Putin’s Pravda
Defensive policies of the Dutch Government against Russian information warfare and influence operations.
Author: Anahita Shekary
Supervisor: Dr. mr. E.E.A. Dijxhoorn
Second Reader: Mr. drs. W.J.M. Aerdts
Master Thesis Crisis and Security Management
Abstract
In the past years, Western democracies have noticed an increase in Russian disinformation campaigns. These campaigns are focused on exploiting vulnerabilities in democratic societies in order to weaken their adversaries internally. Due to the rapid technological developments and the overall use of online platforms, the Russians have found a new enabler for their influence operations. These operations are also targeted at the Netherlands. In this thesis the Dutch governmental policy against Russian information warfare and influence operations will be analysed. This will be done in order to evaluate to what extent the Dutch government is taking defensive measures to protect their society. This thesis will ultimately make recommendations as to what should and can be done to increase the defensive capabilities of the Dutch against Russian information warfare and influence operations.
Master Thesis Crisis and Security Management
Putin’s Pravda
Defensive policies of the Dutch Government against Russian information warfare and influence operations.
Word Count: 20994
Anahita Shekary
Student number: s2119153 anahitashekary@gmail.com
Supervisor: Dr. mr. E.E.A. Dijxhoorn Second Reader: Mr. drs. W.J.M. Aerdts
University of Leiden
Table of Contents
I. Introduction 6
II. Literature Review & Theoretical Framework 10
Literature Review 10
Theoretical Framework 18
III. Methodology 23
IV. Context and Background 26
Part I: What is the nature of the Russian IWIO threat in the Netherlands? 26 Part II: What is the current approach of the Dutch Governmental agencies 29 against Russian influence operations and information warfare?
V. Analysis 38
VI. Conclusion 46
VII. Bibliography 50
VIII. Appendix 58
- Semi structured Topic Lists 58
Preface
The Russian language has two words which both mean ‘truth’, ‘istina’ and ‘pravda’. The meaning of the Russian word ‘istina’ is the same as the meaning of ‘truth’. ‘Pravda’, however, has a deeper meaning that well represents the Russian culture. The meaning of the word ‘pravda’ can best be understood as a tactical lie. This lie is legitimised by the fact that ‘pravda’ serves a higher purpose, namely protecting the Russian state and people (Giles 2019:110).
Due to this reason the West often finds it difficult to understand and judge statements made by Russian leaders or news outlets. ‘A statement can be considered ‘true in Russia because it is pravda but found to be untrue in the West because it is not istina’ (Ibid.). It should, however, be noted that propagating
pravda is not only legitimised, but also stems from a long Russian tradition. Within this tradition, the truth is not a constant factor but is constantly being reinvented in order to protect the Russian state. Currently Western democracies are facing Russian disinformation campaigns that are targeting societies in order to influence decision making processes. The Western inability to think from a Russian perspective and to correctly make the distinction between pravda and istina implies that Western governments lag behind when searching for counter-measures against Russian information warfare and influence operations.
In this thesis the Dutch defensive policy against Russian information warfare and influence operations will be analysed in order to evaluate to what extent the Dutch government is protecting their citizens against Russian interference.
List of abbreviations
AIVD - Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service DNC – Democratic National Committee
EU- European Union
IRA- Internet Research Agency
IWIO – Information Warfare and Influence Operations JIT- Joint Investigation Team
MIVD – Military Intelligence and Security Service NATO- North Atlantic Treaty Organization NCSC - National Cyber Security Centre
NCTV – National Coordinator of Terrorism and Security RT – Russia Today
STRATCOM – NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence UN- United Nations
I.
Introduction
Since the 2016 United States (US) Presidential Elections and the alleged Russian interference in those elections, Russian influence operations have more and more been perceived as a threat to Western Democracies (Shimer, New Yorker 2018). The Russians did not only allegedly try to hack the American Democratic Party (DNC), but it is also suspected that they attempted to interfere in the elections by influencing the public debate (Mueller press conference 2019). The aim of this influence campaign was to change the outcome of the elections and to increase tensions within American society (Idem). Although the Russian influence campaign during the 2016 US elections is seen by many as the starting point of Russian influence operations in the West, the threat of Russian interference in democratic processes started long before 2016 and is not limited to the United States alone (Janda 2018:182). Examples of this are the Brexit referendum, the investigation into the cause of the 2014 Malaysian Airlines (MH17) airplane crash and both the French and German presidential elections in 2017 (Hall 2017: 51). More evidence is being found that the Russians use information warfare as a part of their influence operations for their grand strategy implemented worldwide (Janda 2018:181). In order to protect Dutch society from Russian information warfare, various Dutch governmental agencies have formulated policies on this topic. The suitability of the policies in relation to the existing threat has however not yet been tested. It is therefore important to investigate whether the current approach of the Dutch governmental agencies is suitable to counter the Russian threat. This thesis’ research question will thus be:
‘To what extent does the Dutch governmental policy to counter Russian information warfare and influence operations match the Russian threat, and take defensive measures to protect Dutch society?’
In order to answer the researchquestion, the second chapter of this thesis will provide a literature review of the current state of the academic literature regarding the use of defensive measures taken by the West. This chapter will also discuss the Russian intelligence services and their practices, goals, methods and aims to influence Western societies, of which the Netherlands is a part. This is done in order to provide a clear view of the existing threat of information warfare within the Russian practice of influence operations (IWIO). Subsequently the Russian use of IWIO will also be elaborated in this literature review chapter. This is important since a better understanding of the Russian use of IWIO will contribute to the analysing whether the Dutch approach matches the nature of the Russian threat.
In the next part of the second chapter, the theoretical framework of this thesis will be discussed. The framework of Herbert Lin on how to develop a response to IWIO will be used to analyse the current Dutch approach on countering Russian IWIO. The substantiation for this will also be given in this theoretical framework.
The third chapter describes the used methodology, it will give insights in how the research was conducted and explain certain methodological decisions about the case and sources on which the analysis was made. In order to make this analysis, the fourth chapter of this thesis will provide additional background information about the Russian threat and the current Dutch approach by answering the following sub questions;
1. What is the nature of the Russian IWIO threat in the Netherlands?
2. What is the current approach of the Dutch governmental agencies against Russian information warfare?
Eventually in the fifth chapter an analysis will be made of the present Dutch defensive policies against Russian IWIO on the basis of the framework of Lin. In order to analyse the current state of the Dutch policy and to examine what the available policy options are and how they can be implemented. To explain the relevance of this thesis it is important to understand the nature of the Russian IWIO threat. In 2013 the Russian General Gerasimov wrote an article about his ideas on modern warfare. In this article Gerasimov theorized about a new type of warfare that was later labelled by Western countries as ‘hybrid warfare’. Gerasimov described how the role of non-military means to achieve political and strategic goals had grown, and, in many cases, had exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness’ (POLITICO 2017; Military Review 2017). These new non-traditional means are being used to disrupt and weaken the adversary’s entire society (Monaghan 2016:67). For the Russian Federation, the United States is currently the most significant threat (Giles 2019: 36-37). But due to the cooperation of the United States with its Western allies within NATO, as well as the strategic location of many of the NATO countries on the border of Russia, other Western countries are now also perceived as a threat to Russia’s sovereignty (Janda 2018: 181-183). Another international alliance Russia identifies as a threat to their own security is the European Union (Giles 2019: 37).
The importance of discussing the Dutch case lies in the fact that the Netherlands is both a member of NATO as well as of the EU. In addition, the Dutch are currently leading the investigation concerning the MH17 airplane crash, which was allegedly shot out of the sky by a Russian missile. Due to this investigation Russia may consider the Netherlands as part of a larger security threat.
In order to effectively counter this security threat, Russia is trying to actively weaken its Western adversaries by means of influence operations (Benkler et al 2018:235). These operations are aimed at intensifying political division and weakening Western democracies (Ibid). The information warfare Russia is currently practicing in the West is just one of the components of the much larger hybrid threat Russia is posing (Revaitis 2017-2018:272). These and other aspects of IWIO, such as the use of cyber, will be elaborated in the literature review of this thesis.
The Dutch Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Foreign affairs, the Ministry of Justice and Security, and the Ministry of Interior and Kingdom Relations have alerted Dutch citizens about the possible threat of Russian influence operations. These four ministries created policies in order to counter this threat (Ollongren 2017). While the Dutch Ministry of Defence and the intelligence and security agencies are constantly working on their defensive capacities, the Dutch Ministry of Interior launched a campaign to create awareness about disinformation in the run up to the provincial and European elections which took place in March and May, 2019. The campaign was called ‘’Blijf kritisch’’ which means ‘’Remain Critical’’ (Ministry of Interior and Kingdom Relations 2018).
By analysing both the Russian threat as well as the Dutch policy for countering Russia’s IWIO activities, this research will attempt to contribute to the academic debate regarding Russian influence operations. The researchwill consist of a policy analysis of four separate Dutch ministries, which will be supported by interviews held with civil servants working for these ministries. Subsequently the policy will be tested by means of Lin’s theory on IWIO. This theory provides a framework which can be used by governments to implement policy measures against Russian IWIO (Lin 2018). This theory, as well as the corresponding framework, will be explained and elaborated in the theoretical framework of this thesis.
The analysis will ultimately test whether there is an imbalance between the Russian IWIO threat and the Dutch approach to countering this threat. Following the results from the analysis, this thesis will make a policy recommendation for the governmental agencies of the Netherlands. By doing so this thesis will contribute to the current governmental approach, since this thesis presents the first research that analyses the current policy against IWIO which focusses on a variety of aspects of the Russian IWIO threat in The Netherlands. Analysing the Dutch approach is of importance since the societal consequences of Russian IWIO can have damaging effects. Therefore, analysing whether the Dutch policy is focussing on the right aspects of the threat is of relevance to the Dutch society.
The way in which Russia and Western democracies differ in types of military strategic thinking and the lack of academic literature that focusses on this difference, makes the scientific relevance of this research abundantly clear (Giles 2016: 13). Additionally, due to the incorporation of an analysis based on Lin’s framework, this thesis will provide an academically supported analysis of the current Dutch policy. An analysis like this has not been done before and will therefore offer a new assessment of the current policy.
A significant part of the academic literature is either about the role of cyber in influence operations, or focuses on countries other than The Netherlands. The threat of Russian influence operations needs to be seen from an international perspective since it is widely spread and does not focuses solely on one country in specific (Hall 2017: 52). But for the Netherlands it is of relevance to also specifically examine the Dutch case.
The aim of this thesis is therefore to give clearer insights into the way the Dutch government is countering Russian IWIO and to analyse whether the current Dutch approach matches the nature of the Russian IWIO threat. Examining the Dutch case is of even greater importance since the MH17 plane crash in which 196 Dutch nationals lost their lives (NOS 2014). And because the Dutch government has played a leading role in the investigation of the crash. Dutch intelligence and security agencies have observed a disinformation campaign, by the Russian Internet Research Agency (IRA), which was specifically focussed on getting the general public to question the legitimacy of the investigation (AIVD 2017). This situation makes the Netherlands especially vulnerable when it comes to Russian information warfare. This thesis will therefore solely focus its analysis on the Dutch case starting from July 2014 until spring 2019. Although the research will only consist of an analysis of the Dutch policy on this topic it is important to also take into account examples coming from other Western countries, since the Russian IWIO threat is an international one.
After the analysis of the Dutch approach based on Lin’s framework on how to counter Russian IWIO, this thesis concludes that although the Dutch government has definitely taken steps in the right direction, there are still a lot of measures that need to be taken in order to fully protect the Dutch society. The Dutch approach does not only focus on the technological aspect of these operations, but also on the psychosocial aspects of IWIO, this focus matches the Russian threat.
Although the Dutch government has taken measures to detect and reduce the impact of an IWIO large parts of the Dutch society are still unaware of the IWIO threat. This might have consequences for the effect of the measures that are being taken, since awareness about the threat is one of the key aspects of these defensive measures.
In order to increase the results of the current policy this thesis recommends to expand the visibility of the awareness campaign as well as perform plans to increase media literacy and furthermore to create laws that restrict the spread of disinformation online. In addition to this the Dutch government should implement a critical vulnerability analysis which focuses on the Dutch society itself.
II.
Literature Review & Theoretical Framework
In this chapter the theoretical basis will be laid for analysing the Dutch governmental approach against Russian IWIO, to emphasize the importance of analysing the Dutch case in specific. In order to do so this chapter will define the different components of this thesis’ research question, such as IWIO, Russian IWIO and defensive measures, by the means of a literature review. Thereafter different theories regarding the issue of governmental defensive measures against IWIO will be discussed. Finally this chapter will argue that the framework conceived by Lin is the most suitable for answering the research question.
In order to protect Dutch society against the threat of IWIO the Dutch government has created several policies. These policies and other measures that are being taken by governmental institutions will be emphasized in the fourth chapter of this thesis that answers the question: What is the current approach of the Dutch Governmental agencies against Russian influence operations and information warfare?
Literature Review
When studying Russian IWIO it is important to first define what an influence operation is, and then distinguish the different methods and techniques the Russians use for their operations. Since the Russian IWIO threat can best be defined in light of the broader picture.
Although the concept influence operations is increasingly being used by the wider public the use of influence operations has been used for centuries while conducting war. Because of globalisation and technological innovations the nature of war has changed and has become more complex, this entails that the traditional concept of influence operations does no longer fit the changing times.
This new type of warfare is also often referred to as hybrid warfare. This concept was first published by Simpson. In her definition she mainly focussed on who was fighting wars instead of how wars were fought (Simpson 2005:4-5). She emphasized the importance of also taking into account non-state actors when analysing war. The concept of hybrid warfare has since become more popular and is also being used by states militaries. The definition of hybrid warfare which is currently most referred to is the one by Frank Hoffman. He defines hybrid warfare as ‘any adversary that simultaneously and adaptively employs a fused mix of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism and criminal behaviour in the battlespace to obtain their political objectives’ (Hoffman 2010: 443). This thesis will use Hoffman’s definition since it includes both states and non-state actors and focusses on tactics and combinations of (non)-traditional weapons.
Because definitions of influence operations tend to differ it is important to critically examine which term to use when analysing Russian IWIO. Already thousands of centuries ago the military strategic thinker Sun Tzu introduced the idea of influence operations by writing down ideas on how to fight a war without violence. This idea can be seen as the starting point of what we now call influence operations. ‘This is the essence of influence operations’ anything intended to sway the body politic of any party involved’ (Cohen 2011:2). This is done without getting involved in armed conflict, therefore influence operations take place without kinetic violence (Lin 2018). These definitions do however not take into account one important aspect of influence operations; ‘the physical outcome of political decisions’ (Hutchinson 2010:14). Which is being accomplished through the most important task of influence operations ‘to beneficially change (for the influencer) the emotions, behaviour, knowledge and beliefs of the targeted group’ (Ibid). The U.S. Military defined the term influence operations thus follows: ‘A deliberately planned and synchronized series of actions designed produce desired behaviours within adversaries and affected populations through the direct or indirect, threat or actual use of all U.S. military power and capabilities in order to achieve a relative advantage or desired end state’ (Santa Maria 2013:31). Another definition of the term influence operations is formulated by RAND:
‘Influence operations are the coordinated, integrated, and synchronized application of national diplomatic, informational, military, economic, and other capabilities in peacetime, crisis, conflict, and post conflict to foster attitudes, behaviours, or decisions by foreign target audiences’ These actions are in the interest of the state which conducts the influence operations (RAND Institute).
This thesis chooses to use this definition formulated by RAND, since this definition includes all different aspects which were mentioned in other literature. The definition does not solely focus on wartime but also includes capabilities used in peacetime. This is of importance since due to the so called ‘grey zone’ of war, states are now permanently facing threats. This grey zone can best be understood as: ‘coercive and aggressive in nature, but that is deliberately designed to remain below the threshold of conventional military conflict and open interstate war’ (Brands 2016). Moreover, the definition formulated by RAND focusses both on the societal aspect of influence as well as the physical effect they may have.
Within the practice of influence operations information warfare can currently be seen as one of the most effective components. Information warfare and influence operations are, however, not the same and therefore should not be confused. Information warfare is simply one aspect of influence operations (Lin 2018). Information warfare can best be described as: ‘the deliberate use of information by one party on an adversary’s population to confuse, mislead and ultimately influence the actions that the targeted population makes’ (Lin 2018).
Although this type of warfare is not new technological innovation and globalization surely impacted the use of it. For this reason information warfare is often associated with cyber. In Western media and policy
documents, terms such as ‘cyber warfare’ and ‘information warfare’ are often used interchangeably; this, however, may affect the Western counter approach as Russia has a different view on these tools and strategy (Kramer et al. 2019: 479). ‘Instead of cyberspace Russia refers to “information space,” and includes in this space both computer and human information processing, in effect the cognitive domain.’ (Giles 2016: 9). The decision for a specific operation and tools thus depends on a prior analysis (Thomas 2001: 3). The use of technology is just one of the many resources available that can be used in order to weaponise information. ‘Information weapons’ can be used in many more domains than cyber, crucially including the human cognitive domain’ (Giles 2013:10). Russian information policy makers consider information related operations from a different perspective than the West (Kramer et al 2019: 479). They distinguish information related topics in two different categories: technical information and psychological information (Ibid). This distinction is of significance because Russia sees psycho-physical security as the most crucial threat to a nation’s security (Idem: 480). The intensification of cyber and information technology has unquestionably made it easier for Russian secret services to carry out their operations (Sanger 2018:183). ‘Thanks to the internet and social media the kind of operations Soviet PSYOPs teams once could only fantasize about – upending the domestic affairs of nations with information alone – are now plausible’ (POLITICO 2017). By including the terms ‘cyber’ and ‘information technology’, the reference to and focus on cyber operations is often quickly made. There is, however, a major difference between cyber warfare and cyber-enabled warfare. Cyber warfare can best be described as ‘the actions by a nation-state or international organization to attack and attempt to damage another nation's computers or information networks through, for example, computer viruses or denial-of-service attacks’ (RAND Institute). Whereas in cyber enabled warfare, cyber is merely the tool used to carry out the operation (Lin 2018). In order to fully capture the nature of the Russian IWIO threat, it is best to separate the aim of the Russian influence operations from the tools they use. Since these tools constantly change, one can only ascertain the most used tool for a certain period. At this time information technology (IT) is the most critical enabler of Russian influence operations (Gianetti 2017: 101). This directly implies that cyber warfare is part of Russia’s toolkit, although it should not be mistaken for the only enabler for their operations.
Cyber operations which involve the use of hacking are, however, the most difficult, dangerous and expensive for a country to execute. In contrast to these types of cyber operations, which may possibly affect the critical infrastructure of a country, disinformation is a relatively inexpensive and easily accessible tool to damage or affect the society of one’s adversary. Because cyber has increasingly become the most critical enabler for IWIO and a different way of thinking was determined between the West and the Russian deployment of cyber. It is important to also take into account IWIO specified from a Russian perspective.
It has been argued that the Kremlin has introduced a new type of warfare, whereby tools such as disinformation and fake news are used to influence electoral processes and the civil society (Allcott & Gentzkow 2017: 212). The use of cyber is specifically pointed out by Western media and policy makers as a dangerous weapon in Russia’s hybrid warfare arsenal in order to realize their goals (Giles 2016:13). In their view, social media and hacking activities by groups such as APT28 and 29, also referred to as FancyBear and CozyBear, would make it possible to change, steal and spread information in such a way that it benefits the Russian state (Jensen et al. 2019). In combination with the changing nature of information dissemination, which has created both new opportunities and vulnerabilities in Western societies (Palmertz 2016:1), this has made the use of information technology a perfect tool for the Russian Secret Services (Sanger 2018:183). Although cyber is by some still being viewed as the most important weapon in Russia’s arsenal (Cohen & Ofir Bar’el 2017: 53), there is a growing agreement that this is not the case (Hutchinson 2006: 220). In order to have a better understanding of the full nature of the Russian threat, it is important to have a better understanding of Russia’s views on the use of cyber during their influence operations, so as to understand that influence operations cannot be considered a new phenomenon.
Although the Russians use cyber as an enabler, it should not be taken as a critical component of Russian influence operations (Kramer et Al 2019: 439). No Russian definition of IWIO utilizes the term cyber (Idem: 479); instead Russia’s main focus of their information operations lies in the psychological aspect of these operations (Idem: 480). In order to better comprehend the origin of these Russian operations, one has to take into account their history and development. Since these techniques find their roots in a long history of strategic military thinking, they can therefore only be understood by including a historical component (Hingley 1970: xi). Although the rules of warfare have adapted over the years due to the changing nature of war, IWIO specifically have a long history and have been practiced by the Russian secret services for centuries (Sanger 2018: 183).
These influence operations originate from a long tradition covering a broad spectrum of various types of acts. One aspect the numerous tools and acts all have in common is the psychological component (Bittman 1985:35-69). The Russians have been using psychological operations, also referred to as PSYOPs, in order to effectively carry out their influence operations. Influence operations have been deployed on a large scale both internally as well as externally ever since (Bittman 1985:35-69.). The aim of these influence operations is to negatively affect the state’s opponent in order to weaken them and reduce the threat to its own state (Giles 2016:24). Over the past decades the Russian secret services made influence operations by using information warfare and psychological manipulation part of their regular ‘’playbook’’ (Hingley 1970: 265-275). Influence operations are actively being used by the Russian secret services in order to influence policy decisions taken by their opponents (Giles 2016:11). In order to effectively counter these operations, it is important to understand where they come from and
how they have developed over the years. As previously stated, Russia has an extensive history of influence operations and information operations in particular (Bittman 1985: 35-40). Almost every Russian Tsar had his own intelligence service; this tradition stems from a long history of mistrust of the Russian rulers towards their own people as well as others (Idem.). In 1881, the Ochrana was the first Russian secret service which operated according to ‘dual system of supervision’. This meant that the Ochrana looked at both internal as well as external threats (Idem: 69-116). The Ochrana can also be seen as the founder of Russian disinformation since it was the first Russian secret service to spread propaganda, scandals and fake news in foreign countries (Idem: 80). The Ochrana did, however, not fully implement the use of IWIO; this did not happen until after the second World War (WWII) with the establishment of the KGB.
Not long after the end of WWII, in 1954, the then leader of the Soviet Union and the communist party, Jozef Stalin, introduced a new Russian secret service: the NKVD of which the KGB (Komiteit Gosoedarstbennoj Bezopasnost) was a part (Idem: 225-264). The KGB was meant to serve as the ‘shield and sword’ of the communist party, which lead Russia during the Soviet era (Bader & de Jong 2006: 260). During the time of the Soviet Union, the KGB used disinformation both for internal as well as for external purposes (van Herpen 2016:88). The internal KGB propagandistic disinformation was mainly used to portray a horrific image of the West, and strove for internal demoralization (Bittman 1985:55). ‘The Soviet bloc was not sustained by fervent belief in the system, but by acquiescence in a common discourse that co-opted the population’ (Pomerantsev 2015:42). The practices and goals of the organization were both defensive and offensive in nature. Due to the Cold War and the large external threat the Soviet Union was facing, the KGB had to enlarge its scale and focus on external operations. Therefore, the First Chief Directorate (foreign intelligence) became the most important directorate (Bittman 1985: 39). One of the smaller departments of the First Chief Directorate was ‘service A’ (active measures). Among other things they were responsible for carrying out the Russian disinformation strategy (Andrew & Gordievsky 1990: 652). Disinformation messages often contained large segments of correct information to inspire confidence (Bittman 1985:56). The KGB labelled disinformation as ‘white’, ‘grey’ or ‘black’ based on the level of accuracy of the message (Benkler et al 2018: 243). Due to the internal and external practices during the Cold War, Russia has become an expert in the use of information warfare and the political manipulation that may follow (Pomerantsev 2015: 42). Already in 1985 the KGB recognized the growing importance of computer technology and the opportunities this may offer for future IWIO (Bittman 1985:66). Current Russian IWIO practices have deep roots in long-standing Soviet practices which emphasizes the importance of studying them, as their methods have not changed, only their tools and enablers did (Giles 2016: 33).
As mentioned above, it is clear that Russian influence operations find their roots in different manipulation and interference tactics, also referred to as ‘Soviet Deep Operation Theory’, which has
evolved over the years (Shea 2002). Initially the Russians used Maskirovka (маскировка), which literally means ‘masking, to mislead the enemy in times of war’ (Idem). The Soviet Military Encyclopedia in 1944 referred to Maskirovka as: ‘means of securing combat operations and the daily activities of forces; a complexity of measures, directed to mislead the enemy regarding the presence and disposition of forces’. In order to do so, six elements were part of the Russian military strategy; ‘surprise, camouflage manoeuvres intended to deceive, concealment, the use of decoys and military dummies and disinformation’ (Ash for BBC 2015). Maskirovka was used as both a weapon against Western security and intelligence agencies, and to monitor the United States in the first half or the twentieth century (Shea 2002). During this period strategic political elements were also added to the Maskirovka strategy. The main goal was to manipulate facts in order to alter the perception of the adversary’s society (Idem). During the second half of the twentieth century Maskirovka was further developed and became a new Russian military doctrine called Reflexive Control (Idem). Unlike Maskirovka, Reflexive Control does not only include military deception but also embodies a broader understanding of psychological operations and hybrid warfare (Giles 2016: 19-21). Reflexive Control can therefore be seen as a tool to generate a type of behaviour that is desired in a country’s adversary (Komov 1997:18-22). Reflexive Control is still being used by Russian military and intelligence agencies, and can be defined as ‘The systematic methods of shaping the adversary’s perception, thereby decisions, and latently forcing him to act voluntarily in a way that would be favourable to Russia’s strategic interests’ (Giles 2016:19). In other words, Reflexive Control is being used in order to generate a desired model of behaviour by planting ideas and motives within an adversary’s society and political system (Ibid). ‘The basic elements of reflexive control include distraction, overload paralysis, exhaustion, deception, division, pacification, deterrence, provocation, suggestion and pressure, all with the intent of manipulation’ (Komov 1997:19). The Russian secret services consider an IWIO operation successful whenever the targeted society’s decisions are being made that are unconsciously influenced by Russian operations (Giles 2017). Due to technological innovation and globalisation, the Russians have been re-adjusting the Reflexive Control doctrine over the years, meaning that the tools that enable these operations have changed (Sanger 2018: 183). ‘Stalin used Soviet propaganda to sow fear and distrust ... but Facebook and other social media sites gave it the reach Stalin could scarcely have imagined’ (Ibid). Not only have the tools the Russians use changed, the opponent’s vulnerabilities that could be exploited have also changed over the years. Therefore Russian secret services revise them every few years (Idem). The Russian secret services have a directorate which specialises in dissecting enemy weaknesses, analysing failures and mistake and exploiting them (Bittman 1985: 39) in order to disrupt Western powers internally so chaos will ensue (Giles 2019: 24).
When Russia tries to influence their opponent’s society, different aspects are taken into account, such as: economic activities, political tensions, relations: both internationally political and private, cultural
aspects, and both regular and social media (AIVD 2016: 3/7). In order to effectively complete the influence operation, the Russians use elements in the opponent’s language, culture, math, philosophy, science and their history (Giles 2016:12). Other aspects that are intensively analysed by the Kremlin are vulnerabilities and tensions within other societies (Bittman 1985: 44). The most important aim of an influence operation is to create a false narrative, a lie that strongly influences the perception of citizens (Giles 2016:12). Russian influence operations are precisely adjusted to the society they are targeting (Pomerantsev 2015:42). Due to this, and in addition to the ever-changing tools the Russians apply, it is vital to realise that influence operations can be difficult to identify (Idem).
There is growing evidence that Russia has been using information warfare against Western countries (Besemeres 2016:37-48). Attention to this form of hybrid warfare has increased over the past years. Not only has it caught the attention of Western media outlets, but also of politicians and the general public (Idem). This is in response to several recent events which occurred; for example the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the MH17 plane crash, the 2016 US presidential elections, and the Brexit referendum. Evidence, however, indicates that information warfare should not be seen as a new phenomenon, particularly when creating policy for a counter strategy. With the advent of modern day technology, information warfare has gradually become more important (Benkler et al. 2018:263-264). Cyber and information technology have become new tools which are being used by the Russians for their influence operations. ‘It’s not just cyber, not just electronical warfare, it’s not just intelligence but it’s really effective integration of all these capabilities with kinetic measures to actually create the effect that the commanders want to achieve’ (Giles 2017). Information warfare during peacetime is mainly being used to execute strategic tasks such as influencing public opinion, which even eventually may lead to indirectly influencing electoral processes in favour of the Russian Federation (Giles 2016: 10).
Due to the rising significance of social media, interfering online is particularly inexpensive and simple (Lin 2019:11; FireEye 2019). Evidence shows that Russians have been actively using troll factories in order to spread disinformation online (Aro 2016; 123 Gianetti 2017:100-101). Russia’s disinformation campaigns should therefore be seen as a public/private partnership since the Russian leadership often outsources the creation of disinformation (Oosterwoud 2019). Among other things, the Russians have set up a propaganda centre called ‘’The Internet Research Agency’’ (IRA) (Sanger 2018:182). ‘The Internet Research Agency could actually degrade social media’s organizational; power through weaponing it’ (Idem:183). The IRA sends out tweets and creates fake stories with the aim of shaping the public debate to eventually create a real life protest (Benkler et al 2018: 263-264). Due to the large amount of variety in online platforms, the Russians can choose which platform fits best; ‘Every platform has different advantages from an adversary standpoint’ (McNamara 2019).
Fake news and disinformation are not only spread by the use of social media or bots. When taking into account the way in which the Russians understand ‘information weapons’, it becomes clear that this weapon can be used in many more domains than cyber alone (Giles 2016:10). The Russians have set up their own news channels such as Russia Today (RT), Russia Beyond the Headlines and Sputnik, who now broadcast worldwide and share their version of ‘the truth’ (van Herpen 2016: 91-95; Hall 2017:53). These mass media channels are a different enabler, but are also part of Russia’s information warfare (Giles 2016:46). When it comes to Russian IWIO any type of communication channel can be used (Bittman 1985:56). ‘The purpose of the message is to trigger a chain reaction, therefore the choice for best medium is important’ (Ibid). Despite using their own channels to broadcast Russia’s version of the truth, the Russians are also actively manipulating trust in mainstream Western media. By doing so, Russia is attempting to increase the credibility of their disinformation (Oosterwoud 2019). In addition to the spreading of disinformation, Russia is also trying to directly influence Western politicians who mainly come from specific types of parties. Various right-wing Western politicians have been connected to Russia (Janda 2018; 182). This is not always done directly but often through an intermediary or a donor group (FireEye 2019). This method of influencing is relatively easy and is extremely effective (Giles 2017). Due to this reason, some Russia experts argue that this is why the current Russian President, Vladimir Putin, is focusing on this aspect of warfare. ‘Putin is eighty percent propaganda and twenty percent violence’ (Pomerantsev 2015: 40). This is in line with the Soviet strategy, where informal techniques such as information warfare are as much instruments of foreign policy as formal ones (Bittman 1985: 43). Another aspect is that different targets, and different threats, ask for different counter measures. In order to determine the focus and specific aspects of their policy, Western governments should carefully analyse their adversary’s strategy and playbook.
In order to effectively integrate counter measures that protect Western societies against Russian IWIO, governments should certainly focus on cyber as an enabler for IWIO. Cyber should, however, not be the focus of their counter policy. Both historical as well as theoretical evidence shows that Russian IWIO have both a psychological and a technical component. The psychological part of the operations is especially important to take into account when formulating a long term counter strategy that protects Western societies against IWIO. This is because the psychological component lies at the root of human vulnerabilities, and can therefore always be used by adversaries regardless of the tool they use. These aspects are thus of great importance when answering this thesis’ research question, and will consequently be taken into account in the analysis chapter.
With the arrival of hybrid warfare as ‘the new normal’, countries have to take into account new tactics and threats when formulating their defensive measures. This thesis will focus on defensive measures states can take to protects their societies against IWIO and Russian IWIO in specific.
Theoretical Framework
Over the past decade various scholars have conducted research to determine the optimal ways to counter influence operations from a governmental policy perspective. First, one has to define what these defensive measures are and what they attempt to protect by analysing the focus of these measures. The aim of these Russian IWIO’s as mentioned above is to create a false narrative, a lie that strongly influences the perception of citizens (Giles 2016:12). This false narrative will potentially have consequences for the voter’s perception on political issues and therefore indirectly influence the outcome of democratic elections and the related political decisions (Pomerantsev & Weiss 2014: 12). Russia is using this tool ‘for its own purposes and for achieving its own foreign policy goals’ (Cizik 2018:13). For this reason defensive measures against IWIO are of great importance to protect citizens against the impact of disinformation (Samadashvili 2015:43-44). This is done to protect the sovereignty and legitimacy of Western democracies.
These defensive measures have to deal with a difficult paradox due to the way in which Western societies are set up. ‘Western liberal democracies cannot restrict the right to free speech and the freedom of information’ (Ibid). For this reason Western governments have to take into account these liberal values when formulating their defensive strategy. Although some literature argues that ‘The Western response to the Russian challenge should be ‘more neutral information, better analysis, more honest and transparent politicians, and wider education about the threat’ (Ibid). Others suggest a different defensive approach and recommend that in order to defend ourselves, countries should analyse their own weak spots. ‘Our first response should be to look at the weaknesses of the Western system and think about areas for target hardening’ (Pomerantsev & Weiss 2014: 34).
Western policy makers and researchers have been analysing numerous approaches in order to find a course of action that is most effective and applicable to the Russian IWIO threat. While President Barack Obama was still in office as President of the United States of America, he initiated an act called the Countering Foreign Propaganda and Disinformation Act (CFPDA), which was part of a lager National Defense Act (Hall 2017:50). The aim of the CFPDA was to collect and analyse the stories produced by foreign governments through the use of a ‘Global Engagement Centre’ (Idem). However, the USA is not the only country which has to deal with Russian propaganda and disinformation. While Russia has their own television stations RT and Sputnik, which actively broadcast Russia’s view on the world on a daily basis, some Russian disinformation is occasionally more targeted at specific situations and audiences. In 2017, both the French presidential elections and the Bundestag elections in Germany were targeted (EUvsDisinfo). The Russians used a combination of cyberattacks, cyber-spying and hacking to gain information (West for Brookings 2017). This information was later used to discredit both French President, Emmanuel Macron, and German Chancellor, Angela Merkel (Idem). The German government decided that the best defensive strategy was to address this issue before the elections were
held by a non-partisan actor, the head of the German intelligence agencies (Brookings 2017). The targeted French presidential candidate, Macron, believed it was best to address the Russian interference as late as possible, and announced the issue just minutes before the end of his campaign (Hall 2017: 53). Hall argues that scholars working at the Atlantic Council, an international relations think tank, argued that the best defensive measure for the EU against Russian IWIO is to begin exposing EU politicians who are supported financially by Russia and who fight propaganda (Idem:54). In their opinion, the EU should follow in the footsteps of CFPDA and create a joint taskforce that would coordinate the counter measures taken against the Russian threat (Ibid).
But countering Russian information warfare does not only happen by taking offensive and defensive measures against cyber-attacks, hacks or cyber espionage. Within virtually every research study on this topic, the importance of societal awareness is mentioned (Hall 2017: 56). Hall argues that: ‘Successfully countering any disinformation means there must be an engaged, informed, and media-literate citizenry.’ (Ibid). This view is supported by other literature. Currently troll and robot accounts on social media are Russia’s main tools to spread disinformation. Fighting these accounts is one aspect of the counter strategy, but creating resilience within the targeted society may even be more important to protect societies (Aro 2016:124). Although some scholars argue for the option of censorship of Russian messages by the EU and the US, or for offensive counter information warfare by the Western alliance, (Thornton 2015:44) the focus of the defensive strategy needs to be found within Western societies themselves (Aro 2016:124). This approach of increasing media literacy and knowledge about disinformation through education seems to be effective in Finland (Mackintosh 2019). The case of Finland is, however, a specific one since the Finish population, in contrast to most EU citizens, is well aware of the Russian threat (Idem).
The focus on education and societal resilience is also emphasized by the Dutch Institute of Information Rights (IViR) of the University of Amsterdam, which conducted a research study commissioned by the Dutch Ministry of Education, Culture and Science. In this research study, an inventory was compiled about possible counter methods (McGonagle et al: 3). In the report various relevant strategies were elaborated on, all of these strategies contained the following objectives: preventive measures, identification and monitoring measures, limitation or correction measures, and law enforcing or not law enforcing measures (Idem:25). Other studies agree on measures to detect and expose Russian IWIO but also underscore the importance of acknowledgement of the Russian IWIO threat by Western political leaders (Janda 2018:186). They argue that aside from exposing and acknowledging the Russian use of IWIO, the political leadership should also confront Russia politically (Idem:187).
Despite the fact that literature concerning defensive measures against IWIO has increased, little has been written about policy measures that governments can take to protect their societies against this threat. In order to find the most suitable framework to analyse the Dutch approach against IWIO available
literature was consulted. The framework of Lin was the only framework that combined recommendations which recurred in almost all the available literature.
In his article ‘Developing responses to cyber-enabled information warfare and influence operations’ (Lin 2018), which elaborates on a larger research study: ’On cyber enabled information/influence warfare and manipulation’ (Lin & Kerr 2017), Lin describes both the detection of IWIO as defensive measures that can be taken against them. This framework was also used for Lin’s article: ‘On the organization of the U.S. government for responding to adversarial information warfare and influence operations’ (2019), this article focussed on USA governmental response to IWIO. Lin’s theory uses a variety of criteria of IWIO, such as psychological and technological elements to develop a response to IWIO that is based on empowering and increasing resilience in Western societies. Lin combines numerous components of previously mentioned methods while focusing on the actual nature of the Russian threat, as elaborated in this theoretical framework. He describes that in order to sufficiently respond to an adversary’s IWIO, it is important to ascertain that the adversary is actually conducting such a campaign. The importance of recognizing the threat is also acknowledged by Samadashvili and Janda. This can be difficult because a successful cyber-enabled IWIO campaign may not be noticeable if it was intended to be kept a secret (Ibid). ‘An adversary’s IWIO campaign – if successful- is likely to be invisible because the primary goal of IWIO is to persuade the target’s population that its desires and preferences are well aligned with those of the adversary’ (Ibid). Nevertheless, the identification of a foreign state being responsible for these handlings is a central aspect of detecting an ongoing IWIO (Ibid). Lin describes three elements of detection that can be used by governments:
1. Recognizing parties that might have something to gain from conducting such campaigns.
2. Detection and identification of automated IWIO weapons in use. 3. Detecting efforts to undermine the legitimacy of institutions that
provide societal stability and continuity.
After establishing evidence of an adversary’s IWIO campaign, defensive measures must be taken. Within the defensive measures, a distinction can be made between two different categories:
1. ‘Measures to help people resist the operation of the IWIO weapon targeted at them.’ (Lin 2018) 2. ‘Measures to degrade, disrupt or expose an adversary’s arsenal of IWIO weapons as they are
being used against a target population.’ (Idem)
The first category: ‘Measures to help people resist the operation of the IWIO weapon targeted at them.’ Is supported by almost all of the available literature concerning defensive measures against IWIO. Since the importance of focussing on societal resilience is almost everywhere being emphasized (Aro 2016:124; McGonagle et al: 3). Within this category three possible measures can be taken:
- The first measure is helping people to become more resilient against the effects of IWIO by making it easier for them to engage their rational thought capabilities. Here Lin refers to the use of ‘’debiasing’’.
- The second measure within the first category is using these human biases to find ways to counteract the effects of an adversary’s IWIO. It is important to keep in mind the psychological effects of ‘’affect heuristic’’. This effect implies that the way people feel about a certain situation influences their decision making processes and the conclusions that they draw.
- The third measure Lin mentions is concerning education. By educating the general population to think, look, and reflect critically on the information they consume, people will be less likely to believe everything that they see and read.
The second category: ‘measures to degrade, disrupt or expose an adversary’s arsenal of IWIO weapons as they are being used against a target population’ consists of five possible measures to degrade, disrupt or expose the adversary’s IWIO:
- The first measure is the use of fact checkers in order to counter disinformation. - The second measure is to disrupt the financial incentives for providing fake news.
- The third option that Lin addresses is to bring reduce the amount of automated amplifiers of a disinformation campaign.
- The fourth measure is to create more transparency with regard to the political traffic that is displayed on social media.
- The fifth and final measure focuses on future defensive strategies.
As mentioned previously in this theoretical framework, all of these five suggested measures were suggested not only Lin but also other research.
What separates Lin’s ideas from other theories, is the framework Lin offers that can help guide Western governments. Lin makes a clear distinction between the psychological and technological aspect of IWIO. By doing so, Western governmental agencies can more easily divide responsibilities and tasks so that the various Ministries can focus on the aspects of the threat they have capabilities in. Another facet which makes Lin’s framework very interesting and helpful is the broad applicableness of the framework. Lin does not propose fixed measures that only offer one option, but rather offers options which governments can adapt at their own discretion. Due to this and because almost every measure Lin suggests is substantiated by other literature. This thesis will use Lin’s framework to analyse Dutch policy.
This thesis’ literature review has shown that the main aim of Russian IWIO is to achieve political goals which benefit Russian leadership by weaponizing information to exploit societal vulnerabilities in the West. The main target for these operations is the general public, because their opinion ultimately influences the democratic decision making process. In order to do so the Russian use both technological as well as psychological elements for their IWIO.
In the past years different Dutch governmental agencies have developed policy in order to protect their society against the Russian threat. When looking at the current policies and protocols adopted by Western governments one can observe a specific focus on the cyber aspect of these operations (Giles 2016:13). This focus on cyber is supported by the findings in the theoretical framework of this thesis. When taking into account the use of IWIO by Russia, one can observe a focus on the psychological and societal aspects of these operations, and not as much on cyber itself. The focus on cyber by the Government of the Netherlands might therefore have security consequences for both the Dutch government as well as the Dutch population. Because of the current state of both the academic literature and the current Dutch governmental policy, this thesis will not focus specifically on the cyber aspect of IWIO, but instead focus on defensive measures taken by the Dutch government to protect the Dutch society from a broader perspective. In order to answer this research-question, the following hypothesis will be tested:
H1: ‘The Dutch government’s defensive policy on Russian IWIO does not fit the actual IWIO threat because the Dutch counter strategy focuses too much on the cyber aspect of these influence
operations’.
Although different theories have been written about governmental approaches against Russian IWIO, the framework offered by Lin is found to be the most suitable in order to answer the research question. This framework matches the current threat of IWIO to Western societies, since the recommended measures do not solely focus on technical enablers of IWIO but also on other aspects of the threat. Lin’s framework offers detecting measures for an IWIO in progress, as well as measures to reduce the impact of IWIO. Most importantly the measures described in Lin’s framework are supported by findings
coming from other literature and for that reason do not stand alone.
By making an analysis based on the collected information by the use of Lin’s framework this thesis aims to contribute to the gap in the academic literature concerning defensive measures against Russian IWIO and the policy options Western governments have in order to protect their societies. This research will use both academic literature and interviews with experts in the field (see methodology chapter). The goal of this thesis is to provide clarity and insight into the current situation regarding Russian IWIO in The Netherlands in order to ultimately answer the research question.
III. Methodology
In this chapter the methodology that was used to answer this thesis’ research question, the case selection and the theoretical basis of the analysis will be explained. In order to answer the aforementioned research question this thesis focused upon the strategy of the different governmental agencies of The Netherlands. By choosing the case of IWIO carried out by Russia within The Netherlands this thesis focused solely on the complexity of one specific case (Bryman 2012). Despite the specific focus on Dutch policy, information from other countries was also included in the analysis. This is due to the fact that it is crucial to analyse Russian influence operations from a broader perspective. Since Russia’s hostile attitude is no longer specified on the US, but has become an anti-globalization attitude, their main aim is to disrupt and cause chaos in order to weaken their opponents (Giles 2019: 24). When doing so, the Russians use the same techniques in different countries (Ibid). This emphasizes the importance of not only looking at examples of Russian IWIO for the Dutch case but also taking into account the international examples. By using qualitative research, this thesis tried to gain a better understanding of the topic of Russian information warfare as a part of influence operations. The qualitative research method is suitable to this thesis’ topic due to the specific nature of the case and the lack of quantitative data regarding the topic of IWIO. Due to this, and because of the way in which this type of research is conducted, qualitative research sees phenomena as constructions rather than unchangeable facts. When analysing Russian influence operations, it is important to take into account different aspects of the case in order to portray a full image. However, one has to keep in mind that this thesis was written from a Dutch perspective. This directly implies that this research will always include subjectivity (Bryman 2012) and that the external validity of this research is low since it cannot be generalized to other countries.
This methodology chapter strives to set forth the qualitative research methods used to look into the defensive measures of the Dutch government against Russian IWIO and clarify the decisions that were made in order to answer the research question. The aim of this thesis was to evaluate the current Dutch approach against Russian IWIO and to question to what extend the current defensive measures match the Russian IWIO threat in order to protect Dutch society. This thesis will thus serve as a case study specified to the Netherlands. The decision to focus on the Dutch governmental policy had several reasons. Although Russian interference was noticed in a variety of countries, the case of The Netherlands is an interesting one due to one specific incident: the plane crash of Malaysian Airlines, MH17. The plane, which was allegedly shot down by a Russian missile, caused the death of 196 Dutch citizens. This event will further be discussed in the next chapter of this thesis and is seen as the starting point of this thesis’ analysis. By researching the period from July 2014 until spring 2019, this research both analysed the period in which IWIO were not a regularly discussed topic among the general population, as well as a period in which they were. This is because the crash of flight MH17 took place prior to the media and social scientist started to demonstrate massive interest in the use of disinformation to influence democratic processes.
In order to answer the research question this thesis first gives more background information about the Russian IWIO threat specified toward the Netherlands. Thereafter an evaluation was given of the current Dutch policy concerning the topic of IWIO. Finally, an analysis of the Dutch governmental policy was made by the use of Lin’s framework for developing a response to IWIO. This is validated by the theoretical framework and literature review of this thesis, which were both based on a broad literature study. Both the evaluation of the current Dutch policy as well as an explanation of the Russian IWIO threat specified on the Dutch case are of importance in order to formulate an answer to the research question.
In the analysis chapter, Lin’s framework for developing a response to IWIO was used to analyse the collected data coming from the policy documents. As described in the theoretical framework in chapter II, Lin’s framework consists of detection measures and defensive measures which can both be taken by governments in order to protect their society against IWIO. These measures were applied to the analysed policy documents.
Due to the available data concerning the topic of IWIO, the decision was made to focus on four of the Ministries: The Ministry of Interior and Kingdom Relations, The Ministry of Justice and Security, The Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These four ministries were the only four who formulated policy on the issue of disinformation. The different Ministries each have their own ideas and interests regarding the topic. Although the analysis chapter primarily looked at the interviews and corresponding policy documents drawn by the Ministries individually, the interdepartmental working group, initiated by the Ministry of Interior and Kingdom Relations, the EU Action Plan Against Disinformation, and the NATO Stratcom initiative will also be taken into account.
To answer the research question, first relevant policy documents, and press releases by the Dutch government were gathered. Thereafter, data was collected by conducting semi structured in-depth interviews with experts from the field. This data is complementary to the data coming from the policy documents. At this moment, the data that was collected is the best available data, one always has to keep in mind that new data may become available.
The Interviewees came from different sectors such as: The Ministry of Defence, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Think Thanks, working groups and other events related to the topic. In order to portray a complete overview of the Russian threat, interviews were also held with Russia experts. Some of these interviews were held confidentially. For this reason all interviews will be anonymized. Interviewee profiles that are available in this thesis’ Appendix on page 58. In order to select the interviewees the following criteria were applied: all interviewees have either knowledge about disinformation or Russian warfare, have been working on this topic for a longer period of time and are participating in the interdisciplinary working group on disinformation. In order to increase objectivity, at least two experts per Ministry were asked to participate. Unfortunately it was not possible to interview experts from the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Dutch security services will be disregarded because of the difficulties related to the accessing of information and the focus of this thesis on the policy aspect of the defensive measures.
Using semi-structured interviews was helpful when gathering more (background) information (Bryman 2012). When analysing in-depth interviews, it is important to realise that language plays a key role, and the meaning of words can be multi interpretable (Idem: 472). Therefore the interviews that were used were recorded if permission was granted by the interviewee. The interviews were held on the basis of a semi-structured topic list which entails a deductive approach via a funnel model (Ibid). Topics which were discussed were the extension of the issue of IWIO and Dutch policy regarding this matter. The semi-structured topic on which the questions were based list is included in the Appendix of this thesis on page 57. All interviewees stemming from a similar position or background will be questioned based on the same topic list. The decision to use a semi structured topic list was made because it is likely that this will generate more information than when using a structured/closed topic list (Ibid). This is beneficial for the outcome of the research. The topic list used to question the interviewees is based on the theoretical framework and a funnel model (see Appendix).
The aim of this thesis was to evaluate the current policy of the Dutch governmental agencies regarding Russian IWIO, and to question whether or not this policy is focussing on the correct aspects of the Russian threat. Thus, this thesis served as a case study on Russian IWIO in the Netherlands after the crash of Malaysian Airlines flight MH17. The analysis was based on policy documents coming from Dutch governmental agencies and interviews. The collected data was analysed by the use of Lin’s framework on how states can develop a response to IWIO. In the next chapter more background information is given about the Russian IWIO threat in the Netherlands, as well as about the current Dutch policy.
IV. Context and Background
In this chapter the context and background will be outlined of both the Russian IWIO threat in The Netherlands as well as the current state of the policy regarding the topic of IWIO by the Dutch government. In part I of this chapter the Russian IWIO threat will be specified on the Dutch case in order to get a better understanding of the present- day risks. In part II the Dutch policy against IWIO and Russian IWIO in specific will be elaborated. The aim of this chapter is to create a better understanding about the current state of the threat and what the Dutch approach is to counter this threat. This will help contribute to answering the research question since the context and background information which is given in this chapter is of great importance for the analysis made in the next chapter of this thesis. The first part of this chapter will conclude that although there is only one large example of Russian IWIO in the Netherlands; the IWIO campaign surrounding the cash investigation of flight MH17. One should not forget to put this example in the international context. For this reason Dutch governmental institutions are taking the threat of Russian IWIO to influence political and democratic processes very seriously. The second part of this chapter does not so much draw conclusions but shows to what extend the Dutch government has taken measures to protect Dutch society against Russian IWIO. An analysis of the current state of these measures will be given in the next chapter.
Part I: What is the nature of the Russian IWIO threat in the Netherlands?
To understand the nature of the Russian IWIO threat in the Netherlands, one must take into account international political dynamics and incidents. This is due to the fact that the methods and tactics used by the Russians during their influence operations are being used all around the globe to weaken their adversaries (Janda 2018:182-183). When preparing and organizing an IWIO, the Russians intensively study their adversaries and the social relationships within their societies (Bittman 1985: 39). This is done to create an IWIO campaign that perfectly matches the vulnerabilities of their adversary’s society, in order to exploit those vulnerabilities and to benefit the interests of the Russian state (Palmertz 2016: 31-32).
In order to give a clear view of the nature of the Russian IWIO threat in the Netherlands, it is important to indicate that the Netherlands is a member state of several international organizations which currently have complicated diplomatic relations with Russia (Giles 2019: 24). Russia’s aim is to weaken their adversaries so they become stronger themselves (Ibid). Organizations like NATO and the EU have both acknowledged the possibility of Russian IWIO attempting to interfere in the societies and democratic systems of their member states (EUvsDisinfo; NATO Stratcom). It is therefore conceivable that Russia
