Jakarta Bay Coalition (SJBC), a network of CSOs, has made it their plight to empower the affected fishing communities and stop environmental degradation by halting the NCICD. CSOs can strengthen the awareness of rights and the “patterns of injustices” and increase confidence and capacity among

marginalized groups to collective act (Kaika & Swyngedouw, 2012: 101; Nayak & Berkes, 2011; Padawangi & Douglass, 2015; Scholtens, 2016; van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). At the same time, civil society networks can use collective action to seek political space and translate the voice of fishing communities (Berenschot, Schulte Nordholt & Bakker, 2018; Chaterjee, 2004; Kamstra, 2017, Scholtens, 2016). Consequently, bottom-up forces like grassroots organisations and civil society actors can be “decisive in shaping Jakarta’s socio-eco and spatial context” (see e.g. Padawangi & Douglas, 2015; van Voorst, 2014; Hellman, 2015; Wilson, 2015 in Hellman et al., 2018: 1). This study deems it of social relevance to analyse the potential of civil society efforts to foster inclusivity and

empowerment of Jakarta’s fishing communities in light of the NCICD.

At the same time, the potential of civil society efforts to foster inclusive governance through collective action requires more academic engagement (Kaika & Swyngedouw, 2012: 100). While recent research has focused on the politics behind water security and other large-scale infrastructure projects (Crow-Miller et al., 2017; Loftus & March, 2016) in Jakarta (Batubara et al., 2018; Colven, 2017; Padawangi & Douglass, 2015) and bottom-up

governance (Padawangi & Douglass, 2015; Munk, 2016), there seems to be a gap in literature regarding (1) the politics and drivers behind processes of marginalization and exclusion, and (2) opportunities of civil society networks to address such processes in pluralistic

environments (Kaika & Swyngedouw, 2012: 101).

In a city such as Jakarta, in which inequality in terms of water security, access to resources and inclusion is persistent, this thesis argues that governance processes require an analysis of the distribution authority, voice and expertise to understand how governance is shaped and contested projects such as the NCICD emerge and are opposed (Zwarteveen et al., 2017: 3). This analysis can also challenge water-based inequities and unjust governance orders (ibid.). Following the quote that starts this chapter, analysing how urban governance

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processes are shaped and challenged requires an understanding of the socio-spatial context as “contested, scaled, in flux, and relational” (Swyngedouw & Kaika, 2000: 567 in Kaika & Swyngedouw, 2012: 96).

This thesis seeks academic relevance by integrating urban political ecology (UPE) and social mobilization theory in order to analyse the processes that shape governance and civic space. This creates insights into where potential of civil society networks to foster inclusivity of marginalized groups in the context-specific environment lies. Consequently, this thesis contributes to social mobilization (i.e. Barrett, Wessel, & Hilhorst, 2016; Biekart and Fowler, 2012; Tilly, 1978; van Zomeren et al., 2008) and interactive governance (Torfing et al., 2012) theory by identifying the specific obstacles to participation and inclusion, and by presenting collective action facilitated through civil society networks as a tool to foster inclusive integrated water governance that suits the multi-level and capital-driven context of Indonesia.

1.2 Objectives of the study

The thesis aims to unravel the drivers and effects of multilevel governance projects and explore the potential for inclusion of civil society around the NCICD. Given inequalities in terms of power, resource access and participation, it is pertinent to ask what means civil society networks have at their disposal to influence governance processes and empower marginalized groups (Scholtens, 2016: 24). Its ultimate concerns are to support civil society efforts and contribute to urban water governance in which social justice in terms of inclusion and empowerment of the small-scale fisheries prevails. It is furthermore hoped that this study can encourage Dutch stakeholders to live up to the normative principles of their development and water agenda regarding integrated solutions and engagement of local stakeholders by improving the understanding of the reality on the ground. These objectives raise questions around how governance is shaped and inclusive governance can be fostered, which will be explored throughout this thesis.

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1.3 Introduction to Jakarta and the NCICD

Figure 1: Reported floods in 2007 and 2013, Jakarta Source: Padawangi & Douglass, 2015

Jakarta is a fast changing city that has to cope with different socio-political challenges. The traffic congestion, housing shortage, and complex political dynamics - demonstrated in the rise of fundamentalism groups and a strong engagement of private actors in the political domain - are notable examples. Greater Jakarta is a city that will reach an expected

population of 35 million by 2020 (Padawangi & Douglass, 2015: 220). The fast urbanization is interrelated with alterations in land-use, high-rise buildings and a swift growing population. Moreover, the city is characterized by persistent poverty and a rising income gap (Wilson, 2017). It is estimated that around 3 million live in urban settlements and lack urban facilities such as access to clean water and water sanitation (Padawangi & Douglass, 2015). The north of Jakarta is particularly vulnerable to urban challenges (see figure 1). North Jakarta is occupied with kampung (urban settlements) and fishing communities, which increasingly

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have to make space for property developers that perceive the north as an area of business opportunities (Bakker et al. 2017; Batabura et al., 2018; Padawangi & Douglass, 2015). Moreover, the city sits on low-lying land in a delta area of 13 rivers. Little attention to urban and environmental planning and swift urbanization has made the city vulnerable to water-related risks such as floods and a rising sea level (Colven, 2017; Padawangi & Douglass, 2015).

In 2014, the Dutch consortium presented the NCICD to “turn the tide and protect Jakarta from floods while revitalizing its coastline, improving the water quality of channels and rivers and providing new socio-economic opportunities in the coastal area” (National

Water Partnership (NWP), 2014).2 The $40 billion project calls, among others, for the

construction of a 32-km offshore sea wall, onshore embankments, water basins and pumps to protect Jakarta for flooding from the ocean (see figure 2; NCICD, 2014; Octavianti &

Charles, 2018). Additionally, the project is connected to the creation of 17 artificial islands in Jakarta Bay, which will be sheltered behind the wall. The NCICD and the islands together are claimed to “[make] a robust and unbreakable sea defence” (NCICD, 2014: 36). The 17

islands (namely A, B, C, … Q) were first introduced in 1995 by president Suharto. The project has been slowed down due to heavy criticism and the Asian crises in 1997-1998 (Batubara et al., 2018: 12). After almost a decade of discussing the land reclamation, the Indonesian Supreme Court approved the project in 2011 (Bakker et al., 2017). In 2016, president Jokowi introduced that the dam and the islands (that were already seen by many, such as Bakker et al., 2017), as financially and technically connected) are being merged (Batubara et al., 2018: 11). The Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries have looked into the possibility of “cross-subsidizing the development of NCICD from the revenues of the 17

islands” (ibid.). 3 Although the NCICD still faces legal4 and social challenges, and the merge

further complicates this, multiple islands have already been built and construction is continuing at the time of writing (July 2018).

2_{The NCICD follows the Jakarta Coastal Defence Strategy, which was launched to reduce floods in 2011}

(NCICD, 2014: 14).

3_{This writing will refer to the NCICD and reclamation as one due to the strong interconnection and recent}

merge. However, it needs to be said that the fishing communities and the public are often not aware of the existence of the NCICD due to the dominant public debate around the reclamation.

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Figure 2: Three phases of the NCICD

A: onshore embankments; B: sea wall west; C: sea wall east Source: Government of the Netherlands in Bakker et al. (2017)

In 2014, the Dutch consortium presented the three phases of the project (see figure 2). Phase A (originally scheduled for 2014-2018) started in 2014 and strengthens and heightens the existing embankments along the coastline to protect Northern Jakarta against the tides until 2030; phase B (2018-2040) and C (2030 onwards) focus on building the giant outer sea wall. Since the first Master Plan in 2014, the NCICD has been revised and updated plans are proposed. This is the result of lacking technical and environmental reports on which the 2014 plan is based and the heavy criticism the plan receives. Originally, the project was shaped in the form of a Garuda bird, the national symbol of Indonesia (see figure 3). The Garuda symbol has been left out of the updated proposals as a result of the expected environmental

and water regulation problems it would bring.5 No final decisions have been made with

respect to phase B and C. In 2014, new housing on the edges of the sea wall was promised to the maritime communities that will have to be displaced due to the NCICD. However, in the adapted plans the housing for fishing communities is not clearly specified. The revision and decision-making processes relate on the one hand to flood-related developments, such as the ability to tackle land subsidence, and on the other hand to political power plays and

contestation, as this thesis will show. Nevertheless, the fact that the plans are revised and which adapted plans are proposed are publically unclear. The sad irony is that the critical

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voices that are excluded from the design of the Master Plan and are calling for revision, are now excluded from being informed about the revisions.

Figure 3: NCICD as proposed in the 2014 Master Plan Source: Sherwell, 2016

1.4 Context

1.4.1 Dutch Master Plans and their normative principles

The NCICD is an example of one of the so-called Master Plans or Delta plans that are the results of Dutch efforts to promote expertise in and solutions to flood-risk deltaic areas – from Bangladesh to Vietnam, from New Orleans to New York (Hasan, 2018; Thompson, 2018: 4). The Dutch ambitions are clearly presented in the International Water Ambitions (IWA) that the Dutch ministries of Foreign Affairs, Economic Affairs and Infrastructure and Environment introduced in 2016 (IWA in Thomspon, 2018: 14). The IWA wants to

strengthen "the security in urban deltas and to increase the Netherlands’ contribution to these efforts (ibid.). Additionally, Yarina (2018) in Negotiating rhetorics and imaginaries of

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climate resilience underlines the Dutch water ambitions and pride through several examples,

“The Rotterdam Climate Change Adaptation Strategy proposes global “spin-off” projects as an aspect of “added value for the economy.” Meanwhile, the National Climate Adaptation Strategy directly states, “Dutch water management expertise represents a valuable export product.” Piet Dircke, whose title is “Global Leader in Water Management” at the Dutch design and consultancy firm Arcadis, takes this one step further: “We are branding this knowledge around the globe, and we are benefiting from it.” However, the Master Plans are presented as fixed solutions of ‘climate-proofing’ the delta cities and facing water challenges (Yarina, 2018; Hasan, 2018). Scholars criticize that the Dutch ‘portable experts’ perceive deltas as universal to which a common solution can be offered (i.e. Hasan, 2018; Yarina, 2018).

At the same time, the NCICD, just as many of the Dutch Master Plans, is committed to normative principles related to Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) and the Dutch Delta Approach (NWP, 2014). Good water governance principles and a participation of stakeholders are examples of such principles (Bakker et al., 2017: 11). For instance, the Dutch Delta approach states, “[public] authorities, companies, NGOs and residents together determine the design, the approach, payments and compensation” (Bakker et al., 2017: 46). The NCICD is also part of the Dutch Aid & Trade agenda; the design and planning has been paid by the official development assistance budget (ODA). The development agenda pursues the realization of a conducive business climate and private sector engagement to create benefits for Dutch companies, while at the same time alleviating poverty and fostering sustainable inclusive growth (Bitzer, van Balen, & de Steenhuijsen Piters, 2017).

Additionally, principles of stakeholder inclusion, pro-poor policies and good governance are outlined in the agenda. The Dutch government states in a Memorandum to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in regard to its development policy that the “focus on poverty and deprived groups” is part and parcel of their approach (OECD, 2017: 20). As Bakker et al. (2017: 43) highlighted in terms of the Dutch Memorandum, “the Dutch government claims it is playing a leading role in an international coalition to “leave no one behind.” The policy document continues, stating that most current policy instruments “are specifically intended to benefit deprived populations (…) by fostering inclusive

economic development” (ibid.). Participatory processes that involve the local stakeholders are again deemed relevant (Bitzer et al., 2017). Furthermore, PPPs are presented as a Dutch Diamond approach, which resembles alliances between business, government, civil society and knowledge institutions. Moreover, the Dutch government has made the commitment to

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adhere human rights standards. It is therefore obliged to respect and protect human rights in international cooperation, and to regulate non-state Dutch actors, such as the companies involved in the NCICD (Bakker et al., 2017: 11).

1.4.2 Indonesia’s political climate and the pluralization of the urban-environment context

In Indonesia, there has been a strong focus on marketization and prevailing business elite since the New Order regime of president Suharto (1966-1998). Suharto focused on creating economic and political stability to secure prosperity of the nation. For instance, the water supply network developed under Suharto was there to present an “internationally modern Jakarta” (Kooy & Bakker, 2008: 1851). As Batubara et al. (2018: 15) note, “the “New Developmentalism” that is happening in (post-) New Order Indonesia is not very different from the old “’Developmentalism’ of Suharto’s”; strong political ties with national and foreign capitalists are still prevailing and large-scale infrastructure projects are used as a catalyst of development. The strong connections between the private and public sector and the influence of private actors on governance have been referred to as “crony capitalism” (Batubara et al., 2018: 12-13) and “money politics” (Savirani & Aspinall, 2017: 6).

The dominant presence of private actors in the political space has become even more profound in the current complex pluralized political context of the country. Indonesia, just like many countries in the global south, has been pluralizing by shifting towards global levels on the one hand, and from national to local authorities on the other hand, and incorporating non-governmental actors in the political domain and shaping of cities (Hellman et al., 2018; Kaika & Swyngedouw, 2012; Brenner ,1999; Kennedy et al., 2011 in Stepputat & Voorst,

2016).6 The Dutch government and private stakeholders are, for instance, part and parcel of

the design of water security plans in Jakarta (NCICD, 2014). While proponents argue such processes of decentralization will foster inclusion and decrease the distance between policy and the people, the widening of the state can be criticized for several reasons.

Firstly, the strong engagement of private actors has “created a power vacuum” and led to pro-elite and anti-poor policies as local actors feel they have to cooperate with corporate actors “in order to get things done” (Hellman et al., 2018: 7). This strengthens Jakarta’s socio-eco inequality and the lack of democratic accountability – “neoliberalist policies [marginalize] hundreds of thousands of slum dwellers”, favouring corporate and political elites while the rest of the city’s population are “excluded from decision-making processes”

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(Hellman et al., 2018: 5). Secondly, albeit the provincial government of Jakarta increasingly receives the power to act, it “[does] not have the [necessary] means or capacity” (van Voorst, 2016: 5). The capacities for planning, oversight and funding are usually limited and the city is faced with lacking basic services that were already in place (ibid.). Lastly, the privatization and internationalizing of urban planning makes the political domain ambiguous.

Fragmentation of the political domain and new arrangements such as PPPs to provide urban services, often lead to fuzzy contracts and insufficient public control and transparency, creating the perception that they “blur responsibility” (Stepputat & Voorst, 2016: 18). Principles of inclusive governance become easy to neglect or oversee, if no one takes responsibility in a pluralized setting.

Nevertheless, this widening and changing political landscape has also created space for new opportunities and other actors to arise in urban spatial planning (Hellman et al, 2018: 7-8). The inclusion of non-elected and international actors and the increase in the number of CSOs since the end of the Suharto-era create possibilities for environmentalists, activists, policy makers, technical experts or others to engage in politics and transfer the struggles in claims for rights (Hellman et al., 2018: 7-8; Padawangi & Douglass, 2015: 537). This section raises the question whether the pluralistic, multi-level set-up of the NCICD is also a product of crony capitalism to empower business elites. If not, is the NCICD able to overcome the risks related to pluralized governance? And if so, does the widening political landscape offer enough opportunities for civil society to counter pro-elite and ambiguous processes in Indonesia?

1.5 Thesis Overview

This thesis will continue with the theoretical framework by which processes of water governance and collective action can be understood. In chapter 3, the methodology will be discussed. Chapter 4 will shed light on the techno-political network that shapes the design and implementation of the NCICD. This will help to explore how the project has arisen and if the socio-political setting of the NCICD offers space for inclusive governance. Subsequently, the livelihoods of the affected fishing communities, and the effects on and interests of the fishing communities in respect to the NCICD are identified in chapter 5. This chapter also reflects on processes of marginalization and obstacles to collective action. In chapter 6, the civil society efforts of the SJBC to empower the fishing communities and claim political space are analysed. This will help to understand the opportunities and limits of collective action strategies used by civil society networks to empower fishing communities and seek

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political space to strengthen inclusivity. In the concluding chapter, the obstacles in terms of participation and inclusion, and the potential of collective action to strengthen inclusivity with regard to small-scale fisheries are identified. This will lend the author the opportunity to offer suggestions on how to come to collective action and governance that foster inclusivity.

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Chapter 2. Theoretical Framework

This chapter will describe the theoretical framework that is used for the research. The chapter starts by focusing on water governance as product of techno-political networks.

Subsequently, the writing draws on literature that explains how water and development projects may affect the socio-economic environment. This chapter discusses the legitimacy of participative governance. This offers a starting-point for discussing the prerequisites of inclusive governance. Additionally, social mobilization theory and the conditions of collective actions are identified. This brings up the potential of collective action by civil society networks to challenge processes of urban inequalities and lacking inclusivity, and empower marginalized groups.

2.1 The techno-political network of water governance

Jakarta, just like many other cities, is increasingly struggling with water and environment-related problems such as pollution, social inequity in water services and flooding (Stepputat & van Voorst, 2016). Urban (water) governance is therefore focusing on protecting its citizens, assets and ecosystems to such (environmental) stresses and come to water security (ibid.). Water security is referred to as “the management of water-related risks”(Hall & Borgomeo, 2013: 2) to come to “the availability of an acceptable quantity and quality of water for health, livelihoods, ecosystems and production” for all (Grey & Sadoff, 2007: 548). The latter is applied to the flood risks in Jakarta and availability of water relates to the access

to Jakarta Bay and its resources. 7 Water governance can be understood as “the practices of

coordination and decision-making between different actors around contested water

distributions” (Zwarteveen et al., 2017: 3). Regarding this research, water governance can be understood in terms of flood management (see i.e. van Voorst, 2016). The given that

distributions are contested brings up questions as to whether governance is inherently conflictive with reaching water security for all.

Therefore it is relevant to look at what kind of governance arises. Each setting is namely unique and dynamic, and requires its own governance approach (Kooiman, 2003). In Jakarta for example, water governance has been decentralized, since “it was hoped that decentralization would make it easier for local governments to respond adequately to floods, without having to wait for orders “from above” (van Voorst, 2016: 6). This contrasts the

7_{Water security can be defined in various ways depending on one’s perspective and geographical location (Hall}

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NCICD, of which the decision-making and implementation is the responsibility of the

national government.8

Literature on water governance shows the proliferation of large-scale infrastructure as

prominent throughout the last century (Kaika, 2005).9 Albeit such large-scale infrastructure

projects are often contested due to environmental and social issues, they are seen as a facilitator of modernity (ibid.). This suits the ‘allure’ of the NCICD; a project that is presented as an icon for modernization, as Colven shows (2017). Crow-Miller et al. (2017) explain that capital-intensive infrastructure is being justified by technical arguments and underlying rhetoric that present the projects as beneficial; greater resource safety for the communities or affiliated economic benefits are examples that suit to this framing.

Furthermore, the rhetoric that ‘there is no alternative’ is also used to justify projects. This is done by problematizing water problems to create a technical urgency that “something has to be done” (Crow-Miller et al., 2017: 201). With regard to the NCICD, scholars support the latter by arguing that the intensified discussion around flooding and land subsidence in Jakarta has elevated the water problems to a status of crisis (Colven, 2017; Octavianti & Charles, 2018; Thompson, 2018).

The use of technical urgency to seek legitimation of governance projects could be understood by taking into account the objectives of the project. Scholars claim that the NCICD is focused on generating economic prosperity, business opportunities and serving capital interests (Colven, 2017; Octavianti & Charles, 2018; Thompson, 2018). Additionally, Batubara et al. (2018: 15) show how Jakarta’s flood management facilitates the flourishing of capital and real-estate and the consequent creation of “uneven urbanisation”. The authors underline the close ties between business and political actors and the focus on capitalist development in Indonesia.

The different forms and drivers of governance bring up the techno-political network; the co-production of technical and political arguments that shape the governance in place (Colven, 2017; Sneddon, 2015). Technology and politics are intertwined in governance, as Colven (2017: 252-253) shows in her work on the NCICD. Additionally, Sneddon (2015) demonstrates that dams are produced through a "techno-political network" (ibid.: 13) influenced by “shifting geopolitical alignments and environmental concerns about climate change and renewable energy” (ibid.: 127), the growing engagement of 'non-traditional' aid donor states, and opposition groups of affected communities, advocacy organizations, and

8_{Fieldnote Dutch official #14.}

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academics. Bijker (2007: 115) continues by stating that dams and other “socio-technologies” are “thick with power relations and politics” (in Colven, 2017). Loftus & March (2016: 4) consequently state that understanding the turn to large infrastructure projects requires giving attention to the “financial and political networks” in which they are embedded (in Colven, 2017).

The latter moves beyond understanding the rise of large-scale infrastructure projects and also applies to water governance in general. “Water governance at heart is about politics”;

political choices decide, among others, whose expertise and which norms prevail

(Zwarteveen et al., 2017: 8). Zwarteveen et al. (2017: 1) argue that analysis of the distribution of “water, voice and authority, and expertise” is needed to understand water governance. Moreover, to be able to analyse governance it requires an analysis of the power dynamics in place (Crawford, 2003; Jentoft, 2007). Following the argument of political ecologists Paulson, Gezon & Watts (2003: 205), power can be understood “as a social relation built on the asymmetrical distribution of resources and risks and locate power in the interactions among, and the processes that constitute people, places, and resource”. Gramscian thinkers follow Foucault by underlining that power relations decide whose knowledge is taken into account for certain subjects (Arnold, 2017). ‘Knowledge’ on the ‘needs and deficiencies’ of marginalized groups shape development projects and foster the power of certain institutions (Ferguson, 1994). The approach of the powerful thus determines the governance system, which consequently decides the “division of benefits over the different stakeholders” (Ben-Yami, 2004 in Jentoft, 2007: 428).

Moreover, it is the ones with voice and authority, and expertise that shape the techno-political network and thus determine the discourse in which governance projects are

embedded. Discourse is referred to “as a system of knowledge, practices, technologies, and power relationships that orders and limits description and action within its field” (Mosse & Lewis, 2006: 4). This can be problematic, since a discourse only shows a certain perception of reality (Hajer & Versteeg, 2005). In the Anti-Politics Machine, Ferguson (1994) describes how development projects are based on a ‘construction’ of the situation, instead of on the reality itself. The discourse being used by experts ‘to bring development’ influences the way the projects are being shaped. The development ‘apparatus’ does not take the local political reality of resource allocation, state interests, poverty and powerlessness into account. Ferguson (1994: 180) consequently argues that political questions of e.g. resource use, land and income go through an “anti-politics machine” making them technical problems that

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require technical interventions. In The Will to Improve, Li (2007) supports Ferguson’s (1994) account by discussing rendering technical, a process that places political questions associated with development and environmental management in an enclosed domain to be governed by experts. The experts decide what the solutions can be by “assembling information about that which is included and devising techniques to mobilize the forces and entities thus revealed’ (ibid.: 99). Moreover, “questions [...] rendered as technical are simultaneously rendered nonpolitical” by excluding political-economic relations (ibid.: 7). Ferguson (1994) argues that practice of excluding certain factors, i.e. turning political questions into technical terms, and ‘constructing reality’ is an unintended process with unintended consequences, such as enhancing the bureaucratic reach. Development projects, just like governance in broader sense (i.e. Crawford, 2003; Kooiman, 2003), are thus shaped by a discursive regime which has “institutional effects” (fostering relations of power or resistance), as well as “ideological effects” (Ferguson, 1994 in Mosse, 2004: 7). The discursive process through which socio-economic and political settings are ignored or misperceived and affiliated consequences take place is called depolicization.

Discourse thus influences how (environmental) arguments are being discussed and valued, and is decisive for the policy outcomes (Hajer & Versteeg, 2005). Analysing the setting and framing through which certain knowledge and projects emerge is deemed relevant to understand the actors, diversity of interests, and power struggles behind governance (Hajer & Versteeg, 2005; Mosse & Lewis, 2006). Especially when acknowledging that the

prominent authority and knowledge shaping a discourse inherently excludes the non-prominent voices and actors (Forsyth, 2003). Neglecting prevailing discourses and the

politics shaping them could thus lead to ignorance of the dynamics creating unequal inclusion of voices and distributions of risks and benefits among stakeholders. Moreover, differences in power, knowledge and perspectives can lead to a clash of interests between different

stakeholders as the result of control exercised by direct agency, and control of decision-making by deciding what is being discussed and how (Crawford, 2003). These insights will help the study to analyse the techno-political network, drivers and discourse that shape the NCICD in chapter 4. This offers an understanding of distributions of knowledge, voice and authority that are inherently connected to the power relations under which the project prevails.

The drivers behind governance projects are namely often overseen; scholars “divert attention away from the complexity of policy as institutional practice, from the social life of projects, organizations and professionals and the diversity of interests behind policy models

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and the perspective of actors themselves,” as Mosse & Lewis argue (2006: 5). Given inequalities that have been identified as a result of the NCICD and flood governance in Jakarta (Bakker et al., 2017; Batubara et al., 2018) and the ability of governance to ‘divide benefits’ (Ben-Yami, 2004 in Jentoft, 2007: 428), this study deems it relevant it relevant to analyse “how society functions and universality (truth) is produced” to better understand the drivers of water governance and the related inequalities (Zwarteveen et al., 2017: 3).

2.2 What power brings about through governance

As Scott (1998) in Seeing like a State argues, state planning disregards values, desires, and perceptions of its subjects. This can lead to governance that excludes certain and benefits other voices, or fails to suit the context (i.e. Bakker et al., 2017; Ferguson, 1994). Especially, land use and resource governance are inherent to exclusion of some kind, and often lead to processes of dispossession and marginalization (Hall, Hirsch & Li, 2011). Following Li (2005: 384), this thesis therefore acknowledges that there is a need to move beyond the question of why improvement schemes, i.e. development or governance projects, fail and “examine the question posed by Ferguson: What do these schemes do? What are their messy, contradictory, multi-layered, and conjunctural effects?” This will be the leading question of chapter 5 to understand the effects of the NCICD on the fishing communities.

Drawing on Jehoel-Gijsbers & Vrooman (2007), Scholtens (2016: 23) describes marginality as “a state or process of social exclusion that emerges at the individual or group level on multiple interrelated dimensions: material deprivation, insufficient access to social rights, limited social participation and a lack of cultural integration.” Exclusion is referred to as a process through which individuals or groups are entirely or partially excluded from the society in which they live (du Toit & Hickey, 2007). The urban poor as well as small-scale fishers have often been portrayed as victims of marginality and exclusion (Anguelovski et al., 2016; Sowman & Wynberg, 2014; Wedathanthrige, Amarasiri, & Fernando, 2013). Bakker et al. (2017) show how this also applies to the local fishing communities affected by the NCICD by arguing they are impoverished and excluded from decision-making.

Marginalization of small-scale fisheries strongly relates to the ability to benefit from resources (Scholtens, 2016). To understand the latter, a distinction needs to be made between what people have rights to and what people have access to (Sikor & Lund, 2009). Access entails the ability to benefit from land and its resources, whereas ‘property rights’ consists of legitimised claims to the resource or land, in the sense that these claims are sanctioned by an institution that has the authority to do so (ibid). While the fishermen have the rights to access

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the fishing grounds, the ability, i.e. power, to do so is limited. To understand why the access to property differentiates among stakeholders, one has to look at the “bundle of powers”

(Ribot & Puluso, 2003).10 Inspired by Scholtens’ (2016) work on small-scale fisheries in Sri

Lanka, identifying these powers requires an analysis of the relation of the fishers within the community with other stakeholders that can be identified as resource users or authority holders. This can be done by focusing on ‘whose rights and entitlements’, ‘who has power and control’ and ‘who takes the decisions’ (Nayak & Berkes, 2011 in Scholtens, 2016: 127). The latter gives this study the possibility to focus on effects of the NCICD and how they take shape.

To understand the drivers and effects of the NCICD, this study turns to UPE. Political ecology has a strong analytical view on issues of inequality, marginality and hidden power producing unequal outcomes and can therefore be very useful to understand why the fishers have a deprived position and why their interests may be neglected in the face of bigger powers at different levels (Scholtens, 2016: 24-25). It seeks to explain how power dynamics shape the environment and create inequalities; it asks “how social natures are trasformed, by which actors, for whose benefits, and with what social and ecological consequences?” (Braun & Castree, 1998: 3 in Thompson, 2018). Additionally, UPE understands nature, technology

and society are intertwined (Loftus, 2009; Paulson, 2003; Kaika & Swyngedouw, 2012: 97).11

It thus sees environmental issues as inherent to political and economic proccesses that are profiled at different levels. However, Angelo & Wachsmuth (2015: 21) state that UPE should move from solely understanding inequalities in terms of “access to” to analysing “the

production of” inequality through (global) processes of urbanization.12_{This depends on how}

space is produced and categorized for certain purposes (Batubara et al., 2018: 5). The marginality of Jakarta’s fishers must thus not only be understood as the result of lack of resource access, but as a production of the socio-economic setting (Scholtens, 2016: 24). 2.3 The ‘legitimacy’ of participative decision-making

As a response to social injustices and inequalities within governance and development projects, a global consensus on the need of local ownership, participation and empowerment

10_{Nevertheless, the ability to claim access depends on its legal setting and resource rights should therefore not}

be downplayed, “While rights may have no value at a certain point in time, the fact that they are somehow enshrined in legislation or recognized by some politico-legal institution may come in handy if circumstances change” (Sikor & Lund, 2009: 6).

11_{For reviews see: Keil, R. (2003). Urban political ecology. Urban Geography, 24, 723-738.}

Keil, R. (2005). Progress report - Urban political ecology. Urban Geography, 26, 640-651.

12_{Batubara et al. (2018) apply Angelo & Wachstum’s view on UPE to their analysis on processes of uneven}

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has arrived (Cornwall & Brock, 2005; Mosse, 2006). In Travelling models of participation, Schnegg (2016) describes how participation as a dominant concept in the international development discourse is being translated into national policies. The Dutch government stating that local stakeholders need to be incorporated in each phase of the planning and decision-making in their development and water projects resembles this. This participatory discourse implies a governable, controllable world where everyone gets the opportunity to be included in decisions that affect their lives (Cornwall & Brock, 2005). Participation thus suggests active involvement of stakeholders in formulation, implementation and monitoring of a project or institution and can be defined as a process where individuals, groups and organizations choose to take an active role in making decisions that affect them (Jentoft, 2004; Reed; Scholtens, 2016). Stakeholders can be defined as those affected by or able to affect a decision (Freeman, 1984).

The rationale behind stakeholder participation is that rules and norms drafted in cooperation with those affected foster legitimacy, fairness, compliance and effectiveness (Jentoft, 2004), as Scholtens (2016) also highlights. Nayak & Berkes (2011) showed in their work on the management of commons in the Chilika Lagoon in India, that it is crucial to integrate the resource-users and the resources. This brings up the notion of ‘bottom-up governance’ or ‘co-management’. Ostrom (2010) emphasizes the latter by underlying the need for agency by the community in drafting institutions to regulate common pool resources (CPR). When resource users are indeed able to participate in ecosystem and fisheries

management, it “can have positive impacts on all of the dimensions of poverty, resulting in favourable outcomes for the livelihoods of poor people” (Walmsley, Purvis & Ninnes, 2006: 861).

However, participative decision-making has been criticized as well; participation and other development ‘buzzwords’ can be part of a discursive project of the policy-makers. The inclusion of participative approaches ‘depoliticizes’ projects and presents ‘development recipes’ that everyone can agree with, while at the same time removing questions of politics and power relations (Cornwall & Brock, 2005). This is problematic, since exactly these questions can shed further light on obstacles to participative decision-making. Additionally, Cornwall & Brock (2005: 9) state, the inclusion of such concepts in development projects “lend the legitimacy that development actors need to justify their interventions”. This raises the question to what extent the inclusion of stakeholder participation creates a real difference in practice or solely dresses up ‘business as usual’ (ibid.: 15). For instance, Bakker et al. (2016) argue that the Dutch consortium do not live up to their principles in terms of

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stakeholder participation in Jakarta. However, if this indeed is the case and why so will be analysed in this study. Besides questions of implementation, Scholtens (2016) underlines work of different scholars that focuses on how participatory processes in practice foster elite power and unequal distributions. Moreover, in the context of fisheries, Davis & Ruddle (2012: 248) state that participative approaches betray small-scale fishers by neglecting causes of marginality such as “power”, “wealth appropriation” and “exploitation”. The inequalities and fragmentation on local levels impede equal inclusion. This strengthens elite power and unequal distributions (Green & Lund, 2015 in Scholtens, 2016).

To understand and improve the implementation of the normative principles set by the Dutch government with regard to stakeholder engagement and come to ‘just’ governance, there is a need to continue the debate that several academics have started (Cornwall & Brock, 2005; Mosse & Lewis, 2006) and analyse how ‘participative governance’ of water and development can become inclusive towards local stakeholders in a way that empowers the fishing communities.

2.4 Understanding the potential of collective action 2.4.1 The rise of collective action

While technical contributions are undoubtedly needed to deal with the increasing

environmental challenges and are embedded in a ‘no alternative’ and participative jacket, the implementation is often lacking participation of stakeholders and the “window dressing” is unconvincing (Crow-Miller et al., 2017: 200). Bakker et al. (2017) and others (i.e.

Anguelovski et al., 2016; Batubara et al., 2018) show how flood management in Jakarta is in line with capital development that makes the rich richer and the poor weaker. Affected communities and opponents to water projects are pushing back to gain social and political capacities (Prudham, 2004; Bakker, 2000; Castro and Heller, 2009; Olivera & Lewis, 2004 in Kaika & Swyngedouw, 2012: 100). This raises the question what potential there is for civil society to foster inclusivity and empower fishing communities.

Unequal governance projects can thus provoke collective action, “understood as a […] strategy of ordinary people to pursue their claims for social justice against

better-equipped opponents, whether in the form of large scale insurrections or in more covert forms of resistance” (Scott, 1987 in Scholtens, 2016: 25). As Clausen (2010: 937) argues, an opposing, active civil society can analyse the power relations and contradictions underlying the technical project and “[render] these processes political”. Consequently, collective action

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can be an important step towards changing the consensus by making the technical solutions sensitive to the realities on the ground and communicating these to other levels (ibid.).

Collective action can take shape in the form of advocacy, which is an overarching concept for different collective action strategies. Advocacy is often referred to as “any attempt to influence the decisions of any institutional elite on behalf of a collective interest” (Jenkins, 1987: 297). Barrett's et al. (2016: 15) definition states that certain interests and identities can be articulated into policy input by the accumulation of a certain political alternative or demand. These two definitions underline how advocacy is focused on influencing policy. While Jenkins (1987) and others (i.e. Tilly, 1978) highlight the

importance of a collective nature, Barret et al. (2016) show the need to formulate an alterative or demand to the status-quo. Additionally, Barrett et al. (2016: 15) describe advocacy in terms of development as aiming to create “sustainable changes in public and political contexts”.

Before collective action strategies are executed, social mobilization needs to take place, which refers to people raising awareness about a situation and protecting certain interests by mobilizing constituencies and demanding a particular change. Scholtens (2016) states that the literature around collective action in resource management (e.g. Ostrom, 2010) remains rather ahistorical and apolitical by focusing on “resource health rather than for social justice and marginality” (Johnson, 2004 in Scholtens, 2016: 25). Given the inequalities and exclusion that can arise related to urban developments and prevailing power relations (Hall et al., 2011), it is crucial to not only ask what mechanisms marginal groups have at their

disposal to oppose the prevailing power dynamics and the outcomes by which they are affected, but also under what conditions one mobilizes (Scholtens, 2016: 24).

The resource mobilization theory (RMT) perceives social mobilization as a product of a cost-benefit analysis to reach one’s objectives (McCarthy & Zald, 1979). This approach inherently neglects personal grievances and interests. Consequently, several scholars such as Klandermans (1984) and van Zomeren et al. (2008) tried to scrutinize individuals and their personal motivations for collective action by including subjective, individualistic elements to explain collective action. Van Zomeren at al. (2008) subsequently suggest 3 key incentives of collective action. The conditions can help scholars identify and analyse the motivations and obstacles experienced by local stakeholders to engage in (contentious) collective action (Scholtens, 2016), and offer insights into opportunities to strengthening mobilization.

The first condition is perceived social injustice, referring to people’s feeling of injustice regarding inequality or deprivation; not so much concrete social injustice, but rather

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the perceptions of people spark collective action (Van Zomeren et al., 2008). With respect to fisheries, Bavinck and Johnson (2008) demonstrate that the perception of injustice is

triggered when fishers are unable to stake a claim on local fisher rights and laws that are in place. Hall et al. (2013) support the account of experienced injustices by arguing that people start to resist as the result of unfulfilled promises regarding citizenship or participation.

The second condition can be regarded as perceived efficacy, which “refers to a sense of control, influence, strength, and effectiveness to change a group-related problem” (Jentoft, 2014: 513). The translation of grievances of the felt social injustice through social

mobilization relies on the availability of and access of civil society networks, the presence of leadership figures and other resources (Zald and McCarthy, 1979; Rademaker, 1993).

The last condition for collective action is shared social identity. This refers to the presence of a (politicized) identity, which connects people to the interests and unjust of disadvantaged groups making them more willing to participate in collective actions (Van Zomeren et al. 2008). In the context of fisheries, Jentoft (2014) complements van Zomeren et al. (2008) by stating that fishers require a form of organization to be able to formulate one voice, make others listen, increase their bargaining power and engage in multiple forms of collective action. Moreover, to create a shared identity it is crucial to create a shared

perception of the reality for which one advocates. Through using active framing of the issue at stake an organization or coalition can try to align the identity and message of the individual and the collective (Zald & McCarthy, 1979).

Scholtens (2016: 127), drawing on van Zomeren et al. (2008), concludes by stating that whether social mobilization succeeds in influencing the objective depends on the ability to create a collective organizational network, move around a politicized social identity, and have a “conducive political context”. Tilly (1978) adds goals can only be reached through a collective in the first place. If a collective of local stakeholders arises depends on the interests at stake (Tilly, 1978) and the presence of “civic energy” (Biekart & Fowler, 2012: 185). Civic energy relates to the drive to achieve common goals, while still respecting the individual ones and differences within the community. When a collective and civic energy exists, collective action takes place, in whatever form that may be (Biekart & Fowler, 2012; Scott, 1998; Tilly, 1978).

2.4.2 Collective action approaches

Collective action takes shape through different strategies between which a distinction of confrontational (or contentious) and non-confrontational can be made (Jenkins, 2006 in

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Kamstra, 2017). Confrontational collective action relates to demanding change through direct pressure on the decision-makers. This is usually executed by ‘outsiders’ who do not have direct links or access to the political domain (Barrett et al., 2016: 15). Confrontational action is therefore usually contentious, since it is exercised by people who do not have regular access to representative institutions and use means “that fundamentally challenge others or authorities” (Tarrow, 1998: 3). Affiliated strategies can be, among others, demonstrations, litigation or occupations. These strategies require broader mobilization and long-term

pressure (Minkoff et al., 2008; Saidel, 2002 in Kamstra, 2017). It is therefore crucial for civil society actors to stimulate the above-described conditions of collective action to foster mobilization of individuals and commitment to a collective. Approaches like “awareness raising, legal actions and public education, as well as building networks, relationships and capacity” are forms of advocacy that can support the latter (Barrett et al., 2016: 15).

Non-confrontational strategies focus on cooperation and persuasion to reach the objective. Barett et al. (2016: 19) claim ‘insiders’ usually use these “behind the scenes” strategies through direct or indirect links with politicians. This can be, for example, advising policy makers, lobbying, offering alternative solutions, fostering implementation process or attending political meetings (Minkoff et al., 2017 in Kamstra, 2017). Additionally, close contact to political candidates and mobilizing votes could also be a strategy. Lastly, media use through connections with journalists, raising awareness among the public and influencing the public opinion belong to the latter strategy as Kamstra’s (2017) take on Minkoff et al. (2008) states. However, Minkoff et al. (2008) define media use as strategy to claim political space, and not per se as non-confrontational as Kamstra (2017) claims. Also Barrett et al. (2016: 21) claim mass media, i.e. campaigns and outreach, are ‘outsider’ tactics. Therefore, this writing argues media use should be subordinated as a confrontational approach due to its potential to create pressure on the ones in power.

Furthermore, the translation of certain interests into effective agency through any strategy depends not only on certain material capacities, but has a discursive foundation as

well that is based on the battle of ideas and beliefs (Sum & Jessop, 2013).13 It represents “a

game of persuasion and bargaining of interests” (Constantinou, 2013: 148) to influence “actors, systems, structures and ideas” (Edwards, 1993: 164 in Srikandini, 2018: 111). By framing and positioning one’s identity strategically, one can win support with elite audiences (Li, 2000) and hence strengthen collective action strategies.

13_{Sum & Jessop (2013) use the battle of ideas and beliefs in light of the possibility of a counter-hegemony. This}

Seeking inclusivity in water governance : contestation and collective action around Jakarta's 'great sea wall'