1
Emergency response organizations and
involvement of volunteers
Name: Edouard Lustermans Date: August 2020
Student number: S1503642 Email: e.j.r.m.lustermans@umail.leidenuniv.nl Supervisor: Dr. J. Reijling Second reader: Dr. L.D. Cabane
2 Abstract
During an emergency or crisis in the Netherlands, the official response organizations orchestrate the emergency response. Volunteers, offering their help and forming a great source of potential
manpower, are barely incorporated in a response. This thesis aims to find out why the good intentions of volunteers remain so underutilized by the official responders. This problem is translated into investigating to what extent organizational structure of an emergency response organization has an effect on the level of volunteer involvement during an emergency response. In order to do this a comparative case study design is used to compare the organizational design of several emergency response organizations and the levels of volunteer involvement in these organizations. The main findings of this investigation is that a relation between organizational structure and volunteer
involvement does exist. Two factors are the main drivers in this relation: the level of centralization of decision making power and coordinating mechanisms within an organization. These two factors are determined by the organizational configuration through which an organization is designed. This thesis concludes that successful volunteer involvement can only be accomplished when decision making power is decentralized in combination with a suitable coordination mechanism in the organization.
3 Table of contents
Chapter 1: Introduction 4
Chapter 2: Theoretical framework 6
2.1 Volunteerism 6
2.2 Emergency response organizations 9
2.3 Friction between volunteers and official responders 10
2.4 Command and control 11
2.5 Mintzberg’s configurations for organizational structure 14
2.6 Expectations 20
Chapter 3: Research design 21
3.1 Design 21
3.2 Data collection 21
3.3 Data analysis 22
3.4 Limitations 23
Chapter 4: Data analysis 24
4.1 Security region Hollands midden 24
4.1.1 General intro 24
4.1.2 Dominant organizational configuration 25
4.1.3 The effects of organizational configuration on volunteer involvement 27
4.1.4 Subconclusions on possible relations 29
4.2 Fire Brigade Hollands Midden 30
4.2.1. General case introduction 30
4.2.2 Dominant organizational configuration 31
4.2.3 The effects of organizational configuration on volunteer involvement 33
4.2.4 Subconclusions on possible relations 37
4.3 Red Cross 38
4.3.1. General case introduction 38
4.3.2 Dominant organizational configuration 39
4.3.3 The effects of organizational configuration on volunteer involvement 40
4.3.4 Subconclusions on possible relations 43
4.4. Conclusion 44
4.4.1 Summarizing the subconclusions 44
4.4.2 Testing the hypotheses 45
Chapter 5: Reflection 47
5.1 Conclusion 47
5.2 Reflecting on case selection and conceptual model 48
5.3 Policy recommendations 48
5.4 Future research 49
4 Chapter 1: Introduction
Spontaneous volunteers often are the first ones to arrive at a disaster scene (Auferbauer et al., 2019, Fernandez et al., 2006, Whittaker et al., 2015). In the very first moments that follow after the impact of a disaster, volunteers and citizens are generally on their own. Remarkably, the general opinion on citizen’s response to and capabilities to help during disasters used to be rather pessimistic. Helsloot and Ruitenberg (2004) contributed to a shift from this pessimist thinking about citizen’s capabilities to more opportunistic thinking by confirming that three myths that are the fundaments of this
disqualification of citizens are not true.
The first of these myths is that citizens panic during disaster, the second myth is that citizens are helpless and dependent, and the third states that looting occurs during and after the disaster. Helsloot and Ruitenberg (2004) invalidated these myths in their work, proving that citizens, and volunteers, are valuable assets when it comes to responding to a disaster. Despite the willingness of many people to support in times of crisis, several problems arise when relief organizations attempt to make use of their help.
After a catastrophic event, unaffiliated volunteers often arrive first at the disaster-location to offer their help (NVOAD, 2014). Because these volunteers, often referred to as ‘spontaneous volunteers’, are not familiar with or connected to any of the yet established emergency management response system, their good intentions are very often underutilized. Presence of volunteers can even trouble and confuse the professional emergency responders, causing a problematic situation (NVOAD, 2014). The paradox is clear: people’s willingness to volunteer versus the system’s capability to utilize them effectively.’ (NVOAD, 2014, p.2) It is this paradox on which this thesis will focus. At one hand, the presence of numerous volunteers is a welcome supplement of manpower, while at the other hand the management of volunteers costs much organizational capacity and requires organizational anticipation. A synergy of structure and good intentions is required. This thesis will examine how the organizational design of emergency response organizations has an influence on the incorporation of volunteers in an emergency response. It will investigate what elements in the organizational structure have an effect on volunteer involvement. The research question reads: To what extent do governance models of emergency response organizations influence the involvement of volunteers and why?
Answering this question will provide insights in what organizational structures and coordinating mechanisms are suitable to incorporate volunteers in the work of an emergency response organization. Investigating this topic is academically relevant since the value of citizens and volunteers during disaster response is highly underestimated. (Helsloot & Ruitenberg, 2004, Perry & Lindell, 2003, Dynes 1994). A vast body of scholarly knowledge exists about coordination structures for emergency response organisations. Dynes (1994) designed a problem-solving model that is appropriate to incorporate volunteers into an organization, utilising their efforts to get things done. Furthermore Mintzberg (1980) provided fundamental configurations that help categorizing organizations based on
5
their build-up and characteristics. What is missing, is a combination of these topics of knowledge to investigate what specific characteristics in the organizational structure of organizations really determine whether, and if so how, volunteers are incorporated in emergency responses. Valuable insights can be acquired that point out what the results of specific organizational structures are on the involvement of volunteers.
The societal relevance of this work is to provide an example of how organizations can incorporate volunteers in their emergency response structure. If the big source of volunteer manpower could be effectively incorporated into an emergency response, this could mean that a significant productivity is gained at times that every hour counts. The more people that can be set to work in the first moments of a crisis or emergency, the more lives can be saved.
The second chapter of this thesis includes a conceptual framework (chapter 2) in which volunteerism, spontaneous volunteers and emergency response organizational models will be introduced and defined. After this conceptualization of key concepts follows a theoretical framework, consisting of two parts. First, Dynes’ theory on coordination models is elaborated, displaying how a ‘military’ model has been the dominant model for structuring emergency response organizations, whilst a problem-solving model works better to incorporate spontaneous volunteers. Second, Mintzberg’s configurations of organizational structure are introduced to support and operationalize this theory. The third chapter entails the research design and research method (chapter 3) describing the choice for a multiple case study, introducing these cases and elaborating on why these cases were chosen. The fourth chapter will concern the application of the theory to the real life cases. Each case has unique elements that can reveal which structural arrangements are profitable to volunteer involvement and which are not. Each case delivers subconclusions that together will help answering the research question. Chapter 5 will contain the discussion and reflection on the results of the study within its wider context, leading to recommendations for policy and future study.
6 Chapter 2. Theoretical framework
To work with the central question of how governance models of emergency response organizations can influence involvement of volunteers in an emergency response, it is important to first introduce the central concepts. This chapter starts with the introduction of concepts of volunteerism and emergency response organizations and the culture around it. The second half of this chapter introduces a
theoretical framework on governance models of organizations. After that, all elements that are present in the research question are introduced and the relation between them will be investigated.
2.1 Volunteerism
Volunteers have a considerable impact on crisis and disaster management (Auferbauer et al., 2019). Especially spontaneous volunteers have an important role when crises occur. The spontaneous type of volunteer participates in a crisis response without any affiliation to formal organizations. Spontaneous volunteers respond to sudden, urgent needs. As introduced at the beginning of this thesis, the activity of volunteers and especially whether their presence and activity should be supported or supressed, is subject to debate. This literature review will briefly summarize and display the two sides of this debate. At one hand, spontaneous volunteers are considered a hindrance or nuisance (Cone et al., 2003; Sauer et al., 2014; Whittaker et al., 2015). Scholars on this side of the debate tend to advocate a top-down approach, closely linked to the command and control structure, also referred to as the ‘military’ approach by Dynes (1994). At the other side of the debate, scholars points out that spontaneous volunteers often arrive first on site and deliver a very important form of relief in the immediate aftermath of an incident (Auf der Heide, 2003; Twigg and Mosel, 2017; Whittaker et al., 2015). Therefore here a more bottom-up model seems to be more applicable.
Based on research Auferbauer et al. (2019) conclude that ‘whatever side one may prefer, research has shown that the appearance and convergence of spontaneous volunteers at the disaster site can have negative side effects for organised relief efforts.’ (Auferbauer et al., 2019). Barsky et al. (2007) state that as the presence of spontaneous volunteers is a common aspect in crisis and disaster management, the official response organizations should be incorporating the efforts of spontaneous volunteers in their coordination structure and decision making. However, Drabek and McEntire (2003) bring up that the command and control model – mostly used by official response organizations – is not very well suited for the spontaneous, loosely organized, volunteers. Their way of working doesn’t match with the inflexibility of the command and control organizational model. Drabek and McEntire (2003) mention that official response organizations are rather static and bureaucratic. If they successfully want to incorporate the efforts of volunteers in their emergency response approach, adaptation is needed so that negative effects that volunteering brings are reduced.
7
Fernandez et al. (2006) confirm that volunteers provide a significant resource of temporary manpower, skills, abilities and resources, while also providing valuable insights on a local community’s needs. Fernandez et al. (2006) state that volunteer assistance is important as people that live or work close to damaged areas can quickly provide help. Volunteers can support and be a surplus to emergency staff. With their basic skills and support activities – such as clearing out collapsed structures – volunteers can relief official responders to focus their efforts on specialized work. (Fernandez et al., 2006). Volunteers do not only bring basic skills however. They may be bringing specialized skills that are highly needed due to a lack of them.
As mentioned by Auferbauer et al. (2019), volunteers have a considerable impact in crisis and disaster management. A unique feature of volunteers is that they have no affiliation to any formal response or relief organization. Whittaker et al. (2015) state that it is likely that due to the global growth of population, urban development and climate change, the disaster risk worldwide will increase. This generates an increase in the frequency of emergencies and disasters in the future, bringing forth an increased demand for crisis and emergency response manpower. Whittaker et al. (2015, p.359) state that ‘informal’ volunteers will probably provide much of this additional capacity.
How to define volunteers? In their work, Whittaker et al. (2015) use a definition for volunteering provided by Wilson (2000). Wilson refers to volunteering as ‘any activity in which time is given freely to benefit another person, group or organisation’. (Wilson, 2000, p. 215) In disaster volunteerism literature this definition is narrowed and becomes more specific. Cnaan et al. (1996) provide a strict definition built on four key dimensions: free choice; compensation; structure; and intended
beneficiaries. Based on these dimensions, it is defined that volunteerism: ‘is entirely voluntary and entail no coercion; involves no reward or even personal interest in the voluntary activity; is undertaken through a formal organization; and involves no relationship or similarities between volunteers and beneficiaries.’ (Whittaker, 2015, p.361). A problematic aspect of this definition is the fact that the enormous amount of work undertaken by people outside of formal organizations is not seen as volunteerism.
A more acceptable and usable definition of volunteerism in the context of emergencies and crises is provided by Shaskolsky (1967, p.8, as quoted in Whittaker et al. 2015, p.362). Shaskolsky defines volunteerism as ‘any act that is orientated to the direct or indirect service or some other person or thing regardless of whether or not such act serves the self-interest of the actor.’ A final addition to that is brought up by Wolensky (1979, p.35). He states that volunteerism is monetarily uncompensated, uncoerced, spontaneous or organized, and oriented towards the high priority values of a person or a group of persons.
8
Whittaker et al. have established four forms of volunteerism based on the dimensions and definitions of Wilson (2000), Cnaan et al. (1996), Shaskosly (1967) and Wolensky (1979).
These form of volunteerism are (Whittaker et al. (2015, p.362):
- Anticipated individual volunteers: Involving volunteers that fulfil the general expectations of a society while operating on an individual basis. An example is a doctor who comes to help victims or a construction worker who comes to help rebuild homes
- Anticipated organization volunteers: Involving volunteers that are regularly associated with an organizations. Their participation is expected and planned for and/or coordinated. An example is the voluntary fire brigade or volunteers involved through the Red Cross
- Spontaneous individual volunteers: Involving volunteers that provide assistance as
individuals, usually in the early stages of a disaster. Examples of their activities are to help in search and rescue activities.
- Spontaneous organization volunteers: involving volunteers that place themselves at the service of an organization once an emergency or a disaster occurs. This form of volunteerism entails the setting up of an organization or using a pre-existing organization that was non-disaster related to assist in a disaster response. In the next section of this literature review the different kinds of relief organizations will be discussed.
This list provided by Whittaker et al. displays that there are many kinds of volunteers. To clearly understand what is meant when the term ‘spontaneous’ volunteer is used, I proved one last, conclusive definition, provided by Paciarotti et al. (2018). This definition is most popular in contemporary crisis management literature and defines spontaneous volunteers as ‘those who seek to contribute on impulse and offer assistance following a disaster or emergency but are not previously affiliated with recognised volunteer agencies and may or may not have relevant training, skills or experience.’ (Paciarotte et al., 2018, p. 261).
9 2.2 Emergency response organizations
Apart of elaborating on how to define volunteerism and identifying what kind of volunteers exist, Whittaker et al. (2015) discuss how to categorize emergency response organizations. Four typologies of organizations are identified, based on a classification of the tasks they fulfil (regular and non-regular) and their structure (old or new).
These four types of response organizations are (Whittaker et al., 2015, p. 360 – 361):
- Established organizations: involving those organizations that perform routine tasks through a yet existing structure. An example is a state fire agency or professional firefighter brigade that comes to action during emergencies
- Expanding organizations: involving those organizations that undertake regular tasks through a new structure. Typically, these organizations are volunteer associations or groups that are usually not involved in emergency-related actions, but do have emergency response functions when a disaster strikers. The expansion of the organization occurs because of people who are not a part of the organization’s regular activities do become active participants as the
emergency function is activated. The organization than employs itself with traditional, but not everyday tasks.
- Extending organizations: involving those organizations that take on new and unexpected functions during an emergency period, while working through already established structures. An example of an organization would be a logging company, or a construction company that would send its bulldozers and other heavy equipment, supplied with operators, to help clear debris and collapsed buildings. This type of organization can present challenges to official response organizations because they work through established structures and don’t come under the effective control of official response organizations.
- Emergent organizations: involving those organizations that are newly created. This includes groups that start working on newly assigned tasks through new structures. Organizations like these emerge when needs of victims are not being met – or when it is perceived that they are not being met – by other organizations. Emergent organizations are often formed during or directly after the emergency period, before the established or extending organizations have arrived. Emergent organizations often enact as critical first responders and help in initial search and rescue actions, the providing of first aid to victims and the assessing of damage and needs of communities. Likewise the ‘rogue volunteers’, emergent organizations can pose a significant challenge to emergency managers as they may experience difficulties to comply to leadership of official responders once they have arrived.
This typology provided by Whittaker et al. displays how organizations can have fundamentally
10
long history of participating in responses, while other organizations emerge from out of nothing, but also disappear after the first phases of a disaster response. This thesis mainly focusses on the
established and expanding organizations. Amongst these organizations are the official responders, acting through a yet established structure and thus more interesting to investigate than organizations that shift into another structure at the moment of a disaster. This is further discussed in the research design section.
2.3 Friction between volunteers and official responders
Despite the key roles ordinary people play in times of crisis, officials often consider their actions as somehow external to or separate from the formal emergency and disaster management system
(Scanlon et al., 2014). Because the important role of ordinary citizens (i.e. volunteers) in the response to emergencies is not recognised by officials, their help is often underutilized or even rejected by professional responders (Scanlon et al. 2014, p.43).
Whittaker et al. support this by stating that those who are not part of the system are often seen as illegitimate, intruders even, impeding effective response and requiring management. Professionals and volunteers with official agencies tend to be viewed as the only legitimate actors. (p 361, Whittaker). In the introduction of this thesis three myths on citizens response during disaster are mentioned and invalidated (Helsloot & Ruitenberg, 2004). The literature on crisis and disaster management supports the statements of Helsloot and Ruitenberg on citizens being ‘useful’ in a disaster response and extend these to volunteers. Whittaker et al. state that ‘citizens may play vital roles in helping those affected to respond and recover, and can provide invaluable assistance to official agencies’. (Whittaker et al. 2005, p.360). An important difference between citizens that are survivors of a disaster and citizens that converge at the site of a disaster to offer their help is made by Mathewson (1957). He observed that survivors of a disaster are more ‘subject to social control’. They behave more passively and
cooperative, while citizens that come towards a disaster location have a tendency to wanting to determine their own way of helping.
This is confirmed by Fernandez et al. (2006). These scholars state that when a strong volunteer management system is absent, individuals who have converged at a disaster site start seeking to use their own judgement and narrow view of the incident to decide what services they will perform. That can result in health and medical issues caused by activities of underqualified performers. (Fernandez et al., p. 1 – 2). In an addition to that, Fernandez et al. identify ‘rogue volunteers’. These are individuals who are involved in response roles in the early stages of an incident and who later may be unwilling to recognize official response leaders. When not following their lead, these ‘rogue volunteers’ may cause safety problems.
11 2.4 Command and control
This section of the literature review introduces Dynes’ theory on emergency planning models. Dynes (1994) provides valuable insights that help understanding the fundaments of the structure of official emergency response organizations. Dynes states that emergency planning finds its origins in a military approach where emergencies are viewed as ‘extensions of an enemy attack’ (1994, p. 142). This way of thinking was embedded in early structural arrangements and has been generalized as the appropriate normative model for all emergencies. The main tool for response of the perceived chaotic situations that emerged after a disaster should be command and control. In his work, Dynes argues that the command and control structure is not suitable for emergency planning. Dynes introduces a more adequate model, based on conditions of continuity, coordination and cooperation.
In this section I will briefly elaborate on the command and control structure and display Dynes arguments of why this structure is not suitable.
Dynes (1994) describes the Command and Control model also as the ‘military model of emergency planning’, indicating it is an offspring of the military. The military command and control model is based on three fundamental assumptions, introduced by Dynes as the ‘triple C’s’. (Dynes, 1994, p.142) These are Chaos, Command and Control. After a disaster Chaos erupts all over the place. Command and Control is required to re-establish order and functionality to resolve the disaster. Dynes states that this logic is strongly connected to military organizations as this is their way of effectively dealing with threatening situations. The triple C assumption is extended to disaster response, resulting in the assumption that certain organizations should be structured in a para-military way in order to deal with emergencies. However, this indicates that extraordinary measures are necessary to resolve a problematic situation of chaos after a disaster strikes. Dynes states that this assumes that individuals and the civilian structure are ‘weak’ and that emergency planning is needed to establish a ‘command’ over the chaos and to ‘regain control’ over the disorganization of individuals (Dynes, 1994, p. 144-145). As mentioned before in this thesis, Helsloot and Ruitenberg have proved that civilians are not as ‘weak’ as is assumed in this military logic.
Dynes confirms this in his work and reveals the consequences that follow from these wrongly assumed conditions in relation to emergency planning. He brings up four conclusions that can be displayed best through a quote:
‘First, local institutions will need to be supplemented or replaced by outside organizations, mostly preferable by military organizations. Second, those local entities which can function effectively are paramilitary organizations, such as police and fire. Third, those organizations that hope to be effective in an emergency need to change their structure toward a para-military traditional form.
12
Fourth, that traditional forms of pre-emergency social organization (families, voluntary organizations) are irrelevant to emergency actions.’ (Dynes, 1994, p. 146)
These conclusions are reinforced by assumptions about the behaviour of emergency workers that also form the foundation of the Command and Control model.
‘First, if persons are so disorganized, this suggests that strong authority structures have to be created. Second, it is assumed that considerable attention must be given in the emergency plan to controlling irrational and antisocial behaviour. Third, significant resource allocation must be made by para-military organizations to control such behaviour. Fourth, because of widespread traumatization, individuals are not likely to be able to perform effectively in most occupational roles. Fifth, since individual disorganization is expected, pre-emergency planning needs to emphasize rigid rules, otherwise people will not exhibit appropriate behaviour. (Dynes, 1994, p.146).
These two quotations display how pre-emergency social structures are disregarded and found irrelevant in a crisis or emergency response by the military model. Individuals and socials structures are assumed to have a reduced capacity to deal with chaotic and horrific situations that follow directly after a disaster. Official responders have a deep distrust of these individuals and structures to make intelligent decisions in emergencies. (Dynes, p.148). As a result, the command and control model establishes a top-down authority structure to make sure that the right decisions are made by the right people. A closed system is created to overcome the inherent weakness of civil society that is presumed to be unqualified to deal with disaster response. (Dynes, p.148).
Dynes suggests a different model based on continuity and cooperation. He holds on to a ‘three C’s’ model, but defines it as Continuity, Cooperation and Coordination (Dynes, 1994, p.150). In his work, Dynes introduces six major assumptions on which he bases a more adequate model of emergency planning, much more aimed at problem solving instead of re-establishing control. These six assumptions are:
1. ‘Emergencies may create some degree of confusion and disorganization at the level of routine organizational patterns but to describe that as a social chaos is incorrect.
2. Emergencies do not reduce the capacities of individuals or social structures to cope. They may present new and unexpected problems to resolve.
3. Existing social structure is the most effective way to solve those problems. To create an artificial emergency – specific authority structure is neither possible nor effective.
13
4. Planning efforts should be built around the capacity of social units to make rational and informed decisions. These social units need to be seen as a resource for problem solving, rather than as the problems themselves.
5. An emergency by its very nature is characterized as decentralized and pluralistic decision making, so autonomy of decision making should be valued, rather than the centralization of authority.
6. An open system be created in which the premium is placed on flexibility and initiative among the various social units, then, and those efforts are coordinated. The goals should be oriented toward problem solving, rather than avoiding chaos.’
(Dynes, 1994, p. 149)
This list of assumptions is much more based on the acknowledgement that social structures and civilians do have capacity to cope with stressful situations. It advocates a flexibility in the response structure so that local organizations and structures can deliver work in a way that is suitable to them, instead of forcefully being formed into a centralized, para-military structure.
The key elements in Dynes’ model are continuity, coordination and cooperation. Continuity is important as Dynes states that the best predictor of behaviour in emergencies is that way people and organizations behaved prior to the emergency. Social systems will still be relatively intact after a disaster strikes and routines that are still in place should be utilized in the planning of emergency actions. Instead of regarding to the people affected by an emergency as victims, the problem solving model assumes that these people still have their decision making capacity and are not stunned, passive or irresponsible (Dynes, 1994, p. 150).
Next to continuity, coordination is important in Dynes’ model. By using the pre-emergency structure of a community, coordination can be developed. In these structures communication lines, proper authority relations and cooperation already is established.
Cooperation, the final C in Dynes’ model, replaces ‘control’ in the military model. In the military model, emergency planners are preoccupied that people will behave in anti-social ways or that
‘civilian’ emergency organizations will not be able to cope with the situations because their employees would be traumatized. (Dynes, 1994, p. 153). Because of the fear that civilian organizations will fail to fulfil their tasks, the military model prescribes a control structure. By doing so however, this model disqualifies a massive and highly important source of manpower: volunteers. Volunteers will show up at the disaster scene however (Dynes, 1994, p.154), creating a problem of an overabundance of potential workers.
This remark is relevant as it indicates that a problem solving structure endorses volunteer involvement in a disaster response. In the problem solving structure, emergency planners don’t experience a
14
problem in manpower and staffing their teams, as they know they can count on a loyal motivated work force, willing to increase its team and effort during an emergency period (Dynes, 1994, p.155). The military model however has a lack of trust in this source of manpower and reasons not to incorporate them in their planning. By doing so, the military model generates two problems. First that they have to recruit personnel to staff its para-military organizations, and second that when a disaster strikes, volunteers will show up without being accounted for. That is when chaos arises, as volunteers start assigning tasks to themselves, not being supervised nor coordinated.
Furthermore, Dynes states that ‘an important advantage of planning according to the problem solving model is that it allows the possibility of improvisation of solutions in the response period.’ (1994, p. 152). In the literature summarized above comes forth that it is exactly such a characteristic in a planning model that is required to establish an effective incorporation of volunteers in a disaster response.
Whittaker et al. (2015) underscored this statement two decennia after Dynes provided it. Whittaker et al. argue that ‘more adaptive and inclusive models of emergency and disaster management are needed to harness the capacities and resilience that exist within and across communities, and that attempts to command and control citizen actions are misguided and may be counterproductive.’ (Whittaker et al., 2015, p. 366)
2.5 Mintzberg’s configurations for organizational structure
Dynes theory of emergency planning models tells us much about what logic organizations adopt to react to disasters. Apart of Dynes’ models, that merely address the behaviour of organizations, for this thesis it is relevant to look at the organizational structure of organizations that would correspond to these preferred behaviour.
To identify, organize and investigate governance models of organizations, applying a fundamental work of Mintzberg (1980) is suitable. Mintzberg established five basic types or so called
configurations for organizational design; 1] Simple Structure, 2] Machine Bureaucracy, 3]
Professional Bureaucracy, 4] Divisionalized Form and 5] Adhocracy. For this study is seems prudent to merely focus on the machine bureaucracy as an example for Dynes top-down model, the
Professional Bureaucracy as a bottom-up configuration and the divisionalized form as possible hybrid configuration.
Mintzberg’s theory of organizational design is based upon these configurations. To compose them, Mintzberg (1980) selected three major elements that together determine how an organization functions and approaches its mission and work. To find these elements, three questions are relevant. First, what kind of basic part of the organization is the key part? Second, what coordination mechanism is
15
employed in the organization to coordinate and supervise the labour? And third, where is power located in the organization, and how and where exactly is it (de)centralized?
Before it is possible to analyse the selected cases in these thesis through Mintzberg’s configurations for organizational design, these need more elaboration. That is what this section will be dedicated to.
To be able to understand the characteristics of Mintzberg’s five basic configurations it is first important to know what the major elements look like and how they colourize organizations and their organizational design.
First the basic parts of an organization. Of these, Mintzberg identifies five, as listed here below. (Mintzberg 1980, p.323)
1. The operating core. This part of an organization includes all employees that are involved in producing the basic products and services of the organization or who are directly supporting that production.
2. The strategic apex. This part of an organization consists of the top management team of an organization.
3. The middle line. This part of an organization consists of all managers positioned between the strategic apex and the operating core. They are located in a direct line of formal authority under the strategic apex and above the operating core.
4. The technostructure. This part of an organization consists of analysts who apply analytic techniques to the organizations structure and production. These analysist consult on how the organization can adopt the organization to its environment to deliver better results. (Examples that Mintzberg brings up are accountants, work schedulers and long-range planners)
5. The support staff. This part of an organization involves groups and teams that prove indirect support to the rest of the organization. (Examples that Mintzberg brings up are a legal counsel, public relations and payroll support)
Figure 1 displays how the basic parts of an organization Figure 1 (Mintzberg 1980, p.324) regularly relate to each other. At the top the strategic apex, beneath it the middle line, and the broad fundament is the operational core. At the left the
technostructure, and at the right the support staff, both extensive bodies that are in contact with the top as well as the bottom of the organization, but located outside the formal lines of authorization.
16
Second the coordinating mechanisms. The basic parts of an organization involve the blocks of which an organization is built. A coordinating mechanism determines how these blocks relate to each other and how work is approached. Mintzberg (1980, p. 324) identifies five coordinating mechanisms, also listed here below.
1. Direct supervision. In this mechanism one individual (typically a manager) coordinates work by giving specific orders to others on how to work and how to deliver.
2. Standardization of work processes. In this mechanism standards that are developed by analysts of the technostructure coordinate the work. These standards are guidelines that through work orders, rules and regulations determine how work should be done.
3. Standardization of outputs. This mechanism also imposes standards that are developed by analysts of the technostructure, but focusses on standard performance measure or
specifications that concern the output or production results of the work.
4. Standardization of skills. This mechanism also involves standards, this time related to skills and knowledge. Before individuals begin to do the work, a required of skills and knowledge must be obtained. By internalizing this standardized skillset the work is coordinated. 5. Mutual adjustment. In this mechanisms, individuals coordinate their work themselves by
communicating informally with other colleagues to discuss how to adjust and improve their production outcomes.
The third and final major element that Mintzberg (1980, p. 326) employs to establish his basic configurations is the decision making system of an organization. Mintzberg links this to the level of decentralization of power, which he defines as ‘the extent to which power over decision making in an organization is dispersed among its members.’ (Mintzberg, 1980, p. 326). Mintzberg categorizes these systems into two groups:
1. Vertical decentralization. This form of decentralization refers to a system in which power for decision making is delegated down the chain of line authority
2. Horizontal decentralization. In this form of decentralization decision making power flows informally outside the chain of line authority, meaning that not only the formally designated managers have this power, but also analysts (in the technostructure) or supportive groups have decision making power.
Mintzberg (1980, p. 327) combines the vertical and horizontal features of decentralization with two other features: selective, in which power is transferred to different places for different decision processes and parallel, in which power over various decisions is dispersed to the same place. This results into, again, five forms of how power can be decentralized through an organization.
17
1. Type A: Vertical and horizontal decentralization. In this form decision power mainly remains located in the strategic apex.
2. Type B: Limited horizontal decentralization. In this form analysts of the technostructure, standardizing everyone’s work, selectively can acquire decision making power, while formal power remains at the strategic apex.
3. Type C: Limited vertical decentralization. In this form much power is delegated to managers in the market-based line units that control a division that requires specific decision making. 4. Type D: Horizontal and vertical decentralization. In this form power flows all the way down
the line of the authority. In the operating core, operators acquire decision making power to be able to make specific choices required for their work.
5. Type E: Selective decentralization. In this form decision making power is diffused widely in the organization to enable working groups to make decisions over their own specific section and production methods.
To help understanding these decentralization forms, Mintzberg developed a visualization of the five possible types of decentralization (see figure 2).
18
Now that the basic elements of an organization have been elaborated, it makes more sense to talk about the configurations that Mintzberg has established, built on these previously introduced basic elements. Mintzberg developed a figure to help visualize each configuration. With aid of these figures I will briefly describe the main characteristics and the organizational logic of each configuration that is relevant to this thesis, being the Machine Bureaucracy (Dynes’ top-down model), the Professional Bureaucracy (Dynes’ bottom-up model) and the Divisionaled Form (a hybrid configuration).
1. The Machine Bureaucracy
The Machine Bureaucracy works through routine. Formalized procedures and large sized units form the operating core. The Machine Bureaucracy could be seen as the advanced form of a Simple Structure. A matured organization that has expanded its scope and now requires a technocracy to develop standards that structure the work. Power remains relatively centralized at the strategic apex, however because analysts of the technostructure have to be able to do their work, they need some power as well. And due to the development of an elaborate standardizing system, a supportive staff is needed to maintain this system, also drawing away decision making power of the strategic apex. However, the level of how sophisticated the systems are must be limited, in order for the strategic apex not to lose too much power. This can be described as limited horizontal decentralization (Mintzberg, 1980).
This configuration often is found in mass production firms or service firms with simple, repetitive work. Mintzberg brings up examples such as insurance and telephone companies or government agencies such as the tax collection department. Also organization that strongly emphasize on the need for safety in their work, such as airlines and fire departments, tend to adopt this configuration.
19 2. The Professional Bureaucracy
The key part of a Professional Bureaucracy is the operational core. Highly trained specialists are hired to do the work and they are given considerable autonomy to be able to do their work. The coordinating system in a professional bureaucracy relies on the standardization of skills that determine behaviour of the operational core. Because the operational core possesses specific skills, middle line managers must professionalize themselves and maintain the support of the professional operators in order have power. If the middle line doesn’t do so, the professional operational core knows how to determine its own way of working.
The technostructure in this configuration is small, as it is difficult to standardize the complex work that the professionals in the operational core are doing. The support staff on the other hand is large and highly elaborated. However, it carries out simpler, routine work tasks to back-up the professionals. Mintzberg implies that the support staff works in a machine bureaucratic ‘pocket’, parallel of the Professional Bureaucracy. (Mintzberg, 1980, p.233).
Because professionals are trained before they start working, the same skills are used in the
organization, no matter the age it has. Standards are automatically established, due to the requirement of skill before people start working in the organization. The Professional Bureaucracy configuration is typically found in school systems, social work agencies, accounting firms, and craft manufacturing firms.
The Professional Bureaucracy
3. The Divisionalized Form:
Briefly described, the Divisionalized Form is an organization that exists of a central headquarter that is overseeing a set of divisions. All these divisions are organized through a Machine Bureaucracy
themselves. Middle line managers are the key element in this configuration as they form the link between the central headquarters and the bodies that represent the divisions. Vertical decentralization is important in this configuration, to provide divisions with line managers on top of them the
autonomy to handle the production processes for their specific sector or market.
To coordinate goals of the divisions with the ultimate goal of the headquarters, the strategic apex needs to find a mechanisms that does so without sacrificing the much needed divisional autonomy (Mintzberg, 1980). This is achieved through standardization of outputs, specifically applied to each
20
division. Performance control systems enable monitoring of results so that performance standards can be maintained. This requires a support staff that is capable of operating the complex systems to maintain these performance standards. This configuration is mainly found in industry, but also government itself functions as a Divisionalized Form.
The Divisionalized Form
The sections above have widely elaborated on two main theoretical findings. The first, developed by Dynes (1994), describes coordination models for disaster response planning. The second, developed by Mintzberg (1980), describes organizational structure of organizations through five configurations that entail a set of characteristics of an organization.
2.6 Expectations
At the beginning of this thesis a central research question was posed: To what extent do governance models of emergency response organizations influence the involvement of volunteers and why? The body of academic knowledge above generates an initial sense of the direction where the answer to this question lies. This expectation is best capture in the form of a hypothesis that can be proved to be correct or wrong later in this thesis. I will employ two hypotheses:
H1: Organizational structure of emergency response organizations has effects on the level of volunteer involvement in their response to emergencies.
H2: An organizational structure with little decentralization of decision making power and standardized working procedures results in a limited involvement of volunteers during an emergency response.
21 Chapter 3. Research design
3.1 Design
To investigate how organizational structure affects volunteer involvement during an emergency response, a comparative case study design is employed. As announced in the introduction of this thesis, Mintzberg’s theory of configurations of organizational design will be applied to real live cases so that the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable can be measured. Working through a case study design will contribute to answering the research question as it enables me to emphasize on the differences between organizations and see if specific differences can explain certain outcomes. The independent variables in this research are ‘organizational structure and ‘dominant coordination mechanism’. The dependent variable is ‘volunteer involvement’. This thesis aims to prove that a relation exists between structural design of an organization and the degree of volunteer involvement during an emergency response by that particular organization.
3.2 Data collection
To test this, three cases of emergency response organizations in the Netherlands are selected. These are: 1] The Dutch security region midden-west Brabant 2] The (voluntary) Dutch Fire Department and 3] The Dutch Red Cross. These organizations are selected because of several criteria. First of all, all of them are active in disaster and emergency response in contemporary times. Second, all organizations are Dutch. This is important as there are differences in emergency response between Western countries and non-Western countries, and also among organizations based of Western origin themselves.
Another advantage of selecting Dutch organizations is that they are based in an environment close to the researcher. He is able to contact them and interview them through telephone while speaking Dutch, a significant advantage to the interviewees and contributing to their cooperation. Third, all
organizations are connected to the structure of Security regions in the Netherlands, indicating they are formally established status as an emergency responder. Fourth, the selection of these cases cover two types of emergency organizations: Established organizations (Fire Brigade, Security region) and Expanding organizations (Red Cross). The remaining two types, extending organizations and
emergent organizations are not considered irrelevant. However, data collection on these organizations is considered too difficult however, making it impossible to provide trustworthy conclusions about these types of organizations. Fifth and final, all organizations deal with volunteers, albeit in very different ways.
Data collection is done in two ways: Through analysis of documents such as organizational charts, flowcharts of decision making processes and website-pages that provide information about the bodies of which the management team of an organization consists. Next to that, interviews with employees or staff members of the organizations provide deeper and more detailed information that has the purpose
22
of validating the information that is publicly available. Interviewing employees, coordinators or other attached personnel of the organizations proves to be a very fruitful way to gather data. Through telephone interviews the researcher got connected to all organizations, enabling him to conduct semi-structured interviews.
3.3 Data analysis
To investigate how governance models of emergency response organizations relate to the involvement of volunteers, the selected cases will thoroughly be analyzed. Chapter 2 introduced the central
concepts of volunteerism and emergency response organizations and provided a theoretical framework to categorize organizational structure. Chapter 4 concerns the analysis of collected data to investigate the relation between the independent variable of organizational structure and the dependent variable of volunteer involvement or incorporation.
The analysis will occur through a structured procedure. First, I provide information on the
organizational structure of the organizations that origins from written documentation, either found through public sources or requested at the particular organization itself. This includes an information about the structure of the organisation in the form of organograms, policy documents and process descriptions. After these written sources are analysed and the organization is categorized in one of Mintzberg’s configurations, the written information is mirrored against information that is collected through interviews with relevant persons from within the organization.
‘Testing’ the written documentation to what interview respondents state has two purposes. At one hand, the interviews aim to add nuance to the investigated documents. At the other hand, the interviews can validate the written documentation to acquire a complete triangulation of the information. The respondents can verify whether the practices of processes and operations are the same as how they have been described on paper.
A number of indicators are determined to narrow the focus and ensure that relevant data is collected. - First, it is relevant to know how volunteers get involved in the specific organization. Are they
actively recruited, do they apply for a membership, are they selected, do they need a specific basic-skill level or is the organization open to anyone?
- Second, training of volunteers will be discussed. Does an organization train its volunteers to ensure that certain skills are present?
- Third, how does an organization determine when volunteers are deployed, and where and when does it deploy its volunteers? What structure do organizations use to match their volunteers to specific situations, or isn’t there such a structure at all?
- Fourth, how are organizations designed themselves? Which of the configurations is most applicable to the organization and which elements are the predominant characteristics of the organization?
23
The main objective of the data collection and analyses is to gather information about how the selected organizations are organized internally and how they work with volunteers. To be more specific on the indicators used in the analysis of the collected data I provide a list below:
1. Independent variable
a. Organizational structure / configuration b. Dominant coordinating mechanism 2. Dependent variable
a. Volunteer involvement in emergency response
3.4 Limitations
The selection of cases includes cases that are connected to the official emergency response structure. That means that only established organizations are mentioned in this research. It is very difficult to investigate and research organizations that operate on an ad-hoc basis as they appear when a crisis breaks out an disappear when the crisis is resolved. There is very little documentation on this kind of organizations. The researcher has deliberately chosen for the core organisations in emergency response because documentation is available and co-workers can be approached to extract the required
information.
The selection of interview respondents however can be seen as a limitation. Employees that are stationed at relevant positions were interviewed, however the researches was dependent on the people he got connected to in order to find the right persons. That has resulted in some compromising because some senior leaders or directors were unavailable or unreachable due to the Corona crisis.
24 Chapter 4: Data analysis
In this chapter the collected data of each case is displayed. It is analysed and the researcher looks for relations between the independent variable (organizational configurations) and the dependent variable (volunteer involvement). This occurs through four sections with varying sub-sections.
4.1 Security region Hollands Midden
4.1.1 General case introduction
This section will briefly focus on the national network of Security Regions in the Netherlands and then zoom in into the Security region of Hollands Midden.
Since 2010 the Netherlands adopted a structure of 25 so-called Veiligheidsregio’s (Security regions) . (2010, Rijksoverheid, Wet Veiligheidsregio’s) This law involved that the entire Dutch territory is divided into geographical regions. All municipalities in a region are part of the Security region, meaning that they will cooperate on a shared and common organisation for safety and security. (Article 8 and 9, Wet Veiligheidsregio’s 2010). The mayor of the largest municipality usually is the chairmen of the Security region. For example in the Security region of Hollands Midden is that the mayor of Leiden, Henry Lenferink. All 25 Security regions together form the Security Council of the Netherlands. This is a national council that consists of all chairmen of the regions and that comes together 4 times per year to maintain a decisive organization of emergency and crisis management. The main goal of the Security Council is to standardize the multidisciplinary cooperation within the Security regions (Article 37 and 38, Wet Veiligheidsregio’s 2010).
Within a Security region, municipalities maintain responsible for safety and security within their own territory. When an emergency occurs that requires a large scale response, with the simultaneous deployment of multiple responding organisation in multiple municipalities, the Security region takes over coordination. Within the Security region of Hollands Midden this occurs through the board of the Security region. The board of a Security region consists of all mayors of the involved municipalities and it is governed by the executive committee in which six mayors of the largest and most prominent municipalities have a seat. (VRHM.nl – organisation, governance and management, surveyed in June, 2020)
A Security region is an umbrella-organisation that establishes cooperation between several emergency response organisations. These are the Bureau for crisis management, the Medical assistance
organization, the Fire Brigade, a Common control room, in which all emergencies reports and alarm notifications come in. The National Police is also a part of the Security region, but it is important to note that the Dutch Police is not under the command of the Security region. (VRHM.nl –
25
The Security region focusses on four major tasks. These are 1] Controlling risks, 2] Responding to emergencies, 3] Supporting connected organisations and 4] Governance of the organisation within the Security region. (Organisation plan VRHM 2017, p.13)
4.1.2 Dominant organisational configuration
The above provided information on the Security region displays that a Security region on its own is not an emergency response organisation. It coordinates emergency responders and provides a structured and well-embedded cooperation forms between emergency response organisations. The Security region structure can’t be neglected when researching emergency response organisations however. As the Security region fulfils the main role in coordinating and determining which organisation is deployed to respond to an emergency, it is relevant to investigate and try to find out how the choice is made to select a specific organisation.
Organisation plan Security region Hollands Midden
In a comprehensive organisation plan of the Security region Hollands Midden the governance
structure and coordination mechanisms of the organisation are described. The organisation plan states that a centralized command structure is established. One executive director / regional commander is in charge of the entire Security region. This person is not to be mixed up with the chairman of the Security region, being the mayor of the largest municipality. The executive director bears responsibility for the performance of the tasks assigned to the Security region and for the
multidisciplinary cooperation with partners during crises. (Organisation plan VRHM 2017, p.10,)
Organisation plan Security region Hollands Midden
A Security region is designed through three management layers. From top to bottom these are the director of the Security region, a sectoral director and a departmental manager. In figure 4.1 these management layers are displayed in an organizational chart. On top is the Director of the Security region, connected to a staff that supports him. The second layer consists out of three sectors, each managed by a sectoral director. Each sector consists out of several departments, that all are led by a departmental manager.
The Organisational plan states that the goal of the organisation is to locate responsibilities and
accountability on a low level in the organisation (Organisation plan VRHM 2017, p.10,). The Security region as an organisation aims to allow elements that are close to the operational side of the
organization to compose policies. (Organisation plan VRHM 2017, p.10,). The Security region has this goal because it assigns high value to the interaction between policy and practice, indicating that practical experience can influence modification of policies to enable better customized standard operating procedures
26
Figure 4.1 The organisational chart of the Security Region Hollands Midden. (Source: Organisation plan VRHM, 2017, p.13)
Coordinating mechanisms and level of centralization
In the Security region, the management puts the main focus on results and performance, not on processes (Organisation plan VRHM, 2010, p.40). This matches with Mintzberg’s (1980)
Divisionalized Form configuration, in which output is standardized so that each department realises a specific output target without losing its ability to determine the strategy on how to do so. The
Organisation plan sums up several more coordinating mechanisms. One of these is that continuous self-improvement is a central characteristic of the organisation (Organisation plan VRHM, 2017, p.41). A culture of giving feedback to one another, establishing a mechanism of mutual adjustment, is described in the Organisation plan. These coordinating mechanisms match with the Divisionalized Form configuration.
Although the Security region has adopted elements that correspond to the Divisionalized Form configuration, the Machine Bureaucracy is most applicable when addressing the level of
centralization. Decision making power is very centralized and the supportive staff is relatively small, resulting in the strategic apex being the core element of the organization. From that point of view, the Machine Bureaucracy configuration is best applicable to the governance structure of the Security region. In a Machine Bureaucracy, processes are standardized and routine determines the approach of emergencies. This course of action can be considered a consequence of the centralized decision making power, as in lower levels no, or very little, free roam exists for deciding to deviate from
27
standard procedures. The organisation plan (2010) reports of elements that indicate that some bottom-up elements exist, such as the aim to compose policies close to the operational side of the organisation. That indicates a limited vertical decentralization, however this is kept to a minimum by the central management, in order to not loosen the installed standard procedures.
4.1.3 The effects of organizational configuration on volunteer involvement
Because the Security region doesn’t employ responders that actively come to aid in an emergency response, the structure of this section is different compared to the following two sections that elaborate on emergency response organisations. However, investigating the Security region is relevant because it coordinates what organisation is activated during an emergency and thus can reveal how established structures determine whether ‘unofficial’ responders (i.e. volunteer organisations) are included in a response or not.
Interviewed:
Strategy advisor, Security region Hollands Midden Crisis control manager, Security region Hollands Midden
Shining a light on the culture within the Security region
The Security region finds it origin in the intense firework disasters in the cities of Enschede (2000) and Volendam (2001). During these disastrous events it was noticed that emergency response organizations were working together, but that coordination for an aligned response was absent. (Strategy advisor, interviewed in June, 2020) The call for coordination grew after these disasters, and that is why in 2010 the Security regions were installed, as described in the section above.
A Crisis control manager of the Security region states that 25 regions for security coordination are a necessity because every region requires a unique, customized approach. A national, one size fits all approach, is impossible to realise. The Crisis control manager states that in the national Security council, consisting of the 25 chairmen of the Security regions, arrangements are made and regulations are set up. However, the 25 Security regions find difficulties to hold on to these regulations, resulting in 25 different ‘kingdoms’, as states the Crisis control manager.
The Crisis control manager states that regulation from top to bottom is problematic to implement. He states that this also is applicable for bottom to top issues. An example is the Corona crisis. On a regional level the Security regions were pushing for scaling coordination up to a national level as soon as possible, as the Security were noticing that the crisis was expanding over regional borders. Before national coordination and finetuning of the approach to contain the virus was established, a lot of time had passed however, states the Crisis control manager.
28
An interesting contrast exists between the established routines and working procedures of the Security region and its core task to respond to emergencies. To expose what is in the way of achieving an optimal emergency response, it is first relevant to elaborate on how the routine within the Security region works.
The Crisis control manager states that an emergency notification is received in the central control room. Based on pre-set criteria, units are sent to the emergency location. In this control room a coordinator for calamities is present that can decide on escalating the status of the emergency. This goes through a so-called GRIP structure. Each increase of the GRIP-level means that coordination is lifted to a higher level. Procedures are followed according to the GRIP-level to which the emergency response is escalated.
It is this stiff and rigid structure that results in a very limited flexibility during an emergency response. The Crisis control manager states that many of his colleagues and co-workers simply aren’t capable of deviating from the standard procedures, for example those that come with the GRIP escalation. The Crisis control manager states that in his personal experiences he came across situations that required a deviating approach. When proposing measures and action plans that were not conform the established routines, co-workers responded with that they didn’t want to work that way or said it would be impossible to work in such ways. A quotation of a response that the Crisis control manager often hear is: ‘We don’t do this, because this doesn’t fit within the GRIP structure.’
The Crisis control manager states that this mainly is the case with employees that origin from the ‘old doctrine’. The Strategy advisor states that the Security region is mostly based on the structures of the Fire department. That explains a long tradition of standard operating procedures and the reluctance to deviate from these procedures.
The Crisis control manager finished our interview with a statement that summarizes the dynamics of the GRIP-structure. ‘The positive side is that holding on to pre-established structures during a crisis or emergency guarantees predictability of the course of action. The downside is that the GRIP-structure brings a lot of protocols, regulations and standard procedures. When the optimal solution or response means deviating from this pre-set response structure, it are our own regulations that are in our way for the optimal emergency response.’ This quotation indicates that a tight organization structure
eliminates flexibility, and with that the possibility to involve non-official parties to a response, being the volunteer organizations.
29 4.1.4 Subconclusions on possible relations
When comparing the written documentation with the statements of involved employees, a conclusion comes forward: a security region is an organisation that merely focusses on coordinating an
emergency response, instead of being actively involved in the response itself. To do that in a way that guarantees predictable situations, so that all involved actors know what their tasks are and what other involved parties are working on, the Security region works through pre-established standard
procedures. These procedures provide detailed regulations and prescriptions regarding the course of action that is to be followed. The Strategy advisor and Crisis control manager both state that these procedures, that are reinforced by a centralized decision making structure, are the obstacle for flexibility in an emergency response. The configuration of a Machine Bureaucracy results in an operational culture that is fiercely boarded up and leaves no space for improvisation. In the case that during an emergency response a volunteer organization offers its help, the chance is low that this offer will be utilized, as volunteer organizations are not involved in the standard operating procedures of the Security regions. Of that final statement can be derived that centralized decision making results in little or no free roam for deviating from standard procedures, and that negatively effects the possibility to involve volunteers during an emergency. It can be concluded that in this case a negative relation between the organisational model and volunteer involvement exists. The Machine Bureaucracy eliminates free roam for deviating from standard procedures in such a way, that the possibility of volunteer involvement is severely limited.
30 4.2 Fire Brigade Hollands Midden
4.2.1. General case introduction
In 2011 a reorganisation in the Dutch Fire Brigade became effective, regionalising all departments and firefighter corps’ in alignment with the Safety Regions (Organisatieplan VRHM, 2017) In the previous section, chapter 4.1, the organisation of Safety Regions has been explained. The Fire Brigade became the executive organisation of the region. All 25 Fire Brigade corps’ (there are 25 Safety Regions, and thus 25 firefighter corps’ have a similar general organizational model that is displayed in the figure below:
(Figure 4.2, Source: https://www.brandweer.nl/media/10415/organogramokt2018.pdf)
This model displays that the fire brigade has three major sectors or departments: operational services, business operations and Risk Control & Preparedness. All these departments or sectors are
31
has subunits. In the operational service sector these subunits consist of the fire fighter bases spread through the region. In the other two sector it merely are teams that perform supportive functions or are active in ‘the Cold side’ (i.e. activities that do not involve active firefighting, but consulting in fire prevention, composing training programs for the fire fighters, etc).
The staff unit of a regional firefighter corps consist of the management office and a strategy & innovation department. The management office supports the commander and sector managers in running operations. Next to that the management office consults the leadership of the corps in how to conduct its operations. The strategy & innovation unit consults in strategic police and processes to reinforce the innovation capabilities of the corps.
4.2.2 Dominant organisational configuration
To elaborate on the organizational model of the Dutch Fire Brigade, investigating policy documents is important. However many of these documents are confidential and not publicly accessible, one of the interview respondents provided an organisation plan of the Safety Region Hollands Midden, published in 2017. Combined with other sources, this document provides insight in coordination mechanisms and standardized procedures that the Fire Brigade implements, allowing me to determine which of the configurations of Mintzberg is applicable to the Fire Brigade governance model.
Organisation plan VRHM 2017
First of all, the Fire Brigade in Hollands Midden consists of 47 bases, of which 43 are manned by volunteers. A concise very precise system monitors the preparedness of these bases to ensure that a quick reaction to an emergency is guaranteed. (p.11, Organisation plan VRHM, 2017). The Fire Brigade works through a table that determines the sequence of bases that organizes an emergency response in such a way that the fire truck with the shortest arrival time is sent to the emergency location. If that vehicle is somehow unable to scramble, the team with the second shortest arrival time is selected.
In bases that are manned by volunteers, a chieftain is in charge. This chieftain bears responsibility for all the aspects of the base, from scheduling in personnel to training and form information provision to recruitment of new personnel. (p.29, Organisation plan VRHM, 2017). The Organisation plan
prescribes that it is important to provide good support to the chieftain of a base, as this is a voluntary job.
Cluster managers of voluntary bases take care of this support. In the Safety Region of Hollands Midden three clusters are established, all with their own manager. The cluster managers share the responsibility and accountability for state of preparedness of the base with the Chieftains of the base. This involves that a sufficient base of skilled personnel must be present, tools and vehicles must be reliable and up to date operational information must be available. (p.29, Organisation plan VRHM, 2017). The Cluster manager merely backs up all Chieftains of the bases and is responsible for their
