Contested Statehood and its Impact on the European Union Member State Building in the Western Balkans: Insights from Kosovo and Bosnia

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Master’s Thesis on:

Contested Statehood and its Impact on the

European Union Member State Building in the

Western Balkans: Insights from Kosovo and

Bosnia

Hristiyana Stoyanova

Thesis presented for the Master’s degree in Political

Science: European Politics and External Relations

Student ID: 11707364

Supervisor: Dr. Dimitris Bouris

Second Reader: Prof. Dr. Marieke de Goede

(June 2018)

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Acknowledgements

The encouragement, determination and consistency in writing this thesis is thanks to my supervisor, my proof-readers and all other inspirers. I would like to thank them for their support and constructive criticism in making this contested political journey an enjoyable experience. Finally, I would like to thank Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina for being such interesting and fruitful case studies.

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Key Words:

Contested Statehood; EU Member State Building; Western Balkans; Kosovo;

Bosnia and Herzegovina;

Word Count (pure text):

22, 979

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Table of Abbreviations

BiH – Bosnia and Herzegovina

CFSP - Common Foreign and Security Policy CSDP - Common Security and Defence Policy

DG NEAR - Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations DPA – Dayton Peace Agreement

EAR – European Agency of Reconstruction EEAS – European External Action Service ENP – European Neighbourhood Policy ESI – European Stability Initiative ESS – European Security Strategy EU – European Union

EUMM – European Union Monitoring Mission EUPM – European Union Police Mission

EUSR – European Union Special Representative FBiH – Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina FRY – Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

ICB – International Commission on the Balkans ICJ – International Court of Justice

ICTY – International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia IPA – Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance

KTA – Kosovo Trust Agency

MCRDS – Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States OHR – Office of the High Representative

OSCE – Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe PIC – Peace Implementation Council

RoL – Rule of Law RS – Republika Srpska

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iv SAP - Stabilisation and Association Process

SATM – Stabilisation and Association Tracking Mechanism SRSG – Special Representative of the Secretary-General SSR – Security Sector Reform

TEU – Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union UN – United Nations

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Abstract

This thesis engages with the idea of contested statehood and its impact on European Union’s (EU) member state-building initiatives in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH).

The author provides an academic insight through an operationalisation of different concepts, such as ‘contested statehood’ and ‘EU member state-building’, which are theoretically analysed and applied in the context of two empirical EU member state-building initiatives – the Rule of Law mission EULEX Kosovo and the security sector Police Reform in BiH. This thesis will formulate a research question and set up a hypothesis that aims to close the research gap, dealing with the effects of contested states on EU member state-building. The findings of the research show that this effect is not easily operationalised and it fluctuates due to different levels of contestation. In other words, the EU’s involvement in Kosovo and in BiH is constrained by the existence of contestation, which results in following an inconsistent approach, avoidance of taking political decisions and development of new EU policies.

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Introduction

“The Balkans produce more history than they can consume” (Winston Churchill).

The Balkan region is an important geopolitical area in Southeast Europe and a strategic location for the external politics of the EU. With the pace of political and historical developments in this region, it is appropriately to conclude that the statement by Churchill is still relevant today in understanding politics in the Balkans.

The Balkans, and the Western Balkans in particular, provide some of the most interesting and controversial case studies, capturing the attention of political scholars worldwide. The region has always been intrinsically related and connected to the EU and this year the latter re-acknowledged that the region remains a top priority for the EU politics of enlargement – a membership to the EU.

The EU politics of enlargement requires states to share part of their sovereignty to a higher authority – the EU. The paradox is that to transfer and share parts of sovereignty, it is necessary to first become a sovereign state (Woelk 2013: 472). In the Western Balkans region, certain states experience issues with sovereignty and this is considered a major obstacle for the region to progress towards EU accession.

When states lack sovereignty, or are unable to exercise it on external or on internal level, they are called contested. Contested states are important subject to the process of international state-building, which focuses on constructing legitimate and sustainable state structures that can maintain sovereignty (Paris and Sisk 2009: 2). Contested states are also considered one of the main threats for EU security and the EU involves in them to build state structures that can maintain sovereignty, a process known as EU state-building.

The collapse of Yugoslavia in the 1990s led to the emergence of many contested states in the Western Balkans. As opposed to other regions, in the Western Balkans the EU involves not just to build state structures that can maintain sovereignty, but state structures that can maintain and then pool sovereignty back to the EU through the process of EU accession. This initiative turns the concept of EU state-building into a process of EU member state-building, in which the intention is that those states will eventually become member states of the EU.

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This thesis focuses on two contested and potential candidate member states in the Western Balkans - Kosovo and BiH. Both states experience issues with sovereignty and this is considered a major obstacle to their EU accession.

The EU is unable to generate a comprehensive approach in dealing with such states, because they have different impacts on EU member state-building - they can create opportunities for this process, but they can also obstruct it. Therefore, it is important to examine the impact of contestation of both states on the EU member state-building capacity, in order to define the issues that need to be addressed and the actions that need to be taken by the EU, to facilitate both states’ progress towards EU membership.

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Chapter 1: Methodology

1.1 Methodological Approach and Data Collection

This thesis applies qualitative research methods, accompanied with case studies.

The nature of the research suggests that qualitative content analysis is the most suitable epistemological approach to examine conceptual terms, concepts and ideas and then analyse those in the context of empirical case studies. A quantitative research analysis would not provide answers to the open-ended research questions.

Furthermore, the methodology of this research involves interviews and personal interactions with policy officers and a Head of Division from the European External Action Service (EEAS) and Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR) (a domain of the Commission of the European Union).

Several interviews/personal interactions have been conducted during a university field trip in Brussels in April 2018. For ethical considerations, they will be referenced anonymously in the following order: Head of Division of Western Balkans of the EEAS (Commission Official); Policy Coordinator of the EU Commission (Policy Coordinator); Policy Officer from Kosovo Desk of DG NEAR (Policy Officer 1); Policy Officer from BiH Desk of DG NEAR (Policy Officer 2); Policy Officer from Serbia Desk of DG NEAR (Policy Officer 3); Policy Officer previously working in BiH Desk of DG NEAR, now working in EEAS (Policy Officer 4). The interviews and personal interactions are open and semi-structured, allowing for explorative and elaborative answers. EU Policy Officers and the Head of Division were chosen as the most relevant interviewees, who have empirical knowledge on the nature of the issue. They are working on the files of both states and have practical experience with the EU mission EULEX-Kosovo and the Police Reform in BiH.

The scope of data collection is based on primary and secondary sources of literature. Primary sources of literature are used to incorporate main EU documents and instruments in the context of the case studies and the evolution of relations between the countries and the EU. These will include Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAAs), Progress Reports, Reviews, Commission publications, Council of the EU conclusions, as well as International Court of Justice’ decisions. Secondary sources of literature form the basis of the conceptual framework, explaining the evolution of concepts, the relationships between them and the scholarly debates

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that they ignite. Therefore, this thesis incorporates journal articles, books and scholars’ publications on the main concepts that this research is addressing: sovereignty, contested states and the evolution of EU member state-building. Secondary sources of information will feed the empirical discussion, by applying the conceptual knowledge that they provide.

1.2 Operationalisation of the Research

The conceptual framework of this paper starts by introducing the concepts of sovereignty and contested statehood. Sovereignty is the most important concept and requirement of statehood. When states lack sovereignty or experience issues with it, either on external or internal level, they are called contested and this is where the concept of sovereignty and contested statehood intertwine. Contested states form the basis of analysis of this thesis for several reasons. The Westphalian idea of nation-state system does not place enough emphasis on such states, because they do not fit in the conventional understanding of the state-system. They are considered “square pegs in a world of round holes” and they are the least appealing to researchers (Geldenhuys 2009: 1). Therefore, they have been under-conceptualised and their importance has been neglected in international politics.

Moreover, contested states are of importance in the context of the EU, because they are classified as one of the five main threats to EU security (European Council 2003). Currently, the EU is dealing with nine contested states both inside and outside its borders (Appendix II). However, there is a research gap on the interaction between contested states and the EU, thereby the EU does not have a defined approach to states that face issues of capacity and legitimacy. Therefore, the EU is placing them in the general framework of relations with other states, by applying the same model of interaction. However, this does not produce the same results, as the nature of contestation is an interesting category, which effects are undertheorized. Therefore, the importance, relevance and originality of examining the effects of the contested states, is the unique research gap and challenge of this thesis.

This thesis examines the effects of contestation on EU member state-building – an enlargement specific form of state-building, allowing to build state institutions, while integrating them to the EU (Keil and Arkan 2014: 16). This unit of analysis provides an excellent example of the combination of the two most widely applied policies at the EU’s disposal – state-building and enlargement, but at the same time it does not focus on neither of them. The concept of member

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state-building is a unique category, which goes beyond the literatures on state-building, enlargement, Europeanisation or EU integration.

On one hand, the concept is more ambitious than enlargement, but also more realistically attainable than just state-building. It does not merely focus on the technicalities that the enlargement process provides and it is more realistic than state-building, because it assumes accession at the end of the process. On the other hand, it allows more local ownership, legitimacy and examination of the relations between the contested potential candidate countries and the EU. This is not present in the approach of Europeanisation or EU integration – both ‘demanding and external processes of construction, diffusion and implementation of EU norms’, defined and driven by the latter in a top-down manner to the candidate member states (Radaelli 2000; Anastakis 2005).

Moreover, it considers the idea of sovereignty, by placing it at the centre of analysis, which is not present in the literature of Europeanisation, EU integration or state-building (Denti 2014: 24), except for some recent cases (Bouris and Kyris 2017; Papadimitriou and Petrov 2012; Kyris 2015). Finally, EU member state-building is interesting to examine, because it creates a paradox: When the EU builds states, it also builds sovereignty (sovereignty concentration); when the EU integrates candidate member states, the EU requires them to pool sovereignty back to the EU level (sovereignty diffusion) (Denti 2014: 10). The process of EU member state-building requires both processes to be present at the same time (sovereignty concentration and sovereignty diffusion), making it a unique, interesting and challenging case study on its own. Therefore, the interrelation between the concepts of sovereignty, contested statehood and EU member state-building is the authentic, original and unique approach that thesis undertakes. The relations between the aforementioned concepts will be introduced in the analytical framework of this paper, which will also introduce the operationalisation of the literature. Furthermore, the case studies chapter of this research will present the historical background of the chosen case studies and their relation to the EU. This thesis will examine the concept of contested statehood and EU member state-building in the context of Kosovo and BiH, both states are part of the Western Balkans.

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1.3 Case Studies – Selection and Justification

This thesis will focus on the case studies of Kosovo and BiH for several reasons. Both are considered potential candidate member states and are examples of EU member state-building initiatives, where the EU has been extensively involved and still far less influential in consolidating democracy and economic recovery in comparison to the other states in the Western Balkans (Papadimitriou et al. 2007: 227). Therefore, both states lag behind the process of EU integration. Emphasizing on the challenges of their slow integration is an important and relevant task of this thesis.

Both states are also considered contested, because they experience issues with their sovereignty, either on an external, or on an internal level. Kosovo is a unique case study, because it has experienced three rounds of contestation, starting from 1991 with the dissolution of Yugoslavia, through to 1999 with the strong international presence of the UN and in 2008, when Kosovo self-declared its independence (Geldenhuys 2009: 107). Currently, Kosovo lacks international recognition on an UN level and is not recognised by five-member states of the EU. Therefore, Kosovo is an entity that lacks external sovereignty.

BiH also emerged out of former Yugoslavia, which led to the development of three ethnic divisions with several layers of governance and legislatures. Although BiH is recognised on external level, the contested domestic situation of the state hinders the exercising of basic state functions. The ethnic divisions and the territorial fragmentation lead to the weakness of the state institutions and the ineffective state apparatus (Krasner 2004: 88). Therefore, BiH is an entity that lacks internal sovereignty.

Both states are also at the bottom of the accession process for the Western Balkans, because the presence of contestation reduces the EU’s leverage as a member state-builder. Moreover, they are an example of specific EU member state-building initiatives, representing the EU’s foreign policy in the region in par excellence – establishing the Rule of Law (RoL) and the Security Sector Reform (SSR) – both also fundamental requirements for membership.

To narrow these initiatives, in regard to Kosovo, the mission EULEX Kosovo will be examined, by being the most extensive and external EU strategy of establishing the RoL in the country (EEAS: EULEX). The deployment of the mission (2008) coincides with the time when the declaration of independence of Kosovo was issued and it is the first EU initiative to face the challenge of dealing with Kosovo’s new statehood question, so its analysis is relevant for the

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purposes of this research. Moreover, it is a perfect example to examine the way this new political development implicates on the EU mission. Regarding BiH, the Police Reform will be analysed. The reform is part of the broader EU strategy of SSR in the country and its implementation demonstrates the way the EU member state-building approach is being affected by the existence of three ethnic divisions with opposing opinion and interests.

To summarise, both states are potential candidate member states that are considered contested and in which the EU has been extensively involved through the process of member state-building. They are part of the Western Balkans region, which is a current priority for the EU and they are the only two countries that lag behind the process of accession. Therefore, they are the most relevant, applicable and challenging case studies for the purposes of this thesis.

1.4 Formulation of the Research Question and Setting Up the Hypothesis

To fill the research gap, this thesis is setting up the following main research question:

“How and to what extent does contested statehood impact EU member state-building in the Western Balkans?”

In narrow terms, this research question would allow answering the following two sub-questions:

1. “How does the contested statehood of Kosovo influence the RoL mission EULEX Kosovo?”;

2. “How does the contested statehood of BiH influence the EU-initiated Police Reform?”

The thesis assumes the following correlation: Kosovo and BiH are considered contested states. Contested states have an impact on any form of external involvement in their domestic structure, especially on state-building. Both states trail behind the process of EU integration, so it is most likely that this impact obstructs EU member state-building. Nevertheless, the EU is still an active member state-builder in both states.

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Following this assumption, this thesis will test the following hypothesis:

“Contested statehood limits the EU’s ability of member state-building in Kosovo and in BiH and to adapt to the circumstances of contestation, the EU develops a new policy/strategy each time”.

Consulting with the literature of hypotheses in political research, the author identifies two types of variables and an intervening factor. An independent variable is a factor thought to influence, affect or cause variation in another variable (Halperin and Heath 2012: 144). Therefore, the ‘contested statehood’ is considered as an independent variable, the effect of which is going to be examined. A dependent variable is thought to depend, or be influenced by a variation in an independent variable (ibid). The ‘EU member state-building’ is identified as a dependent variable, which is being influenced by a variation in the independent variable (contested statehood). The intervening factor affects the relationship between the dependent and the independent variable and acts as a mediator (ibid). The intervening factor in this hypothesis is ‘the state’ (Kosovo and BiH).

This thesis predicts that the EU does not have a tailored approach in dealing with contested states when it comes to its policies of member state-building. Moreover, even if it would have, it would not be a unified strategy, since the nature and level of contestation vary from state to state. Therefore, ‘the state’ is considered as the mediator, according to which the contested statehood impacts the EU member state-building policies. The final part of the hypothesis suggests that in order to deal with the different nature of contestation, the EU develops a new policy/strategy of member state-building each time.

1.5 Limitations of the Research

The following limitations of this research have been established. Firstly, the findings of a qualitative content analysis cannot be dispersed with the same level of certainty that a quantitative research can. In other words, the findings of a qualitative research are not subject to measuring whether they are statistically significant or not, thus policy-makers may give low credibility to results from such approach (Rahman 2017: 105). Moreover, certain concepts and terms used in a qualitative research analysis are subject to different interpretations, leading to different conclusions (Atieno 2009: 17). In other words, they are formulated on the basis of preconceptions and assumptions of the author and the way he/she approaches data and

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information. Finally, a qualitative research supposes difficult process of interpretation and analysis, in comparison to the straightforward results of a quantitative analysis (Rahman 2017: 105). Despite these limitations, a qualitative method is considered the most appropriate research method for the chosen conceptual framework and case studies’ sample.

Secondly, the research question examines the effect that contested states have on the EU. Therefore, it is only analysing the issue from an EU perspective, making it a one-sided examination, which is largely subjective and makes the research less valuable on a larger scale. Furthermore, one must consider the prejudicial exercise of analysing EU documents. The idealistic, normative and presumptive nature of EU’s attitude towards its foreign policy allows for a utopian interpretation of EU’s actions. Consequently, the process of analysing EU’s documents is based on the pre-existence of normative assumptions and projection of certain common values and common issues in areas where they are disputed.

Another limitation relates to the interviews as a methodological approach. Referring to the ‘Hawthorne Effect’, this thesis acknowledges that interviewees often change their answers, when they know that are being observed. Moreover, a key consideration should be the likelihood of bias and validity of their answers, which are often presented as ‘socially acceptable (Halperin and Heath 2012: 259). Furthermore, another limitation is interviewing policy officers, who are working in Brussels and not on the ground in the relevant states. Although, it would have brought more relevance to the research to do the latter, due to financial and time constraints, this would not have been achieved. Therefore, interviewing policy officers who have been working either in Kosovo or in BiH in the past was considered to be an appropriate solution.

A final limitation relates to the technical discrepancy between the EU initiatives of member state-building in Kosovo and BiH. The mission EULEX Kosovo is still ongoing and even though its mandate has been extended several times, the final verdict of Kosovo’s contested effect on it cannot be established. Nevertheless, the purpose of the thesis is to establish the way the operationalisation of the mission on the ground was impacted by the contested nature of Kosovo. On the other hand, the Police Reform in BiH has already been implemented in a law, which means that it has been legally transposed into the domestic legislation of the state. However, the purpose of the research is to examine the way the reform came into place and the extent it was impacted by the existence of internal contestation in BiH.

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Chapter 2: Conceptual Framework and Literature Review

2.1 Sovereignty and Contested Statehood – definitions and problematics

2.1.1 Sovereignty

The idea of sovereignty emerged in the 16th and 17th Century by the European rulers in the course of their rivalries and struggles, in religious and political contexts (Jackson 2007: 1). A sovereign state can be defined as an authority that is supreme over and independent from any other authorities in the same jurisdiction (Jackson 2007: 10). The assertion of final authority within a given territory is the core component in any definition of sovereignty (Krasner 1988: 86). Sovereignty is defined as an absolute category, it is not conditional or variable; therefore, it does not fluctuate with the fortunes of political leaders or flow of state power (Geldenhuys 2009: 15-16). The alternative to sovereignty is either a world of clearly undefined boundaries, or no final authority within a certain territory.

Conventional or contemporary sovereignty is the most widely recognised variety of sovereignty. It could take three different forms: international legal sovereignty, Westphalian/ Vatellien sovereignty and domestic sovereignty (Krasner 2004: 87). The international legal sovereignty is to recognise juridically independent territorial entities. Westphalian sovereignty implies refrain from intervention in the internal affairs of other states. Domestic sovereignty is not a norm or a rule, but is rather a description of the domestic structure, which has influence on the internal matters within states’ boundaries (Krasner 2004: 88). Ideally, the combination of all three should be the characteristic of the contemporary sovereign nation-state (Krasner 2004: 88). Nevertheless, in some cases, these elements of sovereignty are not always present and this often results in disputable territories, undefined borders and entities, or states that are ‘contested’ and are later to be examined.

The idea of conventional Westphalian sovereignty is the most important requirement for statehood and it is unthinkable to discuss the latter without considering the former (Geldenhuys 2009: 14). Moreover, sovereignty is an important part of the conventional understanding of state-to-state relations and is an essential characteristic of the contemporary state system in world politics (Krasner 2004: 88). There is no universally recognised definition of sovereignty, but it is generally believed that there are two types: external and internal sovereignty (Geldenhuys 2009: 14). External (international or negative) sovereignty refers to the

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recognition of the state from outside, from international actors, entities and polities. It does not refer to supremacy, but to independence from outside authorities (Krasner 1999: 47). To be externally recognised, the state needs to be legally and politically accepted by the international community of states (in most cases this is the United Nations (the UN)) as an independent, self-governing and autonomous political entity. The internal sovereignty (domestic or positive) implies the presence of effective, independent and credible state structures and institutions on the domestic level. It refers to the ability of the state to exercise supremacy over all other authorities within that state and territory (ibid)1. To be internally sovereign, the state needs to be able to self-regulate its internal affairs without being destructively opposed by internal divisions, conflicts and territorial arrangements.

The conventional sovereignty consists of both external and internal sovereignty and according to Krasner this means a “recognition of juridically independent territorial entities and

non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states” (Krasner 2004: 85). The former refers to the

idea of de jure sovereignty (legal recognition from outside) and the latter refers to de facto sovereignty (exercising autonomy from inside)2. In other words, the contemporary state system consists of states that are de jure independent and de facto autonomous (Geldenhuys 2009: 15). Nevertheless, from a realist’s perspective, attributes associated with sovereignty have always been problematic and contested, as sovereignty is not a permanent state of classification and should not be taken for granted (Krasner 1999: 49). Therefore, in reality there are cases where conventional sovereignty is disputed due to the lack of one of its two components and this is where the concept of contestation intertwines.

For example, a state, lacking external sovereignty refers to the inability of this state to be recognised on a global level by the international community, which often results in international isolation, because international actors maintain an ambiguous and subtle relationship with the issue of state recognition (Bouris and Molina 2018). However, this does not always and necessarily mean that the state loses the ability to claim a right to its statehood (Bouris and Kyris 2017: 756), what Geldenhuys (2009) calls ‘titular recognition’. Therefore, certain domestic domains might be restricted due to the lack of international recognition, such as internal trade, membership in the UN, or non-presence in international agreements, but on

1_{Nevertheless, some authors believe that in political geography, sovereignty is neither inherently territorial,}

nor is it exclusively organised on a state-by-state basis (Agnew 2005: 437).

2_{One should acknowledge that there are more forms of recognition: recognition by conference; by treaty;}

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an internal level the domestic structures work effectively and the state is able to run its political errands and to ensure the smooth circulation of resources to its population. This refers to the presence of internal sovereignty. States with internal sovereignty are capable of maintaining effective government structures with control over the population and the territory. States with no internal sovereignty are unable to perform these functions, due to either territorial fragmentation, ethnic conflicts or disputes. Often, territorial disputes or efforts of secession mean that the contested government lacks control over its self-proclaimed territories (Bouris and Kyris 2017: 758). The end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Empires (The Soviet Union and Yugoslavia) is considered the reason for many internal entities and ethnic configurations to seek recognition and secession as independent states (Ker-Lindsey 2012: 4). States that are considered problematic either on internal or external level, or both, usually attract the attention of the international political community. For example, in order ‘to fix states’ that lack internal sovereignty, or to aid others to achieve external sovereignty and recognition, the powerful states (or institutional arrangements such as the UN or the EU) resort to different policies and tools (Krasner 2004: 96). One such policy refers to the concept of ‘shared sovereignty’. When states that inadequately govern their entities, or are unable to adequately address the needs of their population are believed to require “the transcendence of

certain accepted rules” by other states or entities, which Krasner defines as ‘shared

sovereignty’ (Krasner 2004: 85). The term suggests that in this case-scenario, the ‘weak’ states need to agree to a compromise and surrender their full sovereignty for an indefinite period. This leads to adopting arrangements “under which individuals chosen by international

organizations, powerful states, or ad hoc entities would share authority with nationals over some aspects of domestic sovereignty” (Krasner 2004: 89).

This ideas of ‘shared sovereignty’ and intervention are often highly criticised. Some of the most common issues relate to the nature and level of intrusiveness in the political affairs of the state, the genuine interests of the intervening actors and the bureaucratic coordination (Krasner 2004: 101). To have a ‘shared sovereignty’ means that certain political decisions or policies are taken by external actors who are being empowered to decide directly on the ground or indirectly, resulting in interference in the territorial integrity of the state (Ker-Lindsay 2012: 62). Often there are issues of legitimacy and representation, as usually these policy-makers are not democratically elected, because they are ‘outsiders’. The lack of representation, as well as the level of local involvement in the decision-making process are some of the most complicated issues in this political endeavour.

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The idea of conventional Westphalian sovereignty is intrinsically related to the concept of statehood. A contemporary nation-state enjoys both external and internal sovereignty, leading to de jure and de facto recognition. When some, or all of these features are disputed, or non-existent, then the sovereignty of these states is disputed and their right to statehood is contested. Therefore, the states themselves are called contested. To give a better idea of the existence of such states in international politics, a thorough overview of their peculiarities deserves an examination.

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“Entities that were conceived and born in sin.”

(Geldenhuys 2009) The Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (MCRDS), emerged in 1933 and is the legal internal document, giving the definition of the state. According to this law, the state as a subject of international law possesses the following qualifications: ‘(a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states’ (Article 1 of the MCRDS). The given criteria are relatively broad and over the years they have been subject to several clarifications. For instance, now it is possible that the borders do not need to be fixed for the state to have a defined territory, nor does it mean that the state may not be recognized if it is not in control of all its territory (Ker-Lindsay 2012: 28). In this sense, recognition only marks the willingness of states to enter relations with this entity, but absence of recognition does not in itself deny the statehood (Geldenhuys 2009: 20). Moreover, there is not a condition that it should have a settled population, it is believed that merely a popular support is all that is needed to satisfy the condition of statehood. These factors contribute to the contestation of the states and are reason for political scientists to present the phenomenon of contested statehood.

Different degrees of recognition and the notion of sovereignty made scholars give different names to such structures, such as ‘unrecognized states’, ‘quasi-states’, de facto states, de jure states, de facto trusteeships, protectorates, liminal actors, etc (Berg and Toomla 2009; Caspersen 2011; Kolsto 2006; Pegg 1998; Thomassen 2009). ‘Quasi-states’ refer to states that are independent in law, yet are unable to operate in practice. Although enjoy international legitimacy, they are unable to exercise control over their domestic affairs. De facto states usually refer to an aspirant state which meets some, but not all requirements of statehood and usually enjoys domestic autonomy without international recognition (Berg and Toomla 2009; Pegg 1998). Once all the conditions have been met a de jure recognition usually follows and this takes the form of an official statement or a letter (Geldenhuys 2009: 21). Generally, approval by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, accompanied by a two-thirds majority assembly in the UN membership is considered as constituting a de jure recognition. De facto trusteeships are usually transnational administrations, authorized by the UN Security Council. Protectorates is a new form of trusteeship, introduced as a temporary measure to prepare the entity for a de jure recognition (Geldenhuys 2009: 53-54). Liminal

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international actors refer to states that are going through a transition that is their search for sovereignty and recognition (Thomassen 2009; Bouris and Molina 2018).

These denominations share similar contestation in three areas: the legitimacy of the state, the scope of its institutions and the strength of the state functions (Bieber 2011: 1786). International legitimacy is measured in terms of international recognition and relations to neighbouring countries. Domestic legitimacy refers to the support for the state by different domestic institutions, the most important ones of which are the president, parliament and government (Paris and Sisk 2009: 14-15). Regarding the other two criteria, such states can hold either minimal or no functions in terms of the scope and strength of states’ function (Fukuyama 2004: 21-22).

In the context of this research, this thesis chooses the term ‘contested’, because it provides a much more neutral approach with a low level of dependency and allegiance. It does not define what the entity ‘is’ or ‘is not’, but at the same time it shows that there exists an issue of ‘stateness problem’, either on internal or external level. Moreover, it denotes that there is a deficit in the question of the entity’s sovereignty or recognition; however, does not classify the origin of contestation. In other words, the term ‘contested’ gives a broader definition of such entities that can enjoy certain characteristics of the state, such as territory, population, ruling government and capacity to conclude international agreements, but which fall short on the existence of external or internal recognition and/or sovereignty.

Deriving from Krasner’s conceptualization of sovereignty, Papadimitriou and Petrov’s and Geldenhuys’ research of contested states, as well as Kyris and Ker-Lindsay’s contribution on the issue, this thesis utilizes the following definition of contested states, where one or more of the following characteristics are present:

• The de facto governing authority of a contested territory has declared independence and has the ability and desire to enter into the standard array of relations with other states, yet it does not enjoy full diplomatic recognition by the international community (lack of de jure recognition) (Geldenhuys 2009: 24). The reason for this is that many international actors refrain from interacting with the contested states so as not to imply recognition (Kyris 2015: 20); (Ker Lindsey 2012: 17);

• The lack of international recognition could be accompanied with an effective domestic control within the state apparatus. In this scenario, the state can maintain control over

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its population and territory, regardless of whether it is fully, or incompletely recognised on international level (Papadimitriou and Petrov’s 2012: 749);

• There could be an international recognition, but not by all states in the world. As mentioned above, generally a two-thirds majority in the UN, plus the five permanent members is enough to recognise the sovereignty of the contested state (Bouris and Kyris 2017: 758);

• The capacity of an internationally recognized or a de facto government to exercise authority is extensively compromised due to the weakness of its state institutions and the ineffective state apparatus, either because of an ongoing territorial conflict or its profound disconnection with the local population, resulting from ethnic conflicts (such as Bosnia and Herzegovina) (Papadimitriou and Petrov 2012: 749). This relates to the lack of internal sovereignty and the inability of the state to perform its state functions; • Political, ethnic and/or religious relations to a third uncontested state – it is believed

that this is common to the majority of the contested states. Usually, legitimizing secession is believed to lead to a process of fragmentation, such as with former Yugoslavia (Geldenhuys 2009: 24). The secessionist claim is often related to a dispute with the original state (Kyris 2015: 21). In this case, the original country becomes the veto state of the new contested entity (such as with Serbia and Kosovo) (Geldenhuys 2009: 24).

International recognition or non-recognition, accompanied with the full, incomplete or lack of sovereignty and/or existence of secessionist claims are all factors of ‘contestation’ and characteristics of the contested statehood. They are important elements, influencing any kind of external involvement, which has the intention of creating a stable, legitimate and democratic state. The different levels of contestation have different impacts on any form of external engagement. Contested states can mediate and create opportunities of external involvement, but they can also create obstacles of such involvement. For the purposes of this research, to specify involvement, the thesis refers to EU member state-building, a specific category of EU state-building, which implies a process of building state structures, while integrating them into the EU. Often, this process concerns state structures that are weak, or experience issues with recognition, either on an external, or on an internal level and this is where the concepts of EU member state-building and contested statehood intertwine. To elaborate on this discussion, the next chapter introduces the theoretical foundation of state-building and the EU’s role in it, after which the discussion about EU member state-building is introduced.

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2.2 Theoretical foundation of state-building

2.2.1 What is state-building?

“Before you can have a democracy or economic development, you have to have a state”.

(Fukuyama 2005: 84) State-building is an approach to and a sub-component of peacebuilding. The concept of peacebuilding denotes ‘building peace’, yet there is no universally agreed definition of ‘peace’. The concept suggests subjectivity and is impossible to be categorized in a single definition; therefore, to define peacebuilding is a matter of perception, perspective and opinion. It is widely agreed that the concept is undertheorized and overworked (Heathershaw 2008: 598). The concept of peacebuilding emerged in the aftermath of the Cold War, when the need to implement a unified and comprehensive agenda for peace was required to demonstrate to the international community that the achievement of integration and development is possible. One of the most significant steps, taken by the international community, came with the ‘Agenda for Peace’, introduced by the UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali in 1992 (Boutros-Ghali 1992). This initiative was the universal declaration of the importance of peacebuilding, peace-keeping and conflict prevention. The approach came as a new form of international activism through the 1990s when the international community was interpreting internal armed conflicts, humanitarian crisis and even disruption to democracy as threats to universal peace and security (Chesterman 2004: 2).

Building peace is not an easily operationalized process, because its execution without effectively considering the political environment in which it operates, will result in a failure. When this new form of experimentalism was undertaken by the international community, several peacebuilding operations were conducted, relying on quick fixes, rapid elections and bursts of economic privatization (Paris and Sisk 2009: 1). The UN peace operations in Rwanda in 1994, in Srebrenica in 1995, as well as in Somalia were some of the most condemned operations, considered as ineffective, because much of the peacebuilding initiatives paid little attention to constructing stable and legitimate state structures to maintain the peace (Paris and Sisk 2009: 2). Without a mechanism to ensure the presence of sustainable governance, ensuring the security and well-being of its citizens, any peacebuilding operation is doomed to fail.

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The international community had to re-evaluate and revise the drawbacks of the peace-keeping operations and devise a new approach. The ‘Brahimi Report’ from 2000 was implemented by the UN to make specific reference for the required change in policy (UN 2000). Furthermore, the necessary change was recognized by some scholars:

“By taking the existence of a working government for granted, many scholars have effectively

“assumed away” one of the most difficult and important problems that peace-builders confront in their field of operations: namely how to establish functioning governments and

stable non-violent politics in conditions of virtual anarchy” (Paris 2004: 46-47).

Other scholars, such as Fukuyama, Chesterman, Fearon and Laitin and Krasner began to argue that the operationalisation of peacebuilding “had under-emphasized the creation or

strengthening of governmental institutions as a foundation for successful transitions from war to peace” (Paris and Sisk 2009: 8).

Consequently, the UN reconsidered its peacebuilding approach and extended its international involvement beyond mere peacebuilding operations. They began to focus on reconstructing institutions of governance, capable of providing the citizens with physical and economic stability, which was fundamental for maintaining the peace (Chesterman 2004: 5). At the time, the process of international peacebuilding was beginning to be replaced by a process of international state-building.

A simple break-up of this concept implies a ‘process to build a state’. It relates to strengthening and reconstructing legitimate state institutions in countries, emerging from conflicts, as well as building and then maintaining sustainable long-term peace (Paris and Sisk 2009: 14). It is believed that the political disorder and economic collapse create international security risks, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, transnational terrorism, drug smuggling, and health threats, which happens in states that lack effective control of their governance (Fearon and Laitin 2004: 13). Therefore, the idea to build, rather than to limit or restrict such states was at the top of the state-builders’ agenda (Fukuyama 2004: 17). Consequently, the international community started to focus on establishing effectively working, representative and accountable institutions that can be stable enough and legitimate to keep and maintain peace.

International state-building can take a variety of forms, the most applied one being the post-conflict state-building, which usually takes place in post-post-conflict societies that generally face an issue of legitimacy (Chesterman 2004: 5). This form of state-building is often described as

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the most complex and demanding one, requiring a social, political and economic transition from a war to a post-war arrangement (Paris and Sisk 2009: 1). Therefore, state-builders in post-conflict societies usually focus on building quasi-governmental activities, such as electoral assistance, establishing the Rule of Law (RoL), Security Sector Reform (SSR) or constitution-building (Chesterman 2004: 5).

The challenge for the state-builders is to create public support and a level of legitimacy for the post-conflict institutions (Barnett and Zürcher 2009: 28). However, the willingness of those individuals to comply usually depends on whether they believe the institutions and the government are legitimate. As a result, the process of state-building is extremely complicated, due to fact that state-builders have to develop the motivational factor for the domestic individuals to comply with the state-building process (Barnett and Zürcher 2009: 28).

The international involvement for reconstruction of the post-conflict states can take certain forms. Firstly, when state institutions are divided, the governance structures are the subject of dispute with different groups claiming power, or ethnic divisions within the structures themselves. When they have collapsed, such structures simply did not exist (Chesterman 2013: 613). Finally, when state institutions exist, but are incapable of performing basic functions, post-conflict states are considered unable to operate their internal affairs.

The challenging and contested environments of state-building are often the reason for the process being mostly externally driven. This usually leads to conflicts between the actual transition of international norms and the adoption of those norms by the local actors, raising the question of ownership (Bouris 2014: 96). For example, the mandates and the time-frames of such missions and initiatives are often extended, which usually risks them “being perceived

by local actors as foreign intrusions in domestic affairs” (Paris and Sisk 2009: 3). This leads

to internal tension and creates challenges for the state-builders.

Other issues of state-building include coordination and coherence, legitimacy, capacity-building, dependency, accountability, and exit (Paris and Sisk 2009: 3). As previously mentioned, issues of state-builders’ legitimacy and accountability are often responsible for raising doubts and mistrust from the local population. The technicalities of involvement, relate to the so-called footprint and duration dilemmas of state-building – the extent of intrusiveness and the length of operation (Edelstein 2009: 83). The “smooth exit” of the state-builders should guarantee the sustainable and long-lasting effectively working institutions; however, the ability

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to determine when and how is the right way to exit are not easy tasks which often have repercussions on the state-builders (Paris and Sisk 2009: 56).

It was generally assumed that the UN Security Council is the only international actor authorised to act as a state-builder. This approach changed in the second half of the 1990s when other regional governmental and non-governmental organizations began to develop a foreign policy approach, which included state-building projects (Paris and Sisk 2009: 1). One such actor is the EU, which in the second half of the 1990s started to take over from the UN the responsibility to state-building in certain areas and regions. The environment in which EU’s approach to state-building emerged is thoroughly examined in the next section.

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Page | 21 2.2.2 Context of the EU as a state-builder

To understand the EU as a state-builder, one needs to refer to the Kantian philosophy of perpetual peace, which states that “liberal democracies do not fight against each other”, also known as the Democratic Peace Theory. The EU was established under the principles of democracy, the rule of law, protection of human rights, fundamental freedoms and good governance. Therefore, these are the principles that the EU is projecting both inside and outside its borders. Moreover, the concepts of peace and peacebuilding constitute the foundation of the EU, even though they are only mentioned in one EU document, the Treaty of the Functioning of the EU (TEU Art.6, Art.11; TEC Art. 177). Based on European experience, only stable liberal democracies are capable of building and then maintaining peace and the EU has always been determined to build such democracies.

In legal terms, the aims of promoting democracy, preserving peace, preventing conflicts from erupting into violence and strengthening international security are part of the broad framework of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The CFSP was established as one of the three pillars of the EU under the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993, which for the first time developed the common EU foreign policy. The member states agreed to set up a common EU foreign policy agenda, an additional element to the economic integration and cooperation. The Lisbon Treaty removed the pillar system in 2009, but the foreign policy agenda of the EU remained an important part of the new political arrangement (Council of the EU 2011). When the CFSP was established, the EU also developed itself as a foreign policy actor. The EU began to assume responsibility for the foreign affairs of the EU, as well as external involvements in other states, some of which are state-building projects.

The understanding of the EU as a state-builder cannot be examined in isolation from the UN approach, because the mechanisms, tools and instruments of state-building at EU’s disposal are borrowed from the UN (Duke and Courtier 2010: 23). In most cases, representation, coordination and legitimacy of EU’s state-building initiatives have links to the UN; however, in general, the UN Security Council remains the prime actor in maintaining international peace and security.

The EU’s role in state-building takes different forms, but overall, its state-building approach can be conceptualised with peace as a governance (Richmond 2005: 69). Within its state-building projects, the EU can act as a frame, or as a player (Tocci 2010: 60). In the first case, the EU acts as a model and as a point of reference with regard to various governance practices

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and standards (Noutcheva et al. 2004: 24). When acting as a player, the EU is applying its state-building capabilities through different incentives, carrots, and sticks (ibid). The EU is taking a leading role in areas of peace and state-building operations, by placing special emphasis on the SSR, strengthening of the RoL and reforming the justice system (EU Commission 2006). These are often materialized in civilian or military missions (look Appendice I for current EU missions) or through different bilateral or multilateral agreements for aid, finance and development.

The first example of EU state-building initiatives inside the EU was through the enlargement and accession policy in Eastern Europe (Tocci 2010: 57). The “accession carrot” evolved as one of the strongest primary tools for state-building at EU’s disposal, offering the perspective for membership. The prospect of joining the EU is considered as a state-building exercise, because the candidate member state needs to satisfy certain membership criteria and, among others, to implement the acquis communautaire (the acquis) (the general body of law of the EU) (Duke and Courtier 2010: 35). Moreover, the accession “carrot” created the internal template of the EU’s state-building initiatives, acting as a framework, developing the so-called Copenhagen Criteria – the political, legal, economic and technical requirements for a candidate country to be admitted to the EU (Tocci 2010: 57).

In addition, the EU relies on secondary powerful tools, such as socialisation, conditionality and passive enforcement. Through socialisation or social learning, the EU is capable of providing training and advice to the local authorities without being empowered to enforce policies. This is the least binding secondary tool and the least likely to have a long-term impact upon third states (Tocci 2010: 66). This instrument is widely preferred by the EU actors by having a direct reference to the EU as a “soft power”. Moreover, the EU is applying a ‘bottom-up approach’, which means that it is transforming states from inside, rather than ruling them from above (Chandler 2010: 58).

Additionally, when the EU is acting as a player, it uses negative and positive conditionality. Positive conditionality (or “more for more principle”) refers to the ability of the EU to bring rewards and benefits to third states, if the latter fulfil certain conditions (Hüllen 2012: 118). Satisfying those conditions can bring ex ante or ex post benefits. Ex ante refers to benefits that are granted before the conditions are met, and ex post to those where the benefit follows a condition which is met (Tocci 2010: 67). On the other hand, negative conditionality allows the

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EU to reduce, terminate or suspend benefits and resort to sanctions and restrictions, if the state violates the conditions (Bouris 2014: 30).

The third secondary tool - passive enforcement - is one of the most binding instruments at EU’s disposal. This usually happens through missions with executive mandate, where the EU is capable of directly implementing policies on the ground. The instrument declares that state-building-related tools are the necessary price that comes with the EU’s engagement (Tocci 2010: 70). There exist clearly defined rules that the third state must comply with to enter any kind of relations with the EU. A good example is the acquis, which does not include a possibility for negotiation, but is rather imposed on the candidate states in order to join the EU (in addition to the broader Copenhagen criteria). In other words, the candidate countries need to make only one political decision, which is to subordinate themselves to the accession process, but the process of policy aligning is only external, EU-driven and non-negotiable (Chandler 2010: 110).

For a state-building initiative to be successful, it needs to be comprehensive, democratic and efficient on the ground. It needs to be inclusive, representative and legitimate for the people and it needs to be feasible (Samuels 2009: 173). In certain cases, the challenges of state-building go beyond mere issues of technicalities of the process. Since the end of the Cold War in 1989/1990 the EU has had to face different contested situations from countries emerging out of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, or in the near abroad (Bouris 2014: 32). This new type of challenges related to problems of recognition, sovereignty and internal division. The next section explains they way the EU became interested in such states and explores the way in which EU’s state-building process is being influenced.

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Page | 24 2.2.3 EU state-building in contested states – opportunities and limitations

Some scholars consider the EU as a state-builder par excellence (Trauner 2009: 786). According to them, the EU was successful in initiating reforms and building institutions in cases like Croatia and Macedonia (Trauner 2009: 786). Many new states emerged out of Former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, and the EU has been extensively active in re-building those societies, which emerged out of the conflict. The result of this involvement is most visible through the accession process of twelve-member states in the period between 2004 and 2007 and eight other states were offered the prospect of membership (Bouris 2014: 32). Moreover, with the initiation of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) in 2004, the EU created a single unified framework of political and economic integration with sixteen neighboring countries, some of which are also an example of contested statehood (Bouris 2014: 33).

The reason for the EU to involve in such cases relates to the existence of contestation, which appeal to the EU. In 2003 the EU declared that fragile states constitute part of the five main treats under the European Security Strategy (ESS) (European Council 2003). The ESS pointed out that this new threat cannot be tackled with purely military means, but a new approach is required to address the need of stability, reconstruction and security. Subsequently, they said that the EU and the member states must cooperate and put ‘failed’ states back on their feet, as the overall security in Europe is largely dependent on that (ibid.: 6). Furthermore, the report for the progress of ESS from 2008 stated that conflicts are often linked to a “state fragility and SSR and Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration and establishing the RoL are a key part of post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction, and have been a focus of EU missions” (European Council 2008: 8).

Through the framework of enlargement and the ENP, the EU engages in a total of nine contested states worldwide (Appendix II). The tools and instruments at the EU’s disposal vary in terms of the proximity of the conflict, the nature of the legal relations with the state, as well as the level and degree of contestation. Papadimitriou and Petrov (2012: 751) and Bouris (2014: 38) identify a list of tools, applied by the EU in the nine contested states:

• High diplomatic activity for conflict resolution and/or mediation. Since 1998, the CFSP High Representative has been assigned the task of undertaking intense diplomacy and intensive contact with key players of the conflict;

• Provision of aid to the country/areas under multilateral reconstruction efforts (for example, Bosnia and Kosovo) or through mainstream EU programmes associated with

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major policy initiatives (such as the Instrument for Pre-Accession, European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument);

• The utilisation of the ‘accession carrot’ - promise of EU membership as a diplomatic leverage for ending or pacifying conflicts. It should be noted that this instrument is only credible and feasible in countries that have already been recognized as ‘candidates’ or ‘potential candidates’ for EU membership, rather than for ENP partners whose membership credentials (although not explicitly rejected) are too remote to be relevant; • The deployment of civilian and/or military missions aimed at ensuring ‘softer’ security

concerns and aspects of civilian crisis management.

• The direct exercise of executive powers by the EU in a contested territory as part of an international settlement for ending a conflict (Appendix III).

The list is not exhaustive, but it is comprehensive enough to indicate that the statehood conditions have an impact on the operationalization of the EU missions and initiatives on the ground. Papadimitriou and Petrov call the EU’s involvement in contested entities ‘an existential discourse”. They believe that the EU policies and the actual survival of these states are interconnected. Hence, under conditions of contestation, EU policies are not only important because of the anticipation of a success, but rather they are considered to be of great symbolic importance, which impacts the domestic legitimacy and international credibility (Papadimitriou and Petrov 2012: 751). However, this idea only shows that the EU’ involvement is important for the existence of those states, yet it does not explain the vice-versa effect and way the concept of contestation impacts the EU’s involvement.

Different degrees of contestation have different impact on the EU decision to act as a state-builder. For example, conditionality is not able to produce socialisation, thus social learning, or to modify behaviours, and state weakness leads the EU to behave inconsistently, reducing its own leverage and the effectiveness of conditionality (Denti 2014: 19). In territorially fragmented states, for instance, almost any decision needs to be approved either by the ‘parent state’, or by all participating parties or forces (Bouris and Kyris 2017: 766). In other cases, contested conditions in the form of non-external recognition, lead to international isolation and low absorbed EU policies, whereas more external and less internal sovereignty means more intrusive EU’s involvement (Bouris and Kyris 2017: 767). Therefore, the level of involvement is dependent on the level of contestation and vice versa, the level of contestation has an impact on the level of involvement.

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Issues of sovereignty, recognition and domestic ethnic divisions are recognized by the EU as potential threats to the EU security agenda. As indicated above, the presence of contestation can mediate an external involvement of state-building, but it can also hinder this process. In domestic contexts, the EU has offered the prospect of membership as a contribution to soften and resolve statehood issues, and the entities emerged after the collapse of Yugoslavia are a suitable example of that (Denti 2014: 20). The EU approach in those cases interconnects the concept of EU state-building with the one on enlargement, creating an entirely new process of EU member state-building. This new category of EU state-building places the stake of those states on a high level for the EU, because from their reconstruction depends the development of future member states of the EU. The next section introduces this relatively new concept of EU state-building, by placing it in the most relevant context – the Western Balkans.

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Page | 27 2.2.4 EU member state-building in the Western Balkans

“The objective is not simply to build stable, legitimate states whose own citizens will seek to strengthen and not destroy them - rather it is the establishment of a state that the EU can accept as a full member with absolute confidence.”

(International Commission on the Balkans 2005: 29) EU member state-building is an enlargement-specific form of EU state-building. It represents a dual strategy of EU state-building and enlargement, in which the EU is interested in building state institutions, while integrating them (Keil and Arkan 2014: 16). The concept was first introduced in 2005 by the International Commission on the Balkans (ICB) in a strategy report “The Balkans in Europe’s future” and it is only ever being applied in the context of the Western Balkans.

The ICB (2005) argued that states without full sovereignty are the solution to the failed Balkan state-building projects. Therefore, instead of state-building, the EU introduced the process of ‘member-state building’ in the region – creating states that never have to confront the destabilising difficulties of ‘unconditional sovereignty’ (Keohane, 2002: 756). The Commission argued that the EU is forced into this role by the surrounding circumstances and that it ‘has become a reluctant state-builder’, having no choice other than state integration to prevent any further destructive events within the European territory (ICB 2005: 30;38). Nevertheless, the ICB recognised that “building functional member states, while integrating

them into the EU is Brussels unique challenge in the Balkans” (ICB 2005) and this kind of

initiative would not be easy to achieve.

In the same year, the European Stability Initiative (ESI) presented three distinct varieties of state-building, particularly addressing the Western Balkans: capacity-building; authoritarian building and member building (ESI 2005: 6-8). According to the ESI, member state-building is made up of three processes. First, “an administrative revolution”, bringing about domestic compliance with the EU acquis. Second, “a process of social and economic convergence”, fostered by regional and rural development policies, and certified by the Commission. And third, “a shift in the substance and processes of democratic governance”, establishing the opportunity for the decision-making process to consult with the civil society, due to the effect of the first two elements (ESI 2005: 6-8; Denti 2014: 24). The concept was later used by scholars to define it as a different form of state-building, enlargement and/or Europeanisation. For more clarity, this thesis refers to the process as “a dual strategy, of state

Contested Statehood and its Impact on the European Union Member State Building in the Western Balkans: Insights from Kosovo and Bosnia

Master’s Thesis on: