High Reliability Theory and the Cuban Missile Crisis

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Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs

Master Thesis of Crisis and Security Management

High Reliability Theory and the Cuban Missile Crisis

August 4th_{, 2019} Gilles MJC Piters S0624624

Supervisor: Dr J. Reijling Second reader: Dr J. Matthys

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Acknowledgements

First and foremost, I would like to express my deep gratitude to Dr Jaap Reijling, my thesis supervisor. Without his excellent support and supervision, I would not have been capable of completing this daunting task in a timely and orderly fashion. I would also like to thank Dr Joery Matthys, who as a second supervisor provided me with great feedback to improve my work.

Also, a thank you to my proof-readers, Joris Lehman de Lehnsfeld, Olivier Frijters, Shai Reches and Evert Lafeber

I would also like to thank my sister and my parents in particular for showing great patience and providing support throughout my study and especially this last stretch.

Finally, I would like to offer a special thanks to Franz von Schmallenberg. I owe him a debt of gratitude for his valuable insights and succour.

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Chapter 1. Introduction

“The cost of freedom is always high, but Americans have always paid it. And one path we shall never choose, and that is the path of surrender or submission.”1

These were the words that the President of the United States of America, John F. Kennedy uttered on the 22nd of October 1962 during the Cuban missile crisis. In the entire speech, the uncertainty of the future is alluded to, the severity of the crisis is underlined and the destructive potential of the crisis is implicitly mentioned. Yet ultimately this crisis was resolved peacefully. A crisis of this magnitude did not suddenly materialise. The event is intertwined with other historical events in the late 50s and early 60s. The crisis in West-Berlin and the erection of the Berlin wall to name but a few. The most important of these as a prelude to this case was the Cuban revolution of 1959. In this event, Fidel Castro ousted the dictator Batista. This, however, did not immediately lead to a communist regime in Cuba. While the ousting of Batista was a revolution, it was not outwardly communist. It was only after the revolution that Castro began turning the revolutionary parties into a socialist-communist front.2

The establishment of a socialist state within the Americas was unacceptable to American leadership, then headed by President Eisenhower. It was in his presidency that the foundations were laid and planning began for an armed insurrection against Castro, supported by the United States. This rebellion was supposed to happen when Cuban emigres in the US would invade Cuba and start the counter-revolution. This invasion became known as the Bay of Pigs invasion. Ultimately, the invasion of Cuba failed as the support amongst the native Cubans for a counter-revolution was low and because the United States wanted to maintain plausible deniability3. Therefore, they were not fully committed to the cause.4

This failed invasion became a learning and turning point for both the United States and Cuba. In the United States, the new President Kennedy learned not to blindly trust in the American

1_{Kennedy, John F., Cuban Missile Crisis Address to the Nation. October 22, 1962. Available at:} https://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/jfkcubanmissilecrisis.html last accessed on: 07-04-2019

2_{Stern, Sheldon M. The Week the World Stood Still: Inside the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis. Stanford Nuclear Age} Series 113237561. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005, 14-16

3_{By using unmarked airplanes and commit the full resources the US had at their disposal, they could maintain} claims that it was a strictly Cuban affair.

4_{Houghton, David Patrick. The Decision Point: Six Cases in U.S. Foreign Policy Decision Making. New York, NY} Oxford University Press, 2013, 89

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military leadership who had promised him victory.5 In Cuba, Fidel Castro learned that the United States were actively trying to undermine him and destroy the revolution he started. So, Castro turned to the Soviet Union for help.6

This plea for help alone might not have persuaded Soviet leadership of the need to aid Cuba. Khrushchev was well aware that Castro was an opportunist.7_{Khrushchev had another reason for} sending missiles to Cuba. By the early 1960’s it had become painfully clear to the Soviet

leadership that the Soviet Union was lagging behind the United States in nuclear-capable

strategic missiles.8_{This missile gap was of great concern to the Soviet leadership as they realised} the United States had plenty of strategic capacity to deliver nuclear weapons into the Russian heartland. Not only from intercontinental ballistic missiles, but also intermediate, and medium-range missiles such as the ones based in Turkey and Italy.9 Therefore, Cuba provided

Khrushchev with an opportunity to balance the strategic equilibrium by posting nuclear missiles in Cuba capable of reaching the American heartland. The orders for this Soviet militarisation of Cuba were given on the 10th of June 1962.10

The crisis started on the 16th of October 1962, when American President John F. Kennedy was notified of a Soviet missile presence in Cuba.11 These Soviet ballistic missiles of medium-range and intermediate-range were capable of being equipped with nuclear warheads and as such these missiles proved to be a direct and tangible threat to the mainland United States of America.12 This threat was unacceptable to American leadership and the American public. For months, President Kennedy had in public decried any potential Soviet military presence in Cuba. As recently as the 4th of September 1962, President Kennedy had warned against deploying missiles and troops on Cuba, and should it happen, “the gravest of issues would arise.”13 Ten days later

5_{Stern, The week the world stood still, 16}

6_{Nathan, James A. The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited. New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1992, 42-43} 7_{Nathan, The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited, 45}

8_{Stern, The week the world stood still, 18-19}

9_{While there is no set missile categorization, a Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) in general is a missile} with a range of up to 3000km. An Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile is in general a missile with a larger range, of over 3000km. In this specific case mentioned here, the missiles stationed in Italy and Turkey were American Jupiter MRBMs with a range of 2400 km.

10_{Nathan, The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited, 45}

11_{Gibson, David R. Talk at the Brink: Deliberation and Decision during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Princeton, [etc.]:} Princeton University Press, 2012, 4

12_{The MRBMs and IRBMs on Cuba were Soviet SS-4 and SS-5 (NATO reporting names) missiles, with a range of} up to 2000km for the SS-4. The range of the SS-5 is debated, but the US assessed it at 3200-3700. Almost the entire US mainland would fall under the range of the Soviet SS-5. For full disclosure, the Cuban Missile Crisis did not only include just the missiles, but also nuclear capable bombers; the Ilyushin Il-28. Yet within the ExComm deliberations and the historiography on the crisis, the missiles are the focus of the issue.

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he reiterated this warning and said that “This country will do whatever must be done to protect its own security and that of its allies.”14

The US assumed a strong and determined stance against the Soviet Union and Cuba. The American leadership decided upon a course of action which lead to a stand-off with the Soviet Union. The Executive Committee of the National Security Council (Henceforth: ExComm) contemplated massive airstrikes and a military invasion of Cuba.15_{In the end, they decided to} start with a blockade and quarantine of Cuba to prevent a further build-up of materiel in Cuba and give the Soviet Union an opportunity for diplomacy, in the meantime a military operation against Cuba was being prepared.16

Tensions ran high in this period and the slightest mistake or accident could prompt an almost unstoppable escalation of events. According to Sir Alistair Horne, a British historian and journalist;

“That Saturday, 27 October, was, and remains, the closest the world has come to nuclear holocaust”.17

Thus, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the American leadership faced a very difficult challenge in trying to deescalate a tense situation but still pursuing their national security interests. Yet, on the 28th of October 1962, Khrushchev accepted an offer made by President Kennedy the day before: The Soviet Union would withdraw its missiles and offensive weapons and the United States would promise not to attack Cuba and would withdraw American nuclear weapons from Turkey.18 With this, the Cuban missile crisis had ended.

The question remains how we can qualify decisions made by the American leadership that prevented a deterioration to a nuclear attack and research the system that prevented the outbreak of war and facilitated peaceful solutions. Did the world escape from a nuclear war by pure luck, or was the solution based on a thoughtful and reliable process that could form the basis of

tackling future similar crises? In this research High Reliability Organisations (Henceforth: HRO) will be used to analyse the Cuban Missile Crisis. While this theory has mainly been used for technologically complex organisations like nuclear reactors and submarines, it has also been

14_Ibid.

15_{Preston, Thomas. The President and His Inner Circle: Leadership Style and the Advisory Process in Foreign}

Affairs. Power, Conflict, and Democracy 193165635. New York [etc.]: Columbia University Press, 2001, 116-118

16_{Preston, The president and his inner circle, 124}

17_{Horne, Alistair. "Recalling the Cuban Missile Crisis." The Spectator. January 17, 2007. Accessed April 07, 2019.} https://www.spectator.co.uk/2007/01/recalling-the-cuban-missile-crisis/

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used to research the healthcare service and has been advised for business as well.19 As such, an application of HRO-theory on a non-technical organisation such as the American political and diplomatic leadership seems feasible and would fill a void in this respect.

Without delving too deep into the theoretical framework, which shall follow in chapter 2, the prime theories we shall be using are nuclear deterrence, HRO-theory and NAT.

The aforementioned nuclear deterrence theory, was a doctrinal way of thinking during the majority of the Cold War. The key concept of this idea was that one must have such a great capacity to punish the opponent, that one can deter one’s opponent from following an unwanted course of action. This resulted in a tense atmosphere throughout the Cold War, including the period of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

While diplomacy is not a nuclear reactor, it does share similarities to the processes of a nuclear reactor. A failure of diplomacy during the Cold War could still have disastrous results. If one assumes that an all-out war and a nuclear exchange between the Western and Communist bloc was an undesirable result, then diplomacy does become a high-risk environment. Furthermore, adhering to the theory of nuclear deterrence, one should always provide a credible threat and be prepared to use nuclear arms.20 Thus, diplomacy was a high stakes game wherein states were forced to portray they were ready to use nuclear weapons, yet prevent the actual usage of these weapons at all times.

This tense atmosphere is typical for a high-risk organisation according to Normal Accident Theory (henceforth: NAT). Perrow’s Normal Accident Theory is the theory against which the creators of HRO-theory opposed themselves.21_{Perrow states that accidents are inevitable when} dealing with complex systems. Rather than blaming the circumstances of the systems, Perrow states that the issue lies with the organisations dealing with the systems. Normal accident theory, being the predecessor on which HRO-theory was built, says that an organisation which is tightly coupled, has complex interaction and has the potential for catastrophe is at risk of normal

accidents. HRO-theory countered that and states that organisations in such an environment can be highly reliable.

19_{Weick, Karl E., and Kathleen M. Sutcliffe. Managing the Unexpected: Assuring High Performance in an Age of}

Complexity. University of Michigan Business School Management Series 236305050. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass,

2001, chapter 1

20_{Green, Philip, and Mershon Center. Social Science Program in National Security. Deadly Logic: The Theory of}

Nuclear Deterrence. Columbus]: Ohio State University Press, 1966, 238

21_{Sutcliffe, Kathleen M. "High Reliability Organizations (HROs)." Best Practice & Research Clinical}

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The following question will lead us through our research;

“To what extent could the ExComm during the Cuban Missile Crisis from October 16th until October 28th 1962 be considered a High Reliability Organisation, or is it more subject to Normal Accident Theory?”

The main aim of this research is to test the theory of HRO on American leadership during the Cuban Missile Crisis as exemplified in the ExComm. Our second aim is to generate more knowledge on this tense period from a new organisational perspective.

The academic relevance of the research lies in the fact that HRO-theory so far has not been used in a non-technical environment like politics. Therein lies the challenge as well, to adequately and diligently apply the theory to a situation that was in flux and an organization that did not

primarily use complex technologies and was not wilfully set up as an HRO. Yet we are confident that we can succeed in this challenge, as the crux of HRO-theory is not the usage of technology, but the organisation of the people. Therefore, this research has merit as it is feasible, and the realms of diplomacy and high-level political decision-making have so far remained outside the scope of HRO-theory research.

The societal relevance lies in the idea that in the Western world, war is increasingly considered as an undesirable outcome and the result of failed politics. Should the diplomatic and

government services be, or be capable to be reformed into, an HRO, this could provide for a more stable diplomatic and decision-making system in which the recourse to war would become less likely. Additionally, this research would provide a renewed insight into the Cold War and the Kennedy administration, and in particular on their decision-making.

Through this introduction, we aimed to provide the reader with a general background into the topic and the guidelines through which we aim to achieve our research. In the next chapter, we will elaborate on the analytical framework and will discuss the main theories used. This will provide us with a framework around which we can centre our research. Chapter three contains our methodology and how we aim to do our research through data collection and analyses and the operationalisation of our concepts. Chapter four contains the subsequent analysis of the case and the results we found. Finally, in chapter five we will discuss the results and provide avenues for further research. In the appendix, we will provide a timeline of events during the crisis.

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Chapter 2. Theoretical and Analytical Framework

In this chapter, we will discuss the theories we will use to answer our research question. Our first theory is the theory of nuclear deterrence and linked to that the theory or doctrine of flexible response which was developed during the Kennedy administration. These are important to discuss as they form the basis of (nuclear) diplomacy and doctrinal thinking during the Kennedy period of the Cold War. To understand the concepts of Nuclear Deterrence and Flexible response is required to understand the modus operandi of the American government regarding

international affairs and defence. These theories also provide the hazardous situations in which many HROs or organisations adhering to NAT function. Next, we will discuss the organizational theories of Normal Accident Theory and High Reliability Theory. Finally, while we already take preliminary steps into the conceptualisation of our concepts in this chapter and especially in the HRT section, we will define our concepts at the end of this chapter and end with a conceptual framework.

2.1 Theories

2.1.1 Nuclear deterrence theory

While we will not go into too much depth on deterrence theory, it is important to discuss this theory because it was a leading theory and school of thought during the Cold War. As such, the threat of nuclear annihilation was so omnipresent that to discuss the Cuban Missile Crisis without broaching this topic would be to leave out a very important cornerstone of Cold War dynamics.

The concept of deterrence is not a wholly new concept. The basic tenets have already been discussed by Thomas Hobbes.22 In the past, much of the justice system was based on a method of deterrence as well. Thomas Schelling, one of the founding fathers of the academic concept of Nuclear deterrence theory explained deterrence as followed: “To deter, is somehow to persuade another whom one defines as a ‘potential enemy’ to abandon a certain path of activity by making it appear to him to be in his own self-interest to do so; deterrence is the process of persuasion.”23

22_{Goldstein, Seth M., Brian R. King and Richard Arnold. "Deterrence Theory." In 21st Century Political Science: A}

Reference Handbook, 368-375. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc., 2011, 502

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This is a very diplomatic and friendly way to describe deterrence. As deterrence is not merely to persuade. It is to persuade by force. Or as put by Huth: “deterrence is the use of threats by one party to convince another party to refrain from a certain course of action.”24

Nuclear Deterrence continues in this strain but adds a few parameters. First of all, the immediate destructive power of nuclear weapons. Earlier, the threat of war would entail casualties and destruction, but over a longer period of time. Now, using nuclear weaponry the effects would be almost immediate and absolute. A nuclear weapon would cause massive destruction. On top of that, the effects were near-instantaneous. As soon as one was attacked one could launch a strike. No longer was a protracted war effort needed to destroy an enemy.

Important concepts within nuclear deterrence are credibility and capability. These two are closely linked as a strengthening of nuclear military capability would, in turn, result in a

strengthened position of credibility.25 The cause of this increase in credibility is twofold. First, an increase in military capability increases punitive possibilities. Thus, it would be more costly for a hostile state to attack. Secondly, an increase in military capability increased the states defensive capability. This, in turn, would increase the likelihood of a state’s retributory action as a

strengthened defensive capacity would make it less vulnerable to a hostile state attack. To

conclude, capability is the most important aspect as it increases credibility. After all, if one is not capable to deliver on his threats, one is not credible.

Another aspect of credibility is that a state should not be deterred by non-credible threats or incredible threats by their opponent.26 So only when an enemy threat is credible should a state be deterred. In turn, a threat is only credible if a state is willing to act on that threat. Therefore, one must actually deliver on the threats, as merely pretending to be willing, will almost certainly leak out and disrupt any credibility of a threat.27_{Once you have lost credibility, future threats will} seem less credible as well.

Linked to this idea of credibility is brinkmanship. Brinkmanship is the art of bringing crises to the brink of catastrophe to achieve one’s results. This implies making threats and backing up those threats and has been likened by scholars to a game of chicken.28 Whoever blinks last wins,

24_{Huth, P. (1999). Deterrence and international conflict: Empirical findings and theoretical debates. Annual Review}

of Political Science, 2, 25–48

25_{Powell, Robert. Nuclear Deterrence Theory : The Search for Credibility. Cambridge [etc.]: Cambridge University} Press, 1990, 174

26 _{Green, Deadly logic, 167} 27_{Green, Deadly logic, 238}

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but if nobody blinks it ends in catastrophe. In brinkmanship there are only four possible

outcomes, Nuclear exchange, State A submits, State B submits or both submit and a compromise is found. While compromise is the most desirable option, it would mean both parties would have to submit equally and at the same time.

Flexible response

In practice, nuclear deterrence became visible in American nuclear policy during the Eisenhower administration. Deterrence theory could take hold in the United States in this period for a couple of reasons.29_{First of all, it fit with the opinion the American leadership had of an ever-aggressive} Soviet Union. Second to that was the prevalence of Realist outlooks of International Relations at the time. This outlook maintains that states would always act in their own self-interest and exploit weaknesses of their opponents and therefore they must be deterred. Finally, there were the experiences of the Second World War in which appeasement and a soft stance against Hitler had led to war.

The United States under Eisenhower had lost its monopoly on nuclear weapons as the Soviet Union had developed their own nuclear weapons. Because of this, the need arose for both states to prevent an accidental escalation into a nuclear war. During the Eisenhower presidency, the doctrine was developed to react to any Communist attack anywhere in the world with the full military arsenal of the United States, including nuclear weapons. The rationale behind this was that because the Soviet Union had knowledge of American intentions when threatened, the Soviet Union would not engage in aggressive behaviour, weary of the inevitable American nuclear retaliation.30_{This, of course, is an incredible threat. Massive retaliation could not be seen} as credible as it would be irrational to react to a limited provocation with an immediate

escalation towards nuclear annihilation.

Therefore, President Kennedy developed the strategy of flexible response. This strategy would improve American credibility as it allowed for a US reaction to a provocation without

immediately resorting to nuclear weapons.31_{The strategy of flexible response allowed the United}

29_{Goldstein, Deterrence Theory, 503} 30_{Goldstein, Deterrence theory, 503}

31_{Gaddis, John Lewis. 2005. Strategies of Containment : A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy}

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States to maintain three elements of response.32 The first element was direct defence; meaning a conflict with conventional military means. The second element was deliberate escalation, this allowed for the usage of tactical nuclear weapons should the conventional conflict require it. Finally, there was the element of a general nuclear response. Meaning an engagement with strategic nuclear weapons.

Afterword on nuclear deterrence.

Nuclear deterrence theory has lost much of its credibility. Scholars have been more critical of the theory and it is increasingly being seen as a cause of crisis instability instead of providing

stability.33_{The end of the Cold War made us reappraise deterrence theory and the Realist} approach to international relations has also become less prevalent. So, the idea that states are waiting for an opportunity to strike and expand has lost credibility.34_{Therefore deterrence theory} has a bad reputation these days, especially considering the stakes that are at play.

In our research, we will use the framework of Nuclear deterrence as it existed in that period. So, while the contemporary usage of nuclear deterrence might have waned, during the Cuban Missile Crisis it was still prevalent. Because it was still prevalent it is valid and important for us to use in our research as within historical research it is imperative to assess the period researched using the ideas and concepts prevalent in that period.

2.1.2 Normal Accident Theory

To best understand High Reliability Theory and the origins of the theory it is important to

discuss Normal Accident Theory first. Normal Accident Theory was developed and presented by Charles Perrow in his 1984 book, Normal Accident: Living with high-risk technologies.35_His work was seminal in organisational theories in crisis management on how to explain how accidents happen in high-risk environments despite best efforts to the contrary. His work

focusses not so much on the technological aspect of the organisations, but rather on the systemic features and organisational aspects. He states that normal accidents occur because of systemic and organisational errors and are, as such, inevitable, normal. Sagan described it as follows:

32_{NATO. "NATO'S Strategy Of Flexible Response And The Twenty-First Century." 1986. Accessed May 24, 2019.} https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/1986/LLE.htm

33_{MccGwire, Michael. "Nuclear Deterrence." International Affairs 82, no. 4 (2006): 780} 34_{Goldstein, Deterrence Theory, 506}

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“although complex organisations may work hard to maintain safety and reliability, serious accidents are nonetheless a ‘normal’ result or an integral characteristic of the system. Serious accidents in organizations may be rare, but they are inevitable over time.”36

According to Perrow, organisations can be divided into four categories, dependent on two characteristics; coupling and interaction.37_{An organisation can be loosely coupled or tightly} coupled, and can have linear or complex interactions. Before we go into these separate categories we first need to divulge on coupling and interaction.

Coupling means how tightly the systems processes interact with each other. When a system is tightly coupled this means that the processes are very time-dependent. Interactions occur quickly and delays are not possible. On top of that, the product that is produced is invariant. There is only one way the product can and should be made. A tightly coupled system also does not allow for any slack. The processes must be done absolutely precise. Finally, in a tightly coupled system, safety measures and redundancies are usually planned and designed into the system.38 Compare this to loosely coupled systems. In loosely coupled systems delays and stops are possible, products can be produced in variable ways and processes can be repeated.

Interactions in a system can either be complex or linear. As the names already imply, linear means that sequences follow each other in a linear serial sequence, a good visualisation would be an assembly line. A product enters at A, then goes to B, then to C, and so on. When an issue arises, it is easily spotted and the way it influences a system is clear. Complex interactions are the opposite. Here it is sometimes unclear how one part of the system interacts with another part of the system. According to Perrow: “Complex interactions are those of unfamiliar sequences, unplanned and unexpected sequences, and either not visible or not immediately

comprehensible.”39

The four categories that then follow are:40

1. Tightly coupled linear interactions, e.g. dams and rail transport

2. Tightly coupled complex interactions, e.g. Nuclear powerplants and space missions 3. Loose coupled linear interactions, e.g. assembly lines and manufacturing

36_{Sagan, Scott Douglas. The Limits of Safety : Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons. Princeton Studies} in International History and Politics 099720388. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993, 28

37_{Perrow, Normal Accidents, 78} 38_{Sagan, Limits of Safety, 34} 39_{Perrow, Normal Accidents, 78}

40_{Perrow, C., “Normal Accidents” in International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences. Oxford} [etc.]: Elsevier Science, 2002, 34

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4. Loose coupled complex interactions, e.g. universities and mining

Of these four, the crucial category is category two. When a system is tightly coupled and has complex interactions, it has the potential for normal accidents. Still, one final factor is needed to create the systems to which NAT applies, and that is the potential for catastrophic results. In category two, this potential for catastrophic results is almost always self-evident, yet a catastrophe as well requires a perfect mix of circumstances.41

The theory of Normal Accidents has retained popularity and significance since its inception. Scholars like Sagan and Snooks added to the existing body of literature. Sagan linked the concepts of bounded rationality as coined by Herbert Simon, and group interests to NAT.42 While Snooks showed how NAT, the garbage can model of decision-making and cognitive methods interact and need each other and could link individual, group and system levels within an organisation.43 Yet, important as well is the group of scholars from the University of

California in Berkeley that reacted to NAT and laid the foundations of HRO-theory.44

To conclude, NAT is based around three concepts; coupling, complexity and risk. Only if the combination of these three is right, being tight coupling, high complexity and high risk, is an organisation at risk of Normal Accidents.

2.1.3 High Reliability Theory

Contrary to the perhaps depressive outlook of NAT on organisations and systems, HRO-theory is more positive. Theorists of HRO-theory believe that an organisation that works in a dangerous environment can work safely despite the inherent hazards of the systems. Or as Sagan puts it, according to high reliability theorists, organisations working in hazardous environments can be seen as reasonably rational actors: “they have consistent and clear goals and can therefore learn how to maximize those objectives over time.”45_{In this way, accidents would be prevented and} high reliability of the organisation can be achieved.

41_Ibid.

42_{Sagan, The limits of Safety, 252-256}

43_{Snook, Scott A. Friendly Fire the Accidental Shootdown of U.S. Black Hawks over Northern Iraq. Princeton, N.J.:} Princeton University Press, 2000.

44_{Sutcliffe, Kathleen M. "High Reliability Organizations (HROs)." Best Practice & Research Clinical}

Anaesthesiology 25, no. 2 (2011): 134

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HRO-theory has seen several evolutions of the concept and characteristics. Roberts in her 1989 piece defined an HRO as having the following characteristics:46

1. Hyper-complexity, 2. Tight coupling,

3. Extreme hierarchical differentiation,

4. A large number of decision-makers in complex communication networks, 5. A degree of accountability that does not allow for substandard performance, 6. High frequency of immediate feedback about decisions,

7. Compressed time factors,

8. Simultaneity of critical outcomes.

Points 1 and 2 are similar to those in NAT. The extreme hierarchical differentiation means that there are several levels within the hierarchy and all have their own mechanisms for regulation and control. A large number of decision-makers also means there are complex information and control networks at play with built-in redundancies. Point 5 can be equated to the slack as mentioned in NAT: there is no room for deviations from the standard procedures. Point 6 says decisions have immediate impact, again pointing to little room for slack. Point 7 means that the processes are measured in small time frames. Finally, point 8 signifies that there are several outcomes that must be achieved at the same time, so there is little to no room for deviation. These characteristics still resemble the characteristics of tight coupling and complex interaction as explained by Perrow in NAT. These characteristics also elucidate more on the environment in which an HRO works than rather on the organisational aspects themselves. Therefore, as in NAT, an HRO works in a hazardous environment using tightly coupled systems and complex interactions. Sagan condensed the work of early HRO-theory and claimed that according to HRO-theory an HRO adheres to the following four requirements:47

- Leadership Safety Objectives; Safety and reliability have the highest priority for leadership.

46_{Roberts, K.H.; Rousseau, D.M. (1989). "Research in nearly failure-free, high-reliability organizations: having the} bubble". IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management. 36 (2): 132–139

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- Redundancy; Redundancies need to be built into the system so that when one part fails, another part of the system can take over the task or reduce the damage. This also includes information and communication networks.

- Decentralisation, Culture and Continuity; These are very important and contain some paradoxes. While in a tightly coupled system there is usually a strong centralization effort as only the top of the hierarchy knows the complete big picture, in HROs

decision-making is delegated to low levels as well. The reason for this is that low-level employees in the field usually have better local case knowledge. So, to increase efficiency in case of an emergency the low-level employees have the authority to stop operations. Culture entails an internalization of reliability and the conduct of safe operations.

- Organisational Learning; As trial and error are unfeasible in the HRO environments, continuous analyses of near-failures and simulations of errors teach the organisation how to deal with adversity.

Their characterisations of HROs are all based on circumstances of high complexity and tight coupling in a hazardous environment. Most of the early research into HRO developed around cases of technological complexity or the hazardous environment of operation alone. A watershed in thinking about HRO-theory was the article by Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld. They

emphasised that not the circumstances or complexity of the organisation are the most important. Tight coupling and complex interactions were not necessarily the key features of an HRO. What Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld regarded as the most important characteristic of an HRO, was mindfulness.48

In their seminal piece, the authors reconceptualised reliability and added mindfulness to the HRO-theory vocabulary. Reliability, according to the authors, had too often become equated with routine. This is quite the opposite of what is important in an HRO. The authors stated that an organisation is reliable not necessarily when it can operate on routine without variance, but rather when an organisation can deal with variance and unexpected situations without impeding operations. Or as the authors conceptualised reliability: “as an overall goal of the system and whether the system, in the global sense, works appropriately; not only individual components or subsystems. This distinguishes it from definitions that focus on the repeatability or

reproducibility of single observable actions.”49

48_{Weick, K. E., Sutcliffe, K. M., & Obstfeld, D. Organizing for high reliability: Processes of collective mindfulness.} In R. I. Sutton & B. M. Staw (Eds.), Research in organizational behavior, Vol. 21, (1999)

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The innovative work of the piece of Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld lied in the concept of mindfulness. The authors held the cognitive processes as the feature that connects HROs and distinguishes them from other organisations.50_{A state of mindfulness enables an organisation to} discover and manage unexpected events which in turn increases reliability. Mindfulness, in turn, is made up of several characteristics:51

- Preoccupation with failure

- Reluctance to simplify interpretations - Sensitivity to operations

- Commitment to resilience - Deference to expertise

To an HRO the preoccupation with failure is the constant throughout operations. More than the celebration of success, an HRO focusses on errors or near misses. In this way, an HRO is more capable of dealing with unexpected situations as they are constantly preoccupying themselves with deviances from the norm.52

The reluctance to simplify interpretations is important in keeping an open mind towards different situations. When an organisation allows its members to simplify interpretations a member can reduce their field of vision to merely his direct surroundings. A as complete and nuanced picture of operations is desirable in an HRO.53 This implies that the members of an HRO realise the uniqueness of problems and that there are no best practices.

Sensitivity to operations is the concern the organisation has with the unexpected.54 It entails the realisation of what your part is in the big picture.55 This is important so that an actor knows where he stands but also what is happening throughout the organisation that could influence his operations or what his operation could influence. Should something unexpected occur, this is immediately picked up. Sensitivity to operations also implies good communication systems that are open and accessible to everyone in the chain.

50_{Ibid. 36-37} 51_{Ibid. 38-39}

52_{Weick, Karl E., and Kathleen M. Sutcliffe. Managing the Unexpected : Assuring High Performance in an Age of}

Complexity. University of Michigan Business School Management Series 236305050. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass,

2001, 10-11

53_{Weick Sutcliffe, Managing the Unexpected, 11} 54_{Weick Sutcliffe, Managing the Unexpected, 13}

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Commitment to resilience is the realisation that despite all precautions, errors might still happen. Resilience is about trying to keep errors small and finding workarounds to keep operations going.56_{Therefore, it is important to anticipate failures and predict and prevent danger from} happening. This concept also deals with resilience in the system. This implies the capacity to cope with unexpected events and bouncing back when they happen.57

Finally, deference to expertise or the under specification of structures means that formal hierarchies and ordered structures are not fixed. Authorisation and decision-making can be deferred to the person with the most expertise regardless of rank.58_{This is important to an HRO} as this allows low-level employees or the person in the front line to make a decision on ceasing operations should he detect danger or an anomaly without the decision to have to go up the chain of command.

In these aspects an important and recurring theme is good communication throughout the organisation and its members, the appreciation of the context specificness of solutions and to think or meditate on potential problems. This is exactly the way how Hales and Chakravorty operationalised the idea of mindfulness in their research.59

Hales and Chakravorty expanded on the work done on HRO-theory by Weick and Sutcliffe. They used the five characteristics of Weick and Sutcliffe but added one more; Fast, accurate and robust information systems.60_{Meaning that communication is a key aspect and information} could travel around the organisation in a fast yet accurate fashion.

To conclude, an HRO usually operates in an unforgiving environment, and comprises of six characteristics; preoccupation with failure, reluctance to simplify interpretations, sensitivity to operations, the under specification of structures, a commitment to resilience, and fast, accurate and robust information systems.

56_{Weick Sutcliffe, Managing the Unexpected, 14}

57_{Weick, Sutcliffe, Obstfeld, Organizing for high reliability 46} 58_{Weick Sutcliffe, Managing the Unexpected, 16}

59_{Hales, Douglas, and Satya Chakravorty. "Creating High Reliability Organizations Using Mindfulness." Journal of}

Business Research 69, no. 8 (2016): 2874

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2.1.4 Beyond NAT and HRO-theory

We have discussed how HRO-theory and NAT are two opposing schools of thoughts on the significance of organisational design. Sagan organised some of the opposing thoughts in a table61:

Yet, while HRO-theory and NAT are often portrayed to be antithetical, this is not necessarily so. Weick himself admitted that HRO-theory does not exclude NAT.62 Leveson et al. in their article as well state that NAT and HRO-theory could, after some improvements of the theories,

complement each other.

What Leveson and his colleagues argue is that both HRT and NAT have flaws. NAT is too general and organises coupling and complexity without taking into account different kinds of coupling and complexity. According to Leveson, many systems are in fact already taking into account coupling to remedy errors and provide for margins before system failures would impact safety. 63_{On top of that, tight coupling does not necessarily have to be negative. Orton and} Weick see a tightly coupled system as a system operating as a whole, while a loosely coupled

61_{Sagan, Limits of Safety, 46}

62_{Weick, Karl E. "Normal Accident Theory As Frame, Link, and Provocation." Organization & Environment 17,} no. 1 (2004): 30

63_{Leveson, Nancy, Nicolas Dulac, Karen Marais, and John Carroll. “Moving Beyond Normal Accidents and High} Reliability Organizations: A Systems Approach to Safety in Complex Systems.” Organization Studies 30, no. 2–3 (February 2009): 231

High Reliability Theory Normal Accidents Theory

- Accidents can be prevented through good organizational design and management.

- Safety is the priority organizational objective

- Redundancy enhances safety: duplication and overlap can make “a reliable system out of unreliable parts” - Decentralized decision-making is needed to permit proper and flexible field-level responses to surprises - A “culture of reliability” will enhance safety by encouraging uniform and appropriate responses by field-level operators

- Continuous operations, training, and simulations can create and maintain high reliability operations

- Trial and error learning from accidents can be effective and can be supplemented by anticipation and simulations.

- Accidents are inevitable in complex and tightly coupled systems

- Safety is one of a number of competing objectives

- Redundancy often causes accidents: it increases interactive complexity and opaqueness and encourages risk-taking. - Organizational contradiction: decentralization is needed for

complexity, but centralization is needed for tightly coupled systems.

- A military model of intense discipline, socialization, and isolation is incompatible with democratic values.

- Organizations cannot train for unimagined, highly dangerous, or politically unpalatable operations. - Denial of responsibility, faulty reporting, and reconstruction of history cripples learning efforts.

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system operates as its separate modules. This latter version in crisis situations might be the least favourite option.64

Safety should or is the primary concern for leaders of an HRO according to HRO theorist La Porte and Consolini.65 This is not always the case. When there is a war, for example, other objectives might take precedence over safety, even in an HRO. On the other hand, the picture is not as bleak as NAT would sometimes paint it, and there usually is a trade-off between safety and system operations.

Redundancies become a key issue then in providing for margins and safety measures. To HRO-theory redundancies can loosen coupling and reduce accidents resulting from component failure. Yet, according to Levenson, in tightly coupled organisations the origin of accidents lies in organisational, cultural or human failure and these can hardly be prevented through

redundancies.66 Besides which, redundancies are limited in their effectiveness in reducing risks, they also add complexity and encourage risk-taking. The best redundancy rather than material (being that there is additional equipment built in the system to act as a stop-gap should primary equipment fail) or personnel redundancies (meaning that several people or groups within the organisation have the same task) would be a form of collective mindfulness. NAT proclaims that built-in redundancies are a characteristic of a tightly coupled system and thus increases the complexity of the operations and the risk of failure. Yet, when considering redundancies as collective mindfulness, then the built-in redundancies in a tightly coupled system are actually beneficial to the operations.

Decentralised decision-making is a very important aspect of HRO-theory. Decentralisation allows lower-level employees with the necessary knowledge and judgement to make decisions, yet, these frontline employees might not necessarily have this knowledge. On top of that, they lack the strategical or big-picture overview that is sometimes required.67_{On the other hand, in a} centralised system, the separate actors might be too absorbed in their own sector to realise or appreciate how the other sectors operate. Complexity then becomes an issue as the actors do not take into account the other actors in the system which might enable counterproductive measures

64_{Orton, J. Douglas, and Karl E. Weick. "Loosely Coupled Systems: A Reconceptualization." The Academy of}

Management Review 15, no. 2 (1990): 210

65_{Leveson, moving beyond 239} 66_{Leveson, moving beyond 234} 67_{Leveson, moving beyond 236}

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to be taken. So ideally, a decentralised system would have all the actors and participants in the system to realise their and their partners' position and the big picture are play.

In this paragraph, we tried to show how NAT and HRO-theory do not necessarily contradict each other and that an organisation can show signs of characteristics from both the theories. Next, we will conceptualise our concepts and provide for a conceptual framework.

2.2 How everything ties together and why all these theories are needed

Now that we have created a theoretical framework from which we can build our thesis, it is important to take a moment and reassess why these theories are important to the research. Nuclear deterrence theory shows that the world in the 1960s was a dangerous place. When Kennedy’s strategy of flexible response was implemented, the dangers of a nuclear war were present. If we can show in our analysis that the members of ExComm were of the same opinion, it can be concluded that the organisation works in a dangerous environment. Therefore, the ExComm would meet one of the criteria of NAT. Considering and assuming that the high

potential for an exchange of nuclear weapons is a hazardous environment. Tied to this is also one of the other tenets of nuclear deterrence. A core principle in brinkmanship is to keep the enemy guessing as to your intentions and resolve. Therefore, the complexity of the situation could not completely be overseen. There is also a strong case to be made for the characteristic of tight coupling. As an exchange of hostilities even at low level had the potential to escalate the situation increasingly fast. Therefore, using the theory of nuclear deterrence allows us to show the tendencies of NAT characteristics in a nuclear stand-off.

NAT is important to discuss for a couple of reasons. First, because it is paramount in the development of HRO-theory. Secondly, while NAT and HRO-theory are portrayed as anti-theses, this is not necessarily the case. Even Weick, one of the prominent scholars within HRO-theory, declares that HRO can still undergo normal accidents.68_{Therefore, in the final appraisal} we need to be capable of showing whether tenets of NAT still stand and, as proposed by Leveson et al, how or whether we should look past the HRO-theory and NAT dichotomy.

68_{Weick, Karl E. "Normal Accident Theory As Frame, Link, and Provocation." Organization & Environment 17,} no. 1 (2004): 30

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The mindfulness as defined by Weick and Sutcliffe is what we will actually base our research on. Through the concepts of mindfulness can we show whether the American political and

diplomatic leadership as exemplified in the ExComm was an HRO. Using the definitions by Roberts required us to stretch some concepts, yet HRO-theory based on mindfulness by Weick and Sutcliffe allows us to analyse an organisation that is not technologically complex. It provides the framework unto which we can assess the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

To conclude, we tried to show here why we needed all the theories that we provided before. The theory of nuclear deterrence is interconnected through the case and theory with the theory of high reliability. In turn mindfulness and NAT allow us to delve into this specific case by providing the concepts and a framework through which to analyse the ExComm.

2.3 Conceptual framework

Here we will integrate the previously mentioned theories in a conceptual framework as the basis of our review. We will expand on the concepts of HRO-theory, and NAT as follows.

First the HRO-theory concepts: - Preoccupation with failure

The preoccupation with failure means that an HRO focusses more on the prevention of failure, rather than the attainment of success. Failure, in this case, would be an escalation to war with the Soviet Union, and, a failure to destroy or negate the threat of Soviet weapons in Cuba.

- Reluctance to simplify interpretations

This concept entails that the organisation is aware of the complexity of the situation and does not allow its members to simplify the interpretation of the situation. In this research, this will mean that the complexity of the situation was realised by the ExComm.

- Sensitivity to operations

This concept in the theory deals with the self-awareness of the organisation. Or how each actor is aware of the place he takes in the grand scheme of things and how actions in one sphere might impact those in another. In this case, it comes down to whether the members of the ExComm did not remain stuck in their own field and way of thinking, but stepped

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outside their boundaries and appreciated the issues from a more strategic, big-picture point of view. To aid in the research of the sensitivity to operations, we will look into the goal consensus that existed in the ExComm. When there is consensus on the larger goals, then the big picture is clear and it becomes easier to position oneself in the operations.

- Commitment to resilience

This concept focusses on the realisation of organisations that unexpected events might still happen despite all the precautions. So, an organisation that is committed to resilience tries to anticipate failures and create the capacity to cope with unexpected events and bounce back should they occur. In this research, this will mean the capacity of the ExComm to anticipate failures and the ability to cope with unexpected events.

- Deference to expertise

The deference to expertise means that an established hierarchy can be circumvented when an actor with sufficient expertise knows how to deal with a situation or can halt a specific course of action. In this research, we will focus on the underappreciation of hierarchy, meaning that everyone in the ExComm was equal and discussions took place in a horizontal manner.

Besides the concepts of HRT, we will also use the following concepts of NAT - Coupling and complexity

A tightly coupled organisation leaves little room for slack, meaning amongst others that interactions occur quickly and redundancies are built-in. We also include the aspect of complexity, which exists if there are many interacting parts within the system.

- Centralisation

Centralisation is the measure in which the organisation is centralised and containing a hierarchy with power and decision-making vested in the hands of the top.

- Risk

While a tightly coupled and complex system are the two main elements that can lead to a normal accident, for the system to really fit in the field of NAT, it must also entail the potential for catastrophe should an accident occur. This potential for catastrophe, combined with the likelihood of the event, forms the concept of risk.

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These concepts allow us to ascertain the ExComm and provide a satisfactory answer to our research question. We expect to find all these concepts to be available and discernible in the data. These concepts make sure we can analyse and assess whether the ExComm was an HRO, or adhering to NAT. Our main research question is whether the ExComm can be considered an HRO or a NAT organisation. Using the concepts listed here that we took from the theory, we will go through the data and provide an analysis. To ease the ultimate answering of our research question, we will ask and answer two sub-questions:

- Using the concepts of NAT, does the ExComm adhere to a NAT organisation? - Using the concepts of HRO-theory, does the ExComm adhere to an HRO?

First, we will analyse the ExComm and research what kind of organisation the ExComm was. Basically, this means we will clarify how they operated, what their purpose was and determine how the organisation was set up and structured. Second, we will assess the organisation using the concepts of NAT; Coupling, centralisation and risk. Third, we will attempt to ascertain whether the ExComm was a mindful organisation. To do this we will sift through the documents using the concepts of an HRO as established above.

We expect to find that the ExComm can indeed be considered an HRO. Considering the outcome of the crisis and the potential for disaster that was present, we believe that the ExComm must have had the characteristics of mindfulness that an HRO entails. Therefore, the hypothesis that we test is as follows:

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Chapter 3. Methodology

In this chapter, we delve into the methodology of our research. We do this first and foremost by explaining our design. Secondly, we delve into our case and the unit of analysis. Thirdly, we deal with our data collection or how we plan to gather all our data and why specifically these data are chosen. Fourthly, we divulge on our planned methods for the analysis of the data and the

operationalisation of our concepts. Then fifthly, we discuss the reliability and validity of our research and we conclude with our view on its limitations. Through answering these questions, we intend to provide a clear idea of what procedures we follow in order to get an answer to our research question and fulfil the aims of our research.

3.1 Research design

In order to answer the research question, the most sensible option is to make use of a qualitative design. The reason for this is multi-fold. First of all, the mainstay of this research is based on a historical case and as such requires a multi-disciplinary approach of social sciences and history. While both these sciences entail the possibility of quantitative research, especially traditional historical research is mainly based on a qualitative approach.69 Second, many of the sources we aim to use are qualitative in nature. The combined effort of documents, interviews and meeting minutes ensure that a qualitative approach is the most suitable. Finally, for the result that we aim to achieve, namely the theory testing of HRO-theory in this specific case, the qualitative methods provide for the appropriate way. The qualitative research method allows us to go more in-depth in the how and why of phenomena and provide more detail and description, which is exactly what we aim to achieve.70 That being said, as will become clear from the rest of this chapter, there will most certainly be a tentative mixed-methods approach towards the subject and research matter to make sure the most data can be extracted and the most knowledge can be generated. The research will be based on a mixed deductive-inductive manner. While most qualitative research usually follows a more inductive pattern of developing theory from data, we already

69_{Neuman, William Lawrence. Social Research Methods: Pearson New International Edition: Qualitative and}

Quantitative Approaches. Seventh Edition, Pearson New International ed. Pearson Education M.U.A., 2013, 52

70_{Weathington, Bart L., Christopher J. L. Cunningham, and David J. Pittenger. Research Methods for the}

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have a theory.71 Because one of our research aims is theory-testing of HRO-theory on a specific case, the Cuban missile crisis, the deductive approach is more suitable. Most of our theoretical work and the pattern that we are going to investigate is fixed. We are going to confirm whether the theory is valid in this particular circumstance and can explain the case results based on the data that the case will provide.

For our second research aim, the generation of new knowledge on this period and whether government services can be set up to have the characteristics of an HRO, we are using the qualitative inductive approach. We do this because we take the data from the Cuban crisis and see whether we can develop a theory from these results. This theory does not necessarily align with what HRO-theory contributes. For that purpose, NAT is also discussed in the theoretical framework to provide for a backstop and provide an explanation should HRO-theory fail. While at a first glance these two approaches might seem antithetical, they will provide us with the most possible depth into looking into the case. On top of this, this approach shall provide us with a triangulation of theory which helps us find different interpretations and an open-minded appreciation of data and will, in turn, lead to a more accurate conclusion.72

Our research is centred around a holistic case study of the Cuba crisis. We chose a holistic case study as we focus on one unit of analysis, namely the American leadership in the Cuba crisis as exemplified through ExComm. While the Cuban Missile Crisis had a long build-up and long aftermath, we will limit ourselves to the peak moment of the crisis, being the days from the 16th of October until and including the 28th of October 1962. This research design allows us to provide a detailed account of the American leadership in a tense crisis without breaching the feasibility parameters set for us.

To research the data that we collect, which shall be made clear in the next paragraph about data collection, we will use the theories as provided in the previous chapter. Meaning that the data will be analysed through a lens of HRO-theory and NAT. During the paragraph data analysis, we will divulge more on the exact methods of analysis.

To conclude; our research is based on a qualitative holistic case study, with a mixed deductive and an inductive approach. This allows us to give a detailed description and explanation of what happened during the Cuba crisis and provides us with the best opportunity to test the theory of

71_{Ibid 526}

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HRO-theory on the American leadership in the Cuba crisis and generate new knowledge from a new point of view.

3.2 Case selection and the Unit of Analysis

The Cuban crisis is the one case in the Cold War where the stakes were this high and the actors had to walk a fine line between success and failure. While there were other crises in the Cold War, none got as close to a nuclear exchange as the Cuban crisis did. After this crisis, measures were implemented to make sure that no crisis could come as close to the brink again. Because of the uniqueness of this case, the extreme circumstances and the high price of failure it is an excellent case to research government organisation in a crisis. On top of that, it seems to adhere to the extreme or hazardous circumstances that NAT and early HRO-theory prescribe, just like a nuclear reactor, a submarine, or a space mission.

The unit of analysis and observation in this research are identical. We will be looking at the American political and diplomatic leadership mainly through the ExComm, or the Executive Committee of the National Security Council. This was a body set up by President Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis for the effective handling of incoming information and decision-making.

This committee was made up of the following members: - John F Kennedy, President of the US

- Lyndon B Johnson, Vice-President of the US - Dean Rusk, Secretary of State

- C Douglas Dillon, Secretary of the Treasury - Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defence - Robert F Kennedy, Attorney General

- McGeorge Bundy, National Security Advisor - John McCone, Director of the Central Intelligence

- General Maxwell D Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff - George Ball, Under-Secretary of State

- Llewellyn Thompson, US ambassador to the Soviet Union - Roswell Gilpatrick, Deputy-Secretary of Defence

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Next to these members, there were also several advisors from the CIA, Departments of Defence and State and others that would at times be present during the ExComm meetings. It can be noted that the membership is diverse and entails the primary Departments of the US

governments regarding strategic policy, both foreign and defence.

This research centres around this group and for our intents and purposes this group forms the American political and diplomatic leadership. Therefore, through the ExComm, as the apotheosis and embodiment of the American government machine, we are attempting to ascertain whether it is a mindful organisation using the theories of HRO-theory, or whether it is more in line with a NAT organisation.

3.3 Data collection

As our research is based on qualitative research and especially on historical research our data collection will ensue out of available historical sources, both primary and secondary. This materialises in researching documents, speech acts and interviews.

One of the main sources we will use are the verbatim transcriptions of the secret tapes that President Kennedy had recorded of all the executive committee of the national security council meetings. On top of that, a lot of research has already been done into the subject of the Cuban Missile Crisis. As such, there is a wealth of data available in the form of secondary sources which describe and interpret the event. In addition, there are also sufficient interviews with the actors that were present during these times. On top of that, there are the televised and printed speeches by President Kennedy, which combined and supported by other primary and secondary sources, can provide us with information regarding the public diplomatic posturing towards the Soviet Union and the American public.

Because we use a plethora of secondary sources next to our primary sources we can maintain and ensure a triangulation of observation. Which is explained by Neuman as benefactive towards the objectiveness of our research as: “Multiple observers bring alternative perspectives, backgrounds and social characteristics. … Combining what both see and experience will produce a fuller picture than relying on either one alone.”73

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3.4 Data analysis and operationalisation

The data analysis will be based mainly on content and some discourse analysis using the

concepts provided in the theoretical framework. While content analysis will form the basic form of analysis of this research to determine what was being said and done, discourse analysis will be used as well to determine how things are said and done and what this implicitly conveys.

Especially the meetings, letters and the public statements made will be studied using discourse analysis. For this aspect of the research, Gibson’s linguistical approach to the ExComm meetings will be crucial.74_{The usage of both content and discourse analysis will provide us with a mix of} results, allowing us to approach the issue from separate avenues and thus come to a more in-depth and thorough conclusion.

Regarding the coding of the concepts, there are two axes of advance we aspire to. Following Weathington's description of coding, it would fall in the following two parts: the coding for this analysis will stem on content-coding rather than thematic-coding as the content categories are based on existing theory.75 Thus, the concepts that we identified in the previous chapter are the content categories or codes we will use. That being said, thematic coding will play a part, as some categories might be developed from the data which fall outside of the scope of the concepts provided in the theoretical framework. Neuman would describe this method as axial-coding. In this way, we focus on initial codes and themes rather than on the data itself. Yet, additional codes can be created and used based on the data.76 Finally, the combined effort of content- and thematic- coding, or axial-coding will allow us to attempt to circumvent the dangers of

confirmation bias based on HRO-theory should we look only for the concepts provided by the theory.

We will read through the interviews, minute meetings, speeches and all sources using the concepts as a sieve through which to distil the useful information. This way we will get data, ordered in separate categories. In our analysis, we will go into these separate categories and delve deep into each concept. So, this means that our analysis will not have a strict chronological setup, but rather a thematical. For example, we will first deal with all the data that would support a preoccupation with failure by all the actors involved. When we have exhausted the sources, and

74_{Gibson, David R. Talk at the Brink: Deliberation and Decision during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Princeton, [etc.]:} Princeton University Press, 2012

75_{Weathington, Research methods, 535} 76_{Neuman, Social Research Methods, 483}

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to our satisfaction come to a conclusion whether or not there was a preoccupation with failure by the actors, we shall advance to analyse the next concept being the reluctance to simplify

interpretation.

To clarify the operationalisation the concepts, we made the following table:

Concept Description

HRO-theory

Preoccupation with failure The realisation in the ExComm of the price of failure and the preoccupation with preventing this failure, mainly through risk assessments

Therefore, we use this concept in the sense whether the knowledge was present amongst the members of ExComm on the potential disaster that could befall them if they failed and that they focus on the prevention of failure. If this knowledge is visibly present and appreciated in a significant way, this means that the ExComm was

preoccupied with failure

Reluctance to simplify operations The awareness in the ExComm of the complexity of the situation and the consequences of operations

Thus, whether the members of ExComm appreciated the complexity of the

situation and created a complete and nuanced picture. That the ExComm does not resort to black and white thinking and just approached the manner in a

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simplified fashion without realising the wider consequences of this course of action If they showed their realisation of the complexity of the operations, this means that they were reluctant to simplify operations

Sensitivity to operation The discernment of the members of

ExComm of their position in the situation and the big picture in general and whether there was a high goal consensus

Should the members of ExComm show that they are appreciative of their and their co-members fields of operations, this means they were sensitive to operations. On top of that, a high goal consensus means a higher sensitivity to operations

Commitment to resilience Showing anticipatory capacity and

remaining calm during unexpected events

This concept will be assessed by the ExComm’s ability to anticipate events. On top of that, how the ExComm dealt with unexpected events that occurred. If the ExComm showed anticipatory capacity and stayed calm during unexpected events, this will mean they were committed to resilience

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Deference to expertise An underappreciation of hierarchy and discussions being held in an open and horizontal atmosphere

Was everyone capable of speaking their mind, no matter their background or position in the hierarchy, this means that the ExComm deferred to expertise. For this we will also look at the sub-concept of trust. If there was a high level of trust between the members of the ExComm this would imply that there was a high degree of deference to expertise

NAT

Coupling and complexity Tight coupling means little room for slack and built-in redundancies, which in this case is collective mindfulness. An appreciation of the complexity of the situation or a misunderstanding and misreading of the situation will mean there is a high complexity

We will verify this by ascertaining whether there are quickly occurring interactions and whether the actors were aware of that. On top of that we will determine whether there was a collective mindfulness present. If so, we can say the system had redundancies. If the system showed signs of quickly occurring interactions this means that there was tight coupling. If the members of the ExComm appreciated that the system and situation was complex, or if

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they seemingly did not understand how their committee worked, or were unaware and did not understand the situation and events that were unfolding, or how everything interacted with each other, we will qualify the ExComm as being a complex system

Centralisation A strong hierarchy or a very centralised

system in one actor

Therefore, if all the decision-making, but also coordination of activities and the thought process went through a central actor, then we can consider the ExComm to be a centralised system

Risk The potential for nuclear escalation and

the likelihood of this occurring We will ascertain this through appreciating whether the risk for a nuclear escalation was present. The potential for catastrophe would be the nuclear weapons. Second, the likelihood of the event can be measured by the appraisal of the members of the ExComm on the usage of nuclear

weapons and on their assessments on the likelihood of the usage of Soviet nuclear weapons.

To summarise, we can conclude that the actual analysis of the data will be done through the illustrative method. This means that we will apply the theories of HRT and NAT on the specific

High Reliability Theory and the Cuban Missile Crisis

Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs

Master Thesis of Crisis and Security Management