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Bachelor Thesis (Revision) 13-08-2018
Dhr. dr. G.R. (Gordon) Arlen Words: 7948
Solving inequality through public association? A critical reflection on
Putnam’s idea of “bridging” social capital.
Abstract
Robert Putnam’s work has evoked much response from both scholars as well as policy makers, and it has contributed greatly to the popularity of the concept of social capital. Supporters of the concept view it as being a possible solution to many different problems, as well as a generally positive influence on the well-being of citizens, economic growth and the responsiveness of public policy. While these positive externalities might benefit some, not all societal groups are privileged with high amounts of social capital. This civil inequality correlates with, and strengthens socio-economic inequality. While Putnam tries to overcome this problem by introducing the concept of bridging social capital, in this paper it is argued that this effect is not only theoretically implausible, but that social capital as a whole increases inequality through means of social structure.
Introduction
When Putnam travelled through Italy, it was de Tocqueville that was on his mind. Centuries before, when the French political philosopher made his voyage across the new country of America, he found the most democratic country in the world to be characterized by the vibrant community life that was present in many of the towns he visited and observed. As he describes the township of New England and its different counties, it is made clear that their inhabitants feel greatly connected to their place of residency, and that the local association of citizens is of great importance to the well-being of those citizens and the spirit of the community (De Tocqueville 2003: 83). De Tocqueville states himself that this however is a commonly accepted fact at the time, that local assembly and the public spirit created through this is a great predictor of order and tranquillity within a nation (De Tocqueville 2003: 84). Why then was it important, or distinct of the American society and administration that it was able to facilitate the civil sphere so well? According to de Tocqueville, the answer lies primarily in the institutions of government, namely the decentralisation and relatively high independence of the states and townships from the nation state (De Tocqueville 2003: 99-101). As the absence of comparable forms of public spirit and the difficulty of creating it was a known problem throughout Europe (De Tocqueville 2003: 84), de Tocqueville viewed America as being the new world of politics and state-building.
It is in that respect that we should view Putnam’s travels through Italy for his 1994 book: “Making Democracy Work”. The unexpected implementation of a constitutional provision for regional governments allowed for a systematic study that would be able to determine the influence of de Tocqueville’s public spirit on institutional performance (Putnam 1994: 13). As Putnam explains the theoretical foundation on which his study relies, he finds de Tocqueville to be most relevant, because in addition to explaining why an active civil life existed in America, he also predicted it would positively influence institutional performance in two different ways. Both through internal effects on individual members, and external effects on the community or polity (Putnam 1994: 90). Putnam set out to test this theory by analysing the institutional performance of the newly formed Italian regional governments considering their differences in social and political life, and more importantly their level of civic-ness (Putnam 1994: 91). In short, the results confirm what de Tocqueville believed to be true, as activity in the civil sphere does positively influence the responsiveness of public policy. The general argument brought forward by institutional theorists like Robert Putnam is therefore that a
stronger civil society, and with it a larger amount of social capital within a nation is better for the well-being of its citizens, and the state of democracy.
There is much that can be said about Putnam’s research, and “Making Democracy Work” has been the subject of many critical reviews in which the authors often doubted his causal claims, and this has also been the case for his more recent work “Bowling Alone” (Tarrow 1996) (Lin 2001) (Blokland 2002: 105). Leaving methodological issues aside, Putnam’s work depicts a society in which the public comes together in different forms of associations, and this has a positive outcome on the way that public policy is suited for these people. Even though in reality, we cannot speak of “the public”, or public policy being either good or bad in relation to this public as a whole (Blokland 2002: 107). Even at the regional level on which social capital is measured, there are many differences between people, be it culturally or socio-economically. The formation of public policy is therefore often a matter of distributing and dividing recourses amongst different groups, in which case there are those who get more, the winners, and those who lose. When participation in civil society is an important predictor of the responsiveness of public policy and institutional performance, what happens then to those that do not participate? In this paper it will be shown that even though Putnam does ask himself this question, he does not find the right answers, and generally the problem of inequality within his proposed public sphere is underrepresented.
Admittedly, Putnam does write about the “dark side” of social capital but concludes that empirical evidence proves a positive relationship between social capital and equality (Putnam 2001: 358). However, in the argument that follows it is made clear that his idea of civil inequality is flawed, as it admits to the idea of social structures and norms being embedded into social capital, therefore excluding those that do not conform to those norms, though leaving those that are excluded to be responsible for change and thus conforming. Though this point in its entirety will be developed later, this does bring us to the main argument to be brought forward in this paper. De Tocqueville’s idea on public spirit in nineteenth century America does not suffice in a heterogenous modern society, and with this the arguments as brought forward by Putnam regarding civil inequality are incomplete, as they do not account for all aspects of social capital when describing how it can be put to use. Though Putnam attempts to, I argue that using social capital to overcome inequality is problematic. As it is not just that de Tocqueville’s public spirit or Putnam’s social capital, which will be used interchangeably, have little regard for groups that are untouched by its positive effects, but even more so that the mechanisms behind these phenomena have characteristics that cause them to create inequality and keep it embedded into social structures and norms. Though, I do not argue against strong
civil society or against an increase in social capital, or even against the idea of social capital to be beneficial for those that own it, but for an understanding of these ideas that includes the notion of inequality and social structure, and which rejects the idea that social capital can be used to overcome these things. Though many of this has been brought forward in previous critical reviews on Putnam, I hope to contribute to this discussion by focussing primarily on the notion of civil inequality and social structure, and by offering an argument against Putnam’s idea of bridging social capital that I have not seen to be brought forward yet. This makes it so that Putnam’s idea of using social capital to overcome inequality is not only a questionable causality as it is just a new iteration of “contact theory”, but that it is a theoretical impossibility regarding groups without internal cohesion or social capital according to his own line of thought.
Though this paper is not just a review of Putnam’s work, but more an argument against the idea of using social capital to overcome inequality, the theory that is formed will primarily be presented as being a critical response to his arguments. Therefore, after a general outline of the subject matter, civil society and social capital, I start by presenting Putnam’s ideas on this. Because, as stated before, his general theory on social capital and how it influences the responsiveness of public policy is not rejected in this paper, only his ideas on how marginalized groups are affected. After this, the flaws within his argument regarding the relationship between social capital and inequality are explained, which will be used to support the argument against using social capital in order to overcome inequality. In short, the argument as presented in this paper consists of four different steps; firstly, I argue that civil society as we know it today is not equal in the sense that marginalized groups participate less and in different areas than the privileged in society. Secondly, I present the arguments as proposed by Putnam that attempt to solve this problem, namely the distinction between “bonding”- and “bridging” social capital. Third however, I prove how Putnam’s arguments are flawed in the sense that they do not properly account for inequalities, as the idea of bridging social capital is merely a disguised argument for increased integration of minorities and marginalized groups in general. Fourth and final, I propose my idea of civil inequality that includes the idea that social structure might be embedded in social capital, and the circular mechanism of public spirit rendering Putnam’s bridging social capital useless in relation to groups without internal cohesion or social capital. I conclude therefore that social capital within a modern heterogenous community can only be viewed as a truly positive influence when there is no structural inequality within civil society, and that the idea of bridging social capital to overcome inequality is highly implausible.
What is civil society and what does it look like?
One of the first scholars that introduced the idea of a separated civil society that was independent from government and the market was Hegel. Hegel proposed the idea of an independent form of civility that was distinguishable from political society and the state, which was as he describes it; what happens between the micro-community of the family and the macro-community of the state (Ehrenberg 2011: 8). It is sometimes unclear what Hegel meant exactly when he wrote about the civil society as it can be interpreted in several ways. However, it is most valuable in relationship to the current understanding of civil society, if it is viewed from a right-wing perspective, as referring to all non-state aspects of society (Ehrenberg 2011: 9). It is important to note that the micro-community of the family that Hegel refers to only involves the relationships and activities that take place within the household, as family members can still be active in civil society together if the organizational connection between them is not only based on blood relation.
The most important historic piece that relates to civil society and how we view it now comes from De Tocqueville’s book: Democracy in America. Written in the early nineteenth century, the book describes the young country of America and its many civil associations which according to de Tocqueville lead to the strengthening of democracy and protection from both anarchy and dictatorship. De Tocqueville explicitly distinguishes between civil society and the state and even argues for limited governmental centralization to keep these associations from being influenced by the rulers. He writes that these associations are not only problem solving but that they also create a public spirit that can be interpreted as a form of social capital, as it is the wish for association within the community. He describes it as being very difficult to create through means of governmental action (de Tocqueville 2003: 83). De Tocqueville’s book has led to the current understanding of civil society, as a combination of different organizations or associations with communal goals, that are not part of the state or the market. For de Tocqueville the most important contributing factor to the processes within civil society is public spirit. It is the wish for association, and a feeling of connection to the local community (de Tocqueville 2003: 84). Public spirit is created through means of association, though simultaneously it is what breeds the need for participation in the public sphere. The mechanism of public spirit is therefore circular, and by that account either a virtuous or a vicious cycle. The higher the amount of public spirit within the community, the more they tend to participate in civil society, which in turn increases the level of public spirit. One can imagine however, that this process also works in reverse.
Together with the market and the state, civil society is one of three pillars that form the “democratic triangle”, being the foundation for democratic government. The idea is that this democratic triangle as proposed by Zijderveld (1999) ought to be balanced to maintain democratic values within society. This means that civil society acts as a counter-weight against the state and the market. This instrumental view on civil society is supported by many as it underlines the importance of civil attitudes in the making of public policy and agenda setting (Klijn & Skelcher 2007: 18). Civil society can also be seen as complementary to the state and market. This view regards civil society as being intrinsically valuable, and the freedom to participate within it a democratic right on its own (Klijn & Skelcher 2007: 11). The instrumental view as well as the complementary view can be used to form a positive view on civil society and create the normative idea that a strong civil society is; a good counter-weight against the power of the state and a democratic right in itself. Most scholars support this view and regard civil society to be one of the main factors of progress regarding democratization (Ehrenberg 2011: 5). Civil society is thus the origin of civil attitudes, which in their way influence agenda setting and public policy (Putnam 1994) (Carothers & Barndt 1999). Therefore, it is important to not underestimate the value of the public sphere. If access to this sphere is unequal, some will be more influential than others. Additionally, as civil society is a main factor of progress regarding democratization, inequality would undermine emancipation and progress for those groups that are less active in civil society. These ideas on civil society lead to two different normative claims; first, civil society ought to be strong, meaning that active participation of individuals within civil society is a good thing. Second, access to- and participation in civil society should be equal for all groups within the public. The question is however, whether we can conclude the first when the second is not true.
Though public association may have sufficed almost two centuries ago, and might still suffice in close-knit communities, it has become clear that in larger and more diverse cases it does not. In the case of the Netherlands there are large differences between different ethnic- and socio-economic groups when it comes to civil participation (KIS 2016) (CBS 2010) (CBS 2014). Though there are many positive stories on this, and many minority or marginalized groups are participating more and more (Berger et al. 2001) (SCP 2014), there are still many longitudinal trends that do show the negative influences of for instance low income on public association as will be shown later. In addition to this, many of the groups that are participating more do so within their own group of peers. Thus, the empirical data on this should be viewed with care. Research within the case of the Netherlands still suggest significant differences between socio-economic and ethnic groups regarding civil participation. The highly educated
are more likely to participate in cultural activities regardless of ethnical background, however highly educated immigrant still participate less than the native Dutch (Kraaykamp et al. 2015: 295). Lower income groups within society engage less in social participation and voluntary associations (CBS 2010). Ethnic minorities in the Netherlands are less active in the civil sphere when it comes to associations aimed at improving political participation and the responsiveness of public policy through democratic innovation (KIS 2016) (Smith 2009). When it comes to membership of associations in line with the description by Putnam, there are some interesting findings. Women are less likely to be a member of associations regarding sport; however, they are more likely to be found in self-help groups and larger national associations (CBS 2014: 5). The biggest differences are found between non-western immigrants and western immigrants or the native Dutch. Non-western immigrants are significantly less active in all associations than other groups, regardless of education level or income (CBS 2014: 5).
The mentioned differences are all indications of the amount of civil participation found within the Netherlands. Other evidence suggests that there are also horizontal differences between groups, namely that they participate separately from each other in the sense that when they participate they do so in different groups. This is true regarding education level, where the lower educated are not often found to be a member of professional associations and the higher educated are (CBS 2014: 6). In general, income is positively related to group membership. The wealthier are more likely to be part of any association. The Islamic Dutch citizens are the least likely to be a member of any organization. Membership of religious associations is more likely to be seen amongst immigrants, but again this is an example of horizontal differences as these associations are strongly separated by means of religion. To add to this, Islamic religious participation excludes other forms of association, as those who are more active within this religious sphere are less active in other forms of association (Van Tubergen 2003: 349). Though membership of religious associations at first glance seems like a primary example of civility, in reality this is not the case. Putnam’s research shows that in Italy, strongly religious individuals within society are the least civic minded (Putnam 1994: 175). In addition to this, the vertical structure of religious organizations makes it so that it does not breed civility or positively influence good government (Putnam 1994: 176). Though this is not exceptional for religious organisations, as this vertical structure can be found in many organizations, it does mean according to Putnam, that membership of such an organization does not increase civil participation or contribute to the responsiveness of public policy. However, it cannot be denied that membership of a religious association brings individuals together, be it in the close group of their peers. It can be argued that because of this, the societal position of these people is
improved, as unity would improve their possibilities when it comes to for instance agenda setting. Though, when considered that data within the Dutch case suggests that membership of the Islamic religion excludes other forms of civil participation, it is questionable whether this should be viewed as a positive contribution to this groups civility. A different form of horizontal segregation that has less to do with inequality is that of different ideologic groups. In general, individuals that support more progressive and social values are more likely to be active in the civil sphere than those that support conservative, utilitarian individualistic and-or authoritarian views. Voters of left-wing parties are therefore more likely to participate in free associations (Coffé 2002: 334). Though this fact is not clearly connected to the argument to be brought forward in this paper. It does suggest an alternative to the institutional approach of civility as provided by Putnam. The idea that civility could be connected to individual characteristics or worldview was proposed by de Tocqueville however, when he wrote that the north-western states of America have the same levels of public spirit and civility as New England because many New England natives emigrated there. According to de Tocqueville: “(…) they carry the
habits of their mother country with them into that which they adopt.” (De Tocqueville 2003:
97-98).
What this data shows us is that there is clearly inequality within the civil sphere in the Netherlands, both hierarchical and horizontal. However, accurately stating the size of this problem would require great amounts of empirical work that would not contribute to the purpose of this paper. The use of this data is therefore only to indicate the fact that there is a problem with inequality in the civil sphere, as the value of this paper would be nullified if there was none. The civil inequalities within the Netherlands show that the semi-utopian view as proposed by de Tocqueville regarding association of citizens, even if civil engagement does improve social- and political trust and responsiveness of public policy, it only does so for certain demographic groups. The poor and those with a background of immigration participate less and in different areas. This makes it so that the description made by Smith in 1957 regarding the members of free association is still relevant, as he described the ideal member of the free associations to be: “(…) a forty-five-year-old married man of high social status, who is a
Protestant, a non-manual worker (…) who has two children, a college education, fifty or more “friends” and his own house” (Smith 1957: 325). In the case of the Netherlands it can be
concluded that the civil society is an area that is strongly dominated by the middle-class, middle-aged and native Dutch, who support left-wing views. The largest differences are found between different socio-economic and ethnic groups (Wiertz 2017).
Conceptualizing social capital and social structure.
The concept of social capital is relatively new, though it draws upon the social theory tradition of de Tocqueville and other scholars as J.S. Mill, Durkheim, Simmel, Tönnies and Kornhauser, who believed many social benefits were drawn from membership of voluntary associations (Newton 2001: 202). The concept of social capital is closely related to civil society, as it is what is produced through means of participation within this sphere. However, it requires an explanation of its own because, in its contemporary form, social capital means more than just a communal spirit amongst the public. It is used as an almost tangible form of wealth that can be used to overcome practical societal or communal problems like housing (Lang & Hornburg 1998) and is even said to positively influence economic growth (Fukuyama 1995) (Knack & Keefer 1997). As a concept, social capital is mostly understood as the combination of social trust, networks and norms on which people can build to solve communal problems (Lang & Hornburg 1998: 4). In practice, the term often produces fuzzy understandings of what can be categorized under this and what cannot. In research however, social capital is often measured by examining the previously explained concept of civil society, or participation within this sphere. Where there is a large amount of civil participation, there ought to be large amounts of social capital, as it is social capital that causes this participation. Because, when social capital is available in large amounts, it is said to increase the willingness to co-operate with others in society (Fukuyama 2001: 7).
However, while viewing social capital as merely the willingness and ability to co-operate might encompass the idea of social trust and networks, it does not take note of the other equally important factor; social norms and structures. Social structures are generally defined as consisting of a set of social positions, that all have access to different amounts of resources, and that can be defined hierarchically in terms of authority and control of these resources. In addition, these positions share certain rules and procedures in the use of the resources (Lin 2001: 33). On the individual- or micro level this structure influences behaviour, as it causes people to act in a way that is expected by others. On a system- or macro level it influences the relationship between different groups, resulting in socio-economic hierarchy and stratification that can be assigned to group differences. There are different ways that these structures can be held in place. In the most explicit sense, social structures can take the form of legitimizing ideologies that view structural differences between groups as being normatively right. However more commonly these structures reside under what can be seen empirically and rely on attitudes held by both majority and minority groups. These structures can be very rigid and embedded
into society by a long history of attitude forming. Therefore, they can be very hard to change. The possibility of social change does exist however, and several important factors can be ascribed to this process, namely communication, innovation and diffusion. In short, this means the transmission of new ideas and spreading them across society (Rogers & Shoemaker 1971: 769). Social structures however negatively affect the level of diffusion, as new ideas that go against the existing structures are not heard or ignored. Even before that, innovation is also affected as social structures limit the way individuals can think about societal issues. In an even more fundamental sense, social structures can limit communication when the norms related to these structures do not hold a positive attitude towards for example deliberation amongst the public. This strongly relates to civil society as the three processes that are mentioned above usually take place within this sphere. The hierarchical inequalities of civil participation therefore lead to the fact that only the ideas of privileged groups are innovated, communicated and diffused across society. If already marginalized groups do not actively participate in civil society this means that their position is not only unimproved but worsened by the fact that already dominant paradigms are strengthened. In other words, the before described social structures become more important.
Social capital in this context should be viewed as creating both positive and negative externalities. Positively, as social capital increases co-operation amongst those in the same network, it creates a trusting and safe environment that increases the well-being of those in it, as well as having the potential to benefit more concrete problems. However, these positive effects might negatively influence those in society that do not belong to a network rich of social capital (Fukuyama 2001: 8). In a general sense, when the norms that are reproduced through means of social capital are discriminatory towards others, this leads to a strengthening of the before described social structures. In addition, even when two networks that both have large amounts of social capital but are socially segregated, this still leads to a strengthening of social structure (Putnam 2001: 358). Though solidarity would exist within those groups, this often comes at the cost of out-group hostility, making it so that the radius of trust of the individuals within these groups is limited to the close environment of their peers (Fukuyama 2001: 8). For this reason, social capital can never be viewed without looking at social structure and the limitations to social networks of those that own it. For example, social cohesion and capital within a low-income neighbourhood is not always positively connected to social capital amongst those that live in a wealthy gated community. More likely, the segregation between the two social networks and the norms that are created through this lead to a strengthening of social structure that asserts out-group hostility.
Putnam’s ideas on civil inequality.
As has been established in the beginning of this paper, the normative view on civil society consists of two different claims; firstly, that it should be strong. Secondly, that it should treat all societal groups equally. Though, empirical data in the case of the Netherlands, in which the civil sphere is arguably strong, showed that at least in that context equality was not always present. In addition,the theoretical background of social capital and civil society makes it so that this inequality is harmful in multiple ways, as it decreases the responsiveness of public policy, creates social structures and norms and strengthens out-group hostility.
Putnam acknowledges these problems, specifically the idea of social structure being embedded into social capital: “Norms and networks that serve some groups may obstruct
others, particularly if the norms are discriminatory or the networks socially segregated. A recognition of the importance of social capital in sustaining community life does not exempt us from the need to worry about how that “community” is defined - who is inside and thus benefits from social capital and who is outside and does not” (Putnam 2001: 358). To overcome this
issue, he suggests a form of social capital that does not create social structure, but rather removes it by expanding social networks and trust. He names this “bridging” social capital, which overcomes societal divisions of class, race, ethnicity or sex (Blokland 2002: 107). Its counterpart, “bonding” social capital is what creates in-group cohesion and with it creates and strengthens social structure. The way these different forms of social capital work is similar, as they are created by- and stimulate public association. The difference is that bridging social capital is formed by association between different societal groups, while bonding social capital is formed by associating within the own group of peers. Bonding social capital can be found amongst groups within society when they participate amongst themselves. Therefore it can often be found amongst members of marginalized groups as well as those who are privileged. According to Putnam, bridging social capital not only removes social structure and norms, it has the potential to increase equality within the community (Putnam 2001: 358). As the gaps between hierarchical inequalities are bridged, this increases the possibilities of marginalized groups regarding the three distinguishable aspects of social capital. Namely, trust, networks and norms. Associating with individuals from outside one’s group of peers would increase the trust someone has towards these people. In addition to this, it expands the network of marginalized groups to relating to those who are privileged. Finally, it eliminates social norms and structures by encountering people from other societal groups. Putnam believes that though social capital does has the potential to increase discriminatory social structure, it also holds the power to
eliminate just that, by bridging connections between unequal groups. Therefore, he argues not only for an increase in public association, but that this increase may also be cross-cutting through socially segregated groups. When individuals from different groups come together in free associations, they will develop trust and understanding towards each other. The idea of bridging social capital is both normative as well as empirical.
Where Putnam is wrong.
There are several objections to be made against Putnam’s ideas on overcoming civil inequalities, in general it is peculiar that he would turn from an empirical analysis of civility in America to a normative, or political statement about how different groups in society should relate to each other. Though I understand the necessity of such a claim when arguing in favour of classical forms of civility given the negative externalities as presented in this paper. Putnam’s solution is clearly lacking convincing strength. In this section the flaws within Putnam’s theory will be explored, partly derived from arguments proposed in work by other authors, and three main arguments will be brought forward that show how the theory of bridging social capital is not the right answer to questions of civil inequality. Firstly, that the idea of bridging social capital ignores the social structure argument that Putnam himself acknowledges. Secondly, that even if inter-group association takes place the idea that it would influence trust and social structure relies heavily on the much-debated contact theory. Finally, that the circular nature of public spirit prevents marginalized group without internal cohesion or social capital from feeling the need to participate in civil society even if there is no discriminatory structure that prevents them from doing so.
The first problem with bridging social capital arises when one asks the question of how in practice it will take place. Though inter-group association might seem as simple as putting two people from different social backgrounds in the same room, when confronted with the idea of social structure it becomes a lot harder to have this take place in the context of the free civil society. As social structure negatively influences the relationship between different groups and potentially gives rise to outgroup bias in both marginalized or privileged groups, association between the two becomes more difficult. In it’s most explicit form, the social structure takes the form of a legitimizing ideology that accepts the group differences as being normatively right. Though this is an extreme form of structure, one can imagine that less obvious forms of discriminatory norms exists that would undermine the potential intergroup association, of which two main elements can be defined. The first being that the social structure exists of norms
and values that undermine the will to associate with those who belong to different societal groups. The second being socio-economic differences that are embedded into social structure that increase social segregation, for instance when it comes to housing, religion, culture and language. As social structure segregates those that should be associating according to the idea of bridging social capital, how is this segregation overcome then? One could argue that this could happen through means of governmental interference. In the case of the Netherlands there are many municipalities trying to increase inter-group relationships by organizing or at least facilitating association between different socio-economical or cultural groups (SCP 2014). However, following Putnam’s arguments, the vertical organizational structure of government would negatively influence the production of social capital (Putnam 1994: 176). It would not produce social trust or change social norms as there would be no horizontal association that according to Putnam is the reason trust is formed. Looking back at the conceptualization of civil society, being the sphere that is not the market or the state, it is hard to assign a person or group that is in power and has the ability or responsibility to ensure bridging social capital takes place. Social networks are not decided by authority or coercion, but by mutual agreement (Lin 2001: 38). If one were to look at the influence directed over civil society however, those on top of the hierarchical structure that have authority over the available recourses would clearly be considered as being decisive when it comes to how public interaction takes place. In other words, it would be the already privileged groups that decide whether or not they interact with their marginalized counterparts in free associations. In addition, the privileged are not the ones who would benefit from this association and therefore would not be motivated to do so, making it so that Putnam’s bridging social capital is actually an argument that holds marginalized groups responsible to elevate from their own position (Blokland 2002: 108).
The second problem with Putnam’s theory of bridging social capital is that whenever there is inter-group association despite of social structure, it still relies heavily on contact theory, or the premises that when people of different backgrounds interact frequently, they develop understanding, trust and respect towards each other (Homans 1951) (Allport 1979). Interestingly enough, Putnam himself strongly argued against this thesis in his 2007 article: “E
Pluribus Unum : Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first Century”, in which he claimed
that immigration and diversity foster social isolation, out-group distrust and in-group solidarity (Putnam 2007: 142). In this article Putnam shows empirically that when diversity is higher within a community, there are lower levels of trust and expectations from the community, people volunteer less and give less to charity and in general civic-ness is negatively affected (Putnam 2007: 150-151). This affects the plausibility of Putnam’s bridging social capital idea,
as being confronted with people of other societal groups causes anomie or social isolation (Putnam 2007: 149). It is then a strange assumption of Putnam to make that inter-group association would positively influence social structure and the level of civic-ness of the community as a whole. However, while Putnam does show that diversity negatively affects civil participation on a community level, his evidence suggests that conflict theory, being the opposite of contact theory is also not completely correct, as diversity does not necessarily create group hostility (Putnam 2007: 150). So, while Putnam’s findings do not directly contradict the idea of bridging social capital, they also do not give any indication that inter-group association is in fact helpful in overcoming social structure and inequality. Putnam then shows how bridging- and bonding social capital is not a zero-sum relationship, as in-group solidarity does not necessarily create out-group hostility. One can feel closely connected to his peers as well as to others in society (Putnam 2007: 143). What this also suggests however, is that while cross-group association might decrease out-cross-group hostility according to Putnam, this does not mean that in-group solidarity is decreased as well. In other words, when contact theory is followed and bridging social capital is formed, this still would not erode the idea of “them and us” between different groups, only whether this view is more positive or negative. In terms of group relationship this means that while one would look more positively upon another, group borders are still unmoved and rigid. In order to overcome this problem, Putnam then argues for not trying to erode this distinction, but for creating new social identities that are overarching of existing group borders (Putnam 2007: 163-164). Though this might be an interesting thought that needs more analysis according to Putnam, it is not at all what he described when he first made a claim for bridging social capital. Furthermore, Putnam does not explain how these overarching social identities are supposed to be formed, though seemingly he argues for bridging social capital again when he quotes Trevor Phillips: “We need to respect people’s
ethnicity but also give them, at some point in the week, an opportunity to meet and want to be with people with whom they have something in common that is not defined by their ethnicity”
(Putnam 2007: 164). Again I wish to raise the question why Putnam assumes this form of association does erode social structure and inequality, while he simultaneously admits that contemporary empirical evidence, including his own, mostly support conflict theory and not contact theory.
The third argument against Putnam’s idea of overcoming civil inequalities is an even more fundamental one, originating from the idea of public spirit as proposed by de Tocqueville. When Putnam argues for inter-group association, he does not account for this key element of social capital and the absence of it amongst marginalized groups. As described in this paper,
public spirit is a combination of a communitarian believe amongst the public and the need for civil association within this community. As de Tocqueville describes, and as followed by Putnam, public spirit is created when people associate with each other and also what is needed amongst the public in order for them to have the will to associate, similar to social capital. This circular mechanism of public spirit is what drives communities to high levels of cohesion, and benefits the general well being of those within the community. Though as I briefly argued before, and which both de Tocqueville and Putnam do not mention, is that this circular process can instead of a virtuous cycle be a vicious cycle. Societal groups with low levels of cohesion and social capital also lack the will to associate, and with this social capital is decreased more. The flaw within Putnam’s argument is that he does not account for the circularity of public spirit, as he states that in order to increase social capital of those belonging to marginalized groups they should participate more, while it is social capital in the first place that increases the will to do this. This is less of a problem within marginalized communities that do have internal cohesion and bonding social capital, as they do have high levels of public spirit at least within this community. However as explained before, these groups are often limited by social structure and out-group hostility. Though following the theory of public spirit, these people would at least have the will to associate with others when we disregard social structure. More fundamentally though, those that do not belong to a group with a strong sense of identity or internal cohesion and therefore do not participate in free association both bonding or bridging, are expected not to have any sense of public spirit. In other words, people that are marginalized but not part of distinguishable societal groups for instance on the basis of ethnicity, that do not have any social capital, cannot be expected to increase inter-group association as they lack the will to do so. One could argue that this argument only stands when looking at individuals within society that engage in no associational activities, as otherwise their participation would lead them to become more civil through the logic of public spirit. As this is not often the case and many minority groups have internal cohesion and social capital, the circular mechanism of public spirit does not seem to be a very big issue. However, in the hierarchic relationship between different groups, this would still mean that the position of the already privileged is increased more than that of other groups, as they would see the most increase of public spirit. In any case, privileged groups hold a positional advantage over others through this mechanism. In the case of marginalized groups that also suffer from lack of internal cohesion, bridging social capital is difficult to accomplish. Following this argument, the participation of marginalized groups within civil society would require an increase of their public spirit in a different way than that of public association. However, as de Tocqueville already stated in the
early 19th century, creating public spirit is very difficult through governmental action (De Tocqueville 2003: 84). It is unclear how bridging social capital overcomes the problem of the absence of public spirit amongst marginalized groups, and Putnam does not clarify this.
Then how should we view social capital?
The three arguments as presented above combined show that using social capital in order to overcome inequality the way Putnam describes it is problematic, as it seems to be the case that any positive effects it could have is nullified by the negative externalities is also brings. However, I do realise Putnam’s intent is to say that removing barriers between societal groups might benefit inequality, or at least decrease some of the obstructing factors. Cross-group association, or bridging social capital is however not a plausible solution. What Putnam is saying, when social structure and the absence of public spirit is taken into account, is that bridging social capital overcomes these issues by simply ignoring them, and doing just that what they actually prevent from being able to happen. In other words, when faced with the problem of social segregation and inequality, Putnam suggested cross-group association, the absence of which was the problem in the first place.
While social capital might be a useful term in some empirical studies, in its contemporary use it has become an umbrella term that facilitates things ranging from membership of bowling leagues to how close of a friendship you have with your neighbours. This conceptual vagueness is even found within Putnam’s own book “Bowling Alone” as pointed out by Durlauf, where at first he describes social capital as being: “(…) connections
among individuals—social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them” (Putnam 2001: 19), while later the understanding of the concept is broadened to: “Fraternity, as the French democrats intended it, was another name for what I term “social capital” (Putnam 2001: 351). This use of the concept makes it more difficult to form a definitive
normative statement on social capital, as it could mean a number of things. However, I do believe that in a modern heterogenous society where inequality exists, social capital can never be viewed as a predominantly positive term, as in its essence it holds social norms and structures. While forming a normative statement about social capital is difficult, what can at least be said is that in research it does not suffice to only measure the amount of associational ties within communities without accounting for all possible negative externalities they bring. Just like a nations gross national product can not be used to determine whether or not poverty exists in a country, an aggregate level of social capital says nothing about civil inequality. If
different negative externalities are taken into account however, the idea of social capital definitely has its strengths. As a means to compare different communities for example. Even more so, inequality in social capital is a research subject on its own. But generally one should be aware that just finding high or low levels of public association within a community does not say much about relationships between societal groups and inequality.
Conclusion
Through this paper I argued that using social capital in order to overcome the problem of civil inequality is problematic, as there are several aspects to this that suggest social capital is likely to contribute to this same problem, while the argument for this lacks convincing power. In order to do so, first the concepts of civil society and social capital were explained and empirical evidence was presented that proved the existence of civil inequalities. After this the work of Putnam was analysed, who presented his idea of bridging social capital in order to overcome structural equality through means of cross-group association. However, three different objections to his theory were presented; first, that bridging social capital ignores social structure in the process of bringing groups together. Second, when cross-group association happens, that this would erode social structure and inequality relies heavily on the idea of contact theory. Third, that even if there is no discriminatory social structure, without internal cohesion amongst marginalized groups there will be no civil participation because of the absence of public spirit. Though I believe this shows how Putnam’s ideas on civil inequality are incomplete or even incorrect, it does not fully explain what does happen, or what is correct. The reason for this is that even though Putnam makes it seem this way, social capital is not a predictor of all social phenomena. By using social capital the way Putnam does, he reduces the problem of inequality to that of an immigration issue. There is no explanation for what actually caused this inequality, or the structures keeping them in place. Instead, social capital is presented as a means to overcome all this, while in reality there is few reason to believe that this might be the case. In fact, there is more evidence suggesting that social capital contributes to the creation and sustain of inequality. This makes it so that the argument as presented in this paper has two sides; first, social capital increases discriminatory social structure, norms, out-group hostility and in general reinforces the positional advantages of privileged groups through the circular mechanism of public spirit. Second, the idea of bridging social capital being used to overcome these problems and inequality in general is poorly developed, and theoretically implausible. Though this paper has not explained what can be done about civil inequality, this was also not the goal. I do believe
however that this paper shows how the social capital approach to inequality does not suffice, as it simplifies the problem to that of social segregation and immigration, and even then misses important theory and evidence that suggests counter arguments. This leads to the need for a different understanding of social capital, which takes possible negative externalities into account. In addition, the use of social capital as an umbrella term should be questioned, as shown by the fact that when used as a means to overcome inequality, it does not suffice. Inequality will not be fully solved when we go from “bowling alone” to “bowling in mixed race leagues”, and even though this would be an improvement, there is more to the problem than just that.
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