Catching the Terrorist:
Reframed Realism and Transnational Data
Intelligence in the SWIFT Affair
Jan Pieter Kind 6058620
UvA Politicologie Thesis Bachelor Project 2014: Transnational Spaces/ Political Geographies of Security
Pages: 30
janpieterkind@gmail.com 1st corrector: Stephanie Simon
2nd corrector: Darshan Vigneswaran
Abstract:
After the 9/11 attacks, it became clear that realism needed to reconsider some of the traditional values in order to stay relevant. With the upcoming transnational actors in mind, this research will dive into the enduring relevance of realism and the reframing of the school. This will be done in the light of
transnational intelligence and data protection. Therefore a realist analysis will be made of the 2006 SWIFT affair. The SWIFT consortium was forced to hand over financial data in order to set up the “Terrorist Finance Tracking Program”.
Index
§1 Introduction 5
§2 Power Politics in IR: Tradition, critiques 8 and transnational transformation
§2.1 The traditional definition of Realism 8 §2.2 Critical voices and different visions 11 §2.3 The Transnational Challenge: Waltz got it wrong 13 §2.4 Realism Reframed: the transnational actor as a
political unit in the international system, back to the roots. 16
§3 The SWIFT-‐affair, a realist analysis 19
§3.1 Data and methods 19 §3.2 Power imbalances, interests and unethical behavior 20
§3.3 Coercion 22
§3.4 Power balancing and threat-‐perception causing conflict 22
§4 Conclusion 25
§4.1 Realism under attack 25
§4.2 Realism Reframed 26
§4.3 The SWIFT affair 26
§4.4 Discussion/reflection 27
§1 Introduction
For a long time, war and the possibility of war has been the motor of international politics. Homeland security threats were only being perceived from other states that might go to war if this was believed to be a successful endeavor. Foreign policy thus, was calibrated to the situation of war and the possibility of it being just around the corner (Zedner, 2009: 3).
The terrorist attacks of 9/11 in New York and Washington changed this view. The Al Qaeda attack on the Pentagon and Twin Towers was perceived as a genuine attack on the United States, leading to the War on Terror. Possible threat was not coming only from the state, but non-‐state actors suddenly had to be taken into serious consideration when talking about security issues (Zedner, 2009: 2). The event of 9/11 and other developments forced the study of security out of the traditional study of interstate conflicts and war, the scope was
broadened (Zedner, 2009: 5-‐11).
This new development in the field of security was one that could shift the whole view on security. “Simple” military force was not sufficient to beat the new enemy, since Al Qaeda didn’t attack with conventional soldiers carrying
conventional weapons, like guns and bombs. Instead, they used civilians flying hijacked airplanes in buildings. By taking these actions, Al Qaeda showed that they had to be taken serious. Being a sui generis terrorist group, it is a fact that the group could be seen as a systemic actor. By the different worldwide strikes additional to the 9/11 attacks, like London and Madrid, the non-‐state actor showed to have the capabilities of violence that are normally reserved for the state (Brenner, 2006: 497). Therefore, the organization Al Qaeda trespassed a big deal of the common security policy that is mainly pointed at state-‐to-‐state security issues.
Previously, realism in IR had a fairly hard time after the United States victory of the cold war. The state became less important due to the vanishment of the bi-‐polar state system by the disappearance of the iron curtain and the upcoming transnational and non-‐state organisations like the European Union. Also the UN took a more significant role in conflicts and security, additionally by
preliminary redefining the sovereignty of the state through the Responsibility to Protect.
Roughly a decade after the end of the cold war, realism once again had to go on defense. The paradigm that deals with state-‐to-‐state security issues had supposedly no direct answer to the terrorist attacks that could fit the orthodox view of realism and was therefore critiqued. However, it is believed not only by me, but also by others like Brenner (2006: 499), that realism still has a big role to play for analyzing international security. The continuing relevance of the
paradigm lies not in the analytical level of the state as the only actor in the international system, but will be emphasized in other core values, like the Hobbesian anarchy and the search of survival. With the recent developments slowly maneuvering further away from a traditional realist situation, it may be time for a contemporary redefinition of realism. By facing the traditional philosophical basics, which will be explained later on, realism can move away from the core analytical theories, leading to a revamped version of the paradigm fitting the after 9/11 era (Brenner, 2006: 499 & Glaser, 2003: 403). This is not only a necessary step, but also a logical endeavor since realism deals with the world as it is and not how it should be (Mearsheimer, 2001: 4)
The 9/11 attacks not solitary led to a set of military actions like the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Also in other realms than just the military, the United States government undertook action. One of the new plans was the Terrorist Financing Tracking Program (TFTP). The TFTP was set up by the US treasury and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to track funds of terrorists and terrorist organizations. The program makes use of the database of a Belgian consortium called Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial
Telecommunication (SWIFT). SWIFT was set up to build an infrastructure for worldwide financial transactions and became the industry standard. As many as 9,500 banking organizations worldwide make use of the system and it handles approximately 80% of all worldwide financial transactions (Amicelle, 2011: 6). The secret program was part of a set of new security measures launched in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, including asset freezing, new risk-‐based border control and co-‐operation between justice and police on an European level (De Goede, 2011: 216), first meant as temporary, but it tends to become de facto
permanent. This is not the only controversy around the program; it didn’t pass the U.S. congress and consequently there is no official system to monitor use and eventually abuse of the data gathered by the program.
In 2006 the New York Times published a set of articles revealing the TFTP to the public articulating problems such as possible violations of privacy and lack of congressional examination. This resulted in a public debate and was the onset of what is now called the SWIFT-‐affair.
In this thesis I will research to what extend realism is still applicable when the field of international security is shifting from a state-‐to-‐state business to the state that fights non-‐state or transnational actors. I will do this research by the hand of the SWIFT case and my research question will be as follows:
To what extend is Realism still applicable to contemporary security issues, such as transnational intelligence and data protection?
It will be interesting to see if the basic philosophy of realism can be fitted in the new situation and therefore the first part of this thesis will be rather theoretical. The second part will be dedicated to a more empirical approach. The SWIFT-‐case will be taken as a case study to examine if the parameters of this revamped form of realism are suitable to the case and the different actors, which are the U.S. government, the SWIFT consortium, the E.U. and the New York Times. Analysis of the SWIFT-‐case is suited here because it is one of the first measures taken after 9/11 with a very transnational and non-‐violent character. The secret TFTP set up by the Bush administration is also a perfect example of data led security measures (De Goede, 2011: 221). The TFTP affects a lot of other states and their citizens and it demonstrates the use of new global data-‐systems to set up data-‐led security measures. This new way of dealing with security characterizes the developments in the 9/11 aftermath; realism has to find a definite solution for.
§2 Power Politics in IR: Tradition, critiques and
transnational transformation
§2.1 The traditional Definition of Realism
In this paragraph, I will firstly point out what realism is. This quick look on realism is important for the analysis I will make later on. Some of the basics of the traditional vision of realism can still be found in contemporary times, where others won’t be of much relevance anymore when it comes to non-‐state or transnational actors, like the SWIFT consortium. Throughout the thesis Morgenthau’s vision on realism will be followed. As I will make clear in the following paragraphs, this traditional school tends to be the most appropriate form of realism for the purposes of this research.
Realism finds its basics in the traditional view of international politics; build on roughly four different pillars. The first one is the international state-‐ anarchy. States are on their own. There is no entity that tells the states in the system what they might do or not do. Therefore there are no laws in the international arena with antagonism between the states to follow. This is also referred to as the “911-‐problem”. If a state gets into trouble, there is no higher entity that could be called in for help (Mearsheimer, 2002: Website Berkeley). This Hobbesian approach of anarchy forms the basis for traditional realism in IR.
Beside the first point, states tend to act as rational actors in the system. This implies that the state always strives for self-‐interest and maximization of resources and power.
On an analytical level, realism is focused on the state as an actor and the state-‐to-‐state relationship. This state-‐to-‐state relation is the motor for the security dilemma. Because the states’ primary objective is to survive, they will always try to defend themselves against possible attacks. This can be achieved by building up a military force, which can be perceived by an adversary as a threat to their security since they never know. This leads to a spiral situation of a military arms race (Jervis, 2001: 39 t/m 42).
Being the central concept of the paradigm, power is very important. Everything in the realist eyes is either about the acquisition of power or the destruction of it (Walt, 1997: 932). States try to increase their power because
humans tend to have a lust for power; Morgenthau describes this kind of archetype as the animus dominandi (Morgenthau, 1945: 12). This implies a couple of other values. Since power is a relative concept, you can only have power because someone else has less power, it is inherent to the concept that there is conflict between states per definition, due to the pursuit of power. By combining the two concepts of the search of power in an anarchical system, the lack of morale and ethics is expressed. It is not hard to contemplate, when there is no authority, states do whatever is possible to find power resulting in coercion and deterrence.
Power is a fairly complex concept and therefore highly contested. What many might think is that realism is about the brute force of military power. This view may be obvious for the realist outsider, but it doesn’t make it at all a given truth. Besides military power, realism is also about economic power and above all it is theorized gauging political power (Williams, 2004: 634).
Other than Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz ignores those human natural conditions and postulate that states seek for survival (Walt, 2002: 214). He argues that acquiring relative power is the key to survival in the international anarchy. Waltz therefore is on a more defensive side of realism compared to Morgenthau. Instead of power being used to expand, it is used to secure the state, because security extends the chance of survival (Guzzini, 2004: 539). As it is argued by a relatively new defensive realist, Charles Glasier, a state is not in search of expansion. States would, in de pursuit of their national interest, never go to war to increase their power if this could seriously harm their security and thus survival. This produces a self-‐defeating strategy and is therefore totally counterproductive (Guzzini, 2004: 540). Having too many enemies makes it impossible to win a battle.
On the other end, when states are just looking for survival, this would mean that there are no aggressive states at all. This implies there wouldn’t be any need for security. The reason why defense is needed, is because in the international system, there always will be an aggressor (Frankel, 1996: 91). The aggressive realism of Morgenthau has a more plausible basis here, but survival can still be seen as a main interest of the state.
Power and politics are seen by the realist school as two highly intertwined concepts. Realists assume that “all politics is power politics” (Williams, 2004: 636). Morgenthau’s vision of the political is anchored in the ideas of Nazi-‐jurist and philosopher Carl Schmitt. Politization takes place, and a collective identity is formed by, the use and construction of enemies. Schmitt claims that the opposition between friend and enemy defines the political. Relations between different groups therefore, are inevitably formed by radical opposition and polarization (Williams, 2004: 635). This was perfectly
exemplified by the NSDAP during the onset of the Nazi regime in the Weimar Republic.
This being said about the conception of the political realm, it is still not clear how power is conceptualized. Power cannot be seen separate from interest, since states take action out of national interest and men take actions out of self-‐ interest. This is exactly the reason why states are trying to pursue their national interest. Power defines the interest and vice versa, and as Morgenthau puts it “interest defined as power” (Morgenthau, 1973: 5).
The possibilities for the objects of interest are borderless and, as it seems that power and interest are fluid and also indeterminate and highly flexible concepts, power may be still a somewhat vague and abstract concept. Morgenthau clarifies himself as follows:
The same observations apply to the concept of power. Its content and the manner of its use are determined by the political and cultural environment. Power may comprise anything that
establishes and maintains the power of man over man. Thus
power covers all social relationships which serve that end, from physical violence to the most subtle psychological ties by which one mind controls another. Power covers the domination of man by man, both when it is disciplined by moral ends and controlled by constitutional safe-‐guards, as in Western democracies, and when it is that untamed and barbaric force which finds its laws in nothing but its own strength and its sole justification in its aggrandizement (Morgenthau, 1973: 9).
Morgenthau’s definition of power is indeed very broad, opposite to his definition of politics.
It must be emphasized that power is not only of material nature,
expressed mainly in military strength. It is or was for important realist thinkers like Waltz and Jervis, habitual to take the military power as a starting point. Morgenthau stresses that the fairly underrated immaterial aspects of power, like charismatic leadership, is equally important in the realist school (Williams, 2004: 640).
The same goes more or less for the state as the central object of analysis within the school. In the foundational work it was never stated that the state should be the only actor in the system. Since Morgenthau’s definition of power and politics is quite indeterminate and broad, it is at least peculiar that it is now a common believe that the international politics is solitary territory of the state. When we go back to the very essence of the definition of Morgenthau this
misunderstanding becomes clean. Morgenthau repeatedly states that politics has no limits. It lacks defined object of interest or resources of power. The
confrontation between different wills, interests and different forms of power is the only restriction (Williams, 2004: 644), and thus it is possible that the state won’t be the only actor on the international battlefield.
§2.2 Critical voices and different visions
As stated before, realism, as one of the oldest schools in IR, is critiqued many times. As realism is also the school used to analyze the SWIFT case and the research question is about its relevance, it might be helpful to see whether or not these critiques are convincing and if it needs to be taken into serious
consideration in order to reframe of realist school.
After the cold war, and especially after the 9/11 attacks, it was said that the realist school didn’t had a plausible answer on how to analyze these events. Vasquez triggered a first debate in 1997, charging that realists reject the
systematic use of scientific criteria for determining theoretical knowledge. According Vasquez, this results in blatant and banal statements, which are non-‐ falsifiable (Walt, 1997: 931 and Guzzini, 2004: 534). Legro and Moravcsik fired
another debate in 1999. They boldly stated that the recent work of realists was only of quality because of the incorporation of ideas and variables from other approaches in IR. Charging realism as a small and a usually not sufficient theory in the academic world, the two authors say that realism becomes more and more dependent on the theories of others (Guzzini, 2004: 534). Also Guzzini (2004) tries to show why realism failed. As I will show in the next paragraph, realism in the most traditional sense is still relevant.
One of the main points of debate is the indeterminate definitions of power and politics. The concepts are seen by the contestants as either too broad or too narrow (Guzzini, 2004: 541 and Williams, 2004: 639). Morgenthau’s simplistic idea of politics is therefore a much contested definition. As only taking the group and his enemy as objects in politics, his description seems indeed rather basic and, like Guzzini, many others critiqued him on this definition of politics as it is too narrowed.
It is also a very classical definition in the sense that the economical, the institutional and the political are seen as separate realms. Other academics see those different fields as intertwined (Guzzini, 2004: 540). The main point of critique here is, that this definition is of a very simple sociological nature while the opposite is actually true.
Since Morgenthau seems not the guy who just uses a highly simplified version of reality; Morgenthau was engaged by the legal struggles of the Weimar Republic and was trained in the complex theories of law and the state, there must be a reason for the simplified version. Also being much influenced by Weber, Marx and the philosophies of the Frankfurter School, it may be clear that it is unlikely that Morgenthau wasn’t aware of the cultural and economic sides of the political. In this sense it seems not logical Morgenthau used this definition while completely ignoring his knowledge about the complexities of social structures. His definition is in fact an outcome of a complex philosophical, historical and ethical sociology of modern politics (Williams, 2004: 637). Morgenthau builds the definition not only on the work of Schmitt; it also contains many basic beliefs of Nietzsche and, it is also mainly based on the legacy of Weber. Weber used ideal types to classify different social spheres in order to differentiate and analyze these spheres in a structural manner. In this way he
maintains the autonomy of the political realist by separating it from law (terrain of lawyers) and economics (terrain of economists); the definition of politics is therefore an analytical motor. By making the concept not too complex it is a very useful tool to analyze exactly what the political is for the realist: the affection of policy on the power of the nation (Williams, 2004: 642). Where at first glance the concept seems rather simple and incomplete for critics, it is in fact much more sophisticated and well considered under the surface.
§2.3 The Transnational Challenge: Waltz got it wrong
Where almost all realists take the state as a central object, many of the critique is pointed at this aspect of the state being the only actor in the
international system (Glasier, 2003: 403). It is still a common belief and a custom in the school of realism to take the state as a starting point in the analysis of the international system. It is true that Morgenthau was not an advocate of the interstate exclusivity per see. But as it is seen as normal in the IR realist analysis, and some of the objects of analysis in this research are non-‐state actors, it is very important to go deeper into detail why this element of realism needs a severe change. In the next paragraph I will show why this element of realism is inaccurate. As transnational actors like SWIFT appear to become more important in international conflicts, it is obtuse to be stubborn and follow the orthodox straightjacket of realism.
As Agnew figures out in his article “The Territorial Trap: The
Geographical Assumptions of International Relations Theory” (1994), it is taken for granted that political rule and power is bound to the territory of the state. In the system, states could only exist by the sake of territory. For the realist this is a logical assumption; after all territory gives access to resources and resources are needed to acquire power. This Westphalian conception of the state and its
perception on territory is becoming slowly but steadily less relevant. Agnew puts forward that, taking territorial states as a given fact, is a highly simplified version of reality. He points out that the international state-‐system, as Kenneth Waltz describes it, is an ahistorical concept. Waltz, who builds on Morgenthau’s theory of states in the international system, doesn’t take historical developments, like the growth of capitalism and the rise of centralized military competition during
the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth century, into consideration while laying down his structural model of respectively the systemic, unit and domestic levels (Agnew, 1994: 57 & Ruggie, 1983: 270). This makes the model historically not valid. Well respected realists like Mearsheimer admit the importance of history in IR in general (Mearheimer, 2002: Website Berkeley) and this would imply that the analytical frame of Waltz, that contains many leading elements for the school, needs a severe review. This is needed not only because of the
present-‐day developments, where the nation-‐state is becoming less prominent and where the transnational actors are rising, but also in general due to the lack of historical awareness.
In 1648 the participants of the thirty years war and the eighty years war signed the peace of Westphalia. The nation-‐state and state sovereignty, together with the secular state became existent (Gross, 1948: 22 t/m 23). After almost a century of war in Europe leaving the Middle Ages to more modern times, the Westphalian treaty shows that state sovereignty, which is followed by the realist, and the rise of the nation-‐state is a relative recent development in political history (Agnew, 1994: 60).
In medieval Europe, there was no such as modern state-‐sovereignty. With only a few spatial frontiers and state borders, generally not well established (Ruggie, 1983: 276). There were not many to any circumscribed territories owned by a group with a shared identity and ruled from one, central place (Agnew, 1994: 60 t/m 61).
Considering that concepts like state sovereignty are relatively new in political history, it is at least curious and inaccurate that realism deals with states only. Something that first seems to be a very logical choice, realism only deals with state-‐to-‐state conflict, now resembles to be not so logical at all. It doesn’t mean that realism as a whole can be rejected, since the philosophical values of the school can still be of use.
Ruggie argues that Waltz and his conception of the states as the only unit in the international system is lacking. Ruggie also states that Waltz theory is based on the continuity of the status quo. But as he, and also Agnew point out; this is historically inadequate since the state was not existent as we know it now before the treaty of Westphalia. Having a basis in Durkheims believes that social
structures, like the international system, can be changed by the upcoming of different relevant social units (Ruggie, 1983: 281). As the state was seen as the only social unit in the international system and the system is not bound to a status quo, transnational actors like SWIFT are now the relevant new kids on the block.
Ruggie also states that the sovereignty of the state cannot be seen as a given fact. Sovereignty can also lie in other social aspects. As Locke argues that sovereignty is an individual right of property. As an individual you have the right to fully decide over your own belongings and nobody has the right to do that for you. Taking this individual sovereignty as a starting point it is likely that the state as the only sovereign political power in the international system is of temporal character when social dynamics change and, history shows that this transformation is inevitable (Ruggie, 1983: 275).
After the 9/11 attacks and not to forget the many ethnic conflicts it is obvious that security threats are not solely coming from the state itself (Glasier, 2003: 404). An organization like Al Qaeda directly challenges the dominating structure of the international state system. By the 9/11 attacks it played down the basics of the Westphalian philosophical agreements to attack a state as a non-‐state actor (Brenner, 2006: 500).
This, and the upcoming importance of other non-‐state forces like
companies, imply a transformation of international system. Territorial space is in the Westphalia era a central character of political identity and therefore,
sovereignty lies in the realm of the state and her society (Agnew, 1994: 61). Not only for Al Qaeda it seems obvious that they are not bound to state borders; this is a feature that most transnational organizations have. With the global village in mind, it can be expected that the territory and the sovereignty that was connected to it, becomes less important and, that political identity can also be formed outside the realm of the state (Agnew, 1994: 62). The 2011 occupy movement, although bled to death after a year, showed how a political identity can come up easily in this globalized world, not bound to any state borders (Kurnik &Razsa, 2012: 239). And also political movements like
As SWIFT, outside the state realm, is also being recognized as a transnational organization, this is important for the case that will be analyzed.
§2.4 Realism Reframed: the transnational actor as a political unit in the international system, back to the roots.
Since this research is focusing on the SWIFT-‐case, transnational
intelligence and data gathering, it is useful to reframe the realist school in this context in order to make an appropriate analysis of these specific security issues. Furthermore, it is mentioned before that realism is a school that deals with the world as it is at the very moment; not as it was or should be (Mearsheimer, 2001: 4). The above paragraphs described realism as a school and some of the critiques that were fired on the realist approach. This description of the critiques, and the definition of realism itself, will apparently form the basis of the reframed
version.
The most important change realism is facing is the transnational challenge described above. It is for most of today’s realists a given fact to only deal with interstate relations (Williams, 2004: 650). It is made clear, that this is not a sufficient analytical approach anymore. In order to maintain a sufficient analytical frame, the old philosophical values, drafted by Morgenthau, have to be used.
It must be emphasized though, that the transnational actors are becoming increasingly important here, but that the rise and fall of super powers is equally essential (Brenner, 2006: 504). Therefore the analytical starting point is based on the assumption that the analytical objects of power are only restricted by the confrontation between different wills, interests and different forms of power. To make this definition more suitable for this research; this definition will be
restricted by looking at the important transnational actors SWIFT, and territorial superpower, like the US. These two actors will be the main concern of the
research since these are the main actors of the case. I will also look at the roles of both the E.U. and the New York Times for the analysis since they played a
significant important part in the affair. By taken those four actors, it is possible to draw an exhaustive analytical picture of the case
This analytical shift means that, all the other elements of the school are also pulled out of the interstate realm. This implies that, obviously some of the essential philosophical elements of realism are simply going back to their roots of the political realism, described by Morgenthau. These values can be placed in the new analytical context.
Since the anarchy became somewhat more complex due to the shift of actors; there are more different players on the block now, the archetype of the
animus dominandi will still be a starting point for the analysis. It will be
interesting to see how power is acquired and used in order to pursue the different interests and also how those powers balance and whether or not coercion is used in order to obtain power. Connected with these elements is also rational and unethical behavior to strive for their specific interests. All of the aforementioned elements will also be used in order to analyze the SWIFT -‐ U.S. (and partly E.U. and New York Times) relationship in the SWIFT case.
Many of the elements are staying as they are. So why call it a reframing? The reframed analytical approach is of such an importance that the school gets a new or rediscovered relevance in the field of IR. Due to the common believes that are not sufficient anymore. The basics were snowed under by the habit of the interstate relation. But while critiques were posed, it was simply hiding to come out and show his real face.
However, the concept of power remains somewhat vague and indeterminate. This would cause problems when operationalizing it in this research. Therefore it has to be redefined in such a way that it is suitable for the SWIFT case. One way to measure power in traditional sense of realism was to measure the ability to be violent in the international system. This was measured by the military power a state possesses. As this research is about intelligence and data, and not about physical violence as a primary research object, military power would not be a suitable measure for the research. Therefore “violence” needs to be transformed to “information” in order to make a proper analysis. This implies also that the measurement needs to be redefined from “military power” to “power of data gathering”. This means that the ability to gather data gives power to the particular actor, and the bigger the ability to gather data the more the power the actor has.
The anarchical aspect of realism will still be at his archetypical basis and, as conflict is at the basis of the anarchy, it is helpful to have conflict
conceptualized to have a workable definition. In this research the definition of conflict will be as follows: Conflicts occur when one or more basic interests of an actor are at stake leading to hostile interactions (Brecher & Wilkenfeld, 2002: 278). Coercion and deterrence are also tools to solve a conflict in the data-‐case, although not trough military power, but through other forms.
A transformation is likewise needed for power regulation mechanisms. Where war is a conflict management system for violence (Brecher & Wilkenfeld, 2002: 303) and has a power balancing effect so does, for instance, lawmaking for data gathering, when there is a conflict situation. It must be stressed that, for the realist, processed like lawmaking are a purely rational endeavor. Since realism declines any form of morality in political processes, lawmaking is just a process of balancing different interests and has nothing to do with any societal ethical considerations.
§3 The SWIFT-‐affair, a realist analysis
§3.1 Data and method
In the following paragraph, I will examine whether or not a realist approach towards the analysis of the SWIFT case is helpful. I will do this by taking the revealing newspaper articles of the New York Times as a basis, which got their information partly from the well known and infamous whistle-‐blower website, WikiLeaks. As these articles have a very thorough basis of complex and qualitative journalism (Wesseling, 2013: 97), it is appropriate to use these articles as the data for the research. Supplemented to the New York Times articles, there will be some additional literature like the articles of Amicelle (2011) and de Goede (2012).
To analyze the dimension of power and interest, it must be emphasized that policy is made by the consideration of interests in order to maintain power. During this analysis of power and interests, I will come up with several different elements in the case that show how this policy, whether or not, leads to the pursued power and interest.
I will examine the case on different aspects of realism. These aspect will be respectively power and (im)balance of power, interests, coercion and deterrence. These elements are all traditionally used in order to do a realist analysis in IR. The elements are not used in a military context though, but in the context of transnational intelligence and data protection. Although the realist theories are used in a different context, the military context was still both an inspiration and a starting point for the analysis of the SWIFT affair. At some points in the analysis, I will go back to the traditional realist analysis methods as it was used in the military realm in order to show the analogy and make the way of thinking more clear.
There are some actors and processes playing in a more domestic level. This can be a point of critique, but since it was stated in the conceptual
framework that states and the territorial borders of the state are getting less relevant, it would be not appropriate to leave these actors, like the New York Times and the congress, out of the analysis, as they play an important role.
Before I start analyzing, I want to emphasize two things once again. At the very basis of realism lies the international anarchy in which actors tend to act rationally. This implies that whatever prime interest an actor has, its main priority is to survive in the anarchy.
§3.2 Power imbalances, interests and unethical behavior
After the 9/11 attacks, the Bush-‐administration set up several financial programs in order to fight their new enemy, Al Qaeda (Lichtblau & Risen, New York Times, 2006). As the articles of the New York Times made clear, it is in the interest of the U.S. government to have those programs in order to eliminate future terrorist threats. The U.S. could still be seen as a superpower in the international system (Brenner, 2006: 505). This means it has a great ability to use power in favor of their interests. In the former tradition of realism, this was done by violence, but since we are talking data and intelligence here, violence doesn’t seem very appropriate. Violence can be substituted by power alone and, thus the effective realization of interests.
To make a proper analysis, the pursued interests have to be determined. The interest is as follows: The US wants to fight the new enemy Al Qaeda. The Bush administration has “the desire to exploit technological tools to prevent another terrorist strike” (Lichtblau & Risen, New York Times, 2006). The U.S. government will do anything within their power in order to realize these interests, as long as those actions are considered rational. This desire of the exploitation of technological tools, leads also to attemps “to break down
longstanding legal or institutional barriers to the governments access to private information” (Lichtblau & Risen, New York Times, 2006), initiating a relative higher grade of anarchy in a latent form. This leads to a situation where power can be played out in an, self-‐evidently, unethical way. Breaking down these barriers, not only makes the grade of anarchy higher; it shows also that the U.S. is playing politics in an anarchical system. By ignoring important laws and rules, they take a subset of measures without a proper legal basis and, because they can, the U.S. is getting away with it without any sanction drawn.
The U.S.-‐government set up the program without any congressional approval and a bare minimum of congressional oversight. However, some of the
congressional leaders of both the Democrats and the Republicans where briefed about the program, but the relevant intelligence committees were only briefed just before it became clear that the NY times would publish a story about the case (Calame, 2006: New York Times). The democratic checks and balances system was bypassed by the government, since it was possible that the congress would turn against the interests of the Bush administration during the
lawmaking process.
This results in a multi dimensional imbalance of power. Firstly there is an imbalance between the U.S. government and their citizens/ non-‐U.S. citizens. The persons that are investigated are put in a powerless position since they didn’t know that their data was handed over to the U.S. government for investigation. By doing this secretly, without the knowledge of the congress, it was not an option for citizens to take rational action against the data collection; neither in conventional ways (by the means of lawmaking process of the congress) nor in unconventional ways (by the means of demonstrations and or other
unconventional action like computer hacking). This puts the U.S. government in an extraordinary powerful position.
Also SWIFT, although put in a difficult position by the U.S., had a share in the imbalance. Direct customers; like the different individual banks, and indirect customers; the group formed as the clients of those banks, had similarly no knowledge about the fact that their data, being processed by SWIFT, was accessible by a third party for a not intended secondary purpose of the data (Amicelle, 2011: 9). For the customers of the bank this secondary purpose is especially interesting, since it can be assumed that most of the clients weren’t even aware of the existence of SWIFT as well as the fact that SWIFT processed their transactions.
Another facet of the imbalance of power and the lack of congressional oversight, is the fact that the program at first sight tended to be temporary. The TFTP was set up as a temporary emergency measure, but as time prolonged it became clear that such temporary programs had an open end, denoting that the program could become of a more permanent character.
§3.3 Coercion
It is clear that the program is perceived highly controversial by the SWIFT bank consortium itself. The consortium declines to talk about the program; nevertheless the consortium stated that cooperation to the program was never voluntary (Lichtblau & Risen,2006: New York Times). Officials were worried about both legal and financial risks, despite the US build-‐in controls. These
controls began after SWIFT firstly allowed access to all financial data. Soon it was desired by SWIFT that the data was only used for terrorist related investigation; as SWIFT believed the risk of abuse was too high. Especially, when it became clear that the program wasn’t that temporary, SWIFT was becoming less and less comfortable with the program (Lichtblau & Risen, 2006: New York Times).
Nevertheless, SWIFT was left no choice; therefore cooperating could be seen as coercion towards SWIFT, by the U.S.. The broad subpoenas used by the U.S. demanded, and thus forced, the consortium to cooperate, while this was not in their interest at all. These contradictory interests are expressed by SWIFT via the financial, legal and duration apprehensions. The subpoenas however, were a powerful tool for the U.S. to get the financial data with or without voluntary cooperation. Cooperation wasn’t heart-‐felt in the case of SWIFT, but in order to survive, it was better to cooperate than to refuse the data collection.
§ 3.4 Power balancing and threat-‐perception causing conflict By the disclosure of the program, the situation of imbalance would change. The imbalance transformed to a situation of power balancing. This happened through several different mechanisms involving different actors. Although the Bush administration took a very hard stance towards the publication, accusing the New York Times of treason (Calame, 2006: New York Times). It was nevertheless unavoidable for the U.S. government, that the TFTP would be subject of critiques and action inside and outside the U.S.. This resulted in the fact that the U.S. could no longer take advantage of the clandestine
character of the situation. As possible threats of the U.S. now know about the program, it would simply be not rational to act like they didn’t know about the TFTP. This was also one of the arguments put forward by the Bush
