Hilde Beune 10885129 | Authoritarianism in a Global Age | Thesis Master Politicologie: Internationale Betrekkingen
Maduro’s Battle with
Uncertainty
ELECTORAL DEFEAT OF AUTHORITARIAN INCUMBENTS IN COMPETITIVE ELECTORAL REGIMESAbstract
Most academics state that incumbents of competitive electoral authoritarian regimes create a system that generally helps them to stay in power. By the use of state resources and through repression the incumbent create an unequal political playing field with limited space for their opposition. An electoral defeat is considered to be a rare event. On December sixth 2015, Nicolás Maduro lost the national elections in Venezuela. His party the Partido Socialista Unido Venezuala was in power for over 16 years. This study tries to explain how Maduro could lose the elections by the central question: Why did Nicolás Maduro fail to win the national elections in 2015. The economic crisis is taken into account. More important is the way through which Maduro tried to control the government officials, political opponents and citizens by the use of repression. Even though repression is often a central element in the studies of competitive electoral authoritarianism; repression should only serve as a backbone to achieve regime stability.
Table of Content
Abstract ... 2 1. Introduction ... 6 2. Literature Review ... 9 2.1 Stability or Uncertainty ... 9 2.2 Power Strategies ... 9 2.3 Overcoming Uncertainty through Repression ... 10 2.4 (un)secured electoral outcome ... 11 2.5 Defeat ... 12 2.6 Defeat in competitive electoral authoritarian regimes ... 13 3 Case Selection & Methodology ... 14 3.1 Venezuela ... 14 3.2 Qualitative Content Analysis ... 15 3.3 Time Frame ... 16 4. Successor, a troublesome position ... 17 5. Government disruption ... 23 6. Political Opponents ... 28 7. Active dissidents ... 34 8. Conclusions, Limitations and Recommendations ... 39 8.1 Conclusions ... 39 8.2 Limitations and Recommendations ... 41 Bibliography ... 421. Introduction
The academic literature on competitive electoral authoritarianism, suggest that authoritarian incumbents create a system that generally helps to keep the incumbent in power. Incumbents are in charge of state resource and have an array of repressive and manipulative measure to use against their opponents (Gandhi & Lust-Okar, 2009; Levitsky & Way, 2010; Schedler, 2013). The political playing field is skewed in favour of the incumbent, whilst the playing field for the opposition is diminished.
The defeat of authoritarian incumbents is rarely ascribed to a loss in elections, the so called electoral defeat. Coups d’état, economic crisis and disruption of the government are more often considered causes of authoritarian defeat (Cox, 2007; Geddes, 1999; Morse, 2012; Seeberg, 2014; Smith, 2005). The electoral defeat of KANU in Kenya and incumbents of the post-Soviet Union happened when single party authoritarian regimes allowed other parties to enter the electoral competition. Academics did not debar an electoral defeat of authoritarian incumbents, but do consider it rare. Academics say a defeat can be prevented by adequate levels of repression of government officials, political opponents and citizens (Gandhi & Lust-Okar, 2009; Levitsky & Way, 2010; Schedler, 2013; Seeberg, 2014).
However the academic literature on competitive electoral authoritarian regimes did not explain an electoral defeat. Neither did the literature explicate how repression should be carried out. This research focusses on electoral defeat of incumbents of competitive electoral authoritarian regimes. I will describe the uncertainties incumbents face regarding their power and I will explicate how incumbents try to overcome these uncertainties and maintain their hold on power. In this research the electoral loss of Nicólas Maduro in Venezuela is used as a case to explain how incumbents of competitive electoral authoritarian regimes can lose elections.
Venezuela is an authoritarian states were the incumbent rule was relatively stable under former president Hugo Chávez. However, the power transition from Hugo Chávez to Nicolás Maduro was not stable. Maduro and the Partido Socilista
Unido de Venezuela (PSUV), the incumbent’s political party which was in power
since 1999, lost the elections in 2015. There is literature that explains his failure on the economic crisis. I will focus on the accumulation of different governmental failures and failed repression in particular.
The central question of this thesis is: Why did Nicolás Maduro fail to win the
national elections in 2015? This research question will be answered by applying
Gerschewski’s theory of regime stability (Gerschewski, 2013) and Schedler’s theory of uncertainty (Schedler, 2013). The central argument in this thesis is that the mismanagement of the Maduro government, decreased his popularity and increased his uncertainties. Maduro had a hard time controlling the government, his opponents and the Venezuelan citizens and had to rely on repression to win the elections. An answer to my research question could be that crisis has impaired Maduro’s creditability (Geddes, 1999; Pepinsky, 2009; Smith, 2005). Another hypothesis is that Maduro’s repression contained errors and was not implemented well (Bhasin & Gandhi, 2013; Schedler, 2013). Furthermore it could be that the government was too weak and too divided to function well (Levitsky & Way, 2010; Morse, 2012; Schedler, 2013; Seeberg, 2014). A lost possible explanation can be that Maduro was not charismatic enough to tie the citizens to his politics (García, 2012; Levitsky & Loxton, 2013).
To answer the research question, qualitative methods of research are used. The findings of this study are based on content analysis of different sources. News articles, human rights reports, documentaries and online media are used to explicate Maduro’s uncertainties. Qualitative research enables descriptive explanations of government failure.
The second chapter of this thesis contains a literature review of theories on regime stability, authoritarian defeat, repression and uncertainty. In the third chapter I will explicate how this research is carried out. In the next section of this thesis I build up my argument of electoral defeat by the case of Venezuela. Chapter four is a contextual chapter in which the problems of Venezuela are described and related to different levels of uncertainty. The structure of the other empirical chapters is based on Seeberg’s theory on the main actors in competitive authoritarian regimes; government officials, political opponents and citizens (Seeberg, 2014). In chapter five
Maduro’s control of his government will be discussed. Chapter six discusses the oppositional threat and Maduro’s failed repression of opponents. The last empirical chapter describes how Maduro tried to control the Venezuelan citizenry. Chapter eight is the conclusion of this research. In this section I will answer the research question and exemplify the limitations of this research and give my recommendations for
2. Literature Review
2.1 Stability or Uncertainty
During elections incumbents try to hold onto their power, disregarding the political system (Schedler, 2013). Schedler (2013) describes the different kinds of uncertainty incumbents face in relation to their power. During elections there always is a potential risk to lose power, which Schedler defines as institutional uncertainty. Yet incumbents are never secure over their levels of support, this is defined as informational uncertainty. Incumbents of democracies more or less accept these uncertainties. While incumbents of competitive electoral authoritarian regimes, on the other hand, try to contain these same uncertainties. The ultimate goal of incumbents of competitive electoral authoritarian regimes is to prevent the uncertainty of regime change. Incumbents work hard to prevent, detect and topple uncertainties through. Meantime they practice authoritarianism behind the doors of democracy (Schedler, 2013).
According to Gerschewski (2013) elections are one way to establish legitimation, he mentions elections as one of the three pillars of stability in autocratic regimes. Legitimation is a reciprocal relationship between citizens and incumbents. Citizens accept and support the incumbents power in turn for acceptable socio-economic performances. Citizen support is denoted as co-optation, the second pillar of autocratic regime stability. The third and last pillar of stability is repression, which incumbents can use to contain threats. Repression should only function as the backbone, and should be used to enforce the other two pillars of regime stability (Gerschewski, 2013).
2.2 Power Strategies
Before incumbents turn to repression, stability should be achieved through political strength. “Strong regimes are simply able to win elections and dedicate the electoral
outcome much more easily through their delivery of longer-term economic benefits and maintenance of high levels of elite cohesiveness” (Morse, 2012, pp. 178-179).
According to García (2012) authoritarian leaders rise to power by their charisma and through strong socio-economic promises. Levitsky and Loxton (2013) explain that charisma and socio-economic promises are used to create a personal linkage with
voters. Authoritarian leaders usually mobilise former marginalised groups through political inclusion (Levitsky & Loxton, 2013). Both Morse (2012) and Gerschewski (2013) link these socio-economic promises to the reciprocal relationship that guaranties political acquiescence. Charisma and socio-economic performances are highly important for the endurance of competitive electoral authoritarian incumbents.
2.3 Overcoming Uncertainty through Repression
After authoritarian incumbents rose to power, they disrepute and dispose the old political system (Levitsky & Loxton, 2013). To preserve the image of their salvation and to suppress dissidence, these new incumbents use repression (García, 2012; Levitsky & Loxton, 2013). Even though Gerschewski (2013) argues that repression should only serve as a backbone; the main theories on competitive electoral authoritarianism focus on repression as a central element of power retention. “The
logic of authoritarian elections creates a system that generally helps to keep incumbents in power” (Gandhi & Lust-Okar, 2009, p. 10).
Repression is necessary according to Levitsky and Way (2010) to constrain the potential threat to the incumbent’s power during competition. Electoral authoritarian regimes become competitive when there are multi-party elections and opposition parties can compete over executive power (Levitsky & Way, 2010). There is an uneven political favour skewed in favour of the incumbent (Gandhi & Lust-Okar, 2009; Levitsky & Way, 2010). The favourable position is the effect of repression, incumbents work hard to overcome the uncertainty of regime change (Schedler, 2013). All the same “Institutional uncertainty may come from anywhere
the carriers of threat may be anywhere” (Schedler, 2013, p. 34).
Threats can even occur within the government, which are denoted by Schedler (2013) as a horizontal threats. Government officials have access to ministries who can allow permits, and because of their position they can work for their own gains (Levitsky & Way, 2010). Also the military can endanger the incumbent’s hold on power, they could use their weapons for a coup d’état (Schedler, 2013). Although government officials constitute a threat to the incumbent’s hold on power, incumbents are in need of the same government officials in order to counter threats from outside
the government (Gandhi & Lust-Okar, 2009). Threats outside the government arise by political opponents and dissidents in the citizenry, Schedler (2013) defines these as vertical threats. Seeberg (2014) explicitly appoints government officials, citizens and political opponents as the main actors that need to be kept in control by the incumbent in order to overcome the uncertainty of regime change.
For this matter government officials that do not work in unison with the incumbent should be punished and removed from office (Schedler, 2013). The government officials should support the incumbent in his attempt to counter vertical uncertainty. Incumbents of competitive electoral authoritarian regimes have to silence all dissidents within the citizenry. On the other hand incumbents and government officials have to mobilise the citizen support. Through media censorship incumbents control the information citizens receive; criticism is silenced whilst the state is promoted (Gandhi & Lust-Okar, 2009; Levitsky & Way, 2010; Schedler, 2013). This dissidence can be silenced by illegalising protests or by punishment and imprisonment (Dresden & Howard, 2015; Gandhi & Lust-Okar, 2009; Levitsky & Way, 2010; Schedler, 2013), however incumbents should not violate the physical integrity of their citizens (Schedler, 2013). “Poor dictators. They yearn to be loved and feared, only to
end up confused and ignorant about the extent to which they are either loved or feared” (Schedler, 2013, p. 38). In order to keep the citizen support, repression of the
citizenry should be reduced prior to the elections (Bhasin & Gandhi, 2013). Regarding the political opponents, incumbents should increase the level of repression towards them prior to the election (Bhasin & Gandhi, 2013).
2.4 (un)secured electoral outcome
By the use of state resources and through repression incumbents of competitive electoral authoritarian regimes create a system that is built to stay in power (Gandhi & Lust-Okar, 2009). Research on competitive electoral authoritarian regimes do not debar an electoral defeat, but they do regard an electoral defeat exceptional when repression is used adequately (Dresden & Howard, 2015; Gandhi & Lust-Okar, 2009; Levitsky & Way, 2010; Schedler, 2013). Yet these theories do not define what adequate repression is. Schedler (2013) and Sjöberg (2011) consider case dependent differences in repression. Levitsky & Way (2010) plead that incumbents have to be
creative when it comes to repression, constant adaptation to the circumstances is required. In general it is clear that too little repression will lead to an electoral defeat, however too harsh forms of repression are neither effective (Schedler, 2013). Furthermore the repressive measures, used by incumbents of competitive electoral authoritarian regimes, should not be too cruel and cannot be too obvious, because that will impair their creditability (Schedler, 2013). Creditability of the incumbent is needed for citizen support and thus votes. Timing of repression is considered to be important, but the research on timing of Bhasin & Ghandi does not make clear what should be adequate timing is. This research fits can contribute to the debate of adequate repression, the way in which Maduro carried out repression did not help him to win the elections in 2015.
2.5 Defeat
“Repression is an obvious strategic tool for authoritarian incumbents trying to insure
electoral victories. […] but the manner in which repression should be deployed is not obvious” (Bhasin & Gandhi, 2013, p. 621). Electoral defeat in competitive electoral
authoritarian regimes is often assigned to state incapacity and internal conflicts (Levitsky & Loxton, 2013; Morse, 2012; Schedler, 2013; Seeberg, 2014). Government officials collectively work to thwart threats, disruption within the government affects the governmental ability to counter vertical threats to the regime (Schedler, 2013).
An electoral defeat is likely to happen when there is an opening for opponents (Pepinsky, 2009). Such an opening is created when incumbent’s socio-economic performances are disappointing and incumbents fail to live up to their promises (Pepinsky, 2009). Smith (2005) affirms that incumbents lose support from voters when the incumbent’s promises turn out to be deceptive. Incumbents cannot live up to their promises when there is an economic crisis (Geddes, 1999; Pepinsky, 2009; Smith, 2005). Broken promises make voters feel deceived, dissatisfactions with the regime rises and voters will be likely to opt for different policies and actors (García, 2012; Geddes, 1999; Pepinsky, 2009). If there are scandals and intrigues within the regime along with mismanagement, the likeliness of a defeat rises (Geddes, 1999; Pepinsky, 2009). Cox (2007) describes how dissatisfaction among the citizenry can
lead to a revolution and a regime coup, when dissents organise. He does not consider individual dissidence a threat for regime existence (Cox, 2007).
2.6 Defeat in competitive electoral authoritarian regimes
A common weakness in these studies is that the studies of Geddes (1999), Pepinsky (2009) and Smith (2005) are based on former closed or single party authoritarian regimes, who have just opened up the electoral arena for rivalry parties. Although Schedler (2013) does denote economy as an external threat in competitive electoral authoritarian regimes as well, he does not explicate its relation with defeat. Ghandi and Lust-Okar (2009) assert that an electoral defeat could happen when incumbents miscalculate the level of competitiveness and hence did not carry out enough repression.
Morse (2012) points out that the study of competitive electoral authoritarianism is still in its infancy. For this matter my study contributes to the field of competitive electoral authoritarianism. The studies discussed in this literature review, do not give a complete explanation of electoral defeat, they ascribe defeat to one cause only. In my opinion defeat is caused by the accumulation of different factors. Mismanagement lead to incredibility and dissatisfaction which is at such a high level that repression and state promotion are ineffective.
3 Case Selection & Methodology
3.1 Venezuela
The theories discussed in the literature review will be applied to Venezuela. Venezuela drifted towards authoritarianism after Chávez was elected into office (Weyland, 2013). It like Schedler has defined “Electoral authoritarian regimes
establish the institutions of liberal democracy on paper, yet subvert them in practice through severe, widespread and systematic manipulation. They play the game of multiparty elections, as they hold regular elections for the chief executive and a national legislative assembly” (Schedler, 2013, p. 2). Venezuela is competitive, since
multi-party elections were held in which oppositions groups could compete for executive power albeit the state repression (Levitsky & Way, 2010).
Despite the advantages through the use of state resources and repression, Maduro lost the election. This electoral defeat is the focus this study. Incumbents of competitive electoral authoritarian regimes need to overcome the threats to their power, which are defined as uncertainties (Schedler, 2013). In order to stay in power incumbents need to control government officials, political opponents and citizens (Seeberg, 2014). Repression is usually used to control these actors to overcome uncertainty, the measures of repression that were used by Maduro will be discussed by the theories of Bhasin & Ghandi (2013), Gandhi & Lust-Okar (2009), Levitsky & Way (2010) and Schedler (2013). Aside from these theories, the theories on defeat by Geddes (1999), Pepinsky (2009) and Smith (2005) will be applied to the case of Venezuela.
Electoral defeat is considered to be rare in competitive electoral authoritarian regimes (Gandhi & Lust-Okar, 2009; Levitsky & Way, 2010; Schedler, 2013). Morse (2012) justly notices that research on competitive electoral authoritarian regimes is still in its infancy. For this reason this study can contribute to research and can provide more inside to the actual functioning of those regimes. Moreover studying the events prior to the elections can create more insight into the (in)adequate use and effectiveness of repression. Albeit the Venezuelan media is repressed there are sufficient resources that can be examined through qualitative research.
3.2 Qualitative Content Analysis
Qualitative analysis is favoured over quantitative methods of research for different reasons. First of all quantitative data are used for their descriptiveness, limits to research by testing hypotheses only is not desirable for this explanatory study. Quantitative data do not explain how repressive measures are carried out. Moreover quantitative analysis is not desirable since the ‘official’ numbers are not reliable in authoritarian regimes. The analysed data for this research are derived from independent news sources and human rights reports. These resources give insight to the political unrest and repression, the conclusions of this thesis will thus be based on content analysis.
Inductive content analysis is a tool to explore the current situation, through which the events and problems can be monitored (Matthes, 2009). In this research the current economic and political situation in Venezuela will be described by the use of these inductive methods. Inductive content analysis is a tool to detect problems is used to detect the uncertainties Nicolás Maduro faced prior to the election in 2015.
Through content analysis one can monitor the actors involved and analyse their actions (Berg, 2001). Throughout this research Nicolás Maduro is the main actor, his actions regarding other actors will be studied. The other actors that are studied are the actors Seeberg (2014) has considered crucial to regime stability; government officials, political opponents and citizens. In this way actors are deductively studied (Berg, 2001; Matthes, 2009).
Content analysis is chosen on the basis of the available material. Withal content analysis is a flexible method through which different kind of material can be studied including news, images and interviews (Matthes, 2009). Furthermore it allows for the exploration of different aspects of one issue (Matthes, 2009). Since the possible cause of electoral defeat can be dependent on many different factors, it is necessary to use a method which explores the case broadly. Also through content analysis does not exclude any possible explanation and gives space to link different causes.
The content analysis will be used on different sources; mainly news sources and human rights reports. National Venezuelan news sources are mainly left out for analysis, since in competitive electoral authoritarian regimes the incumbents own the media and apply censorship (Levitsky & Way, 2010; Schedler, 2013). For this matter the Venezuelan news sources are not independent and do not present the actual facts. Therefore international independent news sources are submitted to analysis. Aside from news sources, official human rights organisations are used in this research. The annual human rights reports and specific articles devoted to Venezuela are derived from Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International. Furthermore online media, mainly twitter and youtube, are additional sources that display the facts of actual repression.
3.3 Time Frame
Repression is carried out after the incumbents rose to power (Levitsky & Loxton, 2013). Repression is used to control government officials, citizens and the political space for the opposition (Gandhi & Lust-Okar, 2009; Levitsky & Way, 2010; Schedler, 2013). Since repression is mainly used to preclude an electoral victory for the opposition, levels of repression of opponents are higher in the prelude of elections (Bhasin & Gandhi, 2013).
Maduro rose to power in March 2013, Maduro was defeated during his first election after his inauguration. This specific election was held on December sixth 2015. For this matter the time period over which this study is carried out is March 2013-December 2015. The time prior to Maduro’s inauguration is of importance to the context which will be related to external uncertainties. The events that took place after the specific election do not give a further explanation to the electoral defeat. For this matter these events are left out from analysis. This research methods are applied in the next section of this thesis, the empirical chapters that explain why Maduro lost the presidential elections in Venezuela in 2015.
4. Successor, a troublesome position
Maduro was the designated person, handpicked by former president Hugo Chávez, to complete the Bolivarian revolution and to continue chavismo. Maduro succeeded Chávez after his death, Maduro was considered the most reliable person within the Chávez’ government. Even though Hugo Chávez had proven to be a successful leader, since he was in power for over a decade, whilst Maduro still had to prove himself. When he came to power, Nicolás Maduro was placed in a troublesome position. He had to cope with different and higher levels of uncertainty than Chávez, due to his personal and the Venezuelan misery.
Venezuela has been in an economic crisis for years, when Chávez had promised to solve the economic problems and to improve the situation for the poor when he rose to power. Through the years of chavismo the economic crisis was not solved and was still persistent when Maduro rose to power. Aside from the economic misery, Venezuela suffers from high levels of crime. Despite the socialist reform of the Bolivarian revolution; the problems worsened. Maduro has received the task to solve these problems, whilst he still needs to tie the masses to him as the new symbol of chavismo. Problematically the commodity prices for oil are in decline, which causes even more difficulties.
Oil policy and an economic crisis
Venezuela has the largest proven oil reserves in the world, which makes oil the hub of the Venezuelan economy (Remmer, 1985). In 1975 the Venezuelan government has nationalised the oil industry, the country’s export revenues are mainly derived from the oil industry (Salas, 2009). For this matter Venezuelan economics, and government finances are highly dependent on oil revenues. Consequently subjecting the Venezuelan economy to the international oil commodity prices. When the prices of oil collapsed in the 1980s it had its hold on the Venezuelan economy and caused an economic crisis (Remmer, 1985).
When Hugo Chávez rose to power in 1998, the economic crisis was not dissolved (Ellner & Salas, 2007). Venezuela was caught in an economic, social and
political crisis, which hit the poor disproportionally (Parker, 2007). The rich elites benefited from the oil industry, while half of the Venezuelan population lived below the Venezuelan poverty line (Aveledo, 2010). When Chávez was running for president, he promised to improve the situation for the poor and to dissolve the socio-economic dichotomy (Ellner & Salas, 2007). During his campaign he relied on his strong charisma to tie the masses for his politics (Arreaza, 2010). After he rose to power social welfare programs were introduced, financed by oil revenues (Salas, 2009). The focus of the government economic policy relied on oil, other economic sectors were neglected and private industries were discouraged (McCarthy, 2016).
The welfare programs were so generous, that the government overspend and did not safe for harder times (McCarthy, 2016). Under the Chávez government oil export came to represent 98% of the export revenue (5 reasons why Venezuela's economy is in a 'meltdown', 2016). According to the IMF figures the commodity prices for oil dropped with 50% between 2014 and 2015 (McCarthy, 2016). The Venezuelan state earnings dropped along with the commodity prices, from $80 billion in 2013, to approximately $20-$25 billion in 2016 (McCarthy, 2016).
As said before, the economy of Venezuela is highly dependent on oil, and became even more dependent on oil by the neglect of other economic sectors. The Venezuelan economy is now caught within a severe economic crisis (5 reasons why Venezuela's economy is in a 'meltdown', 2016). The government has a financial deficit and is unable to fund the social welfare programs, which are central to the PSUV politics (5 reasons why Venezuela's economy is in a 'meltdown', 2016). Moreover the government has an impaired economic ranking and cannot lend money from other states (McCarthy, 2016).
The oil revenues provide foreign currency; which is distributed through a controlled, multi-tiered currency exchange market to domestic oil producers (5 reasons why Venezuela's economy is in a 'meltdown', 2016). With the drop of commodity prices, there was a decline in the value of the national currency. The Venezuelan Bolivar is dropping at tremendous rates; with an inflation of 60,3% over 2013, 68,5% over 2014 and up to a devastating 180,9% over 2015 (tradingeconomics, 2016).
Without foreign currency and due to the hyperinflation, it became more expensive to import basic goods. Beyond the impotency to import, Venezuela cannot provide for itself, because the government has neglected or discouraged other economic activities (McCarthy, 2016). This inability has resulted in tremendous shortages of even the most basic goods and services (5 reasons why Venezuela's economy is in a 'meltdown', 2016).
The governmental economic policy and their reliance on oil have put Venezuela in a precarious position. The decline of the world’s commodity prices of oil has affected all Venezuelans. Moreover the economic crisis created an extreme financial deficit for the government. The government is thus unable to pay for the social welfare projects, the central element of the Bolivarian revolution. Maduro cannot deliver on the promises to establish socioeconomic equality. The economic crisis undermines the creditability of the Bolivarian revolution. The shortages that have emerged as an effect of the economic crisis and the hyperinflation, create social unrest and dissatisfaction with the Maduro government.
Violence and impunity
Aside from the ongoing crisis that is affecting the satisfaction with the Maduro government, Venezuela suffers from high levels of violence. The Observatorio Venezolano de Violencia declared 2011 as the most violent year in the Venezuelan history (Observatorio Venezolano de Violencia, 2011). Since then the level of violence has only increased, since 2014 Venezuela has the second highest homicide rate in the world (Observatorio Venezolano de Violencia, 2014). The levels of crime have not declined over the years and many Venezuelans blame the government for not taking effective measures (Observatorio Venezolano de Violencia , 2015).
The Chávez government has stopped publishing the official crime rates, so the reports on crime use are based on independent research. Maduro disregards the crime rates, instead of fighting them he is acting in contrary. The violence is accompanied by high impunity rates and crimes often lack investigation (Amnesty International, 2016). Congresswoman Soloranzo asserted the Venezuelan impunity rate to hover at
about 98% , furthermore she claims that the judicial system is liable to corruption (Riesenfeld, 2015).
The inability to mitigate the violence is another weakness of the Maduro government, aside from economic mismanagement. The impunity rates, lack of investigation and the corruptive system are a demonstration of mismanagement. The Venezuelan citizens demand improvement and a solution of the problems, they express their dissatisfaction in protests.
2013 Elections
These problems already existed during Maduro’s first election in 2013. During this election the circumstances were not in his favour and had put him in a troubled position. Withal the problems do not have a positive effect on the Bolivarian Revolution and the politics of the PSUV. The severity of the problems required political action and changes of policy.
Instead of promising a change to the situation, Maduro advocated chavismo and held on to old promises. As the handpicked successor, Maduro remains true to Chávez and his devotion to the Bolivarian revolution1. Maduro placed himself behind Chávez, the great leader, during the elections in 2013 (Venezuela: Life after Chavez, 2013). During the election in 2013 Maduro was certain over Chávez’ popularity (Venezuela: Life after Chavez, 2013). Nonetheless he was uncertain about his own popularity, which explain high levels of both informational and institutional insecurity.
According to Ernesto Villegas, the minister of communication and responsible for Maduro’s campaign, Maduro would only win the election because of Chávez (Venezuela: Life after Chavez, 2013). Opponents never stood a chance when Chávez was alive, his strong charisma made him convincible (Hellinger, 2007). Chávez knew how to tie the masses to his politics (Venezuela: Life after Chavez, 2013). With Chávez’ endorsement it seemed like Maduro would easily win the elections, notwithstanding the circumstances (Venezuela: Life after Chavez, 2013).
1 “Ejercije te para la vida de él y para la vida en una pueblo, la pueblo de Bolivar” (Nicolás Maduro 15-04-2013)
According to the official results of the Consejo Supremo Electoral, Maduro had won the elections. Yet it was with only a slight majority of the votes; Maduro obtained 50,66%, while his main opponent, Henrique Capriles, obtained 49,07% of the votes (Consejo Supremo Electoral, 2013). By elections one can overcome informational uncertainties (Schedler, 2013), the result revealed a loss of support. The electoral outcome was put in doubt by Maduro’s main opponent, Henrique Capriles (Lopez & Watts, 2013). The legitimacy of the Maduro government were contested, which rose the levels of institutional uncertainty. The contestation by opponents will be further discussed in chapter six.
Analysis: Severe problems and high levels of uncertainty
Nicolás Maduro was the successor of Hugo Chávez: the charismatic leader of the Bolivarian revolution. When Chávez rose to power he made socio-economic promises to the former marginalised citizens of Venezuela. He founded social welfare programs, which he financed by the national oil revenues. When Chávez was in power there was a decline of extreme poverty (Venezuela: Life after Chavez, 2013).
When Maduro rose to power, there was an international decline of oil commodity prices. Oil revenues were the government’s main income and were used to fund the social welfare programs. The drop of oil prices had a major impact on Venezuela resulting in a deep economic crisis. An economic crisis can have a major effect on the creditability of an incumbent (Geddes, 1999; Pepinsky, 2009; Smith, 2005). Maduro could not continue the social welfare programs, the central element of the Bolivarian revolution. Maduro disappointed his voters when he could not live up to his promises. This maladministration can lead to diminished levels of citizen support (Smith, 2005). Moreover mismanagement and loss of creditability is an opening for other options and can rise the support for the opposition (Pepinsky, 2009). The levels of institutional uncertainty were high and with the continuity of the economic misery these levels only increased while Maduro was in office.
Aside from to the economic related problems, Venezuela has high crime rates that demand governmental actions. Meantime the Maduro government disregards these problems and allow crime to be paired with impunity. Venezuela has become
the country with the highest homicide rate in the world in 2014 and these rates have not declined. Maduro’s inability to diminish the violence is another disappointment of his governance, and yet another loss of support.
While the problems demand a change of policy, Maduro is still advocating the politics chavismo. Thereby Maduro lacks charisma and social strength to tie the masses to him. Chávez success was mainly based on his social strength, Maduro’s social weakness affects the support for the PSUV. Maduro hides behind Chávez and the message of the Bolivarian revolution. However over time the Bolivarian revolution turned out to be deceptive. Without any improvement of the national problems, the Maduro government will continue to lose support. Dissidence will rise by the continuance of mismanagement, the vertical threat rises when the dissidents will organise (Cox, 2007). Maduro is in need of repression since the stability pillars of legitimacy and co-optation are subverted (Gerschewski, 2013). A strong cohesive government is required for the implementation of repression (Gandhi & Lust-Okar, 2009). Yet Maduro had to cope with horizontally derived informational and institutional uncertainty as soon as he came to office.
5. Government disruption
The same officials who worked for Chávez were still in office when Maduro rose to power. Chávez had created a government of supportive and reliable party members around him (Aveledo, 2010). It is not certain that the party members who had been supportive to Chávez, would be as supportive to Maduro. Maduro had to cope with high levels of horizontal informational uncertainty as soon as he came to office.
Since the stability pillars of legitimacy and co-optation were troubled, Maduro had to rely harder on repression. In order to prevent, detect and counter vertical threats the incumbent needs a strong government (Gandhi & Lust-Okar, 2009). However government officials can also constitute a serious threat to the government, they can easily work for their own gain through their access to ministries (Gandhi & Lust-Okar, 2009). Intern scandals and intrigues destabilise the regime and the vertical support level (Geddes, 1999).
Maduro had to overcome the informational insecurity as soon as possible after he rose to power. The government had to work in unison in order to be able to counter the vertical threats to Maduro’s power. In Venezuela the bicameral system was abolished under Chávez; the national assembly and the president constitute the government (Aveledo, 2010; Bejarano, 2010). Due to the lack of a bicameral system there are less checks and balances; Maduro and government officials thus have more power than in democracies with a separation of power. Contestation of government officials could reduce horizontal institutional uncertainty. In this chapter the functioning of the Maduro government is discussed on the basis of revealed internal intrigues and scandals caused by government opportunists.
Diosdado Cabello
The biggest contester of Maduro’s power within the government was Diosdado Cabello. As the head of the national assembly and vice-president, Cabello had the power to intervene when Maduro was unable to reign (Munoz, 2013). He was a direct threat to Maduro’s power, because he could relatively easy counter Maduro’s power. Aside from this institutional power, Cabello had tight connections with other important politicians within multiple ministries (Lansberg-Rodríguez, 2014). These
connections enabled him to exert influence in different departments of governance, indirectly this increased his hold on power. According to Wikileaks (2008) Chávez already had problems with Cabello, before the scandals were revealed. Maduro was aware of Cabello’s growing hold on power. However Cabello was not removed from office, he was able to serve his full term, which ended in 2015 (PSUV).
Maduro and Cabello were in a struggle; they cannot overturn the power of one another. Cabello came to the fore in public, and created more visibility of him as a symbol of the PSUV (Lansberg-Rodríguez, 2014). This impaired Maduro’s status as president and the frontman of the PSUV and Venezuela. Apart from ignoring Maduro’s position, Cabello ignored the constitutional hurdles and exceeded the code of conduct of the Maduro government. At various times Cabello prevented the opposition from speaking in session (Lansberg-Rodríguez, 2014). In addition Cabello suspended the salaries of opposition members (Lansberg-Rodríguez, 2014; Munoz, 2013). On top of this Cabello stripped problematic legislators from their parliamentary immunity and even abused at least one physically (Lansberg-Rodríguez, 2014; Munoz, 2013). Ceballo was obtaining more personal influence through extortion and intimidation at the expense of Maduro’s authority.
Apart from these attempts to acquire more power, Diosdado Cabello is accused of nepotism (Zabludovsky, 2015). Through nepotism it is easier to avoid checks and balances and to exert more influence (Gandhi & Lust-Okar, 2009). Cabello assigned important political positions to his family and friends. Maduro was in approval, he even inaugurated Cabello’s wife as the new minister of tourism (noticía al día, 2015). Aside from his wife, Cabello had allies in the financial and oil sector (Wikileaks, 2008).
Cabello used his access to ministries and bureaucrats to obtain permits for his own purpose. Through nepotism Cabello had access to the national oil companies. This allowed him to secretly trade oil with the Unites States, he was given 50 million dollars as a bribe (Delgado, 2014). The United States are the declared state enemy and are accused of solely serving their capitalist motives (Milne, 2014). Involvement with the enemy is treason, in this case treason of the socialist politics and a subversion to Maduro’s authority.
Cabello betrayed the government several times more, he is accused of drug trafficking (Diario las Américas, 2016; Córdoba & Forero, 2015). Nicolás Maduro defends Venezuela by blaming Colombia for bringing drugs into Venezuela. The acts of Diosdado Cabello falsify Maduro’s argumentations and impair Maduro’s and Venezuela’s creditability (Milne, 2014). After the drug accusation came out Diosdado Cabello was imprisoned. The imprisonment was after Cabello had finished his office term, during Cabello’s time in office Maduro did not intervene.
Military Threat
Maduro failed to keep a hold on his government officials at more times. Three air force generals were arrested after an attempt to plot a coup against the government (Shoichet, 2014). This institutional insecurity was only toppled, because other officers warned Maduro (Baker, 2014). The other officers owned up of being recruited by the opposition for a coup d’état (Baker, 2014). The military has the hard powers it needs to fight the government and has gotten more power by the new constitution (Bejarano, 2010). For this reason the military constitutes institutional uncertainty. It seems like Maduro did not overcome informational uncertainty over his military and for this matter did not control the vertical institutional uncertainty.
Jorge Giordani
It has become clear that the biggest threats within the government were not in Maduro’s control. He did try to achieve more control over other government officials, including Jorge Giordani. Giordani was the delegate of economics, until he was accused of treason after he had criticised the Maduro government of corruption and squander (El Nacional Web, 2016; Maduradas, 2015). Maduro blamed Giordani for causing the economic crisis. Meantime Giordani warned Maduro that the Venezuelan economy was in need of change for regime survival (Rawlins, 2015; Maduradas, 2015).
Maduro replaced him on account of his criticism against the government (Rawlins, 2015). Removing Giordani from office has only raised Giordani’s critique on the
government, which he gives openly (Robertson, 2014a). He wrote open letters, or testimonies as he defines those letters himself, in defence of his own tenure (Giordani, 2015). Moreover these letters are a critique on Maduro in which his government is blamed for his mismanagement (Giordani, 2015).
Giordani was Chávez’ right hand when he reformed the economy for his Bolivarian revolution (Robertson, 2014a). Giordani was an experienced economic, and regarded to be an expert of the national Venezuelan economy. His department letters were a testimony of mismanagement of the Maduro government for dissidents and opponents (Denis, 2015; Robertson, 2014a). His criticism created division within the government between those who take Giordani’s allegations serious and those who do not (Dutka, 2014).
This government disruption becomes more evident by the support Giordani has received from inter alia Hector Navarro (Dutka, 2014). Hector Navarro stood up for Giordani and defended that the by Giordani made allegations should be taken serious (Dutka, 2014). Both Giordani’s and Navarro’s main point was to call attention to corruption, the use of off budget funds and uncontrolled public spending by the Maduro government (Robertson, 2014b). By supporting Giordani, Navarro broke the governmental code of conduct, as a result he was removed from his position and expelled from the PSUV (Robertson, 2014b). After Navarro was removed from office, he gave even more critique on Maduro and his government than before (El Nacional, 2015).
Ironically Navarro, who accused the government of corruption, was involved in corruptive activities himself during his tenure as minister of energy (Paliche, 2016). Navarro did not work in unison with the government, yet his case went unnoticed.
Analysis: Disunity, intrigues and scandals
During his time as president of Venezuela, Maduro did not control his government officials. He did not attempt to overcome his informational uncertainty regarding the government after he rose to power. Also after he failed to overcome this horizontal
uncertainty, for this matter his government officials could easily serve their own purposes. After all through their position they have access to ministries who can give them permits for personal practices (Gandhi & Lust-Okar, 2009). Scandals and intrigues can break a government apart, with the result that more officials will work for their own gains (Geddes, 1999). At times Maduro did intervene after government officials carried out misconduct. Yet Maduro did only intervene after the events happened and came out.
It has become clear that the Maduro government did not work in unison, government officials served their own interests instead. The government should actually serve upon citizens demands in order to achieve government stability (García, 2012; Morse, 2012). After all Maduro is only in power through the reciprocal relationship between his performances and citizen support. When the image of the government is impaired by scandals and intrigues, their creditability is decreased. As an effect of the scandals and intrigues of nepotism and treason, Maduro has lost support.
The disruption of the Maduro government took place in in a period in which Maduro was in need of the support of his government officials. The other two pillars of regime stability were already subverted, Maduro had to rely on repression (Gerschewski, 2013). In order to prevent, detect and counter vertical threats incumbents need a strong government which takes the orders of the incumbent and work in unison (Gandhi & Lust-Okar, 2009). A strong government was especially needed for the upcoming elections, strong regimes can more easily win elections (Cox, 2007). Without a coherent government and with the worsening of economic problems and an increase of violence, Maduro had a hard time ahead.
6. Political Opponents
In times of elections the power of incumbents is directly challenged by opposition leaders from rivalry parties. Maduro had only slightly won his first election in 2013, when 49,07% of the votes went to his main opponent Henrique Capriles (Consejo Supremo Electoral, 2013). This slight difference demonstrates that an electoral victory in 2015 would not come at ease. Especially since many people express their dissatisfaction in protest through which they demand a change.
In disregard of his popularity, Maduro had the access to state resources and should have been able to benefit from his better position vis-à-vis the opposition leaders. The law only allowed public funding for the incumbent and his party (Chávez, 1999). On top of that, Maduro had control over the national media, which he used for regime promotion (Bisbal, 2010). Aside these advantages, incumbents of competitive electoral authoritarian regimes have a whole repertoire of repressive measures which they can use to influence the electoral outcome (Gandhi & Lust-Okar, 2009; Levitsky & Way, 2010; Schedler, 2013). By repression incumbents can limit the political space for the opposition. The system is in their favour and is set up to generate incumbent succession.
However, Maduro could not satisfy many citizens and his government is blamed for mismanagement. The worsening of the economic crisis and the increase of violence makes that Venezuelans opt for a change. There is thus an opening for alternatives and for the opposition. Maduro’s main opposition leaders have utilised this opening for a further breakdown of legitimacy and co-optation. To win the elections Maduro therefore had to rely hard on repression, while his government was contested.
A serious contester
After Maduro had won the elections in 2013 with only a slight difference in the amount of votes, the second runner up, Henrique Capriles, refused to accept the electoral outcome (Lopez & Watts, 2013). Capriles described the elections as an illegitimate process full of irregularities and accused Maduro of intimidation during the electoral campaign (BBC, 2013). Capriles first demanded a recount of the votes
through an audit (Lopez & Watts, 2013). Nothing changed after the recount, Capriles than demanded an audit over the complete voting protest (Lopez & Watts, 2013). The
Consejo Nacional Electoral claimed that Capriles lacks any proof of fraud and
intimidation during the elections and did not grant a complete audit (Carlson, 2013).
Capriles did not give up, he collected over three thousand signatures to demand an audit and filed a case against the government over irregularities around the election (Lopez & Watts, 2013). Even though Capriles collected the required amount of signatures to compel the audit, the Maduro government still not granted the demand (Iaconangelo, 2013). Because of Maduro’s unwillingness to carry out an audit, Capriles evoked his supporter to take the streets and contest Maduro’s legitimacy (Iaconangelo, 2013). Capriles demanded for peaceful protest by slamming pots and pans, yet the protest create political unrest (Iaconangelo, 2013).
Despite Capriles peaceful intentions, the protesters devastated government public buildings and the protest turned violent (Iaconangelo, 2013). Capriles was threatened by the Maduro government and forced to stop the protest, furthermore Maduro blackmailed Capriles and portrayed him as a fascist (Iaconangelo, 2013). Capriles distant himself from the protests, when these turned into violent riots (Iaconangelo, 2013).
SOS Venezuela to oust Maduro
Capriles party member Leopoldo López did not withdraw from the protests against the Maduro government. The protest which evoked from the electoral outcome in 2013, evolved into bigger and more violent riots over governmental mismanagement (Virginia López, 2014:b). The protest turned against the Maduro government’s inability to cope with the economic crisis, scarcity, high murder rates and the governmental repression of civil liberties (Law & Walsh, 2014). López brought the hashtag SOSVenezuela into life and demanded the exit of Maduro, this demand is commonly known as La Salida (Friends of a Free Venezuela, 2014; #SOSVenezuela, 2014).
The number of protest increased and spread to different cities and were paired with an increased level of violence (Minaya, 2015). People died as a result of the
violence used in these protest, deaths were among both dissidents and government supporters (Human Rights Watch, 2015:a). Maduro did not take any responsibility over the deaths and neither did López, they blamed the other party of killing their opponents (Munoz, 2013). As the president, Maduro was in his power to blame for evoking violence and could easily accuse him for the murders without sufficient evidence (Amnesty International, 2014).
Maduro let Leopoldo López arrest in February 2014, López was convicted to over thirteen years imprisonment in September 2015 (Amnesty International, 2015). Maduro had his biggest opponent in prison, López was thus unable to run for office during the upcoming elections in December 2015. Maduro has always said López was imprisoned to punish the protesters and to stop the riots, however the protests did not stop (associated press in Caracas, 2014).
Neither did the arrests stopped López from exerting influence on the citizenry. In prison López could not write letters and could only have limited visitations (Tayler, 2016). It was through his wife Lilian Tintori, that López was maintaining contact with Venezuelan citizens. She posted messages on his twitter, through which López urges his supporters not to give up in their struggle to exit Maduro (Leopoldo López, 2014). Not only twitter messages were used to evoke the masses, Leopoldo was even able to smuggle out a video (Hall, 2015). In this video, which he filmed while he was in prison, he urges Venezuelans to express their anger towards the government and proclaimed massive street protests (Hall, 2015). The anti-government protests increased and protesters now also demanded Maduro to free Leopoldo López (associated press in Caracas, 2014).
Enduring protests
The anti-government protests originally evoked in San Cristóbal (Minaya, 2015). Daniel Ceballos, was the mayor of that city at that time (Minaya, 2015; Neuman, 2015). Maduro blamed him for being unwilling to end the protest and he put Ceballos in jail in March 2014 in his attempt to stop the violence (Neuman, 2015). The imprisonment did not have the desired effect; it did not stop the violence and it did not break up the anti-government groups.
The imprisonment of both, Daniel Ceballos and Leopoldo López, even worked in Maduro’s disadvantage. Ceballo and López were able to unite in prison; in a video, which they smuggled out of prison, the two promised to stay on the right side history (Ceballos & López, 2015)2. They said that the riots were not in Ramo Verde, the military prison where they were locked-up, the real problems were in the Maduro government (Ceballos & López, 2015)3. Maduro soon discovered the conjunction and knew it was not in his favour. In order to achieve more control Maduro had Daniel Ceballos be transferred to another prison (Minaya, 2015). Later, in August 2015, Ceballos was released from prison and put under house arrest for medical reasons
(Neuman, 2015).
Eliminating contesters
The release of Cabellos was only a small relief for the protesters, the riots continued and people were more eager to demand the release of Leopoldo López (Friends of a Free Venezuela, 2014). More people than before were out on the street to protest against Maduro (associated press in Caracas, 2014). In an attempt to control the dissidence and end the riots, Maduro imprisoned more politicians.
In February opposition leader for Alianza Bravo Pueblo, Antonio Ledezma was arrested for his support to ‘la salida’ (Alexander, 2016). Ledezma was kept in prison for a year, while awaiting his conviction (Vivanco, 2015b). He was accused for conspiracy and an attempt to plot a coup to oust Maduro (BBC, 2015). In this way Maduro had now imprisoned the leaders from three different opposition parties.
Another runner up for the elections in 2015, María Corina Machado, got arrested as well. Just like Ledezma, she was accused for her support to ‘la Salida’, 2 “A toda la gente del DIM a todos los que han venido, a todos los sargentos, a todos los tenientes que nosh an acompañado acá del DIM. Le mandamus un saludo y les recordamos que nuestra lucha es muy concreta, muy clara por una Venezuela en donde todos los derechos sean para todas las personas. Que no haya discriminación. Que no se abuse del poder. Que no se le violen los derechos a nadie, que todos tengan acceso a salud, al trabajo, a una vivienda. Todos los derechos para todas las personas.” (Leopoldo Lopez 2015, in CNN 2015). 3 “El motín no está en Ramo Verde. El motín está en las colas y los mercales. El motín está en el bolsillo de los venezolanos. El motín está en la escasez. El motín está cuando no hay luz… cuando no hay colegios ni escuelas. Ese es el motín. El motín está en todos lados. No hay fuerza el el mundo para reprimir un pueblo que está cansado de violación de sus derechos.” (Daniel Ceballos 2015 in CNN 2015)
which is considered conspiracy against the government (Human Rights Watch, 2015:b). Through the judicial system Maduro excluded four major opponents from the 2015 elections. Like these imprisonments were not enough Maduro also put other important opponents from the most competitive rival parties. Among them were Carlos Vecchio from ‘primero justicia’ and Enzo Scarano (Human Rights Watch, 2015:a).
Analysis: A political opening and failed repression
The legitimacy of Maduro’s power has been contested ever since he rose to power in 2013. The PSUV had lost in creditability and supporters by mismanagement over the severe economic crisis and the high levels of violence. When severe problems and especially an economic crisis, continue by the tenure of the incumbent government, voters are more likely to opt for something different (García, 2012). The opposition was well aware that the problems were an opening for their politics (Pepinsky, 2009). The opposition in Venezuela used this opening to openly criticise on the Maduro government.
After Maduro was inaugurated as a president, Maduro’s then main opponent, Henrique Capriles mobilised his supporters to demand a recount of the votes. When the recount did not have the desired effect Capriles demanded a complete audit of the election process. Maduro did not grant Capriles demand for the audit, not even after the Capriles collected the required signatures for the audit. For incumbents of authoritarian regimes there are three pillars of stability; legitimacy, co-optation and repression (Gerschewski, 2013). Maduro did not try to stabilise legitimacy over his power when demanded, it is therefore that he had to rely on repression.
Maduro was uncertain over his institutional power, the vertical threat created by his opponents increased. Maduro tried to overcome this uncertainty by the use of repression. Yet the way in which Maduro carried out repression is working more in his disadvantage than in his favour. By repressing Capriles, he activated other political opponents. López was able to evoke massive protests which spread to different cities. When Maduro put López in prison even more people took the streets to protest against the Maduro government and to free López.
One can argument the gain in opponent support through Maduro’s repression in different ways. First of all it must be clear that Maduro did not exert enough control over Leopoldo López while he was imprisoned. López was able to connect with his supporters through different messages. Moreover López had a camera and was able to smuggle videos out of prison, with messages to evoke more protests. Aside López and Ceballos were able to unite in prison. Yet Maduro did enabled Capriles and López to run for president during the 2015 elections.
According to Bhasin & Ghandi (2013) incumbents of competitive electoral authoritarian regimes should increase the level of repression towards their opponents in the year prior to the elections. Certainly, Maduro did increase the repression on his opponents before the elections. He imprisoned different leaders of his rivalry parties and prevent them from running for president in the elections in 2015.
However, Schedler (2013) states that repression should not be too obvious and not too cruel. Imprisonment of opponents is an obvious measure of repression when there is no credible evidence for prosecution. Also many, including Human Rights organisation as well as Venezuelan citizens, consider imprisonment as too harsh for the accused facts. Let alone the credibility of the accusation.
The incredibility thus led to a loss of support for Maduro and an even bigger opening for opposition parties. Despite Maduro’s attempts he was unable to control his political opponents and could not withhold them from mobilizing the Venezuelan citizens.
7. Active dissidents
When it comes to the citizenry, incumbents of competitive electoral authoritarian regimes have a twofold of strategies. On the one hand incumbents promote themselves and their politics to attach voters (Levitsky & Loxton, 2013). It is the reciprocal relationship between incumbents and citizens that make incumbents stay in power (Gerschewski, 2013). Maduro had to attach the masses through his personal and had to convince them to complete the Bolivarian revolution. The socio-economic problems in Venezuela give rise to dissidence (Geddes, 1999; Pepinsky, 2009; Smith, 2005). Growing dissidence among the Venezuelan citizens can obstruct Maduro’s power, dissidents should therefore be silenced.
Maduro’s victory in the 2013 elections were contested, this affected his legitimacy. Legitimacy of one of the pillars of stability, when legitimacy is subverted incumbents have to put in more effort to contain their hold on power (Gerschewski, 2013). Maduro had to work even harder against vertical threats; his political opponents had mobilised the masses to oust him as president of Venezuela, as discussed in the previous chapter. Maduro had to silence the dissidence and stop the protests before he lost more voter support.
Citizen protests
When the protests broke out in San Cristóbal, Maduro initially did not intervene. But when the protests spread to other cities and evolved into violent riots and even caused deaths, the Maduro government had to intervene (Virginia López, 2014:b). During this intervention to divide the protest groups, Maduro mobilised the police and eventually the army (Associated Press in Venezuela, 2014). In Maduro’s attempt to restore Venezuela’s stability, the armed forced used rubber bullets and teargas, and later on real bullets to fight the protesters (Milne, 2014). Human Rights organisations claimed the Maduro government has used excessive violence against mainly innocent and unarmed citizens (Amnesty International, 2016; Human Rights Watch, 2015:a).
Maduro blamed his main opponents for the protests and claimed them to attempt a coup d’état (see chapter 7). Maduro firmly stated to punish all protesters whom compelled violence (Milne, 2014). The ministry of defence took on a
resolution to allow the use of armed forces to restore the public order (Amnesty International, 2016). Maduro states he is in need of violence to fight the ‘dangerous’ dissidents (Milne, 2014). However the protesters have said they only use violence in their defence “when the police fights us with rubber bullets we cannot throw roses
back” (Milne, 2014).
Sanction the Maduro government
Several protesters have died by governmental violence, which was used to fight the protests (Associated Press in Venezuela, 2014). Maduro therefore had to sanction his own government officials in order not to lose credibility himself (Associated Press in Venezuela, 2014). Maduro fired five agents of the Bolivarian National Intelligence over the excessive use of violence (Associated Press in Caracas, 2014). Maduro fired his men to satisfy the Venezuelan citizens and in an attempt to calm down the protests. When not only protesters, but also members of the national defence forces died, Maduro increased the level of violence against the protesters (Human Rights Watch, 2015:a). Maduro did not only fight the dissidents, but also arrested protesters (Amnesty International, 2016; Human Rights Watch, 2015:a). In prison human rights and physical integrity are violated by the use of violence by warders (Amnesty International, 2016; Human Rights Watch, 2015:a).
Despite Maduro’s attempts, he was unable to stop the protest. In contrary, people even start to accuse the government for excessive use of violence (Law & Walsh, 2014). Moreover many Venezuelans felt the need to defend their civil liberties when the government tried to constrain and control the citizens (Friends of a Free Venezuela, 2014). At this point of time Maduro had imprisoned López and Ceballos, these imprisonments even took more citizens to the streets (Friends of a Free Venezuela, 2014). The masses were mobilised in favour of the opposition, and with Maduro still in power the protest that originally broke out in 2014 continue up until today (Nieuwsuur, 2016).
Self-promotion and defending the Bolivarian Revolution
Many Venezuelan citizens take on the streets to express their dissatisfaction with the Maduro government (Nieuwsuur, 2016). They are unhappy over the economic crisis and the related problems and the high levels of violence (Nieuwsuur, 2016). Instead of promising to topple these problems, Maduro defends himself and his politics (Milne, 2014). Moreover Maduro still blames the opposition for causing violence and attempting to topple the government with capitalist motives (Virginia López, 2014:a; Maduro, 2014).
Through media censorship Maduro tries to control the information on the events that reach the citizens (Virginia López, 2014:a). Maduro creates a distorted picture of the reality and discredits the opposition. Journalists who reported fact that could bring the Maduro government in discredit were imprisoned (Freedom House, 2015). Maduro tries to turn the events in his favour; blaming the opposition and defending his own innocence (Virginia López, 2014:b; Maduro, 2014).
Thereby, Maduro claims that the protest only represent a small segment of the citizenry and that many are still satisfied with the Bolivarian revolution (Maduro, 2014). Maduro keeps defending the Bolivarian Revolution and states how it has improved the socio-economic situation of the poorest Venezuelans (Maduro, 2014). Aside Maduro keeps saying Venezuela is a well-functioning democracy with civil liberties (Maduro, 2014; Milne, 2014)4. Aside from the protestors, Maduro still has
supporters who affirm that the protests are a struggle over power for the rich (Walsh & Law, 2014; Weisbrot, 2014). Maduro stands firm for chavismo, although he is losing support among many PSUV adherents (Milne, 2014; Walsh & Law, 2014).
Against Maduro’s plea, the economic crisis and inflation worsen, there is more scarcity and the country turned more violent (Nieuwsuur, 2016). The problems hit all layers of society and even the poor have taken on the streets to protest (Watts, 2016). Even though Maduro tries to control the media, there are alternative ‘news’ resources that reach the citizens. Through social media people report the facts and post videos in which they are attacked by the government (Milne, 2014; Watts, 2016;
