Master’s Thesis
The Far Right and Xenophobes in Disguise:
Media Attention to the Far Right in Germany and Britain during
the 2015 Refugee Crisis
Hanna Valerie Wolf Student ID: 11082038
MA Erasmus Mundus Master in Journalism, Media and Globalisation Graduate School of Communication
Universiteit van Amsterdam Supervisor: Dr. Rachid Azrout Date: 27 May 2015
Abstract
In 2015, the refugee crisis became a pivotal issue for Europe, leading to distinctly diverse political responses and fuelling the already considerable right-wing and anti-immigration sentiment across the continent. The political responses by the German and British governments differed distinctly, with Germany accepting record numbers of migrants and Britain fostering a tough stance on immigration. In this paper I argue that these diverse responses by the political establishment created more (and less, respectively) political
opportunity for the far right to gain grounds, and examine whether this (un-)favourable setting was reflected in the media attention to the far right during the refugee crisis. Furthermore, this study investigates whether there were differences in the coverage between supposedly impartial public and more profit-oriented commercial broadcasters. By means of a systematic content analysis of television news analysing visibility, prominence and evaluations of far right actors and other actors who advance far right views, I demonstrate that the far right is
evaluated more negatively in Germany than in Britain, yet that there are few differences in terms of prominence. Within the larger far right group, the study finds that extreme right actors are more visible in Germany, yet moderate far right actors appear more often in Britain. The results further indicate that the differences in media attention to the far right between public and commercial broadcasters are less pronounced than expected. Therefore, this study suggests that the political-cultural context of a country has a greater influence on media attention to the far right than the broadcasting type. The paper also discusses normative questions regarding impartiality in the news.
Keywords: media attention, visibility, prominence, evaluation, tone, far right, political opportunity, hostile media effects, Germany, Britain, television, broadcasting
Introduction
March 13th, 2016, marks a turning point in the German political landscape. What the
political establishment had feared finally came true: The far right party AfD (‘Alternative for Germany’) received double figures in three state elections and is now represented in a total of eight state parliaments. Germany, where the far right has been unsuccessful since the Nazi era (Ellinas, 2010), no longer appears unreceptive to its rise, a phenomenon other European countries have long grown accustomed to (e.g., Vliegenthart, Boomgaarden, & van Spanje, 2012). Commentators were quick to identify the culprits: chancellor Merkel’s open-door response to the refugee crisis and, above all, the media’s disproportionate attention to the far right, which allegedly provided a platform for its views to become normalised (Joffe, 2016).
Indeed, by welcoming an unprecedented high number of migrants, the government positioned itself far away from those advocating restrictive immigration policies, thereby creating room for the far right to gain grounds. Across the Channel, on the other hand, David Cameron positioned himself as tough on immigration by announcing that Britain would accept a mere 20,000 of Syrian refugees over a period of five years– a position that resonates with the political right-wing. In this paper I argue that these political responses to the migrant crisis created – and impeded, respectively – a political opportunity for the far right, and examine whether this translated into diverging media attention to the far right.
Building on previous research which found that rather than the extreme right, the political mainstream “has pushed West European politics to the right” (Mudde, 2013, p.13), this presents an interesting case to analyse. Scholars have long observed the important role the media play in shaping the public debate and setting the agenda by selecting who makes it into the news (‘gate-keeping’, White, 1950), whose views are discussed, and how these views are evaluated (‘second-level agenda setting’, McCombs, Llamas, & Lopez-Escobar, 1997), suggesting that the success of political actors largely depends on whether and how the media cover them. Yet, despite extensive scholarly interest in the media’s agenda-setting power and the rise of the far right, surprisingly few studies have examined media attention as an
explanatory factor for the far right’s success. Such studies have largely focused on single political-cultural contexts (e.g., van Heerden, 2014; Walgrave & de Swert, 2004), or have
investigated visibility, prominence or framing in isolation from each other (Vliegenthart et al., 2012; Bos, van der Brug, & de Vreese, 2010). Only few have taken the positioning of the mainstream into account (Rooduijn, de Lange, & van der Brug, 2012). Furthermore, the refugee crisis has not received scholarly attention so far, but presents an interesting context, since immigration marks one of the far right’s core issues (Ellinas, 2010).
To assess whether the positioning of the government was reflected in the media, this study applies a systematic content analysis of German and British news reports on the
refugee crisis. As television has been found to be the most influential medium (Newton, 2015), this paper analyses visibility, prominence, and evaluations of far right actors in television news. The overarching research question this study seeks to answer is thus: How does media attention to the far right differ between Germany and Britain during the refugee crisis?
Furthermore, it is interesting to compare whether the coverage differs between public and commercial broadcasting services, as previous research suggests that different objectives and regulations regarding impartiality influence the content of the news (Curran, Iyengar, Lund, & Salovaara-Moring, 2009). Therefore, a sub-question to be examined is: How does media attention to the far right differ between public and commercial broadcasting services?
To answer these questions, I first conceptualise the far right and situate the study in the context of extant research. Secondly, I present the contextual basis for the comparison between the two countries and broadcasting types. Subsequently, I discuss the
methodological framework and the operationalization of media attention. Finally, the results of the analysis are presented and discussed in the light of previous findings. Since the question to what extent the far right should be covered in the media is a dilemma situated at the intersection between freedom of expression and ethical concerns regarding the normalisation of far right ideas, this paper ends with a normative discussion of impartiality in the news.
Theoretical framework Conceptualising the Far Right
In order to analyse media attention devoted to the far right, it is important to
with Frey (1985), who conceptualised them as “any sentient entity whose actions can affect or respond to the actions of other actors” (p.129), which may include individuals or groups, such as political parties. A definition of the far right, however, is not as easily drawn, since its ideology “varies between parties, as well as over time” (Schafraad et al., 2012, p.360). In fact, several scholars have made it their mission to differentiate between distinct factions often grouped together under the term far right (Mudde, 1996; Carter, 2005; van Spanje, 2013). Van Spanje (2013), for instance, pointed out that far right and anti-immigration parties should not be understood as one and the same, and Carter (2005) differentiated between several
subgroups, among them neo-Nazi, authoritarian xenophobic, and neo-liberal populist parties. Despite the term being contested, a combination of (some of) the following ideological standpoints have been found to be characteristic of the (Western European) far right: a) “anti-democratic and anti-progressive attitudes”, b) “populism and anti-establishment standpoints”, c) “nationalism”, d) “xenophobic and exclusionist attitudes”, e) “strict law and order attitudes”, and an f) “emphasis on traditional values” (Schafraad et al., 2012, p.360).1 Since this study is
not ultimately concerned with a precise classification of different groups, but with the media coverage of the larger far right family, I use ‘far right’ as an umbrella term aiming to include all actors associated with the above mentioned features, conscious that this broad definition misses subtle differences between the groups.
In a line with this broad outline, this study adopts the minimal definition of the Western European far right family several scholars have suggested, namely that the core characteristic all subgroups share is nationalism (Ellinas, 2010; Eatwell, 2000; Mudde, 2000; Ennser, 2012). More specifically, Mudde (2007) later suggested the term nativism, which serves as an
extension of nationalism in that it delineates the concept more decidedly from centre-right ideology (Ennser, 2012). While both concepts share a focus on a specific national and cultural identity (Ellinas, 2010), nativism also implies an emphasis on a “homogeneous nation-state inhabited only by members of the nation” (Ennser, 2012, p.156; cf. Mudde, 2007), which
1 Not all of these standpoints can be considered to be exclusively far right views. Anti-democratic standpoints, for
illustrates how closely the concept relates to anti-immigration attitudes. In this study, all actors who fulfil this minimal definition are classified as far right actors.
Among this large group I distinguish between two groups, here termed moderate far right and extreme right. Previous research has identified two core groups as well, associating the group I call moderate far right with populism, and the group I term extreme right with neo-fascism and radicalism (Golder, 2003; Ignazi, 2003). Golder (2003) notes that while the electoral success of the more radical and often openly xenophobic extreme right has declined or remained stable, the success of the populist (moderate) right has grown considerably. One reason for this is that moderate far right actors try not to appear anti-democratic or racist, but aim to be perceived as a legitimate alternative to the political establishment (Rydgren, 2005).
The Far Right: A Manifold Field
Research interest in the far right has been extensive and has focused on manifold aspects. However, it has largely been conducted in the field of political science, which neglects the importance of the media in steering public opinion. A major part of attention has focused on factors contributing to its success, ranging from high immigration numbers (Golder, 2003), to feelings of disillusionment with globalisation (Swank & Betz, 2002), to differences in the electoral threshold (van Spanje, 2010b), to how other actors in the political sphere deal with the far right (Eatwell & Mudde, 2004), to name but a few.
This last point is particularly interesting and leads to another thoroughly studied aspect, namely ostracism of the far right and the effects of this exclusion for the far right’s electoral appeal (van Spanje & van der Brug, 2009) and its ideological (re-)positioning (van Spanje & van der Brug, 2007). Ostracism is an important factor that may also occur in the media, which can engage in (deliberate) strategies of ‘systematically ignoring’ the far right (van Donselaar, 1998). Findings from political science suggest that ostracism can help prevent the far right from gaining electoral success, as voters perceive a vote for the party a wasted one (van Spanje & van der Brug, 2009), yet other results find that ostracism even enhances their popularity, as an “unanimous rejection from the political mainstream strengthens the populist rhetoric” (Koning, 2015, p.10; cf. van Spanje & van der Brug, 2007).
The interaction between the far right and the mainstream becomes apparent in another phenomenon, namely so-called ‘contagion effects’ (Norris, 2005). Such effects were found to set in due to the presence or looming of the far right and describe a shift to the right of the political establishment (Ellinas, 2010; Mudde 2013), or a tendency of the mainstream to adopt tougher lines on immigration (van Spanje, 2010a). By so doing, the mainstream blocks the room on the right of the political spectrum that might else be taken over by the far right, a strategy which is also applied in order not to lose votes to the far right (Koning, 2015). Thus, it becomes apparent that the political mainstream’s response and its willingness to reposition itself on the left-right axis is crucial for the success of the far right (van Spanje, 2010a; Ellinas, 2010). In particular, the response of centre-right actors matters, whose ideology resembles that of the far right most closely, in that they usually place more emphasis on national identity and security (van Spanje, 2010a) and are therefore most likely to lose voters to the far right.
If, however, the political mainstream rejects far right views in its entirety leading to a “convergence at the centre” (Bevelander & Hellström, 2011, p.8) and increasingly blurred political identities, it creates room for the far right to flourish, given it can position itself more credibly as a real alternative to the establishment (Ellinas, 2010; Bevelander & Hellström, 2011). Indeed, scholars suggest that such a convergence creates a so-called ‘political opportunity structure’ for the far right, a favourable setting for alternative movements to gain popularity, which serves as a crucial contextual factor in explaining the performance of the far right (Spies & Franzmann, 2011, Rydgren 2007; Arzheimer & Carter, 2006).
The Far Right and the Media: A Double-Edged Sword
What many scholars have overlooked, however, is the importance of the media in shaping the public debate by selecting which views dominate the discourse. A favourable political setting must also be reflected in the media for the far right to gain grounds, as the media are considered to be the main disseminator of political information to the public (Ellinas, 2010). That such an opportunity structure is reflected in the media, however, is not unlikely, as it is an inherent characteristic of journalism to present conflicting views (Scheuer, 1999). In case of a ‘convergence at the centre’, resulting in only one dominant view, the media likely
grant exposure to views outside of the mainstream.2 Furthermore, the political sphere and the
media do not operate in isolation from each other. Rather, Van Aelst and Vliegenthart (2014) note, they are in a relationship “characterized by interdependence (Neveu and Kuhn 2002), reciprocity (Kepplinger 2007) and contingency (Walgrave and Van Aelst 2006)” (p.392).
This ascribes immense power to the media, which in filtering what the public gets to see and hear act as a gate-keeper (White, 1950) and agenda-setter (McCombs & Shaw, 1972), who decides which issues become important in the public’s eye (Bos et al., 2011). This can be extended to political actors (Kiousis & McCombs, 2004), who depend on media
exposure to gain influence in the public debate. While traditional agenda-setting theory is concerned with what (or who) to think about, another aspect of the media’s power is that it also shapes how the public thinks about an issue or actor, which has been termed second-level agenda-setting (McCombs et al., 1997). By stressing certain attributes more than others, the media can lend legitimacy to views and actors, or create a negative image that might deter the public from supporting them (Kiousis, 2005; Bos et al., 2011).
Far right actors thus depend on media coverage to disseminate their ideas to the public, and they are well aware of the media’s power. This becomes apparent in that many have blamed the media for ignoring or misrepresenting their views. The Pegida movement (‘Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the West’), for instance, accuses the German press of biased reporting, calling it a ‘lying press’. Studies have found that such claims by partisan actors often go in a line with ‘hostile media effects’, which describe “divergent
perceptions of neutral, balanced, and even-handed media content” (Perloff, 2015, p.705). It is therefore possible that the media report objectively (a contested concept in itself), but are still accused of being biased. While the question whether we can observe hostile media effects in the context of the refugee crisis cannot be answered within this study, such accusations of a media bias add an extra layer of importance to a close examination of media attention to the far right, as a negative bias might moderate the influence of favourable political contexts.
2 A ‘convergence at the centre’ is above all observed when a government is made up of a grand coalition of the
largest parties (which is the case in the current German government). Arzheimer and Carter (2006) found that such a grand coalition more than doubles the probability of far right actors achieving electoral successes.
Given the interaction between the political sphere and the media, it is surprising that relatively little research has focused on a detailed investigation of media attention to the far right. It is particularly surprising, since most of the studies that have done so, indeed observed direct or indirect effects on the electoral success of the far right (e.g., Ellinas, 2010; Bos et al., 2011; Art, 2007; Boomgaarden & Vliegenthart, 2007; Walgrave & de Swert, 2004) and have pointed at the need for future research. Scholars investigating media attention to the far right have identified several core indicators to assess the nature of the coverage. These involve above all measures of visibility (Boomgaarden & Vliegenthart, 2007), prominence (Bos, van der Brug, & de Vreese, 2011), and evaluations of the far right (Kluknavská, 2015; Zúquete, 2007). Research has found that visibility alone can influence the electoral success of the far right (Bos et al, 2011; Hopmann et al, 2010), as it makes certain political actors and views more salient than others (Boomgaarden & Vliegenthart, 2007). In addition, the more visibility is paired with prominent positions in the coverage, the more will far right actors be perceived as legitimate and effective (Bos et al., 2011). Greater visibility and prominence can therefore be considered favourable media attention.
And in that the far right seems to be fortunate: studies have repeatedly found that they “received substantially more coverage than expected based on political size or relevance” (Hopmann, van Aelst, & Legnante, 2011, p.246). This is usually explained by media logic, as far right actors provide highly mediagenic features such as dramatization, conflicts,
charismatic leaders, or a simple (populist) ‘us vs. them’ rhetoric (Hopmann et al., 2011; Scheuer 1999). In addition, according to Mazzoleni (2003), the far right is inherently
newsworthy, as they “defy the existing order” (p.7) and can therefore hardly be ignored by the media. Scholars have noted that this is particularly true for television, which according to Scheuer (1999) filters out “complex ideas in favor of blunt emotional messages” (p.10). Such messages resonate with the right-wing, he argues, and concludes that ‘television helps the right and hurts the left’ (title).
However, scholars have increasingly noted that the media can be both ‘friend and foe’ to the far right (Akkerman, 2011; Mudde, 2007; Bos et al., 2011), meaning that the media can legitimize but also delegitimize actors, and Eatwell (2002) concludes that they often do both at
once. Previous research suggests that the tone towards an actor matters for his/her electoral successes (Hopmann et al, 2010) and that the media try to “undermine the far right’s electoral appeal” (Art, 2007, p.332), for instance through strategies of ‘stigmatising’ the far-right and ‘judging consequences of far-right ideology’ (van Donselaar, 1998, p.46). Scholars looking at the portrayal of the far right have overwhelmingly found it to be negative (Schafraad, Wester, & Scheepers, 2013; Kluknavská, 2015; Zúquete, 2007), and have found that once a negative media image is painted, it is difficult to dispose of it (Schafraad et al., 2012).
It is therefore not surprising that several researchers have looked at the media’s use of delegitimizing strategies to portray the far right, most prominently strategies of stigmatization (van Spanje & Azrout, (forthcoming)) and demonization (van Heerden, 2014; Bosman & d’Haenens, 2008), which link actors to extremism, radicalism, or (neo-)Nazism. Schafraad et al (2013) concluded that the media paint an image of controversial, illegitimate outsiders that defer from the acceptable ideology, which goes in a line with Shoemaker (1982), who found that the more a political organization deviates from the dominant ideology, the more the media present it as lacking viability. Thus, when far right actors are linked to extremist ideas,
“excessive attention can no longer be counted as providing a favorable platform for populist politics” (Akkerman, 2011, p.934; cf. van Donselaar, 2003; Rydgren, 2005).
Unlike the present study, which applies an open coding of all actors who appear in the selected news reports, most of the above mentioned studies have examined media attention to one or few specific far right actors, for instance a far right party or a party leader. Albeit what these studies have not considered is that non-far right actors (above all centre-right actors) can also act like far right actors by advancing far right standpoints. This is interesting to consider, as such actors often form part of the government and therefore might benefit from a so-called ‘incumbency bonus’ (Hopmann et al., 2011, p.245). As a result, they are likely granted more exposure, which can on the one hand contribute to a shift to the right of public discourse. On the other hand, it might explain why in a given context there is less exposure for far right actors, namely because there is less need for them, as far right ideas have been ‘smuggled’ into the coverage by non-far right actors. In addition, it is reasonable to expect that actors who are not commonly considered far right are evaluated differently than far right
actors, which has implications for the public, since more favourable evaluations of such actors could result in a normalization of far right ideas. Therefore, in accordance with van Spanje (2010b), who noted that it is important to take into account the behaviour of other actors, this study also examines whether non-far right actors express far right ideological views, and furthermore, whether the media treat such actors differently than far right actors.3
Germany and Britain: Immigration as the Crux
Extant research has addressed a lack of comparative research in the field and has repeatedly suggested a comparison between Germany and Britain (e.g., Ellinas, 2010; van Heerden, 2014), not least because they present two of the largest European countries in which the far right has historically been unsuccessful (Cochrane & Nevitte, 2014; Ellinas, 2010). This is not the only characteristic the two countries share. Although Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) landmark study on media systems classified them into different systems, they noted that in many respects Britain shares more with the Democratic Corporatist system they assigned to Germany, which is especially true for its broadcasting services, with the BBC as the prototype of public broadcasting (Aalberg, van Aelst, & Curran, 2010). It is thus not surprising that Brüggemann et al (2014), in an empirical investigation of Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) study, sorted Germany and Britain into the same (Central) media system, a system characterised by strong public broadcasting next to a well-developed commercial market.
However, as indicated above, the current political climate regarding immigration in the two countries differs decidedly. Despite pronounced intra-party disagreement in Germany about how to deal with the migrant influx, the decision by chancellor Merkel to accept more than a million refugees has created room for the far right to present an alternative approach to the political establishment. The British government, on the other hand, has positioned itself to the right of the centre by opting out of a common European solution to the crisis, while
stressing the importance of national border controls. Immigration has been a hot topic for
3 Research has further suggested that there is a difference in the evaluation of actors and the evaluation of ideas.
Voltmer and Eilders (2003), for instance, found that the media sometimes evaluate an idea positively overall, but are at the same time highly sceptical of actors who support this idea, suggesting that the media evaluate the same idea differently depending on who advances it. Table A4 (Appendix C, p. xiii) indicates that some far right views are indeed evaluated differently depending on which far right subgroup is linked to the idea.
several years in Britain and has increasingly been discussed in negative terms, which goes in a line with pronounced Euroscepticism (Duffy et al., 2014; Cutts & Goodwin, 2014). By
contrast, in Germany the immigration issue has only come to the fore shortly before the crisis and was discussed positively in the media (Duffy et al., 2014).
The different attitudes are not surprising when looking at historical-cultural factors leading to the current position on immigration. Unlike Germany, which joined the EU “to heal the scars of war” (n.n., “Why Britain is so Eurosceptic”, 2014) and is a strong advocate of open borders and freedom of movement, Britain joined the EU hesitantly and has been sceptic towards its free movement policies from the very beginning (Gifford, 2006). Euroscepticism in Britain, unlike in other countries, is built on a sense of ‘British exceptionalism’ – the island nation apart from the continent –, which perceives the EU and European integration as a threat to Britain’s unique identity rather than a desirable goal (Gifford, 2006).
Much of this British exceptionalism builds on its past as an empire, but also on its handling of the Second World War. Germany remembers the Second World War with a sense of guilt, which has rendered xenophobia and far right ideology a sensitive topic ever since (Carle, 2007). The political mainstream carefully avoids associations with Nazism or racism, and Ellinas (2010) observed that “historical alarms go off whenever politicians make appeals to German identity” (p.2). Other authors, too, have pointed out Germany’s particular handling of the far right issue (van Heerden, 2014; Köcher, 1986), which translates into how journalists treat the far right. Köcher (1986) analysed role conceptions of British and German journalists and found that unlike British journalists, 90% of German journalists regarded it as their duty to fight an extreme party by actively warning the public. Ignoring the far right was, however, not an option (Köcher, 1986). The oppression of political views is regarded equally alarming in the light of the instrumentalization of the press during the Nazi era, which is why one can expect German media to make an effort to include far right actors. Therefore, the seemingly
paradoxical simultaneous legitimization (through exposure) and delegitimization (through negative evaluations) of the far right (Eatwell, 2002) is likely to occur in Germany.
Britain, unlike Germany, “recalls the second world war with more pride than fear” (n.n., “Why Britain is so Eurosceptic”, 2014), emphasising the benefits of being isolated from the
continent. The British mainstream’s response to immigration is not tinted with post-War guilt aiming to avoid any association with xenophobic attitudes. Thus, far right ideology is likely regarded more acceptable in public discourse, which leads to a lesser incentive to actively fight the far right by portraying it negatively. On the other hand, far right actors are presumably not as newsworthy in Britain, since they do not offer the marked alternative to the mainstream and are thus less controversial. Therefore, the greater room for the far right is expected to translate into greater exposure in Germany, yet since the far right deviates more decidedly from the dominant ideology one can expect German media to be more critical of the far right.
Television Broadcasting: Different aims, different content?
Television has been identified as a medium contributing greatly to the far right’s success (Hopmann et al., 2010), not least because it has repeatedly been shown to be both the most influential and the most trusted medium (e.g., Newton, 2015; Donsbach & Büttner, 2005). Considering its great influence on the public, it is not surprising that it is also the most heavily regulated medium in both countries (Donsbach & Büttner, 2005). Public broadcasters, in particular, are bound to report with ‘due impartiality’4, objectivity, and to include a variety of
perspectives (Die Medienanstalten, 2013; Ruth & Mendel, n.d.). While commercial broadcasters are bound to regulations, too, these are less binding (Cushion, Lewis, & Ramsay, 2012). Furthermore, the objective of public broadcasters is to serve society. By contrast, the primary goal of commercial broadcasters is to make money (Curran et al., 2009; Esser, 2008) and research has found that commercial channels focus more on emotional appeal, personalities and sensationalism (e.g., Newton, 2015). This resonates with the far right, which often fulfils such criteria and should thus be more visible on commercial channels.
Despite the fact that in both countries, public and commercial broadcasters are bound to regulations, “German commercial broadcasters are arguably less strictly regulated than their British terrestrial counterparts” (Steemers, 2001, p.3). In Britain, commercial
broadcasters are policed by Ofcom, a “light touch regulator” (Cushion et al., 2012, p.834),
4 ‘Due impartiality’ does not imply that every view in a society must be represented; rather, it requires public
broadcasters to weigh different views according to how representative they are of the society as a whole and to allocate airtime accordingly (Ruth & Mendel, n.d.).
which provides guidelines as to which proportions of the coverage should be allotted to specific political parties (Cushion, Ellis, & Thomas, 2015). In contrast, regulations for German commercial broadcasters appear vague, stating that there should be an incentive to include different perspectives, yet no precise explanation as to what that entails (Die Medienanstalten, 2013). Moreover, Thomas (2016) noted that in Britain, “despite varying regulatory burdens, TV news is to a large degree homogenous” (p.110) and Hopmann et al (2011) found that both the BBC and ITV tend to stick to the proportional coverage they are expected to follow. The German commercial broadcaster RTL, on the other hand, Donsbach and Büttner (2005) found, differs decidedly from public broadcasting and shows clear signs of tabloidization.
Hypotheses
In the light of what is known about the relationship between the far right and the media, the interaction between the political mainstream and deviant actors, as well as country- and broadcasting-specific characteristics, seven hypotheses are formulated subsequently.
Given that non-far right actors who advance far right standpoints likely belong to the political mainstream, and are thus in the comfortable position of appealing to media logic and benefitting from an ‘incumbency bonus’, yet not being considered deviant from the dominant ideology, the following hypotheses for both countries and broadcasting types are postulated: H1a: Non-far right actors who advance far right standpoints will be more visible and prominent than moderate far right actors, who in turn will be more visible and prominent than extreme right actors.
H1b: Extreme right actors will be evaluated more negatively than moderate far right actors, who in turn will be evaluated more negatively than non-far right actors who advance far right standpoints.
This study argues that the political-cultural contexts in Germany and Britain have led to a different positioning of the mainstream during the refugee crisis, resulting in more room for the far right in Germany. In combination with the expectation that far right actors should be
perceived more deviant from the dominant ideology in Germany, I expect that:
H2a: Far right actors will be more visible and prominent in Germany than in Britain. H2b: Far right actors will be evaluated more negatively in Germany than in Britain.
Given the different orientations and regulations public and commercial broadcasting services operate in, the following final hypotheses are formulated:
H3a: Far right actors will be more visible and prominent on commercial than on public broadcasters.
H3b: Far right actors will be evaluated more negatively on commercial than on public broadcasters.
H3c: The differences in media attention to the far right between public and commercial broadcasters will be less pronounced in Britain than in Germany.
Methodology Research Design
The purpose of this paper is to present an overview of media attention to the far right at a specific point in time (the European refugee crisis), and to examine differences between countries and broadcasting types. In order to test the hypotheses, a quantitative content analysis was applied on a sample of news reports from the respective major public and major commercial broadcasting services: BBC, ITV, ARD, and RTL. As indicated above, television marks a powerful medium and thus presents the best choice to analyse in this study. In particular its wide appeal, its audiovisuality, and its actuality (Hasebrink, 2015) distinguishes television from other important media types.5 A core advantage of a content analysis is that it
is an unobtrusive method that objectively describes real-world media coverage, which presents the most apt method to answer the overarching research questions and facilitates comparisons between countries and later replications of the study (Macnamara, 2005).
Sampling and Sample Characteristics
The newscasts chosen were the four main evening news shows, “BBC News at Ten”, “ITV News at Ten”,6 “Tagesschau” (8 pm), and “RTL aktuell” (6.45 pm), based on average
5 A further characteristic of television are its limited carrying capacities (i.e., airtime allocated to (political) news),
leading to a strict selection of who makes it into the news (Hilgartner & Bosk, 1988), which adds legitimacy to those actors who are granted valuable on-air seconds.
6 BBC’s and ITV’s “News at Ten” are only broadcasted during working days, therefore on weekends the respective
viewer ratings (Ofcom, 2014; n.n., “Halbjahresbilanz 2014: Das Erste ist am Hauptabend Marktführer”).7 A census of all newscasts broadcasted on the four shows between September
05th, 2015, and November 13th, 2015, was analysed, which presents a carefully chosen time
frame with regards to the unfolding refugee crisis. September 05th, 2015, marks the day
Angela Merkel announced that Germany would accept all Syrian asylum requests regardless of where they first entered the EU, which was shortly after followed by the British reaction to accept 20.000 Syrian refugees over a period of five years. Both statements sparked debates across the political spectrum, which assumedly provided a favourable context for a wide range of opinions. Unlike key events such as the washed up body of the dead Syrian boy Alan Kurdi, which resulted in a call for compassion and therefore likely a bias in favour of pro-immigration reactions, the statements by Merkel and Cameron provoked reactions on all sides of the political spectrum. The end date, 13th November 2015, marks the day of the Paris terror
attacks. These events were connected to the refugee crisis, which likely led to a bias in favour of anti-immigration reactions. The time frame therefore spans a peak, but nonetheless
relatively balanced period of 70 days with regards to which opinions overweigh.
In terms of data collection, the British newscasts were accessed onsite at the British Library national broadcast news archive in London, while Tagesschau newscasts were available from the broadcaster’s online archive and RTL aktuell newscasts were recorded. Due to practical limitations, seven days are missing in the RTL sample. 8 The sample thus
includes a total of 273 newscasts, within which all news items that discussed the refugee crisis were analysed with regards to the visibility, prominence, and evaluative portrayal of up to ten actors per report. The identified actors present the units of analysis. 459 reports were
analysed, in which 2271 actors were identified. Among those 2271 actors, 169 (7.5%) are far right actors. In addition, 107 non-far right actors expressed at least one far right standpoint in the reports, which represents 4.7% of the whole sample. 12.2% (276) of all actors are
7 It is important to note that with an average duration of 15 minutes, Tagesschau is the shortest programme. RTL
aktuell amounts to 20 minutes, whereas BBC’s and ITV’s News at Ten last 25 minutes. Comparisons in terms of time dedicated to actors must therefore be interpreted in relation to the total duration.
8 Missing days: 07th Sept 2015 and 11th-16th Sept. 2015. While this presents a limitation, the data suggest that the
coverage on these days does not differ markedly from other days, as the other three outlets show similar average item lengths, counts of (far right) actors, and a comparable distribution in terms of story angles.
therefore either far right actors or non-far right actors who advanced far right standpoints.9
Figure 1 shows the distribution of far right actors (including non-far right actors who advance far right views) by country.
Among the far right group (including non-far right actors), 79.8% are political actors, 12.3% are civic actors, and 7.9% were classified into other categories. Interestingly, 94% of extreme right actors appeared in domestic news, whereas 86.7% of moderate far right actors appeared in foreign or mixed news. More specifically, the extreme right appeared mostly in reports on civic protest (46.0%) or crime (16%), as opposed to the moderate far right, who appeared in international politics stories (39.2%), or reports on immigration and integration (38.3%), which suggests a different perception of the two groups in the media.10
Measures
The operationalization of media attention largely follows Schafraad et al.’s (2012) study on the Flemish far right, which differentiates between four aspects of media attention: volume attention, formal attention, substantial attention and support attention. The first dimension, volume attention, is a straightforward measure of the overall visibility of far right actors among other actors, subdivided by a) extreme right, b) moderate far right, and c) non-far right actors who advance far right views.11 The second dimension, formal attention, measures an actor’s prominence within the report. Schafraad et al.’s (2012) indicators were therefore adapted from a newspaper to a television news analysis. The prominence within the report variable was
9 By contrast, actors classified as extreme left (2) and moderate left (42) combined make up a mere 1.9% of the
whole sample, which marks an interesting side note.
10 Further figures on report characteristics and the overall distribution of (far right) actors are presented in Appendix
B (figures A1 – A11, p. iv – viii).
11 A second visibility indicator was included in the coding process, i.e. the amount of visibility within the report. This
variable was constructed from three interval variables measuring the amount of time (in seconds) an actor is seen, heard, and/or talked about (cf. Appendix C, p.xii). Due to space constraints, this indicator is not included in the analysis. However, further tests in the Appendix include tests on the visibility of far right actors within the reports.
49 1 69 50 53 54 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Germany Britain
Extreme right Moderate far right Non-far right
constructed from three dichotomous items measuring whether the actor is prominently
displayed in the report (is the actor: a) seen in backdrop behind anchor, b) seen in outstanding focus during report, c) mentioned in a headline/caption). The three items all count how often actors were displayed in such prominent positions and can thus be considered to measure the same construct. The reliability of the three-item scale is reasonable, Cronbach's alpha = .64, with higher scores indicating more prominence within the report.12
The third dimension, substantial attention, is concerned with how an actor is presented. The first indicator for this dimension is the presence of delegitimizing strategies. Schafraad et al. (2012) only investigated stigmatising associations with Nazis, which presents a limited set of associations attributed to the far right. Scholars have identified several delegitimizing strategies (e.g., van Heerden, 2014; van Spanje & Azrout, (forthcoming)), most prominently demonization. According to van Heerden (2014), demonization marks a strategy of legitimizing the (political) elimination of an actor and occurs when an actor is presented as “the
embodiment of absolute evil” (p.10). In Western Europe, Nazism and fascism can be
considered the absolute evil (van Heerden, 2014), thus, if a link to either is present, a strategy of demonization is applied. A second strategy has been identified as stigmatization (e.g., van Spanje & Azrout, (forthcoming)). Scholars have used this term generously for a wide range from mildly negative to hostile associations, yet this study follows van Heerden’s (2014) suggested delineation from demonization, which notes that while stigmatization, too, is a delegitimizing strategy, it “does not concern a wish or legitimacy to destroy” (p.16).
Stigmatization therefore includes associations with or labels as: extremism or radicalism, anti-immigration, xenophobia, discrimination, or being described as best avoided.
Furthermore, it is also interesting to see whether the legitimacy of a far right actor is openly questioned by the journalist (or a third actor in the report) by presenting the actor as not complying with the law, as having no right to get access to power, or as disrespecting the rules of democracy (Azrout, Möller, & de Vreese, 2015). A final delegitimizing strategy this study examines is whether the report features a debate among third actors about how to deal
12 For prominence, too, a second indicator was included in the coding process, i.e. the prominence of the actor among
other actors, measured on a 10 point scale (1 = main actor in the report, 10 = least prominent actor). While not included in the analysis, several further tests in the Appendix feature this indicator.
with the actor, since such debates “contribute to the controversy of the far right” (Schafraad et al., 2012, p.361). The presence of these four strategies – stigmatizing, demonizing, debating, openly delegitimizing – was measured by means of four separate dichotomous variables, but combined into a new variable (delegitimizing strategies) for the analysis. The four items count how often an actor was subject to these strategies and therefore measure the same construct of illegitimate portrayal. The reliability of the four-item scale is reasonable, Cronbach's alpha = .68, with higher scores indicating more frequent use of delegitimizing strategies.
Another indicator of substantial attention is whether far right ideological standpoints are present, taking the six commonly associated ideological standpoints outlined above into account (Schafraad et al., 2012). In this study, I distinguish between which views actors advance in the report and which views actors are linked to. By so doing, non-far right actors who advance far right standpoints form an additional core group for the analysis besides the extreme and moderate far right.13 A look at the distribution shows that 225 actors advanced a
total of 378 far right standpoints. Unsurprisingly, considering the context of the refugee crisis, ‘xenophobic and exclusionist views’ were the most frequently expressed far right standpoints (150 occurrences). Figure 2 presents an overview of far right standpoints advanced in the reports, divided by the three subgroups.
13 Two further indicators of substantial attention were included in the coding process, but are not discussed in the
results section of this study. These are a) whether an actor is represented in a passive (only mentioned), or active (paraphrased or cited) manner, and b) which role an actor is presented in during the report, ranging from positive roles (e.g., in extra-parliamentary peaceful situations), to negative roles (e.g., in legal conflicts) (Schafraad et al., 2012). A set of seven pre-defined roles was included and later divided into positive, negative and neutral roles. Figures A10 and A11 (Appendix C, p. viii) show the distribution of these indicators for the three far right subgroups.
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 Other
Anti-democratic views Traditional values Nationalism Strict law and order Populism Xenophobic views
Extreme right Moderate far right Non-far right
Finally, the last aspect investigated in this study is support attention (Schafraad et al., 2012), which analyses how the actor and far right views are evaluated and by whom. In this study, this is measured by the overall tone towards the actor on a scale from 1 (negative) to 5 (positive). In addition, the coding included measures of evaluations of far right views, as well as who evaluates such views and who uses delegitimizing strategies. As these measures are not directly linked to the hypotheses, but present interesting tendencies for future research, a short overview of the results is attached in Appendix B (figures A12 - A14, p. ix - xi).
Coding Process and Reliability
The coding process started with the set-up of a codebook (Appendix D, p. xix), which was tested and adjusted several times and is subdivided into the following four parts: (A) core information about the item, (B) core information about the actor, (C) visibility and prominence, and (D) evaluations. Parts A and B were coded for all actors (N = 2271), part C for all far right actors, non-far right actors who advanced far right standpoints, and other political and civic actors (n = 1549), whereas part D included only far right actors and non-far right actors who advanced far right views (n = 276). All coding was completed by a single coder speaking German and English fluently. Part D, in particular, contains variables (e.g., tone), which demand a higher degree of subjective judgment, and thus potentially reduce the reliability of the coding. However, strict guidelines were set out for what makes an evaluation in order to minimize such effects. To ensure reliability, a subsample of 12% was coded by a second coder, who was trained for two days with comparable news reports. Intercoder Reliability was calculated using Krippendorff’s Alpha and showed satisfactory results for almost all
variables14, ranging from α = .71 to perfect reliability of α = 1.015. Some variables received
lower scores than others due to their nature of ambiguity (de Swert, 2012). For instance, the KALPHA value of the overall tone towards the actor is lower (α = .78) than the values for easier codes such as whether the actor is seen (α = .98) or heard (α = 1.0).
Results
14 See Appendix A (table A1, p.ii) for a list of KALPHA values per variable.
15 It must be noted that perfect reliability occurred for variables which were very easy to code, such as whether an
H1a: Differences between Far Right Groups - Visibility and Prominence
Hypothesis 1a predicted that non-far right actors who advance far right standpoints would be more visible and prominent than moderate far right actors, who in turn would be more visible and prominent than extreme right actors. In terms of overall visibility within the whole sample, a look at the distribution reveals that with 2.2%, n = 50, extreme right actors are indeed the least visible of the three groups. Moderate right actors, however, are more visible, 5.3%, n = 119, than non-far right actors who advance far right views, 4.7%, n = 107, which goes against the expectation.16
In terms of prominence within the reports, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was run to test for differences between the far right subgroups.17 Table 1 shows the results of
the ANOVA, with higher means indicating more prominence within the reports. The results show that both extreme right and non-far right actors are more prominent in the reports than moderate far right actors. While the non-far right group shows the highest prominence mean, which supports the hypothesis, this does not differ significantly from that of the extreme right, which was expected to be the least prominent group. It must be noted that the assumption of equal variances was violated, Levene's F (2, 273) = 8.34, p< .001. A subsequently run Welch test, however, is significant, Welch’s F (2, 129.58) = 14.29, p< .001.
Thus, looking at the results, there is little support for hypothesis 1a. While indeed the extreme right is the least visible and the non-far right the most prominent group, the moderate far right behaves differently than expected both in terms of visibility and prominence. This
16 In terms of the amount of visibility (in seconds) within the reports, results (Appendix C, table A2, p. xii) show that
extreme right and non-far right actors are more visible than moderate far right actors. This stands in contrast to the findings for overall visibility of far right actors, where moderate far right actors are most visible.
17 Prominence was further tested by comparing the mean position of far right actors among other actors in the reports
might in part be explained by the nature of the open coding, as far right actors in this study include both domestic and foreign far right actors. Due to the context of the refugee crisis, Viktor Orban and the Hungarian government, who were coded as moderate right actors, received substantial coverage. This might explain the higher visibility of the moderate right, but also why it scores low on prominence, since foreign far right actors are likely less accessible for journalists and therefore less likely to appear prominently.
H1b: Differences between Far Right Actors - Evaluation
Hypothesis 1b predicted that the extreme right would be evaluated more negatively than the moderate far right, who in turn would be evaluated more negatively than non-far right actors. To test this hypothesis, I compared the means of the overall tone towards the three groups, which was measured on a five-point scale (1= negative, 5= positive) and is here and in subsequent tests treated as an interval variable, consequently assuming that the distances between the response options are equal. The value ‘no evaluation’ was excluded for the analysis. A one-way ANOVA was run to test for differences between the groups (table 2).
The results show that all three groups differ significantly from each other in accordance with the expectation. Extreme right actors are indeed evaluated most, and non-far right actors least negatively. We may not assume equal variances, Levene's F (2, 199) = 22.95, p< .001, however, a Welch test is significant, Welch’s F (2, 119.77) = 90.82, p< .001.
In addition, I compared the use of delegitimizing strategies between the three groups by means of a second one-way ANOVA. The results in table 2 show that the differences between the extreme right and both the moderate far right and the non-far right are significant,
with extreme right actors most often, and non-far right actors hardly ever being subject to delegitimizing strategies. This further supports the hypothesis, even though the difference between moderate far right and non-far right actors is not found to be significant. It must be noted that the assumption of equal variances was violated, Levene's F (2, 273) = 36.05, p< .001. The subsequent Welch test was significant, Welch’s F (2, 111.44) = 61.65, p< .001.
In conclusion, hypothesis 1b is supported.18 Extreme right actors are both the most
negatively evaluated in terms of tone, and most often portrayed as illegitimate. Non-far right actors are, as expected, evaluated least negatively and hardly ever delegitimized. In a line with the hypothesis, moderate far right actors take the middle position. Interestingly, like the non-far right group, they are hardly ever presented as illegitimate, which supports the idea that the moderate right manages to present itself as a legitimate alternative to the establishment.
H2a: Differences between Countries - Visibility and Prominence
Hypothesis 2a predicted that far right actors would be more visible and prominent in Germany than in Britain. To test this hypothesis, I compared the overall visibility19 of the three
far right groups between the two countries by means of three Chi-square tests (table 3). For this purpose, dummy variables were created for the subgroups ‘extreme right’, ‘moderate far right’, and ‘non-far right’. The results show that, in a line with the hypothesis, the extreme right
18 Furthermore, figures A10 and A11 (Appendix C, p. viii) show that the further right on the political spectrum, the
more passive an actor is represented in the reports, and that the extreme right is more frequently presented in negative roles than the moderate or non-far right groups, which adds further support for hypothesis 1b.
19 In addition, differences between countries in terms of visibility within the reports were tested for (Appendix C,
is significantly more visible in Germany, even though the effect is small. Again, the moderate far right contradicts the hypothesis and is significantly more visible in Britain than in Germany. The effect is, however, negligible. No significant difference was found for non-far right actors. Furthermore, it is interesting that in Germany the three subgroups behave according to the expectation that the extreme right would be least visible, and the non-far right group the most visible group, indicating that hypothesis 1a is supported for Germany, but not for Britain. In terms of the total percentage of far right actors among other actors, the two countries do not differ: far right actors amount to 12.3% of the whole sample in Germany and 12.2% in Britain.
To test for differences in prominence of far right actors, a two-way ANOVA (tables 4 and 5) was conducted to assess the influence of political affiliation on prominence within the reports, in conjunction with country.20
The results show a significant, but weak interaction effect between country and political affiliation. The means indicate that all three subgroups are more prominently displayed in Germany than in Britain, in particular the non-far right group. However, as only one extreme right actor occurred in Britain, drawing conclusions in terms of prominence is difficult for the
20 The second prominence indicator (prominence among other actors) was also tested for (Appendix C, table A7,
extreme right. It must further be noted that equal variances may not be assumed, Levene's F (5, 270) = 2.72, p = .021. Thus, there is some support for hypothesis 2a. Extreme right actors are indeed more visible in Germany – in fact, the extreme right is practically invisible in Britain, with only one appearance. Further, all far right subgroups show higher prominence means in German reports (if only marginally), which goes in accordance with the hypothesis.
Nonetheless, the moderate right group is more visible in Britain, which contradicts the hypothesis. Again, this might be explained by the fact that British coverage focused more on foreign news, in which Viktor Orban and the Hungarian government appeared frequently, as opposed to the coverage in Germany, which focused on domestic news.
H2b: Differences between Countries - Evaluation
Hypothesis 2b predicted that far right actors would be evaluated more negatively in Germany than in Britain. To test this hypothesis, I first compared the means of overall tone towards far right actors (n = 202)21 through an independent-samples t-test. As the hypothesis
is directional, a one-sided test is appropriate. The test shows a significant difference between Germany (M = 1.65, SD = .74) and Britain (M = 1.85, SD = .82), t (201) = -1.78, p (one-tailed) = .039, 95% CI [-.42, -.02], which supports the expectation that Germany evaluates the far right more negatively. In addition, I compared the mean use of delegitimizing strategies (n = 276) between Germany and Britain by means of a second independent-samples t-test, which finds significant differences between Germany (M = .20, SD = .29) and Britain (M =.08, SD = .14), t (272.52) = 4.34, p (one-tailed) < .001, 95% CI [.06, .17], with Germany more prone to use delegitimizing strategies. Thus, hypothesis 2b is supported: Germany evaluates far right actors more negatively and more often portrays them as illegitimate.
H3a: Differences between Broadcasters - Visibility and Prominence
Hypothesis 3a predicted that far right actors would be more visible and prominent on commercial than on public broadcasters. To test this hypothesis, I compared the overall visibility22 of far right actors between the two broadcasting types by means of three Chi-square
21 The n-value for tone is lower due to exclusion of ‘no evaluation’.
22 Furthermore, differences between the broadcasting types in terms of visibility within reports were tested for
(Appendix C, table A9, A10, p. xvii). However, no significant interaction effect between broadcasting and political affiliation was found.
tests, using the above described dummy variables for the subgroups. The results in table 6 show that, in a line with the expectation, extreme right actors were significantly more visible on commercial than on public broadcasters, even though the effect of the association is
negligible. While no significant difference between the broadcasting types was found for non-far right actors, the moderate non-far right, just as in previous analyses, behaves differently than expected and is significantly more visible on public than on commercial broadcasting – even if the effect here is even lower. A possible explanation for the higher visibility of the moderate right on public broadcasting could be that public broadcasters indeed aim to include multiple perspectives, but choose for the more moderate (and thus legitimate) version due to a less sensationalist focus, whereas commercial broadcasters might tend to go for the more extreme (newsworthy, conflictual) alternative at the end of the spectrum due to news values (Harcup & O’Neill, 2001) rather than an aspiration to include a variety of perspectives. In addition, a look at the percentages shows that in terms of visibility among other actors, far right actors as a whole are slightly more visible on commercial (12.8%) than on public broadcasting (11.7%).
In order to test for differences between the two broadcasting types in terms of prominence of far right actors, a two-way ANOVA was carried out to assess the influence of political affiliation (extreme right, moderate right, non-far right) on prominence within reports23,
23 The second prominence indicator (prominence among other actors) also tested for differences between the
broadcasters (Appendix C, tables A11, A12, p. xviii). The results show a significant, but weak interaction effect between political affiliation and broadcasting. The most pronounced differences in the mean scores occur for the extreme right, however contradicting the hypothesis: extreme right actors take more prominent positions among other actors on public than on commercial broadcasters.
in conjunction with broadcasting type. The results indicate that there is no significant
interaction effect between broadcasting type and political affiliation, F (2, 270) = 1.37, p= .255, η2 = .010. A marginally significant effect was found for broadcasting alone, F (1, 270) = 3.76, p= .054, η2 = .014. A stronger, but still small effect was found for political affiliation alone, F (2,
270) = 14.58, p< .001, η2 = .97. It must be taken into account that the assumption of equal
variances in the population has been violated, Levene's F (5, 270) = 5.85, p < .001.
Thus, there is little to no support for hypothesis 3a. The only difference in accordance with the hypothesis is found for the overall visibility of far right actors, with extreme right actors and non-far right actors significantly more visible on commercial than on public broadcasting, yet moderate right actors again contradicting the hypothesis. However, as mentioned above, only one extreme right actor occurred in the whole British sample. Thus, the difference in visibility is rather a difference between the German broadcasters. As German broadcasters are expected to differ more than British ones, the results must thus be interpreted with caution.
H3b: Differences between Broadcasters - Evaluation
Hypothesis 3b predicted that commercial broadcasters would evaluate far right actors more negatively than public broadcasters. To test this hypothesis, I first compared the overall tone towards far right actors (n = 202) between public and commercial broadcasting services by means of an independent-samples t-test. The test finds that the mean tone towards far right actors on public broadcasters (M = 1.71, SD = .72) does not differ significantly from commercial broadcasters (M = 1.73, SD = .83), t (197) = .11, p (two-tailed) = .911, 95% CI [-.21, .23].24 Secondly, I compared the use of delegitimizing strategies (n = 276) between public
and commercial broadcasters. Here, a t-test shows that the use of delegitimizing strategies on public broadcasters (M = .13, SD = .25) differs significantly from the average on commercial broadcasters (M = .21, SD = .27), t (274) = 2.45, p (one-tailed) = .008, 95% CI [.02, .14]. As expected, commercial more than public broadcasters use delegitimizing strategies.
Thus, hypothesis 3b is partially supported. While no differences between the broadcasting types were found for the overall tone towards far right actors, commercial
broadcasters indeed use delegitimizing strategies more frequently. Although it is surprising that in this case tone and delegitimizing strategies do not go hand in hand, this could be explained by the fact that unlike tone, which can include a variety of (mildly) negative
evaluations, delegitimizing strategies present strong, unambiguously negative associations. If we assume that public broadcasters aim to report impartially, it is in particular such strategies that would go against this aspiration.
Hypothesis 3c: Differences between Outlets – Visibility, Prominence, Evaluation The last hypothesis (3c) predicted that differences in media attention to the far right between public and commercial broadcasters would be less pronounced in Britain than in Germany. To test this hypothesis, I re-ran the above tests differentiating between the outlets. In terms of visibility, I compared the overall visibility of far right actors in the four outlets by means of three Chi-square tests (table 7) using the dummy variables described above. To assess which outlets differ from each other, the proportions within each row were compared with a z-test. To reduce the chance of type I errors, a Bonferroni correction was applied.
In accordance with the hypothesis, the results show that the BBC and ITV do not differ significantly from each other in terms of visibility of extreme right actors, whereas ARD and RTL do. By showing significantly more extreme right actors than ARD, RTL behaves like a commercial broadcaster as expected from theory. Also for moderate far right actors there are
significant differences between the four outlets, however, the effect is small. Subscript letters show that the BBC differs significantly from ARD and RTL, not however from ITV, which shows that the two British broadcasters are indeed relatively aligned. Lastly, the test shows no significant difference between the outlets in terms of non-far right actors, which suggests that differences are more pronounced the further right on the political spectrum the actor is.
To test for differences in prominence, a one-way ANOVA was run. It is important to note that for this analysis, only far right actors and non-far right actors who advanced far right views were selected in the data file and treated as one ‘far right‘ group in order to be able to observe differences between the outlets. The results in table 8 show that the only statistically significant difference found is between the two public broadcasters, BBC and ARD, with far right actors more prominently displayed in ARD reports. While none of the other outlets differ significantly from each other, post hoc tests show that the differences between BBC and the German commercial broadcaster RTL almost reach statistically significant level (p= .062), which suggests that the country factor matters more than the broadcasting type. According to a Levene’s test, we may assume equal variances, Levene's F (3, 272) = 1.56, p= .199.
In terms of overall tone, another one-way ANOVA shows no statistically significant differences between the outlets, F (3, 195) = 1.09, p= .357. According to a Levene’s test, we may assume equal variances, Levene's F (3, 195) = 1.00, p= .393. Lastly, a closer look at the differences between outlets in terms of their use of delegitimizing strategies deserves
attention. A one-way ANOVA (table 8) indicates that RTL makes significantly more use of such strategies than both the BBC and ITV, which again shows that RTL, unlike ITV, behaves more like commercial broadcasters were expected to behave. While ARD and RTL do not
differ significantly from each other, the differences nonetheless seem to be more pronounced than they are between the British broadcasters, which adds some support to the hypothesis. Equal variances may not be assumed, Levene’s F (3, 272) = 8.47, p< .001. A Welch test shows significance, Welch’s F (3, 126.06) = 7.39, p< .001.
Thus, there is partial support for the last hypothesis. There are indeed tendencies that the German commercial broadcaster RTL behaves more like a commercial broadcaster as described in theory than the British ITV, which becomes apparent in a more frequent use of delegitimizing strategies and the greater visibility of extreme right actors. The differences between the British broadcasters indeed seem less pronounced than between the German ones, which suggests that ITV adheres to the regulations regarding impartiality more than RTL does. However, it must be noted that these results might in part be due to the small sample size of (extreme) far right actors, which reduces the reliability of the findings.
Discussion and Conclusion
In conclusion, this study shows mixed results as to whether the different political opportunity structures in Germany and Britain were reflected in the media attention to the far right. The expectations towards evaluations find most support, both in terms of country-specific differences, but also in terms of differences in the evaluations of the three subgroups. Actors are indeed evaluated more negatively the further right they are situated on the political spectrum, which goes in a line with Shoemaker’s (1982) finding that the more an actor
deviates from a dominant ideology the more he/she is evaluated unfavourably. It also confirms findings by other studies, which have found the far right’s media image to be predominantly negative (Schafraad et al., 2012, Zúquete, 2007). While this does not appear surprising, it bears implications that should not be underestimated. Firstly, it suggests a negative bias in the media towards actors outside of the political mainstream, which is questionable from a
normative point of objective journalism, and, in a sense, it proves negative media bias claims by far right actors right, thereby potentially strengthening their position (Koning, 2015).
Secondly, by evaluating non-far right actors who advance far right views more favourably than far right actors, the media may not benefit the far right as such in this case, yet they may
contribute to a normalization of its ideas. This is further underlined by a tendency that the same far right view is evaluated more favourably when linked to non-far right actors than when linked to far right actors (Appendix C, table A4, p. xiii). Consequently, there is a risk of a subtle shift of the discourse towards the right, which supports Mudde’s (2013) point that “in the past three decades the main threats to liberal democracy have come from the political main-stream”” (p.15), and is a point that should be considered in further research on the far right.
In a line with these implications, as expected, German media evaluate the far right more negatively than Britain and use delegitimizing strategies more frequently, which supports findings by Köcher (1986) and presents one of the more far-reaching results. Such strategies, in particular demonization, are strong indicators of a bias in the reporting (Bosman &
d’Haenens, 2008), and can be interpreted as a way to fight the opportunity for the far right that has been created in the political sphere. This might in particular have long-term effects for the success of the far right, as illegitimate and negative attributes are difficult to get rid of
(Schafraad et al., 2012). Thus, even though the far right currently appears to achieve
successes in Germany, a continued negative portrayal might limit its scope in the long-term. However, the question whether journalists apply such strategies consciously cannot be answered within the scope of this study. Therefore, and in a line with previous studies, which found German jour-nalists to be particularly critical of the far right (Köcher, 1986; Ellinas, 2010), an investigation of journalists’ role conceptions by means of qualitative interviews might prove insightful, not least because this study supports indications that the political-historical context of a country matters in terms of evaluations of the far right (van Dalen, de Vreese, & Albaek, 2012). Investigating the use of demonization (i.e., a link to Nazism and fascism) in Germany is a particularly interesting aspect that deserves further attention due to its particular handling of post-War guilt.
The differences in visibility and prominence between the two countries are not as pronounced as expected. While the extreme right is more (almost only) visible in Germany, which supports the idea that the political opportunity translated into more exposure, this is not the case for the moderate far right. A possible explanation for this is that with the UKIP, Britain, unlike Germany, has a moderate right party of considerable relevance and therefore
