The White man’s burden, French prestige
and the comprehensive approach
Analysing 36 Common Security and Defence Policy missions and
operations of the European Union, 2003-2017
Tessa de Vries
ABSTRACT
36 missions and operations under the Common Security and Defence
policy are described, covering a timespan from 2003 to 2017. This
complete and comprehensive reference work is a unicum in the scientific
world. It seemed as though the 36 missions and operations were
arbitrary and had nothing to do with each other, yet it will be argued
that there are in fact a lot of correlations.
MA Thesis in European Studies Graduate School for Humanities Universiteit van Amsterdam Author: Tessa de Vries Student number: 10194444
Main Supervisor: Dhr. mr. dr. A.C. van Wageningen Second Supervisor: Dhr. prof. dr. M.J. Wintle 1 July 2017
Table of contents:
Introduction 2
1 History and the shaping of the Common Security and Defence Policy 5 1.1 Background, predecessors and sister organizations 5
1.1.1 The Western European Union 7
1.1.1.1 The Emergence of the Western European Union 7 1.1.1.2 The operational role of the Western European Union 9 1.1.1.3 The decline of the Western European Union 10 1.1.2 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization 12 1.1.2.1 The early history of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 13 1.1.2.2 The Berlin and Berlin-Plus Agreement, a cooperation between the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union
14 1.1.2.3 The operational role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 16 1.2 The Helsinki Headline Goal and the Petersberg Tasks 17 1.3 The Common Security and Defence Policy through Amsterdam and
Lisbon
18
1.3.1 Amsterdam 19
1.3.2 Lisbon 20
1.4 Conclusion 22
2 The contemporary structure of the Common Security and Defence Policy and the conduct of civilian and military missions and operations
23 2.1 Contemporary structure of the Common Security and Defence Policy 23 2.2 Possible missions and operations under the Common Security and
Defence Policy
24 2.3 Other features and characteristics of missions and operations 27
2.3.1 Executive or non-executive 27
2.3.2 Chain of Command 28
2.3.3 Financing Common Security and Defence Policy missions and operations 30
2.4 The Comprehensive Approach 31
2.5 Conclusion 32
3 Common Security and Defence Policy missions and operations in the European context
34 3.1 Missions and operations under the Common Security and Defence Policy 34
3.1.1 Europe 37
3.1.2 Africa 39
3.1.3 Asia 44
3.2 Lessons to be learned from the Common Security and Defence Policy and visible trends in the Common Security and Defence Policy
45
3.2.1 The Sum of the Annexes 45
3.2.2 Deeper thoughts and findings on the Common Security and Defence Policy 51 3.3 Conclusion 57 Conclusion 60 Bibliography 63 Introduction
The European Union has undertaken many operations and missions since the inception of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Using military and civilian instruments or both, the EU has deployed missions and operations in 23 countries in 3 continents. 35 distinctive missions and operations were deployed, of which 12 were civilian missions and 13 were military missions or operations. 11 of these missions or operations were conducted in Europe, 4 in Asia, and 20, the
majority, were undertaken in Africa. 18 missions and operations are still operational, 17 have been completed. There has also been one failed mission, which never took off. These missions and operations have all been accomplished with the approval and cooperation of the 28 member states of the EU. To look into all these figures, a thorough and complete Annex was made to categorize and find all information on these 36 missions and operations. See Annex 2, 10 and 11 for an overlook on the substance stated above.
Annexes 2, 10 and 11, and the facts brought up above, raises a few
questions. When we first look at these 36 missions and operations, they seem to have little to do with each other. At the first glance they seem to involve random countries, crises and impetuses. Some missions or operations address the resolving of an acute crisis in a country, while others are about reforming the police force in a country or the rule of law system. Why does the EU choose to deploy these missions and operations? And is there any cohesion in these seemingly random missions and operations? Why are the missions and operations deployed in these countries? Why not in other countries? Why has to choice come down to these specific countries, mainly in Africa? Which country is making the selections for where the missions and operations are deployed? What is the reasoning behind the deployment of these missions and operations?
The following chapters answer these questions. When we look closer at the material provided in this thesis, there seems to be some consistencies between the CSDP and its missions and operations. The information in the Annexes gives provides a theoretical framework on its own. Furthermore, conclusions can be drawn from the presented material. This altogether will provide an answer to the question: What conclusions can be drawn from 36 missions and operations under the CSDP and are there any consistencies?
The literature and information on the CSDP and its missions and operations is highly fragmented. This is mostly due the sensitive nature of the CSDP; there is not a
lot of transparency in the policy. Therefore, it is of great importance for both the citizens of the EU and the scientific field to gain an increasing amount of coherent knowledge
on this topic. Furthermore, because of the CSDP’s reserved nature, it is essential that more understanding is gathered on the history of the CSDP. Furthermore, the
reasoning behind the missions and operations of the CSDP and how this correlates with the geopolitics and history of the European Union should become less a secluded topic.
To construct a holistic view on the policy and its actions, an analysis was made of all of the 36 missions and operations, accompanied by an explanation of the reasoning behind the mission/operation, the applicable documents that gave the mission/operation a legal basis, the duration of the mission/operation, and a fact list including the number of troops deployed, the number of countries active in the mission/operation, and cooperation with other international organizations. Because the collecting data on this topic was a difficult task, the collection of data was done through different sources. Namely the website of the EEAS (2016), which provided us with different websites on the different missions and operations. Secondly, a paper of the European Parliament (2012) on the different missions and operations was used. And thirdly, a codebook made under the European University Institute and the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (2016) on the CSDP missions and operations was used. Together with the existing literature, the Annexes serve as a theoretical framework that provide answers to the thesis questions, together with the existing literature.
In the Annex 2, the missions and operations are numbered. Throughout the chapters, these numbers will be cited when relevant, corresponding to their numbers in Annex 2. With Annex 2, 10 and 11, the other Annexes and the research done in the following chapters, a complete presentation is made of the actions under the CSPD. This has not been done in this manner before in the literature on the CSDP. This method tries to fill the lacunas in today’s literature New conclusions can be drawn from the following. Furthermore, this will provide some new input for the scientific world.
The first chapter will look into the history and the shaping of the CSDP. Predecessors and sister organizations of the EU and the CSDP, like the Western European Union
and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, will be looked at. Furthermore, the role of the CSDP through the European treaties of Amsterdam and Lisbon is set forth. The second chapter is about the contemporary structure of the CSDP and the conduct of a civilian or military mission or operation. The funding of the CSDP will be looked into and other characteristics and domains of the CSDP will be explored. The final chapter will discuss the annexes. Many smaller and a few bigger conclusions are drawn from this. Finally, on overview will be given together with a number of recommendations for further research.
For over half a century, there have been plans to create a common defence policy in Europe In 1948, France, the United Kingdom and the Benelux signed the Treaty on Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence, also known as the Treaty of Brussels. The Common Foreign and Security Policy (hereafter CFSP), is the foreign policy of the European Union that focuses on security and defence diplomacy and other actions. This policy area aims to strengthen the external ability of the European Union through acting on all the areas of foreign policy and dealing with questions relating to the security of the Union. Since the Cologne European Council of 3 and 4 June 1999, the CFSP also includes the Common
Security and Defence Policy (hereafter CSDP), which has become a significant part.. The CSDP deals with the defence and military aspects of the policy area, as well as management in the sphere of civilian crisis.
This chapter will firstly elaborate on the background of the defence and security policy area. The main predecessors of the CSDP, specifically the Western European Union, will be described. Secondly, the EU-NATO relationship will be explained by setting out the relevant parts of the history of NATO and its
organizational structure. Thirdly, the Helsinki Headline Goal and the Petersberg Tasks, two agreements that have strengthened the policy area, will be described. And finally, the CSDP’s evolvement through the treaties of Amsterdam and Lisbon will be shown.
1.1 – Background, predecessors and sister organizations
The CSDP is formerly known as the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The ESDP was in its turn the successor of the NATO-based European Security and Defence Identity. But first we will elaborate on the starting point of this area, before the ESDI and ESDP existed.
Since 1947, efforts have been made to establish a common European policy concerning security and defence (Trachtenberg, 1998). In the setting of the post-WWII era, a treaty between France and the United Kingdom took shape. In this treaty (the Treaty of Dunkirk), an agreement on mutual assistance, a pledge for mutual defence, and an all-encompassing European alliance was made. With the Treaty of Brussels (1948), the contracting parties were expanded by Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, and the defence pledge was relocated to Article IV of the treaty. This article made sure that if any of the contracting parties would be the object of an
“armed attack in Europe (Ismay, 1954: 1)”, the other contracting parties would help the party that was under attack with “all the military and other aid and assistance in their power (Ismay, 1954: 1)”. The treaty was made to set up a joint defence system and to strengthen the economic and cultural ties of the contracting countries (Ismay, 1954). To reach the goals of this treaty the Western Union Defence Organization (WUDO) was established in the same year of the signing of the treaty (Ismay, 1954). This new organization was developed within the framework of the larger Western Union (WU). The WU would be the precursor to both the Western European Union (WEU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).These two organizations will be looked at later on in this chapter.
One year later, in 1949, the five countries of the Brussels treaty were joined by Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Portugal, Norway and the United States in the NATO (NATO, 2016). NATO joined the mutual defence agreement by implementing Article 5 in its treaty, but this article differed from Article IV of the Brussels Treaty as it did not oblige any contracting party to a military response. However, the article contained a similar idea: “ […] an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and
consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, […], will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area (NATO, 1949: 1)”.
Another year later, the European Defence Community (EDC), an organization with a nature similar to the European Coal and Steal Community, the predecessor of the current European Union, came into existence. The EDC emerged from the Pleven Plan, proposed by René Pleven, the French Prime Minister at that time (Guillen, 1993). The aim was to make a Pan-European defence community, to counterbalance the force of NATO, and also to prevent Germany from going into war again. The Treaty was signed, but it failed to obtain ratification from the French Parliament (Guilen, 1993).
During the London and Paris Conferences in 1954, the earlier established WUDO was enlarged by an amendment to the Brussels Treaty. Instead of improving the EDC, the contracting parties opted for the Western European Union (WEU), by a modification of the Brussels Treaty of 1948. The WEU thus became one of the
WUDO’s successors. therefore became the successor of the WU. Until well into the 1990s, the WEU, in cooperation with NATO, stipulated the principal forum for the dialogue on security and defence in Europe.
1.1.1 – The Western European Union
The western European Union was a military alliance and an international organisation that was tasked with the implementation of the earlier mentioned Modified Brussels Treaty of 1954. The Union was established by seven European countries, namely: Belgium, France, Germany (FRD), Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. During the Cold War, the WEU allied with the United States of America.
1.1.1.1 – The emergence of the Western European Union
The first five Member States of the WEU predominantly came together to form a block to the main threat of that time: the Soviet Union. The main feature of the WEU was the participating countries’ commitment to a mutual defence clause. With the Brussels Treaty of 1948, the air defences of the Member States of the treaty set up a joint command organisation was set up. The military organisation of the WEU was quickly merged into the Treaty after the organization came into existence. Already in 1949, the United States and Canada spoke with the first five countries participating in the WEU, which resulted in the North Atlantic Treaty, signed in Washington (WEU, 2016). After the signing of the treaty, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway and Portugal joined the Treaty as well (WEU, 2016). As a result of which the United States and Canada’s commitment to Europe and the continent’s defence was formalised within the treaty. However, to back up these structures made within the Washington Treaty, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was made in 1950.NATO lodged the military and political structures (WEU, 2016). At this point, the countries of the Brussels Treaty decided to include their military structures in the NATO structures.
The seven contracting parties were equally afraid of a resurgence of the German army and its rearmament. However, when the modified treaty of Brussels was signed in Paris, the Federal Republic of Germany joined the organisation as well.. This was in line with the treaty’s attempt to anchor West Germany (CVCE, 2009). Italy joined the WEU in the same year as Western Germany did. This was already the aim with the EDC, however, as earlier mentioned, this plan was not /failed to be
ratified. Portugal and Spain joined the WEU later, in 1990, after the end of the dictatorship in their countries, and Greece did so in 1995. With the latter countries joining, the Paris Agreement was signed and hence three main objectives became important, namely:
-- “To co-operate loyally and to co-ordinate their efforts to create in Western Europe a firm basis for European economic recovery; - To afford assistance to each other, in accordance with the Charter of
the United Nations, is maintaining international peace and security and in resisting any policy of aggression;
- To promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe (WEU, 1954).”
In the early 1980s, the debate on European defence and security recommenced. Until that point, there had been little progress in this area after the amended Brussels Treaty was signed. The WEU did play an important in the encouragement of improving co-operation and consultation in Europe (WEU, 2016). The debate revived because the European Political Co-operation (EPC) could not be stretched beyond the domains of economics and defence (WEU, 2016). Therefore, the WEU was chosen as the
framework to do so. Belgium and France initiated an assembly of the Foreign ministers and the Defence ministers in Rome in 1984, which resulted in the Rome Declaration (WEU, 2016). The Rome Declaration is also called the “founding text of WEU’s reactivation (WEU, 2016: 3)”. Objectives of the declaration consisted of the harmonisation of the defence policies of the Member States, a fixed definition of the European Security Identity and reaffirmation of Article VIII (3) of the amended Brussels Treaty, which reads as follows:
“At the request of the High Contracting Parties the Council shall be
immediately convened in order to permit Them to consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise, or danger to economic stability (Article VIII (3), Amended Brussels Treaty)”.
With the latter objective, the countries wanted to address the threats outside the European territory that could constitute crisis for Europe. Furthermore, the declaration made clear that from then on, two meetings a year would take place, with both the Foreign affairs ministers and the Defence ministers attending/present (WEU, 2016). This was possibly initiated because defence and security are sensitive subjects that have both political and practical compartments.
1.1.1.2 – The operational role of the Western European Union
The first operational role of the WEU was in accordance with Article VIII (3) of the modified Brussels Treaty, which was mentioned above. During the Iran-Iraq war, mines were planted in the Persian Gulf in 1987 and 1988 (WEU, 2016). The Member States of the WEU reacted to this threat of their freedom of navigation with a Joint WEU Action: Operation Cleansweep (WEU, 2016). This operation lasted from 1988 to 1990 (WEU, 2016).
Hereafter, the WEU deployed three operations in the context of the Yugoslav Conflict between 1992 and 1996 (WEU, 2016). The first, in 1992, was enforced as a contribution to the NATO naval mission in the Adriatic. In 1993, NATO and WEU joined forces and executed a joint operation called Operation Sharp Guard (WEU, 2016). . The operation formed a naval blockade in the Adriatic Sea on shipments to and from the Former Yugoslavia. The blockade was installed to prevent violation of the UN Security Council Resolution 713 in order to avoid further escalations of the conflict in the area (WEU, 2016).1 While the majority of ships and personnel was
contributed by NATO, the WEU only backed the operation with a small staff and four ships out of a total of 76 ships (WEU, 2016). During this period, European countries rather contributed via NATO than via the Western European Union. For instance, the United Kingdom alone contributed eight ships to the mission
The WEU deployed a second operation, a police and customs operation in Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria, in cooperation with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) (WEU, 2016). For this so called Danube
Operation 250 WEU employees, 48 vehicles and eight boats were sent (WEU, 2016). The two operations ended after the Dayton Peace Agreements of 1995. Missions and operations deployed under the CSDP were in accordance with these agreements, like the European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM BiH) (1) and the European Union Military Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR ALTHEA) (6).
The last mission in the context of the Yugoslav conflict was a police
contingent (misschien nog installed hier?) in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1995 until
1 Together with United Nations Security Council Resolution 757; 787; 820; 943; 1021; 1022 (United Nations Security Council Resolution 1022 (1995)).
1996 (WEU, 2016). The aim of this police contingent was to assist the Bosnian and Croat parties in the city of Mostar in setting up a police force.
The WEU also launched three crisis management missions. The first was in 1997 and was deployed in Albania. The WEU sent a Multinational Advisory Police Element (MAPE) to the country (WEU, 2016). MAPE was a part of the undertaken the efforts the OSCE and the EU had undertaken in Albania, as the international community. The key tasks of MAPE was to train (police?) instructors and provide advice. The MAPE mission was of great importance during the Kosovo refugee crisis of 1999, since it helped the Albanian police with receiving, supervising, registering and escorting the refugees (WEU, 2016). The mission ended in May 2001. Another crisis management mission was established in 1999, in Croatia. WEU Demining Assistance Mission was implemented at the request of the EU. Technical expertise, advice and support with training capabilities were provided to the Croatian Mine Action Centre (WEU, 2016). The mission was funded by the EU and lasted until November 2001. The third and last mission under the WEU was deployed in Kosovo in 1998. It concerned a General Security Surveillance Mission and was again
exercised/employed (of een dergelijk woord) on the request of the EU (WEU, 2016). The aim of the mission was to gather information for the EU, NATO and OSCE, that would deploy missions afterwards. The EU deployed one mission in the country in 2008, EULEX KOSOVO (21), which is still operational today. The UN has been active in the country since 1999.
1.1.1.3 – The decline of the Western European Union
During the 1990s, the WEU had to reinvent itself after the Post-Cold War
enlargements of the EU and other crisis management demands. Therefore, in 1992 in Hotel Petersberg, the WEU Council adopted a list of military and security priorities, the Petersberg Tasks. The declaration was completed because a destabilising Eastern Europe was threatening the EU. The aim of the Petersberg declaration was to
contribute to the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) of the European Union (later the CSDP) in accordance with the already existing Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the Brussels Treaty. The WEU had no standing army, but it depended on the collaboration of the different Member States of the Union. Under the authority of the WEU, the Member States could employ military
units for: “humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking (WEU, 1992: 6)”.
Under the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 (which entered into force in 1999), the WEU was given the integral role to implement these Petersberg tasks. In other words: the Petersberg Tasks were incorporated in the EU treaties. The latter formed the basis for the CSDP. Already in November 2000, during the Marseille Council, the WEU Ministers decided to start with transferring the structures and capabilities of the WEU to the still developing CFSP and the CSDP (WEU, 2000). In particular the Articles V and IX were intended to be the first to be transferred (WEU, 2000). Article V contains the Collective Defence clause, whereas Article IX promotes the dialogue between the WEU, which was going to be the EU, and the contracting governments (WEU, 1954). Other moves to the merging of the WEU and the EU consisted of relocating the Western European Union Institute for Security Studies (henceforth the European Union Institute for Security Studies) and the Western Union Satellite Centre (henceforth the European Union Satellite Centre) and the appointment of Javier Solana as High Representative of both the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU as of the Secretary General to the WEU (WEU, 2000).
After these transfers, the WEU became more and more obsolete. For a period of time the European Parliament had to compete with the WEU over securing the national input (Wagner, 2005). But especially when the Lisbon Treaty of 2009 took over the mutual defence clause of the WEU, the WEU became of little importance. The clause went from Article V of the modified Brussels treaty to Article 42 (7) TEU (Article 42 is fully included in paragraph 1.3.2 of this chapter). Hereafter, the European
Parliament was granted a greater scrutiny in the foreign policy area (Wagner, 2005). The United Kingdom was the first country that gave notice of their intention to withdraw from the Western European Union on 30 March 2010 (House of Commons, 2010). One day later, the ten Member States2 of the Western European Union
concluded that the still operational organs of the organization would stop working after June 2011 and decided to withdraw from the treaty (Bailes & Messervy-Whiting, 2011).
2 Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, The Netherlands, The United Kingdom.
The WEU existed for 57 years and helped the EU in the search for an effective and distinct system of European Defence (Bailes & Messervy-Whiting, 2011). With the signing of the modified Brussels Treaty in 1954, an important step was made toward the realization of NATO. After the Second World War, when the WEU became the successor of the Western Union, it made great achievements in securing the post-war order and became a forum for Western Europeans to discuss their defence and security interests. However, the WEU left the operational work
concerning defence to NATO from the start (Bailes & Messervy-Whiting, 2011). The operations deployed under the WEU were of a “loosely coordinated (Bailes &
Messervy-Whiting, 2011: 3)” naval, police or other civilian nature, as described above. Compared to the operational role of the EU, NATO, OSCE or the UN, the WEU does not seem very effective or full-scale operational. Apart from the mission in the Persian Gulf, all missions under the WEU were deployed on European territory. Something entirely different could be said about the missions and operations under the CSDP, which will be elaborated on in chapter 3. However the motives for Operation Cleansweep were quite similar to the motives for the launch of the CSDP operation EUNAVOR SOMALIA ATALANTA (23) and its subsequent sister Mission EUTM Somalia (24). The EU deployed the latter operation and mission to protect its trade routes in the region.
1.1.2 – The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
The WEU mainly left the operative work of defence to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). However, when the needs of the EU and NATO started to evolve, the WEU took on a more intermediary role between the two (Bailes & Messervy-Whiting, 2011). This was largely because of its low profile and its
memberships, which consisted of both non-NATO members and non-EU members, as well as strictly EU or NATO members, and members to both EU and NATO. An outline of the different memberships of the EU and NATO is shown in Annex 1.
NATO does not know a veto, the right to reject a decision or proposal made by a law-making body. Therefore, the allies have to come to a consensus on every issue, otherwise no decision can be made. Therefore a de facto veto power exists in the decision-making procedure of NATO. Furthermore, the NATO Member States France, the United States of America and the United Kingdom are permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations. The latter organ needs to
authorize military action through Security Council Resolutions. Therefore, NATO is not allowed to act military when there is no Security Council Resolution on the existing conflict. Here, France, the United States of America and the United Kingdom do have a de jure veto power.
1.1.2.1 – The early history of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
The Treaty of Brussels of 1948 realized the WEU. However, during the Cold War perils, the participation of the United States was deemed necessary. Therefore, NATO was realized. NATO is an intergovernmental military alliance based on the
Washington Treaty of 1949. The Treaty was signed by twelve founding nations, namely: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States. Nowadays, NATO has 28 independent member countries.3
A crucial point for the development of NATO was the Korean War, which started in 1950. The war seemed to pose a threat that all Communist countries working in a coalition. Therefore, the NATO alliance installed the Supreme
Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Paris in 1951 (NATO, 2016). The Soviet Union suggested joining NATO in 1954, but fearing that the motive was not genuine and the intention was only to weaken the organization, the proposal was rejected by the Member States of NATO.
Another turning point in the history of NATO was the incorporation of West Germany in the alliance in 1955 (NATO, 2016). As mentioned earlier, the Federal Republic of Germany joined the WEU in 1954. After the accession of West Germany, the Warsaw Pact was signed in 1955. The latter could be seen as the counterpart, and the Eastern answer to, NATO and the WEU. During the Cold War period, Europe was divided between memberships of the two alliances: NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
However, the unity of NATO would soon be breached by the French withdrawal. In March 1967, during the presidency of Charles de Gaulle, France withdrew from NATO’s integrated military structure (Martin, 2011). De Gaulle’s ratio behind the withdrawal was to preserve France’s independence and prestige, to build an autonomous Western European organisation, build on a Franco-(West-)
3 Greece and Turkey joined in 1952; Germany in 1955; Spain in 1982; Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland in 1999; Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia joined in 2004 and Albania and Croatia in 2009 (NATO, 2016).
German axis and to build a more “European Europe” (Martin, 2011: 241). The withdrawal meant that the SHAPE headquarters had to be relocated to Casteau in Belgium. Nevertheless, France remained a member of NATO and fully re-joined the alliance in 2009 under the presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy (Martin, 2011).
The Cold War tempers did not lead to a direct form of military action and ATO did not conduct any military operations during this period. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, however, caused some disputes over whether the nuclear sharing of NATO did breach the treaty provisions (NATO, 2016). Only a few states new to NATO partook nuclear sharing during the time, therefore it was not further disputed. In 1978, the Member States of NATO defined two new aims to maintain security and pursue the so-called détente during the Cold War period. Under the arms race, both NATO and the Warsaw Pact kept on stationing more and more missiles. The stationing of missiles led to many peace movement protest throughout the United States of America and Western Europe. From this time on, until the end of the Cold War, the memberships of both alliances remained static, as did the overall atmosphere of the Cold War. Several revolutions in the late 1980s and early 1990s and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991 made sure that the de facto main opponent of NATO
disappeared. After these events, a time of re-evaluation of the purpose, tasks and nature of NATO started.
After the German reunification in 1990 the former East Germany and the former West Germany joined NATO as the Federal Republic of Germany. It was agreed to that no nuclear weapons would be stationed in the eastern part of Germany (Sarotte, 2014). Within NATO opinions diverged on the topic of expansion in eastern Europe, and therefore countries like Hungary and Poland could not become a
member. Now, both countries have been Member States of NATO since 1999.
1.1.2.2 – The Berlin and Berlin-Plus Agreement, a cooperation between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union
At a NATO meeting in Berlin in 1996, it was agreed that the WEU should create a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within the structures of NATO (NAC/NACC, 1996). The ESDI was created to make a European pillar within the already existing defence structures of NATO (NAC/NACC, 1996). The goal of this pillar was: to lower the financial contributions that the United States had been making
to military bases on European territory since the Cold War, and to permit European Member States to carry out military actions in locations where NATO does not want to do this (NAC/NACC, 1996).
In 2003, the Berlin Agreement was amended to the Berlin-Plus Agreement, which turned out to be a key development. This agreement consisted of a package of deals made between the European Union and NATO, and was based on the agreement made in the conclusion of the Washington Summit of 1999 (NATO, 1999). During this summit, the so-called Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) mechanism was ratified, which meant that the European countries were allowed to use NATO military assets in their own peacekeeping missions (Hulsman and Gardiner, 2004). The Berlin-Plus agreement has seven key parts:
1) The NATO-EU Security Agreement, which consists of the exchange of classified information under joint security protection rules;
2) EU-led crisis management operations should have an assured access to the planning capabilities of NATO;
3) The option for EU-led crisis management operations to use NATO assets, such The headquarters of NATO communication units;
4) The release, return, recall and monitoring of assets of NATO are structured in special procedures;
5) European Command options are made for NATO as well as terms of reference for a Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR), who is also the head of allied operations;
6) Arrangements for a coherent and commonly reinforcing competence necessities. For instance, the defence planning of NATO for military
requirements and other capabilities that maybe have to be obtained for a EU-led military operation;
7) The option for EU-NATO consultations, especially when there is a EU-led crisis management operation that uses the capabilities and assets of NATO (Alexander & Prosen, 2015).
This framework was distilled from through an exchange of letters between High Representative Javier Solana and the Secretary General of NATO George Robertson (Alexander & Prosen, 2015).
In practice, this means the following: firstly, whenever the European Union uses the assets offered by NATO, the Union is subject to a “right of first refusal”.
NATO can decide whether to act or engage in a certain region (Bhathal, 2014). When NATO declines, the European Union has the possibility to intervene. This places NATO in the more dominant position, because it decides whether to engage in the crisis situation. Furthermore, this also means that NATO decides whether the organisation shares its recourses, putting the EU in the more dependent position. Although it borrows military assets from NATO, the EU still takes the political lead. (Bailes & Messervy-Whiting, 2011). It can thus be concluded that the success of the CSDP missions relies heavily on the access to the capabilities and assets of NATO (Bhathal 2014:7). However, only two out of 36 CSDP operations were conducted with NATO support. Therefore, this might not be the case. However, NATO remains the more powerful of the two, since it has its own assets and capabilities, instead of the CSDP of the European Union, which depends on the contribution of the Member States.
Secondly, the NATO Member States have to unanimously approve of the usage of NATO assets. The usage of NATO assets can be stalled when one of the Member States would veto this decision.
1.1.2.3 – The operational role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
The organization is based on a system of a mutual defence agreement, Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. A mutual assistance clause is also embedded in the Lisbon treaty. Through this mutual defence clause the parties agree that an armed attack against one of the Member States is considered as an attack against them all. The Mutual defence clause of NATO were invoked after the September 11 attacks of 2001, after which troops were sent to Afghanistan on the NATO mission International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).
As previously stated, NATO did not conduct any military operations during the first forty years of its existence, during the Cold War. The first operations after the Cold War were prompted by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and resulted in the
operations Anchor Guard of 1990 and Ace Guard if 1991 (NATO, 2009). During the 1990s, two operations were installed in Russia following the break-up of the Soviet Union: operations Allied Goodwill I and II. In 1992 another operation was deployed in Libya after the UN Security Council imposed sanctions to persuade Libya into surrendering the suspects of the bombing of a Pan Am aircraft above Scotland. Other terminated operations and missions can be looked up in Annex 9. NATO is currently
active in Afghanistan in a NATO-led non-combat mission called Resolute Support. The mission was launched in January 2015. The legal basis for the mission is provided by the formal invitation of Afghanistan. Furthermore, NATO has been present in Kosovo since 1999. On the basis of Security Council Resolution 1244, NATO agreed to continue its presence in the country after Kosovo declared
independence from Serbia in February 2008. Moreover, NATO has been active in the Mediterranean Sea since 2001 in the surveillance Operation Active Endeavour; NATO has been supporting the African Union (in its missions in Somalia) and the African Standby Force since 2007; and NATO has been boosting its air policing missions since Russia’s illegal military intervention in Ukraine in 2014.
1.2 – The Helsinki Headline Goal and the Petersberg Tasks
Because the WEU earned little trust or political status and the European capabilities made a weak show under NATO, France and the United Kingdom proposed to give the EU its own military arm (Bailes & Messervy-Whiting, 2011). In 1999, the Member States of the ESDP signed the Helsinki Headline Goal and new force concepts were introduced, such as new battle groups and the Rapid Reaction Force (European Parliament, 2006). The Goal stated the following:
“cooperating voluntarily in EU-led operations, Member States must be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least one year. Military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks (European Council, 1999b)”
This condition was established because France and the United Kingdom agreed that the EU “needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stages. […] the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so (ISS-EU, 2000: 1)” in a bilateral meeting. Another guideline in the Helsinki Headline Goal was the establishment of decision-making structures for the ESDP to ensure the political guidance and strategic direction (European Council, 1999b). In 2000, the Nice European Council adopted these structures and established the Political and Security Committee, the EU Military Staff (EUMS) and the EU Military Committee (EUMC) (European Parliament, 2006). Furthermore, a catalogue of forces was created, was created by the EUMS (European Parliament, 2006). This catalogue is also known as the Helsinki Force Catalogue and was made to carry out the Petersberg Tasks. At the
Laeken Summit a year later, the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) was launched, which in its turn was set up to reach the goals of the Helsinki Headline Goal (European Parliament, 2006). The ECAP was based on a “bottom-up” approach, -> proceeding from national decisions: Member States could decide themselves whether, how and when they would contribute troops (European Parliament, 2006).
However, it became evident that the goals would not be achieved quickly, not before 2003. And the experiences with the military operations of Artemis (3) and EUFOR Concordia (2) and the changing environment of security threats, made the EU decide to move away from this more quantitative focus to a focus on a qualitative and comprehensive approach for the CFSP (EEAS, 2016). Therefore, when the new headline goal (Headline Goal 2010) was set out in 2004, the timeline was extended. Based on the Goal for 2003, Headline Goal 2010 envisaged the following:
“Be able by 2010 to respond with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty on European Union [i.e. the Petersberg-tasks] … the EU must be able to act before a crisis occurs and preventive engagement can avoid that a situation deteriorates. The EU must retain the ability to conduct
concurrent operations thus sustaining several operations simultaneously at different levels of engagement (EEAS, 2016: 1)”
A central part of the new Helsinki Headline Goal was the Battle Group Concept. These groups are high readiness forces, which consist of about 1,500 soldiers that are deployable within 10 days after the EU decides to launch a military or civilian
operation (EEAS, 2016). This concept reached the full operational capacity in 2007, but to this date the groups have yet to be utilized.
1.3 – The Common Security and Defence Policy through Amsterdam and Lisbon The Petersberg Tasks are still incorporated in the CSDP, within the Amsterdam Treaty of 1999 (European Union, 1999). Additionally, the post of High
Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy was created within this Treaty, to make sure the European Union would be able to speak with one face and “one voice (Solanda, 2000: 1)”. In 2004, the European Defence Agency was created, rendering the WEU obsolete and leading to its abolishment in 2011 (Council 2004). With the Treaty of Lisbon, most of the tasks of the WEU were incorporated in the Treaty.
Treaties other than the official European Communities/Union treaties largely set up the CSDP. However, the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Treaty of Lisbon incorporated most of the CSDP’s developments and expanded the field additionally.
1.3.1 – Amsterdam
The EU Member States signed the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997. It came into force in 1999. Although the Treaty made some codifications of the newly made tasks and structures for the CFSP, it did not create a CSDP yet. However, there was an increase in responsibilities in the sphere of humanitarian work and peacekeeping, thus getting closer to the WEU (EEAS, 2016).
The Balkan conflicts and the end of the Cold War gave an impetus to strengthen the CFSP. To achieve this, the post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs was created (European Communities, 1997: Art. 6). This mandate was given: “through contributing to the formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions, and, when appropriate and acting on behalf of the Council at the request of the Presidency, through conducting political dialogue with third parties” (European Communities: 1997: 16). The first High Representative, appointed at the Cologne Summit of 1999, was Javier Solana. Before his position as High
Representative, Solana was the Secretary-General of NATO (EEAS, 2016). In 2009, Frederica Mogherini took over his post.
With the Amsterdam Treaty, steps were already made to establish the CSDP. However, this was in the wording of
“The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions relating to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy […] It shall […] recommend to the Member States the
adoption of such a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements (European Communities, 1997: Art 17(1))”
The range of military acts which could be conducted by the EU are also defined in Article 17 of the Amsterdam Treaty, namely: “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including
peacemaking (European Communities, 1997:Article 17(2))”. These are based on the incorporated WEU’s Petersberg Tasks.
The Lisbon Treaty was signed in October 2007 and ultimately entered into force in December 2009. This treaty largely focussed on amending and modifying the TEU and replacing the Treaty of the European Community with the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). It contains some important provisions relating to the CSDP, namely: a mutual assistance clause (Art. 42(7) TEU), a solidarity clause (Art. 222 TFEU), an expansion of the Petersberg Tasks (Art. 43(1) TEU), and the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) (Art. 27(3) TEU). The EEAS falls under the authority of the High Representative. The post of the High Representative was also expanded to include the Security Policy, instead of merely representing Foreign Affairs. Furthermore, the function of HR was combined with the post of the Vice-President of the Commission and now holds a chair at the Foreign Affairs Council (European Union, 2007: 7). The treaty incorporated all the developments of the ESDP/CSDP since the Cologne European Council of 1999 (EEAS, 2016).
As mentioned earlier, the treaty imposed several new clauses. Firstly, the mutual assistance clause, this clause was inspired by and is quite similar to Article V of the WEU Treaty (EEAS, 2016). The clause is binding on all EU Member States. The mutual assistance clause is stated as follows:
‘If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States.
Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commits under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum of its implementation (Art. 42 (7) TEU).’
This clause has only been used once: France invoked the Article after the Paris attacks on 13 November 2015. This will be further explained in chapter 3.
Secondly, the Solidarity clause was made. In 2014, the European Union adopted a new decision to explain the procedures and rules to follow when the clause would be invoked (Eur-Lex, 2016b). This decision ensured that all the parties that are concerned with the operation should respond consistently, quickly and effectively. The clause itself reads as follows:
‘The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States (Art. 222 TFEU)’.
The clause has been invoked after the terrorist attacks of March 2004 in Madrid. The solidarity clause made the WEU obsolete. The clause of Article 222 TFEU is very similar, but not identical to the clause that governed the WEU. Nevertheless the WEU became outdated and consequently it was decided to terminate the organisation on 31 March 2010.
Thirdly, the Petersberg Tasks were expanded. To the pre-existing
“humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking (Art. 43(1) TEU)”, the tasks of “joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks and post-conflict stabilisation (Art. 43(1) TEU)” were added. The Article furthermore states that: “All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories (Art 43(1) TEU)”.
Fourthly, together with the Lisbon Treaty, the Permanent Structured
Cooperation was introduced (Articles 42(6) and 46 TEU and the two main conditions of Protocol No 10 annexed to the treaty). With the Permanent Structured Cooperation the EU Member States can strengthen the cooperation between their military
capabilities and make more binding commitments to one another (Art 42(6) TEU). However, they have to fulfil the criteria of Protocol No 10, annexed to the TEU. These criteria are to be found in Article 1 of the Protocol. The Member State has to:
- “Proceed more intensively to develop its defence capacities through the development of its national contributions and participation, where appropriate, in multinational forces, in the main European equipment programmes, and in the activity of the Agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments, and
- Have the capacity to supply by 2010 at the latest, either at national level or as a component of multilevel force groups, targeted combat units for the missions planned, structured at a tactical level as a battle group, with support elements including transport and logistics, capable of carrying out the tasks referred to in Article 43 TEU, within a period of five to 30 days, in particular in response to request from the United Nations, and which can be sustained for an initial period of 30 days and can be extended up to at least 120 days (Art 1, Protocol No 10, TEU)”.
The Member States that want to make use of the Permanent Structured Cooperation have to make their intentions clear to the Council and the High Representative. The Council can adopt this decision by a qualified majority. Recommendations and decisions that are taken under the Permanent Structured Cooperation can only be adopted by unanimity of the Council (Art 3, Protocol No 10, TEU).
As Dyson and Kostandinides state, the Permanent Structured Cooperation “appears to offer new opportunities for European states to cooperate more flexibly in defence policy and overcome Europe’s capability and institutional deficits by pooling military recourses (2013: 2)”. However, Moeling says: “whether or not the CSDP continues to be a success story will depend not so much on the Lisbon Treaty
provisions, than on the political will of Member States to implement joint responses to security challenges (Moeling in Dyson & Konstadinides, 2013; 2)”.
1.4 – Conclusion
Although the WEU was able to secure harmony over the troubled years after the Second World War and to establish the Petersberg Tasks, the organization itself could not stand the test of time. The CSDP proved to be a more adequate mechanism to deploy civilian or military missions or operations with.
This chapter has explored the history of the CSDP, its predecessors and sister organizations. The post-World-War-II Treaty of Brussels can be seen as its starting point. When this Treaty was signed, a mutual defence clause was implemented, after which all other European defence organs would be founded. For NATO a defence pledge was of great importance as well and it contributed to the loyalty within the organization. For the EU, the pledge to defence has not seen yet seen many
implications. Only France has invoked the Article once after the terrorist attacks in Paris. This was mostly done for political reasons, and the invocation did not have serious consequences until now.
2 – The contemporary structure of the Common Security and Defence Policy and the conduct of civilian and military missions and operations
The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) as we know it today was created by the Lisbon Treaty of 2009. The CFSP is funded by the Member States of the European Union, who finance military operations or defence implications. Other expenditures are financed from the general budget of the European Union (Eur-lex, 2016a). This chapter tries to fill the lacunas in today’s literature on the topic. Firstly, the contemporary structure of the CSDP will be set out. Secondly, it will be explained what different mission or operations can be employed under the CSDP and how they can be categorized. Thirdly, the establishment of a mission or operation is described. Fourthly, other characteristics and specialities of CSDP missions and operations will be elaborated upon. The next chapter will provide an extensive summary with insights taken from the CSDP missions and operations.
2.1 – Contemporary structure of the Common Security and Defence Policy The CSDP is included in the CFSP, the organisation that covers all the areas of the EU’s foreign policy and all the questions concerning the EU’s security (Eur-Lex, 2016a). The CSDP, in turn, covers all the military and defence policies and the management of civilian crises for the EU (Eur-Lex, 2016a). The European Council makes the decisions concerning the CFSP and the CSDP. The Council identifies the strategic interests of the European Union and decides the objectives for both the CFSP and the CSDP (Eur-Lex, 2016a). Subsequently, the Council of the EU votes on these positions or actions that ought to be taken under the sphere of CSFP or the CSDP. The voting requires unanimity, or in some cases a qualified majority4 (Eur-Lex, 2016a).
The High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, currently Frederica Mogherini, puts the CSFP into effect (Eur-lex, 2016a). The European External Action Service (EEAS), and the EU’s diplomatic service assist her. Mogherini is also the Vice-President of the European Commission (Eur-Lex, 2016a). The European Union Military Staff (EUMS), the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) and the Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD), also form a part of the EEAS (Eur-Lex, 2016a). The Court of Justice of the European Union has no jurisdiction in the
field of the CFSP and the CSDP. This is regulated in Article 24 of the Treaty on European Union:
“The Court of the European Union shall not have jurisdiction with respect to these provisions, with the exception of its jurisdiction to monitor compliance with Article 40 of this Treaty and to review the legality of certain decisions as provided for by the second paragraph of Article 275 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Article 24 TEU)”
Consequently, the Court of Justice can only look into the matters of the CFSP and CSDP when reviewing the legality of restrictive measures that are taken by the European Union against individuals and legal persons (Eur-Lex, 2016a). This is for instance required when the funds of a suspected terrorist are frozen. The Court is also allowed to monitor the implementations of the CFSP by the European Union
institutions (Eur-Lex, 2016a).
The following political and military bodies were established under the CSDP: - The Political and Security Committee (PSC);
- The European Union Military Committee (EUMC); - The European Union Military Staff (EUMS);
- Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM); - The Politico-Military Group (PMG);
- The Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD); - The Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC).
The following agencies have been incorporated after the dissolution of the WEU: - The European Union Satellite Centre (SatCen);
- The European Defence Agency (EDA);
- The European Union Institute for Security Studies (ISS); - The European Security and Defence College (ESDC).
2.2 – Possible missions and operations under the Common Security and Defence Policy
The EU possesses a unique strategy for both civilian and military measures. In the toolbox of external relations of the EU, the CSDP is not the only instrument. It is, however, the largest. Through the CSDP, the EU can deploy civilian missions and missions or operations with a military nature. The EU is not autonomous in making
decisions concerning the implementation of new missions or operations: the Union depends on its Member States. The EU Member States decide whether their assets and resources are used in the field. The EEAS, established with the Lisbon Treaty,
implements the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy. The Service is under the direction of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP).
CSDP missions and operations have however become a key instrument in the field of CFSP. Since the launch of the first CSDP mission in 2003, the missions and operations differ in their geographical location, size, nature (such as training, advising or monitoring) and scope (such as rule of law or police) (Entri, 2016). At the time of writing 35 missions have been deployed, with both civilian and military assets on three different continents, namely: Africa, Asia and Europe. The CSDP is controlled and conceived by the EU Member States through the Political and Security
Committee (PSC), therefore one could state that these missions and operations have almost always been a political tool.
The terminology used in the field of crisis response differs. How different missions and operations and phases of the planning are addressed depends on the implementing actor, like international organizations, countries or others. Missions or operations under the EU are often referred to as EU missions/operations, crisis management missions or CSDP missions/operations. Under the CSDP the following missions and operations have been deployed:
- EUAM (European Union Advisory Mission)
- EUAVSEC (European Union Aviation Security Mission) - EUBAM (European Union Border Assistance Mission) - EUCAP (European Union Capacity Building Mission) - EUFOR (European Union Forces (Military))
- EULEX/EUJUST LEX (European Union Rule of Law Mission/European Union Mission in Support of the Justice Sector)
- EUMM (European Union Monitoring Mission)
- EUMAM (European Union Military Advisory Mission) - EUNAVFOR (European Union Naval Force Operation) - EUPAT (European Police Advisory Team Mission)
- EU SSR/EUSEC (European Union Security Sector Reform Mission) - EUTM (European Union Training Mission)
These missions and operations can be categorized as follows:
Military Civilian
Operations Missions Missions
- EUFOR - EUNAVFOR - EUTM - EUMAM - EUAM - EUAVSEC - EUBAM - EUCAP - EULEX/EUJUST LEX - EUMM - EUPAT - EUPM/EUPOL - EU SSR/EUSEC
According to Biscop and Coelemont (2010), the EU also employs civilian missions that in reality are military missions. The missions are executed by military staff in civilian dress but are called civilian for political reasons. They sum up the following civilian-military missions in their paper for the Egmont Institute, a think tank that concentrates on International Relations:
- EUPM in Bosnia and Herzegovina (2003) (1)
- EUPOL Proxima in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (2004) (4) - EUJUST Themis in Georgia (2004) (5)
- EUPOL Kinshasa in the Democratic Republic of Congo (2005) (7) - EUSEC in the Democratic Republic of Congo (2005) (8)
- EUJUST LEX in Iraq (2005) (9)
- EU support to AMMIS II in Sudan (2005) (10) - AMM in Indonesia (2005) (11)
- EUBAM Rafah in the Palestinian Territories (2005) (12) - EUBAM in Moldova and Ukraine (2005) (13)
- EUPAT in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (2006) (14) - EUPOL COPPS in the Palestinian Territories (2006) (15)
- EUPOL in the Democratic Republic of Congo (2007) (17) - EU SSR in Guinea Bissau (2008) (20)
- EULEX in Kosovo (2008) (21) - EUMM in Georgia (2008) (22)
2.3 – Other features and characteristics of missions and operations
The operational range of the CSDP is described by the Petersberg Tasks, which were signed in 1992 by the Western European Union and later transferred to the EU under the Treaty of Amsterdam. These tasks include humanitarian and rescue tasks,
peacekeeping, peacemaking and combat forces tasks in crisis management (Entri, 2016).
Every mission or operation needs a legal basis, a factor that is also known as the mission mandate. For instance, the United Nations authorises peace operations through a Security Council Resolution. Nearly all peace operations by different regional organisations (such as the African Union, OSCE or the EU) are implemented under de mandate of a UN Security Council Resolution.
2.3.1 – Executive or non-executive
Most mandates have a non-executive mandate; some mandates have an executive mandate. There is a difference between missions and operations. The majority of the literature on the CSDP fails to address the difference between these two terms. In the book The European Union and Military Conflict Management: Defining, Evaluating and Achieving Success (2014) it is described as follows. In military phrasing, a
mission tends to connote a small and specific task. “Your mission is to...” is a phrase a commander would use to its junior. This would be at the tactical level. Above this level there are operational and strategic levels. In other words: where an operation final goal lays, as goes for the ‘Bosnian operation’, the operation is larger than a mission. A strategy or a strategic goal is set out by the government(s), after which the military personnel on the ground have to develop an ‘operational plan’ to go achieve this (Peen Rodt, 2014: 14).
However, the strict distinction between the two is as follows: a military intervention can be executive, which makes it a military operation, or it could be non-executive, which makes it a military mission. A military operation could involve an Express Response, a Generic Military Response or a Standard military response (Council of the European Union, 2014). The mandate of these executive operations is for the conduct of actions, in replacement of the nation where the operation is held, the guest country; whereas a non-executive mission’s mandate is conducted to support the nation and to play an advisory role only (Council of the European Union, 2014). However, as has been stated above, in some cases, a civilian mission or a
non-executive military mission is established, where this in fact concerns a military operation. This is done for political reasons.
2.3.2 – Chain of command
For establishing the chain of command, the EU needs an Operation Headquarter (OHQ) to run the operation or mission at a strategic level. The Operational
Headquarter directs the Force Headquarters (FHQ), which carries out the mission or operation on the ground. There are three ways for the EU to establish the chain of command for a military mission or operation.
Firstly, a military mission or operation can be led by one single Member State through the Framework Nation Concept, which was established in 2002 (Council of the European Union, 2015b). Through this concept a Member State, or a group of Member States can volunteer as a Framework Nation. The Member State or a group of Member States takes responsibility in the autonomous EU-led mission or operation and provides the Commander of the operation or mission (OpCdr/MCdr), the staff support, the Communication and Information System (CIS) together with the logistic framework and the core of the military chain of command (Council of the European Union, 2015b). The missions or operations can either be EU-initiated, from a top-down approach or Member State-initiated, from a bottom-up approach (Council of the European Union, 2015b).
The Framework Nation Concept only applies to military missions or
operations. The Framework Nation Concept was used for the military operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, ARTEMIS/DRC (3), where France acted as the Framework Nation (Article 2 of Council Joint Action 2003/423/CFSP). This concept is mostly used when there is a great urgency to act (Council of the European Union, 2015a). A Framework Nation Concept can be applied to a mission or operation launched by Article 44 TEU when the Council adopts a decision accordingly (Council of the European Union, 2015b).
It is also possible to have one of the Member States pledge to take responsibility through their Operation Headquarters. There are Operational Headquarters in France (Paris), Germany (Ulm), Greece (Larissa), Italy (Rome), Poland (forthcoming) and the United Kingdom (Northwood) (European Parliament, 2016). The Italian OHQ is being used for the current operation EUNAVFOR MED
Sophia (35), whilst the British OHQ is used for current operation EUNAVFOR Atalanta (23).
Secondly, a mission or operation can use NATO capabilities and/or assets through the Berlin Plus Agreement. This agreement between NATO and the EU was finalised in 2003 and permits the EU to use the capabilities and assets of NATO for crisis management operations led by the EU (EEAS, 2016). Because NATO and the EU have overlapping memberships they agreed on arrangements for crisis
management operations (See Annex 1). This improved their partnership and made consultation, transparency and cooperation more easy (EEAS, 2016). The Agreement facilitated the first military operation of the EU, namely Operation Concordia (2) in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in December 2003. The EU still uses NATO assets and capabilities under the military operation of EUFOR Althea (6), deployed since 2004. Its OHQ therefore was the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), in Mons, Belgium. When NATO assets or capabilities are used, the OHQ automatically becomes SHAPE.
The third option is to recourse to the EU Operations Centre (OPCEN) in Brussels, which was declared operational in 2007 (European Parliament, 2016). The Military Staff of the EU in Brussels was tasked with establishing an Operations Centre that runs and plans missions or operations, particularly when they have a civil/military nature and when no other national OHQ is accessible (European Parliament, 2016). In March 2012, The EU Operations Centre was activated for the first time for three missions in the Horn of Africa: the civilian Mission EUCAP NESTOR (27), the military operation ATALANTA (23) and the military training mission EUTM Somalia (24) (European Parliament, 2016). It was activated mainly because the missions lacked coordination, which was urgently needed. The mandate of the Council Decision 2012/173/CFSP stated the following:
“The EU Operations Centre shall provide support in the field of operational planning and conduct of the CSDP missions and operation in the Horn of Africa and in the Sahel region with a view to increasing efficiency, coherence and synergies for CSDP with both regions. In this framework the EU Operations Centre shall facilitate information exchange, improve coordination and strengthen civil-military synergies (Article 2(1) Council Decision 2012/173/CFSP).”
Yet, the external expert deemed the results of the OPCEN activation unsatisfactory, because it lacked enough personnel and the “progressive obsolescence of its
infrastructure” (European Parliament, 2016: 15).
Nevertheless, recent military missions or operations, particularly the ones with a small-scale nature, combine their Operational Headquarters with the Force
Headquarters (European Parliament, 2016). The Force Headquarters increasingly features as a new answer to the three concepts above. The military training mission in Mali, EUTM Mali (29), is an example of a combined OHQ and FHQ. The
headquarters of the mission are located in Bamako, the capital of Mali that is located in the south of the country.
2.3.3 – Financing Common Security and Defence Policy missions and operations Civilian missions are financed by the CFSP’s budget. This budget covers the cost for personnel, assets and the costs for maintenance (Entri, 2016). The costs for military operations are financed through the Athena mechanism. The Council of the European Union set up this mechanism in 2004 (Council Decision 2004/197/CFSP). Athena funded the following operations:
- Support to AMIS II (10), July 2005 – December 2007 - EUFOR RD CONGO (16), June 2006 – November 2006 - EUFOR TCHAD RCA (19), January 2008 – March 2009 - EUFOR Libya (30), April 2011 – November 2011 - EUFOR RCA (31), February 2014 – March 2015
- EUMAM RCA (34), January 2015 – July 2016 (European Council & Council of the European Union, 2016)
Athena is currently funding the following missions and operations: - EUFOR ALTHEA (6) (Bosnia and Herzegovina)
- EUNAVFOR ATALANTA (23) (Horn of Africa) - EUTM SOMALIA (24)
- EUTM MALI (29)
- EUNAVFOR MED Sophia (35)
- EUTM RCA (36) (European Council & Council of the European Union, 2016)
Athena finances the common costs made by the EU on military operations, together with the nation borne costs. 27 Member States contribute to the operations with an
annual share based on their gross national income, except for Denmark that opted out of the CSDP in military matters. This is strictly regulated in Article 41(2) TEU and Annex III of Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/528, which amends the Council Decision 2004/197/CFSP and its successors. Within Article 41(2) TEU a strict distinction is made between civilian and military missions or operations. Paragraph 2 of the Article reads as follows:
“Operating expenditure to which the implementation of this Chapter gives rise shall also be charged to the Union budget, except for such expenditure from operations having military or defence implications and cases where the Council acting unanimously decides otherwise.
In cases where expenditure is not charged to the Union budget, it shall be charged to the Member States in accordance with the gross national product scale, unless the Council acting unanimously decides otherwise. As for expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications, Member States whose representatives in the Council have made a formal declaration under Article 31(1), second subparagraph, shall not be obliged to contribute to the financing thereof. (Art. 41(2) TEU)”
In the second paragraph of the Article the situation of Denmark is described. If the Athena mechanism is not used, the principle of ‘costs lie where they fall’ is applied (Council Decision 2004/197/CFSP. In general, this goes for personnel and other items (EUISS, 2013).
2.4 – The Comprehensive Approach
The comprehensive approach is a term that is used a lot in the CSDP policy area. For the external action of the EU, and its different areas and other policies, consistency is needed. Therefore, to achieve this, the Treaty of Lisbon lays out the objectives and principles of the area. The Treaty also introduced a new institutional context, including the new post of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security in combination with the Vice-President of the Commission. Furthermore, it created the EEAS (European Commission, 2013). These organs were introduced to make the external action of the EU more effective, strategic and consistent (European Commission, 2013).
Enhancing peace outside of its borders is a vital concern to the EU. It does so by preparing for, responding to, addressing and preventing crises or conflicts. It is in the global interest of the EU to stop these threats (European Commission, 2013). The EU is known for its longstanding peace and stability, but it is also the largest trading
