Coordination of EU policy in the
Netherlands and Belgium
Student Carin Simons
Student number 4124529
Department Nijmegen School of Management
Master specialization Comparative Politics, Administration and Society
Supervisor Dr. P.J. Zwaan
Second lecturer prof. dr. M.S. de Vries
Date April 2017
Master thesis
Coordination of EU policy in the Netherlands and
Belgium
Preface
This thesis focuses on the coordination mechanisms as they have been established in the Netherlands and Belgium since they both became a member of the European Union in 1957 and has been conducted as part of obtaining my master's degree in Public Administration at the Radboud University Nijmegen.
The study attempts to provide an overview of the extent to which local and regional
authorities in the Netherlands and Belgium have been involved in European decision-making over the years.
The completion of this thesis is not only an end to a months-long writing process but also to a wonderful student life which started five and a half years ago when I attended my first lecture at this university. Since that first lecture, I gained a lot of experience both in Nijmegen and abroad, valuable friendships, and unforgettable memories.
Together with my thesis supervisor, Mr. Pieter Zwaan, I formulated the research question of this thesis. The process of writing has not always been easy, and I want to thank Pieter Zwaan for his feedback on the pieces I sent him and the answers to my questions. Although I did not always have the faith, this thesis is something that makes me proud and is a good reflection of the knowledge I have gained over the years. I would also like to thank the interviewees I was able to speak to while executing this research. They have given me great insight and
knowledge on how coordination mechanisms work in practice.
Finally, I would also like to thank friends and family who have contributed to this thesis, via encouraging conversations when things were not running smoothly, for thinking along about the subject, and for editing spelling and grammar.
I hope you enjoy reading. Carin Simons
Summary
Decentralization has been an important issue for governments in the previous decades. As most European countries are also a member state of the European Union, this also has
consequences for the way in which national negotiation standpoints for the European level are established. The goal of this study was to describe, construe, and explain how sub national authorities are involved in European decision-making processes by the national governments in the Netherlands and Belgium via the coordination mechanisms of these countries, and how this has changed over time.
Literature on Europeanization functions as the scientific foundation for this thesis. As the European Union became a political system in its own right, understanding the impact the EU has on the member states and their domestic policies, polities, and politics became important. As Member states are allowed to speak with one voice only at the European level, and more domestic actors are involved in decision-making, countries had to establish
coordination mechanisms. These can differ on two dimensions: the coordination ambition and the level of centralization. This thesis aims at explaining the differences on these dimensions with domestic factors. To be able to do so, a comparative historical analysis has been
conducted. With the help of policy documents, scientific literature, interviews and running records the changing relationship between national and decentral governments regarding European decision-making and EU policy issues have been investigated.
Both in the Netherlands and Belgium decentral governments have gained more involvement in European decision-making. The coordination mechanisms have adapted to the participation of decentral actors in European decision-making. In Belgium, this has been the consequence of the federalization process that has taken place in Belgium since 1970. In the Netherlands, the central government has also decentralized a lot of policies in the last couple of years, and so the influence of decentral governments has grown. Several attempts have been made over the years to involve decentral entities in European decision-making. Important in this process was the establishment of Interbestuurlijke Dossier Teams where IPO, VNG and the national government work together.
The territorial organization of both countries is completely different. As the
Netherlands is a decentralized unitary state and not a federal state like Belgium, the power of the provinces and municipalities in the Netherlands will remain limited in comparison to the
Table of Contents
Preface...3 Summary...4 List of abbreviations...7 List of Figures...8 List of Tables...8 Introduction...9 1.1. Problem statement...10 1.2. Theories...12 1.3. Methods...12 1.4. Social relevance...13 1.5. Scientific relevance...13 1.6. Outline...14 Theoretical framework...15 2.1. Europeanization...15 2.2. Centre-regional relations...16 2.3. National coordination...17 2.4. Conceptual framework...23 Methodological framework...25 3.1. Research strategy...25 3.2. Case selection...27 3.3. Data analysis...283.4. Validity and reliability...29
3.5. Operationalization...30
3.6. Data collection...33
Analysis of coordination mechanisms in the Netherlands and Belgium...36
4.1. Coordination ambition...36
4.2. Centralization of coordination...43
4.4. Domestic factors...51
4.5. Recap...58
Conclusion...61
5.1. Conclusions...61
5.2. Reflection...67
5.3. Recommendations for further research...68
References...70
Annex 1: Interviewees...77
List of abbreviations
BNC Beoordeling Nieuwe Commissievoorstellen CA Cooperation Agreement
CC Concertation Committee COR Committee of the Regions
COREPER Comité des Représentants Permanents
DGE Directie-generaal Europese Zaken en Coördinatie EC European Community
EU European Union
ICFP Inter-ministerial Conference for Foreign Policy IPO Interprovinciaal Overleg
PR Permanent Representation
List of Figures
Figure 1: National coordination mechanisms (Kassim, 2003) Figure 2: Conceptual model
List of Tables
Table 1: Operationalization
Table 2: Categories in the Cooperation Agreement Table 3: EU coordination in the Netherlands Table 4: EU coordination in Belgium
Introduction
In October 2016, negotiations on the free trade agreement (CETA) between Canada and the European Union were put on hold by the Walloon regional government (NOS, 2016). The Belgian federal government and the Flanders region were for the treaty, but Belgium was not able to sign it for as long as the Walloon region was against it (NOS, 2016). This example showed the power that subnational governments have in Belgium. Over the last years, central governments have dispersed more powers to the subnational level (Tatham & Bauer, 2014). The will for decentralization can also be found in the ambition of the Rutte I government to reorganize the public sector by the decentralization of responsibilities and tasks towards regional and municipal governments (Regeerakkoord VVD-CDA, 2010). That is why since 2015, the policy areas of employment, health care, and youth belong to the tasks of
municipalities, and regional planning, nature, environment, and regional economic policy have been transferred to the regional governments (AIV, 2016). Following this trend, it has become a general tendency that competences between different bodies at the various levels of government overlap more and more (Tatham & Bauer, 2014).
The dispersion of powers affects the way the central government and decentral authorities work together ‘and resulted in a need for policy coordination but also in some frictions regarding different authorities’ autonomy to act independently (Tatham & Bauer, 2014).
Powers have not only been dispersed to the subnational level, but also to the supranational level (Ibid, 2014). Due to further integration, decentral governments are also increasingly faced with European legislation (Hessel, 2003). More and more, local governments are faced with the implementation of a wide range of European policies (Rijksoverheid, 2015).
Although the member states of the European Union (EU) are responsible for the
implementation and enforcement of European regulations adopted in Brussels, it can differ between member states how the implementation process is executed, either at the central or local level (Mastenbroek, Zwaan, Liefferink, Herweijer & Van Voorst, 2013). An increasing part of the policies made by local governments is at least partly determined by European regulations (Ibid, 2013). Rural municipalities, for example, have to consider the EU’s Natura
2000 legislation, which is the largest coordinated network of protected areas in the world (European Commission, 2008; AIV, 2016).
These changes have an impact not only on how the EU and member states deal with each other but also how different governments within a member state deal with each other. There is a growing need for a good explanation of the impact of the EU on the member states and their domestic politics, policy, and polity (Bulmer, 2007). Due to a shift of duties and powers to the supranational level, a situation is created wherein policy responsibilities are shared increasingly by institutions at multiple levels (Beyers & Bursens, 2006). This process is called multi-level governance and has gained more scientific influence over the last few years (Helderman, 2015).
Not only in the Netherlands, but also in other member states the dispersion of powers is visible. The center of the administrative powers in EU affairs in these member states is also changing.
Regions in Belgium, for example, are also increasingly faced with European legislation. Belgium is characterized as a federal state, which influences the way Belgium deals with EU affairs (Beyers & Bursens, 2006). A federal state is characterized by vertically dispersed powers, which means that each governmental layer has its political system. In Belgium, regions are entirely independent in European decision-making and have autonomous
legislative powers (Mastenbroek et al., 2013; AIV, 2016). Because a member state is allowed to speak with one voice only at the European level, a proper coordination between central government and the regions in EU affairs is necessary. The result of good coordination is that a member state can negotiate with other member states at the European level more easily (Beyers & Bursens, 2006; Bursens, Beyers & Donas, 2014; Jensen, 2014). Bursens, Beyers, and Donas (2014), however, state that the national coordination can still vary between member states, due to ‘variation in the domestic institutional and political set-ups which will develop different actor configurations when preparing EU policies (p. 364).
1.1. Problem statement
National coordination between different actors within a member state has become more important since both central and decentral actors have several ways to influence European decision-making. One way is by establishing an office in Brussels (Tatham & Bauer, 2014) or via a coordination mechanism ‘containing interlinked governmental units with the function of
aligning national EU related activities’ (Jensen, 2014; Gärtner, Hörner & Obholzer, 2011). As Bursens, Beyers & Donas (2014) state, the coordination mechanism can vary between
member states due to domestic institutional and political set ups. This study makes a
comparison between Belgium and the Netherlands. On the one side of the spectrum Belgium ‘is a strongly devolved member state in which the formal institutional, regional involvement in EU policymaking is strongly guaranteed, whereas in the Netherlands, on the other side, regional involvement is very weak (Tatham, 2011; Bursens, Beyers & Donas, 2014). With the decentralization processes and devolution processes that have taken place in several member states over the last decades the distinction in territorial structure, however, seems to become more inaccurate. Therefore, this study tries to find other factors that influence the relationship between the national and subnational government as well.
Which factors affect the relationship between the national government and
sub-national authorities, is researched within the framework of the following problem definition. This definition is made up of two parts, a research goal, and research questions.
To be able to answer the research question, several sub-questions help to structure the research process:
1. How can coordination be determined?
2. Which factors influence the coordination mechanism of a country and the change therein, according to scientific literature?
3. How has the role of subnational governments and coordination mechanisms in European decision-making evolved over the years?
Goal of this study: Describe, construe and explain how sub national authorities are
involved in European decision-making processes by the national governments of the Netherlands and Belgium via the coordination mechanisms of these countries, and how this has changed over time.
Research question: To what extent are subnational authorities via the coordination mechanism involved in the European decision-making processes by the national governments of the Netherlands and Belgium and what explains this?
4. Which factors could explain the changes and differences in the role of subnational governments in European decision-making processes of the Netherlands and Belgium over time, and to what extent can this be explained by constitutional factors?
1.2. Theories
Before member states can negotiate about new EU regulations on EU level, they need to consult with and coordinate the different actors involved in the decision-making process at the domestic level. This requires good coordination between actors so that good negotiating instructions can be formulated in due time (Panke, 2010). EU member states differ in the way they have designed this coordination mechanism, and the level of change in power relations between actors can also vary per member state. Literature does imply that certain factors contribute to differences in the coordination mechanisms of member states (Kassim, 2003). With the rise of new ways to influence European decision-making the role of subnational governments and the coordination mechanism on the European level has changed over the years. Based on a framework designed by Kassim (2003), which aims to understand differences in national coordination, an analysis is made of the national coordination mechanisms of the Netherlands and Belgium, and how power relations between different actors have changed over the years. Most of the used theories have a focus on national governments and how the coordination mechanism on the central level is organized. So did Bursens, Beyers & Donas (2014), who have come up with different dimensions that shape the coordination mechanism of member states on national level. Several of these dimensions have proven to be valid for the influence of decentral governments in European decision-making, and will therefore be used in this thesis.
1.3. Methods
A comparative case-study between the Netherlands and Belgium has been conducted to explore whether the extent to which subnational governments are involved in European decision-making affairs differ between countries. The Netherlands is a decentralized unitary state, which would mean that the formal institutional, regional involvement in EU
policymaking is very weak (Tatham, 2011; Bursens, Beyers & Donas, 2014). On the other hand, Belgium was first established as a centralized unitary state, but through several reforms, the country evolved into a federal state (Committee of the Regions, 2012). Decentralized governments in Belgium would, therefore, have greater autonomy than their Dutch
counterparts (Mastenbroek et al., 2013). It is expected that the influence Belgian decentralized governments have in European decision-making processes is quite big.
In the first phase of this study, the two countries were compared with each other. In the second phase several factors that explain differences in the national coordination mechanism of countries are used to describe the role of subnational governments in European decision-making processes. This study also focusses on the changes in the coordination mechanisms over time, to see if certain factors have become more or less important. To conduct this study, qualitative research methods have been used, such as literature study, comparative historical analysis, and interviews.
1.4. Social relevance
Both in the Netherlands and Belgium central governments focus more on decentralization (Beyers & Bursens, 2006; Mastenbroek et al., 2013). The increasing level of decentralization of government tasks in the Netherlands and other member states of the EU provides for a shift of duties and responsibilities to local governments, which limits the role of the national government. Besides the decrease in the responsibilities of the national government, the significance and impact of European laws and regulations will increase. The position of national government thus not only changes concerning subnational governments but also with Europe (Ibid, 2013). For subnational governments, this means that the importance of Europe becomes bigger and bigger. Accepting these new circumstances have implications for the position that local governments have in formal and informal political meetings in Brussels (Ibid, 2013). This implies two changes in the way government is set up: First, it implies that the EU has changed the formal and actual power relations within national administrative systems, and the specific position of the different governmental layers (Fleurke & Willemse, 2006, p.84). Secondly, it implies necessary changes in the internal administration of a state, possible reorganizations to cope with the pressure and challenges coming from Brussels (Ibid, 2006, p.84). As local governments have gained more tasks and responsibilities, they should also have more possibilities to influence EU regulations. National governments are not always willing to see their role being limited, and so the administrative practice of a country might not respond to the role local governments play on the European level. Reorganizations of the domestic administrative system can be necessary to reflect the changing power relations between national and regional governments.
1.5. Scientific relevance
Understanding the influence of European integration and the impact of European policy on domestic political and social processes of the Member states has become a necessary field of study (Börzel & Risse, 2000). The impact the EU has on the polity, policy, and politics of its Member states cannot be underestimated. Intergovernmental relations change, as do
regulatory structures, the relationship between executive and legislature, and administrative structures (Börzel & Risse, 2000). This implies that different actors involved in the decision-making process have gained different roles to play. A proper coordination between all stakeholders is required for having good negotiating instructions in due time (Panke, 2010). Often the relationship between the position of provinces and municipalities as one of these actors in the European policy-making process and the national coordination structure is still unclear (Beyers & Bursens, 2006). It is, therefore, important to focus on how this is organized and could improve. Scientific research and knowledge in this field are still limited. By making a comparison between the Netherlands and Belgium, research can be done on to what extent factors in the constitutional structure of a country determine the extent to which decentral governments are involved in the European decision-making processes. With the
decentralization processes and devolution processes that have taken place in several member states over the last decade, this distinction seems to become more inaccurate (Tatham, 2011). For this reason, this study attempts to focus on the correlation between constitutional factors and the way national coordination mechanisms are organized.
1.6. Outline
This thesis is outlined in the following way. In the second chapter, the theoretical framework on which this research is based can be found. In chapter 3 the used methods are described, followed by an operationalization of the important variables. Chapter 4 is the analysis of the coordination and different factors affecting this over time. The final chapter of this thesis gives a conclusion and discusses possibilities for future research.
Theoretical framework
In this chapter earlier research that could explain the differences and changes of the Netherlands and Belgium in their national coordination of EU policy is outlined. Due to changing power relations between national government and sub-national authorities, good coordination of EU affairs became more important. First, Europeanization as a concept is explained in detail. Europeanization has changed the polity of member states and can be used to explain in general terms why changes in national policy coordination became a necessary thing. In the second section, the national coordination of EU policies is described.
Coordination structures and the influence subnational governments can have on the European level via their national governments varies between member states. The factors that could explain this variation in national coordination mechanisms are outlined in section three. In a final section, it is discussed to what extent changes in these factors are sufficient or necessary to modify the national coordination.
2.1. Europeanization
As the European Union was increasingly understood as a political system in its own right, the implication of this development had to be understood (Bache, George & Bulmer, 2011). A more top-down approach to studying the EU, whereby the impact of European integration and the impact of European policy on domestic political and social processes of the member states is researched as the central theme is necessary (Börzel & Risse, 2000). This phenomenon is described in scientific literature as Europeanization (Börzel, 2005). According to Bulmer (2007), Europeanization can be described as the EU’s subsequent impact not only upon the member states but also on accession states and near-neighbors.
In these studies, the interactive two-way relationship between the EU and its member states has become more important to be able to fully capture how Europe and the European Union matter (Börzel & Risse, 2000; Bache, George & Bulmer, 2011). The difficulty with the concept of Europeanization is that itself is not a theory, but a phenomenon which different theories have tried to explain (Featherstone & Radaelli, 2003). To understand what
Europeanization is about, and what the impact of the European Union is on its member states, five different usages of the concept can be distinguished (Olsen, 2002: p. 923-924).
The first way the term Europeanization can be used is in connection with changes in the outer boundaries (Ibid, 2002). There is a shift in powers between national and
international actors. Secondly, Europeanization can also refer to the development of institutions at the European level (Ibid, 2002). Thirdly, Europeanization can be used to describe the central penetration of national systems of governance, and this will also be the key understanding in this thesis. Fourthly, Europeanization is used to identify exporting forms of political organizations to countries outside the European Union (Ibid, 2002). A fifth and final usage of the term is as a political unification process (Ibid, 2002).
So, Europeanization, as understood in this study, entails that there is a growing need for an explanation of the impact of the EU on the member states and their domestic politics, policy, and polity (Bulmer, 2007). Changes in politics refer to the way actors take political decisions in response to the EU integration process. Politics of an EU member state modify the ‘domestic processes of societal interest formation, aggregation, and representation (Börzel & Risse, 2000). Policy change refers to changes regarding the content of political decisions or policies (Börzel, 2005). More and more policies are affected by European legislation, and some policy areas, such as agriculture and environment are created at the European level for more than 80% (Börzel & Risse, 2000). The implementation of these policies leads to changes in policies of member states, in the instruments used for implementation and the policy standards (Haverland, 2000; Börzel & Risse, 2000). Polity changes refer to the changes at the level of the institutional organization of the political system (Börzel, 2005). This may, for example, affect the relationship between the central and subnational governments. This is explained below in more detail.
2.2. Centre-regional relations
With the dispersion of powers and the growing competencies of subnational governments, Europeanization also affects the pattern of relations between the central state and regions (Ladrech, 2010). Constitutionally, the national executive is responsible for domestic policy implementation, but this is often done in partnership with subnational governments (Ibid, 2010).
Relations between the central government and subnational governments started changing in the 1960s and 1970s when the regional authorities came alive with demands and pressures on the central government (Ibid, 2010). How national governments responded to these new requirements varied, due to ‘pre-existing structures, histories, and the exact nature
of the demand’ (Ibid, 2010). The European Union also contributed to this process, by
adopting and prioritizing regional development policies for further integration in the member states (Keating, 1995).
Regions became more important, and with the involvement of the EU in regional
development, subnational actors started to organize themselves and pressed for more input and control over the regional development (Ladrech, 2010). This lead to regions being more important and influential. The concept of multi-level governance tried to study the new relationship between the central state and the regions (Ibid, 2010).
According to Piattoni (2009), ‘the term multi-level governance denotes a diverse set of arrangements, a panoply of systems of coordination and negotiation among formally
independent but functionally interdependent entities that stand in complex relation to one another and that, through coordination and negotiation keep redefining the interrelations.' Multi-level governance has acknowledged the significant influence that the EU has had and still has on centre-regional relations within member states (Ladrech, 2010). Local, national and European levels of policy, politics, and polity are no longer seen as separate arenas in the decision-making process, but as interrelated fields.
Due to the changing relationship between the national government and sub-national
authorities, good coordination in preparing EU policy between the different actors involved has become more important. Coordination structures and the influence that subnational governments can have on the European level via their national governments varies, though it is suggested in literature that changes in which subnational governments are involved in national coordination are not a zero-sum matter, which means that a ‘decrease in power for national governments does not equal an increase for regions, and vice versa’ (Ladrech, 2010). So, although the influence of subnational governments on EU policy has grown, this does not necessarily imply that the national governments have become less potent.
Differences in coordination structures and the influence of subnational governments within these structures are discussed in the next paragraph.
2.3. National coordination
Before a member state can voice its position at the EU level and negotiate with other member states, it must have ‘a coordination mechanism containing interlinked governmental units with the function of aligning national EU-related activities (Gärtner et al., 2011; Jensen, 2014). The
architecture of this mechanism can change per member state. This is because developing positions for EU negotiations requires several formal steps (Panke, 2010). Depending on the number of actors involved in both domestic and European decision-making, coming up with one national standpoint can be more or less difficult.
The vast majority of decisions are made at the COREPER (Comité des Représentants
Permanents) level of the Council of Ministers, and so states need to know what they want,
and they need to produce good instructions for their negotiating attachés and diplomats in due time (Ibid, 2010). Without these instructions, these delegates have a hard time advocating their national policy preferences at EU level (Kassim, Peters & Wright, 2000; Panke, 2010). Therefore, good coordination between all involved actors is necessary.
Coordination can be defined as ‘the act of working together harmoniously’ (Malone & Crowston, 1990) and is required when more than one actor is involved (Malone, 1988). Within the public sector, coordination is perceived as something positive. Governments that are well coordinated are assumed to be working efficiently, to have fewer conflicting
programs, and to utilize the scarce resources rationally in achieving their policy goals (Kassim et al., 2000).
When a member state enters into the European Union, governments must be prepared to both coordinate their internal policy-making activities as well as to ensure that their proposals in Brussels and their national capitals are compatible with each other (Ibid, 2000). This leads to strong incentives for national governments of EU member states to coordinate the action both at domestic and international level. The incentives arise from the general characteristics of the EU, from specific duties and obligations, and from the increasing politicization of European matters in domestic political life (Ibid, 2000). Coordination has, therefore, become more important. Member states can differ in their ambitions, the strategies they use to coordinate and the structures they put in place (Kassim, 2003).
2.3.1. Ambitions and centralization of coordination
There are two fundamental dimensions along which national coordination mechanisms vary (Kassim, 2003). The first dimension is coordination ambition. This can vary between far-reaching, strategic and directive conceptions that are comprehensive in scope on the one hand, to more modest and selective ambitions on the other side (Ibid, 2003). Member states that have far-reaching conceptions aim at constructing an agreed position with national and
subnational governments on every issue of EU decision-making (Ibid, 203). Other member states decide to only reach an agreed position on the most important matters for their country.
The second dimension is ‘the extent to which coordination is centralized’ (Ibid, 2003). In a centralized coordination system, national negotiating positions are defined at a relatively early stage of the EU policy process, and this stance is accepted by all interested parties, to ensure the consistent representation by all national representatives (Ibid, 2003). This entails that publicly all national representatives of a member state have the same position in policy matters (Ibid, 2003). When coordination is not centralized, there is no single authoritative actor, not even the central government. Subnational governments are not controlled by the national government whether they effectively convert national policy to European policy and vice versa, but it is their responsibility (Ibid, 2003). It can also be the case that subnational authorities play a major role in policy formulation with voice or veto and that the head of government does not have the power to impose solutions on other actors (Ibid, 2003). The extent to which coordination is centralized/decentralized can also be referred to as the distribution of power (Jensen, 2014).
When putting the dimensions coordination ambition and centralization of coordination together, four basic types come up: comprehensive centralized; comprehensive decentralized; selective decentralized and selective centralized (Kassim, 2003).
Gärtner et al. (2011) use different questions to determine whether the coordination ambition of a member state is comprehensive or selective. These questions help to determine on how
many cases a negotiation position is established (Jensen, 2014). The more negotiation
positions are determined, the more comprehensive the coordination ambition will be. Elaboration on the questions can be found in the methodological framework.
To determine the level of centralization of the coordination mechanism, a closer look is given to the distribution of power in a country. This can be measured by two different factors.1 First, the presence of a central coordinator is used to designate the entity responsible for the overall process of coordinating negotiation positions (Jensen, 2014). Most of the times, this is either placed within the Prime Minister’s Office or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Laffan, 2007). Secondly, the mechanisms of conflict resolution can provide more clearance on the extent to which coordination is centralized. A mechanism for resolving conflicts is a device which is used to solve disagreements between different layers of government over the national positions (Jensen, 2014). As many European policies influence provinces and municipalities, this can lead to conflicts of interest that negatively affect the coordination dynamics (Panke, 2010). In coordinating EU policy, there is danger that the central government will attempt to exert their own preferences over those of other governments (Ladrech, 2010). This can cause a suboptimal negotiation position. It is, therefore, necessary to solve conflicts between different governments in a member state, so that the best national response can be achieved (Ibid, 2010). Most of the times the central actor will also be the actor that sovles conflicts (Panke, 2010).
2.3.2. Comparing and explaining national coordination structures
Domestic European policy coordination has been studied ever since it became clear that European integration puts substantial pressure on the internal political and administrative
1 The third factor is the ministries’ margin for maneuver in formulating the national position. This factor deals with the strength of the central coordination unit compared to the individual ministries (Gärtner et al., 2011). Domestic procedures can differ in the degree to which individual departments can autonomously prepare instructions for EU decision-making (Panke, 2010). Both in the Netherlands and Belgium the strength of the central coordinator is limited (Jensen, 2014). The territorial structure of the Netherlands and Belgium also leaves limited room for regions to come up with their own policy, and if they do so – like it is the case in Belgium – the influence of the central actor is limited. This implies that the ministries’ margin for maneuver cannot be
considered a relevant factor in the domestic coordination process of the Netherlands and Belgium. Therefore, this factor will not be taken into account in this thesis.
organization of the member states (Bursens, Beyers & Donas, 2014). Comparing the political arrangements of different member states raises the question of the extent to which they pursue similar ambitions, have similar strategies and have established similar structures (Kassim, 2003). There is not a clear answer to these questions, but over time two major assumptions have been put forward in research on domestic and European levels of EU policy
coordination.
On the one hand, the convergence hypothesis puts forward ‘that member states facing similar external pressures and challenges will, partly also due to mutual interaction, respond in similar ways to external stimuli’ (Bursens, Beyers & Donas, 2014). Convergence can be traced back to three mechanisms in institutional theory. Firstly, in the rational choice theory convergence occurs because ‘institutions in a shared institutional environment are likely to grow increasingly similar, as they converge around the most efficient organizational form’(Kassim, 2003). A second mechanism that encourages convergence is linked to new (sociological) institutionalism (Ibid, 2003). According to new institutionalism, ‘organizations in a common institutional environment are likely to become increasingly similar as a result of two additional factors: ‘coercion; the obligations and pressures that flow from EU rules (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991); and mimicry – the copying by some organizations of the mechanism or features of other organizations (Kassim, 2003).
The third mechanism is socialization which means that states that have ‘frequent contact between their national officials can be expected to lead the development of common norms,' which will result in a growing system of shared values within national administrative systems (Ibid, 2003). Kassim et al. (2000) observed some convergence ‘due to the fact that the EU simply expects national positions to be developed and defended at the European level (Bursens, Beyers & Donas, 2014).
On the other hand, the divergence hypothesis ‘expects variation between the member states, inspired by the historical institutionalist logic of path dependency’: organizations confronted with similar external challenges still respond in their own terms, mobilizing resources they have accumulated over time, and following pre-existing institutional logics (Kassim et al., 2000; Bursens, Beyers & Donas, 2014). Pre-existing constitutional structures, in this view, play a critical role in the position that subnational governments can take in EU-affairs and in their response to the opportunities which the EU presents (Ladrech, 2010).
Bursens, Beyers & Donas (2014) distinguish four dimensions that will shape the coordination mechanism on the national level. These dimensions cannot always be used to determine the input of decentral governments in European decision-making. Therefore, only three dimensions distinguished by Bursens, Beyers & Donas (2014) will be used in this thesis. The degree of politicization through ministerial cabinets and the involvement of political parties in the coordination mechanism are not taken into account.
The first is the territorial organization. The level of centralization/decentralization and the power that subnational governments have in general will affect the intergovernmental relations during domestic EU policymaking (Beyers & Bursens, 2013). In a more fragmented and less concentrated system, power is shared among more actors, and so it is expected that more actors want a say in EU affairs and are so involved in EU coordination. This pattern should not only be visible in the degree of centralization, but also in the coordination ambition (Ibid, 2014). The territorial structure of a member states determines how many (political) actors are involved in the decision-making process. It is expected that the more actors are involved in domestic policy-making – and, therefore, also in European decision-making – the less willing a member state will be to have a far-reaching coordination ambition, as reaching an agreement is more difficult when more actors are involved.
The second dimension distinguished by Bursens, Beyers & Donas (2014) is the way of
policymaking. As both the Netherlands and Belgium are consocational polities with a strong
participatory tradition, power relations in the system are rather egalitarian and inclusive (Ibid, 2014). This way of policymaking implies that the level of centralization is low (Ibid, 2014). More than one actor is involved in decision-making, whereas in centralized countries only a central actor can make decisions. On the other hand, as more actors are involved in decision-making it is more difficult to reach consensus on the negotiation position in Brussels, and the central actor will not consult all actors in all cases. The coordination ambition of the
Netherlands and Belgium is therefore expected to be selective, as in countries with a low level of centralization a lot of actors are involved in the decision-making process and establishing a negotiation position on all cases could be too difficult.
Kassim et al. (2000) came up with the same dimensions in earlier research and used one more. This is the salience of EU issues on the domestic agenda. It is assumed that coordination is more important in countries where EU issues are salient, but also more difficult to achieve (Ibid, 2000). The EU may have become yet another part of the political environment, and the issues arising from Brussels are accepted as little different from
domestic issues (Ibid, 2000). When a country is more for European cooperation, finding a single negotiation position will be less difficult to achieve. EU issues will then not be highly delicate matters that provoke intense political debates that divide the parties and the public (Ibid, 2000). Likewise, countries that tend to see themselves as net beneficiaries of
membership are less likely to generate contentious domestic politics out of EU matters (Ibid, 2000). The coordination ambition in member states where the salience of EU issues is low will be more comprehensive as agreement on the national negotiation position can be reached more easily. Also, the level of centralization is assumed to be higher when the salience of EU issues is low, whereas fewer actors want to have a say in European affairs or as they do not act as veto players (Kassim, 2003).
2.4. Conceptual framework
The theories used in this theoretical framework are schematically shown in the conceptual model, which can be found on the next page.
Methodological framework
In this section, the methodological choices made during the research period will be
expounded. This study was conducted between the period of September 2016 and April 2017. An elaboration is made of the research strategy, the case selection, the data analysis, the reliability and validity, the operationalization of the main concepts, and finally, the data collection.
3.1. Research strategy
To conduct this study, a comparative case study was chosen. The central theme in the research was the extent to which subnational governments are involved by the national governments of the Netherlands and Belgium in European decision-making processes and how this changed over time. The first part of this research deals with the national coordination mechanism for the two countries. The second part of this research aims at explaining the differences in both countries and over time, with the help of the concepts outlined in the theoretical framework. The work of Yin on case study research is very influential in the field of public
administration. Yin (1994, p. 13) describes a case study as ‘an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.' Case study research is necessary because sometimes, in-depth knowledge of an individual example is more helpful than getting knowledge about a larger number of cases. We gain a better understanding of the whole by focusing on a key part (Gerring, 2007).
Main goal while conducting a case study research is to find causes for a certain problem. Case study research is, therefore, a logic choice when a description of a certain problem has to be given or when a problem has to be explained in detail (Yin, 2010).
Case study research is mostly used while doing descriptive or explanatory research (Yin, 2010). George & Bennett (2004) state that case study research also implies that the researcher cannot control the whole phenomenon, whereas research is conducted in the natural context. They also define two different ways case study research can be conducted (Ibid, 2004). First, there are single case studies, where only one case is used to describe a phenomenon, whereas in multiple case study research, more than one case is used (Ibid, 2004).
This research is based on an explanatory multiple case study research, as both the Netherlands and Belgium are compared to explain differences in the national coordination mechanisms. Harder (2010) has given a short list of the elements that should be present in explanatory case study research: ‘they should consist of an accurate description of the facts of the case,
considerations of alternative explanations should be made, and the conclusion should be based on explanations that are congruent with the facts’.
Comparing countries with one another can be very useful. According to Bleijenbergh (2013) case study research is most useful in comparative studies because differences between countries are systematically compared. Most comparative research has been conducted on public policies and policy transfer (Rose, 1991; Cairney, 2012). Using these findings for comparing polity can also be useful, while conclusions can be drawn on the effect that institutional arrangements have on policy outcomes in different countries (Rose, 1991). By conducting cross-country comparative research, both positive and negative lessons from the design, the establishment or change of institutions, and the evaluation in a later stage can be used to prevent from making the same mistakes again (Cairney, 2012). Rose (1991) has also studied the benefits of cross-country case study research. He states that most countries to a certain extent face the same problems; that governments of different countries act quite alike, and the fact that comparative study ‘avoids the risks arising from culture-bound generalizations’ (Ibid, 1991). When adding more cases in case study research, the outcome will become more reliable (Ibid, 1991).
In the process of comparing countries, the aspect of time is also crucial. Processes that provide important clues to the way social and political life is structured is most appropriately studied by explicit comparison between entities that transcend national or regional boundaries (Mahoney & Rueschemeyer, 2003). These processes could also not be studied when the importance of temporal sequences and the unfolding of events over time is not taken into account (Ibid, 2003). This way of studying patterns is known as comparative historical analysis and is defined by ‘ concern with causal analysis, an emphasis on processes over time, and the use of systematic and contextualized comparison’ (Ibid, 2003).
In this thesis, the involvement of subnational governments in EU decision-making is studied and explained. Although Europeanization affects the polity of all member states, the outcome can differ between countries. Therefore, the cases of the Netherlands and Belgium are very suitable for comparative case study research. A phenomenon has been researched within its
natural context, the boundaries between phenomenon and context were not clearly evident, and triangulation of resources was used.
Case selection is very important when conducting case study research (George & Bennett, 2004). The selection procedure of the cases will further be explained in the next paragraph.
3.2. Case selection
A good selection of the cases used in this research is important because only a few units of research are included. The most important criteria when selecting cases is the ‘relevance to the research objective of the study, whether it includes theory development, theory testing, or heuristic purposes’ (George & Bennett, 2004). Secondly, cases should also be selected ‘to provide the kind of control and variation inquired by the research problem’ (Ibid, 2004). Bleijenbergh (2013) states that cases should be selected on the ability to falsify theories and hypotheses of earlier research, whereas the goal of this thesis is an explanatory one.
Therefore, case selection here is based on the ability of cases to verify theories.
Case selection has regularly been a topic of discussion among scholars (Gerring, 2007; Bleijenbergh, 2013). ‘It should be an integral part of a good research strategy to achieve clear objectives of the study (George & Bennett, 2004). There are several different ways to select a case. A first way is by selecting cases that are similar in all respects but differ in the variable of interest (van Klingeren, 2015). By studying which factors differ between the cases, the researcher can identify what explains the variation between cases (Mill, 1974; van Klingeren, 2015). On the other hand, cases can also be selected by the Most Different, Similar Outcome Design (MDSO). The central assumption in this type of case study research is that if the variable of interests affects the independent variable in both cases where all other things are different, it should almost certainly be a causal relationship (van Klingeren, 2015). In this way, proposed causes for the existence of the phenomenon in earlier research can be
eliminated (Ibid, 2015). A limitation of this kind of cases is that there is often more than one explanation or causal pathway (Ibid, 2015).
This study focuses on the question how it is possible that Europeanization can lead to differences in the polity of Member States. Over the last few years, more research is conducted on the role of subnational authorities in European decision-making on the one hand, and, on the contrary, on the interaction between national government and sub-national
governments. The Netherlands was chosen because regional involvement in EU policymaking is considered to be weak (Tatham, 2011), but has increased over the last years (Mastenbroek et al., 2013). Based on the constitutional setup of the Netherlands it was not expected that subnational authorities in the Netherlands would play a prominent role in EU policymaking or that they would have the power to retain EU decision-making.
The second case included in this research was Belgium. The national coordination mechanism of Belgium is characterized by a strong devolvement where regional involvement in EU policymaking is strongly guaranteed, and no domestic EU coordination is possible without the involvement of the Belgian regions or communities (Bursens, Beyers & Donas, 2014).
The selection of the Netherlands and Belgium as cases were underpinned by the divergence hypothesis, which expects that member states facing similar external pressures and challenges will only partly respond in a similar way to external stimuli (Ibid, 2014). Therefore, the case selection was made based on most different, similar outcome approach.
3.3. Data analysis
The first step in this research process was to conduct a literature study, which resulted in a theoretical framework and an institutional context which can be found in the next chapter. The results of the literature study have been used for a comparative historical analysis and to make an interview guide. Several leading concepts in the outcomes determined which interviewees were chosen. The operationalization, as described in paragraph 3.5, was the foundation for the formulated questions. Primary resources, such official documents, and data derived from policy documents are the second category of data used. Statistical data from newspapers, Eurobarometer and several indexes have also been used. Secondary documents include earlier research from other researchers. This was used mainly for the description of the national coordination mechanisms in the Netherlands and Belgium and to explain some of the
variances. Interviews have been analysed and compared with a coding scheme. This scheme was based on the concepts presented in section 3.5.
During the period this paper was written, the researcher kept up to date with new investigations on national coordination mechanisms, and also anticipated on the news
regarding central and decentral relationships. A good example of this was the retaining of the CETA-agreement by the Walloon government.
3.4. Validity and reliability
Validity and reliability are two of the most important factors for measuring the quality of scientific research. Validity refers to the extent to which a research reflects the real world, and what the influence of systematic errors in the investigation is (George & Bennett, 2004). George and Bennett (2004) have elaborated on different forms of validity. First, there is content validity, which entails that the used instruments measure what they are supposed to measure. This concept validity is especially important between the concepts outlined in the theoretical framework on the one hand, and the questions of the interviews on the other hand. The steps taken to go from abstract concepts to tangible questions is called operationalization (section 3.5). George & Bennett (2004) describe two ways in which content validity can be ensured: either by using angles of incidence of other scholars or by discussing the
operationalization with other investigators. In this thesis, the operationalization of the concepts used have been used before by other scholars. Secondly, George & Bennett (2004) describe construct validity, which means that a concept should relate to other concepts of the same theory. In this thesis, the concepts are a set that have been made up by Bursens, Beyers & Donas (2014) to explain pre-existing structures and do complement each other. Construct validity refers to whether the operationalization of a variable does really reflect the theoretical meaning of that concept (George & Bennett, 2004). The theoretical embedment of the used concepts is guaranteed by the fact that the concepts have been used by different scholars while studying coordination mechanisms of different member states.
Reliability, on the other hand, is about similar results when research is conducted under similar conditions (George & Bennett, 2004). It is measured by checking the data collection. Due to a smaller amount of research objects a deviation can be more significant (Ibid, 2004). They way in which the data is analysed is also important in measuring the reliability (Ibid, 2004). The reliability of this thesis is ensured by using concepts that have been used in other research before. There has also been intensive consultation with the thesis supervisor about the different concepts used. The last way to make sure the reliability was guaranteed was by using triangulation of sources and research methods. Errors that may occur in one source can, therefore, be corrected by other sources.
3.5. Operationalization
Operationalization of the important factors is the transition from theory to empirical research (Swanborn, 1981). The institutional determinants that have been outlined in the theoretical framework are operationalized to be able to measure them.
Comparing EU coordination and accounting for cross-country variation requires explicit specification of the concepts that can be used to classify and measure the mechanisms that have been established by national governments to develop positions for the Council (Jensen, 2014). Kassim (2003) has distinguished two dimensions – coordination ambition and
distribution of power – which can be used to compare national coordination mechanisms. 3.5.1. Coordination ambition
The first dimension takes into account the coordination ambition of a country. Some member states have a comprehensive coordination system and attempt to agree on every EU issue with all involved actors (Gärtner et al., 2011). Stakeholders, such as regions, parliaments, interest groups and political parties are involved in the pre-negotiation stage (Jensen, 2014). On the other side of the spectrum, there are also member states that use a selective coordination mechanism. In these countries, a position is formed only for salient cases (Kassim, 2003). Gärtner et al. (2011) use three different questions to determine the coordination ambition of a member state. The first issue is whether coordination and EU-level activities are concentrated in a few policy areas. This is the scope of the coordination process (Jensen, 2014). When this is the case, the coordination ambition will be more selective. The second question is whether coordination takes place for issues that clearly belong to the portfolio of one ministry. If so, the coordination ambition will also be more selective. The last question is whether
stakeholders are consulted on EU-related issues (Gärtner et al., 2011). The more stakeholders are consulted on EU-related issues; the more comprehensive the coordination ambition of a member state will be. These questions help to determine how many cases a negotiation position is established (Jensen, 2014).
3.5.2. Distribution of power
Coordination in member states can range from centralized to decentralized. In centralized countries, a central actor operates as an arbitrage between opposing views and can impose a position if no agreement is reached (Jensen, 2014). To determine whether a member state is centralized or decentralized, two questions are important: First, ‘is there a unit responsible for the overall process of coordinating negotiation positions towards the Council?’ and second, ‘Where is the unit placed in the ministerial system?’ (Ibid, 2014). If there is a central coordination unit placed within the central government, it is expected that the coordination mechanism will be more centralized.
Mechanisms of conflict resolution
Subnational authorities are independent actors in the coordination process and can, therefore, have a disagreement over the national position (Panke, 2010). Most of the time, several ministries have an interest in one policy field, which can cause conflicts that can delay the coordination dynamics (Spanou, 2001). To prevent this as much as possible, all member states have established procedures for conflict resolution. These procedures are often formalized and describe what official representatives of different political levels have to do when an
agreement is not reached at a particular level (Panke, 2010).
To measure conflict resolution, two questions have to be answered: First, ‘In what way is the central coordinator responsible for the overall coordination process?’ The answer to this question is twofold, as the central actor will mostly also be the actor that solves conflicts between different actors; and if the central actor is very powerful and can impose solutions on other actors, conflict resolution will not often be required. The second question is: ‘Is there a system in place to handle conflict resolution and how effective is it?’ (Jensen, 2014). If there is a mechanism for conflict resolution, but it is not effective, problems between actors will remain; if the mechanism is effective, the number of conflicts between actors will be limited.
3.5.3. Strategic use of political opportunity
The degree of national coordination of EU policy will also depend on the political opportunities at the domestic level (Kassim et al., 2000). To some degree, the EU is just another bundle of political issues that must be dealt with, so understanding the domestic political structures are therefore necessary (Ibid, 2000).
Several studies have shown that the formal territorial characteristics of a country affect the nature of domestic coordination mechanisms (Beyers & Bursens, 2006; Bursens, Beyers & Donas, 2014). When a country is less centralized, regions have more power in the
coordination process, and vice versa, when a country is more centralized the views of subnational actors are taken less into account (Jensen, 2014). This dimension correlates with the dimension on the distribution of power distinguished by Kassim (2003). Earlier research has shown that central state executives play the most important role in domestic
pre-negotiations (Bursens, Beyers & Donas, 2014). To measure the degree of federalism in a country the Gerring-Thacker index of federalism – which has also been used by Jensen (2014) before – will be utilized. The Gerring-Thacker index is based on two dimensions: the degree of separation between national and subnational governments and the relative power of the two players (Gerring & Thacker, 2004). The more power the national government has, the more unitary the state will be. A country can be placed somewhere on a scale based on this index, ranging from entirely federal on the one end, to completely unitary on the other end.
Way of policymaking
Both Belgium and the Netherlands have a way of policymaking in which other actors can participate quite easily, so there is a strong participatory tradition. Bursens, Beyers & Donas (2014) hypothesize rather ‘egalitarian and inclusive power relations in the domestic
coordination system, in particular when it concerns the involvement of minorities’ (p. 366). This would mean that the level of centralization is little. There are two main ways of
policymaking. The first is by majoritarian rule and the second is based on finding consensus (Bursens, Beyers & Donas, 2014). The systems are opposed to each other concerning the distribution of power (Vatter, 2007). In majoritarian democracies, there is a bare-majority cabinet, a two-party system, a disproportional system of elections, a unitary and centralized government, and it centers on the concentration of power as a fundamental principle (Ibid, 2007). In a consensus democracy, on the other hand, power is shared between a broad coalition cabinet, there is a proportional electoral system, a multi-party system, and a federal and decentralized government (Ibid, 2007). To measure the way of policymaking one of these policymaking frameworks will be identified.
Salience of EU issues on the domestic agenda
The salience of EU issues on the domestic agenda is one of the crucial political factors (Kassim et al., 2000). Some member states are considered to be very EU-sceptic, which
divides the political parties and the public (Ibid, 2000). In other member states, issues coming from Brussels are accepted more easily. It is argued that member states with a high EU skepticism are more likely to have a centralized coordination mechanism (Kassim et al., 2000; Jensen, 2014). On the other hand, countries that tend to be in favor of further EU integration will not spend a lot of money and time on negotiating the national standpoint. To measure the attitude of a member state on European integration, a media analysis is executed including eight big national and regional newspapers in the Netherlands and Belgium (Bakker, 2013; De Morgen, 2016). Studies on media reporting on the EU indicate that the salience of the EU for media is low (Kevin, 2003). The newspapers include NRC Handelsblad, Algemeen Dagblad,
De Gelderlander, and Leeuwarder Courant. The national newspaper NRC Handelsblad is
known as ‘newspaper of record’ and has its main focus on politics, economy and culture; and they aim at higher-educated readers (NRC Handelsblad, 2016). In this newspaper a lot of articles covering the European Union, European influence in the Netherlands and the work of European politicians can be found (Ibid, 2016). The Algemeen Dagblad considers itself a neutral newspaper with no political affiliation (Algemeen Dagblad, 2016). In addition to the national newspaper Algemeen Dagblad also owns a number of regional newspapers, where Europe is not an important topic for articles. The Belgian newspaper Het Nieuwsblad presents itself as a newspaper for the Catholic lower-educated reader (Het Nieuwsblad, 2016) The newspaper De Morgen positions itself as a critical newspaper in which diverse and outspoken views also have a platform (De Morgen, 2016).
Newspapers from the Walloon region are not taken into account in this media analysis, due to linguistic reasons. The media analysis covers the period between 2001 and 2016 because several important events in European history have taken place in this period, such as the Dutch ‘no’ to the European Constitution in 2005, the entry of decentral governments to the Dutch BNC working group, and the state reforms of 2001 and 2014 in Belgium.
Other expressions of Europe in public debates are also included in the analysis. These expressions could be the number of reports on Europe and decentral governments, the number of scientific researches that have been conducted on the subject or the attention that national parliament gives on multilevel governance. The main keywords in this analysis have been European Union/Euroscepticism/European citizenship/Europe.
3.6. Data collection
When doing a case study research, it is important to use triangulation – use multiple resources (Yin, 2010). A complete picture of the case can be given when more than one data resource is used, and missing parts in one resource can be filled in by others. For the institutional context several policy documents, recommendations written by different institutions and other
scientific literature on the topic have been used. In this way, a good overview of the
relationship between central and decentral governments in the Netherlands and Belgium could be provided. Scientific literature was used to build the theoretical framework. To determine the national coordination mechanism of the Netherlands and Belgium a combination of scientific research and policy documents were used. So, both primary documents and secondary literature have been used to collect all the necessary data. Running records have also been used. These ongoing sets of statistical data help to determine changes over time (Mahoney & Rueschemeyer, 2003).
To complete the data required, interviews were conducted via email. The interviews were set up as semi-structured, the interview guide can be found in Annex 2. For the two cases, several interviewees were selected. A selection was made of the actors involved and on the
knowledge actors had about the subject. So, not only actors in the field are included in the research, but also interviews with other researchers have been conducted. The aim was to interview actors that could tell more about the role of decentral governments in EU affairs, the changing role of national government in this process, and the changes that have occurred over the years. A list of interviewees and the organization they represent can be found in Annex 1.
Theoretical concept Dimensions Measure Value Coordination ambition 1. Are coordination and EU-level activity concentrated in a
few policy areas of particular national interest? 2. Does coordination take place for issues clearly falling
into the realm of one ministry?
3. Are stakeholders, such as subnational authorities, consulted?
(Gärtner et al., 2011)
Comprehensive or selective
Distribution of power Central coordinator 1. Is there a unit responsible for the overall process of coordinating negotiation positions towards the Council? 2. Where is the unit placed in the ministerial system? Conflict resolution 1. How is the central coordinator responsible for the overall
coordinating process?
2. Is there a system in place to handle conflict resolution and how powerful is it?
Measured by Jensen (2014). Question 1 ranges on a scale from 1-3; question 2 on a scale from 1-5.
Strategic use of political opportunity
Territorial structure The extent to which a country can be classified as a federal state on the Gerring-Thacker index (Jensen, 2014)
Scale from 1 to 5 (1 = completely federal; 5 = completely unitary) Degree of politicization 1. Which are the constitutional powers in subnational
parliaments regarding binding voting instructions? 2. To what extent are specialized committees involved in
EU matters in subnational parliaments?
Possible scores: weak, moderate or strong
Salience of EU issues on the domestic agenda
The media coverage of European affairs in national and regional newspapers; other expressions of multilevel governance between Europe and decentral governments in public debate
European Union/
Euroscepticism/ European citizenship/ Europe Table 1: Operationalization
Analysis of coordination mechanisms in the Netherlands and
Belgium
The first part of the analysis describes the (changes in the) coordination structures in the Netherlands and Belgium. It first discusses the coordination ambition in the Netherlands and Belgium over time, and then turns to the centralization of coordination.
The second part explains these structures and their changes by analyzing different (stable and changing) domestic factors in the two member states.
4.1. Coordination ambition
The coordination ambition of member states can vary between far-reaching, strategic and directive conceptions that are comprehensive in scope on the one hand, to more modest and selective ambitions on the other hand (Kassim, 2003). When a member state has a very comprehensive coordination ambition, it tries to construe an agreed position with all involved actors on every issue of EU decision-making (Ibid, 2003). Member states that apply a more selective coordination ambition only try to reach an agreed position on the most important issues for their country (Ibid, 2003).
4.1.1. The Netherlands
The most important committee in the Dutch coordination system is the BNC working group (Beoordeling Nieuwe Commissievoorstellen) (EuropaNu, 2016). New proposals for policies and regulations coming from both the European Commission and other member states are submitted to the BNC working group. The working group then prepares a first Dutch position on these new proposals (EuropaNu, 2016). They write a so-called BNC file (fiche) on behalf of the Dutch government in which a description of the proposal is given as well as the financial and legal implications for the Netherlands, the relation to subsidiarity, and a rough outline of the position that should be taken in the Council of Ministers’ working group (Andeweg & Irwin, 2009). These BNC files are the input for Dutch negotiators in Brussels (EuropaNu, 2016). Members of the BNC working group are officials from the International Executive Board and/or EU affairs of each ministry. Every two weeks, new proposals are discussed in a BNC meeting (Ibid, 2016). Goal of this committee is to prevent late and
