Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hassan Rouhani:
A Trait Analysis
The role of leadership in the shift of Iranian Nuclear Policy
Bachelor Project: Political Leaders in International Relations Supervisor: F.E. Bakker
Abstract
This study compares the leadership traits of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hassan Rouhani. The main question is: what is the role of leadership traits in the shift of Iranian Nuclear Policy? By comparing Iran’s nuclear policy during Ahmadinejad and Rouhani’s presidency, this study will try to find out if the change in Iran’s nuclear behaviour from an aggressive one during Ahmadinejad’s presidency to a moderate one during Rouhani’s is due to leadership traits. This study will use Hermann’s ‘Leadership Trait Analysis’ to determine leaders’ leadership traits. The Profiler Plus software measures these traits and analyses the spontaneous interviews of both presidents. The goal is to find out if certain leadership traits influence behaviour in the nuclear policy decision-making process by analysing official reports of the IAEA, U.N. speeches and secondary literature.
Index
Abstract __________________________________________________________________________________ 2 Introduction _______________________________________________________________________________ 4 Literature Review ___________________________________________________________________________ 6 First Image ______________________________________________________________________________ 6 Leadership Trait Analysis __________________________________________________________________ 7 Most Similar System Design _______________________________________________________________ 10 Concepts ______________________________________________________________________________ 10 Islamic Republic of Iran _____________________________________________________________________ 11 Domestic political system _________________________________________________________________ 12 Method and Data __________________________________________________________________________ 14 Quantitative Content Analysis _____________________________________________________________ 14 Data collection _______________________________________________________________________ 14 Profiler Plus _________________________________________________________________________ 15 Results __________________________________________________________________________________ 16 Distrust of Others _______________________________________________________________________ 17 Analysis _________________________________________________________________________________ 19 Data collection _________________________________________________________________________ 19 Comparison Iranian Nuclear Policy _________________________________________________________ 20 Background information: Iran’s Nuclear Policy before 2005 ___________________________________ 20 Rejection E3 proposal vs. historic phone call with Obama _____________________________________ 20 Enrichment activities at Natanz vs. Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action __________________________ 22 Conclusion __________________________________________________________________________ 23 Other explanations ______________________________________________________________________ 24 Conclusion _______________________________________________________________________________ 26
Introduction
The Islamic Republic of Iran formed its nuclear program during the administration of president Rafsanjani (1989-1997) and continued under president Khatami (1997-2005). Although, Iran’s nuclear program dates back to the Revolution of 1979, when Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei restarted its nuclear program in 1984. It has been an important diplomatic topic since then (Davies, 2013, p. 220). Khamenei (1989-present) urged Rafsanjani and Khatami to defend Iran’s right and necessity of a nuclear program. Meanwhile, Western countries became more concerned with the idea that a nuclear Iran will challenge the fragile situation in the Middle-East. They feared that Iran’s nuclear program would set off a spiral of nuclear proliferation in the Middle-East and kill off the Non-Proliferation Treaty (Leonard, 2005). After the 2005 presidential elections, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad took the office of president of Iran. With Ahmadinejad’s presidency, the nuclear issue got a more confrontational tone (Moshirzadeh, 2007) and Iran’s Foreign Policy became more ‘aggressive’ when Ahmadinejad announced the continuation of nuclear enrichment. Severe sanctions by the U.N. and the U.S. followed which led to the disconnection of Iran from the global economic system. Iran’s aggressive new foreign policy posture created eight years of tension and rivalry between Iran and the Western powers (Davies, 2013, p. 208). In 2013, Hassan Rouhani won the presidential elections, and many believed that Rouhani would start a new chapter in Iran’s relations with the world. Within his first 100 days, Rouhani signed the Geneva Agreement with the P5+1 – the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany – countries. The Geneva Agreement guaranteed 8-billion-dollar cash inflow and no new sanctions in return for Tehran’s slowing down of enrichment activities and full implementation of international control over these activities provided further relief (Ehteshami, 2014). The Agreement has been the first step for the solution of the nuclear issue so far and it managed to sustain mutual trust for the next steps.
The question raises: what contributed to the change in Iran’s attitude towards the nuclear issue? While the foreign policy of the U.S. in the Middle East and the international sanctions by the E.U. and U.S. stayed the same during Iran’s presidential transition, Iran changed their nuclear policy decision-making. Did the individual leader influence this change? This study
analysed in relation to Iran’s Nuclear Policy. One tries to explain the shift from an aggressive nuclear policy during Ahmadinejad to a moderate one during Rouhani. The goal is to find out if variation in leadership traits influenced the nuclear policy decision-making. The dependent variable; Iran’s Nuclear Policy is analysed by looking at observable behaviour through specific agreements and policies in official reports by the IAEA, and speeches at the U.N. General Assembly held by Ahmadinejad and Rouhani regarding the nuclear issue. Finally, secondary literature is used for critical and historic analyses of the actions and words of both presidents.
Literature Review
First Image
The study of individuals in International Relations is underdeveloped. The grand theories such as Realism and Liberalism hold on to the idea that the international relations are explained on a systemic level, also known as the state-centric perspective. They ignore the individual level of analysis and assume that individuals cannot explain international relations since the human nature is constant. According to these theorists; individuals are rational and naturally act out of self-interest. Therefore, when explaining war; states should always be at war because every individual acts out of self-interest and has to defend itself. And since states are not always at war, human nature cannot explain why states go to war (Waltz, 1959, pp. 27-30). However, individuals are not all the same in principle and not every individual acts out of self-interest. Personalities, ideas, and beliefs of individuals differ, so it is possible that variance in these traits explains the differences in international relations. Therefore, human nature is not constant, but it varies (Byman & Pollack, 2001, pp. 111-112). Moreover, individuals make the decisions within a state (Hermann & Hagan, 1998). Ultimately, individuals build alliances and create threats that maintain or destroy a balance of power. Individuals set the goals, strategies, and capacities of states. Individuals determine how the state uses its resources to pursue their goals (Byman & Pollack, 2001, pp. 134-136).
Byman and Pollack confirm the stigma: focus on state-centric perspective is widely supported in the international relations. The idea prevails that individuals are unimportant in major events due to factors such as the anarchist system, domestic politics, and fixed institutions (Byman & Pollack, 2001, p. 108). The "macro attention" for states is implicitly accompanied by the message that structures between states matter. As a result of these structures, the individual will inevitably behave towards these structures (Gerring, 2007, p. 176). However, not only the structure of an anarchist system influences the behaviour of an individual, but the behaviour of an individual can also influence the structural system (Byman & Pollack, 2001, p. 109). Individual leaders not only influence the actions of their states, but their attitude also
foreign policy decision making (Keller, 2005, p. 207; Hermann & Hagan, 1998, p. 126). On that account, Hermann (1990) and Kaarbo (1997) emphasize that the focus should be on differences in leaders’ characteristics and behaviour to understand why these actors change their course in foreign policy (Hermann, 1990, p. 11; Kaarbo, 1997, p. 554). In light of the debate about the importance of the first image, this study looks into Ahmadinejad and Rouhani, and their influence on Iran’s Nuclear Policy. Iran’s nuclear policy and behaviour changed in 2005 when Ahmadinejad came into power. He ended the ongoing negotiations with the E.U. and restarted nuclear enrichment at various facilities in Iran. After eight years, Rouhani put a halt on the enrichment activities of Iran and restarted the negotiations with the E.U. and U.N. (Ehteshami, 2014). According to Warnaar (2013), the ideology of individuals drives Iranian foreign policy not self-interest and rationality, as the majority of scholars claim (Warnaar, 2013, p. 8). Hence, when trying to explain the shift in Iran’s Nuclear Policy from an aggressive one during Ahmadinejad to a moderate one during Rouhani (Haji-Yousefi, 2018, p. 238), one should consider the characteristic differences between Ahmadinejad and Rouhani’s and find out what their impact is on the decisions they make.
Leadership Trait Analysis
In the International relations a prominent approach to study individual leaders is the analysis of traits. In 1980 Margaret Hermann developed the “Leadership Trait Analysis” (LTA). The LTA determines a leader’s leadership style. The styles are developed around three queries: 1) Whether leaders respect or challenge constraints in their environment 2) Whether leaders are open or closed to information from their environment 3) What a leaders’ motivation is to seek their position. The combination of answers to these three questions determines a leader’s leadership style. Nevertheless, to answer the queries Hermann looks at certain leadership traits. These traits provide information regarding how responsive leaders are to constraints from their environment, how they process information, and what motivates them to act (Hermann, 2005, pp. 181-186). Hermann conceptualized seven leadership traits: belief in the ability to control events, need for power, self-confidence, conceptual complexity, task orientation, in-group bias and distrust of others. The believe in the ability to control events presents how strongly leaders perceive the extent of control over the situation (Hermann, 2005, p. 14). The need for power describes the desire to influence, control, or impact others (Hermann, 2005, pp. 16-17). Self-confidence indicates how leaders see their importance and ability to impact the environment. The degree of differentiation by an individual is the conceptual complexity trait. The task
orientation trait describes the motivation of leaders. Leaders are either moving the group towards the completion of a goal or maintaining the group and building a relationship (Hermann, 2005, pp. 22-24). In-group bias indicates the belief that one’s own group is most important. Leaders with high in-group biases are more likely to protect their group. Moreover, particular events are seen as a threat rather than an opportunity. The distrust of others shows how strongly individuals feel doubt or misgiving of others (Hermann, 2005, pp. 31-32). Table 1 illustrates the seven leadership traits within the three questions.
Table 1. Leadership traits from the LTA
Questions Traits Description
Responsiveness to constraints
Believe in ability to control events (BACE)
Perception of the extent to which leaders have control over the situation
Need for Power (PWR) Need to develop, maintain or regain one’s power
Openness to information Self-Confidence (SC)
Degree of self-importance and notion of abilities that leader has in the environment
Conceptual Complexity (CC) Degree of differentiation of complexity within political life Motivation for seeking
office Distrust of Others (DIS)
Feeling of doubt and misgiving towards others
Ingroup-bias (IGB) Believe that own group is the center of the world
Task Orientation (TASK)
Emphasis a leader places in interaction with others; problem solving or relation building
Source: Hermann (2002;2005)
Based on the scores of the leadership traits and the answers of the three questions, leaders can be divided into one of eight leadership styles: expansionistic, evangelistic, actively independent, directive, incremental, influential, opportunistic and collegial (Kaarbo & Hermann, 1998, pp. 243-249). Table 2 illustrates the leadership styles as a function of the three questions.
Table 2. Leadership Styles as a function of responsiveness to constraints, openness to information, and motivation
Motivation
Responsiveness to
Constraints Openness to Information Problem Focus Relationship Focus
Challenges constraints Closed to information
Expansionistic
(Focus of attention is on expanding leader’s, government’s, and state’s span of control)
Evangelistic
(Focus of attention is on persuading others to join in one’s mission, in mobilizing others around one’s message)
Challenges constraints Open to information
Actively Independent
(Focus of attention is on maintaining one’s own and the government’s
manoeuvrability and
independence in a world that is perceived to continually try to limit both)
Directive
(Focus of attention is on maintaining one’s own and the government’s status and acceptance by others by
engaging in actions on the world stage that enhance the state’s reputation)
Respects constraints Closed to information
Incremental
(Focus of attention is on improving state’s economy and/or security in
incremental steps while avoiding the obstacles that will inevitably arise along the way)
Influential
(Focus of attention is on building cooperative relationships with other
governments and states in order to play a leadership role; by working with others, one can gain more than is possible on one’s own)
Respects constraints Open to information
Opportunistic
(Focus of attention is on assessing what is possible in the current situation and context given what one wants to achieve and considering what important constituencies will allow)
Collegial
(Focus of attention is on reconciling differences and building consensus on gaining prestige and status through empowering others and sharing accountability)
Source: Hermann (2005) in Post, Jerrold M. (2003)
Crucially, the analysis is done on the basis of what one can observe regarding written or spoken material. Hermann assumes that the more leaders use certain words and sentences, the more important such content is to them (Hermann, 2005, p. 186). Hermann indicates that by analysing the content of what political leaders say, we can begin to learn something about the person they are showing in public (Hermann, 2002, p. 11).
Most Similar System Design
In order to say something about the influence of individual actors, one has to hold as many variables as possible stable. When as many variables as possible are hold stable and there are some differences found among the actors observed (Ahmadinejad and Rouhani), then the explanation for the phenomenon observed (Iran’s Nuclear Policy) would lie in the differences between our actors. Przeworski and Teune’s (1970) logic of Most Similar System Design (MSSD) is used. MSSD is a system of analysis used for comparative goals whereby the objects that are researched are as similar as possible on a number of specified variables, except with regard to one aspect. This aspect is what we are interested in (Anckar, 2008). One should consider all the factors that contribute to Iran’s Nuclear Policy decision-making in order to conclude what Ahmadinejad and Rouhani’s influence is.
Concepts
The independent variable is leadership and the dependent variable is Iran’s nuclear policy towards the West. By “the West” is meant the Western nations who are directly involved in and affected by Iran’s nuclear policy, e.g. the members of the E.U. and the U.S., because the debate on Tehran’s nuclear program mostly focusses on American and Israeli military threats and negotiations with the E.U. (Bahgat, 2006, p. 325).
According to Kaarbo & Hermann and as elaborated upon above, by leadership style is meant the ways in which leaders relate to those around them – whether constituents or other leaders – and how they structure interactions and the rules, norms and principles, they use to guide such interactions (Kaarbo & Hermann, 1998; Hermann, 2005, p. 181).
Nuclear Policy is part of Foreign Policy. “Foreign Policy” applies to policy towards the world outside states’ territorial borders. For example, going to war with another country or signing international agreements (Kaarbo et al, 2013, pp. 2-3). “Policy” includes specific decisions to sign a treaty/general guideline or to support initiatives. It includes observable behaviour by countries (Kaarbo et al, 2013, p. 4).
Islamic Republic of Iran
Iran’s nuclear program was initiated under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (1941-1979). An ambitious nuclear program was part of the Shah’s plan to modernize Iran. However, after the Revolution of 1979, in which Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini violently overthrew the Pahlavi dynasty, Tehran’s nuclear capability came to a halt. Khomeini stated that nuclear weapons were against Islam. In 1984, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei restarted Iran’s nuclear program, and this continued under Rafsanjani and Khatami. In the early 2000s, Tehran got accused of pursuing nuclear weapons, when two unknown facilities were revealed at Natanz and Arak. As a consequence, the IAEA and the E.U. engaged in negotiations with Iran to verify its commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Under NPT states have the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy (Bahgat, 2006, pp. 309-310). However, Iranian officials kept denying these accusations and claimed that their nuclear program was peaceful and not designed for military purposes but civilian ones (Bahgat, 2006, p. 307; Ehteshami, 2014). In 2005, Iran’s relations with the international community reached a new phase, when the IAEA noticed Iran’s failures to meet the obligations under the NPT. The newly elected Mahmoud Ahmadinejad immediately backed down from the Nuclear deal with the Europeans and began uranium enrichment. Following Ahmadinejad’s choice, a series of tough sanctions by the U.N. were imposed on Iran between 2006-2010 (Bahgat, 2006). The consequences complicated the daily lives of Iranian citizens. However, Ahmadinejad increased Iran’s nuclear activities and by 2010 their uranium enrichment process increased from 3% to 20% (Bowen & Brewer, 2011, p. 937). Iran’s tensions with the international community were high and after the 2013 elections, Hassan Rouhani took office. Rouhani was a well-known member of the political establishment in Iran. For many years, he has been a member of the Supreme National Security Council, the Expediency Council, and the Assembly of Experts. Moreover, Rouhani served under Khatami as Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator (Czulda, 2014, pp. 291-295). With Rouhani’s presidency a series of successful talks with the Western powers regarding Iran’s nuclear program started. Rouhani opened negotiations with the U.S. and signed the Geneva Agreement, which guaranteed no new sanctions in exchange for Iran’s slowing down of enrichment activities (Ehteshami, 2014). What contributed to this shift in Iran’s nuclear policy behaviour?
Many scholars stated that the change in Iran’s Nuclear Policy behaviour is due to domestic pressure on the government, economic sanctions from the international community, and the need to survive (Dehshiri, 2011; Hunter, 2010). After all, all states act within an
international system which limits the choices they can make. The policy changes of big powers in Iran’s region and the institutions of sanctions – also known as the “geopolitics” – are important to consider when trying to explain the change in Iran’s Foreign Policy (Kaarbo et al, 2013, p. 7). In addition, regardless of international circumstances, states also go in different directions due to internal factors. Leaders have to satisfy actors – e.g. the public and governmental organizations – and institutions within the countries (Kaarbo et al, 2013, p. 13). Nonetheless, Haji-Yousefi stated that these factors stayed the same during the transition from Ahmadinejad to Rouhani. The sanctions from the international community, the foreign policy of the great powers – mainly the U.S. – in the Middle-East, and the U.S. president are unchanged. Nevertheless, Iran’s Foreign Policy did change when president Rouhani seized power in 2013. The “geopolitics” so far do not offer an explanation for the change from confrontational to accommodational foreign policy. Therefore, to explain the shift in Iran’s foreign policy behaviour; one should consider a focus on the change of government (Haji-Yousefi, 2018, pp. 240-241).
Domestic political system
Iran has a complex political system, whereby the power is located in several organs (Davies, 2013, p. 213). The organs responsible for Iran’s foreign policy are the supreme leader, the president, the Council of the Guardian, the foreign minister, the National Security Council (NSC), and the majles, which is the Iranian Parliament. The Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, sits at the top of the political system for life. He has the final say on every major issue affecting Iran and he can veto presidential candidates and political decisions. Therefore, the president is not directly responsible for Iran’s nuclear standpoints and Iran’s negotiations with other nations. In short, the Iranian president depends on the endorsement and compliance of the supreme leader to legitimate and sustain the continuity of the regime. So, changes in the policy preferences of Khamenei or changes in the relationship between Khamenei and the Iranian president can trigger changes in foreign policy (Hermann, 1990, pp. 6-7). Khamenei has been the supreme leader since 1989 and did not get additional powers since then. This means that Ahmadinejad and Rouhani dealt with Khamenei in their own ways. Khamenei
As stated above, there is a structural hindrance to the president’s power in his subordination to the supreme leader (Kamrava & Hassan-Yari, 2004). However, Ahmadinejad and Rouhani have proven that their power is not as limited as one would think. Before Ahmadinejad’s presidency, it would have been incomprehensible to think that a president would be able to persuade the ruling clerics to concede to a certain political course. Ahmadinejad’s rhetoric led to the continuation of Iran’s nuclear program (Warnaar, 2013). Rouhani on the other hand persuaded the ruling clerics to start negotiating with the rest of the world and temporarily freeze key parts of its nuclear program (Czulda, 2014, p. 295). And thus, a leader’s influence can be constrained by the structure of the system, but in some settings what they are like as a person can play a critical role on policy outcomes (Kaarbo & Hermann, 1998, p. 245; Winter, 2003, p. 112; Greenstein, 1967). The individual characteristics of Ahmadinejad and Rouhani could have an important impact on Iran’s nuclear policy course.
Method and Data
This study consists of two parts: a quantitative content analysis through Hermann’s LTA and a qualitative content analysis of official reports by the IAEA, U.N. speeches and secondary literature.
Quantitative Content Analysis
The leadership style of Ahmadinejad and Rouhani is operationalized through Hermann’s Leadership Trait Analysis. LTA has been developed to ascertain leaders’ leadership style based on personality traits. These traits are discovered through a quantitative content analysis of written or spoken words. LTA is established on the counts of the frequency of certain words and sentences associated with a particular personality trait. Following this analysis, scores are presented on a scale from zero (low) to one (high) for each of the seven traits. To determine whether a leader scores high or low, the scores on the traits are compared to the average scores of Hermann’s most recent norming group of 284 political leaders (Hermann, 2002; Cuhadar et al, 2017).
Data collection
To generate the data for the LTA, Hermann’s criteria are followed. First, Hermann states that two types of sources can be analysed: speeches orinterviews. Hermann prefers interviews over speeches. She states that interviews are more spontaneous than speeches. Leaders are less in control of what they say because they have to respond quickly without help and they have little influence over the setting and questions. Speeches are mostly written by speechwriters or staff members for a certain audience. As a result, there might be the risk that one determines the personality of the speechwriter rather than the leader in question (Hermann, 2005, p. 2). Hence, a random selection of interviews is gathered during Ahmadinejad’s presidency from August 2005 until August 2013 and Rouhani’s from August 2013 until 2017. Moreover, the content should span the political leader’s tenure in office and should cover various topics to ensure that the LTA scores are not context-specific. Leaders may have a different style when dealing with
not always accurately express the meaning as it was intended. Hermann stated that the difference between texts in original language and translated is minor (Hermann, 2002, p. 40). McClelland & Winter also stated that translation is no issue for the motive of the leader (McClelland, 1961, p. 114; Winter, 1973, pp. 92-93). So, until the LTA is available in more languages an assessment of a profile based on non-English interviews is for now the most valid measurement. Moreover, there has been studies of Turkish, Chinese and Israeli leaders whereby they also used translated interviews (Kesgin, 2019; Cuhadar et al, 2017; Kesgin, 2012; Aylin et al, 2011; Kai & Huiyun, 2013; Hudson, 2008). On the whole, the translation issue must be taken into consideration when discussing the results.
The interviews are collected from international newspapers and -broadcast stations. Ahmadinejad’s interviews are from: ABC News, Channel 4, Cable News Network (CNN), Columbia University, Der Spiegel, National Public Radio (NPR), National Broadcasting Company (NBC) News, Russia Today, New York Times, and Time Magazine. Rouhani’s interviews are from: The Financial Times, Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS), CNN, NPR, and Public Broadcasting Service (PBS). See the appendix for all the interviews.
Profiler Plus
The leadership style of an individual can be operationalized and measured through the software program Profiler Plus 1. Profiler Plus performs a quantitative content analysis of verbal output.
The verbal content will be analysed and scores on seven traits will be presented from zero to one. Hermann indicated that in order to carry out a reliable LTA, one must analyse texts that contain 50 interview responses of one hundred words or more in length. Which brings us to at least 5000 words to determine an adequate assessment (Hermann, 2005, p. 3). This way there are enough words available to perform an accurate analysis and generate reliable results. Profiler Plus analyses texts in English and partially Spanish. In this case, English texts are analysed.
Results
Table 2 shows the LTA-scores of Ahmadinejad and Rouhani in comparison with the norming group of 284 political world leaders.
Table 2. Leadership Trait Analysis of Ahmadinejad and Rouhani compared to the norming group
Traits Ahmadinejad Rouhani
World Leaders N=284 Average (SD) Ahmadinejad score in relation to norming group Rouhani score in relation to norming group Believe in ability
to control events 0,2932 0,3198 0,35(0,05) Average Average
Need for power 0,1971 0,2568 0,26(0,05) Average Average
Self-confidence 0,374 0,4474 0,36(0,10) Average Average
Conceptual
complexity 0,5391 0,541 0,59(0,06) Average Average
Distrust of others 0,1573 0,3038 0,13(0,06) Average High
Looking at the LTA scores of Ahmadinejad and Rouhani, both leaders score average on the belief to control events, need for power, self-confidence, and conceptual complexity. Moreover, both leaders score low on in-group bias. Which indicates that both leaders do not have a strong believe that one’s own group is the centre of the political world. Hence, Ahmadinejad and Rouhani’s scores do not differ on the five traits mentioned above. However, their scores do differ on distrust of others and task orientation. Ahmadinejad scores average on distrust of others while Rouhani scores two standard deviations higher than Ahmadinejad on distrust of others. This indicates that Rouhani is significantly more distrustful of others than Ahmadinejad. On task orientation, Ahmadinejad scored one standard deviation lower than Rouhani, who scored average. This means that Ahmadinejad focusses more on building relationships than Rouhani (Hermann, 2002, p. 26).
Since no other trait is significantly different between the leaders – except for distrust of others and task orientation – this study will not focus on the difference of a leaders’ leadership style but the difference in leadership traits. More specifically, this paper will only focus on the score difference on distrust of others and not the score difference on task orientation. The reason is that, the main question in this research is to determine why Iran’s nuclear policy changed towards the Western nations. Therefrom, one wants to determine the motivation of this change. To do this, one has to focus on the in-group bias and distrust of others trait because these traits indicate what a leader’s motivation is towards the world. The task orientation trait, on the other hand, indicates the motivation of a leader for seeking office (Hermann, 2005, pp. 197-199). This is not what this study is interested in. Therefore, the difference on the task orientation trait is not examined. And since Ahmadinejad and Rouhani did not differ on in-group bias (both scored low) the main focus is on the distrust of others trait.
According to the MSSD logic, the difference on distrust of others between Ahmadinejad and Rouhani can explain the change in Iran’s attitude towards the rest of the world regarding its nuclear program.
Distrust of Others
Distrust of others implies “a general feeling of doubt, misgiving, and wariness about others” (Hermann, 2005, p. 202). Rouhani scored two standard deviations higher than Ahmadinejad on distrust of others. This indicates that Rouhani tends to be more suspicious and worried than Ahmadinejad about the motives and actions of others, especially those who are against his ideology, cause, and are seen as competitors (Hermann, 2005, p. 203). When leaders distrust
others, they question the motives underlying others’ behaviour (Keller, 2005, p. 842). Therefore, they do not rely on others because they are afraid of sabotage. This implies that they are less cooperative. Rouhani would be more closed and more discouraged to cooperate with others than Ahmadinejad. As a consequence, Rouhani might be isolating Iran in the international arena. Furthermore, distrust of others can cause a zero-sum worldview – when someone wins, someone else loses (Hermann, 2005, p. 203). The longing not to lose causes the leader to question and assess others’ motives which means that Rouhani might question the motives of others more than Ahmadinejad and would therefore not be willing to participate in policy-making. Leaders who score low on distrust of others are more likely to put things into perspective (Hermann, 2005, p. 203). Hence, Rouhani would be jumping into conclusions and would see the world more in black-and-white than Ahmadinejad who has an average score.
Analysis
The second part of this study is to link Hermann’s leadership trait: distrust of others to Iran’s nuclear policy behaviour through a qualitative content analysis of official reports, U.N. speeches, and secondary literature.
Data collection
For the examination of agreements, treaties, and policies between Iran and other states or international organization regarding the nuclear issue, reports from the U.N. organizations – the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) – are used from the start of Ahmadinejad’s presidency in 2005 until the end of president Obama’s presidency in 2017. This period is chosen since the attitude of the U.S. under Obama’s regime can be hold stable. During Ahmadinejad and Rouhani’s transition both encountered in their way with president Obama. Therefore, this factor is stable. Official reports by the Iranian government are not analysed, because they are hard to obtain and mostly in Farsi. The data is selected by first analysing the timeline from 2005-2017 of every agreement and report made by Ahmadinejad and Rouhani regarding Iran’s nuclear program with the IAEA 2. Following this timeline, the details on the agreed treaties,
agreements, and policies are further analysed through the reports that the IAEA published 3.
The annual speeches at the U.N. are analysed to look for rhetoric by both presidents regarding the nuclear issue. This study only focuses on the U.N. speeches since leaders share their policies, ideas and opinions to the entire international community. Furthermore, analysing speeches to the same audience and on the same stage by two different Iranian leaders allows for the observation of differences in rhetoric that reveal a change in the way each of them displays himself and the state he is representing (Kayam, 2017, p. 165). Moreover, both Iranian presidents gave limited speeches to the foreign press, which leave the U.N. speeches. The speeches are also examined from 2005-2017 for the same reasons as described above. Since the speeches are given annually, the speeches from 2005-2017 are analysed. Ahmadinejad gave eight speeches at the U.N. and Rouhani three. The secondary literature is used for critical analysis of both leaders and their actions.
To analyse the sources for the distrust of others trait, one needs a systematic way of analysis. Therefore, indicators for distrust are used. First, leaders can use mistrustful, doubtful, and sceptic language when they perceive harmful actions. Second, according to Hermann
suspicion leaders are less likely to cooperate with others, therefore they tend to isolate themselves (Hermann, 2003). So, when a leader does not cooperate with other countries, does not participate in negotiations with other leaders, and does not follow agreements, these actions can all be seen as distrustful acts. Table 3 shows the indicators for distrust of others.
Table 3. Indicators for Distrust of Others
Trait Indicators
Distrust of others Distrustful, doubtful, and sceptic language towards other persons, groups, or countries
Acts that indicate non-cooperation and isolation towards other persons, groups, or countries.
Source: Hermann (2005) in Post, Jerrold M. (2003)
Comparison Iranian Nuclear Policy
Background information: Iran’s Nuclear Policy before 2005
In 2002, Iran revealed its covert development of nuclear fuel cycle including uranium enrichment (Bowen & Brewer, 2011, p. 923). In the years that followed, Iran consistently argued that under NPT Tehran was not allowed to develop weapons of mass destruction for military goals (Bowen & Kidd, 2004). October 2003, former Iranian president Khatami started negotiations with the E3 (France, U.K. and Germany) and in November 2004, the Paris Agreement was signed by both parties. The Agreement stated that the E3 recognized Iran’s right to peaceful produce nuclear energy under the NPT. In return, Iran would temporarily suspend their enrichment and commit to operate with the E3 to find a long-term solution 4.
Rejection E3 proposal vs. historic phone call with Obama
In 2005, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected president. Shortly after Ahmadinejad came into office, he backed down from the Nuclear Deal. Ahmadinejad rejected the E3 proposal – earlier
alter to nuclear weapons 5. In return, the E3 would offer economic support (Bowen & Brewer,
2001, pp. 933-934). Shortly after Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesman stated that Iran would restart its uranium activities in Isfahan 6. This was in violation with the Paris Agreement of
2004. Ahmadinejad’s choice to reject the E3 proposal and continue enrichment at the facility are signs of non-cooperation. Non-cooperating is an indicator for a distrustful leader, and yet Ahmadinejad scored average on distrust of others. Ahmadinejad’s average score on distrust and his actions in his first year as Iran’s president do not match up.
On the other hand, Hassan Rouhani’s first act as Iran’s president was to start negotiations with the “Great Satan” – the U.S – and talk about diplomatic improvements. Immediately after Rouhani entered office in August 2015, he reached out to Barack Obama in a historic telephone conversation about the nuclear issue. Apart from the fact that this was the first conversation between an Iranian president and an U.S. president in more than 30 years (Czulda, 2014, pp. 291-295), both leaders also expressed their desire to improve diplomatic relations and start negotiations on the nuclear issue (Hadžikadunić, 2014, p. 10). On top of that, Iranian foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry agreed to a rendezvous regarding the nuclear deal (Monshipouri & Dorraj, 2013, p. 133). This was a historic moment for both nations. Distrustful leaders do not want to cooperate with others, because they question the motives of others and are afraid of sabotage (Hermann, 2005, p. 203). Nevertheless, Rouhani (who scored high on distrust of others) does the opposite. His first act is to enter into negotiations with the U.S., which does not display his high score on distrust of others. Moreover, Hermann stated that distrustful leaders can have a zero-sum worldview (Hermann, 2005, p. 203). However, Rouhani’s agreement with the “enemy” indicates that he does not have a zero-sum worldview about its relationship with the U.S.
Looking at their first speeches at the U.N. General Assembly, both leaders are seeking to bring the same message but in different ways. Both leaders emphasize Iran’s right to pursue a peaceful nuclear program. In 2006, Ahmadinejad said: “All our nuclear activities are transparent, peaceful and under the watchful eyes of the IAEA inspectors”. Rouhani stated almost the same in 2013 “Iran’s nuclear program pursue exclusively peaceful purposes…”. The difference is in the tone both leaders have against the western powers. Ahmadinejad speaks of the U.N. and the West in terms of the other – referred to as some powers or those. Ahmadinejad’s other has a negative connotation whereby he emphasized the cruelty and hypocrisy of the West at the expense of others. In 2005 for instance he called the West
hypocritical because they are disproving Iran’s nuclear right but not others: “some powerful states practice a discriminatory approach against access of NPT members to peaceful nuclear technology…” The way Ahmadinejad speaks in terms of the other displays Ahmadinejad’s low score on in-group bias. In his first speech at the Assembly, Rouhani only spoke of its willingness to cooperate with the West in order to solve their concerns about Tehran’s program (Kayam, 2017, p. 182) and to not increase tensions with the U.S. In 2013, Rouhani stated: “Iran seeks constructive engagement with other countries based on mutual respect and common interests, and within the same framework does not seek to increase tensions with the U.S.” Ahmadinejad uses strong language, while Rouhani softens the Iranian tone. Again, distrustful leaders would be sceptic about others and would therefore not engage in cooperative ways, whereas leaders who score low on distrust would engage with others. Ahmadinejad, who scored average on distrust of others, is sceptic about the western powers and Rouhani, who scored high on distrust, is willing to engage and show mutual respect. The words of both leaders are inconsistent with their scores on distrust of others.
Enrichment activities at Natanz vs. Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
February 2006, Ahmadinejad ended voluntary inspections by the IAEA which were granted in the Additional Protocol 7 and resumed enrichment at Natanz. In July 2006, Europe responded
to Iran with new incentives in the hopes that Iran would halt its enrichment program. Nevertheless, Ahmadinejad refused to acknowledge the deadline for an answer. Therefore, at the end of July the U.N. Security Council passed a mandatory resolution; instructing Iran to suspend its nuclear fuel activities. Iran did the opposite and small activities in Natanz went on (Jafarzadeh, 2007, p. 32). As a reaction, the U.N. released its first sanctions on Iranian businesses supporting the nuclear program under UNSCR 1747 in 2007, following UNSCR 1803 in 2008 (Bowen & Brewer, 2011, p. 934). Even after the sanction, Ahmadinejad refused to comply with western demands to suspend nuclear activities. In his 2006 speech, he was critical of the West and blamed them for the injustice in the world: “some occupy the homeland of others thousands of kilometres away from their borders, interfere in their affairs and control their oil and other resources… while others are bombarded daily in their own homes…”
continued their demands, “they are the ones who will suffer” (Jafarzadeh, 2000, p. 32). Rouhani also criticized the West in his 2014 speech, but at the same time he continuously expresses his willingness to cooperate with the West. In 2014, Rouhani stated: “democracy is not an export product that can be commercially imported from the West to the East...” but also “…Iran is prepared to engage immediately in time-bound and result-oriented talks build mutual confidence…” Distrustful leaders would not comply with others. Ahmadinejad’s average score does not account for his non-compliance with others concerning agreed treaties. Similarly, Rouhani’s willingness to cooperate with the West does not display his high score on distrust. After a year in office, Rouhani and the P5+1 agreed in November 2014 on a Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) which stated that Iran would limit its nuclear capabilities in exchange for dismantling international sanctions (Kayam, 2017, p. 163). Additionally, a Framework for Cooperation (FFC)was agreed upon in which Iran and the IAEA stated to cooperate further and to give IAEA inspectors access to Iran’s nuclear facilities (Monshipouri & Dorraj, 2013, p. 137). Following the JPOA in July 2015, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was signed by Iran and the P5+1. The JCPOA would limit centrifuges at the enrichment facility in Natanz. In January 2016, the IAEA declared Tehran’s compliance with all the limits and rules under JCPOA. This led to mitigating sanctions for Iran 8. Consistent with his previous attitude,
Rouhani enters into negotiations. This time with the permanent members of the UNSC and the IAEA and agrees to open Iran’s nuclear facilities for control. Tehran’s compliance pays off when the sanctions against Iran are softened. Nevertheless, distrustful leaders would isolate themselves rather than to enter into negotiations. Rouhani’s high score on distrust is again not presented in his actions.
Conclusion
In sum, in the eyes of a distrustful leader the other cannot do anything right and therefore distrustful leaders resist to cooperate (Hermann, 2002, p. 31). Ahmadinejad’s approach regarding the nuclear issue was characterized by a refusal to accept the agreements and limits agreed upon and by determination to restart the enrichment activities. His approach found its expression in catchphrases like “resistance” and “steadfastness” which implied determination to fight “bullies” and secure Iran’s “rights” (Tahler et al, 2010, p. 96). Still, looking at Ahmadinejad’s score on the trait (average distrust of others), the score does not display
https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/iaea-director-Ahmadinejad’s actions and rhetoric noticed so far. https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/iaea-director-Ahmadinejad’s rhetoric regarding fighting bullies and resistance against other western nations actually implies a suspicion and non-cooperating view, belonging under a high score on distrust of others. Likewise, Rouhani’s high score on distrust of others should indicate suspicion and sceptic towards the motives of othe others. Nevertheless, Rouhani’s emphasis on “negotiations” and “engagement” with the Western nations shows the opposite. Moreover, the multiple agreements that Rouhani agreed upon with the U.N. and the IAEA implies that Rouhani is willing to cooperate with the Western nations and does rely on them. Rouhani’s acts are acts of cooperation not confrontation and isolation. Therefore, Rouhani’s high score on distrust of others is neither reflected in his words nor his actions as has been accounted so far.
Hence, both Ahmadinejad and Rouhani’s scores on distrust of others are inconsistent with their words and actions regarding the nuclear program. It is not plausible that the difference in distrust of others between Ahmadinejad and Rouhani changed their nuclear policy decisions because this distrust does not fit their actions and words as been shown so far. The actor-centric perspective does not offer an explanation for the shift in Iran’s nuclear policy. For that reason, in Iran’s case one should consider other explanations.
Other explanations
What could be other explanations for Tehran’s changing attitude towards the nuclear issue? Looking back at the grand theories, realists argue that states exist in an anarchic international system in which mistrust is inevitable and therefore states must rely on itself to protect their national security. Since nuclear weapons have enormous destructive power, every state that tries to maintain its national security must be in balance with any rival state that develops nuclear weapons by gaining access to nuclear deterrence itself (Sagan, 2007, p. 57). Iran has a rivalry history with the U.S. and U.K., bad relations with the Arab neighbours and has to deal with a nuclear monopoly of Israel in the region. It seems that Iran has a rational balance-of-power incentive to develop weapons of mass destruction and to maintain against domination by other powers. As shown during the Iran-Iraq war during the 1980s, Iran has very few international allies and if invaded they could not expect support (Davies, 2013, pp. 217-218).
logic of mutual deterrence arises and the incentives of both actors to wage war against each other would be reduced (Waltz, 2012, pp. 399-400). In short, the grand theories do offer an explanation why Iran wants to develop a nuclear program. Despite that, it fails to explain why Iran changed its attitude towards the nuclear issue. It is still unclear why Iran changed its nuclear policy.
Another explanation for why the difference in distrust of others between Ahmadinejad and Rouhani is not visible in Iran’s nuclear policy change could be the LTA method. The LTA scores could be not reliable, since the spontaneous interviews are not analysed in their original language. The interviews of Ahmadinejad and Rouhani with the foreign press are all held in Farsi but translated by professionals from the international newspapers and/or -broadcast station into English text. The translation of spoken Farsi words into English text can have an effect on the results. Mehvar (2019) made a comparison of Ahmadinejad’s interviews on the conceptual complexity trait. She took ten interviews translated into English and ten interviews in the original language Farsi. The scores obtained from the original documents indicated that Ahmadinejad scored low on conceptual complexity. However, the scores on the translated texts indicated that Ahmadinejad scored average on conceptual complexity. Hence, there was a significant difference between the translated scores and original scores on the conceptual complexity trait (Mehvar, 2019, p. 7). So, which score is more valid? If the scores from the original documents were lower than the scores from the translated text, maybe the same applies to this study. Perhaps if the original texts were analysed, Rouhani would not score two standard deviations higher on distrust of others than Ahmadinejad but also average or even below average. The same is true for Ahmadinejad. Mehvar states that a lot of conceptual complexity words are not recognized when Farsi texts are translated into English (Mehvar, 2019, p. 5). Thus, there is a classification error when translated material is used. If one would analyse the original language, the classification of these words would be better and therefore the scores on these traits more valid. Moreover, Iranian leaders use a lot of religious statements from the Quran in their speeches. These statements can be directly translated, which results into translations that do not always express the meaning as it was intended. So, when these texts are analysed in the original language one is more able to classify the words into the right trait since one is more able to understand the context of the words.
Conclusion
This study tried to find out if the change in Iran’s nuclear policy behaviour from an aggressive one during Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidency to a moderate one during Hassan Rouhani’s presidency was due to the difference in leadership traits. The goal was to find out if certain leadership traits influenced behaviour in the nuclear policy decision-making process by analysing official IAEA reports, U.N. speeches, and secondary literature. Hermann’s LTA determined Ahmadinejad and Rouhani’s leadership traits. The leadership traits for both presidents remained fairly the same except on distrust of others and task orientation. Since this study wanted to examine the motivation of a leader towards the world and not for seeking office, this study only focused on distrust of others. It tried to explain if the differences in distrust of others caused the change in Iran’s nuclear policy decisions. After closely examining U.N. speeches and agreements with the IAEA, one concluded that it is implausible that the difference on distrust of others caused the shift in Iran’s nuclear policy decision. Ahmadinejad’s average score on distrust and Rouhani’s high score on distrust were both not displayed in their words and actions. As a matter of fact, Rouhani’s openness for negotiations and soft tone at the U.N. Assembly proved the contrary. Hence, if both presidents’ score did not reflect their image, one can conclude that the difference in Tehran’s nuclear policy decision cannot be explained by the difference in distrust of others between Ahmadinejad and Rouhani.
Looking back at the grand theories in IR, the grand theories also failed to explain why Tehran changed their attitude towards the nuclear issue. So, looking at the LTA method one could say that the scores are probably not reliable since the material has not been analysed in its original language. The translation of Farsi spoken words to English text can have an effect on the results as Mehvar showed in her research. Maybe the scores would be different when the interviews are analysed in the original language. One way to find out is that there should be more research into a Persian coding scheme for the LTA. When more leadership traits are analysed in English and Farsi, one can determine if the same implications are notable as in Mehvar’s research. In Iran’s case are the LTA results based on English translated material for now not reliable.
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Appendix
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad interviews 2006-2012
1) Mahmoud Ahmadinejad interviewed by Der Spiegel on May 30, 2006. Available at:
http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/spiegel-interview-with-iran-s-president-ahmadinejad-we-are-determined-a-418660.html
2) Mahmoud Ahmadinejad interviewed by NBC on September 20, 2006. Available at: http://www.nbcnews.com/id/14911753/print/1/displaymode/1098/
3) Mahmoud Ahmadinejad interviewed by Columbia University on September 25, 2007. Available at: https://www.globalresearch.ca/full-transcript-of-ahmadinejad-speech-at-columbia-university/6889
4) Mahmoud Ahmadinejad interviewed by Channel 4 on September 13, 2007. Available at: http://www.channel4.com/news/articles/politics/international_politics/full+transcript+ahm adinejad+interview/797347.html
5) Mahmoud Ahmadinejad interviewed by CNN on September 23, 2008. Available at: http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0809/23/lkl.01.html
6) Mahmoud Ahmadinejad interviewed by The New York Times on September 25, 2008. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/26/world/middleeast/26iran-transcript.html
7) Mahmoud Ahmadinejad interviewed by NPR on September 24, 2009. Available at: https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=113175352&t=1539204721585 8) Mahmoud Ahmadinejad interviewed by NBC News on September 18, 2009. Available at:
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/32913296/ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/t/transcript-interview-irans-ahmadinejad/#.W75mFC-iG8U
9) Mahmoud Ahmadinejad interviewed by CNN on September 25, 2009. Available at: http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0909/25/lkl.01.html
10) Mahmoud Ahmadinejad interviewed by TIME on September 25, 2009. Available at: http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1926224,00.html
11) Mahmoud Ahmadinejad interviewed by ABC News on September 21, 2011. Available at: https://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2011/09/full-transcript-interview-with-president-mahmoud-ahmadinejad-of-iran/
12) Mahmoud Ahmadinejad interviewed by Russia Today on August 14, 2011. Available at: https://www.rt.com/politics/ahmadinejad-exclusive-interview-rt/
13) Mahmoud Ahmadinejad interviewed by CNN on October 23, 2011. Available at: http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1110/23/fzgps.01.html
14) Mahmoud Ahmadinejad interviewed by Fareed Zakaria on CNN on September 30, 2012. Available at: http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1209/30/fzgps.01.html
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad U.N. General Assembly Speeches
1) Ahmadinejad to the U.N. General Assembly on September 17, 2005. Available at: https://www.un.org/webcast/ga/60/statements/iran050917eng.pdf
2) Ahmadinejad to the U.N. General Assembly on September 19, 2006. Available at: https://www.un.org/webcast/ga/61/pdfs/iran-e.pdf
3) Ahmadinejad to the U.N. General Assembly on September 25, 2007. Available at: https://www.un.org/webcast/ga/62/2007/pdfs/iran-eng.pdf
Hassan Rouhani interviews 2013-2017
1) Hassan Rouhani interviewed by Ann Curry on September 18, 2013. Available at: http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_ news/2013/09/18/20561148-irans-president-rouhani-we-will-never-develop-nuclear-weapons, accessed on October 17, 2013.
2) Hassan Rouhani interviewed by The Financial Times on November 29, 2013. Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/22bbf304-58e2-11e3-a7cb-00144feabdc0.
3) Hassan Rouhani interviewed by NPR on September 28, 2015. Available at:
https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2015/09/28/443982798/transcript-iranian-president-hassan-rouhanis-full-npr-interview
4) Hassan Rouhani interviewed by CNN on September 18, 2017. Available at: http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1709/18/ampr.01.html
Hassan Rouhani U.N. General Assembly Speeches
1) Hassan Rouhani to the U.N. General Assembly on September 24, 2013. Available at: https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/68/IR_en.pdf
