Key Figure or Snitch? An Exploratory Study into Youth Workers’ Considerations, Dilemmas, and Interventions when Dealing with Radicalization-Related Cases

(1)

Master Thesis: Crisis and Security Management

Key Figure or Snitch?

An Exploratory Study into Youth Workers’ Considerations, Dilemmas, and Interventions when Dealing with Radicalization-Related Cases

Isolde de Louw

S2388871

October 18, 2020

(2)

1

Chapter 1: Introduction

“Of course I am not a spy, but as an appointed ‘key figure,’ I do have this ‘specific kind’ of responsibility” (respondent 6). This quote is derived from one of the interviews I carried out for this master thesis. The quote illustrates a general line of thought that came to the fore during many interviews. Though using differing wordings or examples, interviewed youth workers explained that they want to approach and guide vulnerable youngsters open-mindedly, which is complicated by the fact that they are also expected to notify individuals to the security chain in cases of possible radicalization. This field of tension between social work, more specifically youth work, on the one hand, and the (additional) role of ‘early detector’ on the other, is at the heart of this research paper.

1.1 Context

Radicalization and extremism are popular research topics. The events of 9/11 increased academic interest in Al-Qaeda and related themes such as jihadism, terrorism, and radicalization processes.1_{Terrorist attacks in Madrid (2004) and London (2005) moreover led to an increased}

interest in radicalization of Muslims on European soil, the so-called ‘homegrown terrorists.’2 In the Netherlands, this trend of homegrown terrorism was personified in the members of the Hofstad Group, who planned multiple terrorist attacks on Dutch soil, including the assassination of filmmaker Theo van Gogh in 2004.3

In more recent years, the rise of ISIS added another dimension to radicalization research. Not only did ISIS inspire a relatively high number of European Muslims to carry out attacks in Europe, thereby using ordinary resources, such as vehicles or knives, ISIS also set in motion the flow of an unprecedented number of ‘foreign fighters.’4 Between 2011 and 2015, an estimated number of 27.000 to 31.000 Muslims worldwide,5 among which 3000 to 5000

1_{Peter Neumann and Scott Kleinmann, “How Rigorous Is Radicalization Research?” Democracy and Security 9,}

no. 4 (October 2013): 361 – 362.

2_{Ibid, 363-364.}

3_{Lorenzo Vidino, “The Hofstad Group: The New Face of Terrorist Networks in Europe,” Studies in Conflict &} Terrorism 30, no. 7 (May 2007): 579.

4_{The “foreign fighter phenomenon is not new”: previously, Europeans traveled to countries such as Bosnia,}

Afghanistan, and Iraq to participate in conflicts. See for example: Edwin Bakker, Christophe Paulussen, and Eva Entenmann, “Dealing with European Foreign Fighters in Syria: Governance Challenges & Legal Implications,”

International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (2013): 2, accessed October 15, 2020,

https://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Bakker-Paulussen-Entenmann-Dealing-With-European-Foreign-Fighters-in-Syria.pdf.

5_{Richard Barrett et al., “Foreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria}

and Iraq,” The Soufan Group (December 2015): 4, accessed October 15, 2020, https://templatelab.com/foreign-fighters-in-syria-update/.

(5)

4

European Muslims (including converts), traveled to Iraq and Syria,6 to support the expansion and construction of an Islamic Caliphate. In order to develop effective policies to counter the terrorist threat, and simultaneously inhibit the flow of foreign fighters, European governments were in need of knowledge about radicalization processes and the breeding ground that stirred homegrown terrorism and foreign fighting. In his extensive literature review of radicalization studies, Alex Schmid concludes that certain observations or conclusions are widely accepted in the field of radicalization studies. Three examples of such widely acknowledged insights are:

1. There is no single profile for terrorists:7 the backgrounds of terrorists are diverse.8 Investigation into the backgrounds of known terrorists/radicals shows that they come from all kinds of socioeconomic milieus.9 Some are ideologically driven while others are not.10 Also, many personal factors could potentially play a role in instigating the radicalization process.11

2. Radicalization is a gradual process.12_{Multiple researcher strove to make this process}

comprehensible in so-called ‘radicalization models.’ These models aim at describing and illustrating the process that takes place “before the bomb goes off.”13_Each

radicalization model or theory has its own special focus points. For example, some models focus on ‘micro-level’ factors, such as identity problems, failed integration, and marginalization.14 Other models focus on meso- or macro-level factors, such as living in a radical milieu or experiencing tense majority-minority relations within society.15 3. Social networks and/or environments play a crucial role in drawing vulnerable youths

to extremist/terrorist ideologies or movements.16

6_{Bibi van Ginkel and Eva Entenmann, “The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon in the European Union: Profiles,}

Threats, and Policies,” International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (April 2016): 4, accessed October 15, 2020,

https://icct.nl/app/uploads/2016/03/ICCT-Report_Foreign-Fighters-Phenomenon-in-the-EU_1-April-2016_including-AnnexesLinks.pdf. NB: This estimation was published in 2016.

7_{Alex Schmid, “Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and}

Literature Review,” International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (March 2013): 20, accessed October 15, 2020, https://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Schmid-Radicalisation-De-Radicalisation-Counter-Radicalisation-March-2013.pdf. 8_Ibid. 9_{Ibid, 25.} 10_{Ibid, 28.} 11_{Ibid, 23 and 26.} 12_{Ibid, 20.}

13_{Arun Kundnani, “Radicalisation: The Journey of a Concept,” Race & Class 54, no. 2 (2012): 5.} 14_{Schmid, “Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation,” 4.}

15_Ibid. 16_{Ibid, 20.}

(6)

5

1.2 Problem Outline

Based on academic insights into radicalization processes, (Dutch) youth workers are assigned tasks in radicalization policies, often at a municipal and/or organizational level. The argument behind such tasks and responsibilities, is that youth workers are the ‘eyes and ears’ within (vulnerable) communities. Therefore, they are considered relevant partners for ‘early detection’ (Dutch: ‘vroegsignalering’) of radicalization.17 Indeed, youth workers have a quite unique position: in some instances, they are the first person that youngsters talk to about problems or difficulties which they encounter in their road to adulthood. Youth workers are constantly making assessments about the individuals and groups they work with. Based on these assessments, youth workers make decisions about whether they can help a particular ‘client’ themselves (sometimes in cooperation with other first-line professionals), or whether the security of this individual, or his/her surroundings, faces potential danger. If the latter is the case, the professional could decide to scale up certain interventions, which could include cooperation with, or involvement of, partners from the security chain.

Youth workers thus constantly operate within a field of tension: their primary role is related to social welfare (providing guidance/support, etc.), but in some instances, their tasks and responsibilities become intertwined with processes that are commonly ascribed to the security sector. Early detection, monitoring, and notification are examples of such tasks. These responsibilities are assigned to front-line professionals due to their unique information position.18

In the early stages of possible radicalization processes, youth workers operate within a certain ‘free space’: with every new case they encounter, youth workers decide at a certain point to ‘monitor’ (i.e. keep an eye on) the person in question, or to ‘scale up’ (or scale down) interventions. The fact that youth workers can make such decisions relatively autonomously indicates that youth workers have discretionary power. Thus far, little research has been carried out in order to understand how youth workers use discretion in their day-to-day work. What factors play a role in their assessments of signs of possible radicalization? Which considerations affect what interventions they carry out? What is the threshold for notifying the security chain?

17_{Annemarie van de Weert and Quirine A.M. Eijkman, “Vroegsignalering van Extremisme? De Lokale}

Veiligheidsprofessional over Risico’s en Duiding bij Jongeren,” Kenniscentrum Sociale Innovatie – Hogeschool

Utrecht (2018): 20, accessed October 15, 2020, https://www.hu.nl/onderzoek/publicaties/vroegsignalering-van-extremisme-de-lokale-veiligheidsprofessional-over-risicos-en-duiding-bij-jonger.

(7)

6

The answers to such questions are important because they provide information about how policies, which are designed by national and regional authorities, are implemented by front-line professionals such as youth workers.

1.3 Research Question

For this master thesis, I aim to answer the following bipartite research question: “What factors affect youth workers’ use of discretionary power in cases of possible radicalization, and what considerations and dilemmas are at play when evaluating signs and deciding whether or not the security chain should be notified?”

1.4 Academic Relevance

Academic research about radicalization has real-life consequences, because insights from this academic field are used as a framework for developing (counter-)radicalization policies at an (inter)national and local level. In other words, at the policy-making level, knowledge about radicalization is translated into frameworks for action for first-line professionals such as youth workers. Within the academic field of terrorism studies, much research has focused on understanding radicalization processes. However, a limited amount of research has been dedicated to the daily experiences and working methods of front-line workers19 (also referred to as first-line professionals or street-level workers). This is surprising, given the fact that in many national and local radicalization and counter-extremism policy documents, an important role is ascribed to these professionals.

In the Netherlands, Annemarie van de Weert and Quirine Eijkman, both researchers at the Hogeschool Utrecht (HU), have carried out important exploratory research into topics such as: early detection by front-line professionals, dilemma’s that arise at the “intersection between social welfare and social control,”20_{and the role of local (municipal) security professionals and}

youth workers in (counter-)radicalization policies. They studied Dutch national and local radicalization policies and, additionally, interviewed youth workers, to find out how much

19_{Annemarie van de Weert and Quirine Eijkman, “Hoe Werkt Vroegsignalering door Lokale Jongerenwerkers in}

de Strijd Tegen Terrorisme?” PROCES 96, no. 4 (2017): 294.

20_{Annemarie van de Weert and Quirine Eijkman, “Subjectivity in Detection of Radicalisation and Violent}

Extremism: A Youth Worker’s Perspective,” Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression 11, no. 3 (2019): 206.

(8)

7

knowledge they have about radicalization and extremism, and whether they are able to adequately detect early signs of extremism among adolescents.21

Since research into these topics is still in its infancy, the articles by van de Weert and Eijkman contain preliminary conclusions. These insights are nonetheless important because they pave the way for a discussion regarding the role, expertise, and working methods of front-line professionals in countering and detecting radicalization and extremism. Van de Weert and Eijkman uncover important limitations, complexities, and weaknesses of the current approaches, as well as the dilemmas that professionals are confronted with when carrying out their tasks. At the end of the next chapter, I will give an overview of their most important conclusions.

I consider this thesis research an expansion of the work already carried out by van de Weert and Eijkman. Dutch youth workers are the central object of analysis. The outcomes of this research paper add to the field of knowledge regarding the use of discretion, as well as the implementation of radicalization policies by youth workers.

1.5 Societal Relevance

It is likely that, in the coming years, Dutch youth workers will continue to be seen as the ‘eyes and ears within society.’ If we assume that their role in radicalization policies will not significantly decrease in the near future, it is important that we understand how youth workers implement and shape the policies that national and local authorities design. With this knowledge, the effectiveness of youth workers as partners in (counter-)radicalization strategies could be enhanced, for example through:

1. Improvement of education and training for youth workers. If we understand how youth workers use their discretionary power, what dilemma’s they face, and how they make assessments and decisions, their training could be enhanced, so that supplementary education more effectively addresses professionals’ knowledge gaps, strengths, and weaknesses.

21_{Annemarie van de Weert and Quirine A.M. Eijkman, “De Lokale Jongerenwerker over de Wirwar van het}

Signaleren van Radicalisering versus Extremisme,” Kenniscentrum Sociale Innovatie – Hogeschool Utrecht (2017): 7, accessed October 15, 2020, https://www.hu.nl/onderzoek/publicaties/de-lokale-jongerenwerker-over-de-wirwar-van-het-signaleren-van-radicalisering-versus-extremisme.

(9)

8

2. Improvement of the explanation of reports, observations, and notifications by youth workers. If we understand how youth workers give meaning to behavior and expressions of youngsters, and moreover know what signs they might overlook or downplay, partners from the security sector can more accurately evaluate and analyze the information that youth workers bring to the table.

3. Improvement of future radicalization and counter-extremism policies. If we understand how youth workers implement, and thereby shape, radicalization policies, we can review what unforeseen and/or undesired effects the implementation of policies has at a street-level. This information could be used when designing new radicalization policies (or updating existing ones).

1.6 Structure of the Research Paper

In the next chapter (chapter two), I will establish the theoretical framework for this research paper. It starts relatively abstract, with a discussion of the interplay between policy design and policy implementation (2.1), and an explanation of the concepts ‘Street-Level Bureaucracy’ and ‘discretionary power’ (2.2). Then, I will gradually zoom in on more specific themes, and discuss how discretionary power is put into practice according to Lipsky and Maynard-Moody/Musheno (2.3). After this, I will explain a little about youth work in the Netherlands, and more specifically about radicalization-related tasks assigned to youth workers (2.4). The penultimate subchapter provides an overview of the most important findings that can be derived from previous research by van de Weert and Eijkman (2.5). The theoretical framework chapter is concluded with a short ‘wrap-up’ (2.6).

The methodology will be discussed in chapter three. I will first elaborate on the research design and data collection (3.1). I will explain why I have chosen to carry out semi-structured interviews, and moreover discuss the strategy for participant selection. Then, I will pay attention to the method for data analysis, which consists of coding and content analysis (3.2).

In chapter four, I will thoroughly discuss the results of my research and give meaning to the data that I have gathered during the interviews. Five overarching themes are discussed in this chapter, namely: youth workers’ general reflections on radicalization (4.1), youth workers as Street-Level Bureaucrats (4.2), different types of youth work (4.3), early detection of radicalization and extremism (4.4), and notifying the security chain (4.5). The last subchapter consists of a short ‘wrap-up’ of the most important findings of the analytical chapter (4.6).

(10)

9

The final chapter of this master thesis is the conclusion. First, I will answer the main research question (5.1). The second part has a reflective character. I will reflect on the main theme of this thesis (5.2.1), the theoretical framework and added value of my research (5.2.2), and the used research method (5.2.3). In the last part of the reflection, I will also mention shortcomings, and give some suggestions for further research (5.2.3).

(11)

10

Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework

Radicalization policies and youth workers: these are the two major points of interest in my thesis. On the one hand there are policies, more specifically, radicalization policies. These policies are (generally) designed by local and/or national civil servants. On the other hand, there are youth workers, who have to put these policies into practice. I hypothesize that there exists a tension between these two: policies that make sense ‘on paper,’ are not necessarily in sync with the context in which first-line professionals have to operate. At the beginning of this chapter, I will explore this tension between ‘policy design’ and ‘policy implementation,’ and discuss the differences between the ‘top-down’ and the ‘bottom-up’ approach in academic discussions. Subsequently, I will introduce Lipsky’s theory on Street-Level Bureaucracy and discretionary power.

After discussing these relatively abstract theories, I will focus on how discretionary is put into practice. Two theories play a central role in this part: Michael Lipsky’s theory on ‘coping strategies’ and Steven Maynard-Moody and Michael Musheno’s distinction between the ‘citizen-agent narrative’ and ‘state-agent narrative.’ These theories provide different frameworks for analyzing how first-line professionals deal with discretionary power and will serve as an important point of reference for analyzing my interview data in chapter 4.

Towards the end of this chapter, I will focus on youth work in the Netherlands, and pay specific attention to the tasks that are assigned to youth workers in Dutch radicalization policies. The final subchapter is dedicated to a discussion of previous research by Annemarie van de Weert and Quirine Eijkman. Their exploratory research into youth work and radicalization policies resulted in multiple (preliminary) conclusions which I want to explore further in my own research. For this reason, I will provide a short overview of their most important findings.

2.1 Policy Design and Policy Implementation

Where does policy design end and policy implementation begin? This has been, and still is, a prominent topic for discussion within policy research. In 1973, Pressman and Wildavsky’s work

Implementation: How Great Expectations in Washington Are Dashed in Oakland led to a

(12)

11

interest.22 Implementation was considered to be a complex process, consisting of a chain of interactions at, and between, different levels of government.23 In their research project on the Economic Development Agency (EDA) program in Oakland, Pressman and Wildavksy made a distinction between policy design and policy implementation.24 Making a distinction between these two is not as self-evident as it might appear. The two ‘founding fathers’ of implementation research already recognized the conceptual problem that arises when studying policies, they noted: “We can work neither with a definition of policy that excludes any implementation nor one that includes all implementation.”25

However, separating design from implementation gave them the opportunity to analyze how the project in Oakland could fail so mercilessly. Pressman and Wildavsky argued that two factors are crucial for the outcome of a policy project.26_{Firstly, the policy design: the way in}

which a new policy is designed can have a positive or negative effect on the implementation process and later results of the policy.27_{Secondly, implementation processes are generally}

characterized by a phenomenon called the ‘complexity of joint action.’28_{This means that during}

the implementation process, there are many points at which actors from different levels of government and from multiple organizations have to interact and make agreements in order to move the implementation process forward.29 These so-called ‘clearing points’ complicate, and possibly hinder, the implementation process.30

Another influential policy researcher in the late seventies, Eugene Bardach, argued that policy implementation is in fact a continuation of politics.31 He observed that during implementation processes, ‘games’ are played between actors from different involved agencies and organizations. What Pressman, Wildavsky and Bardach have in common, is that they all considered policy implementation to be a top-down process: policies are designed ‘at the top’ and are subsequently directed, in chronological order, to ‘street-level’ contexts, where

22_{Kai Wegrich, “Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron B. Wildavsky, Implementation,” in The Oxford Handbook of} Classics in Public Policy and Administration, ed. Martin Lodge, Edward C. Page, and Steven J. Balla (Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 2018), 342.

23_{Ibid, 342.} 24_{Ibid, 346.} 25_{Ibid, 346-247.} 26_{Ibid, 347.} 27_Ibid. 28_Ibid. 29_{Ibid, 348.} 30_Ibid. 31_{Ibid, 349.}

(13)

12

professionals implement and carry out new rules and regulations.32 An implicit assumption that stems from the top-down perspective, is that if implementation fails and/or envisioned goals are not reached, there must be an error in the policy design. If the policy design is insufficient or flawed, one cannot reasonably expect street-level professionals to effectively put this policy into practice.

Not long after Pressman and Wildavsky published their book on implementation, other scholars in the field, such as Michael Lipsky, started to analyze policies from the opposite perspective, namely ‘bottom-up.’33_{Supporters of this perspective prefer to start ‘at the bottom’ to find out}

how street-level professionals put into practice existing policies and regulations, and to understand how they deal with the dilemma’s, contradictions and bureaucratic obstacles they encounter in their daily work.34

In the two tables below, I have attempted to schematically describe the crucial difference between top-down and bottom-up approaches to policy implementation. Whereas supporters of the top-down perspective consider policy (design) to be a starting point that shapes implementation, supporters of the bottom-up perspective instead consider policy to be the outcome of implementation practices. The reasoning behind the bottom-up approach is that decisions taken by street-level professionals (i.e. professionals working in the public service sector, also called ‘first-line professionals’) embody a broader policy: when citizens are confronted with policy, this is generally because a certain decision (within public services) has a direct effect on them, not because they have analyzed certain policy (design) papers. For many citizens, decisions made within a street-level context are therefore synonym to policy.35 This does not mean that there are no frameworks or regulations that professionals in public services have to abide by.36 But within these frameworks, professionals can choose between multiple modes of action (or inaction), as will also become clear later in this chapter.

32_{Wegrich, “Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron B. Wildavsky, Implementation,” 350.} 33_{Ibid, 352.}

34_{Ibid, 351.}

35_{Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services (Amsterdam:}

Athenaeum, 2010), xix-xx.

(14)

13 Table 1: Top-down perspective on policy implementation37

Table 2: Bottom-up perspective on policy implementation38

Theories with a bottom-up perspective sometimes (metaphorically)39 refer to professionals in public services as ‘policy makers’40_{(i.e. they make policy by making decisions in individual}

cases). Both top-down and bottom-up perspectives have been influential in policy implementation research.41 Attempts have also been made to develop synthesis models that combine these two perspectives.42_{In what follows, I will have a closer look at a particularly}

influential ‘bottom-up’ approach, namely Lipsky’s theory on Street-Level Bureaucracy.

37_{Based on: Wegrich, “Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron B. Wildavsky, Implementation,” 350-351.} 38_Ibid.

39_{Steven Maynard-Moody and Michael Musheno, Cops, Teachers, Counselors: Stories from the Front Lines of} Public Service (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003), 11.

40_{Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy, chapter “Street Level Bureaucrats as Policy Makers.”} 41_{Wegrich, “Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron B. Wildavsky, Implementation,” 351.} 42_Ibid.

(15)

14

2.2 Street-Level Bureaucracy

Lipsky’s most famous work, Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public

Services, was first published in 1980 and is still republished and read today. Street-Level Bureaucracy has become a ‘classic work’ within the domain of public administration.43_In

recent years, new research has been carried out using Lipsky’s theory as a starting point.44

Lipsky studied front-line workers: who are they and what characterizes their jobs? Moreover, he analyzed how these job characteristics relate to the design and implementation of policies. Lipsky also paid extensive attention to the dilemmas and difficulties that ‘street-level bureaucrats’ encounter and the ways in which professionals cope with these aspects of their jobs. Despite the multiple issues that are discussed in his book, Lipsky continuously links these topics to the broader question of how the implementation of policies is influenced by street-level workers.

To understand Lipsky’s main claims, it is important to be familiar with the concepts ‘street-level bureaucrats’ (abb. SLBs) and ‘street-‘street-level bureaucracy’ (SLB).45_{What makes a}

professional a street-level bureaucrat? In short, SLBs are professionals who have direct interactions with citizens and who have substantial discretion over the execution of their work.46 Examples of typical SLBs are teachers, police officers, social workers and health workers.47 As these examples indicate, SLBs can have very different jobs, but citizen-interaction and discretion are clear common denominators, which makes it possible to analyze such professionals as a group.48

Later in this chapter, I will discuss the concepts of discretion and discretionary power more thoroughly. Now, I will focus a little more on the concept of street-level work. It is possible to detect a shared set of working conditions which all SLBs, to a greater or lesser extent, experience when carrying out their jobs. These working conditions are:

43_{Emile Kolthoff, Kim Loyens, and Antoinette Verhage, “Street-Level Bureaucracy en Actoren in de}

Veiligheidszorg,” Tijdschrift voor Criminologie 58, no. 4 (2016): 3.

44_{See for example: Hans Moors and Eric Bervoets, ed., Frontlijnwerkers in de Veiligheidszorg: Gevalstudies,} Patronen, Analyse (Den Haag: Boom Lemma Uitgevers, 2013).

45_{Abbreviations derived from: Lucy L. Gilson, “Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the}

Individual in Public Service,” in The Oxford Handbook of Classics in Public Policy and Administration, ed. Martin Lodge, Edward C. Page, and Steven J. Balla (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).

46_{Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy, 3.} 47_Ibid.

48_{Jorrit de Jong, “Interview: ‘Frontlijnwerk Is Duidelijker Geworden, Niet Eenvoudiger’: in Gesprek met}

(16)

15

(1) Inadequate resources49: SLBs generally have to carry out tasks and make decisions based on a limited amount of (available) information, often under time pressure. Moreover, bureaucratic paperwork obligations and a lack of experience or training make that SLBs have to perform in a context where necessary resources are not (always) available.50

(2) High demand, which cannot be met by supply51: when more (public) services become available, this will always lead to an increasing demand of these services.52 It is not realistic to think that SLBs can assist or provide high-quality service to every member of society: therefore, choices with regard to the target group and quality of the service have to made on a daily basis.

(3) Agency goals are ambiguous / vague53: street-level jobs are not always clearly defined.54_{Agencies where SLBs work often strive to achieve multiple goals, which}

can be contradictory or conflicting.55_{Moreover, SLBs have to compromise between}

client-centered goals and organization-centered goals.56

(4) Achievements are difficult or impossible to measure57_{: it is difficult to measure to}

effectiveness of services provided by SLBs because many variables have to be taken into account.58 Moreover, it is difficult to reach conclusions about the success of public services: it is not always clear what would have happened to a citizen if services had been provided differently or had not been provided at all.

(5) Contact with clients is generally not voluntary59: Some clients are dependent upon certain services provided by SLBs: this can create an unequal relationship and complicate communication and cooperation.60 Moreover, SLBs sometimes have to work with clients that are, due to their personal circumstances, obliged to take part in the service system, even though they do not wish to receive this assistance.61

49_{De Jong, “Interview,” 12. See also: Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy, 27.} 50_{Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy, 29-31.}

51_{Ibid, 27.} 52_{Ibid, 33.} 53_{Ibid, 27.} 54_Ibid. 55_{Ibid, 40-41.} 56_{Ibid, 41.} 57_{Ibid, 28.} 58_{Ibid, 49.}

59_{De Jong, “Interview,” 12. See also: Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy, 28.} 60_{Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy, 55-57.}

(17)

16

Looking at these five working conditions, two keywords are helpful to describe the nature of street-level work: flexibility and autonomy. If one has to work with inadequate resources, a never-ending demand for services, and non-voluntary clients, flexibility is important to carry out such a job on a daily basis. Flexibility enables the street-level bureaucrat to make quick decisions (despite being in an inadequate information position) about necessary interventions, as well as making a distinction between citizens that will or will not receive certain assistance or services. Also, flexibility enables the street-level bureaucrat to adapt working methods based on the client’s willingness to communicate and cooperate effectively and mannerly.

The autonomy of SLBs stems from the fact that the goals of public service agencies are generally ambiguous, and that outcomes are difficult to measure and evaluate.62 If organizations define multiple goals, it is up to the SLB to estimate how these targets can best be reached. Also, the SLB is considered to know the client(s) and their personal situation, therefore they receive a relatively high degree of autonomy to make decisions about the necessary assistance. Of course there are many rules and procedures to which SLBs have to comply. However, it is simply not possible to capture all possible situations in standardized procedures and formats.63 At the same time, providers of public service are generally expected to deal with individual cases in a manner that fits the personal circumstances of the clients.64 SLBs thus assess a particular case or situation, and sometimes make use of a certain leeway within existing procedures, in order to assist a client in an appropriate manner. In such instances, flexibility and autonomy go hand in hand.

This autonomy is strengthened by the fact that the outcomes of provided services can hardly be measured: this makes it difficult to guide and control the working methods of SLBs.65 Lastly, there is generally no overseer or manager who continuously overlooks and evaluates all decisions that are made by SLBs, which again increases the degree of autonomy these employees have. Managers are generally result-oriented,66 but do not necessarily analyze all individual decisions that have been made by employees during the process.

62_{Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy, 40 and 48.} 63_{Ibid, 15.}

64_Ibid. 65_{Ibid, 48-51.} 66_{Ibid, 19.}

(18)

17

According to Lipsky, the nature of street-level work, which is characterized by a constant need for flexibility, combined with the way in which street-level work is organized, with a high level of autonomy for the SLBs, creates the necessary conditions for discretion and discretionary power.67 I will discuss these concepts in the next paragraphs.

2.2.1 Discretion and Discretionary Power

According to Lipsky, the phrase ‘street-level bureaucracy’ contains a paradox: on the one hand, the term ‘bureaucracy’ refers to rules and regulations and the existence of structured authority, while the term ‘street-level’ refers to a context that is outside the center of these same authorities.68 This paradox poses a question for SLBs working in public services: “how to treat all citizens alike in their claims on government, and how at the same time to be responsive to the individual case when appropriate?”69_{Discretion, in the form of discretionary power, is an}

instrument that helps SLBs to carry out their job in the context of this ever-existing dilemma.

But what is meant by the term ‘discretion’? In her discussion of Lipsky’s work, Gilson clearly explains when discretion occurs and how it can be defined:

“Discretion occurs ‘whenever the effective limits on [the public official’s] power leave him free to make a choice among possible courses of action and inaction.’70_{In other words,}

discretion is the space between the legal rules in which actors exercise choice– the sphere of an actor’s autonomy for decision making.”71

When Lipsky claims that street-level bureaucrats have a relatively high level of discretion, he means that these professionals can independently make impactful decisions about the provision of benefits to certain clients as well as the execution of sanctions.72 Street-level bureaucrats work within a framework, consisting of policies, rules and procedures, but within this

67_{Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy, 13, 15-16, and 221-225. See also: Gilson, “Michael Lipsky, Street-Level}

Bureaucracy,” 386 and 389.

68_{Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy, xii.} 69_{Ibid, xii.}

70_{Gilson, “Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy,” 386. Quote derived from: Davis, K.C. Discretionary} Justice: A Preliminary Inquire. Batan Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969 (page 4).

71_{Gilson, “Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy,” 386. Quote derived from: Hawkins, K. The Uses of} Discretion. Oxford: Clarendon, 1992 (page 80). Cited in: Loyens, Kim, and Jeroen Maesschalck. “Toward a

Theoretical Framework for Ethical Decision Making of Street-Level Bureaucracy: Existing Models Reconsidered.” Administration & Society 42, no. 1 (2010): 66-100 (page 67).

(19)

18

framework there is room to take individual circumstances of a client into account.73 As mentioned earlier, the discretionary power that SLBs possess, follows from the nature of their work, which is characterized by flexibility and autonomy (i.e. the power to make decisions autonomously and have the flexibility to evaluate cases individually).

2.2.2 Relevance of Researching Discretionary Power

Above, I have defined and explained discretion. Now I will consider why the presence of discretionary power in street-level work matters, and why academic research into this phenomenon is relevant. I will highlight three spheres of relevancy: personal relevance (to individual citizens), societal relevance, and political relevance.

Personal relevance: Decisions that SLBs make literally affect the lives of their clients.74_There

are multiple ways in which SLBs can exercise control over clients.75_{SLBs distribute both}

benefits and sanctions which their respective agencies are entitled to.76_{Also, SLBs shape the}

context in which assistance is taking place (frequency, location, modes of communication, etc.).77 Moreover, these professionals tend to have an important role in teaching clients how to behave within the context of the particular street-level bureaucracy and what to expect from public services.78 Lastly, SLBs do not only distribute benefits and services, but also provide clients with psychological ‘rewards and sanctions.’79_{This psychological component is affected}

by ‘labels’ that SLBs attach to clients, which are in turn (partly) based on stereotypical images or personal preferences.80

The combination of making crucial (life-changing) decisions, and the possibility to exercise control in multiple ways, results in SLBs having a profound impact on personal lives. Generally speaking, SLBs will try to have a positive impact on the lives of their clients, however, sometimes regulations (‘from above’) or obstacles in the professional-client relationship can lead to SLBs having a negative impact (or less positive impact than originally envisioned) on the lives of certain clients. When looking into the work of public service professionals, it is

73_{Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy, 15.} 74_{Ibid, 9.} 75_{Ibid, 60.} 76_{Ibid, 60-61.} 77_{Ibid, 61.} 78_{Ibid, 61-62.} 79_{Ibid, 60.} 80_{Ibid, 68-69.}

(20)

19

always important to not only look at the positive effects of street-level work, but also to reflect on cases where clients do not receive the necessary or appropriate assistance. Such instances can provide better insights in both the working methods of SLBs, and the effectiveness of existing regulations, programs and frameworks.

Societal relevance: I believe that the societal impact of SLBs goes beyond the sum of decisions

that are made in individual cases. SLBs are employed in important societal institutions and are responsible for determining who is, or is not, eligible for certain services, assistance, benefits, penalties, etc.81 This means that SLBs also have the power to exclude individuals, or groups, from particular services. Especially in situations where existing regulations leave room for interpretation, the legitimate question to ask is which factors determine the decisions made by SLBs. Action and inaction vis-à-vis individuals or groups has an effect the outcome of policies, but also on how groups (re)view them. This is also the case with radicalization policies, which often focus on specific groups or communities within society.

Debates in recent years have shown that defining ‘target groups’ for certain policies can have an impact on social cohesion within society. In some instances, the implementation of certain programs or regulations creates a context in which particular groups feel disproportionally punished or neglected: this can lead to unrest, discontent, or dissent. An example of the societal impact of policies carried out by SLBs are the counter-terrorism policies in the United States (especially in New York) after the events of 9/11. Research showed that these policies mainly targeted Muslims and created a strong ‘us-versus-them’ divide between different communities.82 This phenomenon is also apparent in other countries, such as the Netherlands.

Political relevance: Personally, I think that it is hard to deny the interaction between politics

and street-level work. As Gilson explains: “through their decisions, SLBs influence citizens’ level of access to public services or welfare benefits, as well as their experience of that access.”83_{This in turn affects how people within society evaluate the current political course}

within the country. At the same time, the work carried out by SLBs, their failures and successes,

81_{Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy, 60-61.}

82_{See for example: Diala Shamas and Nermeen Arastu, “Mapping Muslims: NYPD Spying and Its Impact on}

American Muslims,” ed. Ramzi Kassem, Ken Kimerling, and Amna Akbar (Long Island City: MACLC, CLEAR & AALDEF Project, 2013), accessed March 4, 2020, https://www.law.cuny.edu/wp-content/uploads/page-assets/academics/clinics/immigration/clear/Mapping-Muslims.pdf.

(21)

20

have an impact on societal and political debates: is there need for a change of laws, regulations, and (public) programs?

Moreover, whenever society is confronted with new challenges related to, for example, health care, education, or security (i.e. domains that are dominated by SLBs), national and regional governments have the power to initiate new programs and interventions. These have to be implemented and carried out by SLBs. As a consequence, SLBs receive a growing amount of tasks, responsibilities and discretionary powers. This results in a growing demand for resources, supplementary education, etc.

2.3 Discretionary Power in Practice

By now it is clear that SLBs can make decisions, interpret regulations, and have an impact on the implementation and/or outcome of policies. How does the use of discretionary power manifest itself in practice? I will discuss two important frameworks that deal with this question. I will start with Lipsky’s ideas regarding the use of discretion, and subsequently explain how another academic duo, Maynard-Moody and Musheno, understand the use of discretionary power. Both perspectives offer interesting starting points for further research into the decision-making process of SLBs.

2.3.1 Lipsky: Coping Strategies

Lipsky’s starting point for analyzing SLBs’ use of discretionary power is the assumption that the nature of street-level work is characterized by complexity and stressful situations. Concrete factors that affect SLBs working strategies are, among other things, inadequate resources, a high demand, vague (immeasurable) ambitions, and non-voluntary contact with clients. To deal with these obstacles, SLBs establish so-called ‘coping strategies.’ These coping strategies aim at routinizing and simplifying the working context and the interaction with clients.84 Lipsky identifies four main coping strategies:

• Rationing services: this technique is generally used to cope with the ever-increasing demand for public services. This technique encompasses all kinds of methods and decisions that influence the amount and quality of services that specific clients will receive. Financial costs/restraints, time (limitations), information (restraints),

(22)

21

psychological pressures and personal bias/preferences can be used in order to make services available to some, but not to others.85

• Controlling clients: this technique is used to cope with the high number of clients that demand services, mostly by looking at clients’ willingness to cooperate and to comply with (procedural) regulations. It encompasses all different ways in which SLBs structure their interaction with clients, for example by deciding when, where and how often interaction takes place, as well as sanctioning clients that hinder the procedural processes or behave disrespectfully.86

• Husbanding resources: this technique is used to deal with the general lack of necessary resources. It consists of managing and conserving available resources.87 Examples are screening (hiring employees who “stand as buffers between SLBs and clients,” like receptionists, secretaries etc.),88 rubber stamping (adopting previously made judgements as one’s own),89_{and referrals (transferring clients to another agency, specialist, etc.).}90

• Managing consequences of routinization: this technique is used to process deviant cases in a manner that is ‘as routinely as possible.’91_{It encompasses procedures that occur in}

extraordinary circumstances. Examples are the use of ‘pressure specialists’92_and

emergency regulations.93

In subchapter 2.3.3, I will schematically illustrate Lipsky’s framework and comprehensively summarize the starting point (i.e. main assumption), contextual factors and subsequent working strategies that constitute his theory.

2.3.2 Maynard-Moody and Musheno: A Citizen-Agent Narrative

Maynard-Moody and Musheno interviewed many street-level workers to get a better sense of how discretionary power works in practice. They distinguished between the ‘stage-agent narrative’ and the ‘citizen-agent narrative.’ The assumption in the former is that “self-interest guides the exercise of discretion.”94_{Thus, according to the state-agent narrative, street-level}

85_{Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy, chapter 7 and 8.} 86_{Ibid, chapter 9, 117-124.} 87_{Ibid, chapter 9, 125.} 88_{Ibid, 128-129.} 89_{Ibid, 129-131.} 90_{Ibid, 132.} 91_{Ibid, 133.} 92_Ibid. 93_{Ibid, 36-139.}

(23)

22

workers use their discretion “to make their work easier, safer, and more rewarding.”95_In

opposition to this narrative, they put forward a citizen-agent narrative, which recognizes that street-level workers sometimes make their job “harder, more unpleasant, more dangerous, and less officially successful” in order to help their clients in the best way possible.96_Lipsky’s

theory is in line with the state-agent narrative. However, through an analysis of their gathered data, Maynard-Moody and Musheno found that the citizen-agent narrative is sometimes more in line with how SLBs use their discretionary power.

Maynard-Moody and Musheno discovered multiple factors that affect street-level decision-making. They argue that decision-making is highly affected by the identity and actions of clients, as well as the identity of the professional:97 “workers recognize themselves as belonging to racial, class, gender, and sexual grouping.”98_{During interaction with clients, workers ‘enact}

identities,’ which means that they organize the social world by endowing ‘recognizable meaning’ to themselves and their clients.99_{Maynard-Moody and Musheno found that workers}

“are attentive to who their clients are.”100_{Thus, they assess the identity of clients and}

subsequently act upon this judgement.101 Instead of handling cases routinely, workers use their discretion “to select clients for special treatment”102 and then adapt existing procedures and rules to the specific context of these clients.103

Identification with clients and/or their circumstances (i.e. recognition) is an important factor that affects the ‘identity assessment’ and subsequent ‘estimation of worthiness’ of clients. If the professional’s identity ‘matches’ with the identity of the client, it is likely that this professional will “go the extra mile to help this citizen.”104_{In cases of very differing identities, professionals}

are more likely to withhold assistance or handle a case more routinely.105

95_{Maynard-Moody and Musheno, Cops, Teachers, Counselors, 12.} 96_{Ibid, 19.} 97_{Ibid, 51.} 98_{Ibid, 20-21.} 99_{Ibid, 51.} 100_{Ibid, 13.} 101_Ibid. 102_{Ibid, 12.} 103_{Ibid, 10.} 104_{Ibid, 83.} 105_Ibid.

(24)

23

Another important factor that affects street-level decision-making, is what Maynard-Moody and Musheno call ‘perceived worth.’106 This factor is closely related to the enactment of identities. The modes of action that street-level professionals use, depend to a significant extent upon the estimation of perceived worth of a client. This estimation is based upon a combination of factors, among which are:

• Genuine need (for help)107

• Disability (disabilities that are not caused by the client’s own -irresponsible- behavior)108

• Motivation (to change)109

• Co-operation (not trying to ‘scam’ the system)110

• Challenge (clients that cannot be ‘routinely handled’)111

• Realistic expectations (clients who expect unrealistic assistance are considered ‘less worthy’ of help)112

• Investment opportunity (when clients are believed to -metaphorically- ‘repay’ the investment)113

After SLBs have estimated a client’s worth, they have four possible ‘modes of action’ to fall back on, according to Maynard-Moody and Musheno. These modes of action are:

1. Normal, routine, bureaucratic treatment

2. Extraordinary service (to those deemed worthy) 3. “Doing what can be done” (given constraints/limits)

4. Providing less that pragmatism would allow (to the ‘unworthy’) 114

In accordance with Lipsky, this academic duo acknowledges that some clients are assisted in a ‘routinized’ manner. This is not necessarily a bad thing. In some instances, following existing procedures is enough to adequately help a client. Routines also enable SLBs to carry out their tasks within the context of ever-existing constraints. However, Maynard-Moody and Musheno

106_{Maynard-Moody and Musheno, Cops, Teachers, Counselors, 94.} 107_{Ibid, 103.} 108_Ibid. 109_{Ibid, 104.} 110_Ibid. 111_{Ibid, 105.} 112_Ibid. 113_{Ibid, 105-106.} 114_{Ibid, 94-95.}

(25)

24

are also convinced that some clients receive more service than routines would allow for, while others receive less. In the following paragraph, I will schematically illustrate their framework and compare it to Lipsky’s theory.

2.3.3 Schematic Overview of the State-Agent and Citizen-Agent Narrative

In my research into the use of discretion by Dutch youth workers, I will use Lipky’s, as well as Maynard-Moody and Musheno’s, framework on the use of discretionary power. A distinction can be made between the state-agent narrative (Lipsky) and the citizen-agent narrative (Maynard-Moody/Musheno). Although both frameworks recognize that ‘the nature of street-level work is characterized by complexity,’ they differ in their explanation of how SLBs deal with this complexity. On the next page, these differences are summarized in a table.

(26)

25 Starting point (assumption) Factors affecting decision-making / use of discretion Working methods / strategies State-Agent Narrative (Framework Lipsky) “Self-interest guides the exercise of discretion”115 1. Ever-existing constraints: Inadequate resources, high demand, vague (immeasurable) ambitions, non-voluntary contact with clients 2. Existing rules, procedures, laws (governmental and organizational) Coping strategies (i.e. routines) Such as: rationing services, controlling clients, husbanding resources, and managing consequences of routinization Citizen-Agent Narrative (Framework Maynard-Moody and Musheno) SLBs sometimes make their job

“harder, more unpleasant, more dangerous, and less officially successful”

in order to help their clients in the best

way possible.116 1. Identity of both professional and client 2. Perceived worth Normal routine Extraordinary service “Doing what can be

done” Providing less than pragmatism would

allow

Table 3: State-Agent Narrative versus Citizen-Agent Narrative

Neither the state-agent narrative, nor the citizen-agent narrative can explain the use of discretion in all circumstances. To fully understand street-level decision-making, both narratives should be taken into account. Street-levels workers are likely to combine working methods from both frameworks: this also follows from the fact that ‘routines’ are included as a working method in both narratives. Which narrative best reflects the use of discretion might also depend upon the specific function of a street-level professional. In case of youth workers, I can imagine that recognition/identification with clients occurs more often than is the case for police officers or rehabilitation officers. This could impact youth workers’ working methods, and therefore their

115_{Maynard-Moody and Musheno, Cops, Teachers, Counselors, 12.} 116_Ibid.

(27)

26

use of discretion in cases of (possible) radicalization. I will explore this assumption in my own research.

2.4 Youth Work in the Netherlands

In the paragraphs above, I have discussed Street-Level Bureaucracy, discretionary power, and two theoretical frameworks that aim to explain how SLBs put discretionary power into practice. In the remaining subchapters of this theoretical chapter, I will specifically zoom in on youth workers. I will discuss their working conditions and their role in Dutch radicalization policies.

2.4.1 Youth Workers as Street-Level Bureaucrats

In this thesis, Dutch youth workers will be the main object of focus. In what way does youth work match the characteristics of a street-level bureaucracy?

(1) Inadequate resources: scarcities that youth workers can be confronted with are: time, information, knowledge, skills and, in some instances, also money.

(2) High demand: the target group of these SLBs is very extensive. In the Netherlands, youth workers generally focus on youths between 10-23 years old.117 Needless to say, this means that they have a large amount of potential ‘clients.’ Therefore, youth workers continuously have to make decisions regarding which individuals and/or groups will have their attention. Attention is generally given to ‘vulnerable’ youths.118_{Youth work}

primarily targets youngsters “who grow up in vulnerable situations.”119_These

‘vulnerable situations’ result from poverty, harassment, and discrimination (among other factors).120_{Such neighborhoods are generally referred to as ‘socioeconomically}

disadvantaged.’

(3) Vague goals / ambitions: what are the main goals and tasks of youth workers? When looking at, for example, documents by the Dutch Youth Institute (Nederlands Jeugd Instituut), it becomes clear that youth workers are given ambitious, diverging, and difficult tasks. In a 2015 paper, it is stated that:

117_{Marja Valkestijn, Pieter Paul Bakker, Pink Hilverdink, and Judith Metz, “Jongerenwerk in Beeld: Voor}

Partners in de Wijk,” Nederlands Jeugdinstituut (2015): 5, accessed August 16, 2020, https://www.nji.nl/nl/Download-NJi/Publicatie-NJi/(320799)-Jongerenwerk-in-beeld.pdf.

118_Ibid.

119_{Jolanda Sonneveld, Judith Metz, and Willeke Manders, “De Preventieve Kracht van het Jongerenwerk:}

Bijdrage aan de Transformatiedoelen van de Jeugdwet,” Amsterdam University of Applied Sciences (2019): 26, accessed August 16, 2020, https://www.hva.nl/binaries/content/assets/subsites/kc-mr/lectoraat-ys/hva---a4-brochure---de-preventieve-kracht-van-het-jongerenwerk-web.pdf?1573047538818.

(28)

27

“Youth workers have a unique public pedagogic function. They encourage youngsters’ personal and social development, they promote their interests, and indicate boundaries. They contribute to youngsters’ personal growth by promoting talent development, functioning as a role model, assisting in building a social network, providing guidance in cases of personal or social problems, and organizing or searching positive ways of leisure activities.”121

Other themes and tasks that are connected to youth work are: the promotion of social cohesion,122 detection of risks and problems in an early stage,123 prevention (of all sorts),124 counseling (also for parents),125 and promotion of livability and security in neighborhoods.126 The main goal of youth work is not always clearly or explicitly defined. Moreover, youth workers are generally expected to independently work out their own initiatives, make decisions, and carry out tasks which contribute to the overall ambitions of their agency.127

(4) Achievements are difficult to measure: it is difficult to measure the effects of youth work. Nevertheless, attempts are made: research by Koops, Metz, and Sonneveld shows that youth work positively affects the personal development and social participation of youngsters in society.128 These researchers moreover claim that youth work reduces youth (group) nuisance.129 However, other tasks and goals are more difficult to measure, such as: the effect on social cohesion, the results of preventive measures, and the impact of (abstract) campaigns (for example to make youngsters ‘more resilient’).

(5) Contact with clients (non-voluntarily): youth work takes place at the heart of society: in the streets, at schools, at sport clubs etc. Youth workers thus have much contact with (young) citizens. These contacts are generally voluntary. However, some (newer) aspects of youth work, such as detecting radicalization and extremism, affect the voluntary character of youth work. As will also become clear in the next paragraphs, youth workers are nowadays also expected to ‘keep an eye’ on individuals and groups

121_{Valkestijn, Bakker, Hilverdink, and Metz, “Jongerenwerk in Beeld,” 5. NB: own translation.} 122_{Ibid, 6.}

123_{Ibid, 9.} 124_Ibid. 125_Ibid,11. 126_{Ibid, 12.}

127_{Corrie van Dam and Niels Zwikker, “Jongerenwerker,” Movisie (2008): 12, accessed August 16, 2020,}

https://www.sociaalwerknederland.nl/?file=4226&m=1320760041&action=file.download.

128_{Valkestijn, Bakker, Hilverdink, and Metz, “Jongerenwerk in Beeld,” 16.} 129_Ibid.

(29)

28

that could possibly become a security threat. These tasks are much less ‘voluntary’ in nature, since the individuals in question generally prefer to remain ‘under te radar.’

2.4.2 Youth Work: Radicalization and Extremism

The experiences and problems of young people change over time, and so does youth work. New (or renewed) challenges within in society, such as discrimination, polarization, and internet can lead to new programs, campaigns, and tasks for social workers. This thesis focuses on topics that have become more prominent in youth work in the past decade, namely radicalization and extremism.

Around 2007, the Dutch government observed a trend in which polarization and radicalization in society were increasing, in scale, pace, and intensity.130_{The Ministry of Internal Affairs}

launched a five-year action plan to address polarization and radicalization.131_{In this document,}

the government announced that it would analyze in which cities radicalization was particularly increasing. Moreover, the government urged municipalities to make in-depth analyses of phenomena such as radicalization and polarization “by using the knowledge of teachers, youth workers, etcetera. in the neighborhoods.”132 Here we see how an increasing phenomenon in society (radicalization) leads to a demand for information gathered by SLBs. In the years that followed, new programs were designed, which had to be carried out by SLBs.

This trend, where SLBs are responsible for prevention, providing information, and early detection is not completely new. In an article published in 2011, Beatrice de Graaf describes how an increasing number of societal themes is “dragged into the domain of security.”133_{As a}

consequence, more institutions, powers, and facilities become part of the security sector. Also, more professionals have become involved in security related issues and programs.134 De Graaf specifically discusses how religion, and Islam in particular, became the object of the “national security state.”135_{She locates the start of the securitization of (Islamic) religion in the nineties.}

130_{Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, “Actieplan Polarisatie en Radicalisering}

2007-2011,” (Publication date unknown): 4, accessed March 25, 2020.

131_Ibid. 132_{Ibid, 12-13.}

133_{Beatrice de Graaf, “Religion Bites: Religieuze Orthodoxie op de Nationale Veiligheidsagenda,” Tijdschrift} voor Religie, Recht en Beleid 2, no. 2 (2011): 62.

134_Ibid. 135_{Ibid, 62.}

(30)

29

The securitization of religion had, and still has, far-reaching consequences for first-line professionals. At a political level, the idea arose that early detection of deviant, radical, religiously inspired behavior136 had to become a priority and required “a change of perspective in certain sectors.”137

I this research paper, I will focus on the situation after 2011. With the start of the civil war in Syria, and the subsequent rise of extremist groups (such as ISIS), drastic measures have been taken to prevent radicalized citizens from becoming ‘foreign fighters’ or commit terrorist attacks. Moreover, in recent years, radicalization in other domains, such as right- and left-wing extremism, has also caught the attention of politicians, policymakers, local authorities and street-level professionals. Youth workers have been mobilized both for the prevention of radicalization processes, as well as detection of radicalization in an early stage.

Policy papers and ‘manuals’ from national and local institutions endorse this claim. These papers aim to support municipalities and organizations with shaping their counter-extremism programs. For example, the Expertise Unit Social Stability (Expertise-unit Sociale Stabiliteit – ESS) published a manual for local governments with advice on how to establish local networks and involve ‘key figures’ (Dutch: ‘sleutelfiguren’) in their radicalization policies.138_{These key}

figures are professionals (and sometimes volunteers) who have close contact with (vulnerable) citizens: this logically includes many street-level bureaucrats. Moreover, Platform Youth Prevention Extremism and Polarization (Platform Jeugd preventie Extremisme en Polarisatie – JEP) created an advisory unit which professionals can turn to when they have questions concerning extremism or related topics.139

When specifically looking into municipal papers on radicalization policies, for example by the municipality of Rotterdam, we also see that key figures, such as youth workers, are explicitly mentioned as important partners in the overall radicalization approach.140 Therefore, these

136_{De Graaf, “Religion Bites,” 71.} 137_{Ibid, 72.}

138_{Expertise-Unit Sociale Stabiliteit (ESS), “Handreiking Lokaal Netwerk van Sleutelfiguren,” (June 2018):}

1-44,accessed March 25, 2020, https://www.socialestabiliteit.nl/documenten/publicaties/2018/06/18/handreiking-lokaal-netwerk-van-sleutelfiguren.

139_{Vereniging Nederlandse Gemeenten (VNG), “JEP Helpt Jeugdprofessionals bij Vragen over Extremisme,”}

(February 9, 2018), accessed March 25, 2020, https://vng.nl/nieuws/jep-helpt-jeugdprofessionals-bij-vragen-over-extremisme.

140_{Gemeente Rotterdam – Directie Veiligheid, “Aanpak Radicalisering, Extremisme, en Polarisatie 2018-2022,”}

(Publication date unknown): 7-9,accessed March 25, 2020, https://www.rotterdam.nl/wonen-leven/radicalisering/.

(31)

30

professionals also receive support, for example through expert meetings or extra training.141 Though every municipality approaches radicalization in a slightly different way, we can conclude that overall, youth workers are viewed as the ‘eyes and ears’ in the streets and therefore as relevant partners in radicalization policies.142

2.5 Exploratory Research by van de Weert and Eijkman

In addition to the theories by Lipsky and Maynard-Moody/Musheno, I will use van de Weert and Eijkman’s observations and critical reflections as a framework for my own research project. They did thorough literature studies and analyzed the content of various policy papers. Moreover, they interviewed 18 youth workers from ‘prioritized municipalities’143_{in the}

Netherlands.

When analyzing the results of my interviews, I aim to compare my findings with the observations previously made in van de Weert and Eijkman’s articles. Below, I will provide a short summary of their most important findings on the role and functioning of youth workers within Dutch radicalization policies.

2.5.1 Van de Weert and Eijkman: Dutch Radicalization Policies

It is beyond the scope of this research paper to evaluate national and local radicalization policy papers in depth, but I think the following five conclusions from van de Weert and Eijkman’s research are relevant to keep in mind in the following chapters of this research paper:

• Academically, there is no consensus over the definition of concepts such as radicalization and extremism.144 Van de Weert and Eijkman consider it useful to distinguish between radicalism, extremism and violent extremism.145 The difference between extremism and violent extremism mostly depends upon an individual’s ‘mind-set.’146

• In Dutch policy papers, both from national and local governments, the terms radicalization and (violent) extremism are used ambiguously and interchangeably. The

141_{Gemeente Rotterdam, “Aanpak Radicalisering, Extremisme, en Polarisatie 2018-2022,” 9.} 142_{Van de Weert and Eijkman, “De Lokale Jongerenwerker,” 5.}

143_{Prioritized municipalities are municipalities that deal with a relatively high number of cases related to}

radicalization and extremism. Such regions receive extra support from the NCTV to deal with these phenomena. See: Van de Weert and Eijkman, “De Lokale Jongerenwerker,” 11.

144_{Van de Weert and Eijkman, “De Lokale Jongerenwerker,” 8.} 145_{Ibid, 9.}

Key Figure or Snitch? An Exploratory Study into Youth Workers’ Considerations, Dilemmas, and Interventions when Dealing with Radicalization-Related Cases