‘Democracy, not
democratization’
The coverage of the 1989 elections in Poland by Radio Free
Europe
Eline Hoeneveld Student number: 10425535
Master Thesis Geschiedenis van Internationale Betrekkingen University van Amsterdam
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Peter Romijn Final version
Table of Contents
Introduction 2
1. Beginning of Solidarity: 11
the Polish intelligentsia and their thought
2. Radio Free Europe (RFE): 22
the background, beginnings and intentions of its Polish section
3. Radio Free Europe’s coverage of the 1989 elections 35
4. Radio Free Europe’s audiences and reception 50
Conclusion 60
Introduction
‘It is not about the events of 1989, but about 1989 as a “world event”’1 is the opening
statement of political scientist and international relations historian Jacques Rupnik’s monograph. The year 1989 was in many ways a transitional period to a new world order. As explained in Rupnik’s argument, the first semi-free elections were held in Poland in June of that year and Hungary passed legislation in September, which allowed a multi-party system. The Berlin Wall fell two months later on 9 November 1989 and following, the Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia began in late November. Bulgaria and Romania also saw several uprisings and demonstrations against communist regimes. The revolutions of 1989 were part of a radical trend across the world that led to the widespread abolishment of socialism – or ‘communism’ how it is referred to in western literature – and the implementation of more social democratic political systems.2 This wave of revolutions is what makes
1989 such a revolutionary year, and it could be compared to the events of 1789; another start of a new world order.
Of course, socialism did not collapse overnight. The first cracks in the vast regime were beginning to show mid-twentieth century, and one could even argue socialism was never truly up and running. Either way, the first official derivation of a socialist regime in Eastern Europe was seen in Poland, because it broke with the official dogma of the Communist Party. Semi-free elections (more than one party was allowed to enter the race) were held for the first time. This started with the uprisings and strikes of 1980-81, led by the newly founded workers’ union, Solidarity. Solidarity was the first trade union in a Soviet-model country that was not controlled by a Communist Party. The union was founded in September 1980 and led by an electrician named Lech Walesa.3 The cause for the creation of the union were the
protests and strikes at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk, where earlier that month a woman named Anna Walentynowicz was fired just before her retirement, which angered many workers.4 This initiated the beginning of countless strikes during
1980-81. Years of dissatisfaction and unrest came to an eruption in the early 1980s. In the 1 Jacques Rupnik, 1989 As a political world event: democracy, Europe and the new International
System in the Age of Globalization, New York (2012). 18-32.
2 Jacques Rupnik, 1989 As a political world event: democracy, Europe and the new International
System in the Age of Globalization, New York (2012). 18-32.
3 Arista Maria Cirtautas, The Polish solidarity movement: Revolution, Democracy and Natural Rights, New York (1997).
1970s socialist Poland was struggling with a number of problems, such as the growing frustration of the Polish people which resulted from dealing with a declining economy, which led to a large amount of national debt. This caused prices to rise, yet wages stayed the same.5 In 1976 these problems were a key reason for protests in
Poland, where many people were arrested. In response to these arrests, the intellectual activist group named Komitet Obrony Robotnikow (KOR) – or the Workers’ Defence Committee – was created; among those within the group were Antoni Macierewicz and Jacek Kurón.6
From 1980 on, Solidarity gained a great deal of support and became incredibly popular in Poland. At its peak, Solidarity had ten million members, in a population of 36 million. 7 The strikes of 1980-81 did have quite an impact in Poland, as well as
abroad, as it was the first time there were massive protests in a Soviet country. The Polish government did not agree with these uprisings and then-prime minister Wojciech Jaruzelski decided to suppress these manifestations of discontent by harsh means, that is the deployment of Zmotoryzowane Odwody Milicji Obywatelskiej (ZOMO), being paramilitary-police formations.8 The Polish government then also
imposed martial law from December 1981 to July 1983. Martial Law meant that in this state of emergency, the army held the authority and could intervene on a normative level in civilian life.9 Walesa and other opposition members were sent to
prison for eleven months.10 In the following years, the Solidarity movement was
forced to operate underground.
In 1985 Mikhail Gorbachev, then-general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, proclaimed his policies of perestroika and glasnost. This led to the political landscape was remotely welcoming sounds of opposition. The Polish economy was in poor shape by the end of the 1980s; the prices of food rose forty per cent, yet the wages stayed the same.11 This caused a new wave of protests in 1988. On
30 November 1988, the national channel broadcasted a debate between Lech Walesa and Alfred Miodowicz, leader of the pro-government workers union. Walesa 5 Michael Dobbs, Poland, Solidarty, Walesa, Oxford (1981).
6 Ibidem.
7 Arista Maria Cirtautas, The Polish solidarity movement: Revolution, Democracy and Natural Rights, New York (1997).
8 Ibidem.
9 A. Kemp-Welch, Poland under Communism: A Cold War History. Cambridge, (2008).
10 Ibidem.
performed gloriously, winning the debate and consequently making it rather difficult for the government to ignore Solidarity. These events in early 1989 led to the Round Table Talks, a series of debates initiated by the Polish United Workers Party, the main socialist Party, to work with Solidarity toward a compromise with the aim of ending unrest in Poland. Resulting in the first semi-free elections of Poland in 1989.12
The Polish situation sparked much debate on a national and international level; never before had such uprisings led to the Communist Party being wiling to negotiate with the opposition. The United States showed much support for Solidarity and they endorsed every opposition movement. In the international media there was a high level of attention on the Round Table Talks and the Polish elections – especially by the American Government, that sponsored Radio Free Europe (RFE)/Radio Liberty (RL), which broadcasted news on the situation in Poland regularly. However, whether or not this coverage was neutral remains open to discussion and doubt. The objective of this research-project is to analyse whether the coverage by US-led broadcast stations – such as RFE/RL – of the 1989 Polish elections was primarily inspired by ‘democratic framing’. Was this transition in fact as democratic as it was made out to be? Did the Polish intelligentsia surrounding Solidarity and KOR have a different view on Poland’s socio-political future than the government? Did this vision derivate much from the image created in the coverage by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty? These are the questions I hope to answer by the end of this research.
In order to achieve this, the political thinking of the Polish intellectuals and activists – especially Lech Walesa, Jacek Kuron, Bronislaw Geremek, Adam Michnik and Karol Modzelewski – will be examined. Each of these opposition figures played a different role in the formation of Solidarity-thought, which calls for a closer look at the monographs of publicist and historian Michnik, such as The Trouble with History and his 2001 Erasmus-award winning essay titled ‘Confessions of a converted dissident’. Historian Bronislaw Geremek published a great deal of work on international relations and Polish politics. Fellow historians Kuron and Modzelewski wrote the ‘Open Letter to the Polish Party’ in the late 1960s. Walesa, not academically schooled, started his career as an electrician and gained popularity due to the strikes in the mid-1970s at the Lenin Shipyard. This contrast in Walesa’s background is taken into account in this research when considering the backgrounds 12 Arista Maria Cirtautas, The Polish solidarity movement: Revolution, Democracy and Natural
of Walesa and the other Polish intelligentsia. Further primary sources include reports from RFE/RL, which released numerous situation reports, press reviews and background essays on the Round Table Talks and the events in Poland at the end of the 1980s. These documents are well archived in the Open Society Archives, a part of the Central European University in Budapest. In regard to historiographical context, many books have been written on Solidarity, the transitional year 1989 and Poland. Important books include 1989: The
Struggle to Create Post-War Europe by American historian Marie Elise Sarotte
(2011). Sarotte wrote a detailed and clear review on the transitions of regimes in Eastern Europe after 1989. As a main focus point, she utilises Germany as an example, examining which transition model would be best used on the ‘new Germany’. Prague-born French political scientist Jacques Rupnik released a book in the early 1990s on this same subject titled, 1989 as a Political World Event:
Democracy, Europe and the New International System in the Age of Globalization
(1994). From a theoretical point of view, it is also interesting to examine at the works of Michal Kopecek and Piotr Wcislik. Kopecek is a Czech historian and Wcislik is a historian at the University of Budapest. Kopecek and Wcislik look closely at the East European regimes after the revolutionary year of 1989 in their book, Thinking
Through Transition: Liberal Democracy, Authoritarian Pasts and Intellectual History in East Central Europe After 1989 (2015). Wcislik and Kopecek approach these
issues in eastern Europe from the transitional history model standpoint, which focuses on changing systems with a historical perspective.
These monographs provide in-depth information on the backgrounds, as well as offering historical basis the research needs. However, the present research-project is carried by the ambition to consider pertinent theoretical definitions in order to answer the main questions. In this way the discussion should be carries further. When discussing topics such as democracy, socialism framing and ideology can be multi-interpretable. Therefore, I refer to Andrew Heywood, a well-known academic in political science handbooks for broad ideas and theorisation on politics and political science. In his third edition of Political Ideologies, Heywood explains how ideologies such as liberalism, socialism and fascism work together.13 When explaining the
importance of ideology and political thought, Heywood refers to the work of economist John Keynes, as saying ‘the world is ruled by little other than the ideas of 13 Andrew Heywood, Political Ideologies: An Introduction, Cambridge (2012, third edition) 10-13.
economists and political philosophers’.14 Heywood goes on to say that ideologies are
not mere personal interests or ambition, but also have the power and capacity to inspire and mould daily life.15 To put it simply, Heywood says that political theory
and political practice are inseparably linked.16 For that very reason, the
interconnections between these should be studied in the specific socio-political contexts.
At the same time, to define ‘ideology’ is somewhat difficult as there is not much of an agreed-upon definition. The difficulty is that ideology can be used as a passive academic term on one hand, but it is also a dynamic, contingent weapon in the hands of politicians. Some definitions of ideology entail a political-based origin, such as ‘an officially sanctioned set of ideas used to legitimise a political system or regime’ or more negatively: ‘an all-embracing political doctrine that claims a monopoly of truth’.17 In my own opinion, an ideology does not necessarily have to be political or to
be about truth or falseness. Therefore for the purpose of this research, the following broader definition will be used: ideology is ‘the world-view of a particular social class or social group’.18 Ideology can be considered an intrinsic-type view and in some
ways it can border on religion, but it can be found in multiple aspects in life – not just politics.
Having said this, it is necessary to tackle ideologies that play an important role in the twentieth century. In the broader sense, the elections in Poland were also elections about ideology: at stake was a transition from a socialist to a liberal system, one could say. Or perhaps, was it a transition from socialism to social democracy, or even from communism to neo-socialism? Of course, countless books are written on these subjects, but it remains necessary to have a somewhat demarcated definition of these terms. To start with socialism, it is important to note the difference between Marxism, socialism and communism. Heywood also profoundly explains this in
Political Ideologies. I would like to use his work as an academic reference, but mostly
I will use my own definition of these terms. Though often used in the same context, these terms are quite different. Socialism, just as like liberalism, finds its roots in the
14 Ibidem.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Andrew Heywood, Political Ideologies: An Introduction, Cambridge (2012, third edition) 10-13.
Age of the Enlightenment in the nineteenth century.19 Socialism was a response to the
dire circumstances for workers since the industrial revolution; a ‘no man is an island’ mentality arose. At its foundation lays the conviction of social ownership, general equality and solidarity.20 Socialism appears in many variations considering these core
values. In the nineteenth century, economist Karl Marx arose, who had a more
economical and structural take on capitalism.
In essence, Marxism takes from the concept of socialism, but it provides it with a background story and purpose. In Marxist theory, modern society is constructed by power struggles and more precisely: the struggle between classes. Since modern times, there has always been a battle between the proletariat and bourgeoisie, said Marx. Due to the dominance of the bourgeoisie, capitalism was able to take the lead. In Marxist theory, socialism would eventually take over in a dialectic process. The dialectic follows from class struggle. Through revolution led by the proletariat, a true socialist society would appear, in which equality between men is the core idea.21 It is important to note that Marxism mainly consist of theory, as there has
never been a Marxism-practising society. This is where ‘communism’ comes into play, because this can be seen as a practical outcome of Vladimir Lenin’s take on Marxism. The socialist state that was put into power by the Bolsheviks in 1917 was founded on what is now called Marxism-Leninism. Marxism-Leninism is the theory of Marxism but implemented by Lenin in the Soviet state.22 However, to complicate
matters even more, Marxism-Leninism is also what we call the policies that Lenin imposed between roughly 1917 and 1922 during the early days of war communism. Yet, socialism is the political implementation of Marxism-Leninism, but not just in Russia as it also appears elsewhere in the world. In this respect, Socialism is the socialist, political and economic ideology for a classless and stateless society based on common goods and production means.23 This was also implemented in China, but
Chinese socialism is considered quite far from Marxism-Leninism.
Socialism nowadays usually stands for division of power, a strong government and social safety nets for the less fortunate in society. Having established this, there is another nineteenth century ideology to be discussed: liberalism. The word liberalism 19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Andrew Heywood, Political Ideologies: An Introduction, Cambridge (2012, third edition) 255-276.
22 Ibidem.
derives from ‘liber’, which means free. The central thought in liberalism is centred on individualism, freedom, reason, justice and tolerance.24 Liberals hugely advocate a
small government. Enlightenment literature on liberalism usually revolves around Adam Smith, John Locke, John Stuart Mill and James Madison. Modern liberalism knows many different types: in neoliberalism, economic theory is incredibly important, as is the laissez-faire technique in which the economic market is regulated by its own market forces.25 In modern society, there are many forms in which
liberalism is often combined with socialism and democratic values, such as social responsibility, a managed economy and enabling the state.26 The utilitarian aspect in
classic liberalism was often deemed especially difficult for socialists.27
This form of liberal democracy is what American political scientist David Held hails in the third edition of Model of Democracy (1986) as the great victor at the end of the twentieth century, more specifically, the end of the Cold War.28 Democracy
and liberalism were terms that by 1989 were seen as the summit of political practice. Held dedicated a whole chapter in the 2006 revised-edition of his book Democracy
After Soviet Communism. It would be easy to instantly refer to Francis Fukuyama’s End of Ideology theory, which sees the demise of communism worldwide and the
victory of liberal democracy as the end-game of modern society.29 Yet, this would be
jumping to conclusions. However, Held’s definition of democracy can be wisely applied to. In my opinion, democracy is one of the hollowest terms in society. The term officially derives from the Greek word demokratia, where demos refers to the 24 Andrew Heywood, Political Ideologies, 25-68.
25 Ibidem.
26 Heywood, Political Ideologies: An Introduction, Cambridge (2012, third edition) 25-68.
27 Further explanation on classic liberalism and modern liberalism:
28 David Held, Models of Democracy, Cambridge (2006, third edition) 1-11.
people, and kratos signifies rule.30 Held described democracy as: ‘a form of
government in which, in contradistinction to monarchies and aristocracies, the people rule. Democracy entails a political community in which there is some form of
political equality among the people. “Rule by the people” may appear to be an
unambiguous concept, but appearances are deceptive.’31 This is a definition that can
serve as a tool to help understand other theories involving democracy. However, some aspects deem to be problematic: who are the people? What is rule? Does this also imply obedience? Perhaps, these are thoughts for a different thesis. Then of course, this leads to the central element in this research-project: what is the definition of ‘democratic framing’? This concept can be defined by means of framing theory, which is when a certain set of ideas, concepts and perspectives on concepts about a certain matter are moulded in a way that offers a selective view of reality.32 This usually happens through the means of mass communication, such as
media or political sources. ‘Democratic framing’ is taking the principles and perspectives of democracy and projecting it on certain developments in a regime. In short, it entails seeing what one wants to see.
Summing up, the term propaganda is a crucial in connection to democratic framing. However, propaganda is a widely used term and its definition may be hazy. For this I refer to the Oxford Handbook of Propaganda. In the introduction, Jonathan Auerbach and Russ Castronovo offer a detailed overview of their definition of propaganda. For starters, they say that propaganda derives from the Latin word
propagare, a word that is usually used within the Christian church to describe the
spreading of faith.33 They say that in general, propaganda is associated with conquest
of extension of territory.34 To say the least, this is a possible objective of propaganda.
Yet on the other side of the spectrum, propaganda could also be used as a form of widespread communication. Propaganda does not always have to be a bad thing, it could be considered a study alone, however, a strict definition is needed in that case. Auerbach and Castronovo state: ‘… a central means of organizing and shaping thought and perception, a practice that has pervaded the twentieth century but whose 30 Held, Models of Democracy, 1-11.
31 Held, David, Models of Democracy, 12.
32 Jamie Terence Kelly, Framing Democracy: A Behavioural Approach to Democretic Theory, Princeton (2012) 1-7.
33 John Auerbach and Castronovo, Russ, The Oxford Handbook of Propaganda Studies, Oxford (2013) 1-15.
modern origins go back at least to the spread of religious doctrine during the Counter Reformation.’35 It could be summarised as: ‘persuasion in forms of mass
communication’. In Merriam-Webster definitions, it states often noted that propaganda is false and over-exaggerated. Although this might be true, I would like to consider a more objective definition of the word as proposed in the Oxford Handbook
of Propaganda by Auerbach and Castronovo.
The 1989 Polish elections have been discussed very widely. So, why start this research-project? In my opinion, there has not been much written that relies on the approach of western media’s ideology of revolutions. A couple of years ago, for example, revolutions broke loose in Northern Africa, referred to as the ‘Arabic Spring’. According to western media, the peoples of these countries wanted nothing more than to become a social democratic society. Yet, years later we see that these societies are still far away from having a participatory democracy and an accountable government, or a western-model social democracy. How did Poland do at the time? I am curious to examine whether the thought of Polish intelligentsia, considering the Round Table Talks and their vision for future Poland, is different from the image created in the media. Does this comply with how Poland stands today? These are two big questions that deserve substantial answers.
35 John Auerbach, and Castronovo, Russ, The Oxford Handbook of Propaganda Studies, Oxford (2013) 3.
1. Beginning of Solidarity: the thought of the Polish intelligentsia
The foundation for the dissident movement in Poland started at the University of Warsaw in the 1960s. Jacek Kuron and Karol Modzelewski were two young assistant professors at the University when they began to spread their document ‘Open Letter to the Party’ in late-1964. Kuron and Modzelewski both had graduated at the History faculty a few years before. In the 1950s they were a part of the Discussion Club at the University called Krzywe Koło (Crooked Circle).36 Kuron was born in 1934 in Lwow,
Poland – now Lviv, Ukraine. Kuron was a passionate socialist; he joined the Polska
Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza (Polish United Workers Party, short: PZPR) at the age
of 19.37 Modzelewski was born in 1937 in Moscow, then Soviet Union. He was also a
member of the PZPR at a young age.38 The letter they wrote in 1964 was perceived as
revolutionary by the Communist leadership and therefore they were both imprisoned for more than three years.
Kuron and Modzelewski were both hard-core Marxist-Leninists. In the 1960s, they felt the Polish government at that time was not harbouring their socialist conviction. In November 1964, they were investigated by the Ministry of the Interior for the ideas they included in their 128-page manifesto. The police searched their houses and confiscated the original document. Both men were arrested on 14 November 1964 when their document was discovered and released clandestinely two days later. As a result, both Kuron and Modzelewski were expelled from the party on 27 November that year. The original manuscript was deemed by the PZPR to contain pieces of texts of ‘dishonesty’ and ones that ‘lack of civil courage’.39 In order to
maintain their message they so furiously put across in their manuscript, both men decided to rewrite their manifesto, resulting in a 95-page letter this time.40 The letter
was circulated at the University of Warsaw and for this act, the Ministry of the Interior took the authors into custody in March 1965. At their trial in July 1965, Kuron was sentenced to three years in jail and Modzelewski was sentenced to three-and-a-half years for ‘preparing and distributing works harmful to then interests of the
36 A. Kemp-Welch, Poland under Communism (Cambridge, 2008) 204.
37 Jacek Kuron interviews, webofstories.com, https://www.webofstories.com/play/jacek.kuron/1, seen 28th november 2017.
38 A. Kemp-Welch, Poland under Communism (Cambridge, 2008) 204.
39 Einde O’Callaghan, ‘Jacek Kuron and Karl Modzelewski: Social Manifesto for Poland’,
International Socialism, No.28 (Spring 1967) 25-27.
Polish state’.41
The ‘Open Letter to the Party’ addressed several topics concerning the Polish state in eleven chapters. The manifesto starts off by problematizing the ‘Power of the Bureaucracy’. In the first chapter, they wonder if the working class is still indeed in power, in accordance with Marxist theory. In their argument, the elite members of the Polish United Workers Party were actually the ruling class in Poland at that time – not the proletariat. Therefore, this was brandished as contrary to Marxist principles.42 In
the second chapter, the authors defy the notion that the worker is rewarded by labour. According to Kuron and Modzelewski, the workers were is exploited because they receive less than what he or she produces.43 In the following chapter, the common
goal of production was questioned, whereas the ‘managerial class’ has a different goal of production than the worker class. Of course, the very divide of classes should not appear at all in a model Marxist society. However, they felt this was the case in Poland at the time. In the fourth chapter, this problem is addressed further: after the overthrow of the regime, the bureaucracy was able to take political power due to the backwardness of the country. In this phase, the bureaucracy had to act accordingly to the national interests and followed the requirement of economic developments as long as it carried out the industrialisation over the country.44 Yet, the problem was that the
bureaucracy did not give up this monopolistic role after this task was completed. In the following chapters, Kuron and Modzelewski addressed the economic problems the country was suffering, according to them mostly caused by the following contradiction: the production potential could be expanded, but at the same time consumption would stay low due to low wages. The same problem was noted in agriculture. By problematizing this, the authors made predictions for the future. If the economic crisis would continue, eventually the spiritual crisis would deepen, too. In this case, the bureaucracy would become isolated from society and would probably turn out another revolution from the proletariat.45 In chapter 9 and 10, the authors
made a counterargument for revolution by saying revolutions are not conspiracies, but a result of social conditions. Also, the authors put forth the notion that the fact that the 41 Einde O’Callaghan, ‘Jacek Kuron and Karl Modzelewski: Social Manifesto for Poland’,
International Socialism, No.28 (Spring 1967) 25-27.
42 Ibidem.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 Einde O’Callaghan, ‘Jacek Kuron and Karl Modzelewski: Social Manifesto for Poland’,
USSR would maintain the authority to send troops into Polish revolutions was not valid because revolutions are not limited to one country. In addition, the authors say that not only does the imperial Western Bloc use violence to achieve its goals, but so does the Eastern Bloc. The two blocs do not want to destroy each other; they rather wish to compete on the basis of mutually delimited zones of influence.46
In the final chapters, Kuron and Modzelewski make their points for their ideal future for socialist Poland. This is put together in a set of eight points:
1. Workers’ control of factories;
2. Legislative and executive power over the country in the hands of the federation of workers’ councils;
3. Multi-party system, freedom of speech and organisations, no censorship;
4. Free independent trade unions;
5. The political activation of the working class. Providing necessary education of workers for that purpose;
6. Abolition of political police and of the regular army. The functions of the army to be taken over by workers’ militia. The navy and the air force to be preserved, but consisting of industrial factories;
7. In agriculture both collectivisation and free market are to be avoided. Problems to be solved by the establishment of an autonomous political representation of peasant producers; 8. International solidarity of the working class. Expanding
revolution to other countries of both East and West, as well as to the underdeveloped areas.47
These points are argued in order to ‘free the classes’, for now the working class, the soldier and the intellectual are confined. Both men acknowledge the classes and focus on the relationships between these classes. In the final chapter, they conclude with reactions to their criticisms: ‘Brought up in dogmatic Marxism, they rejected Marxism, retaining the dogma. They doubt the validity of Marx’s theory about the 46 Ibidem.
classes, but do not doubt that in the party there can be no factions and that authority
should be obeyed.’48
The ‘Open Letter’ can be interpreted in multiple ways. First of all, the nature of the letter was revolutionary at that time and still to this day. Also, its revolutionary nature has roots in Kuron’s and Michnick’s desire for democratization within the Party, as early as 1964. Although the term ‘democratization’ is not explicitly used in the Letter, the outline of the manifest showcases clearly their understanding of democratizing the Party. In the spheres of Polish intelligentsia, the letter sparked much commotion – mostly in regard to their peers (such as Adam Michnik) but also abroad. Although the document was supposedly destroyed or locked away by Polish authorities, it was smuggled out of Poland and made its way to the international press. In 1966, it was featured in a Paris journal called Kultura. Also, in the United States for example some of the document was published in New Politics and the
International Socialist Review.49
For American socialists, the letter and its intention seemed to be of a Trotskyist tendency, which is Leon Trotsky’s version of Marxism. This comparison was also noted in the report of the letter by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty in November 1966. RFE/RL made parallels to Trotsky’s Left Opposition and Yugoslav revisionism in the 1950s. Trotskyism, is and was a very important part to the Marxist practical thought for some. Trotsky was one of the prominent leaders during the Russian Revolution in the early twentieth century, along with Vladimir Lenin. Trotsky and Lenin were close during their time as young revolutionists and despite differences as they shared common thought processes. However, Stalin fiercely opposed the thoughts of Trotsky and vice versa. The main differences are that Trotskyism is critical of the bureaucracy that was developed under Stalinism and in Trotskyism is the idea of permanent revolution versus the Socialism in One Country in Stalinism. Advocating ‘permanent revolution’ Trotsky argued that in a country that has not had advanced capitalism, the switch to socialism would be too big and therefore the proletariat and peasantry would be required to be in a permanent state of revolution as an expression of continued class struggle. Stalin on the other hand, believed in reforming the country to a socialist one by changing things quickly.50
48 Einde O’Callaghan, ‘Jacek Kuron and Karl Modzelewski: Social Manifesto for Poland’,
International Socialism, No.28 (Spring 1967) 25-27.
49 Ibidem.
Trotsky founded the Left Opposition in 1930, an opposition group to the Comintern. He consolidated his ideas in his Fourth International in 1938.51
In the report of 1966, RFE remarks that the condemnation of the bureaucracy by Kuron and Modzelewski is reminiscent of Trotsky’s thought. Kuron and Modzelewski also argue for a dogmatic Marxism that is favourable of agriculture and beneficial for Polish economy. They distil a utopian image of society – they do not mention specific names of Polish authorities, or Marx or Trotsky for that matter.52 The
RFE report further mentions that the authors did build on Yugoslav ‘revisionism’ – as so mentioned by the author A.R. Johnson – that became popular during the 1950s. In was in the early 1950s that Josip Broz Tito, president of Yugoslavia, broke with Stalin’s Comintern, and never fully accepted the Comintern. Tito did not implement the Socialism in One Country theory by Stalin, and he is also seen as a sympathiser of militarism and social democracy. The latter is an important term, but it is often erratic to interpretations. As is written in the RFE report:
‘Kuron and Modzelewski's "Open Letter" is a revolutionary, "leftist" Marxist critique of the system of Communist Party rule in Poland. It is not a direct continuation of the "revisionism" which arose in Poland, as throughout the Soviet Bloc, after Stalin's death, and has since turned into political apathy or become almost indistinguishable from Social Democracy.’53
Since there is no specific definition of what RFE meant by ‘social democracy’ in the United States in the 1960s, I will use a more general understanding of what is meant by social democracy. Social democracy promotes social justice by involvement of a representative democracy. In today’s definition of social democracy, it is mainly seen in a capitalist society, intervened by social and economic regulations.54 Seeing as
Kuron and Modzelewski did not intend to incorporate capitalism in the state, I am assuming that the comparisons are drawn by the desire for less bureaucracy, better 51 Ibidem.
52 A.R. Johnson, ‘Kuron and Modzelewski’s “Open Letter to the Party”’, Radio Free Europe report, 16 november 1966.
53 Ibidem.
54 John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens, The Globalization of World Politics: an introdution
implementation of government means for the purpose of economic results and more involvement by proletariat. The RFE report makes it seem, however, that Kuron and Modzelewski were in favour of a representative democracy, while in fact; Kuron mainly advocated direct democracy in his time.55 On Kuron’s idea of direct
democracy and Polish dissidence, Andrew Arato, Hungarian-born American political science professor, wrote insightful works and also incorporated the works of another prominent Polish dissident, Adam Michnik. Arato’s conclusions on the democratic thought of Michnik and Kuron will be further elaborated upon, but I will first introduce the other main characters.
Adam Michnik was born in Warsaw, Poland in 1946 to a Jewish family of committed communists. He met Jacek Kuron during his early primary school years. During their time at school, Michnik was also a member of Kuron’s group, The Crooked Circle. In 1964 he began his studies in history, but was suspended later that year for disseminating the ‘Open Letter’ Kuron and Modzelewski wrote. In 1966 he was suspended again, this time for colluding with Leszek Kołakowski, who was expelled from the party earlier for criticising its leaders.56 In Kemp-Welch’s Poland
under Communism, it is said that Michnik was the one to circulate the letter to the
University of Paris. Despite Michnik’s fair warnings regarding the Polish United Workers Party, his definitive break with the Party came in late 1968 during the Polish political crisis.57 It all started with a play called Dziady, or Forefather’s Eve, by
well-known Polish playwright Adam Mickiewicz. The play is considered a classic in Polish culture, based on the poem by the same name. The adaption of the play by Polish actor and director Kazimierz Dejmek in late 1967 sparked much controversy. It was put upon the University of Warsaw to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the Russian Revolution, but Dejmek implemented many anti-Russian elements in the play. Young students at the University especially celebrated the play and went out to march toward the Adam Mickiewicz Monument that same evening.58
The Warsaw students started a petition protesting the ban of the play. It became an international issue when Michnik and fellow student Henryk Szlajfer gave interviews to the French journal Le Monde, which eventually made its way to RFE. 55 Andrew Arato, ‘The Democratic Theory of the Polish Opposition: Normative Intentions and Strategic Ambiguities’, Working paper, Kellog Institute, April 1984, 2-32.
56 A. Kemp-Welch, Poland under Communism (Cambridge, 2008) 203-245.
57 Ibidem.
The student protest in the late 1960s was, among other things, a critique of the censorship that had begun to exist in the past years. Polish intelligentsia claimed that there was little left of the achievements gained in 1956 when there had been uprisings, mainly for the cause of better working conditions. In 1953, following Joseph Stalin’s death, in many parts of the Eastern Bloc, de-Stalinization had begun to set in. A good example for this is the already mentioned rule of Titoism in Yugoslavia.59 The
protests in the 1950s led to a slight thaw conducted by the government under then-party leader Władysław Gomułka in Poland.60 However, the years after 1956 made the
Polish regime become stricter. Yet, the uprisings in Prague in 1967 sparked hope for a more moderate one. Kuron, Michnik and Szlajfer met in early March 1968 to organise a student protest. On 8 March, several hundreds of students came together at University of Warsaw, protesting the ban of Dziady, stating it was in violation of the constitution, pointing out Article 71 – freedom of speech, press and assembly.61 The
Polish police sent many troops to the demonstrations and the students were violently
arrested and broken up by ZOMO squads.62
The police’s harsh reaction to the student protests did not go unnoticed. The Club of the Catholic Intelligentsia – the only separate gathering that was tolerated by the PZPR – openly condemned the actions of the government. In a few days, the protest spread to other student cities. Also by the means of RFE, the events at the University spread worldwide. Gomulka only spoke out on the events after an 11-day silence. In his speech then, he pointed out the Jewish origins of the instigators. Anti-Zionist expression by the government also came forth from the Arab-Israeli war in 1967. Poland had followed the Russian line in the conflict, supporting the Arab side and criticising Israeli violence.63 After the student uprisings of March 1968, Gomulka
instigated a sort of witch-hunt against Jewish officials and intelligentsia.64 Many
devoted socialists left Poland after the events of 1968, including Adam Michnik’s half-brother Stefan Michnik, who was a judge. In these events, Adam Michnik was arrested and sent to prison for three years for ‘acts of hooliganism’.65
59 Ibidem. 60 Ibid. 61 Ibid. 62 Ibid. 63 Ibid. 64 Ibid. 65 Ibid.
It was during these years in prison that Michnik formulated his critical thought on the Polish state and Marxism, and his future vision for Poland. Also, because of the highly anti-Semitic nature of the 1968 crisis, Michnik rigorously broke with the RZPR. In the years to come, Michnik was imprisoned for his involvement with the KOR ( Workers’ Defence Committee) the Polish uprisings of 1980-81 and the martial law that followed. His writings during these times were bundled in the book Letters
from Prison and other Essays, originally published in 1985. One of the main ideas
that Michnik became famous for was his formulation of ‘new evolutionism.’ In one of his essays in 1976, after the assembling of the KOR – he wrote down clearly what he
wanted to be changed in Poland.
The KOR was founded in 1976 following the June protests of Polish workers. This came about when then-Prime Minister Piotr Jaroszewicz wanted to raise the prices of basic commodities, such as butter, meat and sugar.66 Workers’ protests
started on 24 June, but were harshly put down by the government. It did lead to the
prime minister shelving the plan and backing down. A few years earlier in 1971, Jaroszewicz had already tried to raise the prices on food – for example, the price of meat had been increased by 100 per cent. This, too, had led to protests in the city of Łódź, a town mostly known for it textile production. Remarkably, most participants in the strikes were women. In his ‘new evolutionism’, Michnik laid the foundation for a successful workers movement against the government, following the creation of KOR and later, Solidarity. ‘New evolutionism’, Michnik said, ‘is based on faith in the power of the working class, which, with a steady and unyielding stand, has on several occasions forced the government to make spectacular concessions. It is difficult to foresee developments in the working class, but there is no question that the power elite fears this social group most. Pressure from the working classes is a necessary condition for the evolution of public life toward a democracy.’67
Michnik’s main point of interest was democratisation of the state and self-government. Self-government is usually associated with autonomy, but a more precise definition for this comes from Professor Bronisław Geremek, which shall be explained later.
Later development of Solidarity
66 A. Kemp-Welch, Poland under Communism (Cambridge, 2008) 237-255.
The Komitet Obrony Robotników (Worker’s Defence Committee, short: KOR) drew quite some attention to itself in the late 1970s as being the most prominent dissident group in socialist Poland, so much so that they got the attention of a small town electrician named Lech Walesa. Walesa was born in German-occupied Polish town Popowo in 1943. Born into a workers family, Walesa qualified as an electrician after primary school and continued his obligatory two-year service in the Polish military.68
In the late 1960s, Walesa began to work as an electrician at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk.
His career at the Lenin Shipyard was tumultuous to say the least. In 1970 he helped organise workers’ strikes at the shipyard due to the raising of prices of food by the government. The protests did not go about quietly and led to the deaths of 30 workers. In 1976, Walesa was fired from the shipyard due to his constant involvement with strikes and illegal protests. It was difficult afterward for Walesa to hold down a job, considering his dissident activity. It was during this time that Walesa became more involved with the KOR. In the late 1970s, he became an activist for the legalisation of trade unions. Eventually, in 1980 another strike broke out – the most known one at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk following the firing of Anna Walentynowicz for joining an illegal trade union.69 This strike sparked many more
across the country, initiating the creation of the trade union Solidarity with Walesa as chairman. Due to these strikes and the following Gdansk Agreement, the Polish people were granted the right to set up trade unions and the right to strike.70
Walesa, effectively being the leader of Solidarity, was a non-academic and incredibly charismatic. Walesa maintained his position as leader of Solidarity through 1981 when General Wojciech Jaruzelski imposed martial law on Poland. It was around this time in the early 1980s that prominent Polish intellectuals, such as Bronislaw Geremek, became involved with Solidarity. Geremek was born in 1932 in Warsaw to an originally Jewish family.71 Geremek made a name for himself due to his
work in the field of History nationally and internationally. Firstly, he was associated with the RZPR, but became more distanced from it throughout the years. In 1978 he cofounded the Society for Educational Courses, in which he also taught. After Solidarity took off in 1980, Geremek became one of the main advisors for the trade 68 A. Kemp-Welch, Poland under Communism (Cambridge, 2008) 238.
69 A. Kemp-Welch, Poland under Communism (Cambridge, 2008) 240.
70 Kemp-Welch, Poland under Communism, 253.
union. Having a doctorate in French, Geremek gave the Solidarity movement academic credibility. Kuron stated in one of his later interviews that it was Geremek who came up with adding the concept of ‘self-governing’ to the set-up of Solidarity.72
During the days of martial law, Geremek was sent to prison for a year. After his release, he worked closely with Walesa for Solidarity to make plans for future Poland.
Conclusions
The imposition of martial law in Poland had quite an impact on the activity of Solidarity. Most of its leading members were imprisoned and banned. In the years to come, Solidarity had to work mostly underground. The majority of Solidarity’s work was brutally annihilated by Jaruzelski’s ZOMO police. Jaruzelski had the backing of the Brezhnev doctrine, which was still in place at the time, meant that socialist countries had the backing of other socialist countries in case the implementation of socialism was in danger. The dissident movement however, was strongly supported by the United States’ Reagan administration. The tide turned as Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the Soviet Union in 1985.73 His policies were in an extremely
different direction to those of his predecessor. The Soviet Union had been undergoing many problems, most of which economic. The declining economic situation had been troublesome for the whole Eastern Bloc. Gorbachev sought to solve this by imposing a few reform policies to loosen the reigns on socialist Europe. In his 1987 book,
Perestroika: New Thinking for the Country and The World, Gorbachev introduced the
terms perestroika and glasnost. The politics of Perestroika – which meant ‘to restructure’ – resulted in a thaw of Soviet policy. Glasnost stood for openness, meaning less censorship and more democracy. Economic reforms in Gorbachev’s new regime led to a slightly more market-regulated economy.74 The reforms by Gorbachev
had a massive impact on the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc, which would later
become more apparent.
The Solidarity movement, meanwhile, had gained much support from Western Europe, the United States and NATO. A significant breakthrough came when in 1986, amnesty was awarded for 225 Polish political prisoners. Also, in 1987 the Polish
72 Jacek Kuron interviews, webofstories.com, https://www.webofstories.com/play/jacek.kuron/1, seen 28th november 2017.
73 A. Kemp-Welch, Poland under Communism (Cambridge, 2008) 232-255.
Council permitted workers to legally join free trade unions.75 Eventually, the
economic problems of Poland worsened so much that the government had to talk to Solidarity to reform the country. Together with Gorbachev’s thaw policy and the influence of the church, the position of the government had weakened. Namely, in 1979 Polish pope John Paul II was chosen to be the head of the Catholic Church. Although religion was forbidden in socialist Poland, many people were celebrating the election of the Pope by feasting on the streets.76 All these events would lead to the
beginning of the Round Table Talks where the PRZR and Solidarity made agreements
for a more democratic Poland.
Judging from the lives and works previously discussed on Kuron, Modzelewski, Michnik, Walesa and Geremek, there are some conclusions to be made. For the way it was interpreted by the RFE, the picture painted by A.R. Johnson deemed to be somewhat different from the individual work of Michnik and Kuron. As stated before, the RFE hinted to Solidarity’s view of a representative democracy, whilst Kuron’s and Michnik view was more radical than this. Using the term ‘Social Democracy’ quite distinctively – without specific determination suggests a gap in interpretation as early as 1967. Concluding from their work, Kuron stayed a true Marxist socialist at heart, with a radical democratic side. Michnik advocated a more open, regulated form of government – one that is very democratised. Geremek helped construct the term that is so important to all of this: self-government, which shows that a high level of autonomy was desired by the group, at least, within the Polish intelligentsia.
However, it was deemed difficult for the high circles of Solidarity to maintain this focus in the first days of the organisation during 1980. It seemed that a clear view for a new Poland was missing; yet this was consolidated in the late 1980s during the Round Table agreements.
75 A. Kemp-Welch, Poland under Communism (Cambridge, 2008) 232-255.
2. Radio Free Europe: the background, beginnings and intentions of its Polish section
Crusade for freedom
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty emerged from American soil at the end of the Second World War during the early stages of the Cold War. Radiobroadcasting was a popular phenomenon in the early 20th century and was influential during the Second World War. Radio had proved itself particularly useful for wartime propaganda with its ability to reach millions of people. In the first years of the Second World War, US radio broadcasting was extremely popular among the American people, yet these radio stations were mostly in hands of private individuals or companies.77 Because of
radio’s ability to mobilise people, the American government founded an international broadcaster called Voice of America (VOA) in 1942. VOA was designed to broadcast information to international audiences for ‘accurate, balanced and comprehensive news’.78 Broadcasting in several languages, VOA began dissemination in Russia to
Soviet citizens in 1947. The aim was to counter the anti-American propaganda stowed
upon them by the Soviet government.79
Because of the Soviet takeover of eastern European satellite states in the late 1940s, the Soviets possessed a large propaganda machine, which the United States wanted to undermine this as much as possible. In a report by the United States National Security Council (NSC) on 17 December 1947, it says: ‘The USSR is conducting a very extensive propaganda campaign directed primarily at U.S. and its employing coordinated, psychological, political and economic measures designed to undermine non-Communist elements in all countries.’80 Thus, in the 1940s the United
States began producing its own offensive propaganda campaign in Europe. The aim was to create radio stations that were sponsored by the United States government, but not officially linked to it, allowing it to be broadcast in the satellite countries. George F. Kennan conceived the plans for such stations. At the time he was the director of Department of State’s policy planning staff. Overall, Kennan is seen as a great 77 Richard H. Cummings, Cold War Radio: The Dangerous History of American Broadcasting in
Europe 1950-1989 (London, 2009) 1-10.
78 Pawel Machcewicz, Poland’s War on Radio Free Europe (Washington, 2014) 14.
79 Cummings, Cold War Radio: The Dangerous History of American Broadcasting in Europe
1950-1989 (London, 2009) 1-10.
80 The Report of the President’s Committee on International Information Activities, June 30, 1953, National Security Affairs, Foreign Relations, vol 2.
ambassador of containment politics, and this was directly connection to him being well-kown for his liberation politics in Europe.81 In fact, Kennan articulated this
‘containment doctrine’ in a 1946 report, during the time of the Truman administration.82 By using the term ‘containment’, the United States government was
not seen as aggressive by being on the offensive, but also not as timid, as in détente. One of Kennan’s tactics to this strategy was to set up several liberation committees within the government. In the directive of the National Security Council,
10/2, Kennan penned a new direction for the NSC, namely to prepare the United
States for ‘ideological and psychological warfare’ against the Soviet Union. This meant covert operations to dismantle the activities of the Soviet Union, such as propaganda, economic warfare, sabotage and guerrillas.83 The NSC 2/10 directive was
the blueprint for the creation of a new office within the Central Intelligence Administration (CIA) called Office of Special Projects. The Office would report to the heads of the CIA, but ultimately would work independently from the agency. Kennan, being the leading figure in the prospects of covert radio operations, called in help from two other important protagonists, Frank Wisner and Allen Dulles, to put his plan into action. Wisner used to work at the World War II Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and was also a lawyer. In his time at the OSS, Wisner was stationed in Bucharest, Romania, where he controlled an OSS-led operation. Due to his qualifications, Wisner was somewhat coveted by Kennan to lead to newly named Office of Special Projects, focussing on radio transmitters.84
On 17 May 1949 the National Committee for a Free Europe (NCFE) was created in New York. Directors included Allen Dulles – future head of the CIA – and Dwight D. Eisenhower – future president of the United States.85 The objective of the
NCFE was to appeal to the émigrés of communist countries and to simultaneously give them a voice. As the corporate chairman, Joseph C. Grew said in 1949: ‘to put the voices of these exiled leaders in the air, addressed to their own peoples in Europe, 81 Richard H. Cummings, Cold War Radio: The Dangerous History of American Broadcasting in
Europe 1950-1989 (London, 2009) 1-10.
82 Robert Frazier, ‘Kennan, “Universalism” and the Truman Doctrine’, Journal of Cold War Studies Vol. 11, No.2 (Spring 2009) 3-34.
83 Cummings, Cold War Radio: The Dangerous History of American Broadcasting in Europe
1950-1989 (London, 2009) 3-10.
84 Cummings, Cold War Radio: The Dangerous History of American Broadcasting in Europe
1950-1989 (London, 2009) 3-10.
85 Robert Frazier, ‘Kennan, “Universalism” and the Truman Doctrine’, Journal of Cold War Studies Vol. 11, No.2 (Spring 2009) 3-34.
in their own languages, in familiar tones’.86 The exact formulation used in a review by
the United States government on RFE was:
‘The National Committee for a Free Europe (NCFE) was created by CIA in 1949 with the following purposes:
1. to create an institution in which the émigrés from the satellite nations could find employment which would utilize their skills and, at the same time, document for the world at large the actions of the satellite
governments and Soviet Russia;
2. to utilize the political figures of such emigrations as rallying points and as symbols of unified opposition to communism in this country and abroad;
3. to relieve the Department of State of the need to deal with émigré political leaders whom they could not endorse as “Governments in Exile” at a time when the United States officially recognized the satellite
governments; and
4. generally to “aid the non-fascist, non-communist leaders in their peaceful efforts to prepare the way toward the restoration in Eastern Europe of the social, political, and religious liberties, in which they and we believe.’ 87
RFE was highly campaigned in the United States. The NCFE, along with Office of Policy Coordination, the State Department and the CIA created the ‘Crusade for Freedom’ campaign to raise funds and awareness for RFE in the United States. The organisation behind the campaign was apt to gain more support from the domestic community. Therefore, several ways were conceived to promote RFE, such as a ‘Freedom Bell’, which was modelled after the Liberty Bell. President Dwight D. 86 269. Policy Planning Staff Memorandum, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, document 269.
87 The Report of the President’s Committee on International Information Activities, June 30, 1953, National Security Affairs, Foreign Relations, vol 2.
Eisenhower issued the campaign on 4 September, Labor Day, 1950, with Lucius D. Clay as its chairman.88 The propaganda campaign entailed all types of activities, such
as a ‘Freedom Scroll’ that citizens could sign and the option to donate a ‘Truth Dollar’ to the fundraising campaign.89
On 4 July 1950, RFE transmitted its first program, which was 30 minutes long. RFE’s headquarters were located in Munich, southern West Germany. RFE initially broadcasted to Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Romania. The first Polish-language broadcast was on 3 May 1950.90 It was preceded by an ideological message
from Harold Miller, then-president of the NCFE, which would last through the whole of RFE’s Polish lifetime:
‘This superb instrument is to carry the new Voice of Free Poland. Over its pulsing waves, the free Poles hope to make this echo audible to the dauntless people of their enslaved homeland, that you may share with us the knowledge that the people of Poland are not forgotten and that we in American and in the West have faith in Poland and the certainty of her ultimate victory. The Polish Station of Radio Free Europe, organized by the National Committee of Free Europe, is a station run by Poles for their countrymen. It aims at piercing the Iron Curtain with words of truth. It does not propose to tell the people of Poland what to think or what to do. When they know what goes on in the Free World, when they know that their brother see exile and their friends in the West have not forgotten them, they will be able to draw their conclusion, and form their own ideas.’91
First years
88 Cummings, Cold War Radio: The Dangerous History of American Broadcasting in Europe
1950-1989 (London, 2009) 16-20.
89 Ibidem.
90 Cummings, Cold War Radio: The Dangerous History of American Broadcasting in Europe
1950-1989 (London, 2009) 3-10.
91 Admiral Harold B. Miller (Ret.) announces the launch of Radio Free Europe's broadcasts to Poland May 3rd 1953, Hoover Institution, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Broadcast Archives, consulted 23 december 2017.
In the first years, the programmes of RFE Poland were put together from New York and communicated to the Munich office. The first head of the Polish section of RFE in New York was Lesław Bodeński, a pre-war employee of the Polish Foreign Ministry. Stanisław Strzetelski, a pre-war journalist, succeeded him in 1951.92 Strzetelski was a
well-known émigré, who had an outstanding background in radio journalism. In the Munich office, it was Jan Nowak who held down the fort for the Polish section. Jan Nowak was born with the name Zdzisław Jeziorański in 1914 in Berlin to a Polish family. Nowak studied economics and aspired to be a teacher at a university. However, at the start of the Second World War in 1939, the Polish army mobilised him. During the war, the Germans held him captive as a Prisoner of War. After his escape, he joined the Home Army, the most prominent resistance group in Poland.93 After the
war, he stayed in Western Europe and had a career at BBC radio, and was also an active member of the Polish freedom movement ‘Independence and Democracy’,
which represented the political émigré parties.94
At first, the New York and Munich offices worked independently, but broadcast the same news. This came to an end as the authority of the New York office was subordinated to Nowak. What made RFE different from BBC and VOA stations was that it relied heavily and communicated directly with the Polish émigré communities. This duality also made it difficult for Nowak, who found himself often stuck between both worlds. This was also because the émigré community itself was divided. For example, there were different political groups such as the Polish National Democratic Committee and the Political Council. They demanded that programmes were discussed with them before they were aired, but RFE did not always find itself able to do so.95 The Polish section of RFE worked closely with Paris-based
émigré-newspaper Kultura and the Union of Journalists. Despite its American background, RFE mostly found its voice in the Polish émigré community. However, some people from the émigré community criticised it for retrieving its information from a lot of non-Polish sources.96 Political émigrés felt disappointed that they could not have the
amount of influence they wanted to in the radio’s programme. 92 Cummings, Cold War Radio: The Dangerous History of American Broadcasting in Europe
1950-1989 (London, 2009) 3-10.
93 Jan Nowak, Courier from Warsaw (Michigan, 1982) 2-25.
94 Ibidem.
95 Cummings, Cold War Radio: The Dangerous History of American Broadcasting in Europe
1950-1989 (London, 2009) 8-23.
It would later become clear that RFE’s future path would not be so much focused on the émigré community, but mainly on propaganda to the people living within the ‘satellite countries’. As explained above, RFE was initially a CIA project. Polish scholar Pawel Machcewicz says in his book, Poland’s War on Radio Free
Europe (2014), that early on the CIA became more of a consumer of RFE than a
supplier.97 The radio station worked well as an intelligence source for the CIA. Despite
their close connection, the CIA did not pull the strings on RFE in the years to come. Nevertheless, for the CIA it was a perfect platform to influence the people living behind the Iron Curtain. One of the more drastic tactics they used was the use of ‘balloon operations’. Between 1953 and 1956 thousands of balloons were sent into Soviet territories containing flyers in which grassroots resistance was promoted. Since the NCFE was slightly less known, the acts became associated with RFE. Former New York head of office Strzetelski did not agree with this type of distributing and
subsequently broke away from Nowak’s office.98
During Stalinism, resistance movements remained quite cautious, for it was difficult and dangerous providing information from the West to the East. However, when Stalin died in 1953, times began to change. The times also changed in Poland, when in 1956 Bolesław Bierut, Stalinist General Secretary of the Polish United Workers’ Party (Polish: Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza, short: PZPR), died. Before Bierut’s reign, Władysław Gomułka was de facto leader of post-war Poland. After Beirut’s death, Gomułka again became the first secretary of PZPR in 1956.99 In
the early 1950s, the Polish regime did not consider the Polish section of RFE as potentially dangerous, at least until the moment when the Polish RFE began broadcasting the interviews and views of Jozef Swiatlo in 1954. These interviews by Swiatlo shook Eastern Europe and played into the triangle with Gomulka, Nowak and Kennan.
Swiatlo
Polish RFE struck gold when they got a hold of Jozef Swiatlo’s confessions on the Eastern Bloc to the West. Swiatlo was born in 1915 in Poland and had joined the Communist Party in 1933. During the Second World War, the Germans captured him, 97 Pawel Machcewicz, Poland’s War on Radio Free Europe (Washington, 2014) 36-37.
98 Cummings, Cold War Radio: The Dangerous History of American Broadcasting in Europe
1950-1989 (London, 2009) 8-23.
but he managed to escape and flee to the eastern part of Poland, controlled by the Soviets. After the liberation of Warsaw by the Red Army, he spent his time in the Soviet Army in Warsaw and attended the University of Public Security in 1944, and in 1945 he became a security officer. Lieutenant Swiatlo served as a deputy chief of Department 10 of the Foreign Ministry, a department that was focused on protecting the PZPR from subversive forces and maintaining the Party’s purity.100
He was known within inside circles for his hard tactics while asking questions, often being called ‘The Butcher’. He was one of the best-informed functionaries of the Polish police, the Ministry of Public Security. He took part in many important operations, such as the arrest of PZPR-leader Gomulka in 1951. In December 1953 he was stationed in Berlin and he decided to stay in the west, leaving his family behind in the east. After his defection, his revelations on the PZPR were broadcast in 1954, under the name of ‘Behind the Scenes in the Secret Police and the Party'. Swiatlo spoke on the ways the communist police interrogated the enemies and its close ties to Moscow, as well as the fact that the communist elite enjoyed a luxurious lifestyle. Swiatlo’s revelations also became part of the balloon operations, creating Operation Spotlight – Swiatlo meaning ‘light’ in Polish. Testimonies by him were sent into the Soviet bloc using balloons. The Swiatlo campaign had outstretching consequences. It was RFE’s purpose to mirror the state and to give people insight into what the tactics were of the Polish government. The Polish regime countered with their own propaganda campaign, containing leaflets, radio commentaries and newspapers. Many Party officials were affected by the Swiatlo case.101
The Swiatlo case also sparked controversy within the RFE camp. Swiatlo eventually fled to the United States in 1954. Robert Lang, director of RFE at the time, wrote in his eight-page resignation letter that those behind the Balloon Operation and the Spotlight Operation failed to consult with the RFE top. Lang complained that the actions lacked validity and were of no help to the émigré community.102
The Balloon Operation proved to be effective nonetheless. Between February 1955 and August 1956 seven issues of Wolna Europe (Free Europe) were distributed via balloon droppings in Eastern Europe. In less than two months, between April and 100 Cummings, Cold War Radio: The Dangerous History of American Broadcasting in Europe
1950-1989 (London, 2009) 40.
101 Cummings, Cold War Radio: The Dangerous History of American Broadcasting in Europe
1950-1989 (London, 2009) 40.
June 1956, more than a 1.5 million items were sent to Poland.103 Of course, PZPR was
displeased by these balloon operations. The PZPR saw these as propaganda and to counter them, they associated the acts with American-Nazi sabotage. The PZPR depicted the NCFE and RFE as national socialist and Hitlerite propaganda.104 In 1955,
the Polish government began to hit back at the balloon actions by means of a diplomatic offensive. Warsaw made complaints to Moscow that the balloons were causing plane crashes. Also, since the droppings were initiated from Munich, tensions began to rise between Poland and West Germany. The Polish government threatened to make family reunifications more difficult for West Germans if the balloons did not stop. Eventually, these threats did not amount to much until the new government in Poland was put into place. In 1956, the decision was made that Gomulka would return as the PZPR leader. In the United States there was great interest to keep tensions low in Poland to keep Gomulka in place as a supposed reformer. When the Hungarian Revolution began in 1956, plans to drop the balloons were ceased because of large criticism and to stop hopes that the Americans would come to their aid.105
In the early years of the Cold War, several intelligence operations were also set up in the West and the East. Just as in Swiatlo’s case, another Polish infiltrator made its way to RFE. Young refugee Zbigniew Brydak applied for a job at RFE, but soon his Polish girlfriend whom he worked for the PZPR, blew his cover. After being released in Poland, Brydak worked at several Polish radio stations, including Western ones such as VOA. However, he remained critical of RFE. He exposed them as a CIA operation, solely fixed on harbouring American intelligence and to make sure a very certain view of Poland reached Western Europe. Brydak denounced RFE’s staff as ‘fascists’ and ‘Nazis’ with its purpose to serve the thought of the Western revisionists.106 Brydak’s intentions were to write a book on RFE in order to attack
them, however this book was never written.107
The struggle for the émigré community remained a crucial part of the propaganda wars in the 1950s. Opponents of RFE, such as Brydak, accused RFE of not actually caring for the émigré community, but instead caring for West Germany’s power. According to Jan Nowak’s memoirs, listeners asked: ‘It must be supremely 103 Pawel Machcewicz, Poland’s War on Radio Free Europe (Washington, 2014) 64.
104 Machcewicz, Poland’s War on Radio Free Europe (Washington, 2014) 65.
105 Machcewicz, Poland’s War on Radio Free Europe (Washington, 2014) 74-75.
106 Ibidem.
