Danique François S1835408
Dr. L. Demarest
Democratisation Processes in Contemporary Africa
Bachelor thesis 2/6/2020 Word count: 8717
Abstract
Several reports show that Uganda has a relatively high degree of freedom of expression, while political rights are still below average. As media freedom has commonly been strongly associated with democracy, the Ugandan case does not fit the general theory. This could be due to how the media operates in Uganda. Maybe the media are free, but financially dependent on politicians, leading to uncritical reporting. In this paper I investigate the extent to which Ugandan media are critical towards the government of President Museveni. I focus specifically on the case of famous political opponent Bobi Wine and how he is represented in the media. I conduct a quantitative as well as qualitative investigation of media reports on Bobi Wine, in two newspapers, one government-affiliated, the New Vision, and one opposition-affiliated, the Daily Monitor. I find that the independent press is indeed able to criticize the government and openly support the opposition, while the state-owned newspaper is reluctant in this respect, although still somewhat critical. This finding indicates that the mismatch in the relation between media freedom and democracy in Uganda cannot be attributed to uncritical media reporting.
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN AN UNFREE
COUNTRY: THE CASE OF UGANDA
1
Table of Content
1. Introduction ... 2
2. Literature Review ... 4
2.1 Literature ... 4
2.1.1. Media and Democracy ... 4
2.1.2. Media and Democracy in Africa ... 6
2.2 Case of Uganda ... 9
3. Methodological framework ... 11
3.1. Case study selection ... 11
3.2 Media analysis ... 12
4. Empirical Findings ... 15
4.1 Quotations Bobi Wine ... 15
4.2 Quotations NRM government ... 16
4.3 Strong support for the government ... 18
4.4 Strong support against the government ... 19
5. Conclusion ... 22 5.1 Conclusions Research ... 22 5.2 Implications ... 23 5.3 Discussion ... 24 References ... 25 Appendices ... 29
A Newspaper articles quantitative & qualitative analysis ... 29
B SPSS Syntax ... 37
2 1. Introduction
We are tired of oppressive policies to our life, and all that blockades our freedom, (…) They say you distorted what used to be democracy, it has now become a hypocrisy! (…) What is the purpose of the constitution? When the government disrespects the constitution? Where is my freedom of expression? When you charge me because of my expression? (Bobi Wine, 2017)
This passage of the song ‘Freedom’ presents the view of Ugandan pop star, activist and politician Robert Kyagulanyi, also known as Bobi Wine, in which he criticizes the Ugandan government. In several songs, Bobi Wine calls upon the population to be more critical of their government. With his critical and outspoken opinion on political and social issues in Uganda he is quite popular among the so-called ghetto youth, but not so much with the authorities. Not only is he being censored in performing and were several songs during the election period off the radio, over the past years he has also been repressed multiple times in the political sphere by the authorities. On August 15th 2018, he was charged with possession of unlawful firearms and the incitement of violence. After further investigation he was released. However, on August 7th 2019, Bobi Wine was charged again, with an intent to “alarm, annoy, or ridicule,” President Yoweri Museveni. The most recent time he was arrested, was January 2020, for speaking in public about his presidential bid for the 2021 general elections in Uganda.
Even though Bobi Wine, as one of the most high-profile political opposition members, is being repressed by the government in advancing his political career, the press is able to report on this dynamic. The Ugandan government under President Museveni is trying to repress the opposition, while it seemingly leaves the media free in writing on the events happening around Bobi Wine. Has the Ugandan press in effect more freedom of expression compared to the political rights and freedom of its citizens?
The general positive relationship between media and democracy, in which they enhance each other, has a more complex relationship on the African continent (Berger, 1998; Kupe, 2004; Iazzolino & Stremlau, 2017). Political rights are restrained and often the media is in the hands of the government. However, when a country in Sub-Saharan Africa does turn into a more democratic state, it generally also has more media freedom compared to countries with few democratic rights (Schoemaker & Stremlau, 2014). So far, most African countries fit the general theory on media and democracy. A deviant case in this theory is Uganda, as it has quite a high degree of press freedom, while on the contrary it is commonly not seen as a free country (Freedom House, 2019; Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019). As most countries that are labelled
3 as ‘not free’ also have a controlled press, I aim to explore the press freedom of Uganda. Is the Ugandan press indeed able to criticize the current government under President Museveni?
4 2. Literature Review
2.1 Literature
2.1.1. Media and Democracy
The relationship between media and democracy dates from the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, when newspapers and journals were highly politicized (Curran, p. 63, 2011). Different media channels made it possible to spread political messages, convince people of a certain point of view or create a platform for discussion. News media became involved in assuring the accountability of the checks and balances on the government and the powerful. The press became a means to the freedom of expression, and with this freedom it exercised a role as an independent institution in political systems. The institutionalisation happened in the eighteenth century in Britain and slowly spread across the globe. Since then, the news media was also conceptualized as the ‘fourth estate’, a crucial political institution (Schultz, 1998). In the nineteenth century the role of the press moved from an elitist point of view to a more activist role in society, representing all interests. After the 1970s, news organisations saw the freedom of expression and their work as a social responsibility (Curran, p. 48, 2011). The role of watchdog of the state was invented. This created a new central role for media organisations in society.
Media freedom is since then seen as key to promoting development, democracy and human rights as independent media became involved in the checks and balances on the government (Whitten-Woodring, 2010). Transparency from the government to its citizens through media platforms is an important aspect in free and fair elections, in this way citizens are able to make a well informed decision in the voting process. The democratisation process is, the other way around, also enhanced as the media can function as a platform through which citizens can influence the political agenda. However, as Schultz (1998) indicates, there has been some critique on the commercial aspect of the fourth estate. The press is not only driven by its curiosity and social responsibility, it is also driven by profit. Competition arises in the independent media field where media organisations need to distinguish themselves, while simultaneously covering news stories as independent institutions, providing transparency and objectivity of the news to the people. Most media organisations differentiate themselves with a new focus on entertainment, and profile themselves less as a political institution.
The general relationship between media and democracy is a bidirectional process in which they support and benefit from each other. However, the extent of influence the media and politics
5 have on each other differs across the globe. Hallin and Mancini (2004) created three different models to capture the differences. Their first model is the ‘Liberal Model’, with characterisations of limited government influence, strong market orientation, majoritarian politics and fragmented interests combined with a tendency to the common good. The media platform that is connected with this model is market-dominant, with professionally orientated journalists and factual journalism that has a focus on objectivity, as found in France, Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal. The second, ‘Democratic Corporatist Model’, is similar to the ‘Liberal Model’. However, it is associated with a highly organised civil society and a consensus striving coalition government, formed by proportional electoral systems, and tends to be actively involved in the economy and supply of public services. Their media platforms are associated with regulations and subsidies, with journalism that intentionally and transparently adopts a non-objective point of view based on facts. Examples of this model can be found in Austria, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland. Thirdly is the ‘Polarized Pluralist Model’ that is mostly based on weak rational-legal authority. Their civil society is also highly organised due to the sharp political and ideological divisions, political patronage and strong political parties. This political model gives media an instrumental role to expand support for political opinions in the public sphere. Media platforms are therefore closely related to certain political parties, also called parallelism, which can be found in Britain, United States, Canada and Ireland.
The models created by Hallin and Mancini (2004) are solely based on Western countries in the late twentieth century. Keane (2013) describes a more global vision on the relationship between media and politics and elaborates on four general political effects of the media. First, the democratisation of information. In other words, an open market to information for all. The transparency of information reinforces the democratisation process, as citizens now have access to information and can make viable judgements on contemporary debates, especially during elections. Another effect of the media exposes the ambiguities between the private and public spheres. What is supposed to be private can now become easily accessible for the public due to new media means. This is connected to the third political effect; exposing corruption, a phenomenon also known as ‘muckraking’. Where some countries have no checks and balances on the government, the independent media provides the information for a critical public opinion to protect the values of a democratic government. The fourth and final trend that connects democracy to media is the growth of unelected representatives. Through media they become
6 known, popular and gain legitimacy and respect as public figures. An example that Keane (2013) cites is Nelson Mandela and his unelected leadership supported by the media.
In summary, the literature on democracy and media proposes a positive influential relationship between independent media and democratisation, as they have the capacity to enhance each other (Keane, 2013; Whitten-Woodring, 2010). The relationship nevertheless differs in degree of positive influence among different regime types (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). Is the positive relationship as suggested by the literature also visible in African countries, or does the general theory on media and democracy not hold for Sub-Saharan countries? We will now have a closer look at media and democracy in Africa.
2.1.2. Media and Democracy in Africa
Is the media in Africa also viewed as a ‘watchdog of the state’ or ‘fourth estate’, complementary to the government of a democracy as in the literature of the previous section? From a historical point of view, Berger (1998) argues that the media in the South after independence from the colonial powers did not reach beyond the elite, in contradiction to the arguments of Keane (2013) in which the influence of the media reaches all levels of society. Most media after independence was under direct state control or combined with colonial media (Berger, 1998). However, the growth and popularity of the media over time in Southern countries meant that there was space created for alternatives that challenged the neo-colonial order. Perhaps due to the time of writing but Berger (1998) concludes that the media in developing countries is mostly constrained in its contribution to democracy as a result of its limited reach of the population, the state control of the media and its restricted content. I will now go further into the literature on the relationship between media and democracy in contemporary Africa and the factors that are of influence to the general trend.
I will first take a look at the difference between English- (former British colonies) and French-speaking countries (former French or Belgian colonies) in Sub-Saharan Africa that both have their own media system. The discrepancy in the media organisation is also visible in their relation towards the authorities (Frère, 2012). Francophone regulatory authorities of the media are more intervening than the English speaking parallel institutions, which monitor the media content to a limited degree. This results in a different role of the state towards the media. In English-speaking Africa the state is often almost absent, apart from the financial aid to public media, while in French-speaking Africa the state is visible in several layers of the media sector (Frère, 2012). Kupe (2004) acknowledges the legacy of the colonial powers in media
7 organisations as they are often modelled along the same lines or influenced by the same commercial requirements.
Secondly, there are different forms of democracies in contemporary Africa; e.g. emerging, hybrid, conflict or post-conflict democracies that perhaps need a different approach in researching the relationship towards media, as their governments have limited authority (Iazzolino & Stremlau, 2017). The media in hybrid democracies are capable of contributing to political and social change by informing the public debate, but their autonomy can also be restricted through laws or forms of informal repression. This may lead to aspects of ‘illiberal democracy’ in the media sector, in which the media is used to spread a certain message and increase the legitimacy of the content from the government. Civil liberties are reduced through these laws and other forms of repression, for instance by lack of transparency, even though there are forms of democracy, such as elections and formal separation of powers (Iazzolino & Stremlau, 2017). It is also possible that in emerging, post-conflict democracies the media plays a certain part in facilitating peace and reconciliation (Schoemaker & Stremlau, 2014). However, there remains insufficient evidence to support the statement that the media play a rigorous important role in the transition from a state of conflict to a stable government (Schoemaker & Stremlau, 2014).
Often liberalisation of the media in African context did not turn into a democratic free pass with media that represent the broader interests of society (Kupe, 2004). State-controlled or –linked media disguised as private and independent media censoring or controlling news segments prevent the general theory of media and democracy to apply on several African countries. This brings us to the third factor that influences the relationship on media and democracy, which is the challenge of socio-economic development that a major part of Africa is currently facing. Underrepresented communities, possibly caused by geographical, linguistic and socio-economic factors, are underrepresented in the media. This is because the press caters information and communication for the target audiences of their media and advertisement platforms. Therefore, the media does not represent the broader interest of the whole society which complicates the democratic paradigm (Kupe, 2004).
Next to the limited public where media organisations refer to in several African countries, a fourth aspect that complicates the general theory is the political environment where the media operate (Iazzolino & Stremlau, 2017). Aspects of this environment that possibly complicate the relationship of media towards democracy are among others; paid news, political advertisement and ‘tokens of gratitude’ paid to reporters to cover specific political events. For example,
8 newspapers and media outlets in Nigeria became important tools for political leaders to control the public debate and influence the population. Even though several independent newspapers exist, they still face three forms of self-censorship, next to actual censorship by the government on certain content or critical reports (Demarest & Langer, 2019). First, independent newspapers are very sensitive to political pressures as they remain largely financially dependent on advertisement from politicians. Next to the financial dependency on politicians, news media are also dependent on political sources for information. Third, the press faces repression and violence from dissatisfied politicians and their supporters. This means that the environment in which the Nigerian, and other African, journalists operate is significantly different from the environment in which the general theory between media and democracy is proposed.
Finally, where the phenomena of bribery and corruption in Western journalism has largely disappeared, it is still a common practice in many African countries (Lodamo & Skjerdal, 2009). That the circumstances of journalists and reporters in African countries do not always support democratic values, becomes clear from another research conducted in Nigeria from 1999 to 2003: “The working environment of journalists – corruption in the media and the fragility of media business in Nigeria – limit their role in advancing democratic causes.” (Olukoyun, p. 87, 2004). In other African countries, such as Ethiopia, the attitude of corruption towards the media field is nothing new, operationalized in different forms as ‘brown envelope journalism’, ‘bonus journalism’, ‘oiling hands’ or ‘sitting fee’ (Lodamo & Skjerdal, 2009). The main reason for the bribery in Ethiopia is the lack of ethical consciousness and the link to journalistic professionalism. Thus, the absence of norms and ethical standards in regard to ‘brown envelopes’ results in media segments from a subjective standpoint.
To summarize, the general relationship between media and democracy as presented in the previous section is perceived differently in the global South as it is influenced by the colonial aftermath (Frère, 2012; Kupe, 2004), the phase of democratisation (Iazzolino & Stremlau, 2017; Schoemaker & Stremlau, 2014), the challenges of socio-economic development that many African countries face (Kupe, 2004) and in coherence with that, the different political environment in which the media operates and the higher levels of corruption (Iazzolino & Stremlau, 2017; Demarest & Langer, 2009; Olukoyun, 2004; Lodamo & Skjerdal, 2009). Therefore media organisations in the African continent are restrained in their capability of enhancing the democratisation processes and vice versa.
9 2.2 Case of Uganda
Several media organisations in African countries are affected by the limited freedom of the press within the emerging democracies, whereas in most Western countries the high levels of democracy support press freedom and the other way around. However, there are certain countries that tend to have relatively high levels of press freedom within a limited democracy. How do these cases fit in the general theory where media freedom is strongly associated with democracy? Uganda is such a deviant case to the theory. The graphic below shows the Freedom House scores of 2019 on political rights, measured in electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and functioning of the government against the freedom of expression and belief in Uganda. The graphic shows all countries in Eastern Africa with Uganda standing out as it has higher press freedom than expected. It is classified as one of the lowest 10 countries in measuring political rights, with a score of 11 out of 40, and fourth highest East African country when it comes to freedom of expression and belief with a score of 10 out of 16 (FH, 2019).
In 1986, Yoweri Museveni and his party, the National Resistance Movement (NRM), came to power with an armed rebellion after a period of dictatorship and violent conflict, and have been in government since. Immediately Museveni implemented a no-party system in order to rule out the possibility of dangerous political divisions rooted in ethnic differences (Kasfir, 1998). The no-party system meant that candidates could only ran solely for president, without the support of a party behind them. This system made it difficult for Museveni’s opponents to compete in the following elections (Izama and Wilkerson, 2011). In 2006 the first elections in
Other East African Countries
10 a multiparty system were held, nevertheless the elections had other beneficial conditions in order for Museveni to win. His major opponent Besigye was arrested and in detention the year before the general elections (Izama and Wilkerson, 2011). The 2011 elections were marked by the third re-election for Museveni due to him “(…) effectively using a flood of state resources to float himself in yet another term as president” (Izama and Wilkerson, p. 64, 2011). Museveni is known to bribe local leaders and supporters with money or promising futures in order to mobilize voters (Izama & Wilkerson, 2011). In short, the Ugandan democracy has some severe flaws when it comes to free and fair elections, as well as the common practices of corruption and political repression (EIU, 2019; FH, 2019)
The media freedom in Uganda is nevertheless relatively high (FH, 2019), even though there is plenty of room for improvement in the degree of media freedom in Uganda. Journalists and reporters are still being harassed, intimidated and (in)directly censored by the ruling government (Human Rights Watch, 2010; African Media Barometer, 2016; Nassanga & Tayeebwa, 2018). Despite these limitations the media is critical of the government, therefore a score of two was given to Uganda in the Freedom House report (2019). Mwesige (2004), a Ugandan journalist, interviewed over 100 other journalists on their point of view towards freedom in the media. One of the conclusions of the research was that Ugandan journalists evaluated themselves as enjoying a modest amount of professional autonomy and freedom. The average score of the respondents was six, on a scale of 0 meaning ‘no press freedom’ to 10 meaning ‘absolute freedom’. This implies that the press freedom in Uganda remains fragile, but journalists are able to address more topics compared to other African countries (Mwesige, 2004). This is supported with the score on freedom of expression of two out of four (FH, 2019).
The level of democracy is thus not parallel to the level of press freedom in Uganda, which is relatively restricted in terms of civil liberties but partly free in terms of press freedom (FH, 2019). The inconsistency between the role of the press in Uganda and its stage of democratisation compared to the general theory will be the focal point of the research. This could be due to the way in which the media organisations operate in practice. Is the press indeed independent and critical of the Museveni government, or still controlled by the state and its resources? In this research I aim to find out if the Ugandan press is able to criticize the current government with the following question: to what extent is the Ugandan press critical towards its current government under President Museveni? To address this broad question, I will specifically conduct a case study of the representation of Bobi Wine in Ugandan newspapers.
11 3. Methodological framework
3.1. Case study selection
To answer the research question; To what extent is the Ugandan press critical towards its current government under President Museveni? I will focus on the case of Robert Kyagulanyi, or more commonly known as popstar Bobi Wine. He became popular in Uganda with his music, in which he often questioned the status quo with lyrics on political and social issues. The ‘people power’ movement consists of Bobi Wine’s supporters who also demand a change of Museveni’s 34-year rule. In the beginning of 2017 Bobi Wine started to engage in the political sphere when he announced his independent candidacy as Member of Parliament (MP) for the Kyaddondo East constituency, near the Ugandan capital Kampala. He won the majority of the votes, leaving his rivalry candidates from the NRM and Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) behind. Kyagulanyi is seen as the figurehead of the new generation, mostly of people under 35 years old, who grew up under Museveni and now want a change of government.
Robert Kyagulanyi, or Bobi Wine, was repeatedly arrested since he entered parliament in 2017. In April 2018 he was accused and charged with unlawful possession of firearms and violent rebellion. However, after several weeks he was released from military prison as the story did not add up and he was handed over to the police who held him in civil prison. Only after pressure from activist groups, civil society organisations, a diplomatic mission and international attention, the popstar was released on bail. In September 2018 Bobi Wine fled to the United States for medical treatment as he was allegedly tortured by Ugandan security forces in detention. In September 2018 he flew back to Uganda to continue his campaign with the ‘people power’ movement.
In April 2019 he was again arrested and charged over his role in an illegal public assembly against the social media tax implemented by the government in July 2018. This time, Amnesty International intervened and demanded to release Robert Kyagulanyi: “The Ugandan Authorities must immediately free Bobi Wine and stop misusing the law in a shameless attempt to silence him for criticizing the government.” (Amnesty International, 30 April 2019). As it is not a crime to hold a concert or organise a protest, but it is rather a right enshrined in the Ugandan and international law that the government must protect. In July 2019 Bobi Wine officially announced that he would run against Museveni for president in the 2021 national elections. Very recently, in January 2020 Kyagulanyi was arrested again when he tried to hold a consultation meeting for his 2021 presidential bid, as Ugandan authorities blocked all political
12 meetings and arrested opposition figures and journalists. Next to the charges against him, his scheduled performances were cancelled last year and some of his critical songs on the government have been banned in the past. Bobi Wine is seen as Uganda’s most high-profile opposition member and his arrests caused political unrest and demonstrations throughout the country.
The position of Bobi Wine as Uganda’s most prominent and influential opposition member, attracting international attention and causing upheavals through the country, makes it an interesting case to research the representation of the opposition in the media. Due to the recent developments around Bobi Wine and his bid for presidency, it is also a highly contemporary case. As the freedom in the press is supposedly above average in Uganda compared to other East African countries, while the democracy is limited, to what degree is the press actually able to criticize the Museveni government? The contradictory relationship between freedom of expression in the media and level of democracy in Uganda will be analysed through the most high-profile leader of the opposition: Robert Kyagulanyi. The case study on the objective representation of the opposition, led by Bobi Wine, will show if the freedom of expression is brought into practice in the hybrid democratic state of Uganda.
3.2 Media analysis
Examining the extent of criticism in the media towards the current NRM government and the attitude towards the opposition, will be the focal point of this research. A comparative case study will be conducted between two Ugandan newspapers, as newspapers are an influential medium of the press and accessible for research in clear and transparent online archives, in comparison to online, television or radio platforms. The two newspapers that will be used in a comparative analysis have different political backgrounds. The New Vision is a state-owned newspaper and has the largest share in the nation. The second largest is The Daily Monitor, an independent newspaper that tends to share the perspective of the opposition. The diversification between the two biggest newspapers sometimes leads to entirely different articles and diverging aspects highlighted by the reporters. These two newspapers will be used as data for the research, as they offer different insights in the representation of Bobi Wine and his opposition movement against the Museveni government. Additionally, the New Vision and the Daily Monitor are both written in English and thus able to access the biggest part of the population.
The first appearance of Bobi Wine in the New Vision was in October 2013 and in the Daily Monitor in December 2002. However, at that time he was mostly mentioned for his music. Therefore, the time period from the point he returned from his medical treatment in the United
13 States in September 2018, up until the relevant articles in the beginning of March 2020 will be researched, when Bobi Wine became more of a political figure than an artist. This time period might seem short, but offers almost 100 articles in each newspaper that include the relevant search terms. It also shows the vision on the opposition in the upcoming elections of 2021 of the independent newspaper versus the state-affiliated one.
The New Vision articles were selected in the described time period with the combination of the terms ‘Bobi Wine’ or ‘[Robert] Kyagulanyi’, with either ‘opposition’, ‘[Yoweri] Museveni’, ‘President’, ‘people power’ or ‘elections’, while the Daily Monitor offered enough articles in the same time period to select on all terms; ‘Bobi Wine’ or ‘[Robert] Kyagulanyi’, ‘opposition’, ‘[Yoweri] Museveni’ or ‘President’, ‘people power’ and ‘elections’. This is by itself already interesting data, as the independent newspaper offers more articles on the opposition and its race against the current government than the New Vision. In total 190 articles are used for the research, coming from both newspapers in the same period of time, September 2018 to March 2020, with the same general subjects. The complete list of articles can be found in appendix A.
By using primary data a content analysis will be conducted in order to perform a comparative case study between the two tabloids. I make use of both quantitative and qualitative methods. For the quantitative part I coded four bivariate variables to analyse the 190 articles in the two newspapers. The first variable focuses on the number of articles that contained quotes by Bobi Wine. The second variable shows the number of articles that quoted the government. The quotes will show for each newspaper the dedication to cite either Bobi Wine or the government, and thus how truthfully they cover the exact words of the political characters. Citing the original author or speaker in an article shows objectivity of the newspaper, as it does not alter the words to influence a message (Corden & Sainsbury, 2006). The usage of quotes is considered to contribute to the trustworthiness. The third variable presents the overall support for the government in each article. Lastly, the fourth variable shows the overall support against the government in the articles. More concrete, the stories that spread a clear positive message on the government were coded positive, while any article that included information questioning or criticizing the government, or did not have a clear opinion was coded neutral in the third variable. The same logic applied to the fourth variable where the articles that were clearly against the government were coded positive, and the neutral or supporting articles were coded as zero. If the newspaper is independent and indeed objective it will show at minimum a balance between support and criticism, preferably leaning more towards a critical perspective on the government, as the media is supposedly the watchdog of the state (Curran, p. 48, 2011).
14 For the qualitative part of this research, I will analyse the context of the quotes as well as the sentences that indicate a strong support for or against the government. The framing of the quotes within the articles will be the focal point of the qualitative content analysis, as it shows the perspective that the author is aiming to emphasize, and often the point of view of the newspaper (Ette, p. 179, 2018). The amount and length of attention to the opposition or the government will also present a tendency of the newspaper to either side. The articles will be looked at in more detail through the qualitative research in order to examine the overall content and in what light the articles are written, as the numbers do not tell the whole story.
15 4. Empirical Findings
4.1 Quotations Bobi Wine
To examine the role of the different newspapers in the representation of the opposition, I will first have a look at the quantitative data. Four bivariate variables were created to measure the criticism on the government. The first variable showed, for each of the articles in both the Daily Monitor and the New Vision, if it contained a quote from Bobi Wine. The quote indicates if the newspaper is able to show the direct view of the opposition. In the Daily Monitor, 24% of the random sample included one or more quotes of Bobi Wine, respectively to 13,3% of the articles by the New Vision. To see if this is a significant difference, a chi-square test was performed. As shown in table 1, the variable measuring the quotes of Bobi Wine was found not to be significantly different between the Daily Monitor and the New Vision, χ² (1, n = 190) = 3.51, p > .050. This means that the number of articles that included quotations by Bobi Wine in the Daily Monitor is not significantly different from the number of articles with quotations of Bobi Wine in the New Vision. There appears to be no association between the newspapers and representation of Bobi Wine.
Table 1. Cross tabulation of Bobi Wine quotes with newspaper
Newspaper
Daily Monitor New Vision Total
Quotes Bobi Wine 0 79 78 154
1 24 12 36
Total 100 90 190
Pearson’s chi-square (df=1)
3.51
Note: 0 cells have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 17.05 * p < .050 ** p < .010 *** p < .001
The minor difference in the representation through quotes in both newspapers will now be qualitatively analysed. Even though, the difference in number of quotations might be minor in the quantitative analysis, the qualitative analysis will tell us more about the context and what kind of quotes are used.
In an article of the Daily Monitor Bobi Wine calls upon the population to “put an end to Museveni’s rule in the 2021 election” and claims that “We have the power to remove the tyrant but we want to do it in a constitutional and civilized way through election, so we call upon all
16 Ugandans to get their National Identification [ID] cards come 2021 so that we kick Museveni out of power." (Ocungi, 11 January 2019). With this article the Daily Monitor gives room to a call on the population not to vote for Museveni in the 2021 elections. The Daily Monitor publishes in another article a complete statement by Bobi Wine on how he will end Museveni’s rule (Monitor reporter, 12 April 2019). Within this statement an open contemplation on the NRM government and warning for the population is made: “We are even aware of plans by Museveni and his regime to amend laws so as to block our participation in the next election.”. Another article presents the direct response from Bobi Wine on a letter from Museveni:
Just to remind you of what you did during the 2016 election- you deployed the military on the streets, delivered polling materials many hours later in Kampala and Wakiso, switched off social media and mobile money, arrested agents for opposition candidates, impoverished opposition candidates while blocking their sources of funding, blocked their campaign rallies, beat up our people, manipulated the voting system, and literally declared yourself duly elected! Is this democracy to you? (Wandera, 7 May 2019)
The fact that the Daily Monitor publishes various accusations and critiques directly from the opposition towards the current government, shows that they have a certain amount of freedom of expression and are able to represent the view of the opposition, even ahead of the 2021 election period.
The New Vision also reports in several articles quotes by Bobi Wine. One contained the following quote from Bobi Wine: “I will stand for president in 2021” (Tumusiime, 18 March 2019). However, the title and the subtitle of the article are respectively “Yes, Museveni will comfortably win 2021 elections” and “On the contrary, President Museveni is going to gain more votes than 2016 and even the youth who are the majority are going to vote for him”. Thus, even though the article included a quote from Bobi Wine, the opposition and its perspective on the 2021 elections is not being represented, rather it is being called into question. This was a pattern in multiple articles from the New Vision, that even though they cited Bobi Wine, it was not supporting the view of the opposition (Buregyeya, 20 May 2019; Kashaka, 30 July 2019).
4.2 Quotations NRM government
The same research that was conducted in the previous section was performed on quotes from the current government in the two newspapers. In the Daily Monitor 22% of the sample included quotes from the government, respectively to 21,1% of the articles in the New Vision. A second chi-square test was performed to determine whether the number of quotes by the NRM government differed between the articles of the Daily Monitor and the New Vision. The
17 variable measuring the quotes of the current government was found not to be significantly different between the Daily Monitor and the New Vision, χ² (1, n = 190) = .02, p > .050 as shown in table 2. The same quantitative conclusion thus applies to the number of articles that included quotations by the government in the Daily Monitor that is not significantly different from the number of articles with quotations of the government in the New Vision.
Table 2. Cross tabulation of government quotes with newspaper
Newspaper
Daily Monitor New Vision Total
Quotes Government 0 78 71 149 1 22 19 41 Total 100 90 190 Pearson’s chi-square (df=1) .02
Note: 0 cells have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 17.05 * p < .050 ** p < .010 *** p < .001
The qualitative findings show a more in-depth analysis of the content of the quotes mentioned by the newspapers. In a Daily Monitor article, the government responds to British critiques on the state of democracy in Uganda (Kabengwa & Musisi, 7 January 2019). Both speakers that support or criticize the current democracy are being quoted, showing that the Daily Monitor presents both statements to the population. Another article writes about the reaction of Museveni to the presidential bid of Bobi Wine in the 2021 elections. Among other things, he says “Opposition are murderers. (…)” (Bagala, 15 March 2019). Nevertheless, this statement is followed up by the author with: “However, the courts of law reserves the statutory authority of declaring people ‘murderers’. Bobi Wine has been advocating for non-violent protest and leads what his supports calls a peaceful resistance under “People Power, Our Power”, arguing with the Presidents quote. The presence of a quote by the government is thus not representing the approach of the article. Also in another article that includes several government quotes, but under the topic of members from the NRM that have defected to the opposition ‘people power’ pressure group (Omollo, 15 August 2019).
The New Vision on the contrary publishes complete statements of Museveni, in which he openly criticizes the opposition (Governance, 5 May 2019). In another article, Museveni tells the press “Mr Bobi Wine went to America and said that people should not come and invest in
18 Uganda. That means he’s an enemy of progress in Uganda.” (Lumu, 21 October 2019). The rest of the article does not reject nor criticize the various statements made by Museveni. This is also the case in an article where the NRM government comments on the ‘people power’ wave: “Populist politics does not dwell on issues, but rather plays into people’s hopes and fears for the future in the same way religion (pastors) does,” (Mayanja, 5 November 2019). In the New Vision, the quotes from the government indeed support the view in favour of the NRM, to the contrary of the Daily Monitor in which the quotes from the government do not necessarily support the current regime, looking at the broader context.
4.3 Strong support for the government
To examine to what extent the different newspapers are able to criticize the government a third and fourth variable were constructed, measuring strong support in favour of the government or strong support against the government. The third binary variable showed support for the NRM government in 7% of the Daily Monitor articles, while 18.9% of the New Vision articles showed a strong support in favour. A third chi-square test was performed to determine whether the variable that indicated strong support for the NRM government differed between the Daily Monitor and the New Vision. Strong support in favour of the current government was found to be statistically different between the Daily Monitor and the New Vision, χ² (1, n = 190) = 4.92, p < .050. The chi-square test in table 3 indicates a significant association between strong support for the government and the newspapers.
Table 3. Cross tabulation of support for the government with newspaper
Newspaper
Daily Monitor New Vision Total
Government support 0 92 73 165 1 8 17 25 Total 100 90 190 Pearson’s chi-square (df=1) 4.92*
Note: 0 cells have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 17.05 * p < .050 ** p < .010 *** p < .001
Looking into the content of the articles that showed a strong support for the ruling government, the Daily Monitor had few articles with clear and strong arguments supporting the government. One of those articles contained a warning for students not to embrace the ‘people’s power’
19 movement: “Ms Cherukut said the students should instead fully support President Museveni, a tested and visionary leader, who has presided over Uganda’s economic growth and development since 1986.” (Wambede, 8 April 2019). This article is clearly in favour of the current government, calling upon the youth not to vote for Bobi Wine. As another article writes about the initiative of President Museveni to fund certain groups: “The ruling party has intensified their campaign among the youth since Kyaddondo East legislator Robert Kyagulanyi, alias Bobi Wine, who has a big following among the young, declared that he would stand for president in 2021.” (Bagala, 9 September 2019). Despite this article not being as clear as the former that was in favour of the current government, it does not criticize its actions either. Rather, this article gives positive attention to the “good deeds” of Museveni, which makes it more of a supporting article.
Conversely, the New Vision makes some clear statements in support for the NRM government with several opinion pieces, all praising Museveni and his policy. For example, one by Hudu Hussein: “Museveni has demonstrated his heart for this nation and it would be unfair to underestimate his voluminous achievements in exchange of visionless political excitements.” in which he also mentions Bobi Wine as “political cry baby” (5 October, 2018). The New Vision placed another article by the same author, in which he asks for support from the population to keep Museveni in power: “(…) we are blessed that our President has both experience and ideology and we should wake up and take advantage of his presence as we strive to keep him still with us.” (Hussein, 22 August 2019). Other opinion leaders are filling up 23,3% of the sample of articles in the New Vision with a strong support for the NRM government. Moreover, various news sections of the newspaper are filled with headlines such as “The ‘People Power’ hullabaloo”, “Making sense of Bobi Wine (…)”, “Museveni is a gift from God” and “Yes, President Museveni rescued Uganda from total collapse” (Hussein, 5 October 2018; Kashaka, 30 July 2019; Mulondo, 31 October 2019).
4.4 Strong support against the government
The final bivariate variable measured a strong support against the NRM government and leaning towards the opposition. Within the Daily Monitor sample, 37% of the articles supported the opposition rather than the government, while 7,8% of the New Vision articles had that same angle. A final chi-square test was performed to determine whether the variable that indicated strong support against the NRM government differed between the Daily Monitor and the New Vision. Strong support against the current government was also found to be significantly different between the Daily Monitor and the New Vision, χ² (1, n = 190) = 23.73, p < .001. This
20 means that the number of articles from the Daily Monitor that have a strong support against the government is statistically different from the number of articles of the New Vision that tend to have a strong support against the government, as visible in table 4.
Table 4. Cross tabulation of support against the government with newspaper
Newspaper
Daily Monitor New Vision Total
Support against Government 0 63 83 146 1 37 7 44 Total 100 90 190 Pearson’s chi-square (df=1) 22.73***
Note: 0 cells have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 17.05 * p < .050 ** p < .010 *** p < .001
In the Daily Monitor, strong support against the government is found in several articles, sometimes implicitly, but more often quite explicit. For example, articles that criticize the government on the repression and harassment of the opposition or articles that openly describe the electoral process as corrupt (Mugabe, 30 September 2018; Kahungu, 28 July 2019). Another article compares the years 1981 to 1986 of Museveni to the years 2018 to 2021 of Bobi Wine, emphasizing the corruption, harassments and violent overthrow of the status quo by Museveni, compared to the peaceful electoral reform of Bobi Wine (Tacca, 27 October 2019). The Daily Monitor also offers more space for interviews with members of the opposition compared to the New Vision, respectively 5 to 1 articles of the complete random sample.
One article in the New Vision that openly questioned the NRM government was also criticizing the ‘people power’ movement under Bobi Wine: “People Power thrives on the resounding rhetoric for a change, but either lacks leadership beyond the change of guard or is an ill organised katogo of Anti-Museveni sentiments.” (Muhwezi, 8 November 2018). The New Vision also published the critique on the NRM government made by the United States on the 2019 arrest of Bobi Wine (Masaba, 23 April 2019). The few articles that doubt the current regime are mostly critical of the fairness in elections or also question the other alternative, the opposition (Muhwezi, 8 November 2018; Namanya, 14 January 2020). The trend that can be found in the New Vision articles that do not support the current government, is that they criticize
21 Ugandan politics as a whole or do not support the opposition either. Within the New Vision sample there were only two articles that openly supported the opposition while questioning the NRM government (Mbabazi & Emorut, 9 January 2020; Ramadhan, 20 February 2020). Both articles also call for a balanced political ground in the run towards the elections.
22 5. Conclusion
5.1 Conclusions Research
The general theory between media and democracy argues that freedom of the press enhances democratisation and vice versa (Curran, 2011; Whitten-Woodring, 2010; Hallin & Mancini, 2004; Keane, 2013). However, as we have seen throughout the literature, this trend is more complex in Sub-Saharan Africa, as the abilities for freedom and rights are restrained compared to Western countries (Berger, 1998; Kupe, 2004; Iazzolino & Stremlau, 2017). Nevertheless, if there is freedom of the press in an African country, the country will most likely have a higher degree of freedom (Schoemaker & Stremlau, 2014). Uganda is a deviant case as it has a relatively high Freedom House score on freedom of expression, but scores below average on political rights (FH, 2019). In this research I aimed to find out whether the Freedom House scores on freedom of expression were valid, and Uganda is indeed an exception to the rule. In order to research if the media is able to criticize the government, a case study on the representation of opposition leader Robert Kyagulanyi or Bobi Wine in two influential Ugandan newspapers was conducted.
The two newspapers have vastly different backgrounds as the New Vision is a state-owned newspaper, while the Daily Monitor is an independent news source. Within a sample of 190 articles, four indicators were constructed to measure the representation of Bobi Wine. First, the number of articles that contained one or more quotes from the opposition leader. Second, the number of articles that included one or more quotes from the NRM government in both newspapers. Third, if the article contained strong support in favour of the government and fourth, strong support against the government. The articles were analysed through a qualitative and quantitative content analysis.
In the quantitative analysis, there was no significant relationship found between the quotes from either Bobi Wine or the government towards the newspapers, as there was little difference in the number of quotes cited between the two newspapers. The qualitative content analysis showed that quotes do not always support the view of the speaker but can also be used to refute a perspective. However, the qualitative content analyses pointed out that the Daily Monitor was more likely to defend the opposition with the help of quotes by either the government or Bobi Wine. In these cases, the quotes were used as evidence of speech, and highlighted in the newspaper to prove a point, mostly benefitting the opposition. The New Vision made use of quotes in the same way, however supporting the government. From these indicators we can conclude that quotes do not necessarily support the view of the person being cited. In both
23 newspapers, quotes were used as a defence mechanism mainly supporting the newspapers individual perspective, refuting the arguments made by the speaker.
The third variable, strong support for the government did have a significant relationship with the newspapers. Only 7% of the Daily Monitor articles had a strong support in favour of the government, while almost 19% of the New Vision articles clearly support Museveni. This was also visible in the number of opinion pieces praising Museveni, which were commonly found in the New Vision. The fourth variable, strong support against the NRM government, also found a strong significance with the newspapers. In 37% of the Daily Monitor articles compared to less than 8% of the New Vision articles, strong support against the government was indicated. However, the few New Vision articles that criticized the government, were also critical of the whole democratic state of Uganda.
From the four variables above, we can conclude that the Daily Monitor is indeed able to criticize the NRM government and openly support the opposition led by Bobi Wine. The New Vision, as a state-owned newspaper, to a lesser extent as the quotes by Bobi Wine in their articles are mostly used to counter the opposition’s arguments. Moreover, the support in favour of the government is significantly higher in the New Vision, while the support against President Museveni is significantly lower. The same logic is applicable to the Daily Monitor as they have significantly less support in favour of the current President. Both newspapers are to a certain degree able to criticize the current government, although the state-affiliated New Vision to a lesser extent than the independent Daily Monitor. They are thus both able to exercise a certain amount of press freedom as the government is not completely censoring their criticism, as one would expect of a government in a country that is labelled as ‘not free’. This finding indicates that the mismatch in the relation between media freedom and democracy in Uganda cannot be attributed to uncritical media reporting.
The research confirms the relatively high degree of press freedom the media in Uganda enjoys, even though they live under a non-democratic regime. Which does not fit into the general theory where media and democracy enhance and complement each other. Uganda proves that freedom of the press is able to exist independently from democracy.
5.2 Implications
It is important to research the source of the contradictory case of Uganda, why does this country differ from the others within the general trend of media and democracy? The paradox case of Uganda within the general theory cannot be attributed to the media, as the newspapers are in
24 effect able to criticize the NRM government. Perhaps the government turns a blind eye towards the critical newspapers in their regime as they know that most people do not read the newspapers these days. The most recent data from the Afrobarometer in Uganda shows that 75% of the NRM supporters never receive the news from the newspaper, compared to 57% of the opposition (Afrobarometer Uganda Round 6, 2015). This could explain the policy of the NRM government in keeping the standards of the freedom of the press high, as they know the critical articles do not affect the small number of voters that actually read the newspapers. It is important to keep this in mind when accrediting the freedom of the media and its actual influence. Setting this aside, within the general theory there could be other factors than media that constrain the democratic level, which would explain the discrepancy between media and democracy. A follow-up research on the trend between media and democracy in Uganda could take a closer look at the actual level of democracy and explanatory factors for the paradox of Uganda within political rights. Lastly, this research has hopefully contributed to the debate on the relationship between media and democracy and proved that the general theory does not always hold up. Freedom of expression and media is not always dependent on the democratic state, as in the case of Uganda
5.3 Discussion
I would like to offer a few suggestions, possibly for further research or to improve this research. First, one could include the quotes from the whole opposition or the ‘people power’ movement instead of only from Bobi Wine. This would make the data more viable, as the quotes from the government were also collectively gathered instead of just from Museveni. Furthermore, it would be interesting to see how Robert Kyagulanyi is presented in each newspaper, under his stage name as popstar Bobi Wine or the way in which he is presented on the voting ballot, as Robert Kyagulanyi. A significant difference in this variable would show how serious the newspaper is about his efforts to run for president in the name of Robert Kyagulanyi, or if they still see him as popstar with a political edge, Bobi Wine. Further shortcomings of the research are the number of articles and newspapers researched, whereby one should be cautious to draw generalizations from the observations that emerged from the analysis. It would also be interesting to analyse and compare different media platforms, such as radio, television and social media, to see if different media platforms creates a difference in the results. Nevertheless, the findings suggest a general trend in the Ugandan newspapers that provide some new insights in the freedom of expression.
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29 Appendices
A Newspaper articles quantitative & qualitative analysis
Newspaper Date Article Name Reporter
Daily Monitor 13-9-2018 The pop star vs the president:
Uganda's generational fight
AFP
Daily Monitor 17-9-2018 How Bobi Wine's trumpet charmed
disillusioned masses
Gillian Nantume
Daily Monitor 19-9-2018 Let's say no to political brutality Major Meaud
Majwala
Daily Monitor 25-9-2018 I'm not eyeing presidency for now -
Bobi Wine
Amos Ngwomoya
Daily Monitor 26-9-2018 Full Statement: Gen Muntu explains
why he quit FDC
Monitor reporter
Daily Monitor 27-9-2019 Politics, cash divides artistes Isaac Ssejjombwe
Daily Monitor 30-9-2018 Muntu's move: Death or FDC or a
stronger Opposition?
Timothy Kalyegira
Daily Monitor 30-9-2018 How opposition MPs have been
tortured since Independence
Faustin Mugabe
Daily Monitor 30-9-2018 I'm against defiance, says Gen
Muntu
Jacobs Odongo Seaman
Daily Monitor 6-10-2018 Youth leaders taking Africa by storm
Daily Monitor 7-10-2018 The Junta has two plans: Kill
opponents and incite state of insecurity
Misairi Thembo Kahungu
Daily Monitor 30-10-2018 New Formation: Is Opposition
rebranding the same product
Nicolas Sengooba
Daily Monitor 11-11-2018 Bobi Wine performs at sold out
Kyarenga concert as police watch on
AFP
Daily Monitor 17-11-2018 Crisis rocks plan for national
dialogue
Eriasa Mukiibi Sserunjogi
Daily Monitor 18-11-2018 Political movements and their impact
on Uganda
Henry Lubega
Daily Monitor 13-12-2018 I am not about to retire, says
Museveni
Misairi Thembo Kahungu
Daily Monitor 16-12-2018 Inside the playbooks of Museveni,
Besigye, Bobi
Eriasa Mukiibi Sserunjogi
Daily Monitor 16-12-2018 What happened on the political scene
in 2018
Joan Salmon
Daily Monitor 1-1-2019 2018; the year of thoughts about how
and who is to succees Museveni
Nicolas Sengooba
Daily Monitor 7-1-2019 British MPs to debate rule of law in
Uganda
James Kabengwa & Frederic Musisi
Daily Monitor 7-1-2019 My intention is to help give Ugandan
people a voice - British MP
Frederic Musisi
Daily Monitor 9-1-2019 British MP questions UK
involvement in Uganda's internal affairs
30
Daily Monitor 10-1-2019 British MPs want Ugandan govt
sanctioned
Frederic Musisi & James Kabengwa
Daily Monitor 11-1-2019 We shall put an end to Museveni's
rule in 2021 election, Bobi Wine
Julius Ocungi
Daily Monitor 27-1-2019 Africa's political dinosaurs need a
survival insurance plan
Allan Tacca
Daily Monitor 29-1-2019 Most civil servants support
Opposition - Mukula
Fred Wambede
Daily Monitor 6-2-2019 Opposition moot plan for joint
candidates in 2021
Tausi Nakato & Misairi Thembo Kahungu
Daily Monitor 17-2-2019 Inside Besigye's secret operations Eriasa Mukiibi
Sserunjogi
Daily Monitor 24-2-2019 Opposition begin talk ahead of 2021
polls
The EastAfrican
Daily Monitor 10-3-2019 Bobi Wine for president in 2021:
What are his chances?
Timothy Kalyegira
Daily Monitor 10-3-2019 Bobi Wine calls for unity among
Opposition groups
Barbra Nalweyiso
Daily Monitor 15-3-2019 Museveni scoffs at Bobi Wine Andrew Bagala
Daily Monitor 17-3-2019 Why Museveni is rallying NRM
early
Misairi Thembo Kahungu & Isaac Mufumba
Daily Monitor 24-3-2019 First the ghettos, then university
halls: Is it time to notice People Power?
Timothy Kalyegira
Daily Monitor 1-4-2019 Third People Power candidate wins
universtiy guild presidency
Eve Muganga
Daily Monitor 6-4-2019 Opposition camp: Rest vs Besigye Stephen Kafeero
Daily Monitor 8-4-2019 RDC warns students on People
Power
Fred Wambede
Daily Monitor 8-4-2019 I will keep fighting to reclaim my
2016 victory, says Besigye
Felix Ainebyoona
Daily Monitor 9-4-2019 We will not ally with weak people,
says FDC
Derrick Wandera
Daily Monitor 12-4-2019 What is Opposition's game plan for
Busoga ahead of 2021 polls
Philip Wafula
Daily Monitor 12-4-2019 Bobi Wine explains plan to end
Museveni's three decade rule
Monitor reporter
Daily Monitor 14-4-2019 Uganda electoral reforms delay,
divided opposition could fuel voter apathy
The EastAfrican
Daily Monitor 24-4-2019 Besigye, Bobi, and Uganda in 2021:
What Museveni fears - and doesn't
Charles Onyango-obbo
Daily Monitor 27-4-2019 Government scoffs at Bobi Wine
over Trump petition
James Kabengwa
Daily Monitor 4-5-2019 Besigye, Bobi Wine, Lukwago
discuss joint candidate ahead of 2021 polls
