New players, new entries?
The connection and influence of the private military and security industry on political assistants of the ministry of Defense in the Netherlands
B.W.Dencher S1743546
Master thesis Crisis and Security Management Faculty Governance and Global Affairs
University Leiden
Supervisor: Dr. C.F. van den Berg Final version: 23 March 2017
Summary
A new functionary made its debut across different parliamentarian systems in in the 1980s and 1990s. Ministers were increasingly faced with a deficiency in both their own capacity and capability to respond adequately to the growing demands placed on them by the civil service, parliament and the then emerging 24-hour media circus. To ensure their own political survival, ministers appointed political advisors to their side. With the first of these appointments in the Netherlands in 1994, political assistants have become a common and accepted sight in the governmental and political elite of the Netherlands. While first being scrutinized as shadowy figures, political assistants are now widely believed to have a positive effect on the workings of government.
The first wave of research, domestically and international, found that the political assistants could serve as channels for the unwarranted influence of lobbyists and interests groups due to their function as gatekeepers, and trusted aides, to the minister. However, the first wave of research is seen to be inconclusive on this issue. This thesis has sought to provide an answer to this question by examining the connections between the private military and security industry and political assistants working at the ministry of Defense and if the former uses the latter to exert influence on the Defense policy of the Netherlands. The findings of this research, based on interviews with several political assistants, an unique dataset containing information on all political assistants since 1994 and an extensive literature study, show that a connection that would allow even the most occasional influence to be extorted on the Defense policy does not exist between political assistants of the ministry of Defense and the private military and security industry.
The interviewed insiders do hint that a connection exists at other levels of the Defense organization, with former military personnel becoming lobbyist and utilizing their connections to their former colleagues. The unwarranted influence of the private sector could therefore still exist but seems to ignore the political assistant. This does not imply that their relevance for the private sector will remain low, as the function of the political assistant is continuously evolving and might one day possess a level of influence over Defense policy. It is therefore of importance to conduct further, and a wider, research into political assistants and their connection to the private sector to develop a deeper understanding of the interactions between the political assistant and the private sector.
Table of contents Summary ...2 Table of contents ...3 Chapter 1: Introduction ...5 1.1 Scientific relevance ...7 1.2 Social Relevance ...8
1.3 Thesis lay out ...9
Chapter 2: Literature overview ...10
2.1 Political Assistants in the Netherlands ...10
2.2 Private military and security industry in the Netherlands ...17
2.2.1 Defense Industry in the Netherlands ...17
2.2.2 Private military contractors ...19
2.2.3 The Dutch government and PMC’s ...21
2.3 Political assistants and the private industry ...24
2.4 Hypotheses flowing from the theoretical findings ...28
Chapter 3: Methodology ...32 3.1 Research design ...32 3.2 Empirical strategy ...33 3.3 Operationalization ...34 3.4 Validity ...36 3.5 Reliability ...37
Chapter 4: Empirical findings ...39
4.1 Political Assistants and the Private Industry ...40
4.2 Political assistants and Connaughton’s typology ...45
4.3 Political assistants and the four Arena’s ...51
List of References ...55
Newspaper articles ...59
Defense industry websites ...60
Appendix 1: Private Military Companies ...61
1.1 Categorization of PMC’s ...61
1.2 Overview of employed PMC’s by the Dutch government in Afghanistan ...61
Appendix 2: Summary of interviews ...64
2.1 Standard interview invitation e-mail ...64
Chapter 1: Introduction
‘In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.’ (Pres. D. Eisenhower, 1961
‘A homogenous interest group—in this case, defense contractors— has a vested interest in
increasing spending or favorable regulation that will transfer wealth from government to the group.’ (Brito and Watkins, 2011, p. 39)
‘The number and influence of ministerial advisors have become a source of public concern in the last decade in many countries. Media and government enquiries have pointed out their growing numbers, the opacity of their status and the lack of clear accountability structures in which they operate.’ (OECD, 2011, p. 3)
The new functionary mentioned by the OECD (2011) emerged in the administrative and political elite of the Netherlands in the 1990’s and has firmly established itself in the Hague in 2017. Called special advisors or ministerial advisors in other countries but known as political assistants (PA) in the Netherlands, these men and women are tasked with aiding their 1 minister . These tasks vary widely, however the primary goal is the same: ensuring the 2 political survival of their minister. In the Dutch ’merit-based’ and a-political civil service PA’s, themselves highly politicized functionaries, are in a special position and act as confidants of their minister, safeguarding their political interest.
The manner in which they do so has caused them to be seen as a ‘shadow army’ (NRC, 2012), themselves eschewing the public eye. Academical attention has been substantial in various countries, finding that PA’s can influence policy and act as gatekeepers to their ministers whom is approached by private interest groups and lobbyist. These groups aim to further their own agenda by influencing the minister and governmental policy, which constitutes as an unwarranted influence that causes a democratic deficit. Political assistants could be an interesting actor for these groups considering their proximity to a minister. This
In this thesis PA refers both to a male and female PA.
1
In this thesis minister and a state secretary share the same denomination.
research seeks to determine if PA’s are connected to the private sector, and if so, how this connection influences the policy of the minister.
The private military and security industry, abbreviated to PMSI, has grown in importance in the past twenty years, with national militaries heavily depended on this industry’s products and services. This dependency is also seen in the Netherlands, with the government being a major customer the national and international operating industry. The increased dependency on the private sector is a source of great concern for various academics and activist groups. They warn that the interest of this sector threaten democratic principles such as the publicly owned and controlled monopoly on the use of force, which is eroded by depending more and more on the private industry.
This study aims specifically on those PA’s that work or have worked at the ministry of Defense and their connection with the private military and security industry in the Netherlands. The citations at the start of this chapter are not to be taken lightly. Developing insight into this connection will provide clearance on several important issues concerned with the relation of PA’s and the private security industry. Are they connected, do PA’s have contacts within this sector? If so, what is the effect of these contacts of the PA’s, does it influence the decision making of their minister? And how do the political assistants at the ministry of Defense compare to their colleagues within the Netherlands and abroad? Are there substantial similarities that would allow the findings to extrapolate to other ministries? In order to obtain the required knowledge to answer these questions the following research question has been formulated:
What is the relation between PA’s at the ministry of Defense and the private security industry and how does it influence policy of the ministry of Defense?
Sub questions have been formulated in order to answer the research question, and are as follows:
1. Are there indicators that the professional career, prior and after, of PA’s have been influenced by their contact with the private security industry and was this contact aimed at influencing the policy of the ministry of Defense?
2. Does the classification of Connaughton regarding political advisors, when applied on the PA’s of the ministry of defense, correspond with earlier findings on Dutch PA’s and do they differ strongly from PA’s at other ministries?
3. In what arena do PA’s from the ministry of Defense work primarily and why, and how does this compare to the findings in the literature concerning other PA’s?
As will be seen in chapter 4, the various subquestions incorporate existing theory, discussed in chapter 2, that enables one to establish a clear picture of the primary activities and connections that political assistants have. These findings complement the empirical findings from the interviews, allowing for a objective assessment of the connection between political assistants and the private military and security industry.
1.1 Scientific relevance
Much has been written on both political assistants and the private military and security industry and the manner in which the latter tries to influence public policy. However, the body of knowledge on how these two interact in the Netherlands is presently undocumented and the different findings remain inconclusive on the influence private actors have on political assistants. This research aims to explore this connection and help answer the question if PA’s are targeted by the private sector.
The research is conducted within a research group, consisting of multiple Master students, led by dr. van der Berg. Open-source data has been gathered on all political assistants since 1994 and it is supplemented by survey’s filled out by multiple former and present political assistants. This provided an unique dataset, allowing each student to utilize the data in their own specific master theses. Van den Berg will use the dataset in an international research project called Ministerial Advisers Research Consortium, or MARC, which aims to build an internationally accessible source concerning political advisors. Additionally, this research aims to supplement the growing body of knowledge on political assistants in the Netherlands by conducting interviews with former and present political assistants of the ministry of Defense. These interviews provides unique data on these political assistants and their connections to the private military and security industry. In sum, the research aims to provide both unique quantitative and qualitative data on PA's in the Netherlands.
1.2 Social Relevance
Political assistants have become part of the elite of public administration in the Netherlands. They operate on behalf of their ministers, safeguarding their interests, while also working closely with senior civil servants on a daily basis. Their position is unique in the Netherlands but much remains unknown about the PA’s and the influence they have on their surroundings. This research seeks to develop the understanding on political assistants, providing a more complete picture on how the Dutch government works, enlarging its transparency.
Political assistants are criticized by journalists, seeing them as ‘shadow army’s’ (NRC, 2012; Volkskrant, 2015; Volkskrant, 2016). Is this denomination warranted, or should they be judged more kindly? Their position allows for unwarranted influence to reach the minister and obscures the manner in which policy is formulated. Enlarging the understanding of their true nature, and effects on their surroundings, is thus essential. This research aims to provide more insight into this shadowy niche of government.
The private military and security industry has become increasingly powerful and have been found to successful influence governmental policy in many countries with weak but also strong democratic institutions. The seemingly never ceasing increasing number of threatening developments in the field of international security provide ample demand for their products and services. The increased dependency on the private sector for the provision of hitherto publicly provided tasks raises concern with many. To better understand if the sector causes their own demand, or influences governmental policy through unseeable channels, it’s imperative to establish a clear notion of the manner in which they operate. The increasing dependency on this sector, while also providing beneficial services and products, is not without risks. Some academics claim that the ‘unwarranted influence’ of the ‘military-industrial complex’, warned for by Dwight Eisenhower, is already an reality in the United States, which is constantly seeking to ‘manipulate public policy to perpetuate itself.’ (Ledbetter, 2010). While this may not be the case yet in the Netherlands, the ministry of Defense remains an target for continuous advocacy groups of the private military and security industry and is likely to remain as such as various political parties are looking to increase the Defense budget, that currently sits at €7.9 billion (Rijksoverheid, 2017). The
general public, as well as the academical society, should be vigilant against the unwarranted influence of the private industry, especially against the ever growing private military and security industry that deliberately influence the government to perpetuate and enrich itself at the cost of taxpayers money and, more importantly, the democratic principles of a transparent and accountable government.
1.3 Thesis lay out
A substantial body of knowledge on political assistants and the private military and security industry will provide the fundament on which this research builds, which will be discussed in chapter 2, the theoretical framework. Included in this chapter are the various hypotheses that will be tested to help answer the research question.
Chapter 3 will present the methodology of this research. The research design, the research population, the methods of data collection and the validity and reliability of the research will be presented.
Following on the previous chapters, the empirical findings will be presented in chapter 4. The results from the dataset and the interviews will be combined to affirm or reject the various hypotheses stated in chapter 2, allowing the sub questions to be answered.
Finally, chapter 5 will present the conclusion of this research. The research question will be answered, its implications for both the academical and societal spheres will be discussed and avenues for further research will be advised.
Chapter 2: Literature overview
This chapter will present the current body of knowledge on political assistants, in the Netherlands and abroad. Secondly, the private military and security industry will be discussed. What companies are considered part of it, what are private military companies and how does the government, i.e. the ministry of Defense, interact with this industry? Lastly, the manner in which the private military and security industry has been seen to influence those working in government will be discussed. These three part provide a literature overview and constitute the theoretical background of this thesis.
The theoretical findings will show gaps of knowledge as well pose questions. The literature overview will therefore be accompanied with hypotheses that are linked to the sub questions (see chapter 1). The hypotheses and the subquestions will be answered in chapter 5 by using the theoretical findings presented in this chapter and the empirical findings which flow from the collected data.
2.1 Political Assistants in the Netherlands
Two waves of research can be distinguished in the Netherlands regarding political assistants. The first wave, which focussed on the practical activities of the PA’s, can be said to have started with Frequin, a senior civil servant, who dedicated a small chapter to his experiences with political assistants, with one seeing himself as a ‘plunger’ tasked with ‘unclogging the congested’ relation between the minister and his civil servants (2006, p. 71). Frequin considered a PA as either a partisan, with the same political background as the minister, or a politically neutral person tasked primarily with maintaining communications with political connections of the minister and the media (Ibid.). According to Frequin, the first unofficial political assistant can be traced back to the 1960’s (p. 70). This informal version continued to exist until the incumbency of Paars I in 1994. The coalition government existed out of the social-democrats (PvdA), the liberals (VVD) and the social-liberals. They decided that the prime minister and the two vice prime ministers were all allowed to appoint one political assistant. Maijenburgh notes that this was the first formal naming of these functionaries (2007, p. 19). Not all political parties were accepting of this change, with the VVD claiming
that ministers could do without (Ibid.). This attitude changed over the years, as can be seen in table 2.1 below, which shows the number of ministers (which includes state secretaries) and the number of political assistants for the past eight cabinets.
Aimed to shed more led on the PA, Maijenburg set out to map the hitherto largely unknown phenomena of PA’s, as well as their various relations and rolls. Maijenburg added an important aspect to the definition of a PA that will be used in this research as well. Thus, a PA is considered to be
“A civil servant with a temporary appointment, which is parallel to the appointment of the minister he or she serves, who is tasked with supports the minister with specific focus on political party activities” (Maijenburg, 2007, p. 5)
The use of political assistants grew, as the table clearly shows. Maijenburgh notes several reasons for this. Firstly, the ukase of Kok in 1998 forbid civil servants to talk with the media and members of the Dutch parliament, making the PA a helpful tool for the minister to
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 Paars I Paars II Balkenende I Balkenende II Balkenende III Balkenende IV Ru5e I Ru5e II poli9cal assistents ministers Table 2.1
Absolute numbers of political assistants or ministers Cabinet
communicate with the parties mentioned (Maijenburgh, p. 20). The ukase stipulated that the PA would function as a liaison, a connector between the ministry and the other parties, a difficult task considering the tension and competition that can exist between those actors. Secondly, Maijenburg points out that the christian-democrats (CDA) and PvdA widely used PA’s, causing the VVD to adopt them as well in fear of lacking behind on the other political parties (pp. 20-21).
Following Frequin and Maijenburg, de Vries (2008) set out to gain insights into the ‘black box’ and improve the understanding of PA within the administrative system, the relations a PA had and how information was handled within these relations by the PA (2008, p. 5). The job prescription, written in 2003 by then prime minister Balkenende (CDA), for political assistants was found to be unclear, with the specific goal or tasks unspecified in the one page document (Ibid.). It positioned the PA ‘directly under the minister’ , meaning the PA reports to the minister, but the PA is stationed as an employee of the Secretary General (SG), with salary depending on the specifics of earlier experience, the minister he or she serves and the challenges of that position (Secretariaat Ministerraad, 2013, p. 67; de Vries, p. 5). According to de Vries found the first and foremost interest of the PA is the political survival of the minister (p. 5). To this end, the PA has many relations and tasks that vary in their intensity. PA’s are found to act as gatekeepers for their ministers, with interest groups and lobbyist targeting them to move relevant information to the minister (de Vries, p. 50).
The research of de Vries opened up the black box broadly and was followed by research that specifically focussed on the role PA’s have as liaisons, aiming to understand the ‘strategic value’ PA’s (Steen et. al., 2009, p. 10). This research underscores earlier findings concerning the primary role played by PA’s as being connectors (Steen et. al., p. 37).
Political assistants are seen around the globe, with similarities and differences existing between them. Eichbaum and Shaw (2007) conducted research on political assistants in both New Zealand and Australia, seeking to gain more understanding of the triangular relation between the minister, the civl servants and the political assistants. In both countries, PA’s became necessary as the ‘amount of information’ presented to policy makers increased just as rapidly as the pressure the ‘policy environment places ministers’ under (Eichbaum and Shaw, p. 465). The PA is essential in aiding their minister to cope with the increased pressure,
coming also from the constant media coverage, providing themselves as the necessary resource to keep the minister capable of his or her tasks (Eichbaum and Shaw, 2011, p. 598).
They found that PA’s enjoy an ‘asymmetrical advantage’ over civil servants, with civil servants in New Zealand in general say that this advantage is not ‘being exercised to negative effect’ (Eichbaum and Shaw, 2007, pp. 455-457). To the contrary, the civil servants in New Zealand are positive towards PA’s, finding their policy contribution useful as they ‘add value to … the rigor of the policy process’ (Ibid.). The PA increases the ‘advice base, increasing ministers’ options, testing officials’ advice, and democratizing processes by providing an additional point of entry for external policy actors’ (p. 457). Later research by Eichbaum and Shaw (2011) further clarified the role ministerial advisors play. They found that two thirds of the PA’s scheduled meetings between the minister and interest groups, and also attending these meetings (2011, p. 590). Additional interaction with these external stakeholders also entailed creating special policy groups which was done by ‘encouraging interest groups to lobby appropriate organizations’ believed to be beneficial for the policy development (Ibid.) These findings support those of de Vries (2008, p. 50), and others, that PA’s can influence the policy process by proposing their own issues and new policies to the minister (Eichbaum and Shaw, p. 595).
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, or OECD, has published two research papers aimed specifically to enlarge the scarce literature on political assistants. In both cases the scope has been limited to members of the European Union (EU) and candidate member states. In short, the OECD found that a political assistant has several tasks, with the primary as acting as a liaison for their minister. Secondly, the PA offers as the closest aide to the minister and advising the minister on grounds of political expertise. The OECD found similarities between the United Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands, with the civil service remaining political neutral towards their minister and thus requiring the PA to fill this gap. Additionally, the OECD found that unwarranted influence of private actors or parties can reach and influence the ministers policy through the PA, who works closely with the minister. The PA can work as an ‘informal emissary to outside groups’, with these groups including ‘pressure groups, … think tanks, business leaders…’ (OECD, 2007, p. 12). The close proximity to the minister and the close interaction with the ‘private sector’ makes
political assistants ‘particularly vulnerable to undue influence’ (OECD, 2011, p. 12) Considering these findings, in combination with the findings of de Vries that PA’s are targeted by lobbyists and interest groups, hints that the political assistant in theory could be used to exert unwarranted influence on the minister (2008, p. 50).
Vancoppenolle, Noordergraaf and Van der Steen conducted an comparative analysis of Dutch and Flemish political assistants aimed at their tasks and behavior in four arenas, those being internal vertical arena, internal horizontal arena, political-parliamentarian arena and lastly the external societal arena (2011, p. 65). Their findings suggest that PA’s have little influence in the vertical arena, considering themselves unable to influence policy of the minister (Vancoppenolle, Noordergraaf and Van der Steen, p. 69). Political assistants claimed to primarily focus on the political-parliamentarian arena, in which they focus primarily on preparing their minister for debates and discussions, to ensure that ‘the political process goes smoothly in the political arena’ (Ibid.). These findings underscore the aforementioned findings that the PA act as a connector, a liaison for their minister. The four arena’s and the connections of the PA are visualized in figure 2.2.
Figure 2.2 (Vancoppenolle, Noordergraaf and Van der Steen, 2011, p. 72)
While other researchers mention the possibility of unwarranted influence from the private sector as a legitimate cause for concern, Vancoppenolle, Noordergraaf and Van der Steen, see PA’s as an effort to maintain the ‘relative’ purity of the Dutch system in which PA’s operate as liaisons: they ‘stabilize the current system and ensure its pure mode of operation’ (2011, pp. 73-74).
The French and Belgian system of ministerial cabinets has been criticized, as they are considered to be partisans, supporting the minister and enforcing a closed circle of likeminded trustees around him or her (Frequin, 2006, p.47). Maijenburgh (2007, p.44) found that the English political advisors whom are appointed by their minister share many characteristics with PA’s, with differences still remaining present.
Connaughton (2010) studied political assistants in Ireland and interviewed several of them, allowing her to formulate four different types of political assistants which are based on their origin and their role:
1. Expert. This PA is a highly qualified political ‘outsider’, not part of the political system. The expertise of this PA is used to initiate new policies and enhance existing ones. This PA is not expected to take an active role in the political arena but is instead expected to use his or her expertise to the full potential to supplement and assist the minister.
2. Partisan. This PA is a fellow member of the minister’s party and has been given the position from this perspective. The PA is expected to assist the minister by keeping a sharp eye on the political arena, ensuring an overall good performance of the minister in this respect. The PA stays in close contact with the ministers political party members, parliamentarians and other influentials associated with the party.
3. Coordinator. The PA assists the minister by staying in touch with the various actors whom are deemed relevant by the minister. This entails the vertical and horizontal arena, as well as the political-parliamentarian arena and the societal arena. His or her most important task is to manage ministerial policies and ensure their accordance with each other. The aim of this labour is to get good and timely results that can be claimed by the minster or his or her cabinet for political gains.
4. Minder. This type of PA is especially appointed on grounds of trust and affinity with the minster. The PA has generally no specific speciality to offer but work close to the minister and their relationship already existed prior to the ministers appointment.
Table 2.3 provides a comprehensive overview of Connaughtons typology.
In sum, various Dutch researchers have compared the historical development and the position of PA’s in the Netherlands with those positions similar to them in other countries, as seen in the research of Vancoppenolle, Noordergraaf and Van der Steen (2011) as well as Maijenburgh (2007) and the reports of the OECD (2007:2011). The various authors are not conclusive in their assessment of the influence the private sector has on PA’s and the corresponding influence PA’s can have on the public policy process or the key decision maker, the minister. The empirical findings, presented in chapter 4, will provide more insights into this for the PA’s that have worked, or are working, ate the ministry of Defense.
Still untouched here is the American system, where a ‘spoils system’ allows the president-elect to appoint new, also coming from the private sector, civil servants. This allows clientelism and nepotism to take place, causing much concern for conflicts of interest and the unwarranted influence of the private sector even tough the US has strong institutions, independent media and a legal framework in place to counter these forms of corruption (Bovens et. al., 2001). A connected concern is regulatory capture, a course of events in which
Role Profile Political Communicate
Policy-making role
Impact
Expert Specialist Passive Technical Knowledge Expertise Partisan Responsive Active Political Politics Political
dominance
Coordinator Generalist Variable Both Fixer Management
Minder Generalist/
responsive Active Political Politics/ passive Mutuality
Table 2.3 (Connaughton, 2010, p. 352)
a body of government puts the interest of the private sector over those of the society. This will be described in depth in chapter 2.3.
2.2 Private military and security industry in the Netherlands
The aim of this research is to develop increased knowledge of the interaction between PA’s and the private military and security industry, in the Netherlands (see Chapter 1). While the former, PA’s, have already been discussed in depth, the latter will be examined in this section. What companies are considered part of this industry and what findings are there available in the manner the industry seeks to influence public policy for their own benefit? In contrast to the relative scarcity of academical publications that detail PA’s, the private military and security industry has caused more widespread interest and a corresponding large body of academical publications. Therefore the focus will be limited to the type of companies that are known to have interacted with the ministry of Defense in the years after 1994.
A brief look into the historical development of the industry is required to fully understand its importance for - and its connection to the government. In addition, various major projects and collaborations between the ministry and the industry that have taken place since cabinet Kok I until now will be discussed. Lastly, the manner in which the industry seeks to influence key decision makers at the ministry of Defense will be discussed. Before moving on, it’s critical to establish what companies are considered part of the private military and security industry.
2.2.1 Defense Industry in the Netherlands
The private military and defense industry consists of several subcategories. The arms industry, also called defense industry, produces military equipment, for example such as helicopters or assault rifles, are part of this industry, but so are private military companies, who provide logistical services to national militaries (PMC’s). Some of the largest defense companies in the Netherlands are Thales, manufacturer of radar and communication systems (Thales, 2017), and Damen Shipyard Group, who build naval vessels ‘ranging from 7 to 200 meters’ (Damen, 2017). While some are native to the Netherlands, such as Damen, others originate from elsewhere and have a branch in the Netherlands. A prime example is Airbus
Defense and Space who provided a training simulator for the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) (Airbus, 2017). These three and other, smaller, companies are part of the Netherlands Industry of Defense and Security Foundation, abbreviated to NIVD, consisting out of 169 companies , 3 and is tasked to optimize the interest of the defense industry and promote it at the national and international level (NIDV, 2017). Their mission is to ensure ‘the sustainable positioning of the Dutch Defence and Security-related Industry (NL-DVI) in national and international orders (from the government and elsewhere) and in national and international supplier chains. The NL-DVI is synonymous with the highest possible quality and effectiveness of equipment, services and application-oriented knowledge. The NIDV is a strategic partner of the government in the area of defence and security and a key figure in the triple helix collaboration between the government, knowledge institutes and the business community’ (NIDV, 2017). The total number of companies in the industry is considered to be 651 in 2015, together employing 24.800 people, whom shared a turnover of €4.54 billion, of which €3.09 billion is made from the armaments export, in 2015 (MinDef, 2016, pp. 3-5)
The Dutch government supports the Dutch defense industry in different ways. A clear example are the Defense Industry Strategies (DIS) published in 2007 and 2013 by the ministry of Defense in collaboration with the Ministry of Economic Affairs . Both documents 4 highlight the ‘golden triangle’ that exists between the government, the private industry and research institutes and aims to ensure the ‘alignment of the operational interests and needs of Defense, the Dutch Defense and Security related industry and research institutes ins such a manner that they can make an high quality contribution to the safety of the Netherlands. This will additionally allow them to be competitive in the European and international market’ (DIS, 2013, p. 3). The collaboration between the private defense industry in the Netherlands and the government is also seen in the political representation that accompanies the defense industry when they conduct trade missions abroad or go to international military and security trade shows. For example, Damen supplies naval vessels to Vietnam, with Thales building the radar and communication system, while the entire project is partly financed by the Dutch ministry of Defense (NRC, 2013). The collaboration between the Dutch government and the Dutch defense industry has born fruit, as the Stockholm International
For a full overview, see https://www.nidv.eu/en/participants/
3
These documents are published solely in Dutch. Citations from these documents are therefore translated by the author.
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) shows in their annual reports on the world wide defense industry: the Netherlands ranks tenth as major weapon exporter in the years from 2011 to 2015, with 2 percent marketshare (SIPRI, 2016, p. 20).
2.2.2 Private military contractors
Another part of the private military and industry industry are private military companies (PMC’s) who provide national militaries with ‘military and/or security services’ that ‘include, in particular, armed guarding and protection of persons and objects, such as convoys, buildings and other places; maintenance and operation of weapons systems; prisoner detention; and advice to or training of local forces and security personnel’ (ICRC, 2008). While mostly consisting of noncombatant duties, PMC’s operate in areas where ‘shots are fired and bombs go off’, causing PMC personnel to ‘wear body armor, carry arms, and travel in Humvees’ (Goodsell, 2007, p. 679). A full overview of the services and the corresponding classification of different types of PMC’s can be found in appendix 1.1. McFate found that PMC’s can deliver multiple services, thus allowing for mixed forms of companies or companies that offer a total package of military services, functioning in ‘all three categories, but this is exceptional; most companies specialize in only one category’ (p. 18). Goodsell found that they provide ‘provide logistical support and also perform protection, training, consulting and planning services . Some … actually engage in combat under contract’ (Goodsell, 2007, p. 678).
PMCs find employment with a wide range of nation states, with the United States government being their primary costumer, and also non-state actors such as the United Nations, rebels and multinational companies who operate in hostile environments. PMC’s provide a temporary increase in military capabilities, acting as force multipliers, which has made it into a multi-billion sub sector of the private military and security industry operating worldwide (Singer, 2008; McFate, 2015; Percy, 2009).
The role of PMC’s in contemporary conflicts is substantial. Over half of the personnel employed by the US in Iraq and Afghanistan are supplied by PMC’s, showing how deeply they are intertwined with the US military and its foreign policy (Avant and de Nevers, pp. 88-91). Not surprisingly, PMC’s are considered to be instrumental actors in modern warfare,
with their provision of specialized services, support and advice to nations and non-state actors, (McFate, 2014, pp. 6-8).
The precedents of private military companies can been found throughout history, for example in the Swiss pikemen that sold their services to many medieval rulers (McFate, pp. 26-50). The role of these private providers of armies became significantly less after the emergence of standing armies raised by centralized nation states, lasting from approximately the 19th century until the fall of the Iron curtain in the 1990s (Ibid.) With the fall of the Soviet Union many West European nations gutted their defense budgets, and were confronted several years later with the shortcomings of their militaries when new types of conflicts flared up to which they were unable to respond in a satisfying manner (Ibid.). They turned, partially, towards PMC’s that provided those services which the governments had cut spending on. Avant found that the revenues ‘from the global international security market would rise from $55.6 billion in 1990 to $202 billion in 2010’ (2007, p. 8). Estimates put the revenue of the global revenue earned by this sector in 2003 around $100 billion (Ibd.). The ‘insatiable need for security in Iraq and Afghanistan fueled the growth of today’s private security industry’ which allowed it to grow from a ‘multimillion-dollar to a multibillion-dollar market’ (McFate, p. 12).
The rise of PMC’s over the past decades can be seen in the wider context of securitization, and the subsequent responsibilization and commodification of security (Loader, 2000; Krahmann, 2008; Isima, 2009). Isima (2009) notes that security had been provided privately before the rise of the modern, Westphalian, state and is now one again provided by the market as aforementioned governments started to privatize ‘public monopoly of the the means of legitimate violence for security purposes’ (pp. 113-116) in a world that became globalized, causing the private industry to become increasingly powerful. de Waard (1999), Singer (2008), Percy (2009) and McFate (2014) all illustrate a continues growth of the private military companies, which has been driven by ‘multiple and complexing rationalities.’ (White, 2011, p. 98). A major issue is the fragmentation of power, shown by Matthews (1997). Pointing to the rise of traditional security threats, projected by a complicated mix of non-state actors, and the increased importance of technology Matthews has caused others to see the world as becoming a durable disorder, classified as a neomedieval world order, in which
the private market of force plays an increasingly important role as governments are seen to share their power, reluctantly, with these private actors (Cerny, 1998, McFate, 2014).
The use of PMC’s is also found to raise ethical, the allocation of the justified use of force, and legal issues, with the regulating legal frameworks ‘outdated and ineffective’ (Leander, 2005, p. 19). Avant (2007) argues that the allocation of violence matters, as the increased allocation of the use of force at the market side of the spectrum increases the dependency of the state, and thus the general public, on private military companies (pp. 263-264). The increased share of PMC’s that exist alongside the ‘system of states and state forces’ (Avant, 2007, p. 3), in numerous (post)-conflicts has ‘undermined states collective ability to monopolize violence in the international system’, causing ‘serious consequences for politics and political order’ (Ibid., p. 264).
2.2.3 The Dutch government and PMC’s
As previously noted, nation states have increasingly used PMC’s for their various tasks. The Netherlands is no exception to this. PMC’s have been employed during the Dutch mission in Afghanistan which lasted from 2006 to 2010. The Dutch government was concerned about the various implications of this employment and therefore requested AIV, a Dutch non-governmental council on foreign affairs and security issues, to investigate and share her opinion on the matter.
The AIV found that ‘The Dutch armed forces are … making increasing use of private service providers.’ (2007, p. 5). This increased reliance on PMC’s causes several issues, such as the lack of total control over the required resources due to the command structure being split between the military and the PMC. For example, privately supplied military aircrafts were crucial in supplying the Dutch forces in Afghanistan (AIV, p. 15; Leeuwe, 2008). The AIV warns for relying to much on PMC’s as well for the ‘fundamental conflict of interest’ that exists due the PMC’s for profit motive that contrasts with the general interest of the government, causing potentially grave issues when PMC’s refuse certain assignments demanded by military commanders (Ibid.). Much concern is raised by the AIV when discussing the legal and ethical issues that come into play when employing PMC’s. The state that contracts PMC’s should take heed that it takes on ‘a special political and moral responsibility’ (AIV, p. 16) and that the legal and political responsibility for PMC misconduct
lies entirely with the Dutch government (AIV, pp. 30-31). In regards of the threat on the monopoly on force (or violence) of the government posed by the use of PMC’s, the AIV strongly reaffirms that the state should minimize the use of PMC’s as much as possible in order to retain its monopoly (AIV, p. 31). Pattinson is one of the academics who shares the view of the AIV, stating that governmental use of PMC’s reinforces the commodification of military services which has strong negative ‘consequences for national and international security’ (2010, p. 446).
The AIV also highlights the rising ‘gap between political ambitions and military capabilities’ (pp. 8-9). They found that the Dutch armed forces are unable to sustain the required level of operational capabilities, due to budget cuts, to provide satisfactory levels of performance in several aspects of modern warfare or peacekeeping, such as logistics, in the operations that are requested from them by the Dutch government. Their use of PMC’s is a solution to this problem (Ibid.), as these companies can provide the required level of services and provide a decisive advantage over adversaries (Duingan, 2011). The AIV found that the transparency, accountability and media coverage of PMC's is relatively small when contrasted with regular, governmental, armed forces (AIV, p. 14). Not surprisingly, this is in part caused by the secretive attitude of PMC’s, but just as much caused by the focus of governmental reports and media on the regular armed forces rather then on PMC’s (Ibid.). This is hampering the democratic control of the governments actions in an fundamental aspect of its being, namely the exercise of the monopoly of force, be it domestically or abroad, as it is ‘unclear who is responsible for what’ (AIV, p. 14).
The AIV found that ‘the Netherlands is operationally dependent on private contracting for military operations in Afghanistan’ (AIV, p. 28). They found that the armed forces are working together with multiple companies, that supply different services and have different home countries: ‘In Afghanistan … catering at Dutch military camps and the supply of food and fuel have been outsourced to private companies; civil aviation companies are frequently used for local transport needs; civilian mechanics repair military materiel in the operational area, and armed Afghan contractors perform guard duties around the Dutch bases. In Afghanistan, the Netherlands is also cooperating closely with a private party employed by the United States to train the local security services.’ (AIV, 2007, p. 5). For a full overview of the findings of the AIV, which is not complete to the lack of information given to them by the
Dutch government, see appendix 1.1. The AIV concludes that hiring ‘responsible and well-regulated PMCs can … contribute to the effectiveness of military operations and the enhancement of stability’ allowing the government to ‘reduce the gap between their ambitions and shortages in transport and logistical capacity’ (AIV, p. 33).
PMC’s are not only used by the Dutch government. The Dutch commercial shipping sector, represented by the Koninklijke Vereniging van Nederlandse Reders (KNVR) has been pressing the Dutch government for many years in an effort to legalize the employment of PMC’s for their sector. PMC’s that operate on the sea are called private naval companies, or PNC’s, and provide the same surge in capacity and capabilities their land based counterparts offer (Berube, 2007, pp. 609-614). Berube considers PNC’s to be a ‘vialbe, robust, accountable, adaptable and potentially cost-effective solution’ to safeguard the international waters from piracy, smuggling and non-traditional threats (pp. 613-614). The Dutch commercial shippers have been under threat of Somali pirates since the second halve of the 00’s, and they have pressed the Dutch government to allow them to hire private military contractors to protect their ships. Reluctant to change legislation but still wishing to assist the commercial shipping sector the government provided their own solution. They supplied Vessel Protection Detachments (VPD’s). These detachments of Marines are available for hire to Dutch shippers but are more expensive, less flexible and less reliable to be available on a short notice and are substantially larger than their private counterparts. The shippers have publicly stated that they have employed PMC’s illegally in order to protect their ships, its cargo and their own sailors, ignoring the law, since 2010 (Schuttevaer, 2010). As one shipper stated, going ‘without protection would be suicide’ (NRC, 2012a). The shippers are unsatisfied with the slacking protection of the Dutch government, and have continuously lobbied to have the law changed and have met with the minister of Defense on several occasions. They want to be legally allowed to contract ‘serious private military companies instead of illegal Rambo’s’ (Ibid.). A new law, proposed by the VVD and the CDA in 2016, would allow the shippers to legally hire private military companies to provide protection against piracy (NRC, 2016).
2.3 Political assistants and the private industry
The private military and security industry in the Netherlands is seen to exist of many different companies, and is already connected to the ministry of Defense through the Defense Industry Strategies (DIS). Also, the government has used PMC’s and is pressured to allow commercial shipping companies the same in order to protect their vessels against piracy attacks. The manner in which the private industry connects to the ministry of Defense, and its officials, warrants further explanation. As already discussed in chapter 2.1, de Vries found that PA’s act as gatekeepers to the minister, making them a target for lobbyists and interest groups who desire to influence the minister (2008, p. 50). Additionally, Eichbaum and Shaw found that PA’s can initiate policy proposals and invite interest groups to participate in discussions on governmental policy, facilitating interest groups from the private industry (2011, p. 590). Other findings support the notion that PA’s are interesting for the private sector to approach (OECD, 2007; OECD, 2008). On the other hand, Vancoppenolle, Noordergraaf and van der Steen (2011) found that PA’s exert little to none influence over the policy of the ministry. This subchapter will discuss the manner in which unwarranted influence is exercised by the private sector on various sectors of government. The concepts, sharing similar and overlapping characteristics, of the revolving door, regulatory capture and the iron triangle will be discussed as they all concern the same issue: the potentially harmful influence of the private sector on public officials and policy.
The iron triangle was formulated by George Adams in 1982, as being the network of relationships that ‘bind the private sector, the Congress, and the Department of Defense (Rayman, 1982, p. 612). The network effectively excludes public influence and results in high defense procurements for the private industry. Additionally, Adams showed that persons whom first worked for the public agencies find employment en masse within the private defense industry (Rayman, pp. 612-613). This iron triangle in the sector of defense was further explored by Briody (2004) who looked into the Carlyle Group. He found that this group’s financial successes coincide with the hiring of outgoing, or former, senior officials of the department of Defense and even a former president. His findings suggest that the revolving door successfully helped Carlyle Group to obtain more contracts from the
Department of Defense, or in other words, steer the policy of the Department to favor the company.
The issues shown by Adams and Briody (2004) can be considered examples of regulatory capture, which encompasses characteristics of the iron triangle and the revolving door concepts. Dal Bó (2006) provides a review of the existing literature on regulatory capture that evolved after Stigler published in 1971. Stigler, in 1971, and Peltzman, in 1976, idea of regulatory capture assume that companies will ‘provide incentives to regulators, and that regulators can be thought of as single persons’ (Dal Bó, p. 211). These incentives can be positive, such as ‘campaign contribution to politicians’ and the ‘promise … of future lucrative employment in the industry’, known as the revolving door phenomenon (Ibid., p. 212). Furthermore, Dal Bó suggests that the private sector also offer information to ‘ensure a more favorable treatment’, causing regulating bodies to see the world as the private sector wants them to see it (p. 220). This notion is furthered by the clarification of the two different types of regulatory capture, which is provided by Engstrom (2013). He differentiates between materialist capture, considered to be the classical version, and non-materialist capture, also called cultural capture (p. 32). Materialist capture is caused by the regulators personal material wellbeing and achieved in the manner described by Dal Bó (2006) as positive incentives. Non-materialist capture on the other hand results in the regulatory agency thinking similarly as their private counterparts, resulting in regulatory policy and actions that favor the private sector (Engstrom, p. 32). An example of non-materialist capture is seen in the financial deregulation, the lowering op capital requirements of commercial banks. The commercial banks allegedly convinced the financial regulators that what ‘was good for Wall Street, is good for America’ (Engrstrom, p. 32). Engstrom (2013) points out to the scarcity of empirical evidence and the problem that it’s difficult to pinpoint regulatory capture precisely, as policy comes about in a complex manner. Several authors however provide interesting studies that will counter Engstrom’s notion, albeit in regards to regulatory capture in the sector of military and defense.
Leuchinger and Moser (2014) researched the effect of the revolving door by examine t he appointment of private sector personnel to administrative positions on grounds of political
connections to the US President and the appointment of former public sector personnel to positions within defense companies or associated private bodies, and the preferential treatment given to those private companies during their appointment. Their focus was on the Department of Defense, the ministry of Defense in the United States, and the American defense industry. These officials are appointed to increase the power of elected officials, in this case the President, over the bureaucracy. A conflict of interest is deemed present, as these appointees have motives and incentives to give preferential treatment to their former employees: they want to work there again after their appointment ends or they simply want something in return. Similarly, the revolving door also puts appointed officials back on the street, leaving office when a new President enters the White House. Those former officials are seen to (re)join the private military and security industry, bringing with them their connections and information ‘about processes, upcoming decisions’ and the insights into the direct competition of their new employers (Leuchinger and Moser, p. 103). Their connections are seen to heavily influence the value of defense procurement contracts as companies with former appointees receive more lucrative contracts (Leuchinger and Moser, p. 5). While strong institutional and legal frameworks are in place to counter any form of fraud or corrupt behavior, Leuchinger and Moser are doubtful of their enforcement, concluding that even in a country with strong countermeasures, conflicts of interests in the defense industry can persist. They see this at best to be caused by ‘informational advantages’ that some companies have over their competitors, and in the worst scenario caused by preferential allocation of contracts to certain firms that disregard the interests of the ‘taxpayers and the armed forces’ (Leuchinger and Moser, p. 21). Dal Bó commented on the revolving door with caution, questioning wether former public officials are being hired by private companies is driven by the ‘expertise or the lobbying potential’ they bring to their new employer (p. 214).
Hall and Coyne (2014) studied the policy process of the increasing use of unmanned aerial systems, popularly known as drones, and found that ‘this policy process’ developed ‘in the existing relationships, networks, and power distributions between the players based on past interactions and policies’ (p. 457). In these interactions, they found that the private market had extensively lobbied and provided financial support to elected officials for their own benefit, i.e. an increased demand for drone’s of which they profited (Ibid.). Closer to the Netherlands,
Rufanges (2016) examined the arms industry and the manner in which they lobby throughout Europe. He found four types of lobbies for the private military and security industry:
Firstly, he found industry associations such as the NIDV as being the main body of lobbying for the industry. They seek to operate closely with national governments, and other parts of the lobby such as think tanks, to ensure an increased demand for their industries products. Secondly, the companies own lobbies maintain communications with various relevant officials in order to promote their companies interest. Thirdly, expert panels are started with the aim of gaining ‘influence and recognition’ which is done through holding conferences, publishing papers or holding seminars that promote increased defense budgets in order to face new threats (Rufanges, pp. 314-315). Fourthly, think tanks are funded as nonprofit organizations but are funded by industry actors. Their goal is to hold debates, publish reports and hold conferences that advocate an increased defense budget.
The overall goal of these lobbies is to influence and steer, directly or indirectly, the political agenda to those issues that are relevant to themselves and in general ensure that the government seeks to maintain a ‘high level of military and security spending’ (Rufanges, p. 317). These interest can go against those of the general public, as shown by Hall and Coyne study of the development of drones in the US. They found that the narrow interests of the drone producing industry, part of the larger defense industry, generally don't align with the ‘broader notions of public interests as it relates to defense’ (Hall and Coyne, p. 457). Their findings thus suggest that the policy actor has been capture in both a materialist, funding political campaigns, and non-materialist way, influencing policy through expert panels for example, successfully to further their own narrow interests.
While large differences exist between the defense budgets of the US and the Netherlands it is theoretically possible that similar revolving door practices and regulatory capture occur in the Netherlands, even without the phenomena of appointed officials. Goldman, Rochelle and So (2013) found that political connections, which can result in ‘one-on-one time with the government agency’ increase the chances of winning a contract bid (p. 13). Their findings suggest that if a company has political connections to officials in the ministry of Defense their chances of gaining a contract, and thus governmental resources, is significantly higher than companies without such connections (Goldman, Rochelle and So, 2010, p. 42). Faccio (2010)
showed that this is not only the case for the US but is in fact visible in over forty-seven countries, including the Netherlands, with his findings focussing on many different sectors, and not specifically the defense industry. Nonetheless, his findings strongly point to the benefits of political and institutional connections for firms over unconnected companies (Foccia, p. 924). Gen and Wright (2013) found, in their study of policy advocacy, that success is higher when a interest group has access to people within the governmental agency and is able to utilize those relationships. In fact, they see relationships, financial resources, a certain degree of agency and specialized knowledge and skills as essential competencies to successfully conduct activities aimed at influencing and changing the vies of key decision makers (Gen and Wright, pp. 180-186). As shown by Rufanges and others, these four competencies are found in the private military and security industry lobby in several countries.
2.4 Hypotheses flowing from the theoretical findings
As already discussed in chapter 2.1, de Vries found that PA’s act as gatekeepers to the minister, making them a target for lobbyists and interest groups who desire to influence the minister (2008, p. 50). Considering the findings of de Vries, as well as others such as Leuchinger and Moser (2014), discussed in chapter 2.3, the following hypothesis can be formulated in order to achieve more knowledge on the connection:
Hypotheses 1.1: PA’s are contacted by the PMSI in order to gain access to the minister.
As was shown by the various authors, the private military and security industry in the US operates in many ways, of which the revolving door is a prominent tool to gain influence within the ministry of Defense and thus with policy makers and key decision makers. It is interesting to establish if this practice is also done by the private industry in the Netherlands by employing political assistants. Therefore, the following hypotheses have been established:
Hypotheses 1.3: Formers PA’s, currently employed by the PMSI, use their contacts in their previous employment to benefit the PMSI.
While similarities might be expected, large differences also exist between the Netherlands and the US. Additionally, political assistants are not primarily focussed on the private sector, instead focussing primarily on actors that operate in the parliamentarian and ministerial arena’s. It could therefore also be the case that private actors show no interest in them. This is formulated in the third hypothesis, a so called null hypothesis, that will be tested in the empirical phase of the research.
Hypotheses 1.4: PA’s are not interesting actors for- and are therefore not contacted by the PMSI.
These hypotheses, 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4, will be used to answer sub question 1, which is as following: are there indicators that the professional career, prior and after, of PA’s has been influenced by their contact with the private security industry and was this contact aimed at influencing the policy of the ministry of Defense?
Considering the theoretical findings of Connaughton and others, such as Eichbaum and Shaw, discussed in chapter 2.1, a number of hypotheses have been formulated that aim to improve the understanding of the type of PA’s that are employed, and what causes differences between them. One such difference can exist due to the demand for specialized knowledge, or on the other hand the search for a more overall skilled PA to supplement the minister (see Eichbaum and Shaw). The following hypotheses have been formulated to steer the research into the differences between PA’s:
Hypotheses 2.1: PA’s that worked for the state secretary are more likely to be experts due to the more in depth required knowledge on files. PA’s that worked for the ministers are not experts but partisans whom are more focussed to supplement their minister in regards of political dominance.
Hypotheses 2.2: Different types of PA’s at the ministry of Defense are recruited by the different political parties.
Hypotheses 2.3: PA’s at the ministry of Defense differ from other PA’s in their classifications due to the budgetary differences between the ministries.
In order to answer hypothesis 2.3 a comparison will be made by using the survey data, as well as publicly available information on the budgetary differences between ministries. The hypotheses will help answer sub question 2, which has been formulated as: does the classification of Connaughton regarding political advisors, when applied on the PA’s of the ministry of defense, correspond with earlier findings on Dutch PA’s and do they differ strongly from PA’s at other ministries?
The following four hypotheses are linked to the findings of Vancoppenolle, Noordergraaf and van der Steen (see chapter 2.1). They found that PA’s in general focus primarily on the political-parliamentarian arena, while various findings of chapter 2.3 point to an strong connection with the horizontal arena of appointed officials. It’s
Hypotheses 3.1: PA’s from the ministry of Defense are distinctly active in the societal arena, with substantial attention going towards contact with the PMSI.
Hypotheses 3.2: There are no differences between PA’s of the minister and PA’s of the state secretary of Defense in regards of their relative activity in the various arena’s.
Hypotheses 3.3: PA’s that operate largely in the societal arena are more likely to have connection to the private sector that is connected to their ministry and subsequently are more likely to work in the private sector after their tenure as PA.
These hypotheses will help to answer sub question 3, which is as follows: In what arena do PA’s from the ministry of Defense work primarily and why, and how does this compare to the findings in the literature concerning other PA’s?
The hypotheses will be answered in a linear fashion in chapter 5, meaning that firstly the hypotheses connected to sub question 1 will be answered before moving on to those related to subquestions 2 and 3. It may be that some hypotheses are accepted or rejected in combination of one another, or that several hypotheses will prove to be unable to accept or reject on grounds of the collected data. The following chapter 3 will further discuss the methodology of the research.
Chapter 3: Methodology
It is important to put forth the manner in which the research was conducted, what the various research steps have been taken during the research. These steps will be elucidated in this chapter, followed by a clarification on the type of research design that has been implemented and the empirical strategy. The following part is aimed to give a birds-eye view of the research, while later parts of the chapter will allow for more in-depth clarification of the chosen approaches and methods.
It is of importance to note that this thesis has has been written under the supervision of dr. C.F. van den Berg, associate professor at the Institute of Public Administration of Leiden University, as part of a wider research on political assistants in the Netherlands. Aimed to start the second wave of research on political assistants in the Netherlands, van den Berg established a capstone group of master students who would write their thesis on various aspects of PA’s in the Netherlands. This group of students have gathered open-source data that was transferred into a dataset in collaboration with the Parliamentarian Documentation Center (PDC). The open-source data was supplemented by former and currently employed political assistants whom filled out a survey. This dataset will be used by van den Berg to conduct an international research on special advisors, such as political assistants in governmental circles, in collaboration with various scholars from around the world whom together form the Ministerial Advisers Research Consortium, or MARC. They aim to further the broadening of the literature and allow for comparative analysis. This thesis can be placed within the wider context of both the capstone and the MARC, as it provides unique data on political assistants of the ministry of Defense and their connection to the private sector. In that sense, this research is explorative, while it also seeks to test existing theoretical findings on political assistants.
3.1 Research design
The nature of the research and the research goals (see chapter 1) require a mixed research design, with both a quantitative and qualitative research design with corresponding differences in data collection. The quantitative part of the research is considered to entail the
data collection done in cooperation with the capstone group and the PDC, while the qualitative research methods provided unique data from the interviews. The findings from both parts will provide the empirical findings, that combined with the theoretical findings presented in chapter 2, will allow the various hypotheses, sub questions and the research question to be answered. With the increased focus on the qualitative part of the data, as this provides unique and deep insights, a nonlinear research path has been followed. This allowed for the researcher to make himself familiar with the specific contexts in which the study population was and is active. Findings in different phases of the research required adjustments in the planning, as they prompted new avenues for research. This flexibility has allowed the researcher to answer the research goal and question, resulting in a grounded theory that will provide the field with new insights into the connection between political assistants and the private military and security industry.
3.2 Empirical strategy
The collection of the various forms of data required different empirical strategies. The data-set constructed with cooperation of the PDC was collected using LinkedIn and Google search queries. For example, one would search LinkedIn for the term ‘political assistant’ and narrow the search results down to a certain ministry in the Netherlands. Google searches were conducted similarly. These would, for example, show a personal website that explicitly stated the person worked as political assistant for a minister.
The survey was send to all those found to be, or have been, political assistants and whose e-mail address was available. During the research period more e-mail addresses became known, with those also receiving an e-mail. The results of the survey are available at the PDC, and are used in chapter 4. From the total of 116 political assistants found, 38 filled out the survey, constituting just below one third, namely 32 percent, of all PA’s. At the time of writing, none those respondents were of the smaller research population of the PA’s that worked at the ministry of Defense.
The political assistants of the ministry of Defense, six in total (including the present PA), were send a separate e-mail in which the researcher asked them to participate in an interview (see Appendix 2.1). Two responded negative, one did not respond at all and three
