Analysing differences in compellence policies between the United
States of America and the Soviet Union during the Cold War
Bachelor project: Deterrence & Compellence in International Politics
Name: Emma de Weerd
St. number: S1785753
Supervisor: Dr. Huib Pellikaan Submission date: 20-12-2019
Index
Introduction p. 2
Background of the Research Question p. 3
Theoretical Framework p. 5
Methodology p. 8
- Case-& Variable Selection p. 9
- Cases p.9 - Variables p.12 - Variable Classification p. 13 Case Studies p. 15 - U.S. Cases p. 15 - Pueblo p. 15 - Black September p. 16 - Invasion of Panama p. 16
- Comparing the U.S. Cases p. 17
- Soviet Cases p. 20
- Berlin Deadline p. 20
- October- Yom Kippur War p. 21
- Solidarity p. 21
- Comparing the Soviet Cases p. 22
Comparing the U.S. and Soviet Cases p. 24
Conclusion p. 28
Bibliography p. 30
Bibliography determining Soviet Cases p. 33
Introduction
In Jervis’ (1979) ‘Deterrence Theory Revisited’, he reviews George & Smoke’s (1974) ‘Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory & Practice’. In this review he notes that deterrence theory is predominantly based on an American/Western-centric world view (p. 297).
In other words, the theory which would explain American deterrence policy, would not necessarily explain the situation with a different state system’s deterrence policy (p. 297). Jervis also accounts that deterrence theory has relied too heavily on deduction and that while there is an increase in literature reviewing if states actually behave according to how deterrence theory says they should, the deductive method is still the dominant approach.
This leaves empirical comparative case studies out of the spotlight, as the focus is rather on theory-confirming comparisons (Jervis, 1979, p 302).
Jervis’ focus is on deterrence theory, but the observations he made can also be applied to compellence theory, which are often intertwined . Compellence theory is 1 often tested in a deductive way and is American/Western-centric. There are studies about compellence and how to broaden compellence theory to make it inclusive for more states , but because this is used in a deductive manner, there is often a bias to 2 choose cases that match the theory.
Secondly, there are also case studies which focus on historical cases in which a compellent threat is issued, but these studies are often single case studies, issuing a historical account with a broader research focus than only compellence.
This gap in understanding compellence threats in a broader sense, warrants comparison of compellence policies from different types of states. Not to test the theory, but to focus on the empirical differences between the compellence policies of states.
1 Mentions of compellence & deterrence being intertwined or related to each other can be found in Schaub
(2004), pp. 389-390, Sperandei (2006), pp. 254-263 & Bratton (2005), p.101. Then there is literature that studies both compellence and deterrence without distinguishing from one another, like Petersen (1986) & Harkavy (1998).
2 An example would be van Angeren’s (2006) ‘The opportunities & limits of compellence strategies: the
This kind of comparative research could help develop more specific insights on how to potentially adjust compellence theory to different state systems, in different world systems. These potential adjustments could contribute to a clearer view of an opposing state’s intentions and interests; lack thereof is often a reason for failing policy (Jervis, 1974, pp. 305-310).
Following this reasoning, the research question of this thesis will be: ‘What is the difference between Soviet- and U.S. compellence policies during the Cold War?’.
In the next chapters there firstly will be more elaboration on the research question and the theoretical aspect after which the methodology, variable- and case selection will be explained.
Following this, the case studies will be presented and compared. Lastly, the findings will be presented from which a conclusion shall be drawn that there are definitely some interesting variations between the two states regarding their compellence policies, but also some similarities.
Background of the Research Question
Since compellence and deterrence theory gained their traction in American politics and academics during the Cold War, this would be an interesting time frame to start
exploring differences between compellence in different state systems.
The mainstream political theory during the Cold War was realism. Deterrence theory eventually evolved out of realist views and helped to broaden the realist worldview . There are not any specific articles about compellence and realism but, as 3 was mentioned in the introduction, there have been a number of papers on coercion, where compellence and deterrence were studied together. For this reason it is still worthy to mention the relationship between deterrence and realism. Deterrence theory, together with compellence theory, helped to widen the international relations theory of realism by determining how states would act in international conflictual situations. Deterrence theorists used realist views of state behaviour in the international system to determine the specific state behaviour in international conflict situations . Compellence 4
3 Jervis (1979), pp. 289-290 and Huth, Gelpi & Bennett (1993), p. 609. 4 Huth, Gelpi, Bennett (1993), p. 609.
can be linked to realism in the way that compellence, just like deterrence, was
constructed with realist world views. This link between Compellence and Realism can be found in the theory that a more powerful country can get a weaker country to do what it wants out of fear of retribution from an overwhelming power. The states studied in this thesis are both in a position of overwhelming power over other states.
The Cold War was defined by a bipolar world system. Even though we
nowadays live in a unipolar world system or a multipolar world system, depending on who you ask, it is still interesting to look at the differences between the superpowers in a bipolar world system.
Studying compellence policy of two superpowers in a bipolar world system can produce new insights if they have similar policies regarding compellence; this could indicate that there could be a separate compellence theory regarding superpowers and what kind of effect that can have in other world systems. However, if it turns out that there are differences between the two superpowers, compellence theory can be modified by differentiating the theory according to different state systems. Either way, comparing superpowers in a bipolar world system can create interesting implications for further specifications in compellence theory.
The choice to incorporate the U.S. comes from the fact that U.S. compellence policy cases are at the centre of compellence literature. They are well documented and provide a starting point for further explorative research to find differences between state systems. Furthermore, the U.S. was one of the Superpowers during the Cold War.
The Soviet Union is chosen as an actor because it was the other Superpower during the Cold War, meaning it had a similar level of political- and military influence on the world stage compared to the U.S.. The two states are politically and
economically polar opposites of each other with the U.S. being a democratic, capitalist state and the Soviet Union an autocratic, communist regime. The two states are similar when it comes to their ability to influence, but are politically and economically
dissimilar. From this observation, a hypothesis can be made that their method of influencing might be different and so their approach of using compellence might also differ.
Theoretical Framework
As mentioned in the introduction, research into the differences between different types of states’ compellence policies has not really been conducted yet. The majority of the comparison literature is intra-state comparison, with the U.S. as the main subject. These comparisons regarding only the U.S. might still be useful to help create a research framework to compare different kinds of states.
Furthermore, there is literature about creating datasets that map out different state characteristics when it comes to conflict, crises and compellence. These datasets are intended to be used for comparative analysis regarding different states and therefore can also deliver useful information on comparing compellence threats from different states.
Pfundstein (2012) has created a dataset regarding U.S. compellence cases. Herein she tries to find out which factors are different in U.S. compellence methods which can help determine under which circumstances a compellence threat is successful or not. In particular, she uses the ICB dataset to compile different variables which can be useful to compare U.S. compellence cases. Further, she defines compellence as an implicit or explicit threat that communicates to a target state that the compelling state will execute limited military action if the target does not alter its behavior according to the compelling state’s commands (p. 4).
An important aspect of a compellence threat is that violence must only be used if the target refuses to cooperate; violence must not be the first response to unfavourable behaviour. Schelling (1966) highlights this by mentioning that the threat of violence is more useful to achieve certain goals than the direct use of violence (pp. 64-65).
Pfundstein’s (2012) definition does not only take these aspects into account, but
broadens the definition by mentioning that it does not matter if a threat is communicated implicitly or explicitly (p. 12). Based on her definition she is able to distinguish five different types of compellence, which she uses to define compellence cases from the ICB data set. These will be elaborated on in the ‘Case Selection’ chapter.
Pfundstein uses variables from the ICB data set to define the different
compellence cases, by doing so she avoids using variables which discriminate against any country.
It is worth mentioning that the ICB project has been conducted to not
specifically study compellence, but they do give an overview of all the inter-state crises on the world stage from 1918 to 2007. Pfundstein (2012) argues that it is unlikely for a state to issue an compellent threat outside of a scope of crisis that would call for a change in behaviour (p. 10). Furthermore, the ICB project is a collection of crisis data that does not discriminate if a compellent threat is a success or not, it only gives an overview of what happened.
Sechser (2011) attempts to create a compellence threat data set including all compellent threats issued from 1918-2001. While Pfundstein (2012) uses a typology of five different types of compellence threats on top of the general conceptualisation of compellence, Sechser keeps his definition of a compellence threat in line with the general conceptualisation . He defines a compellence threat as a threat that issues a 5 demand, with the threat assuring that violence will be used if the demand isn’t met and that the threat must be made from one state to another (p. 380). He does however, only include compellence threats which aim to alter the ‘material status-quo’(p. 380).
From these two similar articles, it seems that Pfundstein values inclusivity of different compellence cases more, rather than Sechser, who prefers the inclusivity of different states.
Another dataset that might be interesting to study compellence threats with is the ‘Military Intervention by Powerful States’, or ‘MIPS’ dataset (Sullivan & Koch, 2009). However this dataset includes all instances in which the U.S. used violence to achieve objectives, so not necessarily compellence threats. Since it only documents events in which violence is used, it does not show successful compellence threats, the ones that consists of not having to issue a military attack.
Lastly, the ‘Correlates of War’ dataset was also studied since it is the largest data set available with regard to international conflictual relations. This dataset however, only describes interstate wars, which means it had the same problem as the MIPS dataset: it does not include instances of successful compellence where military conflict was avoided.
Conclusively, there are plenty of datasets to choose from to conduct comparative research between different types of states. The dataset that will be used in this thesis to compare Soviet Union cases and U.S. cases will be Pfundstein’s variables and
methodology. There are two reasons to do so:
Firstly, Pfundstein’s use of the ICB dataset supports using variables which are non-discriminatory of other states and state’s systems. The ICB project has been
conducted to not specifically study compellence, but they do give an overview of all the inter-state crises on the world stage from 1918 to 2007. Pfundstein (2012) argues that it is unlikely for a state to issue a compellent threat outside of a scope of crisis that would call for a change in behaviour (p. 10).
Secondly, the ICB project is a collection of crisis data that does not discriminate whether a compellent threat is a success or not, it only gives an overview of what happened. This makes it a good source for variables which are not biased towards a singular state or if a threat was successful or not.
Additionally Sechser (2011), the ‘MIPS’ dataset and the ‘Correlations of War’ are less suitable to conduct the research necessary for this thesis. Sechser only focuses on compellence threats, but loses a large part of the conceptualisation of compellence by only looking at threats where there is a material threat, which excludes an important variable for comparison between compellence threats. The ‘MIPS’ dataset is more useful for studying conflicts that involved violence. It does not involve cases of
successful compellence where no violence had to be used. The same can be said for the ‘Correlates of War’ dataset.
Methodology
Explorative, small-N comparative case study
A small-N study was chosen because a mixed-method comparative research in a limited time frame will be conducted. The number of compellence cases from the U.S. and the Soviet Union during the Cold War equals 23 cases in total (In the chapter: ‘Case- & Variable Selection’, more elaboration on how this was established will be presented). There are eleven U.S. compellence cases as well as twelve regarding the Soviet Union. It would be unlikely to compare all these cases in a qualitative way in the available time frame and still get a valid result.
The number of cases is too high for a feasible qualitative comparison method with all the cases included, but it is also too low for only a statistical comparative analysis (Halperin & Heath, 2017, p. 231). A statistical analysis would be interesting if more states or cases per state were involved. By only comparing two states with twenty-four compellence cases between them, statistical analysis would give a too shallow overview of the differences between the states which can undermine the validity of the results. There is however, a possibility to show the differences between the Soviet Union and the U.S. by creating a mixed design ANOVA with the used variables. Using this type of statistical analysis in combination with a qualitative overview of a small-N number of events, can provide a clearer, -more thorough understanding of events than only using a qualitative or quantitative method.
A total of six cases, three from each contender, were chosen using
pseudo-random selection. Firstly, the U.S. and Soviet cases will be compared among their respective faction, before comparing the two contenders with each other. This will be done by conducting a historical analysis for each case, and test them against several variables. By only using six cases, it will be possible to present a more in-depth
description of the cases and the variables that will contribute to well-defined outcomes. These outcomes will be visualised by a small-N ANOVA comparison. This will
increase the credibility of the research but it will not be as generalizable as an analysis with more contenders. However, it is more important that data is well worked out and
complete rather than generalizing using a lack of data. For this reason, a small-N mixed-method, comparative case study will be used for this analysis.
Case- & Variable selection
For both the case selection and the variable selection, Pfundstein’s (2012) methods will be used. As mentioned in the Theoretical Framework, her research is focussed on different kinds of U.S. compellence threats and their success levels. While success levels are not relevant for this thesis, Pfundstein does offer a method of describing U.S. compellence cases which can also be used to help defining other countries’ compellence threats by using variables from the ICB dataset. This is a dataset which involves all states in crises and measures them against the same variables. This means that the variables Pfundstein used for the U.S. comparison, are also available for Soviet comparison.
Cases
For U.S. cases, the eleven U.S. Cold War cases from Pfundstein’s (2012) analysis have been used. By not only taking compellence actions into account but also the communication method, she has added an important comparative variable for different kinds of compellence threats. Her typology of compellence cases is as follows:- 1. an ultimatum, -an open-ended threat,- a vague threat,- an active-implicit threat &- a passive implicit threat . 6
As mentioned before, Pfundstein determines if a case is a compellence case or not based on her compellence definition and the ICB crisis summary, potentially with extra literature if the summary was not clear enough. Pfundstein excludes non-state actors in her research . While this can be interesting for this research, it would be 7 more useful for this thesis to stay as close to Pfundstein methods as possible as her U.S. Cold War compellence cases are used in this thesis. This method was chosen to
6 Pfundstein, 2012, p. 15. 7Pfundstein, 2012, p. 8.
determine the cases for the Soviet Union .8
First, all the cases in which the Soviet Union was a crisis actor from the ICB version 10 dataset were extracted. After that, all the cases from before 1946 and after 1991 were removed. This showed that the Soviet Union has been involved in 23 crises cases during the Cold War.
Following this, Pfundstein’s method of studying the case summaries and additional data were used to eventually determine that the Soviet Union issued twelve compellence threats (Table 1&2).
After selecting the compellence cases from both states, three cases per state had to be chosen. A method of random selection was used to select the cases. There is always some type of bias involved in case selection ; to try and avoid personal bias in the 9 case selection and since this is an explorative research, randomization was used for the selection. Random selection can never be purely random. To programme a random number generator, there is still a mathematical system running in which the circumstances can be replicated to achieve the same result twice. Even dice are subjected to certain mathematical laws . However, a random number generator or a 10 set of dice will not hold personal biases, and can approach random selection closer than a human could so the decision was made to use a random number generator. The ‘Random Number Generator’ on andrew.hedges.name was chosen to choose the cases. This produces a pseudo-random number using Javascript’s math function. The classic method of choosing random cases by using dice wasn’t used because of the odd number of cases (11 U.S. cases & 12 S.U. cases) which would mean that if a twelve-sided die was used for the eleven cases, there would be an extra option, altering the chances of selection for the eleven cases. For the twelve Soviet cases, a twelve sided die could be used, but in combination with the uneven numbers of U.S. cases it still would still not be an optimal method. A pseudo-random number picker seemed more logical due to the controlled input of cases. All the numbers of the
8 See ‘Bibliography for determining Soviet Cases’ at the end of this thesis for the additional sources that
were used to determine Soviet compellence cases.
9Halperin & Heath, 2012, p. 218
cases were added and the tool picked the numbers from the sequence.
For the Soviet Union it picked case numbers: 168, 255 and 315, or rather: the Berlin Deadline (1958), October Yom Kippur War (1973) & Solidarity USSR crisis (1980). For the U.S. it picked case numbers: 224, 238 & 391: Pueblo (1968), Black September (1970), Invasion of Panama (1989).
Table 1: U.S. Crises in which the U.S. Issued a Compellent Threat during the Cold War (Pfundstein, 2012, p. 34)
Crisis # Crisis Name Opponent Demand
111 Turkish Straits USSR Accept agreement
on Turkish Straits 140 Korean War III China, North Korea Accept armistice
180 Pathet Lao
Offensive
Pathet Lao (USSR) Cease-fire
196 Cuban Missiles USSR Remove missiles
213 Pleiku North Vietnam Cease-fire
224 Pueblo North Korea Release ship
238 Black September Syria (USSR) Withdraw from
Jordan 249 Christmas Bombing North Vietnam Return to
negotiations
259 Mayaguez Cambodia Release ship
309 U.S. hostages in Iran Iran Release hostages
Table 2: Soviet Crises in which the Soviet Union Issued a Compellent Threat during the Cold War (Data from ICB data set Version 10)
Case # Crisis Name Opponent Demand
113 Communism in
Hungary
Hungary Accept Communist rule
115 Marshall Plan Czechoslovakia Stop asking the West for financial aid
123 Berlin Blockade France, U.K., U.S Don’t create a West-German state
152 Suez
Nationalisation-War
France, U.K., U.S., Israel Retreat 154 Poland Liberalization Poland Reinstate Communist rule 168 Berlin Deadline France, U.K., U.S.,
West Germany
Free City Ultimatum
222 Six Day War Israel, U.S. Retreat
227 Prague Spring Czechoslovakia Revoke Law
255 October-Yom
Kippur War
Israel, U.S. Retreat
315 Solidarity Poland Reinstate order
333 U-137 Incident Sweden Return Submarine
344 Able Archer 83 U.S. Pull Back troops
Variables
As mentioned earlier, Pfundstein’s (2012) variables and selection method will be used, with some alterations. The goal is to study potential differences between states in their usage of compellence threats, therefore some variables have to be altered to fit this scope as Pfundstein is not studying this. For this reason, ‘Compelled State Regime’ (ICB Codebook: REGIME) has been added to the variables. It would be interesting if the two contenders of the Cold War targeted similar or different types of regimes with
compellent threats. ‘Gravity of the crisis for the opponent’ has been left out, since that is not necessarily important for the differences between compellence policies. Gravity of Crisis for the opponent is more interesting when determining the outcome of a
compellence threat. For that same reason ‘Threat Executed’ and ‘If Threat Executed, Target’s Reaction’ have been left out. Threat executed means that the compellence threat has failed, which is not important for this thesis. The main interest of this thesis lies in the differences in compellence threats and the situations in which they arise between the two contenders. After these changes, the final variable selection that will help determine the differences between the two compelling contenders will consist of:
- Type of Compellence Threat
- Gravity of Crisis for Compelling State - Compelled State Response
- Threat by Coalition - Power Discrepancy - Compelled State Regime
Variable Classification
The crisis numbers and names are directly taken from the ICB dataset. The opponent is classified by Pfundstein as being the other crisis actor(s) identified by the ICB dataset or a state that was not a crisis actor, but was still the focus of the U.S. during the crisis (pp. 12-13).
The Gravity of Crisis for the U.S.- variable has been taken from the ICB dataset, which conceptualises the variable as ‘the object of greatest threat at any time during the crisis’ . It contains the following types of threats: - economic threat,- limited military 11 threat, - political threat,- territorial threat,- threat to influence in the international system or regional subsystem (threat to influence),- threat to grave damage and- threat to existence.
The variables ‘Compelled State Response’ variable is a binary variable that determines if a compelled state has complied or resisted the compellence threat. Pfundstein (2012) determines that a state ‘resists’ when the compelled state did not agree with the
compelling state’s demands after the threat is issued but before the threat has been executed. ‘Comply’ was used when the compelled state modified its behaviour in accordance to the compelling state’s demands (p. 28).
The Power Discrepancy variable has been coded by the ICB project by taking into account six different scores including: -size of population, -GNP, -territorial size, -alliance capability, -military expenditure and nuclear capability . All scores were 12 recorded at the onset of the crisis. Finally, the Threat of Coalition variable has been defined by Pfundstein (2012) as being coded ‘Yes’ if a state acts with- or on behalf of at least one other country (p. 28). If this is not the case, the case will be coded as ‘No’.
‘Threat Type’ is Pfundstein’s (2012) threat typology and has been conceptualized earlier on in ‘Cases’.
Case Studies
First, a short summary of the U.S. cases will be provided, after which they will be compared. This is followed by a description and comparison of the Soviet cases. After comparing the Soviet cases to each other, a comparison between both contender’s cases will be presented.
The U.S. Cases
Table 3. U.S. Compellence cases overview
Crisis # Crisis Name Opponent Threat Type Gravity of Crisis (U.S.) Compell-ed state response Threat by Coalition Power Discrepancy Compelled State Regime 224 Pueblo North Korea Passive implicit Threat to influence Resist No 16 Civil authoritarian regime 238 Black Septemb er Syria, USSR Passive implicit Threat to influence
Comply No 34 Military dual
authority & Civil authoritarian regime 391 Invasion of Panama
Panama Vague Threat to influence
Resist No 19 Military dual
authority
Pueblo (Case # 224)
The U.S.S. Pueblo was an environmental research ship or spy ship that may- or may not have entered North Korean territorial waters in 1968. North Korea claims it was a spy ship within their territorial waters; the U.S. claims it was an environmental research ship which was in international waters. As a response to this, North Korea captured the ship, taking the crew hostage . The U.S. responded by putting army- and airforce reservists 13 on standby and then dispatched naval power to the North Korean coast. During the Panmunjom Armistice talks, the U.S. demanded the return of the Pueblo and its crew.
North Korea refused because the U.S. would not admit that the ship was in North Korean waters, even after the U.N. declared that it was. Eventually North Korea released the crew of the U.S.S. Pueblo but kept the ship. The U.S. publicly apologized that the ship was within territorial waters, but disavowed it before they signed the agreement . 14
Black September (Case # 238)
The king of Jordan tried to adopt a more western way of life in the country, resulting in Palestinian immigrants/refugees trying to overthrow him in 1970 . In response, 15
Jordan’s king Hussein announced that he would change his cabinet to now include military personnel. The U.S. feared losing a powerful ally in the Middle East if Hussein was overthrown. Syria would see its influence over the region diminish if the
Palestinians were defeated.
Syria attacked Jordan, while Jordan prepared to strike the Palestinians. The U.S. decided to lend umbrella support to Jordan and Israel just in case the Soviet Union or Egypt became involved. The U.S. placed airborne divisions in Germany and navigated a naval fleet towards Lebanese shores together with an aircraft carrier which was sent to the Mediterranean. Syria eventually pulled back because of the threat of escalation and the losses at the hand of Jordan’s army .16
Invasion of Panama (Case# 391)
Panama wanted more control over the Panama canal, which has been in U.S. hands since 1903. The U.S. promised to transfer the Canal Zone to Panama in 2000 after several negotiations. This changed a year later when the U.S. promised that the Canal would become neutral ground. This would allow U.S. intervention for an undetermined amount of time. After a new regime was installed, violations of U.S. sovereignty over the Panama Canal began with the killing of a U.S. marine after which Panama declared
14 ICB Crisis Summary with additional material from the CIA report ‘North Korea Remains Unyielding in
Pueblo Crisis’(1968)
15 ICB Crisis Summary with additional material from R. Elphick’s ‘Black September’ (2006) & S.
Irving’s ‘Leila Khaled: Icon of Palestinian Liberation’ chapter 3: Black September (2012).
war on the U.S.. The U.S. responded by sending reinforcements to Panama to protect U.S. citizens from increasing government violence in the region. The U.S. also made declarations condemning Panama’s behaviour, but didn’t clarify if they were going to use force or not. Eventually, the U.S. did launch a twelve-day military campaign . 17
Comparing the U.S. cases
The first thing to look at in Table 3 is that in all three cases, the largest threat to the U.S. was the threat to influence in the international system or the regional subsystem. In the Pueblo crisis, the U.S.’s reputation was on the line. Even though the U.S.S. Pueblo was hardly of any significance materially to the U.S., they could not just let it slide and negotiate under the table with North Korea for the crew’s release. If they had not reacted, it was a signal to the rest of the world that other rogue states would get away with actions like this and U.S. allies would see U.S. threats as less credible.
The Pueblo crisis was a direct threat to U.S. influence caused by the U.S. and North Korea. The Black September crisis was a different kind of threat to the loss of influence. With the Black September crisis it was the threat of losing a strategically placed ally in an unstable environment. Both the Soviet Union and the United States were both trying to extend their sphere of influence in the Middle East. Jordan was an important ally to the U.S. in that it could deter an attack on Israel by Soviet-supported states like Egypt and Syria. The Black September crisis was more of strategic
importance while Pueblo was important to retain credibility. The threat to influence in the Panama Invasion crisis was like the Black September crisis. It was about the maintaining of U.S. influence over a strategic position, in this case the Panama Canal.
Another difference can be observed in whether an opponent resisted or not. In two out of three cases the opponents resisted. From those two resistances, only the Panama crisis led to military intervention while North Korea during the Pueblo crisis resisted by issuing counter demands. Syria in the Black September crisis eventually pulled back its forces from Jordan after the U.S. amassed large amounts of military personnel in the region and put them on alert in Europe.
The method of concentrating military forces in the crisis region seems to be an overlapping strategic method of the U.S. to convey their compellence threats. The Pueblo crisis and the Black September crisis are both labeled by Pfundstein (2012) as Passive Implicit threats. This means that the threat is communicated by movement of military assets to generate fear of future violence. On top of that, no specific demands or punishments are communicated (p.15). In the Pueblo crisis this was shown by putting U.S. reservists on high alert and sending an aircraft carrier with support towards the region of crisis. The same goes for the Black September crisis where an aircraft carrier was repositioned to the Mediterranean sea and U.S. bases in Germany were put on alert.
The Panama Invasion crisis is labeled as a Vague threat which is defined by Pfundstein (2012) as a threat that is ‘conveyed by public statement or private
communication, but lacks specificity in demands and/or punishment. The demands are ‘not… specified and the actions to be taken against the target… is vague or unspecified’ (p. 15). The U.S. did accumulate extra military personnel in Panama and prepared troops in the U.S., but after the war declaration on the U.S., the U.S. issued a public statement, pleading for peaceful resolutions. When that failed, the U.S. intervened. At first, the troop accumulation was seen as extra protective measures for Americans living in Panama. Only after the war declaration were U.S. responses seen as compellence. There is a difference between the Vague threat of the Panama Invasion crisis and the Black September and Pueblo crisis, but we do see a trend, that even though it is smaller in the case of the Panama Invasion crisis, of the U.S. showing its muscles to the
opponent as means of compelling states to obey the U.S.’s wishes.
The U.S. also does not tend to work in coalitions with regard to compelling an opponent. Even in the Black September crisis they refused to vocalise a compellence threat together with Jordan, out of fear that actively participating and aligning itself with Jordan would invoke a reaction from the Soviet Union and/or Egypt . In the Pueblo 18 crisis the U.S. even ignored the UN verdict that the U.S. was trespassing in North Korean waters and a similar thing happened during the Panama crisis, in which the 19
18 ICB Crisis Summary (#238) with additional material from Commander R. Mobely, U.S. Navy (2001) 19 ICB Crisis Summary (#224)
international community condemned the U.S.’s military intervention . 20
The Power Discrepancy numbers also show that the U.S. issues compellence threats when they have the material and economic advantage over the other state. It is however, interesting to observe that although the power discrepancy is lower in the Black September case, it was the only case which complied with U.S. demands. According to classical deterrence/compellence theory, the more power discrepancy there is between states in favour of the compelling state, the more logical it is for a state to concede to the compelling state’s demands . The Black September case was also the 21 only case in which a compelled country had access to international support, in this case Syria had potential support from Egypt and/or the Soviet Union. The other cases were on their own against the U.S., with North Korea not being on good terms with the Soviet Union at that time and Panama being an unaligned state. Yet they decided to resist.
Finally the U.S. seems to convey threats towards dissimilar state systems. All the opponents are classified as non-democratic, with North Korea being a Civil Authoritarian regime, Syria a Military Dual Authority, the Soviet Union, although engaged implicitly in the affair, a Civil Authoritarian regime and Panama having a Military Dual Authority regime. The difference between these types of regimes is whether a singular person, a party or the military is in charge, but all are far removed from being any type of democracy.
In conclusion, the most favoured U.S. compellence tactic seems to be the movement of forces to show muscle to maintain their sphere of influence in the world, whether it is about maintaining a strategic position or upholding their international reputation. The states that the U.S. attempts to compel do not adhere to classical coercion theory that in the case of a large power discrepancy, compelled states will concede. Finally, the U.S. compels states which have a dissimilar state system compared to their own.
20 ICB Crisis Summary (Case#391)
21See for example Schelling (1966) p. 350, taken out of ‘Essential Readings in World Politics’ by K.A.
The Soviet cases
Table 4. Soviet Compellence cases overview
Crisis # Crisis Name Opponent Threat Type Gravity of Crisis (Soviet) Compelled state response Threat by Coalition Power Discrepan-cy Compelled State Regime 168 Berlin Deadline France, U.S, U.K,West-Germany Open-en ded Threat of grave damage
Resist Yes -41 Democratic
regime
255 October-Yom Kippur
U.S, Israel Open-en ded
Threat to influence
Comply Yes 14 Democratic
regime
315 Solidarity Poland Vague Threat to influence
Comply Yes 40 Civil-
authoritarian regime
Berlin Deadline (Case# 168)
NATO announced it would station nuclear weapons in Western European countries, including West Germany. The Soviet Union’s reaction to this was to demand, under pressure from East-Germany, that the Allied forces declare Berlin a free, demilitarized city. If the West failed to comply, the Soviet Union would transfer their part of Berlin over to East-German rule, under which the signed treaties regarding access to
West-Berlin would not be upheld . The Soviet Union declared that the Western powers 22 had six months to come to terms with this demand before Berlin’s sovereignty would be handed over to East-Germany. Later on the same day, however, the Soviet Union
revoked the six month term. The Western countries refused to accept the Soviet Union’s demands, leading to a number of conferences to broker a deal. The West meanwhile prepared for another airlift. Eventually, an agreement was reached where there would be a ban on nuclear weapons in Berlin and a reduction of Western troops in the city . 23
22 ICB Data viewer, Crisis Summary #168; Mauer (1998), p. 55; Brecher (2009), Chapter 9. 23 ICB data viewer, Crisis summary #168.
October- Yom Kippur War (Case# 255)
Syria and Egypt launched an attack on Israel, who was taken by surprise but was able to turn the tide. Israel succeeded in pushing both aggressors back and started gaining ground. Several attempts from Israel and the Soviet Union on behalf of Syria were made to broker for a cease-fire, but failed soon after they were agreed on.
The Soviet Union turned to the U.S., demanding a halt to the Israeli advances, otherwise the Soviet Union would intervene unilaterally. The U.S. responded by pressuring Israel to stop fighting but did warn the Soviet Union that most of the U.S. armed forces were put on a high state of alert.
Eventually, all parties agreed to a Soviet - U.S. backed cease-fire with the borders of the Six-Day war as reestablished positions for all parties . 24
Solidarity (Case# 315)
This case is slightly different compared to the other cases in that it started with an intra-state conflict but became a inter-state conflict. Polish dock workers in Gdansk went on strike and made demands for better labour conditions. Some of these demands were seen as an attack on the Communist regime of Poland. The Polish regime first reacted by criticizing the striker’s demands and promising to surrounding communist regimes that Poland would resolve this problem. The strikes continued however and Poland’s ministers were summoned to Moscow.
Contingency plans were made because the Polish government seemed to agree to some concessions of the strikers. The contingency plans consisted of Soviet military mobilization surrounding Poland, including positioning military divisions in
Czechoslovakia and East Germany. Nothing seemed to change in Poland, so the Soviet Union sent a letter in which was stated that they were disappointed at the lack of Polish Communist leadership and ‘demanded radical measures’ . Poland complied, arresting 25 the entire leadership of the Solidarity movement . 26
24ICB data viewer, Crisis summary #255; Israelyan, 1995; Golan, 1999. 25 ICB data viewer, Crisis Summary, Case# 315.
Comparing the Soviet cases
The Soviet Union seems to be quite articulate when voicing their compellence threats with two out of three cases being ‘Open-ended’ compellence threat types. These types of threats consist of specific demands which are communicated by public statement or private communications. The only aspect that remains unspecified is the timeframe . 27 The Berlin Deadline-case came close to an Ultimatum threat, but was quickly turned back on the same day to an Open-ended threat by revoking the potential six month deadline to the demand that the West removes its troops from Berlin. During the Yom-Kippur October crisis, the Soviet Union also dealt an Open-ended threat by demanding from the U.S. that Israel pulls back, otherwise the Soviet Union would intervene. The remaining case, ‘Solidarity’, is labeled as a ‘Vague’ threat, which already has been specified in the U.S. case comparisons. In the Solidarity case, the Soviet Union compelled the Polish government by sending a stern letter that Poland had to get rid of the strikers or else-, with the ‘or else’ not being defined.
Another observation is that the Soviet Union seems to issue threats to similar regimes to itself, but also to different regimes. In the ‘Berlin Deadline’ crisis and the ‘October-Yom Kippur’ crisis the Soviet Union issued a threat to democratic countries, both of these were ‘Open-ended’ threats. Meanwhile they also issued a compellence threat to a fellow communist, Civil Authoritarian regime, to which they issued a ‘Vague’ threat. So whilst they show that there is a preference to compel dissimilar regimes, the Soviet Union seems slightly less held back in compelling states with similar regimes. They do, however, seem to use different type of compellence threats when they compel different kinds of regimes. A ‘Vague’ threat does give more leeway to the compelled state than an ‘Open-ended’ threat.
It is also shown that the Soviet Union prefers to issue their threats while being part of a coalition. In all three cases the Soviet Union issued a compellence threat on behalf of, or together with, at least one other crisis actor. This might be to boost
international legitimacy of issuing a threat, or an increased show of muscles towards the compelled state. In the Berlin Deadline crisis, the Soviet Union issued a compellence
threat under pressure- and together with East-Germany, while in the Yom-Kippur October crisis it issued a compellence threat on behalf of Syria and Egypt. In the Solidarity case the Soviet Union issued a compellence threat together with Czechoslovakia and East-Germany.
The Soviet Union also seems to have more success convincing states to comply, with only one case in which the opponent resisted. According to the study of these cases, the Soviet Union’s compellence behaviour upholds the theory in which if the compelling state is more powerful than the compelled state, the compelled state will concede. In the ‘Berlin Deadline’ crisis, there was a power discrepancy which was not in the Soviet Union’s favour, but they issued a threat anyway. The compelled states resisted the Soviet Union’s threat. In the other cases, where the Soviet Union had a military advantage over the opponents, both opponents eventually conceded to the Soviet Union’s wishes.
There is however, a distinctive difference in which circumstances the Soviet Union issued a compellence case against a group of countries which were stronger. It looks like the Soviet Union dared to issue a compellent threat against a group of states that were more powerful than it in the case of it facing a threat of grave damage. The other issued threats were issued with the threat to influence.
In conclusion, the Soviet Union seems to prefer being quite articulate when communicating a compellence threat. When they issue a compellence threat it can either be issued against a dissimilar political system, or a similar political system. It also seems that they would rather compel states when they are part of a coalition; in none of the studied cases has the Soviet Union issued an individual compellence threat. They issue compellence threats when they are facing a threat of grave damage or a threat to influence. Lastly, the Soviet Union seems to comply with classical denominators of deterrence/compellence theory: when they were the disadvantaged state regarding power discrepancy, their compellence failed. Their compellence succeeded however when they were in the stronger position regarding power discrepancy.
Comparing the Soviet- and U.S. cases
To provide a first impression of the comparison between the two states, a graph is presented which illustrates that there are some differences, but also some similarities between the U.S. and the Soviet Union regarding their compellence policies. The only variable excluded from the graph was the ‘Power Discrepancy’ variable because that was a variable determined by six different factors, which meant it did not fit in the statistical model. It is however, an interesting factor to take into consideration seeing as there are differences between the U.S. and Soviet Union regarding whether they would issue a compellence threat when they were in a position of superior strength or not.
It would have been possible to use the six individual variables that make up the Power Discrepancy variable, but that would have affected the validity of the results, seeing as there are only two states that are being compared. If there are too many variables with only two actors and three cases per actor, the chance of a Type 1 error increases and then the results will not be valid . Therefore, the Power Discrepancy 28 variable will be left out of the statistical analysis, but will be reviewed in a qualitative manner.
Furthermore, the ICB variable of Compelled Regimes has been altered. If the variable was used in a statistical analysis in the way that it is coded, it would show a big difference between the two countries because they both compel opposing regimes compared to their own regime. The Soviet Union and the U.S. both have dissimilar regimes and they both compel dissimilar regimes. The U.S. compels non-democracies and the Soviet Union compels mostly democratic states. These outcomes would show up as a big difference between the two contenders when used on a scale from
democratic to non-democratic in the graph. It should however, show a similarity as both contenders prefer to compel different type of state systems. For this reason, I have re-coded the Regime variable to a binary variable which tests if the two contenders compel dissimilar state types or not. The aspect of testing if the U.S. and the Soviet Union are compelling dissimilar states is more interesting than only looking to what
kind of opposing states they issue compellence threats to, since both contenders have different regimes.
Graph 1: Soviet & U.S. variable results compared
Variable # Variable 1. Gravity 2. Diss. Regime 3. Threat type 4. Coalition 5. Resist/Comply
As can be seen in the tables in the individual country reports and the graph, the two countries have some differences, but they also share similarities. According to the data, the differences between the two countries are not significant; F(1, 4) = 2.29, p = 0,205, r = 0,533. The results being significant or not, is not very important however. Since this is a small-N study, designed to fit in certain timeframe, it is not possible that this small sample gives an accurate projection of what is happening in the general population. The results presented in the graph however, do project an overview of the differences and similarities between the two contenders in the selected cases, which can guide further elaboration on the results.
Both states seem to feel most obliged to compel a state when they are facing a threat to their global or regional influence. A potential reason for this is that it is quite hard to create a credible threat of grave damage towards a super power. However, the Soviet Union was facing a threat of grave damage in one of the cases. That leads to the
second difference in which the Soviet Union seems to be willing to issue a compellence threat even when they have a negative level of power discrepancy, while the U.S. makes sure that they have a positive power discrepancy before they issue a compellence threat. The U.S. might do this because deterrence theory claims that threats issued with a positive power discrepancy for the compelling state are going to be successful . The 29 Soviet cases seem to explain this theory more clearly. With the U.S. cases, even in the case of a positive power discrepancy level, two out of three cases resisted. Meanwhile, only the case in which the Soviet Union had a negative power discrepancy score did the compelled states resist. In the other two cases, where the Soviet Union has a positive power discrepancy score, both compelled states complied.
The first difference between both countries seems to be their threat types. The U.S. seems to prefer passive-implicit threats. In every case they moved military assets as a show of force without clearly articulating demands, retribution or time limits. At least two aspects of these three components were missing in every case. The Soviet Union prefers a more vocal approach. Their preferred threat type were open-ended threats, clearly voicing demands and retributions, but they were less keen on implying time limits.
Both countries have issued ‘Vague’ threats, where demands are made, but retribution and time limits were not issued. For the U.S. cases, a ‘Vague’ threat was the most vocal way of how they issued a compellence threat, while for the Soviet Union it was the least vocal way.
Another major difference was the division in issuing a compellence threat while in a coalition or not. Both countries seem to have completely opposite preferences regarding issuing a compellence threat while in a coalition.
The U.S. seems to prefer to work alone regarding compellence. In the Pueblo case for instance, they even disregarded a U.N. verdict that stated that the U.S. was in North-Korean waters .30
The Soviet Union shows the opposite result; the Soviet Union only issued compellence threats whilst in a coalition. Although in two cases, the coalitions existed
29Schelling, 1966
of Soviet satellite states instead of independent states. Regardless if the coalition states were Soviet satellite states or not, it is still interesting to see that the Soviet Union seems to strengthen international legitimacy or increase its threat level by seeking out
coalitions before it issues a compellence threat.
Lastly, both states seem to favour issuing compellence threats to dissimilar regimes compared to their own regime. The U.S. compels civil authoritarian regimes and military dual authority regimes whilst the Soviet Union prefers to compel
democratic regimes. The Soviet Union does, however, display more variation in the regimes it influences. In the Solidarity case, the Soviet Union compels the Polish civil authoritarian regime. In this case, it is also interesting to notice that the Soviet Union issued a Vague threat instead of an Open-ended threat. This could indicate that even though the Soviet Union is willing to compel a similar regime, it does give the compelled state more leeway by using a Vague threat.
To conclude, some compelling differences and similarities can be found between the two contender’s compellence policies. Whilst the U.S. and the Soviet Union both seem to have fairly similar preferences regarding compelling different regimes and issuing compellence threats for similar reasons, the other variables indicate interesting differences between them. The U.S. and the Soviet Union have quite dissimilar
preferences regarding what type of compellence threats they issue and whether to issue them while being part of a coalition or not.
The remaining variables describing if a compelled state resisted or not and the power discrepancy levels show some similarity between the two states, but also some noteworthy differences. The Soviet Union cases for instance, seem to be more
applicable to support compellence theory than the U.S. cases, with two cases complying to Soviet demands and only one case in which the compelled states resisted. This was also the only case in which the compelling actor had a negative power discrepancy. The remaining power discrepancy levels of both contenders are all in their favour.
Conclusion
The comparison between the Soviet Union and the U.S. during the Cold War highlighted some interesting insights about both states’ preferences regarding
compellence threats. When we look at Table 3 & 4 detailing the case of both states and the graph comparing both states; there are some variables which yielded similar results between the two states, but also variables which showed dissimilarities.
Table 5 : Similarities and differences between the U.S. and the Soviet Union
Similarities Differences
Compelled dissimilar regimes Type of compellence threats Gravity of threat for compelling
state
Preference to work in coalitions
Positive power discrepancy levels Resistance of compelled states
Table 5 lends a simplified overview of the main differences and similarities, but these aspects do need further elaboration. The most interesting results are that both contenders seem to issue quite different type of compellence threats and the dissimilar levels of willingness to compel other states while in a coalition. The U.S. prefers to compel states by passive-implicit threats and work alone, while the Soviet Union is more keen on clearly communicating their threat through open-ended threats and making sure they work within a coalition.
The largest similarities were the observations that both countries seem to be inclined to compel dissimilar state systems, with the U.S. compelling non-democracies and the Soviet Union compelling democracies. Furthermore, they both seemed to compel states for similar reasons; mainly that both states were facing a threat to influence. Next, observations can be made about the reaction of the compelled states. For both contenders, they both seemed to favour a positive power discrepancy level when issuing compellence threats. The realist argument that a state will comply when threatened by a more powerful state does not seem to work for the U.S. though, with two out of three compellence cases resisting. For the Soviet Union this theory does
seem to work, with two out of three cases complying with Soviet wishes and one case resisting. This happens to be the only case in which the Soviet Union faced a negative power discrepancy score. While the graph in the comparison shows that the two have very similar scores numerically, the implications of the outcomes are quite different.
On top of researching the differences between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, implications for a larger goal can be made to further explore a research method for determining empirical differences regarding compellence policies of different states.
The results in this thesis are only based on two states with three cases each, compared against only six different variables. This makes it too limited to draw general conclusions compared to if all the cases per state were to be included, or more states were included.
Further collection of empirical observations on compellence policies and the comparison of those collections, can eventually assist with deepening compellence theory. It can lessen its Western-centric label or show that certain characteristics of the contemporary compellence theory need to be altered or can be firmer established, which the dominant theory-confirming case studies lack in their capacity.
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Appendix
Output SPSS
GLM gravty dissimilarregime threat coalition ResistComply BY actor /WSFACTOR=factor1 5 Polynomial
/METHOD=SSTYPE(3)
/PLOT=PROFILE(factor1*actor) TYPE=LINE ERRORBAR=NO MEANREFERENCE=NO YAXIS=AUTO
/CRITERIA=ALPHA(.05) /WSDESIGN=factor1 /DESIGN=actor.
Mauchly’s Sphericity test
Test of Within-Subject Effects
