Table of Contents
*excluding the cover page and the table of contents
1. Introduction………1
2. Methodology/ Theoretical Framework………...1
a. Methodology i. Selection of Subject………....2
ii. Theories………..2
iii. Outline and Sources………...2
iv. Limitations/ Source criticism……… 4
b. Theoretical Framework i. Securitization……….4
ii. Europeanization……….5
3. Background Information a. Europe and Migration………6
b. How is Migration framed in the EU and Europe?...8
c. The Crisis……….11
d. The Balkan Route……….12
4. The EU Response a. Before the Crisis………...16
b. During the Crisis………..17
i. Great Britain……….19
ii. Germany………...20
iii. The Visegrad Group……….22
iv. EU and Turkey……….23
c. Conclusion to the Chapter………24
5. Europeanization: The Serbian Response a. Serbia and the migration crisis……….25
b. Serbia and the EU ………25
c. Europeanization through Borders i. What is Schengen Zone?...27
ii. How does the crisis affect Schengen Zone?...28
iii. What is Serbia’s role?...30
iv. Serbia and the Schengen Zone……….36
d. Europeanization through European values i. How does the crisis affect European Values?...38
ii. What is Serbia’s role?...40
e. Conclusion to the chapter……….45
6. Conclusion………46
8.
1. Introduction
The divergent European approaches to the European Migration Crisis influences migration securitization among the Member States because of forcible threats from illicit activities. The need to securitize migration has affected the way the European Union (EU) views candidate states for EU membership. The need for security of the EU, protection of Schengen Zone and the EU project have blurred the borders of the Schengen Zone, the EU, and the rest of the Europe. The changing function of borders has forced the EU and candidate/ potential Member States to work together to come up with an appropriate response to the crisis as the same continues to plague the entire European continent.
The turbulent relationship between the EU and Serbia, which has been most recently based on the conditionality principle that paves a long and challenging road for Serbia’s
membership in the EU. Because of this relationship, this thesis seeks to investigate whether Serbia’s response to the migration crisis has in any way or if it should change Serbia’s prospects for membership into the EU as the migrants have utilized the Serbian territory to enter the EU and further on the Schengen Zone. The thesis will argue that Serbia used the crisis to its advantage to demonstrate that it is worthy of EU membership as the EU and the Member States securitized migration.
As a result, Serbia’s response will be looked at through two channels. First, the idea of borders will be addressed by discussing how securitization of the EU borders contributed to Serbia’s Europeanization through the same as Serbia became more involved in policing European borders with the financial help from the EU, which is of Serbian interests because its citizens enjoy visa-free travel to the EU. And finally, Serbia’s humanitarian response demonstrated that Serbia is able and willing to uphold European values of protection of human rights and solidarity, as noted in the Treaty of Lisbon.
2. Methodology/ Theoretical Framework
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the specific methods I have chosen to follow in the thesis, along with explaining the theoretical framework, which introduces the point of view from which the thesis will be explored.
a. Methodology
i. Selection of Subject
Since I hail from the Balkans, I became interested in Serbia and its relationship with the EU when completing my Bachelor thesis, where I explored the relations between the ICTY and Serbia. Through my research, I came across the EU’s conditionality stance towards the Serbia’s path to membership. Given the conditionality principle and Serbia’s geographical location, neighboring several EU Member States, further solidified my decision to explore the EU-Serbia relation through the lens of the European Refugee Crisis. This is a current topic and thus is under-researched, I am restricted to reviewing previous case studies related to this topic. However, the relevance and lack of research on the topic is my strongest argument for choosing this topic-- a contribution to the understanding of how the EU’s desire for security, because of migration, Europeanizes Western Balkan countries, which includes Serbia.
ii. Theories
Theories of securitization and Europeanization help explain how Europe’s refugee crisis perpetuates the relationship between Serbia and the EU. These two theories are chosen because Europe recognizes migration as a security threat, thus the use of political rhetoric encourages others to perceive it as such. Because of the unwavering threat that migration brings, security of the EU has been a paramount for EU’s officials. Given that migrants utilize the Western Balkan countries to enter the EU, and since Serbia serves as a point of transit, migration has forced the candidate countries like Serbia to work together with the EU for Europe’s common good. As a result of the increased cooperation, because of migration, between Serbia and the EU, the EU treats Serbia like an EU Member State. Therefore, the refugee crisis has improved Serbia’s image in the EU, which demonstrates that the EU see Serbia as “Europeanized” enough because Serbia accepts EU’s directives through its response; elucidating that Serbia’s response to the migration crisis is in Serbia’s political interest because of the desire to join the EU. The migration crisis has strengthened the relations between the entities.
iii. Outline and Sources
The thesis will use discourse analysis of journalistic articles, discussed individually below. The thesis is divided as follows: After the introduction, I outline the methods to the thesis, in
addition to explaining the theoretical framework that uses the Europeanization and securitization theories.
The thesis offers an overview of migrations into Europe, then details how migration is framed in Europe, defines the European Refugee Crisis and the Balkan Route. In this chapter, I explore the changes in migration patterns since the establishment of the EU to demonstrate how Europe has been a safe haven from that time and how things have not changed as illustrated by the current crisis. The chapter further continues to explain how migration is securitized through revisions of policies and thus explains how the migration is negatively framed in the EU. This is important to do because it shows how through the years Europe has become less accepting of migrants as evident in the migration crisis, illuminating the
importance that candidate states along the Balkan Route plays in helping Europe securitize its borders and national interests. In this chapter, I utilize academic sources which give more credibility to the paper, given the dependence on journalistic articles. I have chosen the academic articles that explain how migration influences European states’ need to secure national interest, which goes hand in hand with journalist articles chosen that show how the high influx of migrants affect internal structures of the EU and its wealthiest countries. Chapter three compares Europe’s response to migration to that of Serbia. This approach allows me to explore how the migration crisis has divided the EU as its Member States cannot agree on a common migration policy, elucidating how states seek to safeguard their national interests. This is in contrast to how candidate countries like Serbia have responded by being accepting and accommodating. By comparing the responses, this chapter sets the stage for the main chapter of the thesis, in which I analyze Serbia and EU’s intentions and what it means for the relationship between the two, in the light of the influx of refugees. Regarding sources for this chapter, I utilize journalist articles. These articles detail conflicting responses from the EU Member States, which demonstrate securitization of migration. In detailing Serbia’s response, media articles are also used. These articles describe Serbia’s positive reception of migrants, which is different from that of the EU; thus, the reason for using articles as such to illustrate that Serbia’s response is strategic as the response shapes the interaction between two entities.
Before concluding remarks, chapter four analyzes Serbia’s intention in the crisis utilizing the Europeanization perspective. For the final chapter, I use EU documents on Serbia and media
articles. This allows me to see what the EU requires of Serbia in order for the country to join the EU. This permits me to frame the Serbian response to its enlargement process in an attempt to analyze how the migration crisis has contributed to Serbia’s advancement on its road to EU membership. To do this, journalistic articles on the crisis and political gatherings will allow me to analyze the intentions of political actors both in Serbia and the EU by using quotes and agreements made between the two entities in order to get a sense how and if the refugee crisis has helped Serbia on its path to EU membership.
The concluding remarks states that Serbia’s response was obliged and accept European principles, Europeanized in the process while membership status has yet to be granted to Serbia. The reaction to the crisis by the Serbian officials demonstrates that the country is willing and able to become to abide by the EU’s principles. Also, broader implications on the topic are elucidated.
iv. Limitations/ Source criticism
One of the constraints for the thesis has been the access to scholarly articles that address Europeanization of Western Balkans, mainly Serbia that are different from the conditionality principle as the conditionality principle does not explain the context of this thesis. For this reason, two theories were chosen. Also, dependency on media sources limits my ability to engage broader academic debate. Because this is a rapidly changing topic, further research need to be done on how the migration crisis has affected the relationship between the EU and candidate states like Serbia, along the Balkan Route, as the influxes of migrants continue to rattle Europe.
b. Theoretical Framework i. Securitization
The theory of securitization was first mentioned and referred to in the late 1990s by the scholars Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver, and Jaap de Wilde at the Copenhagen School.1 Under the
securitization theory, security is defined as “the move that takes politics beyond the
established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a particular kind of politics or as above politics.”2 As a result, when an issue is framed as a security issue it becomes a focus
of politicization as securitization is defined as a speech act and thus socially constructed. The
1 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, (London 1998).
authors state that securitization is negotiated between the securitizer and the audience, where a relationship should exist. On the grounds of this relationship, rhetoric plays a huge role in securitizing an issue because it enables agents to lift an issue above politics. In turn, security becomes a self-referential practice not because a real threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat.
Discourse allows for actors to take the form of presenting an existential threat to objects do not create securitization, rather it is a securitization move. Thus, securitization is negotiated between the securitizer and the audience, where a relationship should exist between the two parties. Since securitization cannot be imposed, there is a need for political actors to argue their case for why securitization is required. Discourse allows threats have to be argued and gain resonance for a platform, which legitimizes measures and steps needed to alleviate the existence of threats. On the grounds of discourse, the importance of political constellations is illuminated because of the language used during the securitization process. This language includes ideas of survival and priority of action. Language allows the political agents to dramatize and present the issue as an issue of highest priority. Thereby, labeling it as security allows the agent to claim a need for and right to treat it by extraordinary means.
ii. Europeanization
Claudio Radaelli argues that Europeanization affects integration of domestic political structures, and it closes the gap between local politics, integration and political systems responsible for integration.3 Because domestic institutions are malleable, Europeanization is
interested in adapting to Europe. As a result, Radaelli defines Europeanization as a
“processes of construction, diffusion and institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, style and ways of doing things.”4 Europeanization also
consists of shared values and beliefs that are defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and later incorporated into the nation's discourse, political structures and policies. Therefore, Europeanization is a process in which a subject adopts European features of democracy, solidarity, and respect for the minority. Thus, it is the growth of the European identity and polity over national identities and politics. This understanding of
3 Claudio Radaelli, “Europeanization: Solution or Problem”, in Michelle Cini, Angela K. Bourne (eds), Palgrave Advances in European Union Studies (New York 2006): 56-77.
Europeanization produces and facilitates a top-down impact of the EU on domestic systems. Radaelli contends that domestic system can respond differently to the impact of the EU. The domestic systems can draw on Europe as a resource without pressures from Brussels and become trapped in European discourse. Europeanization addresses how domestic change is processed and adapted to the policy set by Brussels. Europeanization is not an end-state, but rather a process that involves institutionalization which is demonstrated by the behavior of domestic actors as they engage in the Europeanization process by adopting rules and norms that are first experienced at the EU level.5 Therefore, Europeanization precedes and produces
domestic change through a slow process of socialization of domestic political elites into the European paradigm.
The securitization theory can be linked to the current migration crisis. Migration is negatively perceived in society because of the fears of the unknown coming from migrants. The negative perception of migration is only fueled by politicians as evident by the elites of the EU, who seek to protect the interests of the EU. Because of the need to protect one’s interest at the expense of the migrants, the use of rhetoric, as mentioned above, dramatizes and presents migration as a security issue. As a result, securitization of migration influences policy changes as evident in the Balkans, in which the EU practically treated Serbia like a Member State. Thus the connection between securitization of migration and Europeanization of Serbia as the country plays a more active role in helping the EU mitigate the crisis. The theory of Europeanization helps clarify the relationship between Serbia and the EU. Europeanization helps explain how Europe influences the national policies of states, and national development gives motivation to the outcomes of Europeanization. In the crisis, Europeanization is evident in how the EU financially helped the Western Balkan countries to shelter adequately the influxes of people, which in turn helps the EU secure its interests even outside of its borders.
3. Background Information a. Europe and Migration
Globalization has shaped Europe’s long history of migration that dates back to the back to the nineteenth century. Immigration into Europe substantially increased in the later twentieth century and has continued into the twenty-first century with the European Refugee Crisis. However, for the purpose of this thesis, a brief historical perspective, since the Second World
War (WWII), on migration to Europe will be provided to place the Balkan Route into a context of previous migration influxes into Europe and thus, demonstrate how migration has changed from an economic benefit for Europe to the idea that migration is a grave security threat to European stability.
Population movements in Europe after WWII, are equated to the strong economic
cooperation of European states with the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957. The EEC and its subsequent expansion thus the creation of a larger common market with free movement of people, goods, and capital influenced migration patterns within Europe. Moreover, Europe became a lucrative spot for relocation among victims of war and asylum seekers, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, due to its revived political and economic stability in part because of the success of the EEC. As a consequence, Europe suffered migration influxes for either economic or political reasons.
First, the conclusion of the war brought the need to rebuild Europe and along with that came economic expansion. Western and Northern Europe began to rebuild their economies thus creating a labor shortage. During the reconstruction, immigrants were welcomed into Europe and were actively recruited by governments of Western European states through bilateral agreements.6 As a result, migrants from Southern Europe and non-European countries,
usually from former European colonies, were a source of cheap labor in construction, factory, and low-grade service industries.7 Countries like France, Germany, and the Netherlands,
after WWII, were motivated by the need for cheap labor that did not exist in the domestic market. Although permissive migration policy bilateral agreements were temporary, an absence of legal arrangement to the temporary status meant that significant portion of
migrants resettled permanently, changing the demographics of Europe. Just in Germany, as a result of the reconstruction, nearly 10 percent of the country’s population was foreign-born in 1973. Between 1973 and 1985, the economic downturn due to an oil crisis did not impede migration. Rather, migration into Western Europe was shaped by family reunification.8
Aside from economic migration, political changes have inspired mass migrations into Europe. First, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union
6 Christian Dustmann and Tommaso Frattini. Immigration: The European Experience. London: Norface Migration, 2012. February 5, 2015: Further referenaced as Immigration: The European Experience.
7 Russell King, “Towards a New Map of Migration, “International Journal of Population Geography vol. 8 (2002): 89-106.
influenced migrations from the East to the West, with many people intent on escaping the rigidity of the Soviet regime. This is especially the case of ethnic Germans who were fleeing Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, with 700,000 entering Germany by 2001.9 Similarly,
the collapse of the Soviet rule led to extensive democratization efforts throughout Eastern and Southern Europe that triggered widespread displacements of civilizations. Such ethnic
conflicts led to massive influxes of asylum and refugee migrations, especially from the Balkans. However, effects of these ethnic conflicts were not only felt in Northern Europe, but also Southern European countries, which, in the meantime, joined the European Union and thus became integrated members of the economic community.
b. How is Migration framed in the EU and Europe?
The above chapter paints a picture of Europe as a haven for the less privileged. However, in the recent decades, Europe’s acceptance of immigration has changed and thus become more politicized and negatively viewed by its citizens and politicians. The negative view of immigration among the European community has influenced changes to the European policies and have threatened Europe’s integration process because of division among the Member States over the response to the surge of refugees. These disagreements regarding the immigration stance elucidate Europe’s dysfunctional asylum system and lack of political will to address the immigration plight, further intensified and politicized by the current refugee crisis. However, immigration framing and politicization in the European Union dates back to the 1980s.
Since the 1980s, politics have implied that migration destabilizes domestic integration, suggesting that public order is in danger because of increased phenomena such as human trafficking, smuggling of people, illegal immigration, transnational crimes and other illegal practices, which are also present in the current migration scheme.10 These crimes, along with
sharp increases in unemployment in Western Europe, gave rise to right-wing parties, which blamed immigrants for the problems that affected western society.11
9 Christian Dustmann, and Albrecht Glitz, “Migration and Education”, in E. A. Hanushek, S. Machin, and L. Woessmann (Eds.), Handbook of the Economics of Education Vol. IV (Amsterdam 2011): 327-439.
10 Apostolos G Papadopoulos, “Migration and security threats in south-eastern Europe” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 11, no. 4 (December 2011): 451 (541-469).
11 M. Vachudova, “Eastern Europe as gatekeeper: The Immigration and asylum Policies of an Enlarging European Union” in Andreas, Peter and Timothy Snyder, The Wall around the West: state border and
As a result, Member States seek to protect their national interests by not agreeing on a common EU refugee/asylum policy as migrants are perceived to be a threat to sovereignty and national interests. Implementation of restrictive migration policy privileges and offering support national of Member States not only in the internal market but also in the welfare chauvinism and expression of cultural homogeneity.12
Because migration is framed as a threat to cultural and economic stability, the EU policies make it difficult for the inclusion of immigrants through policy changes. Certain policy changes were prompted by problematization of migration as migration became identified as a danger to domestic society, thus emphasizing the need for protection of internal security. This is because of the risks that immigration and asylum seekers bring not only into the state but also into the society and internal market. Because migration in the EU is considered as a threat to domestic stability, the EU chooses to protect its interest at the expense of
immigrants. This is seen through the formation of the Schengen Agreements, and the Dublin Convention; hence Europeanization of migration policy as policy became communitarized with the Treaty of Amsterdam.
The Dublin Convention enables the Member States to reduce the number of asylum applications submitted, in the process deterring applicants from applying for and attaining any benefits in Western Europe. This obstructive approach to migration is representative of Europe’s desire to prevent the outsiders from attaining benefits made available by the Schengen Agreements, which enable free movement of people and, in turn, more economic opportunities within the EU. These agreements singled how the signees for the same began to align national policies with that of EU’s “third pillar” in an attempt to tighten common external borders. The tightening of the borders leads to reinforcement and standardization of policies, causing the Member States to impose principles that curtail illegal immigration and international crime as a result of the same.
Aside from institutional changes, FRONTEX was established to further securitize the EU from the outsiders.13 The FRONTEX was created to curb the number of migrants by immigration controls in North America and Europe, (Lanham, 2003).
12 Huysmans, Jef, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration,” Journal of Common Market Studies vol. 38, no. 5 (December 2000): 751-777.
13 Sarah Leonard, “EU border security and migration into the European Union: FRONTEX and securitization through practices” European Security vol. 19, no. 2 (June 2010): 234 (231-254).
strengthening of border controls and limiting the access of migrants and asylum seekers to the EU territory, increase cooperation between the current and future EU Member States, and tighten border controls following numerous terrorist attacks. The concept of the FRONTEX is to nourish better activities among European countries and their authorities about border control and border surveillance. As a result, the tasks of the FRONTEX help securitize migration in the EU, clarifying how negatively migration is framed in the EU and its Member States.
These political developments signal the formation of restrictive migration policy and the viewing of migration as a security issue. The policy is a tool that protects the state and its society from dangers that are related to illegal immigrants and asylum seeks. The political elites present and dramatize the issue as a security matter which requires and justifies
extraordinary means as evident and explained by the above institutional developments. As a consequence, this political framing of migration on the European level further intensifies how migration is understood in the community and thus easily connected to security-related crimes. Such activities include: crime, domestic instability, transnational crimes and welfare fraud.14 Lack of knowledge and fear of the unknown, given the recent terrorist attacks in
Paris, have caused for migration to be negatively and politically framed around interests of the Member States and the security of the European Union as demonstrated by the current migration crisis.
As a result of the Paris attacks, the connection between migration and politics has clearly become in the current crisis. Europe’s response to the crisis and differences between Member States’ opinions in terms of an appropriate way of dealing with the issue has divided the EU into the East and the West, yet again. Poland’s minister of EU affairs, Konrad Szymanksi, reiterated this East/ West divide, “in the face of the tragic events in Paris, Poland sees no political possibilities for implementing the decision on relocation of refugees.”15 Here,
Szymanski’s rebukes were reemphasized by Victor Orban, Hungarian prime minister, who noted that, in a crisis, “Brussels cannot challenge the right of member states to defend themselves. Mandatory resettlement quotas are dangerous because they would spread
14 Jef Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration,” Journal of Common Market Studies vol. 38, no. 5 (December 2000): 751-777.
15 Eric Maurice, "France Confirms It Will Receive 30,000 Refugees." France Confirms It Will Receive 30,000
terrorism across Europe.”16 As Eastern European Member States challenge Germany’s
relocation of refugees plan, states in the West such as France do not see the refugee crisis as a threat to national security, as elucidated by French President Francois Hollande, who does not see the refugees as link to terrorism, but a links the refugees’ struggle to the struggle that Europe faces with terrorist organization such as ISIS.17
Because of this politicization, countries serving as transit locations are an important factor in addressing the crisis because they play a significant role in securing Europe’s interests and borders. The Paris attacks helped to illustrate the importance of transit countries such as Serbia because the alleged attackers utilized the Balkan Route and were registered by the Serbian officials as asylum seekers.18 The importance of transient countries will be illustrated
in the project by analyzing Serbia’s response as the country it uses the European Refugee Crisis as a tool to Europeanize itself, and thus become a more reputable candidate state for membership into the European Union by being a protector of Europe’s values and borders.
c. The Crisis
Conflict, oppression, and poverty have significantly contributed to the severity of the crisis as individuals from Kosovo, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq and Somalia are seeking protection in Western Europe. However, the Syrian civil war is the major cause of the refugee crisis with more than half of the migrants being Syrian. And, thus Syria has become world’s top source of refugees, sparking the current refugee crisis, because of the civil unrest in the Middle East and the Arab Spring, a revolutionary wave of protests and conflicts that toppled many authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. Although the Arab Spring was successful in many Middle Eastern countries, it was not successful in Syria, where the al-Assad regime launched a brutal civil war as different ethnicities and religious groups fought against each other. The civil conflict in Syria gave rise to ISIS, which used the opportunity to build an Islamic caliphate and quickly became one of the most violent and extremist organizations on Earth. The Syrian population became trapped between the regime, rebel groups and religious extremists, as the warring parties engaged in gruesome war tactics that range from mass executions to usage of chemical weapons. These inhumane tactics have contributed to the
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Dan McLaughlin, "Refugees Fear Backlash as Europe Reels from Paris Attacks." Refugees Fear Backlash After
biggest refugee crisis that the world has seen as Syrians seek refuge not only in neighboring Arab countries such as Jordan, Iraq, Egypt, Lebanon and Turkey but also in Europe. Over 1.1 million Syrians have sought refuge in Lebanon more than any other Arab state, excluding Turkey, which has accepted nearly two million refugees.19 While the Arab countries continue
to suffer the brunt of the crisis, the majority of refugees embark on a perilous journey to Europe.
By 2015, more than a million refugees have entered Europe, creating division in the European Union over an appropriate response to the influx of immigrants.20 As a result,
Europe has become paralyzed with newcomers. Germany became the world’s highest recipient of asylum claims at nearly 159, 000 in just the first six months of 2015-- more than the entire total for the year 2014.21 Although Germany has been the biggest recipient of
asylum applications, Hungary has also seen the highest in proportion to its population, despite closing its border. In Hungary 1,800 refugees claimed asylum per 100,000 of that country’s residents. In addition to Germany and Hungary, Sweden has also been most affected by the crisis.22
As Europe politicizes its response to the crisis, immigrants continue to arrive via sea, as was the case with Europe’s first influx of immigrants, arriving in Italy from Libya. In addition to immigrants accessing the sea passage, the EU was forced to deal with two new migration routes by 2015: 1) the eastern Mediterranean began to be used as migrants crossed the
Aegean Sea from Turkey to Greece, and 2) thousands of the migrants reached the EU through the Western Balkans by crossing the Serbia-Hungary border also known as the Balkan Route.
d. The Balkan Route
With the Schengen visa restriction relaxed for the Balkan countries of- Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, and Macedonia, they became home to the busiest and most irregular route to the EU known as the Western Balkan Route. Being at the crossroads
between the East and the West, the Balkan Route to Europe, although much longer and more
19 Jared Malsin. "Why Some Arabs States Refuse to Accept Syrian Refugees." Time. September 8, 2015. Accessed June 25, 2016.
20 "Migrant Crisis: Migration to Europe Explained in Seven Charts." BBC News. March 4, 2015. Accessed June 25, 2016. Further referenced as Seven Charts
21 Tim Gaynor, "2015 Likely to Break Records for Forced Displacement - Study." UNHCR News. December 18,
2015. Accessed June 27, 2016.
expensive, is much safer in comparison with other routes taken by migrants such as via the Mediterranean Sea. The Balkan Route became the only, if not, the most attractive land route for migrants during the warm summer months, which made the journey safer as sea travel perilous. The warm Balkan climate also bearable as it enabled the migrants to establish makeshift camps along the route, given its flat terrain.
In addition to the weather factors, Bulgaria and Hungary both closed their borders to refugees. This caused the refugees to be susceptible to dangerous border entries and
dependent on illegal smugglers, which is the case in Bulgaria; when it closed its borders, the number of illegal entries drastically decreased.23 As the Bulgarian fence kept people out, the
Hungarian one encouraged people to move quicker, in a rush against time, before Hungary ultimately sealed its borders with its neighbors. Despite the fence, Hungary was a natural point of entry into the EU and the Schengen zone, where loose border controls made the subsequent journey into Western Europe easier. The international accords such as the UN Refugee Convention obliges the Hungarian authorities to let the asylum seekers in, notwithstanding which side of the fence one is in because they are considered to be on Hungarian territory.
Finally, the Balkan route was further popularized by Greece, Macedonia and Serbia’s facilitation of the refugees’ journey. As the migrants entered the prospective territories, the authorities in the transit countries took steps to move people off their territory as quickly as possible. The Greek authorities provided free ferry rides from eastern islands to Athens and Thessaloniki, where migrants were encouraged to take regular buses and train services to Macedonia and Serbia.24 Similarly, Macedonian officials passed a legal amendment, which
enabled migrants/ asylum seekers to register with any police officer. This significantly reduced the number of asylum-seekers in Macedonian reception centers. The amendment also permitted migrants to stay legally in Macedonia for 72- hours and have the right to health services and public transport.25 In the same way, once migrants entered the Serbian territory,
there were seventeen reception centers, along the Serbian part of the Balkan Route and where
23 Rick Lyman, "Bulgaria Puts Up a New Wall, but This One Keeps People Out." The New York Times. April 05, 2015. Accessed June 25, 2016.
24 Nikolay Nikolov and Zachary Alfred. "Europe's 'No-Man's Land'" Medium. August 31, 2015. Accessed June
25, 2016.
25 Amnesty International. (2015). Europe’s Borderland: Violations against Refugees and Migrants in Macedonia, Serbia and Hungary. London, England Amnesty International Publications.
Serbia borders Macedonia, Croatia, and Hungary, where migrants can seek emergency care and assistance.26
The migrant Balkan Route in Serbia takes migrants from Macedonia. Once crossing into Serbia between the towns of Tabanovce (Macedonia) and Miratovac (Serbia), migrants are directed to Preševo, either by foot or vehicles. From Preševo, migrants can go to Belgrade or to Sid along the Croatian border, where free train transport is provided to the Austrian border, after Croatian and Serbian police conduct separate screening of refugees. Before the
coordinated transportation, migrants would cross the border on foot at Berkasovo/Bapska border crossing or by utilizing illegal greenspace.
Given the reasons for which the refugees employed the Balkan Route, the treacherous journey to Germany and northern European countries, in an attempt to ultimately find new life, begins on the borders of Turkey and Greece where migrants are subjected to smuggling and inhumane ways of travel. Once arriving in Greece, migrants continue their trek to
Western Europe through states, which are vying for EU membership. From Greece, migrants cross into the Macedonian territory, before proceeding into Serbia, where they decided to continue their journey through Hungary or through Croatia and eventually into the EU states that are the signees of the Schengen Agreement. Utilizing the perks of the Schengen
Agreement, once in the Schengen Zone, migrants are treated as ordinary travelers or irregular migrants, depending on possession of a visa. Irregular migrants can abuse the Schengen Agreement by choosing to apply for asylum, remain in the irregular situation, or are free to asylum shop. As a result, the Balkan Route, in 2012, became a passageway to the EU as Syrians, Iraqis, and Afghans among other nationalities from the Balkans and economic migrants from Asia began to flood Europe’s outer borders in the Western Balkans, whose countries became transit points to the European dream.
Since the lifting of visa restrictions to the Western Balkan countries, migration trends from African, Middle, and the Far East began to rise drastically from 2013 until now. According to FRONTEX, in 2014, more than 43360 individuals have illegally used the Western Balkan route on their hunt for a better life in the wealthier countries of the European Union.27 The
26 “Reception centers are transit, not permanent- Commissariat,” B92 News. March 4, 2015. Accessed June 25, 2016.
primary responsibility of the transit countries is to provide temporary receptions centers, thus providing shelter, food, water, and medical attention.
However, despite being already economically and politically underdeveloped, the Western Balkan countries’ infrastructure and institutions have coped well with the massive influx of migrants. As part of the Serbian response, it has established five accommodating centers. Two of the accommodation centers were located on the Macedonia border, in Miratovac and Presevco, which could host up to 500 and 1500 person, respectively. And along Croatia, there were three centers in Šid, Principovac, and Adaševci. In total, Serbia was able to
accommodate temporarily up to 3000-6000 persons. This is in contrast to Macedonia, where the process to align their legal framework with international standards is slow to take shape, with only one border reception center in Gevgelija.28 Likewise, Bulgaria also has one
registration/accommodation center in Dimitrovgrad in Bulgaria, which has a maximum capacity of 140 persons.
Given the uneven advancement of capabilities, the inability to deal with the crisis has resulted in inhumane treatment of migrants and lack of facilities to address the needs of the migrants. Amnesty International reports that migrants along the Western Balkan route have been victims of human rights violations. These violations include subjection to illegal push-backs, ill-treatment by local authorities and exploitation by smugglers.29
Aside from human rights abuses, migrants along the Balkan Route have been forced to deal with obstacles placed by states like Hungary, which erected barbed wire fence along its border with Bulgaria, Croatia, and Serbia in an attempt to protect the Schengen Zone. These human rights violations and politicizations over quotas and attempts to identify individuals as a refugee or economic migrant have left the migrants in dire conditions, stranded with
nowhere to go and without any assistance from local authorities; these actions have resulted in increased cooperation between the Balkan countries and the European Union. For this reason, the EU funded projects to equip border police stations better in the Balkan States, in an attempt to curtail illicit activities and strengthen the capacities of border management.
28 Nikoleta Gabrovska and Fredrik Wesslau. "Working with the Western Balkans." ECFR. March 3, 2016. Accessed June 27, 2016. Further referenced as Gabrovska.
29 "Italian PM Matteo Renzi Condemns 'new Slave Trade' in Mediterranean - BBC News." BBC News. April 19,
However, EU’s funding illustrates how it securitizes itself from the outside given the division as between western and the eastern Member States.
4. The EU Response
This chapter will explore EU’s response to the migration crisis before and while it affected the European territory. Through its response to the same, it will be demonstrated how the EU and Member States securitize migration and thus are vying to protect their own interests, which has influenced Serbia’s own actions regarding the crisis.
a. Before the Crisis
Since 2012, the EU has provided 230 million euros in humanitarian and other assistance to those affected by the Syrian Civil War, making the EU the largest international donor. In addition to the humanitarian financial aid, the EU has worked to bring about political transformation in Syria by toppling the Assad regime and constructing a representative democracy. The goal of the EU response to the Syria problem was “to address the immediate and future needs while also containing the crisis with its regional boundaries.”30 Through this
approach, it is demonstrated how the EU securitizes migration and thus tries to keep the happenings away from the European continent.
The EU’s external response to the Syrian refugee crisis is embedded in ending the violence and fostering political change, while providing humanitarian aid to the refugee and internally displaced persons. The EU has pressured the Assad regime to resign by imposing restrictive measures such as economic sanctions and terminating the EU- Syrian bilateral cooperation agreement. The EU’s pressure to end the Assad regime has been concurrent with the UN statements and resolutions that condemn the oppressive regime and call for cessation of violence, and advocate for investigations of human rights abuses.
On the other hand, the EU’s response is also an internal one. These internal actions have the purpose of to “maintain and protect”. Through this approach the EU and its Member States seek to maintain and protect European borders from irregular migration routes. In the case of Greece, for example, where Syrians utilize the Greek-Turkish border to enter the EU, the EU,
30 Philippe Fargues and Christine Fandrich. The European Response to the Syrian Crisis: What next? Florence: Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. June 14, 2016.
in conjunction, with Greek authorities have taken preemptive steps to curtail migration by sending more than 1,800 border guards along the border and by placing floating barriers along the water border to keep out potential waves of migrants.
Despite the efforts to contain the crisis at the regional level in the Middle East, the EU has failed to secure itself from the influx of refugees. As a result, this gave rise to increased politicization at the EU level among Member States as the migrants continued to flood the borders of Europe on their way to Western Europe, in a search of a better life. The lack of EU unity on the migration crisis and different ideas on how securitization of migration should be shaped has contributed to the division between the Member States, who are vying to protect their national interest and do not have any interest in sharing the migration burden with the 28 state union, as discussed in the following section of this chapter.
b. During the Crisis
The European Union has agreed to talk about the imminent migration crisis when a ship full of illegal migrants crashed off the Italian coast. An emergency meeting of the EU’s interior ministers was held to address the problems associated with the looming migrant crisis, including human trafficking and threats of terrorism.31 Given the threats associated with the
migrant crisis, Italy’s Premier Matteo Renzi’s called for “an emergency meeting of EU leaders to find a comprehensive solution”, which was supported by European leaders; thus the emergency meeting was held in Luxembourg on 20 April 2015 as the migrant crisis questioned the stability and security of the EU.32
At the meeting, the European Commission recommended a 10- point plan to address the crisis. The 10- point plan called for 1) border control through increased financial resources and assets 2) operations to capture and destroy vessels by the smugglers 3) cooperation among law enforcement to eradicate the source of smugglers 4) faster processing of asylum applications 5) ensuring fingerprinting of all migrants 6) options for an emergency relocation mechanism 7) pilot relocation projects 8) return of irregular migrants 9) initiatives to engage with countries that shelter smugglers and 10) gathering of intelligence on migratory flows.33
31 Italian PM.
32 Adrian Krajewski, "Poland Says Cannot Take Migrants under EU Quotas without Guarantees after Paris Attacks." Reuters UK. November 14, 2015. Accessed June 25, 2016. Further referenced as Krajewski.
33 "Joint Foreign and Home Affairs Council: Ten Point Action Plan on Migration." European Commission. April 20, 2015. Accessed June 27, 2016.
These points elucidate how migration is securitized not only in the EU as the EU spreads its influence by trying to control happenings in its periphery.
At the Luxembourg conference, border control was the paramount goal in eradicating the irregularities of migration. The EU sought to protect its border through increased border patrols. FRONTEX troops were also stationed on the borders of Greece, Macedonia, Turkey and Bulgaria, drawing a defining line between EU Member States and those who are
candidate states for membership. In addition to the increased patrols on continental borders to the EU, operations such as the Operation Triton and the Poseidon patrolled the EU’s
coastline, also conducted by FRONTEX. After the Luxembourg conference, EU states agreed to triple the budget of Operation Triton to 120 million euros. Although most EU states agreed to allocate funds, despite the success of FRONTEX operations, many EU states refused like Great Britain to fund such projects believing that rescue operations influence migration to Europe given that operations at sea such as that Triton and the Poseidon have rescued over 250,000 people in the course of 2015.34
In conjunction with increased border control, Operation Sophia sought to disrupt smugglers’ ambitions of preying on migrants by boarding, seizing and searching vessels in international waters; thereby, stopping the migration problem at the root.35 The operations at sea
demonstrates EU’s desire to spread its influence beyond its border, which clarify how
migration is securitized among the EU elites because it enables the EU to manage and control exodus of people at its root; thus, outside of its borders by controlling the enablers and facilitators of irregular migration routes.
Another example that also demonstrates how the EU is trying to expand its influence outside of its border is evident by the Valletta Summit on Migration in Malta. The summit in Malta was a European initiative whose purpose was to strengthen cooperation between the
European and the African continent, in the light of the current migration crisis; thus reflecting the interests of the Union. This is because key points discussed at the summit were protection of the Schengen Area and securing Europe’s external borders. The urgency of the Malta summit for the EU is illumined by Donald Tusk, President of the European Council, “Saving
34 Gabrovska.
35 Jim Muir "Migrant Crisis: EU to Begin Seizing Smugglers' Boats." BBC News. October 7, 2015. Accessed June 25, 2016.
Schengen is a race against time. And we are determined to win that race.”36 Therefore, at the
conclusion of the Valletta Summit, the European and African leaders agreed to establish an Emergency Trust Fund, whose purpose is to spur development of African countries and encourage African counties to take back migrants who have already arrived in Europe. It is the hope of the EU that financial aid would help curtail the flow of African refugees, while promoting migration through regular migration patterns and policies37; and thus enabling the
EU to have better oversight and control of people entering its territory.
The EU hopes to expedite asylum applications by designing an EU safe countries of origin list.38 Through which, the European Commission proposed that all EU candidate and potential
Member States as “safe”. This action would allow for faster returns to these countries, if conditions for asylum are not met, in addition to the relocation and resettlement of asylum seekers with the assistance by the European Support Office. The plan for relocation and resettlement gave rise to a problem of how asylum applications should be processed and how the EU should fairly relocate the asylees throughout the Member States.
i. Great Britain
The disagreement over the allocation of funds to curtail the migration crisis, on the
peripheries the EU, elucidate how states such as Great Britain are not willing to use British resource and money to aid the rest of Europe, given their geographical location in relation to the rest of Europe. The geographical location enables the Great Britain not to experience the pressure of the influx of refugees to the same intensity as the rest of the states in continental Europe; thus funding of rescue operations is not in the British interest. United Kingdom’s elite argue that it has already shared the burden of migration through aiding operations such as the Triton and by taking a fair share of the refugees when compared to other Member States in accepting unoccupied minors from the Jungle, the border with France and the United Kingdom in Calais (UK), causing strife between France and the UK. Thereby, Great Britain opposes the unified European resolution to the migration crisis, and the system of quotas, which are discussed later in this chapter, and its exit from the EU could not only affect the situation in Calais but also the freedom of movement between the EU and UK; thus
36 "Migration Summit: "We Are in a Race against Time to save Schengen" - Tusk." Times of Malta. November 12, 2015. Accessed June 25, 2016.
37 "2015 Valletta Summit on Migration - Background on EU Action." - Consilium. November 11, 2015. Accessed June 27, 2016.
38 European Commission. An EU Safe Countries of Origin. Brussels: European Commission, 2015. March 25, 2015.
solving the crisis on British end as elucidated by British votes, who blame Brussels and Merkel for the situation that plagues Europe because of the open door-refugee policy embodied by the top EU elites. One voter said, “we need tougher border control and to reclaim from Brussels our power of entry and exit into the UK”39 because Nigel Farage, a
member of the British elite, noted that “Merkel sent a signal to the whole of North Africa and the Middle East that anyone who wanted to come can [to the EU].”40
ii. Germany
Furthermore, the German chancellor Angela Merkel argued that the Dublin Regulation, which states that refugee/asylum seeker must claim status in the first EU country of arrival and cannot pick between Member States, should be revised because southern Member State- Greece and Italy were accused by Germany for not following through this agreement. Merkel contended that Member States on EU’s outer borders were encouraging migrants to migrate to Germany, who are lured into Germany because of its strong economy. Germany is Europe’s biggest economy41 with lowest unemployment rates.42 This provides migrants
seeking jobs a safest bet because of German refugee friendly policies that date back to the Second World War, which are backed by industry groups, who are in need of well trained and qualified individuals to fill the labor shortage as refugees possess the need qualifications. Despite the probable positive contributions to the German society, the German society has been greatly divided by the crises because of New Year’s Day rapes in Cologne and dissent from the Bavaria region as security concerns were reinforced, giving rise to sentiments of fear among EU citizens. In conjunction with the German division and the bleakness of the Dublin Regulation, Merkel proposed a quota distribution system.
Under Merkel’s plan, a system of quotas to distribute asylum seekers around Member States was put forth, which was supported by the EU Commission President Jean-Claude Junker.43
Merkel’s plan seeks to create a system of quotas that distributes asylum seekers to Member States. Merkel wants the Member States to share the burden of asylum seekers, while taking into consideration the size of the economy and population of each Member State. However, a
39 Perring, Rebecca Perring, "Horrors of Calais Migrant Camp EXPOSED as Brits Told Way to Tackle Crisis Is to LEAVE EU." Daily Express UK RSS. April 15, 2016. Accessed June 25, 2016.
40 Ibid.
41 "Germany." Data. Accessed June 27, 2016.
42 "European Economic Guide." The Economist. February 18, 2016. Accessed June 25, 2016.
43 Justin Huggler and Andrew Marszal, "Angela Merkel Calls for New Rules for Distributing Asylum Seekers in Europe." The Telegraph. April 24, 2015. Accessed June 25, 2016.
system of quotas was greatly rejected by several Member States, more prominently by United Kingdom, as previously discussed, and by the Visegrad Group (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia); providing clear examples of how migrants are not welcomed into all EU states.44
Furthermore, the German chancellor Angela Merkel argued that the Dublin Regulation, which states that refugee/asylum seeker must claim status in the first EU country of arrival and cannot pick between Member States, should be revised because southern Member State- Greece and Italy were accused by Germany for not following through this agreement. Merkel contended that Member States on EU’s outer borders were encouraging migrants to migrate to Germany, who are lured into Germany because of its strong economy. Germany is Europe’s biggest economy45 with lowest unemployment rates.46 This provides migrant
seeking jobs a safest bet because of German refugee friendly policies that date back to the Second World War, which are backed by industry groups, who are in need of well trained and qualified individuals to fill the labor shortage as refugees possess the need qualifications. Despite the probable positive contributions to the German society, the German society has been greatly divided by the crises because of New Year’s Day rapes in Cologne and dissent from the Bavaria region as security concerns were reinforced, giving rise to sentiments of fear among EU citizens. In conjunction with the German division and the bleakness of the Dublin Regulation, Merkel prosed a quota distribution system.
Under Merkel’s plan, a system of quotas to distribute asylum seekers around Member States, which was supported by the EU Commission President Jean-Claude Junker.47 Merkel’s plan
seeks to create a system of quotas that distributes asylum seekers to Member States. Merkel wants the Member States to share the burden of asylum seekers, while taking into
consideration the size of the economy and population of each Member State. However, system of quotas was greatly rejected by several Member States, more prominently by United
44 Ian Traynor, "Refugee Crisis: East and West Split as Leaders Resent Germany for Waiving Rules." The Guardian. September 05, 2015. Accessed June 25, 2016.
45 "Germany." Data. Accessed June 27, 2016.
46 "European Economic Guide." The Economist. February 18, 2016. Accessed June 25, 2016.
47 Justin Huggler and Andrew Marszal, "Angela Merkel Calls for New Rules for Distributing Asylum Seekers in Europe." The Telegraph. April 24, 2015. Accessed June 25, 2016.
Kingdom, as previously discussed, and by the Visegrad Group (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia); elucidating how migrants are not welcomed into all EU states.48
iii. The Visegrad Group
The Visegrad Group states have a restrictive asylum policy, thus, in their view, Merkel’s plan is seen as an initiation for more asylum seekers to embark on a journey to Europe.49 The
Group has called the Merkel plan as “moral imperialism”, which the Visegrad Group believe is being imposed by Merkel on to the Member States. Viktor Orban, the Hungarian Prime Minister, notes, “I don't doubt Germany's right to define its moral obligations for itself. They can decide if they accept every refugee or not... (but) that should only be compulsory for them. We are Hungarians however, we cannot think with German minds. Hungary should have the right to control the impact of a mass migration.”50 The strife over the relocation and
resettlement policies not only divided Europe between the East and the West, but also demonstrated how powerless the EU is in devising comprehensive migration policy. As a consequence, the power of national governments is illuminated, as national interests are represented by ministers on the European level. As a result, the ministers use the European platform to securitize migration as illustrated by Poland’s minister Konrad Symanski who is quoted as saying, “We’ll accept refugees only if we have security guarantees”, after the November 2015 Paris attacks.51 For this reason, leaders of the Visegrad Group have resented
the German sponsored migration policies as such policies are a drain to Visegrad states’ institutional resources.52 To show their resentment towards common EU migration policies,
Hungary, a member of the Visegrad Group, has engaged in protectionist policies by building fences along the Serbian and Croatian borders, in an attempt to protect the European borders and the Schengen Area.
iv. EU and Turkey
Aside from the disagreements between the Member States, securitization of migration, from the EU perspective, is linked to enlargement as evident by the EU-Turkey negotiations. After
48 Ian Traynor, "Refugee Crisis: East and West Split as Leaders Resent Germany for Waiving Rules." The Guardian. September 05, 2015. Accessed June 25, 2016.
49 "Visegrad Group Opposes Germany's Refugee Policy | News | DW.COM | 15.02.2016." DW.COM. February 15, 2016. Accessed June 25, 2016.
50 Bad Staffelstein, "Hungary PM Rejects Merkel's 'moral Imperialism' in Refugee Crisis." Hungary PM Rejects Merkel's 'moral Imperialism' in Refugee Crisis. September 23, 2015. Accessed June 25, 2016.
51 Krajewski.
the Malta summit, the EU and Turkey agreed on a deal to offer 3 million euros in aid to help manage the refugee crisis, in return for curtailing the migration patterns through Turkey into the EU, which was approved by the EU in February 2016.53 However, further politicization
happened on both sides, in which both sides sought to protect their interests as evidenced in further negotiations.
As negotiations continued, Turkey rejected any plans of closing the Aegean sea route and the Balkan route, which the EU proposed in addition to the accepting a Syrian refugee who legally entered the EU (Greece) for returning a refugee who illegally entered Turkey.54
However, Turkey offered a counter offer, asking for financial aid, and free travel into the Schengen area for its citizens and increased speed of accession of Turkey into the EU.55 After
great negotiations, the EU-Turkey deal came into effect on 20 March 2016. The deal
stipulates that migrants arriving in Greece will be sent back to Turkey if asylum requirements are not met. In addition, the EU will send exports, including security and migration officials to Greece to help implement the deal. As for Turkey, through the deal, it got what it
demanded from the EU: access to Schengen zone by June 2016, continuation of accession talks, which are scheduled to start in July 2016, and increased financial aid to deal with the refugee burden.56
With the signing of the EU-Turkey agreement, the clear objective was distinct—to find a way to curtail illegal arrivals into the EU. The agreement brought the increasingly divergent interests of the Member States, which communicate to the level of concern that leaders have for national interests. The deal embodies the important role that neighboring states of the EU and thus candidate states such as Serbia play in bringing a resolution to a crisis that plagues not only European stability. This is because the prognosis for the EU-Turkey agreement are bleak, although the success of the deal is hard to evaluate in the early stage of the
implementation process.
Looking down the road, the smugglers will adapt new ways of navigating the migrant routes such as the Balkan Route by increasing the price, which makes the journey to Europe that
53 "Migrant Crisis: EU Approves 3 Bn-euro Fund for Turkey." BBC News. February 3, 2016. Accessed June 25, 2016.
54 Ian Traynor and Jennifer Rankin, "Turkey Dismisses EU Plan to Resettle Refugees in Return for Sealing Sea Route." The Guardian. February 10, 2016. Accessed June 25, 2016.
55 Ibid.
more dangerous, undermining the effectiveness of the deal and calling for refugee advocates to speak against the deal.
c. Conclusion to the Chapter
Despite the agreement of the Luxemburg Conference, there is still a sense that the
policymakers in the EU lack the political will to bolster and support the institutions of the EU because the EU refugee and migration policy is not working, causing Europe to have lost the control over the crisis, which is taken over by people smugglers and other illicit activities. As a result, many politicians favor national remedies in order to stop the policy of accepting all migrants and refugees that are coming to Europe via illegal smuggling routes. However, unilateral approaches to the crisis by the Member States inhibit the political actors from reaching a unified resolution to the crisis. For example, Austria warned that it will take measures on the national level if no resolution is reached on the supranational level because the migrants are putting a strain on the Austrian welfare system.57 With no sense of political
unity in the near future to resolve the crisis as a Union, countries along the Balkan Route like Serbia are drowning in the crisis because Member States securitize migration for the sake of national interests.
To conclude, the EU securitized and non-unified response of the EU resulted in politicization of the migration crisis among Member States, has affected how the EU as a whole failed to address the crisis. This chapter has shown that the EU response resulted in a division between the eastern and western EU Member States because states have different ways and
understandings of securitizing migration. In addition, the EU response also showed how migration securitization is an enlargement issue given the EU-Turkey deal, which enables the EU to control its peripheries; thereby preventing the migrants from attaining the European dream and in attempts to save the Schengen Zone and the EU as a whole.
5. Europeanization: The Serbian Response
In this chapter, the thesis explores how Serbia is Europeanized through its response to the migration crisis; thus a positive change in Serbia- EU relations is illuminated because of EU’s need to securitize migration. Before detailing how Serbia is Europeanized by protecting the EU frontier as a non-Member State and by the humanitarian response, which is in line with
57 "European Countries Lost Control over Refugee Crisis, Should Act in National Interests – Austrian FM." RT International. June 21, 2016. Accessed June 25, 2016.
the European values, the chapter will detail how the migration crisis prompted Serbia’s involvement in the same and the relationship between Serbia and the EU.
a. Serbia and the migration crisis
Serbia began to experience an increased number of migrants traversing the Serbian territory in summer of 2015. Serbia became a logical stop as migrants continued their journey towards the Schengen Area, Hungary, after Greece and Macedonia. However, as Hungary introduced stricter penalties for illegal border crossings and initiated construction of a fence along the Serbian border in July of 2015, tensions between the two countries began to escalate.
Incidents were reported at the border between the migrants, who were on the Serbian side of the border, and the Hungarian police forces, who used teargas and water cannons in an attempt to prevent the migrants from entering the Hungarian territory. As the border fence was completed on September 2015, the migration route from Serbia to Hungary was redirected to Croatia. The redirection of the migrant route led to an increased turmoil along the Balkan route, especially between Serbia and Croatia, in which Serbia called for all security forces to be on high alert, including the possibility of sending its army to protect state borders.58 The turmoil on the border subsided when the parties agreed to a coordinated
response in shipping the migrants from border to border and increased securitization through coordinated registration of migrants at reception sites.
b. Serbia and the EU
After a series of fratricidal wars in the late 1990s, Serbia as the core country of the former Yugoslavia is firmly on track for the EU) membership. Serbia and the EU began to establish their relationship when Serbia was included in the Stabilization and Association process (SAP) for the Western Balkans, which the Feira European Council consolidated that Western Balkan countries should be considered as potential candidate countries following the
Thessaloniki European Council.
However, the relation between the EU and Serbia has been a sour one, with difficulties of implementing the SAP and the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) as the Dutch government repeatedly blocked Serbia’s attempt to begin its negotiations until Serbia fully cooperates with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY),
resolves open-questions with its neighbors in the region, and improves both political and economic outlooks. With an election of a pro-EU president and government, who fought to meet the above criteria and extradite all of the accused to the ICTY, Serbia made slow steps towards Europeanization and European integration.
Economically speaking, the relations between the two entities improved greatly after the visa facilitation took effect as access to EU exporters to the Serbian market improved. The EU fast became Serbia’s leading trade partner and thus, trade integration with the EU is high after the Interim Agreement on Trade and Trade-related Issues was signed in 2008.59
With improved economic conditions, Serbia applied for EU membership in December 2009, and the European Commission recommended that Serbia become an official candidate in October of 2011, with Serbia gaining full candidate status in March of the same year. Soon after, Serbia hosted the first Intergovernmental Conference after the EU Council approved the opening negotiations on Serbia’s accession.60 Serbia’s determination for EU membership is
illuminated as the country continues to work with the EU to stabilize its relations with Kosovo. But, the migration crisis has more elucidated the importance of this relationship, through which Serbia uses the crisis to align, if not accept directives from the EU as noted by Rados Djurovic, director of Serbian’s Center for Protection and Help for Asylum, “If the EU asks [Serbia], we should take in more refugees.”61
c. Europeanization through Borders i. What is Schengen Zone?
The Schengen Agreement of 1985 established the Schengen area and economic cooperation between the EU Member States. The Schengen Zone represents a territory where the free movement of peoples is guaranteed as signatory states are obliged to abolish all internal borders instead of a single external border. The removal of external borders is made possible through establishment of common rules and procedures that are applied with regard to visas for short stays, asylum requests and border controls, which guarantees security within the
59 "Serbia - EU-Serbia Relations." European Commission. Accessed June 27, 2016.
60 "Chronology of Relations between the Republic of Serbia and the European Union." Ministry of the Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia. Accessed June 27, 2016.
61 Filip Avramovic and Igor Jovanovic. "Serbia Will Take in Some Migrants, Vucic Says.": Balkan Insight. September 2, 2015. Accessed June 25, 2016.
Schengen area, cooperation and coordination among authorities after the Agreement became incorporated into the EU legal framework with the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997.
Despite the signing of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the development of the Schengen has been debated among the Member States. The Member States could not agree on the meaning of free movement of a person, who should be eligible for such privilege; whether the privilege should extend to just EU citizens or to also to include non-EU, which would remove internal border checks altogether. Because no consensus was reached, the Benelux states, France, and Germany in 1985 formed the Schengen area.
With the first agreement signed in 1985, a further convention was drafted in 1990, which took effect in 1995. The convention abolished checks at the internal border of signatory states; thus, a single external border was created, where immigration checks were carried out by agreed principles. As a result, the freedom of people was made possible because it leads to increased cooperation and coordination between the law enforcement officials, because of which the Schengen Information System (SIS) was set up. The SIS enabled the officials from each signatory states to exchange information on people and goods to safeguard the internal security better safeguard the internal security, paying particular attention to organized crime. Given the security and economic benefits of the Schengen Agreements, the Schengen Area gradually expended to include the Member States that were just joining the European
community but only after the States agreed to adopt the following rules: 1) removal of check on persons at the internal borders 2) a common set of rules applying to people crossing the external borders of the EU Member States 3) harmonization of conditions of entry and the rules on visas for short stays 4) enhanced police cooperation 5) stronger judicial cooperation through a faster extradition system and transfer of enforcement of criminal judgements and 6) establishment and development of the SIS.62
Today twenty-six Member States and several non-EU, including Serbia, have adopted the above principles. As a result, the states more easily connected with one another.
Economically speaking, the Schengen Agreement has greatly reduced the time it takes for goods to be delivered within the Schengen Zone. This makes it much easier, quicker and cheaper to be moved across Europe. Also, states share the burden of policing the common
62 Summary of the development of the Schengen Agreement found on this link. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV%3Al33020
