North-south relations between NGOs in a transnational advocacy network collaboration on human rights in Colombia

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North-South Relations between NGOs in a Transnational Advocacy Network

Collaboration on Human Rights in Colombia

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Master Thesis

June 27th, 2014

Samantha Zohlandt

10469826

Supervisor: Dr. Rosa Sanchez Salgado Second reader: Dr. Julia Bader

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Acknowledgement

Foremost, I would like to thank Rosa Sánchez Salgado, my supervisor, for her assistance and support. Her knowledge and guidance helped me in all stages of research and writing of this thesis. Besides my supervisor, I would like to express gratitude to all the representatives of the NGOs that sacrificed some of their time in order to help me with interviews. Last but not least, I would like to thank my family and friends for supporting and motivating me during the writing of my thesis.

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Abstract

In this era of globalization, transnational activism has become more important in the defense of human rights. Ever more NGOs from developed countries organize themselves in networks in which they can collaborate on human rights with their partners in Southern countries. These north-south coalitions are seen by some scholars as sites in which Northern and Southern actors can cooperate as equal partners. Other scholars state that these type of collaborations are characterized by clear power imbalances. This research looks at a transnational advocacy network in which European NGOs work together with Colombian NGOs in order to address human rights issues in Colombia. The scope of the investigation is to find out if a north-south divide exists between these two groups of NGOs, and if so, why this is the case. Three explanatory factors are considered: resources, institutions, and ideas. The main conclusion drawn from the data is that an effective partnership between Northern and Southern NGOs is possible, but that this partnership inevitably can never be completely equal.

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Abbreviations

AI Amnesty International

CC Corporación Cactus

CCAJAR Corporación Colectivo de Abogados José Alvear Restrepo

CCEEU Coordinación Colombia Europa Estados Unidos

DESCA derechos económicos, sociales, culturales y ambientales

EU European Union

HRW Human Rights Watch

NGO non-governmental organization

NNGO Northern non-governmental organization

OIDHACO the International Office for Human Rights Action on Colombia

PBI Peace Brigades International

PCDHDD la Plataforma Colombiana de Derechos Humanos, Democracia y Desarrollo

SNGO Southern non-governmental organization

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The end of the Second World War marked a change in attitude towards human rights. Where previously human rights were thought of as a national concern protected by sovereign rights, civil society placed human rights on the international agenda as from 1945. This growing attention to international human rights led to the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on 10 December 1948 by the United Nations General Assembly (Baylis et al., 2011: 496).

Not only states play an important role in the international politics of human rights. Non-state actors play an important part in the defense of human rights as well. Together with individuals, NGOs (non-governmental organizations) make up the ‘civil society’ that can operate on national as well as transnational level and that has started to play a very important role in international relations since the beginning of the era of globalization. Transnational human rights NGOs have played and still play an important part in the spreading of knowledge of human rights and in putting human rights issues on the international agenda (Baylis et al., 2011: 503-504). These non-state actors also interact with each other and collaborate to achieve certain goals. These interactions can be structured in networks. When actors from different countries collaborate together on the same issue, we talk about transnational advocacy networks (Keck and Sikkink, 1999: 89). Human rights advocacy networks arose in the 1970s and 1980s, as international human rights organizations started to develop strong linkages with domestic organizations that focus on human rights violations in their own countries (Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 89). In the past, human rights advocacy networks have been effective in bringing change about in human rights practices in various countries. “Most governments’ human rights policies have emerged as a response to pressure from organizations in the human rights network, and have depended fundamentally on network information” (Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 102).

Colombia is a country in which various transnational advocacy networks concerned with human rights are present. The country has had to deal with an internal conflict between the Colombian government, paramilitary groups, drug mafias, and left-wing guerrillas such as the FARC or the ELN, all competing for more influence in the country since 1964. All the parties in this conflict have been accused by human rights organizations for various human rights violations (Amnesty USA). Most of the approximately 220.000 victims that have fallen during the conflict years have been civilians (AI, 2014). Furthermore, more than 4 million

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Colombians have been internally displaced in this period and more than an additional 100.000 persons are displaced every year. Even though the Colombian government has openly condemned human rights abuses by the various groups involved in the conflict, accountability for various violations remains a problem and impunity remains the norm. In 2012 the government has implemented a law aimed at the restitution of abandoned and stolen land of the internally displaced persons, but this process is only advancing at a slow pace, so a lot of work remains to be done for human rights organizations, according to the 2013 World Report by Human Rights Watch (HRW, 2013).

A problem closely related to the armed conflict that has aggravated the conflict in recent years, is that of human rights violations due to the extractives industry in Colombia. Since 2002, when the government decided mining was to be one of the driving forces behind Colombian economic development, large numbers of mining rights have been awarded to foreign companies. Nowadays, over 40% of the countries national territory has been granted or solicited by these companies (PBI, 2011: 4). Often, these territories coincide with natural reserves or living areas of indigenous communities and afro-descendent communities. Their rights to these lands are thus violated. And besides the foreign companies, also armed groups try to gain influence in the mining zones, when they try to expand their income obtained from illicit activities (PBI, 2011: 5). For the often poor people living in these zones, this means they are exposed to “massacres, economic blockades, forced displacements, threats, and assassinations carried out by paramilitary and guerrilla groups” (PBI, 2011: 22).

The Colombian government thus far has not been able to address the problems related to the armed conflict effectively. Negotiations between the government and the FARC might have had some results, but this is just one of many armed actors present in the country. Furthermore, since civil society has been excluded from peace talks and accords between the government and the armed actors, the peace process is not sustainable. This is so, “because multiple and conflicting understandings have not been integrated into peacebuilding and development, the processes are not linked to the grassroots, and public policies do not reflect a genuine consensus” (Paladini, 2009: 335-336). Since in the mining sector are great interests for the Colombian government represented as well, it is not likely the government alone will address problems related to human rights violations effectively. An improvement of the human rights situation in Colombia will thus depend in great part on civil society in both Colombia and elsewhere in the world. Collaboration between domestic and international NGOs, if effective, might be able to put human rights issues on the international agenda so

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that international pressures on the domestic government to change human rights practices can be carried out, following the logics of the so-called “boomerang effect” (Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 36).

Even though in theory cooperation between ‘Northern’ and ‘Southern’ NGOs could be mutually beneficial, and they could do work that is in theory complementary, a big concern is that these two groups of NGOs do not play an equal part within the transnational advocacy networks. In my thesis I would like to investigate if asymmetries exist between Northern and Southern NGOs. In order to find an answer to my research question, I will look at both actors from Western countries and Colombian actors that collaborate within a transnational human rights network. The research question I will try to answer goes as follows: Is there a north-south divide within transnational advocacy networks operating in Colombia, and if so, why? To this purpose, I am asking four sub-question in my research:

I. To which extent does resource dependency create power imbalances in the network?

II. Do formal and informal rules that are present within the network favor one group of NGOs over the other?

III. Do ideas of both Northern and Southern NGOs have an equal representation within the TAN?

With my research, I hope to contribute to the already existing literature on transnational advocacy networks in giving suggestions to fill in some of the gaps that exist here. According to Henry et al., “one of the most fundamental limitations in much of the networks literature is that, although there is some understanding of the power relationships between networks and their environment, there is little theorization of power relationships within and between networks” (Henry et al., 2004: 849). The literature that does exist regarding this topic, mainly focuses on the role of resources in north-south divides. My contribution will exist in taking resources, institutions, and ideas into account when looking if power imbalances between Northern and Southern NGOs exist within a transnational advocacy network (TAN).

Regarding the societal relevance of this research, I hope to provide new insights on the collaboration between Northern and Southern NGOs that might help improve collaboration between the two parties. Insights in possible power imbalances within the network can serve as recommendations for NNGOs and SNGOs so that a potential north-south divide can be diminished.

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In the following chapter, I will give an overview of the relevant literature on this topic after which I will present the theoretical framework that will guide my research. To conclude this chapter, I will present the research design as I intend to carry this out in my research. In the chapters two, three, and four, the data I have collected will be presented according to the four sub-questions. The last chapter will present my conclusions, concerns about generalizations, and further recommendations.

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1. Human Rights Network

This first chapter will introduce the lay-out of my research. In the literature review, I will give a brief review on what has been written so far on the topic of north-south divides in transnational advocacy networks. I will show where the literature has left gaps in the theorizing of north-south collaboration between human rights NGOs, thus presenting the relevance of my research. In the following theoretical framework, I will present the theories that give rise to the sub-questions I will try to answer. These sub-questions will guide my research. In the third and final part of the first chapter, I will present and justify my research design.

1.1 Literature review

In this section I will give an account of the relevant literature published on the role of networks in international relations. As already indicated in the introduction, civil society has started to play a bigger role in policy making in the international realm. As Kaldor states: “the growing interconnectedness of states, the emergence of a system of global governance, and the explosion of the movements, groups, networks and organizations that engage in global or transnational public debate, have called into question the primacy of states” (Kaldor, 2003: 583). Even though the term ‘civil society’ has already been used for many centuries, ‘global civil society’ has only come into use since the aftermath of the Cold War (Kaldor, 2003: 583-584). This means in practice that a system of global governance has emerged in which rules are no longer determined just by states, but which also need a degree of public support through global civil society (Kaldor, 2003: 590). A uniform definition of this concept does not exist in the literature on global civil society. Wapner gives a broad definition that expresses the core of this concept: “Global civil society, in short, is the domain that exists above the individual and below the state but also across state boundaries, where people voluntarily organize themselves to pursue various aims” (Wapner, 1997: 66). Although even this broad description of civil society is already a source of disagreement, since Anheier et al. do include individuals in the realm of global civil society along with INGOs, grass-roots groups, loose coalitions, and networks (Anheier et al., 2001: 4). Wapner describes global civil society as essentially “a set of relational networks” that also have a political dimension. The organizations within global civil society try to influence the actions and beliefs regarding a

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specific issue area of people over the world (Wapner, 1997: 66). Price seems to agree with Wapner on this point, stating that global civil society refers to “self-organized advocacy groups that undertake voluntary collective action across state borders in pursuit of what they deem the wider public interest” (Price, 2003: 580). In my research, I will use the definition Price gives of transnational civil society, since he clearly excludes private companies from the definition, something Wapner does not. Price defines the concept as “privately organized citizens as distinguished from government or profit-seeking actors” (Price, 2003: 580).

The increase in NGOs in the international relations field is explained by Fowler as a result of a changing doctrine in the 1980s that put ever more emphasis on the privatization of development. This led to a large increase of government aid to NGOs, thus causing them to increase in number rapidly all over the world. Because these NGOs rose in the South as well as the North, a new division of labor had to be considered. This led to these two groups of NGOs forming ‘partnerships’ (Fowler, 1991: 5). The concept of partnership is not defined in the same way by scholars that have published on this topic. Lister states that the following definition represents the core essence of ‘partnerships’ on which most scholars within social policy agree: “a working relationship that is characterized by a shared sense of purpose, mutual respect and the willingness to negotiate” (Lister, 2000: 228).

According to Henry et al., participation of non-state actors in transnational networks appears to be increasing (Henry et al., 2004: 839). These authors see the forming of networks as a response to globalization, since the globalization of capital and better possibilities for information exchange caused by technological advances facilitates transnational cooperation. “In comparison to other relationships between organizations they have the potential to provide a more flexible, flat and non-hierarchical means of exchange and interaction which promises to be more innovative, responsive and dynamic, while overcoming spatial separation and providing scale economies” (Henry et al., 2004: 839). Keck and Sikkink also describe world politics at the end of the twentieth century as a domain where many non-state actors interact with each other and with states and international organizations. They introduce the term ‘transnational advocacy network’. This is a network that “[…] includes those actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services” (Keck and Sikkink, 1999: 89). According to Keck and Sikkink, the organization of networks is characterized by “voluntary, reciprocal and horizontal patterns of communication and exchange” (Keck and Sikkink, 1999: 91). In both articles is thus expressed how networks can potentially benefit all partners within a

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transnational civil society network. However, these last authors also recognize that power relations between Northern and Southern actors are often reflected within the networks (Keck and Sikkink, 1999: 93). And also Kaldor states that, even though the platform of global civil society offers possibilities for individuals to participate in global or transnational debate on certain issues, “it is also uneven and Northern-dominated” (Kaldor, 2003: 591).

Bandy and Smith contribute to the literature on north-south networks by looking at transnational movement networks. A transnational movement network is “a collaboration of movement organizations in at least two countries that exchange information and experiences, provide mutual support, have at least a partially organized social base, and engage in joint strategic campaigns” (Bandy and Smith, 2005: 231). These authors also state that transnational civil society is often characterized by internal conflicts and external limitations (Bandy and Smith, 2005: 231). Four possible conflicts between parties within a network are identified within this article (Bandy and Smith, 2005: 237-240):

- resource conflicts, resource dependencies - organizational conflicts

- identity conflicts

- conflicts over goals and strategies

The first conflict occurs when one NGO within a collaboration has more resources than the other organization and can, therefore, exert more power (Bandy and Smith, 2005: 237). The second conflict describes the situation where NGOs do not agree with each other about the organizational structure that determines the degree of democracy and autonomy within the network (Bandy and Smith, 2005: 238). The third conflict takes place when differences in identity within a coalition is reason for tension and division. When specifically looking at a coalition between Northern and Southern partners, conflicts might arise when Northern organizations “assume paternal or imperial roles” in the collaboration while Southern partners “articulate nationalism or regionalisms” (Bandy and Smith, 2005: 238-239). The last conflict looks at problems that arise when organizations disagree about what objectives to strive for and what tactics to use to reach those goals (Bandy and Smith, 2005: 239-240).

As Himmel does in her thesis, these four possible conflicts that can arise within a network, give rise to the three factors (Himmel, 2013: 6) that I have used as a basis for my three sub-questions, namely resources, institutions, and ideas (Himmel, 2013: 6). I will further explain this in the next theoretical section. I am aware the framework of my research is very much

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inspired on the thesis written by Himmel. My contribution, however, to her work will be that I will apply this framework to a different research question and a different case study.

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1.2 Theoretical framework

The four sources of possible conflicts within an NGO network mentioned in the previous section, can be translated into these three possible sources of a north-south divide: resources, institutions, and ideas. The resource conflict as explained by Bandy and Smith is translated into the role resources play in a potential north-south divide. The organizational conflict will help identify the role institutions play in evaluating relations between Northern and Southern partners within a TAN. Identity conflicts and conflicts over goals and strategies are translated into the role ideas play in establishing a possible north-south divide. The latter two conflicts are both seen as elements of the role ideas play within a network, since I expect that the identity of a certain actor will also determine in great part what goals and strategies this actor wishes to fulfill. In the next section, the theoretical frame of each factor is discussed separately, after which a section follows that presents the theory that links these factors together.

The role of resources

Resources, or the unequal access to them, can lead to power disparities within transnational advocacy networks. There are many types of resources and in the literature on this topic authors mean different things when referring to resources. Bandy and Smith indicate “financial, human, organizational, political, informational, or cultural” as possible forms resources can take (Bandy and Smith, 2005: 235). Henry et al. appear to refer primarily to “material resources, such as funding from external bodies” (Henry et al., 2004: 847). Keck and Sikkink mention information and membership as possible resources (Keck and Sikkink, 1999: 91). Sorj mainly describes human and material resources in his text as cause of inequality between Northern and Southern NGOs (Sorj, 2005: 13). In my research, I will look principally at material resources, and information and membership as proposed by Keck and Sikkink. I expect one party’s access to material resources to also say something about its human and technical resources. In the literature there appears to be a consensus that resource inequality between Northern and Southern actors within TANs exist. However, the degree to which this inequality leads to power asymmetries is not something authors agree upon.

In networks in which Northern and Southern actors collaborate, Northern partners quite evidently have better access to resources. Most research about relations between Northern and

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Southern NGOs has been done with regard to resource dependency. Resource Dependence Theory states that: “[…] a given organization will respond to and become dependent on those organizations or entities in its environment that control resources which are both critical to its operations and over which it has limited control”(Johnson, 1995: 1). This type of dependence makes power exercise over the receiving party possible, thus creating power asymmetries (Johnson, 1995: 1).

Emerson explains the relationship between power and dependency as following: “the power of A over B is equal to, and based upon, the dependence of B over A” (Emerson, 1962: 33). Dependency is explained by Emerson as the desire of one party to achieve a goal that is facilitated by actions of the other party. The power of one party over the other party exists in the fact that the former can either facilitate or hinder the achievement of certain goals of the latter, thus making one party dependent on the other for certain actions (Emerson, 1962: 32). Various authors see resources as the basis for power-dependence relations within organizations. In this context, resources can be any factor necessary to accomplish a certain goal. With resources are often meant financial resources, since the possessing of these might also facilitate the access to other resources. Since organizations need resources in order to survive and pursue the goals they wish to accomplish, it is crucial to obtain enough. It is herefore that organizations depend on resource suppliers (Provan et al., 1980: 202). In exchange for resources, the supplying party can demand certain actions from the receiving party or influence this party to make certain decisions. As explained before, power is the ability of party A to make party B do something party B would normally not do. In this sense, resource dependency can lead to a power imbalance in which the resource-dependent organization has to make certain concessions in its behaviour that it might otherwise not make, in order to obtain the necessary resources from the organization that has access to them.

The extent to which resources can lead to dependency of one party on another, and thus the degree to which a party can exert influence over the other party, can variate substantially taking into consideration various factors. It is necessary to consider “[...] the importance of the resource to the focal organization, the existence of and control over alternative sources, the use of various forms of compulsion, and the ability to change goals to do without some resources” (Provan et al., 1980: 202). Thus in the first place it is important to assess in how far a certain resource is necessary for an organization in order to achieve their goals, since it will be harder for an organization to exert power over another party when the that party is to a

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lesser extent dependent on the resource. Secondly, when an organization can obtain resources via different canals, it is harder for the extending party to exert power. When the receiving organization does not agree with the conditions posed by the giving organization in exchange for resources, it can direct itself to a different resource-extending party that demands more favourable conditions. Thirdly, the effective power an organization has over another depends on the ways in which the resource-possessing organization coerces the receiving party to undertake the actions the first party wants to get done. Finally, the degree of power over an organization depends also on the possibility of that organization to change its goals to pursue for which it has no need of resources, and therefore it is not dependent on another, resource-providing, organization.

Besides power imbalances due to resource dependency, it is necessary to take interdepence between organisations into account. By interdependence the actors’ mutual dependence on each other is meant (Casciaro and Piskorski, 2004: 6). In this situation, both parties are dependent on one another for resources that they can both only obtain from less desirable alternative partners. A higher degree of interdependence, therefore, provides both parties with more incentives to engage in exchange and to establish long-term contracts or permanent inter-organizational arrangements (Casciaro and Piskorski, 2004: 9-10). Because conflicts over resources due to the exercise of power of one party over another is costly to both parties in a relationship of interdependence, a high degree of interdependence gives organizations more reason to collaborate on an equal level.

In reality, relations between organizations are rarely relations in which either power imbalance or interdependence is present between the two parties (Casciaro and Piskorski, 2004: 10). Power imbalance and interdependence can coexist. In this scenario, one party has more power over the other party, because the second party is more dependent on the first party than vice versa, but both parties require certain actions from each other in order to achieve their goals that they can only obtain from less favorable partners (Casciaro and Piskorski, 2004: 10).

As Sorj explains, all NGOs are dependent on donors and both Northern and Southern NGOs receive large part of their funding from Northern donors. However, for Northern NGOs this means that their agendas are at least the expression of their own societies, while this is not the case for Southern NGOs. “In so being, the world of NGOs is not a network of equals but is

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based on a hierarchical power structure” (Sorj, 2005: 26). In order to tackle the issue to what degree resources are a source of power imbalance within the network, I will ask the following sub-question: To which extent does resource dependency create power imbalances in the

network? I expect resource inequality between Northern and Southern actors to lead to a

certain degree of power asymmetry, but in how far this might be the case, further research in my thesis will have to show.

The role of institutions

Besides resources, power relations within networks can also be shaped by the institutional design of the network: the formal and informal rules that are present within the organization (Elbers and Schulpen, 2013: 52). North defines institutions as “the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction” (North, 1991: 97). Pande and Udry express agreement with the explanation by North, except with the part stating that institutions are humanly devised. “We adopt his definition of institutions as sets of rules, procedures or norms that constrain behavior but not the notion of agency embodied in this definition” (Pande and Udry, 2005: 2). These authors state that institutions are not necessarily designed, and even if they are, their outcomes might be different than how they were originally intended. Therefore, it is important to concentrate not just on the formal, or de jure, institutions, but also on the informal, or de facto, ones. (Pande and Udry, 2005: 2) (Casson et al., 2010: 137). The distinction between formal and informal institution I will define as follows, using the definition given by Helmke and Levitsky:

“we define informal institutions as socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels. By contrast, formal institutions are rules and procedures that are created, communicated, and enforced through channels widely accepted as official” (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004: 727).

As Helmke and Levitsky suggest, “many rules of the game that structure political life are

informal – created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels”

(Helmke and Levitsky, 2004: 725). Much of the current literature focuses on formal institutions to explain actors’ incentives and expectations. However, the exclusive focus on formal institutions potentially misses a big part of the explanation of political actors’ behavior

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and, therefore, political phenomena (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004: 725-726). Thus, in order to get a full understanding of power relations within the investigated network, both formal and informal institutions have been taken into consideration.

Mawdsley et al. suggest that collaborations between NGOs in the North and South are dominated nowadays by an overreliance on formal institutions such as documentation and monitoring. In contrast with the informal relation that existed between NNGOs and SNGOs before this period, the huge increase in funding in the 1980s and 1990s has contributed to the notion that collaboration with Southern partners should be organized more efficiently (Mawdsley et al., 2005: 77-78). “Although many Southern NGOs are supportive of the goal of improving effectiveness and accountability, they are critical of the manner in which these objectives are being pursued” (Mawdsley et al., 2005: 78). Because of a decrease in personal contact with the SNGOs, the voice of these Southern organizations has become less heard by their partners and Northern funding organizations have less understanding of the situation in the countries they are trying to help. Visits to partners in developing countries and informal contact with the SNGOs would contribute to making NNGOs understand their Southern partners better and get a better idea of the issues they are dealing with. “This would, ideally, help to improve dialogue and enable Southern partners to have more of a voice in setting the agenda” (Mawdsley et al., 2005: 79).

Koppenjan and Klijn explain that the institutional design of organizations on the one hand improves cooperation between two parties within a network, because it provides stability and forms a social infrastructure. On the other hand, institutional designs are difficult to adapt, because they inherit the characteristics of previous interactions and power relations. “Institutions are thus a two-edged sword: they enable interactions, provide stability and certainty and form the basis on which actors’ trust may be founded. At the same time they serve to ‘codify’ previous (unequal) power relations, of common opinions and permitted discussions and may thus obstruct or hamper reforms” (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2006: 143-144).

Rules within the institutional framework that structure the cooperation within the network show if one party has a bigger vote in the decision-making process than another party. “Rules are inseparably related to the prevailing power relations within institutional arrangements” (Elbers and Schulpen, 2013: 53). “As rules are usually set by the actor with control over critical resources, they tend to fix the hierarchical authority structure in the relationship” (Elbers and Schulpen, 2013: 53). I will discuss this statement further in the last section of the

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theoretical framework. Rules can thus also indicate certain power asymmetries that might be present within a transnational advocacy network. Therefore, I will also look at the relations between NGOs from an institutional perspective.

In my thesis I will look in the first place to the formal rules that shape the decision-making process within networks. This should give a clear view of which party within the network has a bigger say in the decision-making process. In the second place, I will investigate whether possible informal institutions exist that promote or restrict participation of certain actors. The sub-question I will try to answer in my thesis related to institutions goes as following: Do

formal and informal rules that are present within the network favor one group of NGOs over the other? I expect to find that the institutional design of networks favors Northern actors,

since rules often reflect previous power relations and these rules cannot easily be changed.

The role of ideas

Ideas are important in the concept of transnational advocacy networks. They can be defined as social constructions of reality (Baylis et al., 2011: 155). According to some scholars, transnational advocacy networks can be seen as enactors of dominant Western norms while Keck and Sikkink disagree and describe them as “ sites of cultural and political negotiation” (Keck and Sikkink, 1999: 99-100). Keck and Sikkink put emphasis on shared values within a transnational advocacy network. They declare that the different parties within a network are united by values they share. Henry et al. question whether this is the case. These authors do not see values as something that unites different actors within a network, but precisely as a cause for division within the network. They state that: “analysis of the role of values within networks is closely related to questions of power relationships”. In order to find out in how far consensus exists within networks about the principal values, it is necessary to look at opposing views that are excluded from the frame of public discussion (Henry et al., 2004: 851).

Townsend and Townsend show that through ever cheaper and faster communication that increased contact between NGOs worldwide, a transnational community of NGOs working in developing countries has arisen. NGOs, both Northern and Southern ones, in this community are increasingly adopting the same ideas and discourses (Townsend and Townsend, 2004: 271). It is described as “a community expressing shared values, language and practices which

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differ from those of local everyday life” (Townsend, 1999: 613). For Tvedt, this community appears to be the expression of a north-south divide. “This is a donor-created and donor-led system, “a transmission belt of a powerful language and of Western concepts of development”, carrying resources and authority from the core to the periphery, and information and legitimization from periphery to core (Tvedt as cited in Townsend and Townsend, 2004: 273). Townsend et al. describe this transnational community as a new expression of imperialism in which Northern countries increasingly tell Southern partners what to do and impose upon them Northern standards, where before ideas where exchanged amongst Northern and Southern partners (Townsend et al., 2002: 830-831). In this way, power imbalance expresses itself between Northern and Southern organizations as ideas that are imposed on Southern organizations by their Northern partners. In the case NNGOs are the providers of funds to their Southern partners, they can demand their partners to incorporate the ideas of the Northern organization in their mission and vision and strategies. If SNGOs want to receive funds, they might have to comply with this condition.

However, it is to be doubted how sustainable a collaboration as described here above is. Within a true north-south partnership, some degree of unity is necessary in order to make the partnership efficient. A shared purpose of action, for example, is necessary in making the partnership efficient. However, diversity is also important, since this promotes members’ inclusivity and autonomy (Bandy and Smith, 2004: 244). “Both unity and difference must be satisfied if coalitions are to sustain themselves, even if they balance these needs in different ways” (Bandy and Smith, 2004: 245). Even if a north-south divide exists regarding resources or institutions, for ideas this does not have to be the case. Democracy in partnerships can be achieved “as they [brokers] openly affirm and respect members’ needs for autonomy while promoting inclusive participation toward general common goals” (Bandy as cited in Bandy and Smith, 2004: 244-245). This view proposes that a shared purpose by the NGOs within a collaboration is necessary is the coalition is to be efficient. This might take the form of a shared framework that structures objectives and strategies within a network. However, a degree of diversity might also be good for the partnership, by possibly making the work of NNGOs and SNGOs more complementary.

In order to investigate the role ideas play in the establishment of a possible north-south divide, I will compare ideas of Northern and Southern actors within the TAN to see if certain ideas are excluded by certain actors. Ideas in my research will take the form of goals and strategies both Northern and Southern actors wish to accomplish. The sub-question formulated to guide

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this part of the research is the following: Do ideas of both Northern and Southern NGOs have

an equal representation within the TAN? I expect that Northern ideas will dominate the

debate within the network because if my expectations about the role of resources and institutions prove to be correct, Northern actors will be in a position of power within networks that enables them to dominate the principal ideas in the TAN as well.

Relation between resources, institutions, and ideas

The authors that published on this topic have not reached consensus on how these three factors are related to each other. Resource dependence is often seen as the decisive factor in power relations in north-south collaborations, since the actor that possess the critical resources can impose institutions and ideas on the other actors.

Elbers and Schulpen take institutions as the factor that determines relations of power within a collaboration. They state that:

rules determine actors’ rights and obligations, their participation in the decision-making and the distribution of resources. Once the rules have been set, they continue to shape the future choices of actors long after they have been established (Elbers and Schulpen, 2013: 52).

Elbers and Schulpen thus argue that institutions can influence resources and ideas within the network. According to these authors, institutions are very inflexible and they do not change easily. That is why they keep continuing to influence the other factors in the NGO cooperation.

Keck and Sikkink see ideas as the dominant factor in the network. These authors state that shared values bind the network together (Keck and Sikkink, 1999: 89). Actors are bound together not by the resources that one actor has and the other one needs, nor by institutions that indicate the rules in the network. These values create a common discourse that influences the other factors.

In the final concluding chapter I will deduce from the presented data how resources, institutions, and ideas are interconnected within the human rights network I selected as the case for this research.

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1.3 Methodology

In order to investigate whether a north-south division exists between NGOs, I will take the case study as my research design. A case study is the detailed and intensive investigation of a single case (Bryman, 2012: 66). The case study method has strengths and weaknesses. The main advantage of case study research is that it “[…] allows investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events […]” (Yin, 2009: 4). An important weakness is the lack of representativeness of a single case study design. Conclusions drawn about one unit cannot easily say something about other cases that have not been investigated (Gerring, 2004: 348).

In my thesis, I will look closely at NGOs operating on human rights issues in Colombia. The unit of analysis in my thesis will, therefore, be NGOs in developed countries as well as NGOs in Colombia. My case study will be a least likely case study. In my thesis I will be looking at the relation between NGOs from Northern countries with those from Southern countries. Within the group of Southern countries, however, mayor differences can be indicated. Colombia is a country within this category that comes relatively close to the developed countries, since it is a nation that is growing rapidly in economic sense. Therefore, I expect that if a north-south divide exists between international NGOs and Colombian NGOs, it is probable that a north-south divide also exists between international NGOs and NGOs from countries that are less developed.

Findings about the specific Colombian case might therefore give useful insights that can be considered in other cases as well. Still, it is important to observe that findings based on the situation of a single case cannot be generalized across different cases. I will take into account that findings about this specific case might be influenced by country-specific characteristics. I will discuss the possible influence of these characteristics in the conclusion.

To investigate this specific case, I will use a qualitative research strategy. This strategy, rather than putting emphasis on the collection and analysis of less data on many cases, emphasizes a deeper understanding of more data on less cases (Bryman, 2012: 380). The research method I will apply in my thesis will be qualitative interviewing, or semi-structured interviewing. To find an answer to my sub questions, I will conduct interviews with various representatives of international NGOs that are located in the Netherlands as well as with representatives of

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Colombian NGOs. This method makes use of an interview guide, but the interviewer can depart from this guide in order to get a deeper understanding of a certain topic or a better view of the interviewee’s perspective. This strategy of interviewing is flexible, meaning that the order of the questions as they appear in the interview guide is not fixed and questions that do not appear on the guide can be asked when a certain topic in the interview requires more elaboration. This flexibility gives room to the interviewee to determine what is important in the investigated phenomenon (Bryman, 2012: 471). The main disadvantage of this method is that reliability and validity of measurement are less than they will be in quantitative interviewing, since the relatively unstructured nature of this method and the emphasis on people’s views and opinions makes it hard to draw conclusions that make generalization possible or make replication of the research easy. Semi-structured interviewing helps the researcher “keep more of an open mind about the contours of what her or she needs to know about, so that concepts and theories can emerge out of the data” (Bryman, 2012: 12). In my thesis I will complement the data collection process of qualitative interviewing with content analysis of websites of the NGOs.

Case: the network

For my case study I decided to look at networks of human rights NGOs that are active in Colombia. My decision was based on multiple justifications. Before starting my master´s degree in International Relations, I graduated in Latin American Studies. The knowledge acquired during these studies provided me with sufficient background information about the region, amongst others about the current conflict in Colombia. I chose OIDHACO as organization of European NGOs to analyze in this thesis out of practical considerations. This organization is located in Brussels, therefore making it possible for me to go there and conduct interviews with a representative from this organization. Furthermore, this organization works closely together with four Colombian platforms, of which I could interview to delegates that visited the OIDHACO office in Brussels to attend the General Assembly.

In this investigation I have solely analyzed data about NGOs and how they work together within the network. However, organizations in the network collaborate as well with intergovernmental organizations such as the UN, or parts of some governments such as the Colombian government or European Union. It is important to note that these organizations form part of the TAN as well (Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 80).

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The network studied in my thesis is actually a network of hundreds of NGOs all working on the improvement of human rights in Colombia. 30 NGOs in Europe, some working solely on Colombian, others working in many countries in the global South, together make up the non-governmental network OIDHACO. This stands for the International Office on Human Rights – Action Colombia and this organization works on improving human rights in Colombia through “political incidence before EU institutions, its Member States, Switzerland, Norway and the United Nations”1. This organization has four associated platforms in Colombia, that together form an even bigger platform called Techo Común. These platforms can be seen as a type of national NGOs in which each multiple dozen if not over a hundred more local NGOs are represented. Working with OIDHACO, these platforms try to increase political incidence in the European Union2.

The first organization I contacted for an interview, was OIDHACO. This organization brought me into contact with two of the four associated platforms in Colombia, namely CCEEU and PCDHDD, that I could speak to as well. The representatives could also give me information about two smaller NGOs forming part of the platforms, MINGA and CCAJAR, because they were also executive directors of those NGOs. I contacted various NGOs that are members of OIDHACO, and Cordaid and ABColombia were the organizations that were able to help me with interviews. Cordaid is an organization that works on the development of various developing countries. ABColombia is the joint project of five British NGOs that work on different countries, but that organize themselves in ABColombia to work specifically on the human rights in this country. I was not able to arrange an interview with one of the smaller and more local Colombian NGOs forming part of the network when I tried to contact these organizations by myself. In the end, through mediation of PCDHDD, I was given the opportunity to speak with CC, a very small Colombian NGO operating on a very local basis.

In this way, I have tried to gather information about a fraction of this very large human rights network. The gathered information gives me a general idea of how north-south relations are present in this network, although it is important to keep in mind that this information could not possibly capture all the nuances on north-south relations that exist amongst the different NGOs working in this network. However, since I have spoken to NGOs that operate on the international level, as well as NGOs that work on the national or local Colombian level, it is possible to at least give insights about all types of organizations within this network.

1

Website OIDHACO (http://www.oidhaco.org/?cat=1018&lang=en, accessed May-June 2014).

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Data collection

The strategy of my data collection process was semi-structured interviewing supplemented by content analysis of the websites of the investigated NGOs. With the people I was able to speak to, I conducted interviews that where between 30 minutes and one hour in length. I tried to do as much face-to-face interviews as possible, but two interviews I had to conduct via Skype. I made use of an interview guide3, thus making sure that certain questions were posed to all the respondents4. When interviewees would give me certain answers to questions that seemed interesting or relevant to my research, I would ask follow-up questions to get a better understanding of their personal view and opinion. When answers given to me were unclear, I would ask for further explanation or examples. I recorded all interviews and transcribed them later to make the analysis of the acquired data easier. Transcribing the interviews made the data analysis much easier for me. This way of decoding interviews is a very time-consuming process, and the fact that I spend hours typing out each interview, made sure that at the end of the process I was very familiar with the material presented to me.

I used content analysis of the websites of the NGOs especially in the chapter about ideas. The websites of especially the Colombian NGOs were not always up-to-date and most of those websites did not provide (recent) data on resources or institutions. The websites did, however, give a good view of what the mission and vision of the various organizations was, as well as the different issues and projects they concerned themselves with in relation to human rights in Colombia. Content analysis of these topics on the websites made it easier to compare the different NGOs with each other regarding their ideas, than is the case with semi-structured interviews. Interviewees in qualitative interviewing can interpret questions differently and thus provide answers from completely different perspectives.

The following three chapters will present the data obtained in the interviews and on the websites of the organizations according to the strategy described here above. The aim of these chapters is to give answers to the three sub-questions.

3

Examples of used interview guides can be found in the appendix.

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2. Resources

In this chapter I will examine the role of resources in the existence of a possible north-south divide between international NGOs and local NGOs. In the first place, I will look at the origin of resources of NGOs in the network, both NGOs in Colombia and NGOs in Northern countries. Then I will look at the influence of non-financial resources and in the third section I will assess what the influence of these two types of resources has on north-south partnership. In the literature, many authors agree that dependency on resources of one party on the other leads to an unequal partnership. The data suggests, however, that a good partnership is still possible even in the case of resource dependency. The different roles the two parties within the network play, thus the roles of donor and receiver, do not necessarily prevent the partnership from being one in which both groups of NGOs have an important say in the decisions that are made.

2.1 The role of financial resources in the network

As explained in the theoretical section, resource dependency is the situation in which one party is dependent on the other party for resources in order to achieve its objectives. When considering the role of financial resources in the investigated TAN, such a dependency is clearly present. Data obtained in the interviews reveals a clear financial dependence of Colombian NGOs on European and other Northern NGOs. The Colombian representatives declared about all five organizations they could give me information about, that they were entirely dependent on international organizations for their funding. Diana Sánchez, representative of the CCEEU and the organization MINGA, declared: “we are generally depending on the international cooperation, one hundred per cent”5. Many Colombian organizations forming part of OIDHACO’s associated platforms in Colombia, receive funding from OIDHACO members, and as well do the platforms themselves in some cases. These Colombian NGOs do not receive financial resources from the Colombian government6.

Funds from Northern organization to Southern partner do not come without strings attached. The SNGOs are obliged to hand in large reports justifying the destination of the funding, and they have to subject themselves to various audits that control how the money gets spent7. I

5_{Original interview with Diana Sánchez: “ nosotros dependemos de la cooperación internacional en general,}

cien por ciento”, interview with author, 6 May 2014.

6

Jomary Ortegón.

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will elaborate more on these formal institutions in the next chapter. What is important to notice, is that Southern organizations cannot just spend the financial resources on whatever they want, they have to have to get some sort of approval from their Northern partners.

Northern NGOs receive their funds mostly from government sources. Cordaid, as well as a couple of other big Dutch traditional organizations such as NOVIB and HIVOS, received the most part of its funding from the Cofinancing System (MFS), a program of the Dutch government that extends subsidies to organizations that help achieve developmental goals. About 30 percent of Cordaid’s funding comes from private donations, according to Margreet Houdijk. Organizations like Cordaid are, therefore, in great part a sort of channel of government funding to Southern organizations8.

2.2 The importance of non-financial resources

Besides financial resources, other types of resources also play a big role in relations between partners in the network. Networks OIDHACO and ABColombia provide the Colombian NGOs with a different kind of resource. These two organizations rather form a sort of information channel between organizations in Colombia and in Europe, but they do not involve themselves directly in taking action in Colombia. Their ground of action is more in European politics. The resources they provide for the Colombian NGOs is different from the financial resources, since what they provide is information and access to a relevant network, such as the EU or the UN. OIDHACO and ABColombia are the way into international politics for the voice of the Colombian NGOs. They provide the Colombian organizations with information and political support these organization themselves lack. In this sense, Colombian NGOs are also dependent on these networks for a different kind of resource. Jomary Ortegón explains this access to international politics is important for the following reason: “the platform OIDHACO is a channel of amplification, a megaphone, that permits that [our] voice reaches many different places”9. Aura Rodríguez, working for Corporación Cactus, also described the value of contacts with international political institutions as a way of protection from local actors in Colombia that do not agree with the work the human rights NGOs do. It

8_{Margreet Houdijk.}

9

Original interview with Jomary Ortegón: “La plataforma OIDHACO es un canal de amplificación, un megáfono, que permite que la voz llegue a muchísimas otras partes”.

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serves as a message to local actors, “[them] knowing we have international support and international relations, they are more careful not to hurt us”10.

Thus, Colombian NGOs also are dependent on Northern organizations for access to Northern political institutions for two reasons. Political contacts help SNGOs get their ideas across to influential institutions that help them achieve their goal of political incidence. And the relations with international actors help them do their work in the first place, because these contacts protect them from local actors that want to hurt them because of the work they do.

But it is not just Northern NGOs that have all the essential resources in this network. Even though Colombian NGOs are depending clearly on their Northern partners for funding and access to relevant political institutions, such as the EU or the UN, they also contribute to the collaboration, thus showing that the relations between Northern and Southern NGOs within this network are also to some degree based on interdependence. The asset of Colombian organizations that most Northern organizations lack is knowledge of the conflict on the ground. Diana Sánchez explained that for Northern NGOs it is very complex to be able to enter in the conflictive areas where people are in need of help without the right information or help local organizations can provide. She mentions:

There are cases in which cooperation agencies that wanted to enter the territory by themselves had to leave, because they did not have the contextual information, and could not count on the trust of the communities or social organizations that give permission to enter there with some credibility11.

This example also highlights the second aspect Colombian NGOs provide their Northern counterparts with, which is credibility. Without the collaboration of organizations in the country itself, the entrance of foreign aid organizations might be conceived by the international community as illegitimate. If NNGOs would not have access to the resources provided to them by their Southern partners, they would be hindered in their work as well. Northern NGOs are thus also to a certain degree dependent on the SNGOs.

10

Original interview with Aura Rodríguez: “sabiendo que tenemos respaldo internacional y relaciones internacionales tienen más cuidado con hacernos daño”, interviewed by author via Skype, 18 June 2014.

11_{Original interview with Diana Sánchez: “Hay casos donde hay agencias de cooperación que querían entrar}

solitas a un territorio y han tenido que salir, porque no contaron con la información del contexto, con la confianza de comunidades o organizaciones sociales que les permiten entrar allá con algo de credibilidad”.

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2.3 Consequences of resource dependence on the north-south partnership

When I asked the Colombian organizations if the roles of donor and receiver of respectively Northern and Southern NGOs had any negative consequences for the collaboration, they explained they generally only worked together with organizations that coincided in principles with their own organizations, making conflicts over resources less likely. The representatives of CCEEU and the Plataforma DESC explained they would not work together with organizations that in exchange for money would have them pursue goals or ideas that were not their own. Diana stated the following:

They respect our autonomy. Because, after all, we are organizations with criteria, with principles. And we have the capacity to say: I do not need your cooperation, because if we do not coincide in the fundamentals, well then it does not work for me”12

.

As an example, Diana Sánchez mentioned that the Colombian NGO MINGA, where she works as executive director, refused the help of the organization USAID, because this organization did not have the same ideas about the conflict and how to address it. “Knowing that, if USAID would support us economically, they would not respect our functioning” 13

. But both Jomary Ortegón as Diana Sánchez stated that there definitely were many NGOs in Colombia that let themselves co-govern in exchange for financial resources. Some organizations were even created, according to them, in order to capture the funds from the international community. Jomary Ortegón explained: “I believe that the human rights organizations forming part of the Platform and the Coordination are not like this. But in Colombia there are a lot […] of NGOs that were created just for this [reason]”14

. They explained that it also depended on the organization, its strength and autonomy, in how far they would permit another organization to manipulate and influence the acting of the Colombian organization.

The representatives of the European NGOs I spoke to, confirmed the statements made above about the importance of the autonomy of the Colombian NGOs. Margreet Houdijk explained

12_{Original interview with Diana Sánchez: “Ellos respetan nuestra autonomía. Porque, de todas maneras, somos}

organizaciones con criterios, con principios. Y hasta en capacidad de decir: no necesito su cooperación porque si no coincidimos en lo fundamental, pues no me sirve”.

13

Original interview with Diana Sánchez: “Aun sabiendo que USAID, si nos aportara económicamente, no respetaría nuestro actuar.”

14_{Original interview with Jomary Ortegón: “Yo creo que las organizaciones de derechos humanos que hacen}

parte de la Plataforma y la Coordinación no son de este estilo. Que en Colombia hay sí, muchos […], muchos que se crearon ONGs (sic) para eso”.

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that for Cordaid, ownership of the local organizations in Colombia is essential. She admitted difficulties for Colombian NGOs might especially arise when they receive funding from multiple Northern NGOs in the sense that conditions requested from the various organizations might conflict. Even though controls by auditors to see where the money from each organization came from have become more lenient in the case of Cordaid, according to Margreet Houdijk, it still remains difficult for Colombian organizations to justify where each part was invested in15.

Nico van Leeuwen, senior Program Officer Extractives at Cordaid, agrees with this last statement. He describes Colombian partners as “strong partners, strong persons, people that are used to leave their mark in a certain way on the surroundings. If they do not have this opportunity, or have to take a step back, some partners have difficulties with this”16. This representative was, however, the person I spoke to that most clearly stated a power imbalance due to resource dependency is present, and even inevitable, between Colombian and international NGOs. He explains:

Northern organizations are often, in a certain way, in the position of providers of financial funds. So there are givers and receivers. If you notice an important difference [between Northern and Southern NGOs], then you see that Northern organizations are the givers and Southern ones the receivers. This creates a huge difference. It creates a sort of, wanted or unwanted, a sort of dependent position17.

According to Nico van Leeuwen, this situation of dependency also has negative consequences for the collaboration. He explains that relations between Northern and Southern NGOs purely based on the financial aspect are not sustainable. As soon as the funding stops, then so does the collaboration. However, also in relations where there is more to it than just the financing of Southern NGOs by Northern ones, the influence of Northern NGOs on the whole undertaking is substantial. What the financer says is taken into high account, according to Nico van Leeuwen. He mentions the lack of feedback from receiving organizations towards

15_{Margreet Houdijk}

16_{Original interview with Nico van Leeuwen: “[…] sterke partners, sterke personen, mensen die gewend zijn om}

wel een beetje een stempel op de omgeving te drukken. En als ze die kans niet hebben, of als men een stapje terug moet doen, hebben sommige partijen daar moeite mee”, interview with author, 3 June 2014.

17_{Original interview with Nico van Leeuwen: “Noordelijke organisaties zijn vaak toch in de positie van, op een}

bepaalde manier, geldverstrekkers. Dus je hebt gevers en ontvangers. Als je dus een belangrijk verschil ziet, dan zie je dat noordelijke organisaties de gevers zijn en de zuidelijke de ontvangers. Dat geeft natuurlijk een enorm verschil. Dat creëert toch een soort, gewild of ongewild, een soort afhankelijke positie.”

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the donating organization as a disadvantage. The Southern organizations often express agreement with the Northern ones, but this might not always be the way they really feel18.

Taking this last view into account, it appears that a power imbalance in this donor-recipient relation between Northern and Southern organizations is inevitable. This power imbalance might not intentionally be imposed by NNGOs, who might even try to empower local organizations, according Margreet Houdijk, the fact that this donor-recipient relation exists in this way already makes a perfectly equal relationship impossible. In the first place, because NNGOs receive the funds to be passed on to the South from other donors, that demand certain conditions in return, NNGOs are forced to impose those conditions on the Southern partners in the form of audits and reports. In the second place, Southern NGOs might not always demand their full autonomy in order to please their funding partner.

However, even if NNGOs wanted it to, a situation in which Northern NGOs take away too much of the autonomy of the Southern ones does not seem probable either. The following perspective by Vincent Vallies clarifies this. His personal view based on work experience both in Africa and Colombia, was the Colombian social movement was stronger than elsewhere:

“I have the idea, which can be wrong, but I have the idea that the Colombian social movement is very strong and makes very clear what it wants and does not want. I believe this has created a relationship with the European partners that is very much on the same level. […] I do not believe they would accept orders or too much influence in their financial behavior”19

.

So the Colombian NGOs have the ability to demand a certain degree of autonomy and to not accept too much influence from the Northern organizations, even though they do have to comply with the requisites demanded of them by Northern partners There are indications that the north-south divide within this NGO network will become more pronounced in the near future. What Diana Sánchez and Jomary Ortegón identified as a problem for their partnership with NNGOs that is becoming ever more urgent in the current climate of developmental aid, is that the current economic crisis that affects most Northern countries has its effects on

18_{Nico van Leeuwen.}

19

Original interview with Vincent Vallies: “Tengo la sensación, que puede ser un error, pero tengo la sensación que el movimiento social colombiano es muy, muy fuerte y tiene muy claro lo que quiere y lo que no quiere. Y creo que eso ha creado, digamos, un nivel de (sic) relación con las copartes europeas, muy de al mismo nivel. […] Y no creo que aceptarían, digamos, órdenes o demasiado incidencia por financiación”, interview with author, 20 May 2014.

North-south relations between NGOs in a transnational advocacy network collaboration on human rights in Colombia