Europeanization through depoliticisation in Moldava : the role of EU-funded consultants in the European neighbourhood policy

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EUROPEANIZATION THROUGH DEPOLITICISATION

IN MOLDOVA

The role of EU-funded consultants in the

European Neighbourhood Policy

Course: MSc International Development Studies

School year: 2014/2015

Student name: Emanuele Sessa

Student number: 10863443

Supervisor: mw. dr. V.D. Mamadouh

Second reader: dr. E.G Gomez Llata Cazares

Word count: 34256

NB:

Footnotes, bibliography and annexes are excluded from the word count.

Disclaimer:

The author alone is responsible for the interpretation of the events in the field, the contributions of

the consultants interviewed and the projects retained for the purpose of this research. The list of

interviewees is not provided to protect the anonymity of the respondents and confidentiality of

their contributions.

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2 Abstract

Europeanization through Depoliticisation in Moldova

The overall aim of this research is to reach an in-depth understanding of how Europeanization – the process of convergence towards EU norms and standards – is enforced through the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in countries of the ‘shared neighbourhood’ such as Moldova. The problem statement on which this whole study has been constructed is that in a sensitive geopolitical context characterised by the overlapping spheres of influence of the EU and Russia, the legitimacy of the former in promoting its norms and standards should not be taken for granted. The main concepts retained are Europeanization and depoliticisation – intended as the paradigm underlying the ENP – while legitimacy is reduced in terms of co-ownership and participation of the beneficiaries in the policy to facilitate the understanding of the issues and dynamics at stake.

The role of EU-funded consultants in the European Neighbourhood Policy

The specific aim of this research is to unravel how depoliticisation is functionally used to legitimise the role of EU-funded consultants – intended as core agents of Europeanization – in the ENP context and through their intervention enhance both the legitimacy and the effectiveness of the policy altogether. To do so an in-depth qualitative analysis of the governance strategy of the ENP is developed through the interpretive lens of the consultants themselves, adopting an insider perspective. The researcher embedded himself in one of the projects retained for the purpose of this study and fathomed the role of consultants in the governance of the ENP through the reflexive observation of their daily interactions and the collection of their insightful contributions. The methods used include discourse analysis, participatory observation ad semi-structured in-depth interviews.

The study is developed in four subsequent stages. First, the ENP discourse – intended as the rhetoric accompanying the formulation of the policy – is scrutinised to identify the specific rhetorical devices used to promote depoliticisation. Second, reference documents of the ENP policy are analysed to unravel how a depoliticisation strategy is articulated and embodied in the governance arrangements of the ENP practice. Third, the specific governance strategies of the projects under study are described to delineate the role of consultants in the practice of the ENP. Fourth, the role of consultants is fathomed to reach an in-depth understanding of how through their intervention legitimacy and effectiveness of the ENP are enhanced. The analysis provides evidence that depoliticising the practice of the ENP and legitimising the intervention of EU-funded consultants is functional to ensure effective convergence towards EU norms and standards in countries such as Moldova. On the other hand, it is shown that depoliticising the policy process leads to a structural deficit of co-ownership and participation from the Moldovan side eroding the legitimacy of the ENP and the undergoing process of Europeanization. Finally, the pro-active role of EU-funded consultants in addressing such deficit and by extension enhancing effectiveness and legitimacy of the ENP is unravelled, leading to the conclusion that the consultants can be considered as necessary agents of Europeanization.

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1. Introduction

In this introductive chapter the research framework is delineated. First, the current geopolitical situation of the ‘shared neighbourhood’ between the European Union (EU) and Russia is analysed, leading to the problem statement that the legitimacy of the EU in imposing convergence towards its norms and standards in countries such as Moldova is eroding. Second, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) intended as the mean through which the EU imposes its norms and standards in ‘neighbouring countries’ such as Moldova is presented and the role of EU-funded consultants in its implementation described, leading to the focus of this research on their leading role in promoting EU norms and standards. Third, the principle according to which delegating the implementation of the ENP to non-political actors such as private consultants is an appropriate form of policy-making is discussed, leading to the choice of depoliticisation as analytical framework of this research.

The main concepts retained in this study are Europeanization – intended as the process of convergence towards EU norms and standards – and depoliticisation – intended as the underlying paradigm of the ENP legitimising the leading role of EU-funded consultants in promoting these norms and standards. Europeanization is introduced in the discussion on the geopolitical context of Moldova and put into the perspective of the overlapping spheres of influence of the EU and Russia in the country. Depoliticisation is introduced in the discussion on the discursive strategy accompanying the ENP policy and underlying the governance arrangements of the ENP practice.

It is important to stress at this very early stage that legitimacy is not retained as a main concept, notwithstanding questions of legitimacy lie at the heart of the problem statement addressed in this research and are ever-present in the analysis developed. This is a deliberated choice made by the researcher, who decided to frame legitimacy as a function of the degree of co-ownership of and participation in the ENP of the Moldovan beneficiaries and approach it transversally throughout the whole research.

1.1. Geopolitics of the ‘shared neighbourhood’ – The Moldovan case

“One key to understanding Moldova today is to understand the space you are in. You are not in Russia, but you are not in Europe either. This is a useful reminder that stereotypes and Western readings mean nothing when your face is pressed against the window of an overcrowded mashrutka while Russian pop blasts from the radio. It is also important to realise that EU bubbles and fairy tales of a democratic continent can easily come tumbling down in the face of a bad wine year that throws the country’s only industry and economy into chaos.” *Burtea, 2014: 49+

Tiny and landlocked country wedged between Romania and Ukraine, Moldova has always been a crossroad of great power struggles. The Moldovan peasants, powerless spectators of the turbulent history of their country, have known many occupiers and regime changes since their momentum of glory under the national heroes Alexander the Good and Stephan the Great, princes of the then prosperous Principality of Moldavia between 1400 and 1504. After Stephan’s death and several incursions of Crimean Tatars, the country got conquered by the Ottomans in 1538 and remained vassal of the Porte until the decay of the

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Empire and the epochal shifts of the early nineteenth century. Battlefield of European powers for decades, the Principality got finally torn apart in 1812 and the region between the Prut and Dniester rivers – roughly corresponding to modern Moldova – came under Russian control. Under the rule of Moscow authorities, determined in preventing any non-Russian nationalism and pro-Romanian revolutionary tendencies, the then called Bessarabia endured far-reaching Russification processes entangling among other things the purge of Romanian language from all schools and the imposition of Russian in state institutions [Burtea, 2014: 46-47]. The situation shifted again in the aftermath of the First World War, when the Bessarabian autonomous parliament voted to join the newly-born Romania, in the name of pan-Romanianism and notwithstanding the controversy over the existence of a distinct Moldovan language already undergoing at the time. The Second World War put an end to the Greater Romania parenthesis and in 1944 Russia regained control of Bessarabia, which became part of the Soviet Union with the name Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (MASSR). In the fifty years of Soviet rule, Moldovans endured a second and harsher wave of Russification, achieved through propaganda, repeated deportation of Moldo-Romanians and repopulation of the MASSR with consistent Russians and Ukrainians minorities [Burtea, 2014: 49].

These continuous shifts from one side to the other of the European chessboard left visible scars in the Moldovan society. Twenty-five years after having declared their independence from the Soviet Union and notwithstanding having expressed their commitment to European integration ever since, Moldova is still in search of an identity [for a discussion see Burtea, 2014]. The breakaway territory of Transnistria and the autonomous region of Gagauzia, used by Russia as secessionist weapons to maintain an influence on the country [Racheru, 2014: 41], are ever-present reminders that territorial integrity and national identity are illusions of the present, not creations of the past. The question of the country’s orientation in foreign affairs lied at the heart of the political campaign preceding the 2014 parliamentary elections and the controversy over the existence of a Moldovan language distinct from Romanian still added fire to the fuel in the debate. The common denominator of the hot topics addressed in the campaign was the call into question of the Moldovan establishment’s commitment to European integration, seen in the light of the bilateral relations with Romania, historical pole of attraction for the country having become member of the EU in 2007. The signature of a far-reaching EU-Moldova Association Agreement1 few months before the elections crystallised both the expectations of the ruling pro-European coalition seeking to maintain power and the scepticisms of the Russian-supported opposition groups, who fomented their electorates by stressing respectively benefits and threats of the Europeanization process sealed by the agreement. The results of the elections, giving to a Russian party a majority of seats in the parliament but enabling the pro-European parties to form a ruling coalition, provide unequivocal evidence of the structural polarisation of the Moldovan society, torn between the siren calls of the EU and the Russian eagerness to fight for its traditional sphere of interest [Racheru, 2014: 35].

The EU and Russia played a determinant role in the elections, shaping the political discourses and influencing the electors through more or less explicit means [for a discussion see Racheru, 2014]. The political stratagems they used to respectively affirm and reaffirm their influence in the country are summarised in the following terms by Derek Averre (2010) in his article Competing Rationalities: Russia, the EU and the ‘Shared Neighbourhood’:

1_{The EU-Moldova Association Agreement will be described in detail in Chapter 4 - The Moldovan context.} 2

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EUROPEANIZATION SOVEREIGNTY

EU RF

MD

Figure 1: EU-Russia competing rationalities

EU: European Union; MD: Moldova; RF: Russian Federation, Europeanization and Sovereignty: for a discussion see

Medvedev (2008).

“The divergence between the EU’s and Russia’s policies towards the shared neighbourhood is often framed as follows. The EU seeks to extend a European ‘postmodern’ security across the wider Europe and create a ‘ring of well governed countries’ to the east through trade and assistance programmes to encourage the maximum possible convergence with European norms and values. Russia, on the other hand, is often perceived as seeking to maintain or recreate a traditional, realist ‘sphere of influence’ by manipulating a range of hard and soft instruments to exploit its predominantly structural power in the post-Soviet space.” *Averre, 2009: 1690+

In this depiction of the geopolitical reality of post-Soviet countries, the EU is considered a normative power proposing liberal values and soft integration as a legitimate alternative to Russia, portrayed as a structural power moved by an ideological stance and preference for hard coercion inherited from the Soviet times. In that sense, the legitimacy of EU norms and standards and of the EU in promoting them is seen as closely interlinked with the political dynamics having accompanied the dissolution of the Soviet Union, basically consisting in countries such as Moldova trying to wean from the grip of the authorities in Moscow. The author then challenges this simplistic view and propose the concept of competing rationalities, moving beyond an analysis in terms of opposite approaches to look at the “tension between elements of normative and structural power in the relations of both with the countries on their periphery” *Averre, 2009: 1691+. This conceptualisation is rooted in an understanding of the regional geopolitics characterised by the Russian come-back rather than the Soviet Union dismantlement and of the relations between the EU and Russia as a battle of ideas aimed at promoting and defending the legitimacy of their respective norms [Averre, 2009: 1696]. In such scenario, further reinforced by the latest events in Ukraine posterior to the publication of the article but fully in line with its argument, the Europeanization projected by the EU in the shared neighbourhood is compared and contrasted with the Sovereignty protected by Russia [Medvedev, 2008: 225].

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This research draws on this reading of the regional geopolitics in terms of competing rationalities between EU and Russia and questions the legitimacy of the ENP intended as the main vector of Europeanization in such context. To do so an in-depth analysis of the ENP policy and practice in Moldova is developed through the interpretive lens of EU-funded consultants and its core constitutive elements discussed in terms of perceived legitimacy at the eyes of partner countries. The fundamental assumption made is that the legitimacy of the policy altogether depends on the degree of co-ownership and participation of the partners in its different constitutive elements, from the formulation down to the implementation level.

1.2. Europeanization through cooperation – The European Neighbourhood Policy

The ENP is the framework for cooperation launched by the EU in 2004 with the explicit aim of ensuring prosperity, stability and security at its borders through enhanced political association with and sustained economic development in neighbouring countries [EEAS, 2015a]. It is a chiefly bilateral policy covering a broad range of sectors2 and posing as precondition to financial support the commitment of the partner countries to unilaterally defined common values3 [EEAS, 2015a]. It entangles the creation of free trade areas and the gradual harmonisation of legal norms with the acquis communautaire – the body of common rights and obligations of the EU member states – and can be therefore considered as the principal mean through which the EU extends the integration process beyond its borders. This ambition is attested by the expression “sharing everything but institutions” used by the then president of the European Commission Romano Prodi to describe the overall approach of the EU towards its neighbourhood [Prodi, 2002: 6]. The ENP has the dual function of precluding membership while reaffirming conditionality4 in neighbouring countries such as Moldova [Haukkala, 2008: 1611] and in that sense represents both the continuation and the avoidance of the enlargement process [Haukkala, 2008: 1616].

Two structural elements of the ENP as currently formulated bear the risk of undermining its perceived legitimacy and deserve some particular attention already at this stage of the research. These consist in the lack of membership perspective for partner countries and the unilateral definition of the common values to which their participation in the policy is conditioned. The offer of membership is broadly recognised in the literature as the main incentive for prospective member countries to accept the normative agenda of the EU and as such constitutes the legitimising basis for its external actions [for a discussion see Haukkala, 2008: 1605]. In contrast, the lack of membership perspective is likely to legitimise the calls into question of such agenda, as attested by the last parliamentary elections in Moldova. This is further aggravated by the unilateral definition of common values and the reaffirmation of conditionality as a policy paradigm, legitimising the claims of these actors framing the political association between EU and partner countries in terms of imposition rather than concerted adoption of a normative agenda. Evidence in support of this statement is provided by the strategic use of the sovereignty argument by Russian-supported parties in the political campaign preceding the elections. These structural shortcomings in terms of co-ownership led

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These include regional development, employment and social policy, trade, industrial and competition policy, agriculture and rural development, climate change and environment, energy security, transport, research and innovation as well as support to health, education, culture and youth.

3

These consist in democracy and human rights, rule of law, good governance, market economy principles and sustainable development.

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Haukkala (2008) to argue that “the ENP can be seen as resting on a fairly dubious legitimacy” *Haukkala, 2008: 1612].

The ENP is operationalised through bilateral Action Plans and Association Agreements signed with the partner countries and implemented in line with two guiding principles, more for more and differentiation [EEAS, 2015b]. The former consists in proportionating financial support to the ambition and determination demonstrated by the different partners in the implementation of the ENP and can be considered as the main tool used by the EU to incentivise its partners in enacting the reforms foreseen in the agreements. The latter consists in tailoring financial support to the specific needs of the different partners and can be considered as the essence of the bilateral format of the ENP, enabling the EU to maintain its firm grip on the process by preventing the coordination between partners.

The practical application of these principles consists in tying the disbursement of the financial support channelled through different modalities5 to the achievement of given conditions. These conditions are reflected in the specific objectives of the different projects foreseen to be implemented and in that sense Europeanization through ENP should be approached as a self-reinforcing process enforced step by step, project after project. This is represented visually in Figure 2. The EU and Moldova agree on the policy targets to be achieved and the related allocation of funds, these policy targets are declined in a series of specific objectives and different projects are implemented to ensure an effective use of the funds to achieve the objectives in question.

5

The different modalities of financial support foreseen under the ENP are described in Chapter 4 - The Moldovan

context.

EUROPEANIZATION

Figure 2: Europeanization through ENP

ì FUNDS OBJECTIVES Project A PROJECT ì FUNDS OBJECTIVES Project B PROJECT

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The implementation of the projects is made in line with the principle of value for money, meaning ensuring the higher efficiency and effectiveness for the minimum cost. To do so the implementation of the individual projects is delegated to a consortium generally composed of private consultancies selected through competitive tendering procedures. The latter consist in issuing specific public calls on the basis of which the different candidate consortia prepare their technical and financial proposals and are evaluated according to pre-established and transparent criteria6. The contract is then awarded to the candidate consortium having proposed the lower price for the higher quality of the services.

To provide the higher quality, the candidate consortia compete for the most relevant and therefore better positioned freelance consultants in terms of technical expertise and regional experience. These consultants then form the implementing team of the individual projects, generally composed of a Team Leader (TL) responsible of the overall coordination of the project activities, a limited amount of Key Experts (KE) supporting the coordination of the activities in their respective domains of expertise and a pool of Short-Term Experts (STE) stepping-in the project implementation for specific technical tasks. The Team Leader and the Key Experts represent the core of the implementing team and are required to spend most of their time on the field, while the Shot-Term Experts involvement is generally limited to missions of one or two weeks at the maximum. It is important to notice at this stage that there is no difference made between ‘consultants’ and ‘expert’ in the praxis of the ENP. It could be argued that consultants are hired as experts on the project but the two terms are generally used interchangeably. In this research this amalgam is called into question and a meaningful distinction between the two is proposed7.

The implementing team is mandated to stay in close contact to the beneficiaries and assist them in the achievement of the project objectives to which the financial support is conditioned during the entire duration of the project implementation. In that sense, EU-funded consultants are put at the core of the ENP practice and have a central role in the promotion of EU norms and standards, project after project. This is represented visually in Figure 3. The blue arrows and the central position accorded to consultants illustrate their responsibility over the funds disbursed. The black arrows represent their contractual tie with the EU as a donor and their mandate to assist the beneficiaries in meeting the conditions to which the funds are tied.

It is important to stress at this early stage of the research that the use of the term ‘beneficiaries’ is not neutral, provided that the term ‘partners’ is officially required by EU policy-makers in most of the projects implemented since the last revision of the ENP, evidence of an ontological shift in their conception of the relations with partner countries. The use of the word ‘beneficiaries’ evokes a relation of assistance, while the use of ‘partners’ evokes a relation of cooperation. This has direct repercussions on the role of EU-funded consultants, who are now required to work with the partners rather than work for the beneficiaries. In this research the term ‘beneficiaries’ is preferred to do not blur the lines in the critical analysis of issues related to the co-ownership of and participation in the ENP.

6

For further information see http://ec.europa.eu/competition/calls/.

7

The distinction made is related to one of the main findings of this research and is discussed in Chapter 7 - EU-funded

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This research focuses on EU-funded consultants intended as core agents of Europeanization in the practice of the ENP. The legitimacy of the ENP as main vector of the Europeanization process is analysed through the lens of the consultants and their perceived legitimacy at the eyes of the beneficiaries and other actors involved in the implementation of the ENP projects retained for the purpose of this study8. To do so, an insider perspective9 is adopted and a bottom-up understanding of the issues at stake reached through the collection of the views and perspectives of the consultants in the field. It is important to note that from now on the mention of ‘consultants’ will refer to Team Leaders and Key Experts but not to Short-Term Experts, not relevant for the purpose of this analysis as per the limited scope of their involvement in the ENP.

8_{The projects in question will be presented in Chapter 4 - The Moldovan context and analysed in depth in Chapter 6 -} The role of consultants in the governance of the ENP.

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The methodological challenges and issues related to the adoption of an insider perspective are discussed in Chapter

3 - Research design and methodology.

Figure 3: The role of consultants in the project implementation

Project ì C FUNDS OBJECTIVES ASSISTANCE CONTRACT

= project; = consultants; = Europeanization; EU-funded consultants are placed at the

core of the project implementation and by extension have a central role in the Europeanization process.

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1.3. The ENP discourse – From government to governance

To fully appreciate the importance accorded to consultants in the promotion of EU norms and standards, their role in the ENP is analysed in the light of the broader shift from government to governance, intended as the process through which power and responsibilities are redistributed from state actors upwards, downwards and outwards to supra-national institutions, local administrations and non-state actors [Prince, 2012: 188]. The latter redistributive dimension is particularly relevant for the purpose of this research and increasingly studied in the growing body of literature on transnational policy networks, defined as communities of consultants and other non-political actors co-opted in national bureaucracies to facilitate multilateral cooperation between international institutions and delivery of global public goods [Stone, 2008: 23]. These networks are the product of emerging models of multilevel and polycentric governance characteristic of an increasingly globalised and interconnected world [Stone, 2008: 24]. In such complicated context, consultants are generally assumed to be rational actors seeking optimal policy solutions and their predominant place and role in the policy process framed as an inevitable outcome of the increasingly transnational character of policy-making [Prince, 2012: 191].

The principle underlying these shifting dynamics is the one of depoliticisation, according to which delegating at least parts of the policy-making process to non-political actors is considered a desirable state of affairs [Flinders and Buller, 2005: 5]. The principle is a product of the neoliberal ideological stance assuming that a “society functions better under market logic than any other logic especially a state-directed one” [Olesen, 2013: 290] and is firmly rooted in “a consensus built around the inevitability of neo-liberal capitalism as an economic system, parliamentary democracy as the political ideal, humanitarianism and inclusive cosmopolitanism as a moral foundation” [Swyngedouw, 2010: 193]. In line with this argument, Ross Beveridge (2012) in his article Consultants, Depoliticization and Arena-Shifting in the Policy Process: Privatizing Water in Berlin suggests that:

“If Keynesianism entailed the growth of state bureaucracy and the pre-eminence of the bureaucrat as the manager of government, then neoliberalism can be understood in terms of the spread of the market and the increasing pre-eminence of the consultant as the manager of governance” *Beveridge, 2012: 51+

Building on this quote, EU-funded consultants can be considered as the managers of the ENP, legitimised in such position through the functional use of the depoliticisation principle by EU policy-makers in the rhetoric accompanying the formulation of the policy and reproduced by EU-funded consultants themselves in the practice of their work. This rhetoric is constitutive of what is herewith defined as the ENP discourse10, the essence of which can be grasped in the following syllogism:

EU norms and standards are rooted in the neoliberal consensus and as such are desirable beyond political confrontation. EU-funded consultants are experts of EU good practices rooted in this consensus and as rational actors are the better placed to promote them as optimal policy solutions. EU-funded consultants are therefore necessary in fostering convergence towards EU norms and standards and legitimate as core actors of the ENP.

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In this syllogism the above discussion on the shift from government to governance is reflected and the related emergence of transnational policy networks institutionalised. EU practices are framed as desirable global public goods and the role of consultants in the policy process legitimised as inevitable outcome of their knowledge of EU norms and standards. The main rhetorical tool used to do so – according to the understanding developed in this research – is the depoliticisation principle, functional to sweeten the pill of a demanding normative agenda and by extension to legitimise the consultants responsible to promote it. The discursive strategy developed in the ENP context basically consists in the EU posing itself as an actor “doing good – through visible and active intervention – and being good – assuming that its creation and survival are something of existential value for the world” *Bailes, 2008: 121+. In line with this argument, the depoliticisation discourse can be considered as the legitimising basis on which the EU intended as a normative power relies when presenting itself as a paladin of the international consensus in the attempt to define “its own interests as general interests and using this to formulate general ideas on the order and development of society” *Brand, 2005: 171+.

In this research depoliticisation is considered the underlying paradigm of the ENP and retained as a relevant analytical framework11 to reach an in-depth understanding of the legitimising processes at stake. The articulation of the depoliticisation concept in the discursive strategy of the ENP policy and its embodiment in the governance arrangements of the ENP practice are subsequently analysed to unravel how and to which extent EU-funded consultants are posed as necessary agents of Europeanization.

11_{The analytical framework is detailed in Chapter 2 - Europeanization through depoliticisation.} Project ì C FUNDS OBJECTIVES ASSISTANCE CONTRACT ENP discourse RHETORICAL DEVICES Legitimise Legitimise

Figure 4: The ENP discourse

= legitimisation; the role of consultants in the ENP and by extension the undergoing Europeanization

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1.4. Research questions

The overall aim of this research is to reach an in-depth understanding of how Europeanization is enforced through the ENP in neighbouring countries such as Moldova. The specific aim is to unravel how the depoliticisation concept is used to legitimise the role of private consultants in the ENP and through their intervention foster both the legitimacy and the effectiveness of the policy altogether. The basic assumption linking the overall and specific objectives of the research is that the intervention of EU-funded consultants is the mean through which the EU fosters the legitimacy of its norms and standards and ensures effective Europeanization in politically sensitive contexts such as the Moldovan one.

Research question

To which extent can EU-funded consultants be considered as necessary agents of Europeanization in ENP countries such as Moldova?

Research sub-questions

1. Through which mechanisms of convergence embodied in the work of EU-funded consultants does the EU enforce Europeanization in Moldova?

2. To which extent can the depoliticisation concept be used as a relevant frame to analyse how these mechanisms of convergence are articulated in the governance strategy of the ENP?

3. Which rhetorical devices are used in the ENP discourse to depoliticise and legitimise the role of EU-funded consultants in the governance arrangements of the ENP?

4. Through which depoliticisation modalities are consultants placed at the core of these arrangements? 5. In what the role of consultants in the governance strategy of the ENP essentially consists?

6. What are the potential shortcomings of enforcing Europeanization through depoliticisation of the ENP? 7. How EU-funded consultants address such shortcomings in the practice of their work?

To answer these specific questions an in-depth qualitative analysis is developed in four subsequent stages. First, the relevant academic literature on Europeanization and depoliticisation is reviewed to highlight the mechanisms of convergence towards EU norms and standards entailed in the ENP and to discuss the relevance of using depoliticisation as a frame to analyse the legitimising processes at stake in the ENP policy and practice (Chapter 2 - Europeanization through depoliticisation). Second, the articulation of a depoliticisation strategy in the discursive and governance strategies of the ENP is unravelled through the methodical scrutiny of reference policy documents (Chapter 5 - The depoliticisation strategy in the ENP policy and practice). The concrete result of such analysis is a conceptualisation of depoliticisation more adequate for the purpose of this research, which is then used to reach an in-depth understanding of the governance arrangements of the projects under study and the role accorded to consultants in such arrangements (Chapter 6 - The role of consultants in the governance of the ENP). Lastly, an inductive stance is adopted in the scrutiny of the contributions collected in the field to unravel the consequences of depoliticisation in terms of co-ownership and participation of the beneficiaries. This ultimately lead to a discussion on how the consultants pro-actively address the shortcomings of the ENP policy and practice and to which extent this legitimise them as necessary agents of Europeanization (Chapter 7 - EU-funded consultants and the consequences of depoliticisation).

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The in-depth analysis entails three distinct analytical dimensions – rhetorical, deductive and inductive – reflected in both the research design and the methods retained for the purpose of this study, namely critical discourse analysis, participatory observation and semi-structured in-depth interviews of key informants. The researcher being actively involved as junior consultant in one of the projects under study, the analysis is conducted from an insider perspective, consistent with the choice of retaining the views of the consultants in the field as interpretive lens in this research. The ethical considerations related to “researching from the inside” are discussed in detail together with the methods in Chapter 3 - Research design and methodology, while the research context in which the characters of the story evolve – me included – is described in detail in Chapter 4 - The Moldovan context.

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2. Europeanization through depoliticisation

The title of this chapter reflects the basic relationship between the main concepts retained for the purpose of this research: Europeanization is enforced through depoliticisation of the ENP. In the following pages the relevant academic literature of the two concepts is analysed in the light of the role of EU-funded consultants in the ENP practice. First, the literature on Europeanization in the EU neighbourhood is scrutinised to highlight the mechanisms through which the EU enforces convergence towards EU norms and standards in countries such as Moldova. Second, the literature on depoliticisation is reviewed to attest the relevance of the depoliticisation concept for the study of the ENP. Finally, on the basis of the literature review, the basic function of EU-funded consultants in the ENP context and the analytical framework retained for the study of the ENP policy and practice are delineated.

2.1. Europeanization

Europeanization is a broad concept entangling the various dynamics of regime-transformation through which national political structures, actors and processes converge towards EU norms and standards [Clark and Jones, 2009: 194]. Notwithstanding the multitude of approaches and conceptualisations developed in the extensive academic literature on the subject [see Clark and Jones, 2009: 198-199], three distinct streams of Europeanization research can be identified according to the position of the target state in relation to the process of European integration – member, accession or neighbouring countries [Gawrich, Melnykovska and Schweickert, 2010: 1210]. These distinct research streams reflect substantial differences in the dynamics of convergence closely related to the framework of cooperation in place. In that sense, the main distinguishing feature of neighbouring countries is the lack of membership perspective, resulting from the premises of the ENP and having non-negligible repercussions on the mechanisms underlying the Europeanization process, as I will show further on.

In his article Europeanization beyond Europe, Frank Schimmelfennig (2012) reviews the literature on Europeanization in neighbouring countries and provides an overview of the mechanisms in question (Table 1), clustering them according to the overarching logic of action. The logic of consequences assumes that Europeanization can be driven by the EU itself through sanctions and rewards, while the logic of appropriateness stipulates that Europeanization may be induced by social learning [Schimmelfennig, 2012: 7]. These logics apply to both formal political interactions between governments and processes led by societal actors, the main channels through which EU norms and standards are promoted [Schimmelfennig, 2012: 7].

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INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSNATIONAL

Direct Indirect Direct Indirect

LOGIC OF CONSEQUENCES

Conditionality Externalisation Transnational incentives

Transnational externalisation

Intergovernmental

incentives Competition Connective impact Competition

Compulsory impact Negative externality

Compliance

LOGIC OF APPROPRIATENESS

Socialisation Imitation Transnational

socialisation Societal imitation

Intergovernmental

social learning Lesson-drawing

Transnational social

learning Enabling impact

Constructive impact Enabling impact

Communication Unilateral emulation

[adapted from Schimmelfennig, 2012: 8]

This research being concerned with the dynamics of convergence towards EU norms and standards induced by the EU itself through the ENP, an exclusive focus is put in the analysis on the two fundamental mechanisms promoted through direct intergovernmental action, namely conditionality and socialisation [Schimmelfennig, 2012: 8]. These mechanisms form the backbone of EU actions in its direct neighbourhood since the 1993 European Summit in Copenhagen, when the term Europeanization has been first introduced and defined as a combination of rational institutionalism through policies of conditionality and sociological institutionalism through norm diffusion and social learning [Van Houtum and Boedeltje, 2011: 125].

In the literature, conditionality is often narrowly conceptualised as a reward and punish system [Van Houtum and Boedeltje, 2011: 124], relying on incentivising countries by tying cooperation to specific conditions [Schimmelfennig, 2013: 8] and entailing the right to punish them through partial or total suspension of assistance [Browning and Joenniemi, 2008: 534]. That said in some research conditionality has been conceptualised as a process in order to highlight the malleable and politicised nature of the conditions imposed and the significance of different actors in boosting or limiting their impact on institutional, policy or behavioural change [Sasse, 2008: 296]. This research draws on this more flexible conceptualisation of conditionality to analyse the role of private consultants in “boosting” the process of convergence towards EU norms and standards underlying the ENP.

In order to be effective, conditionality requires strong incentives and consistent conditions [Sasse, 2008: 300]. These two requisites are rather problematic in the case of neighbouring countries to the extent that membership perspective – the strong incentive having determined the success of the Copenhagen Criteria for candidate countries – is conspicuous by its absence in the ENP [Van Houtum and Boedeltje, 2011: 122]. In her article The European Neighbourhood Policy: Conditionality Revisited for the EU’s Eastern Neighbours, Gwendolyn Sasse highlights both the ambiguity of the incentives structure of the ENP and its repercussions on the effectiveness of conditionality:

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“The incentive structure of the ENP was explicitly built around a country’s potential to fully participate in the four freedoms of movement – goods, services, capital and persons. *…+ This approach blurs the distinction between the end point of ENP and EU membership.” *Sasse, 2008: 301]

“The main elements of conditionality – incentive structures, consistency and credibility of the conditions, underlying power asymmetry and adoption costs – are all lower, weaker, vague and in flux within the ENP. Both the EU and the ENP countries, or individual actors within these countries, are aware of this.” *Sasse, 2008: 303]

Despite the structural weakness of the conditionality mechanism in the ENP context, the EU has developed a whole range of programmes, action plans and activities aimed at increasing its influence on neighbouring countries and Europeanize their economic, political and social affairs [Van Houtum and Boedeltje, 2011: 123]. This has been possible by combining conditionality policies with processes of socialisation, concept comprising all the efforts to teach EU policies, ideas and norms and persuade the partners of their appropriateness [Schimmelfennig, 2013: 8]. In that sense, socialisation is less about manipulating the partners through political and financial incentives than it is about convincing them of the legitimacy of the policy solutions proposed through reasoned arguments.

In order to be effective, socialisation requires frequent and intense linkages between the EU and all relevant actors of its neighbouring partners [Gawrich, Melnykovska and Schweickert, 2010: 1230] and is facilitated in a context of high resonance of EU governance with the domestic traditions, norms and practices of the target countries [Schimmelfennig, 2012: 8]. This research builds on these considerations to highlight the role of private consultants in “teaching” EU norms and standards and therefore substantially contribute to the Europeanization process beyond the confines of their technical assignments.

The twofold function of EU-funded consultants

In the above discussion on conditionality and socialisation two distinct although closely interrelated functions of private consultants in the governance of the ENP have been unravelled. On the one hand, consultants are hired to ensure achievement of the project objectives – or better said to ensure that the conditions imposed to disburse the funds are met. In that sense, they can be considered as managers of conditionality. On the other hand, consultants develop close ties with the beneficiaries during the project lifetime and are therefore in the ideal position to persuade them of the appropriateness of the objectives in question. In that sense, they can be considered as agents of socialisation.

These two functions are mutually reinforcing. To receive their respective shares of the allocated funds private consultants are just as conditioned as the beneficiaries to the achievement of project objectives, meaning that both parts have something to gain in acknowledging the appropriateness of the objectives and ensure a smooth implementation of the project activities. In this context, private consultants appear to be in the eyes of beneficiaries as independent complicit actors having the knowledge and the contractual power to ensure actual disbursement of the allocated funds rather than politically interested actors undertaking a normative function on behalf of their employer. This perceptual difference has far-reaching implications in terms of effectiveness of both conditionality policies and socialisation processes and is the product of the depoliticisation modalities embodied in the work of EU-funded consultants, as it shall be demonstrated further on.

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These two functions have been presented as separated but are in fact so closely intermeshed that is not trivial even for consultants themselves to distinguish one from the other – assuming that they are aware of the existence of a distinction between their two functions, which is generally not the case. In that sense, the distinction between logics of action and mechanisms of impact highlighted by Frank Schimmelfennig (referring to Table 1) is rather fuzzy in practice. First, EU-funded consultants and beneficiaries respond to the same stimuli when questioning – or not questioning – the appropriateness of the project objectives, blurring the distinction between intergovernmental incentives and social learning. Second, engaging the beneficiaries in a discussion on the appropriateness of the project objectives is functional to achieve them in a timely manner, meaning that a constructive approach to socialisation can be used as a tool to soften the compulsory impact of conditionality. Third, there can be no compliance without prior communication to the beneficiaries of what is required in practice.

Project ì ASSISTANCE CONTRACT ENP discourse RHETORICAL DEVICES Legitimise Legitimise

Figure 5: The twofold function of EU-funded consultants

C

OBJECTIVES FUNDS

= consultants; = conditionality; = socialisation; EU-funded consultants contribute to

the Europeanization process as managers of conditionality and agents of socialization.

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2.2. Depoliticisation

“In a broad sense, politics is about the mediation of social power and the strategic action related to that mediation, that is, the process through which the social relations of power are constituted, negotiated, reproduced, transformed or otherwise shaped” [quoted in Mishra, 2011: 154]

“It is clear that all development projects are therefore inescapably political, not managerial or administrative in the current technicist sense. For at any point in any developmental sequence what is crucially at stake is how resources are to be used and distributed in new ways and the inevitable disputes arising from calculations by individuals and groups as to who will win and who will lose as a result.” *Leftwich, 1996: 6]

The relevance of using the concept of ‘depoliticisation’ to reach an in-depth understanding of the role of private consultants in the governance of the ENP derives from the importance accorded to the notion of ‘politics’ in the present understanding of governance *Mishra, 2011: 154+. In the above related quotes the intrinsically political nature of supposedly technical development projects is unambiguously unravelled by adopting a broader definition of politics, leading to an understanding of depoliticisation as a deliberate strategy aimed at legitimising given political decisions and related actors. The rhetoric used to legitimise the role of consultants in the ENP discourse evoked earlier shows that the ENP itself makes no exception to this rule.

Building on the same broad definition of politics, depoliticisation can be defined as the deliberated process through which political issues and actors are made less subject to the mediation of social power and the strategic action related to this mediation [Mishra, 2011: 159]. In the case of the governance arrangements under study in this research, a straightforward application of this definition would consider the role of consultants as “depoliticised” to the extent that the mediation of power related to the allocation of resources and formulation of objectives is held upstream by representatives of the EU and Moldova, out of scope of the consultants’ intervention in the project.

In fact, this narrow definition does not do justice to the multiple facets of depoliticisation, from the values reflected in its conceptualisation down to its political repercussions passing from the variety of processes through which it manifests itself. In his article Unravelling Governance Networks in Development Projects: Depoliticization as an Analytical Framework, Neeraj Mishra (2011) reviews the values and processes denoted in most of the literature and clusters them into six common themes:

1. the role and power of a dominant rationality;

2. the shifts in political reasoning and conceptions of legitimacy;

3. the process of placing at one remove the political character of decision-making;

4. the reallocation of functions and responsibilities to independent bodies or panels of experts; 5. the exclusion of politics through the adoption of ‘rational’ practices;

6. the political exhaustion feeding loss of confidence and resignation to fate.

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These themes further attest the relevance of placing depoliticisation at the core of the analysis developed in this research. The shifts in the conception of legitimacy concerning EU norms and standards and the role of EU-funded consultants in promoting them are closely related to the role and power of the EU rationality, currently dominant in Moldova. The exclusion of politics through the adoption of rational practices promoted through the ENP entangles the reallocation of functions in and responsibilities over the national policy process to EU-funded consultants, in the limits of their actual involvement in the field.

Particular attention in the literature has been accorded to the definition of depoliticisation as the “process of placing at one remove the political character of decision-making” *Burnham, 2001: 128+. In their article Depoliticisation, Democracy and Arena-Shifting, Matthew Flinders and Jim Buller (2005) build on this definition and reframe depoliticisation as ‘arena-shifting’, arguing in the following terms:

“The concept of depoliticisation has been constructed on a very narrow interpretation of the ‘political’, which is largely concerned with the traditional institutions of politics. However, in reality the issues on which decisions are taken and their potential impact on the public are made no less ‘political’ by them being taken in a different arena.” [Flinders and Buller, 2005: 19]

For the authors, this reconceptualisation of depoliticisation is functional to unveil the existence and role of numerous power centres which may operate beyond the view of democratic scrutiny [Flinders and Buller, 2005: 19] and to highlight a change in relation to the ‘arena’ or processes through which decisions are either taken or avoided [Mishra, 2011: 159]. The concept of arena-shifting is therefore used to analyse both the processes through which depoliticisation manifests itself and its political repercussions. To the extent that scrutinising the intentions of EU policy-makers is out of scope of this research, only the second analytical function of the arena-shifting concept has been herewith retained.

To analyse the concept of depoliticisation, Flinders and Buller (2005) suggest distinguishing between three distinct elements respectively at the macro, meso and micro-political level. These elements consist in the acceptance of the principle – macro level – that depoliticisation is an appropriate form of government (macro level), the deployment of tactics – meso level – to depoliticise the policy-making process and the concrete policy tools – micro level – used to do so [Flinders and Buller, 2005: 4]. The authors then end up questioning the consequences for democracy of downplaying or diminishing the role and responsibilities of politicians [Flinders and Buller, 2005: 21].

Principle

The decision to adopt depoliticisation as paradigm of government is rooted in the assumption that politicians are self-interested vote maximisers tied into short-term electoral cycles [Flinders and Buller, 2005: 5] and that reducing their room for discretion in the policy-making process is therefore a desirable state of affairs. In the case of Moldova, the reliance on depoliticisation as a guiding principle of the ENP results from the mistrust on national politicians, portrayed as being highly corrupt [European Commission, 2014: 6]. Building on that, depoliticisation can be considered a mean to preserve the credibility of the policy-making process in a context of mistrust in politicians and political institutions [Flinders and Buller, 2005: 5], aspect all the more important considering that the EU as an external actor interfering in the national state of affairs is likely to be looked at with suspicion.

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Three distinct depoliticisation tactics considered to be predominant in development governance [Mishra, 2011: 160] are highlighted in the literature: institutional, rule-based and preference-shaping. These tactics are discussed separately herewith and integrated further on in the analysis, following the same approach used to highlight the two-fold function of EU-funded consultants in the discussion on conditionality and socialisation12.

Institutional depoliticisation, allegedly the most frequently employed tactic, is introduced as follows by Flinders and Buller (2005) in their reference article:

“A formalised principal-agent relationship is established in which the former sets broad policy parameters while the latter enjoys day-to-day managerial and specialist freedom within the broad framework set. Institutional depoliticisation is designed to release the agent (and its sphere of responsibility) to some extent from short-term political considerations.” *Buller and Flinders, 2005: 6+

The principal-agent relationship between the EU Delegation to Moldova as the institution responsible for the overall implementation of the ENP in the country and EU-funded consultants hired to manage on a day-to-day basis specific projects is formalised through a contractual arrangement engaging the latter to respect the parameters set by the former. These parameters are detailed in the project Terms of Reference, reference document on the basis of which the work of consultants is then supervised and evaluated. The institution formally responsible for the supervision is the project Steering Committee, ad-hoc instance composed of representatives of the different stakeholders meeting on a regular basis to discuss political and implementation issues related to the project activities. That being said, when it comes to supervision informal interactions between consultants and their counterparts in the delegation seem to play an equally important role than formal arrangements13_{. In the literature, such a situation of} “government by luncheon” is seen as undermining the benefits of depoliticisation, to the extent that formal arrangements are diverted to veil the influence exerted beyond the scrutiny of the concerned parts [Flinders and Buller, 2005: 7]. The resulting shortcomings in terms of participation and co-ownership of the ENP are discussed further on in this research.

Rule-based depoliticisation involves the adoption of explicit rules minimising the need for political discretion [Flinders and Buller, 2005: 10]. The advantage of such tactic is that once agreed by the parts, the rules prevent specific interest groups from having an influence on the policy-making process. The question of how and by whom the rules are formulated is therefore particularly important: if set under the influence of a given interest group, rules might institutionalise iniquity in the policy-making process and generate a sense of frustration among the parts, meaning that from a depoliticisation perspective rules should be as neutral and universal as possible [Flinders and Buller, 2005: 11]. The case of the ENP is rather problematic in that concern, to the extent that the provisions contained in both reference policy and programme-specific documents are explicitly drawn from the bureaucracy in Brussels, once again in contradiction with the claims of the EU concerning partnership and co-ownership of the ENP.

12

Referring to Section 2.1 - Europeanization.

13

Evidence supporting this statement is presented in Section 6.1 - The governance arrangements of the ENP practice and discussed in Section 7.1 - The deficit of co-ownership and participation in the ENP.

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Finally, preference-shaping depoliticisation relies on ideological and rhetorical claims to place given political decisions beyond the scope of democratic confrontation [Flinders and Buller, 2005: 15], using consensus-building to shape the system of preferences in place. This tactic can be considered as the quintessence of the rhetoric used in the ENP discourse, to the extent that creating consensus on the desirability of EU norms and standards is the precondition to legitimise the ENP and the undergoing process of Europeanization. The significant aspect of this tactic is that it enables EU policy-makers to construct a powerful line of reasoning based on a far-reaching translation of its normative beliefs into the national system of preferences. However, rooting the legitimacy of the ENP on such a line of reasoning may be costly in terms of political capital as EU policy-makers may be repeatedly forced to justify their position [Flinders and Buller, 2005: 15], especially considering the risks of rhetorical entrapment they face when stressing the desirability of EU norms and standards while avoiding the topic of a prospective membership. Tools

Under the label depoliticisation tools are included the concrete elements of the policy and practice used to operationalise the different depoliticisation tactics [Flinders and Buller, 2005: 4]. In the case of the ENP, these approximately consists in the supervision of the Steering Committee for institutional depoliticisation, the formulation of binding Terms of Reference for rule-based depoliticisation and the rhetorical devices used in the ENP discourse for preference-shaping depoliticisation. These tools are the direct elements of depoliticisation shaping the work of EU-funded consultants in the field.

Consequences

In their reference article, Flinders and Buller (2005) highlight four consequences for democracy of depoliticising the policy-making process, namely complexity, arena-shifting, accountability and apathy. These concepts are retained in this research with the explicit aim of unravelling the consequences in terms of participation and co-ownership of the partner country of depoliticisation intended as the underlying paradigm of the ENP.

The issue of complexity is related to the emergence of multi-level and polycentric models of governance entangling a transfer of functions and responsibilities both vertically between institutions, upwards to supra-national bodies, downwards to sub-national entities and horizontally between actors involved in the policy-making process [Flinders and Buller, 2005: 21]. The complex arrangements resulting from such redistribution entail the dilution of responsibilities and accountability, as attested by the formal and informal interactions between EUD and EU-funded consultants evoked earlier and discussed further on. The redistribution of functions and responsibilities within a governance network, besides the issues of complexity it entangles, has repercussions on the balance of power between actors involved, leading the authors to reframe the depoliticisation concept in terms of arena-shifting on the premise that the processes at stake are less about “depoliticisation” than they are about “attempted refocusing” *Flinders and Buller, 2005: 24]. In the case of the ENP, the arena-shifting process can be considered as multi-scalar and should be approached as such. Individual consultants are given margin for discretion in the limits of their involvement in a specific project and have therefore limited power within the governance of the ENP.

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However, consultants intended as integral parts of a transnational policy network14 have a non-negligible influence on the ENP as a whole and by extension on the policy process of countries such as Moldova, attesting the relevance for this research of the arena-shifting concept.

Accountability – or better said its dilution in multi-level governance arrangements – is highlighted by the authors as one of the most obvious consequences of these complex redistribution dynamics. It is a complex and multi-faceted concept feeding into wider notions of legitimacy, trust and efficacy [Flinders and Buller, 2005: 26] and therefore central to our understanding of the role of consultants in the governance of the ENP. The perceptual difference enabling consultants to be seen at the eyes of beneficiaries as independent complicit actors rather than politically interested agents unravelled before is the product of the ambiguous division of responsibilities and the related dilution of accountability between EU and EU-funded consultants. In contrast with the principle of ministerial responsibility characteristic of government – who is accountable for what – in multi-level governance accountability structures are rather fuzzy and multicentric – who is accountable for what, to which extent and to whom – further complicating the picture [Flinders and Buller, 2005: 27].

Last but not least, apathy in the policy-making process is pointed out in the literature as the result of the confusion engendered by the above mentioned complex and interrelated redistributive dynamics within governance networks [Flinders and Buller, 2005: 27]. This issue is all the more important in the case of the ENP, considering the consequences of the wage and knowledge gap between EU-funded consultants and beneficiaries in terms of engagement of the latter in the implementation of the policy.

Using depoliticisation as analytical framework

In line with the argument that adopting a depoliticisation perspective is useful to observe the contested nature and potential shortcomings of governance strategies in international development projects [Mishra, 2011: 154], depoliticisation is used in this research as analytical framework to scrutinise the governance strategy of the ENP policy and practice and the legitimising processes at stake. The relevance of this choice is attested by the previous uses of depoliticisation in development studies [see Mishra, 2011: 163-164] and is particularly evident in the case of consultants, as argued by Ross Beveridge (2012):

“Consultants, as a consequence of their much sought-after knowledge services, are often agents of depoliticisation: both as advocates for and actors within new, extra-formal arenas of decision-making. They are points at which public and private mix.” [Beveridge, 2012: 48]

Besides attesting the relevance of depoliticisation as analytical framework, this enlightening quote justifies the decision to analyse the governance of the ENP through the interpretive lens of EU-funded consultants and the related focus on their role and functions in the implementation of the policy. The analytical framework developed for the purpose of this study is explicitly drawn from the work of Flinders and Buller (2005). Three distinct analytical dimensions – rhetorical, deductive and inductive – are retained to study the different elements of the depoliticisation concept discussed in the literature – principle, modalities (including the tactics and their operationalising tools) and consequences.

14

The question of the ENP transnational policy network and the role of consultants as integral parts of such network is discussed in Section 7.3 – The formal and informal dynamics of the ENP.

Europeanization through depoliticisation in Moldava : the role of EU-funded consultants in the European neighbourhood policy