The role of alliances and domestic support: U.S. foreign policy towards

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MA International Relations Leiden University

Dr. M. Foulon

Thesis

The role of alliances and domestic support: U.S. foreign policy towards Egypt, Libya and Syria under the Obama administration

Dylano de Wilde S1883550 6 July 2018 14907 words APA-Style Citations British-English spelling

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INTRODUCTION

During a speech for the United Nations (UN) at the World Summit on Humanitarian Leadership, Former Secretary General Ban Ki-moon said, “There was outrage that national sovereignty and security are placed above people’s rights to protection and assistance, and that the most basic tenets of international humanitarian and human rights law are violated every day without accountability” (Guardian, 2016). By saying this, Ban Ki-moon tried to raise awareness of the connection between sovereignty, human rights and (possible) military engagement by states. Ban Ki-moon further stipulated that military engagement (e.g. in regard to human rights) is a highly debated topic, remarking the importance of this issue.

One country well known for its military engagement is the United States (U.S.), which is shown in scholars’ great interest in U.S. interventionism. As Fordham (2008) argues, the U.S. sees military involvement as an effective foreign policy tool and therefore uses it frequently—as cases like Afghanistan, Iraq, the former Yugoslavia and Sudan show. Moreover, recent examples have been added to the number of cases in which the U.S. was involved militarily (i.e. Libya and Syria during the Arab Spring). In contrast to normal U.S. military engagement, U.S. support in these two countries is often mentioned as ‘leading from behind’ (De Castro & Helena, 2015). The ‘leading from behind’ strategy can best be described as one that aligns the United States with others (i.e. states) such that it engages less directly (Lofflmann, 2015). What is interesting is that the U.S. military led from behind in Libya and Syria, but not in Egypt. In Libya, the U.S. was a part of a NATO-led coalition to take out air strikes (European Parliament, 2014). In Syria, several countries gathered under an American-led military coalition (European Parliament, 2014). In contrast, the U.S. did not take any action to militarily engage in Egypt during the Arab Spring; underlining the good relations the U.S. and Egypt seem to have had in recent years.

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4 Moreover, the similarities between these three cases are interesting. Although Anderson (2011) points out the differences in the paths to the protests in Egypt, Libya and Syria, the turmoil in each country was grounded in similar factors. According to Amnesty International (2016), the similarities between the three cases rest on several factors. First, long-standing authoritarian leaders were swept from power (i.e. Assad in Syria, Gadhafi in Libya and Mubarak in Egypt). Second, the citizens of the three countries demanded government reform and social justice. Third, all three countries saw great violence against their citizens during the Arab Spring, with widespread human rights violations. In light of these factors, it becomes evident that the turmoil in each country, starting with the protests, occurred during the Obama administration. Additionally, the U.S. has great interests in stability in the Middle East (Brookings, 2016).

This raises the question of why the U.S. led from behind in Libya and Syria but not in Egypt, even though similar factors were in place. Additionally, what factors influenced the decision to lead from behind in Libya and Syria but not in Egypt? This serves as a guide for the research at hand.

To my knowledge we already know that academic research suggests that the U.S. chose to lead from behind in Libya and Syria, rather than serving as the main actor (De Castro & Helena, 2015; Lofflmann, 2015). Additionally, Kuperman (2013) states that the UN based its measures on Libyan intervention (under NATO) on the responsibility to protect (R2P). Moreover, Plappert (2010) and Choi and James (2016) have shown several important causes that have recently influenced U.S. intervention, such as the war on terror and the promotion of democratic values.

However, addressing the topic of the U.S. leading from behind in Libya and Syria (and not in Egypt) can, in my opinion, contribute to questions in academic research on U.S. military engagement, specifically in the Middle East. Moreover, certain research gaps arise. First, the link between international relations theory and how it shapes U.S. foreign policy is still open for further research. For example, Plappert’s (2010) and

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5 Choi and James’ (2016) research lack several factors that other academics address (i.e. domestic support, the role of alliances). Second, an in-depth review of U.S. policy choices in all three cases in one study (and comparison) has not yet been done. Third, this research aims to gain insights into the question of why deviant cases (i.e. Egypt) of military involvement occur under the same government (i.e. the Obama administration); therefore, the literature also needs more propositions that can be tested. This paper hopes to extend the academic literature by filling the gap in recent knowledge on U.S. military involvement. This may consequently alter results and contribute to academic knowledge of why the U.S. leads from behind in some states, but not in others.

Thus, research must examine U.S. foreign policy towards the three cases from the twenty-first century, taking into account more factors and contexts that may update and alter findings on the U.S. leading from behind. Looking through the theoretical lens of why states lead from behind in some cases but not in others, a research puzzle in U.S. foreign policy can be addressed through the cases of Egypt, Libya and Syria.

This is also of interest for policy makers for the following reasons. First, this will create a better understanding of the U.S.’s lead from behind strategy and foreign policy as a whole. Secondly, it might be interesting for foreign policy advisors since it creates a better understanding of the U.S.’s attitudes towards the Middle East. Third, Tunisia won’t be addressed in this research, but it is a state in which the U.S. did not lead from behind (and is therefore in line with the U.S.’ policy decision towards Egypt). This research may help understand why the U.S. did not lead from behind in Tunisia, by looking at Egypt. Overall, this research may contribute to the knowledge of other states’ policy decisions and have direct impacts on the safety and security of civilians around the world.

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6 The questions that remain in academia and the aim to conduct research on policymakers’ interests bring forth the following research question to better explain and understand U.S. foreign policy:

Under the Obama administration, why did the U.S. not lead from behind in Egypt but did so in Libya and Syria, despite the similarities between the

countries’ humanitarian crises and the U.S.’s broader interests in the Middle East?

The research is structured as follows. The first chapter explores the extant literature and theories regarding U.S. military involvement. From this literature review, the subsequent chapter explains the factors that influence U.S. foreign policy and creates several models to steer the research at hand. After this, the research design addresses the data collection and analysis. This produces a tool upon which three chapters will be based that describe what led to the decision to lead from behind in Libya and Syria but not in Egypt.

Following this, a comparative analysis is conducted to examine the differences in U.S. decision-making in regard to the three cases and is linked further to the academic literature. Upon this, several concluding remarks are provided, which pave the way for a discussion.

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7

LITERATURE REVIEW

The aim of this literature review is to explain the focus, background and extant literature on U.S. military engagement, and it identifies questions and differences about earlier academic assumptions on the subject. First, the backgrounds of two bodies of literature in light of U.S. military involvement are given to categorise and identify the literature and to better understand U.S. military involvement and foreign policy. Second, several alternative explanations are extracted to determine which factors influence U.S. foreign policy to lead from behind (and militarily engage). This consequently produces tools to steer the research at hand.

2.1 Explaining liberalism and neo-conservatism: Background of U.S. military involvement

Regarding U.S. foreign policy in the last two decades, there are two bodies of literature that help us better understand U.S. military involvement in and foreign policy towards other states.

The first body of literature is liberalism or liberal interventionism, a concept that steers U.S. foreign policy and influences the U.S.’s decisions to take action. Much has been written about liberalism. One group of scholars argue, as Hoffman (1995) explains, that liberal interventionism argues that liberal states could intervene in other states in order to pursue liberal objectives. Moreover, intervention could help to create the global structures that promote a liberal world order wherein liberal states have relations characterised by non-violence (Hoffman, 1995).

Another group of scholars argues that this is related to the “democratic peace theory”, which hypothesizes that democracies do not go to war each other, and therefore creates a theoretical incentive to promote liberal values (through military engagement) on the basis that it could create peace in the long term (Doyle, 1997). This is a relevant given since the democratic peace theory fails to explain why states do not intervene and is therefore a useful concept in this thesis. For example,

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8 there are many cases in which the U.S. could have intervened (based on liberalism) but did not, such as in North Korea, Iran and Egypt.

In retrospect, liberalism does not give the full picture of U.S. foreign policy. The issue with liberalism, or liberal interventionism, is that there are several problems with the definitions and methodology it uses. Specifically, states reinterpret the others’ regimes as a consequence of their own viewpoint, for example in regard to security concerns. For example, Oren (1995) provides the example that pre-WWI Germany was considered a democratic state, while during WWI (when relations with the U.S. and Britain changed) Germany was seen as an autocratic state, even though there was no regime change. Therefore, it seems that liberal interventionist states change their attitudes towards other states under the umbrella of liberalism if it suits their interests and helps them justify military engagement. Additionally, it seems that liberalism fails to explain the U.S.’s post-9/11 foreign policy.

Therefore, neo-conservatism could better explain U.S. foreign policy and military engagement in relation to the security concerns mentioned , especially from 9/11 onwards. Neo-conservatism helps us better understand U.S. interventionism at the beginning of the twenty-first century and the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Record, 2010). Within neo-conservatism, three pillars—strong patriotism, a rejection of a world government and a clear distinction between friends and enemies—tend to form foreign policy (Kristol, 2003). In the same corner as liberalism, neo-conservatism does not shy from the spread of liberal institutions into areas that do not have them in place. However, its distinctive feature is that it believes military engagement can effect and accelerate the process of constructing liberal institutions (Kristol, 2003).

A group of scholars argues that President George W. Bush put neo-conservatism into practice in U.S. foreign policy (Muller, 2011). As Former President Bush stated in 2002, “We cannot put our faith in the word of tyrants, who solemnly sign non-proliferation treaties, and then systematically break them. If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we

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9 will have waited too long”. This statement introduces the “policy of preventive force” against dictators, terrorists and affluent groups that could challenge U.S. security interests (Muller, 2011:778).

Liberalism and neo-conservatism possess several similar and different factors. Both systems do not shy away from intervention and see the promotion of human rights, democratization and combatting terrorism as grounds on which the U.S. could take action. However, Bosco (2012:1) argues, liberal interventionists “share the desire to spread freedom and the conviction that outsiders can help do so, but they also care deeply about building international architecture (almost always) and respecting international rules (usually)”, while neo-conservatives are not so interested in global architecture. Rather, neo-conservatives believe that international organisations (such as the UN) and procedures work against their goals.

2.2 Influencing U.S. military engagement

From the two bodies of literature under section 2.1, several explanations can be extracted that help explain why the U.S. military engages in some countries but not in others.

One explanation of why the U.S. engages is domestic embedded culture, which relates to liberalism. Domestic embedded culture has to do with policy makers’ ideas on how to face foreign policy issues. To be more specific, it explains the domestic factors influencing U.S. foreign policy relate to the societal environment in which the U.S. operates. It capitalizes on the basic needs, values, beliefs and self-images Americans widely share about their political system to shape foreign policy (MacCormick & Wittkopf, 1999:10). For example, the U.S. culture of stimulating liberal values and needs can be seen as a base to steer U.S. foreign policy.

A second explanation of why the U.S. military engages is superiority, which partly stems from neo-conservatism. Superiority proposes that U.S. foreign policy is influenced by and can be understood as a means to

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10 maintain the American political identity (Campbell, 1998). Especially throughout the last parts of the twentieth century and at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the U.S. addressed foreign policy issues as dangers and risks; everything non-Western could be seen as barbaric. An example is Iraq, where the U.S. argued—among other reasons—that Iraq needed to be attacked based on the risk of the existence of weapons of mass destruction.

A third explanation for why the U.S. engages is commercial interest groups. Approximately 10,000 lobbyists are active in Washington, DC, and influence U.S. policy (Skonieczny, 2017). The influence of commercial interest groups can be seen as a mechanism that tries to influence security decisions (e.g. military engagement) to steer U.S. foreign policy decisions that are beneficial to corporate or special interests. This is also shown within the research, which shows that U.S. foreign policy is heavily influenced by corporations and special interest groups, such as lobbyists from big trade companies and the Israeli lobby (MacCormick & Wittkopf, 1999; Skonieczny, 2017).

These three explanations were the main reasons for the U.S. to engage in other countries from 1981 to 2005. In turn, it is useful to delve into the three explanations that influence the decision for a (possible) intervention and military engagement. It may help clarify why the U.S. military engages in some countries but not in others; therefore, these three explanations are described in more detail in the following sections. 2.2.1 Variable one: Domestic embedded culture

Domestic embedded culture can be seen as a powerful variable that influences U.S. foreign policy. States do not follow the path of rational action, but adhere to structures, beliefs and values that steer their (foreign) policy. In terms of military engagement, this can be seen as a tool to enhance the liberal values and culture the U.S. arguably possesses, upon which military engagement can be based.

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11 One group of scholars argues that the acts of states are shaped by different historical experiences and (transnational) relations (Risse-Kappen, 1995). States, or sub-units of governments, act in a process of trans-governmental coalition through which they are constituted and formed and through which states are exposed (Nowell, 1994). Additionally, this stems from social and economic changes over decades, which have formed a system and a domestic embedded culture upon which policy makers base their decisions. A norm can be created throughout state and society that enjoys support in upper political echelons and steers the policy with regard to economics, security and other policy issues (Risse-Kappen, 1995).

Another group of scholars argues that domestic embedded culture relates to the needs, values and images shared by U.S. citizens and policy makers (McCormick & Wittkopf, 2008). The argument is that ideas and beliefs influence policy when they provide roadmaps for policy makers that have clear goals; policy is made to transform ideas to reach those goals. An idea thus becomes embedded in political institutions (Goldstein & Keohane, 1993). For example, sovereignty (in regard to foreign policy) can be seen as a norm that has changed in how it is perceived and embedded in U.S. culture, which itself transformed from an isolated country before WWII with few international ties to an active participant in international institutions, such as the UN.

In short, domestic embedded culture could shape foreign policy through the formation of beliefs and values or in regard to history, in which culture shapes foreign policy.

2.2.2 Variable two: Superiority

From security to technology, the U.S. exercises a dominance that cannot easily be matched on the global stage. From this dominance emerges the neo-conservative value of superiority. Within superiority, the U.S. is seen as a global superpower, which plays a key role in disputing

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12 conflicts around the world, and the thought of the U.S. superior changes and alters its foreign policy decisions.

Some argue that the U.S. sees itself as a superior power that is an indispensable component of international stability (Kissinger, 2002). Many foreign policy actions and decisions can be traced to this school of thought. In this way, the U.S. considers itself “both the source and the guarantor of democratic institutions around the globe, increasingly setting itself up as the judge of the fairness of foreign elections and applying economic sanctions or other pressures if its criteria were not met” (Kissinger, 2002: 17). For example, the U.S. is so committed to this role that has almost ritually assigned itself as a mediator, even when it was not invited to mediate (Kissinger, 2002). A premiere example can be seen in the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan in 1999, in which the U.S. involved itself in the negotiations, though not formally invited.

Others argue that superiority can be explained in regard to pre-emptive security and exceptionalism. Within its foreign policy, the U.S. could install pre-emptive security measures as a form of dominance over the other (de Goede, 2008). This aim is to defend the U.S. as an “exceptional nation” that differs from others in terms of history, people and mission, all of which are superior to other nations (Lipset, 1996). This exceptional nation must be protected at all costs. Military engagement could, for example, stem from counterterrorism to protect the U.S. (Stewart & Muller, 2012). The invasion of Iraq being one such example of this policy.

Essentially, superiority could shape U.S. foreign policy by creating the idea that the U.S. is an exceptional country that protects international stability and that must be protected at all costs.

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13 2.2.3 Variable three: (Commercial) interest groups

A third explanation of why the U.S. military engages is the influence of (commercial) interest groups on U.S. foreign policy. Interest groups (i.e. foreign governments, corporations) act as strategic players that make moves with U.S. policy makers to produce a policy (the desired outcome). Lindsay (2007) suggests this is happening in the U.S., as foreign affairs decisions are normally the outcome of intense bargaining between several branches and levels of the U.S. government. Lobbying is sometimes even seen as a legitimate activity or constitutional right (Thomas, 1993).

Some argue that lobbying is done through “logrolling”, wherein there is an exchange of political favours (Destler, 2005). This means that if Congressman X supports an initiative (motivated by the interest groups), he will receive favours from the interest group. In this way, foreign policy is steered by deals between interest groups and members of Congress.

Others argue that interest groups use former policy makers as lobbyists to further steer debate and policy. It can be seen as a “revolving door”, as many policy makers leave politics and come back as lobbyists (Mearshmeier & Walt, 2007). An example of the influence of interest groups can be found in the Israeli-American lobby, whose influence rate is around 81.7%, meaning that in 81.7% of the laws they lobby, the desired outcomes are met (Mearshmeier & Walt, 2007).

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14 Table 1 presents an overview of the theories that explain U.S. military engagement and that could explain the U.S.’s lead from behind strategy in Libya and Syria.

Table 1: Theoretical explanations that steer U.S. foreign policy and military engagement

Theories Explanations Details

Liberalism and liberal

interventionism

 Domestic embedded culture

 U.S. history shapes foreign policy.

 U.S. values and images shape foreign policy.

Neo-conservatism  Superiority  The U.S. sees itself as an indispensable component of international stability, which shapes its foreign policy  The U.S. sees itself as an

exceptional nation that must be protected, which shapes its foreign policy.

Liberalism/Neo-conservatism

 Commercial interest groups

 U.S. foreign policy is shaped by logrolling.

 U.S. foreign policy is shaped by a “revolving door” of lobbyists.

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15

MODEL AND FRAMEWORK

Now that the two main bodies of literature that could influence U.S. foreign policy have been identified and discussed, this chapter explains how these explanations can be used in this research. First, three constraining factors on the explanations of U.S. foreign policy (mentioned in Chapter 2) are explained thoroughly. Second, a model is provided to further explain the relations between the variables used in this research. Third, several propositions are made to further steer the research at hand. 3.1 Altering U.S. action: Moderating factors in U.S. decision making

Given the two bodies of literature that form the basis for three explanations of U.S. foreign policy, a certain “control’’ is needed. Domestic embedded culture, superiority and commercial interest groups alone cannot fully explain U.S. foreign policy, since there are cases in which the U.S. did militarily engage (i.e. Libya and Syria) but others in which they did not. Therefore, there must be constraining factors that steer U.S. foreign policy and decision making.

There are several constraining factors, such as the influence of alliances, domestic support (i.e. the influence of popular and political support) and geopolitical interests, which could help explain the factors influencing U.S. foreign policy. These three factors are further explained in the paragraphs below.

3.1.1 Factor one: Alliances

The first factor that can be identified, which could help explain U.S. military engagement, is alliances (Choi & James, 2006). Alliances are a key factor of U.S. foreign policy and influence U.S. action, as the U.S. has shown that it is more likely to take part in a military mission if the mission provides assistance to its allies and is less likely to participate in a conflict with its allies to protect the interests of both sides.

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16 One group of scholars show that the UK and France, as U.S. allies, have used strategic narratives to ensure that the U.S. became a part of their military engagements (Roselle, 2017: Oneal and Russett, 2001). Therefore, other states’ strategic narratives can alter U.S. foreign policy.

Another group of scholars argue that states may fear that other states will be inclined to leave or join various alliances, which may lead to a shift in the dynamics of inter-state relationships and eventually lead to a lesser conflict (Roselle, 2017). Therefore, foreign policy can be steered by existing inter-state relationships.

It is clear that alliances are not constant and change over time. Therefore, alliances can constrain the U.S. decision to engage militarily and help explain why the U.S. military engaged in Libya and Syria and not in Egypt, since it can differ among cases and change over time.

3.1.2 Factor two: Domestic support

Domestic support is important since low domestic support could lower the chance of U.S. military engagement. One group of scholars show that domestic support relies on the influence of political elites and public support. It is argued that if political elites (e.g. congress, political parties etc.) disagree with military engagement, military engagement is much less likely to happen (Berinsky, 2007). Simultaneously, another group argues that if public support wanes, political elites are less likely to push for engagement (Berinsky, 2007). In line with alliances, domestic support changes over time, and therefore is not constant. Therefore, domestic support can constrain the decision to engage militarily and explain to why the U.S. engaged in Libya and Syria but not in Egypt.

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17 3.1.3 Factor three: Geopolitical interests

Geopolitical interests could include economic resources and regions that are considered critical to U.S. interests (Flint et al, 2009; Nye, 2006). A key economic resource is a reliable oil supply. This is largely because a steady oil supply is in the national interest of the U.S., upon which military operations can thrive. As Fordham (2008:742) argues, “the need to ensure continuing access to the region’s oil resources might help explain current American security commitments’’. In short, if there is oil at stake or a situation could influence the U.S. oil supply, the U.S. may intervene. If oil is not at stake, it might not military engage. Additionally, Choi and James (2016) show that the U.S. is more likely to intervene militarily if the conditions of the people in the host country could be improved.

A difference between alliances and domestic support and geopolitical interests is that the former two change, while the latter is constant. To be specific, geopolitical interests tend not to change over time. Additionally, Egypt, Libya and Syria are all in the Middle East and Northern Africa and therefore do not differ too much with regard to U.S. interests.

Therefore, geopolitical interests influence U.S. action. However, this is not a factor that could change or differ among the three cases; therefore, it is not useful to consider geopolitical interests further since it cannot explain why the U.S. intervened in Libya and Syria but not in Egypt.

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18 Table 2 presents an overview of the factors of U.S. military engagement, which could explain non-constant variables that influenced the lead from behind strategy in Libya and Syria and the decision not to lead from behind in Egypt.

Table 2: Constraining factors on U.S. military engagement

Constraining factors Constant or changeable? Specifics

Alliances Changeable  Military intervention against

allies is rare.

 Use of strategic narratives by

other states.

 Shifts in the dynamics of

relationships.

Domestic support Changeable  If political elites disagree with

military engagement, it is less likely to happen.

 If public support is low, U.S.

military engagement is less likely to happen.

 If lobby groups support U.S.

action, it is more likely to happen.

Geopolitical interests Constant  If region is not crucial to the

U.S., the U.S. is less likely to intervene.

 If the economic conditions of the host country’s people are low, the U.S. may intervene.

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19 3.2 Model: U.S. military engagement

Following both Table 1 and Table 2, Model 1 shows the different relations, theories and causes at hand.

Model 1: The relationship between possible explanations of U.S. military engagement and its constraining factors

This model can be explained and applied as follows. Based on liberalism and neo-conservatism, three main influential factors on U.S. foreign policy (i.e. domestic embedded culture, superiority and interest groups) can be explained. These three explanations could form variables, which could explain why the U.S. decides whether to militarily engage. To be more specific, they can explain the reasoning behind the lead from behind strategy in Libya and Syria.

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20 For example, when a feeling of superiority over Libya or Syria exists, the U.S. is more likely to engage militarily. Moreover, if these variables are absent in the U.S. debate, they could explain why the U.S. decided to not lead from behind and/or engage in Egypt.

However, as mentioned earlier, this does not describe the full framework. If superiority is present, it does not automatically lead to U.S. military engagement and the lead from behind strategy. Therefore, alliances, domestic support and geopolitical interests constrain the relation between the explanation and actual U.S. intervention. Therefore, the box at the bottom of the model has an arrow pointing at the relationship between the explanation and the decision for the U.S. to engage militarily. Within this, a hierarchy is created wherein alliances and domestic support are subject to change and therefore could play a larger role in this framework, followed by geopolitical interests that could play a lesser role since they are not subject to change within the three cases.

3.3 Interpretation of factors: Propositions

Now that the important factors of military engagement have been displayed, creating the boundaries of a framework that could explain the U.S. decision to lead from behind in Libya and Syria and not in Egypt, this raises the question of how these factors can be interpreted and what we can expect from them to answer the research question at hand.

Drawing from the academic literature, liberalism and neo-conservatism offer several possible explanations on what could influence the lead from behind strategy in Libya and Egypt—namely, domestic embedded culture, superiority and interest groups. What all these factors have in common for liberalists and supporters of neo-conservatism is that they are all independent factors, they are in place or not and they explain the basis on which the lead from behind strategy in Libya and Syria is justified.

However, liberalism and neo-conservatism fail to explain deviant cases (i.e. Egypt). Therefore, it is important to assess and focus on the

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21 inconstant and constraining factors (i.e. domestic support and alliances) that could explain why the U.S. decided to not engage in Egypt.

Additionally, alliances and domestic support change over time. For example, if domestic support decreases, it could influence the decision to not lead from behind in Egypt. For this reason, these two constraining factors help explain the research question by questioning and challenging liberal and neo-conservative ideas on military engagement and the lead from behind strategy.

Therefore, in this thesis, the focus is on alliances and domestic support, since these two (constraining) factors help to explain the difference between the lead from behind strategy in Libya and Syria and the deviant case (Egypt).

Now this has been touched upon, it is important to turn this information into propositions on the outcomes of U.S. (non-)military engagement in Egypt, Libya and Syria.

First, alliances successfully explain why the U.S. decided not to implement the lead from behind strategy and/or military engagement in Egypt as it did in Libya and Syria. Second, domestic support successfully explains why the U.S. decided not to implement the lead from behind strategy and/or military engagement in Egypt as it did in Libya and Syria. These propositions guide the research, and the following chapter attempts to explain how these propositions and the research question can be measured and answered.

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22

METHODS AND DATA

The research question invites a between-case research design, so a qualitative comparative case analysis is used that allows for a greater comparison between cases (Lamont, 2015).

In light of this, there is a need to highlight the cases chosen for this research. The selection criteria for the cases include the fact that they all should include U.S. military involvement with a leading from behind strategy, be located in the Middle East and be during the Obama administration. A deviant case is added on the basis of non-involvement, but it must include all other criteria.

First, Egypt, Libya and Syria are selected because they are in the same region and therefore fall under the same component of U.S. foreign policy. Several authors (Kuperman, 2013; Zifcak, 2012) state that the UN decision to intervene in Libya and Syria relates to the R2P; however, the U.S. decision to contribute to this military engagement may be based on or influenced by other variables. Therefore, this must be tested. Third, both Libya and Syria experienced the same outcome of the U.S. decision-making process: U.S. military engagement and the lead from behind strategy. Meanwhile, Egypt did not experience U.S. military engagement. The outcome of the variables is therefore different, which allows the causal mechanisms of U.S. foreign policy to be traced. Fourth, there may be some discussion on the decision to choose Egypt over Tunisia, another case during the Arab Spring where the U.S. chose not to intervene. U.S.-Egypt relations were assumed to be warm before the Arab Spring—at least warmer than U.S.-Tunisia relations were (Abbas et al, 2007; Sharp, 2007). As mentioned, one of the influential factors this research takes into account is alliance.

It is interesting to test if the alliance between Egypt and the U.S. was why the U.S. did not intervene. Additionally, adding more cases (i.e. Tunisia), may cause the research to lose focus.

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23 Process tracing, specifically ‘explaining-outcome’ process tracing, is used to test these cases. This helps highlight the causal mechanisms and pathways that lead to decisions to intervene (Lamont, 2015). Moreover, it helps assess what happened to determine the different outcomes. As part of process tracing, a focus is placed on who was involved in the decision-making process (e.g. security advisors, executives etc.), what they said, why they were there and what important events shaped the decision (Lamont, 2015).

4.1 Data collection

To answer the research question, information on the three cases must be gathered to ensure that the process tracing is reliable. The author aims to understand the motivations and processes that brought about U.S. military engagement. As Koh (2012) puts forth, in the U.S., both Congress and the president decide on military engagements, which narrows the potential data sources. This is related to the War Powers Resolution, which requires the president to obtain congressional authorization for the use of military force when U.S. armed forces are introduced into hostilities.

Regarding the primary sources, it is useful to look into U.S. decision-making records, relevant academic articles and Congressional records and reports.1_{The gathered documents are dated from the beginning of the}

Arab Spring in January 2011 until the U.S.’s decision to engage. 2

President Obama’s statements as well as newspaper articles are used as secondary sources. As Lamont (2015) points out, official documents are not often published, which is an obstacle to the research.

1_{These are all openly available. To narrow the amount of information and Congressional records,}

an explicit search using word combinations such as “intervention + country X” , “country X military”, “country X alliances”, “country X domestic support” and “country X lead from behind” has been conducted, where “Country X” indicates either Egypt, Libya or Syria.

2_{This was May 2014 in Syria (BBC, 2018b) and March 2011 for Libya (UNSC, 2011). Further, the}

timeframe for Libya is extended to October 2011, when the coalition decided to stop bombing. Moreover, for Egypt the timeframe is until June 2012, when the first democratic elections were held.

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24 However, the U.S. Congress tracks its official documents and reports and posts them on their official website.

The following procedure is used based on the process-tracing procedure of the Centre for Development Impact (2015). First, codes are made for each case to divide the data into three categories. Second, an Excel table is made to categorise the background information, raw data, information related to important variables, mechanisms and story line.

Third, the Excel table is filled with data from the different categories. Once the data collection is finished, it should enhance the research.

4.2 Data analysis

The data are analysed to different show relations and mechanisms (Lamont, 2015). First, the materials of the table containing the data are analysed and read thoroughly. Second, the data are interpreted and analysed with a focus on the mechanisms in place, which leads to an overview of all factors in the U.S.’s decision to lead from behind or not in Egypt, Libya and Syria. The data are categorised between the two variables constraining U.S. foreign policy (i.e. role of alliances and domestic support). Moreover, this results in a fully written report.

As an outcome of the data analysis, several chapters are written on the respective countries. In these chapters, a short background of their (humanitarian) crises and U.S. (non-)involvement is given. Additionally, the full series events and their implications for U.S. politics are given. After these three chapters, a comparative chapter is written to further compare the cases, link them to the theoretical framework and determine the differences between the three cases of U.S. (non-)involvement.

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25

CASE ONE: LIBYA

This chapter provides the context of the (humanitarian) crisis in Libya and, through process tracing, explains important events and their implications for the U.S. decision to lead from behind. First, a short introduction to the crisis and changes under Libya’s Arab Spring uprisings is given. Second, through the information gathered thorough process tracing, the mechanisms and important events that led to U.S. involvement in Libya are given.

5.1 Background: Turmoil and protests in Libya (2011 to present)

At the beginning of 2011, protesters took the streets in Libya to protest Muammar Gadhafi (McQuinn, 2013). McQuinn (2013) explains that the protests started peacefully but transitioned to a more violent approach, attacking both government and state security buildings. The main protests were centred in Benghazi and Tripoli. In March 2011, a major hallmark was reached, when the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 1973, which allowed the Libyan government and mandated member states to take all necessary measures (UNSC, 2011). Following this, France, the UK and the U.S., with support of the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, enforced a no-fly zone above Libya and began military strikes against government ground forces (McQuinn, 2013). Here, the U.S. led from behind through a NATO initiative.

Following the fighting in October 2011, Gadhafi was captured and killed (McQuinn, 2013). The NATO coalition then stopped bombing Libya in support of the protesters and peaceful coalitions in Libya.

Unfortunately, Gadhafi’s death did not end the protests nor persuade political parties to enforce democratic mechanisms. The protests escalated into a major civil war in which several Libyan tribes and the Islamic State have fought against each other that continues today (BBC, 2018a).

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26 5.2. U.S. decision making: Important events

Blanchard (2011) explains that U.S. decision making in regard to Libya was trigged by fast-moving events and independent decisions, which shaped the context in which U.S. officials pursued U.S. interests and made decisions.

Before the Arab Spring and the uprising in Libya, the U.S. was pursuing a policy of reengagement with Gadhafi (Blanchard, 2011). In this way, it broke with the traditional view of U.S.-Libya relations, which are noted by confrontation, severe sanctions and Libyan isolation. What triggered the U.S. decision were the protests in Benghazi and other eastern Libyan cities, which the members of Congress described as “out of control”. Congress adopted Senate Resolution 85 to condemn Gadhafi’s use of force against civilians (Blanchard, 2011).

The first important event in the U.S.’s decision was the start of a series of discussions between the White House, the National Security Committee (NSC) and key advisors in late February 2011 (Blomdahl, 2016). On February 23, President Obama called the bloodshed in Libya “outrageous” and “unacceptable” and said that his administration was looking at the “full range of options we have to respond to this crisis” (Blanchard, 2011: White House, 2011).

On February 25, 2011, President Obama reversed the policy of rapprochement in Executive Order 13566 and declared that the situation posed a threat to stability and safety in Libya (Blanchard, 2011). During this time, and at start of the NSC meetings and discussions, the president’s advisors were divided into two opposing sides. On the one hand, a camp was formed with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who were dubious of military engagement and opposed a no-fly zone above Libya (Blomdahl, 2016). On the other hand, Ambassador Rice and several staff members pushed for engagement on the basis of humanitarian intervention (Blomdahl, 2016).

After these discussions and the NSC meetings, a working group was installed on March 6 under the umbrella of National Security Advisor

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27 Thomas Donilon that began to plan for a post-Gadhafi government (Blomdahl, 2016). By doing so, Donilon created a break-through in the previous discussions, in which neither side gained enough power to determine the decision on intervention. Setting the precedent that the U.S. needed to think about a post-Gadhafi government ensured that negotiations sped up and made U.S. action seem inevitable.

In the second half of these discussions, a third important event happened that was not related to a new discussion or bill, but rather was centred on a person: Secretary of State Clinton. Blomdahl (2016) suggests that Clinton switched sides to support U.S. military engagement in Libya because the Arab League supported a no-fly zone and military engagement, the British and French did not want to military engage without the U.S. and Gadhafi and his army were approaching Benghazi, which could lead to a possible major human catastrophe (Blomdahl, 2016). Following this, Clinton joined Ambassador Rice to try to convince Obama to act in Libya. This was followed by a statement from Senator John Kerry, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC), who said that the international community cannot watch from the side-lines while the quest for democracy is met with violence (Blanchard, 2011).

Ultimately, although President Obama did not seem to indicate support for military intervention, in one of the final meetings on Libya around March 16-17, he decided to support U.S. military engagement in Libya. Following this, the U.S., European and Arab states could carry out military operations in Libya under the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1973, which was adopted on March 17. This was followed by a statement on March 18 in which Obama called for a cease-fire and an end to the attacks against Libyan civilians.

Finally on 19 March 2011, President Obama ordered U.S. forces to launch attacks against Libyan military targets (Blomdahl, 2016). However, President Obama did not actively pursue a vote in Congress on this issue. As Blanchard (2011:3) states, “on March 21, President Obama sent a

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28 letter to Congress outlining U.S. military objectives and operations, but not explicitly seeking congressional authorization”.

By doing so, President Obama overstepped the War Powers Resolution, underlining President Obama as a major player in this decision-making process alongside Gates and Clinton (Blomdahl, 2016). 5.3. The role of alliances and domestic support in the U.S. decision making

Seeing the overview of the U.S. decision-making process and the important events that shaped it, the next step is to assess the impact of alliances and domestic support on U.S. decision making in regard to Libya and see if these factors further strengthened the relationship between the explanation and the decision to intervene.

In terms of alliances, several states (both Arab and long-standing Asian and European allies) condemned Gadhafi’s presence in Libya and attacks on its citizens (Blanchard, 2011). At the forefront of U.S. decision, a group gathered around Ambassador Rice, who draws mainly from a liberalist perspective in regard to the promotion of human rights (Rice, 2011). Blomdahl (2016) says that Rice belonged to a group that heavily favoured humanitarian intervention. In light of this, Arab countries mostly departed from their original stances and relationships with the Gadhafi government, leading to a larger UN alliance in regard to Libya.

Second, Clinton flipped to a pro-intervention stance when she visited several Arab League countries and reported that the regional leaders were willing to take part in military operations, thereby strengthening a possible U.S. lead from behind strategy (Blomdahl, 2016). Clinton joined Rice to support military engagement partly because human rights were severely shunned and Gadhafi’s troops were outside of Benghazi waiting to put further pressure on the Libyan people (Blanchard, 2011: Blomdahl, 2016). Third, France and the UK increasingly used narratives from February to March 2011 in order to motivate U.S. decision-makers to join them in the fight against Gadhafi. It seems that British and French officials clearly

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29 wanted (and expected) the U.S. to join them (Clinton, 2014: Blomdahl, 2016). The use of narratives was further strengthened by President Obama’s Chief of Staff Daley since it would help the president’s popularity and image if he stated that the U.S. had joined its allies (Blomdahl, 2016).

In terms of domestic support, it was rather low in regard to Libya. Pew Research Center (2011) shows only one-third of U.S. citizens favoured helping the Libyan protesters militarily. Therefore, it seems that President Obama’s public support was rather low.

In contrast to this, U.S. political elites heavily steered the decision, especially Clinton’s support of U.S. military engagement. Clinton represented a large sector of the Democratic Party that President Obama was unwilling to provoke and thereby used her bargaining and influence to push U.S. intervention (Blomdahl, 2016: Woordward, 2011) and pressured President Obama to consider a military alternative (Blomdahl, 2016). Additionally, within the NSC, a group of staff and military advisors pursued the idea of military engagement, further pressuring President Obama to take military measures (Blomdahl, 2016).

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30 Table 3 gives an overview of the impact of alliances and domestic support in constraining U.S. decision making in regard to Libya. The scale from ++ to ––represents a “strong” (++) to “weak” (--) presence of the variable in the case, respectively.

Table 3: Influence of alliances and domestic support in the U.S.’s intervention in Libya

Constraining factor Specification Presence in case

Changed over time?

1. Alliances - Influence of allies. + Yes - Use of strategic

narratives by other states.

++ Yes

- Shifts in the dynamics of relationships. -/+ No 2. Domestic Support - Influence of political elites. ++ Yes - Public support. - No

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31

CASE TWO: SYRIA

Following the Libyan case, this chapter provides the context of the humanitarian crisis in Syria and, through process tracing, explains important events and their implications for what happened in the U.S.’s (political) decision making in regard to the decision to lead from behind in Syria. First, a short introduction to the humanitarian crisis and changes under Syria’s Arab Spring uprisings are given. Second, through the information gathered by process tracing, the mechanisms and important events that led to the U.S.’s involvement in Syria are given.

6.1. Background: Turmoil and protests in Syria (2011 to present)

In the backdrop of both Egypt and Libya, Arab Spring uprisings started in March 2011 in Syria. As Lesch (2011) points out, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad did not expect that uprisings would happen in Syria due to its political stability and his anti-U.S. and anti-Israel rhetoric in the past. Just as the other two cases, Syrian protesters demanded democratic reform and a better economic position.

At the beginning of May and June 2011, the U.S. and the European Union (EU) decided to tighten sanctions against Syria. Following this, in October 2011 the New Syrian National Council formed, which found a common group of internal and exiled opposition activists (BBC, 2018b). In March 2012, the UNSC endorsed a non-binding peace plan (BCC, 2018b). During this time, the Arab Spring in Syria had changed from a protest into the Syrian Civil War between several factions (i.e. supporters of al-Assad, nationalists, liberalists and Islamists). During this time, ISIS moved forward in their efforts in Syria (BBC, 2018b).

After the peace plan failed, in September 2014, the U.S. and five Arab countries launched air strikes (through the U.S.’s lead from behind strategy) against ISIS in Aleppo and Raqqa (Humud, Blanchard & Nikitin, 2018; BBC, 2018b).

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32 Following these air strikes, in 2015 Russia decided to join al-Assad in his war against Islamists and, presumably, the rebels (BBC, 2018b). The U.S. and Russia are still militarily engaged in Syria, and the conflict seems to have no end (BBC, 2018b).

6.2 U.S. decision making: Important events

Seeing the background of what triggered the Arab Spring and the civil war in Syria, we now turn to important events that shaped the decision-making process in the U.S.. In general, no major events happened at the start of the Arab Spring in relation to military engagement. As exemplified in August 2011, President Obama called for the resignation of President al-Assad; however, Obama rejected U.S. intervention in Syria (Sharp & Blanchard, 2013). Humud, Blanchard and Nikitin (2018) state that the strategy at that time mostly worked through local partners. By July 2012, it became apparent that President Obama and the U.S. government still believed U.S. intervention and military engagement was undesirable (Sharp & Blanchard, 2013). However, the Obama administration worked with Congress to increase non-radical assistance, such as humanitarian assistance, to respond to the alleged use of chemical weapons by the Assad government (Sharp & Blanchard, 2013).

The first important event happened in May 2013, when Democratic and Republican members of Congress introduced legislation that would authorize assistance to the Syrian opposition fighting against the Assad government (Sharp & Blanchard, 2013). This resulted in the Free Syria Act of 2013 (H.R. 1327) and the Syria Transition Support Act of 2013 (S.960), which authorized the President to provide (non-)lethal support to Syrian opposition groups as well as defence services and training. According to Shard and Blanchard’s (2013) congressional report, a 15-3 vote from the SFRC in May 2013 shifted U.S. decision making more towards military engagement in Syria.

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33 By August 21, 2013, U.S. military leaders outlined options to accomplish a range of objectives in Syria, but stated that military engagement could not solve the ethnic and religious tensions in the conflict (Sharp & Blanchard, 2013). By doing so, the leaders opposed military engagement in Syria. In contrast, several prominent members of the Obama administration, such as CIA Director David Petraeus, supported military engagement, especially after it became clear that President al-Assad had used chemical weapons (BBC, 2017).

A second important event was on August 30, 2013, when President Obama requested Congress to authorize the use of U.S. military force in response to President al-Assad’s use of chemical weapons (Sharp & Blanchard, 2013: Humud, Blanchard & Nikitin, 2018). Following this request, Secretary of State John Kerry publicly expressed his confidence and support for U.S. military engagement in Syria (Sharp & Blanchard, 2013). In the last week of August, a pro forma session with was held, organised by Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (Sharp & Blanchard, 2013).

A third important event happened on September 6, 2013, when a Reid requested full authorization to use military force in Syria. Reid sought to authorize 60 days of military action, and his bill would have prohibited the use of U.S. ground troops in Syria (Sharp & Blanchard, 2013). However, because of a deal on September 10, 2013 between the U.S. and Russia to not use and to destroy all chemical weapons that was accepted by the Syrian government, the bill never reached the floor.

In the coming months, U.S. decision-makers assessed the Syrian situation and the use of chemical weapons. The U.S.—among others— started an international round of diplomatic talks in Montreux, Switzerland, known as Geneva II (Margesson & Chesser, 2014). Unfortunately, these talks ended with little progress.

From September 5–15, 2014 several the heads of state from the U.S., France, UK, Germany and Italy met to discuss concerted action against ISIS. In Congress on September 10, 2014, President Obama

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34 announced a strategy to counter ISIS with military engagement (White House, 2014), thereby marking the fourth important event in U.S. decision making. Following this on September 22, 2014, the U.S., Bahrain, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates started to engage in Syria as part of a military intervention against ISIS (Humud, Blanchard & Nikitin, 2018).

6.3. The role of alliances and domestic support in U.S. decision making After seeing the reasons for U.S. action, the next step is to assess the impact of alliances and domestic support and see if these factors constrained U.S. decision making with regard to Syria. In terms of alliances, there are several factors that further strengthened U.S. decision making.

First, before the decision to engage was made, Sharp and Blanchard (2013) suggest that several members of the Obama administration made comments that U.S. allies were pressured by the crisis in terms of refugees and potential terrorist attacks. Thus, the U.S.’s European allies and the problems they faced influenced the U.S.’s decision to engage.

By September 2, 2013, it was clear in a Congressional report that the UK did not seek a new authorization from Parliament to participate in a military operation, while French government officials continued to support military engagement (Sharp & Blanchard, 2013). Additionally, on February 22, 2014 the U.S. supported UNSC Resolution 2139, which called for the protection of civilians and an end to detention, torture and violations of international humanitarian law, thereby joining an allied UN front (Margesson & Chesser, 2014).

One year later, the influence of allies (and the UK adjusted narrative) was made clear. The U.S., UK, France, Germany, Italy, Canada, Turkey and Denmark met in Paris to discuss U.S. action in Syria. Obama made specific reference to the comprehensive strategy that included U.S. partners, in which he stated the following:

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35

Our goal is clear: to degrade and ultimately destroy ISIL through a comprehensive and sustained counterterrorism strategy so that it’s no longer a threat to Iraq, the region, the United States, and our partners. To achieve this goal, our strategy will be underpinned by a strong coalition of regional and international partners who are willing to commit resources and will to this long-term endeavor. Dozens of countries are already contributing in Iraq – from military to humanitarian support – and in coming days and weeks we will work to strengthen and expand that coalition. (White House, 2014)

President Obama referred to the U.S.’s regional and international partners and thereby acknowledged the role of allies in the conflict.

In terms of domestic support, U.S. political elites were divided in two camps. On the one hand were U.S. military leaders who condemned U.S. action and were afraid that the U.S. would enter another costly war (Sharp & Blanchard, 2013). On the other hand, several prominent members of the president’s cabinet, such as then-Secretary of State Kerry and CIA Director Petraeus, supported military engagement. It seems that the chemical attack changed the minds of U.S. military leaders and prominent members of the Obama administration from war weary to positive towards military engagement (Humud, Blanchard & Nikitin. 2018).

Additionally, according to an NBC survey (2013), 50% of Americans believed the U.S. should not intervene in Syria, even after the August 21 chemical attack. Additionally, only 50% of respondents supported military action limited to launching cruise missiles, and 44% opposed it. Second, it seems that domestic support changed. In a 2014 poll from the

Washington Post, roughly 70% of U.S. citizens supported potential air

strikes on Syria. Therefore, it seems that public support shifted given that President Obama made reference to the public’s support and their willingness to defeat ISIS in Syria (White House, 2014).

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36 Table 4 provides an overview of the impact of alliances and domestic support on constraining U.S. decision making in regard to Syria. The scale from ++ to ––represents a “strong” (++) to “weak” (--) presence of the variable in the case, respectively.

Table 4: Influence alliances and domestic support in Syria

Constraining factor Specification Presence in case

Changed over time?

1. Alliances - Influence of allies. ++ Yes - Use of strategic

narratives by other states.

+ Yes

- Shifts in the dynamics of relationships. -/+ No 2. Domestic Support - Influence of political elites. + Yes

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37

CASE THREE: EGYPT

This chapter provides the context of the humanitarian crisis in Egypt and explains important events and their implications for U.S. decision making in regard to the decision to not lead from behind in Egypt. First, a short introduction to the crisis and Egypt’s Arab Spring uprisings are given. Second, the mechanisms and important events that led to the non-involvement of the U.S. in Egypt are given.

7.1. Background: Turmoil and protests in Egypt (2011 to present)

The protests in Egypt began in January 2011 in Tahir Square in Cairo (Hamdy, 2012). Hamdy and Sherine (2008) state that Egyptians’ frustrations pertained to poor water quality, contaminated food and deteriorating public health care services, which had been issues since 2008, well before the Arab Spring. Moreover, as Cattle (2016) explains, it was a protest against a dictatorial regime. Egyptian protestors managed to bring several different groups of people together, including Islamists and liberalists, to demand change. During these protests, then-President Hosni Mubarak imposed several hardships on his citizens by using the army and police to attack protesters and initiating an electronic communication blackout (Cattle, 2016: Hamdy, 2012). After eighteen weeks of protests, Mubarak stepped down from office. In June 2012, the first democratic elections in Egypt were held, which Mohamed Morsi’s controversial Muslim Brotherhood (MB) won by a small margin (Tabaar, 2013).

Unfortunately, this did not bring peace and reform to Egypt. To the contrary, Morsi’s election fuelled new protests among liberal and secular Egyptians (Tabaar, 2013). In 2013, protesters took to the street once again, demanding democratic reforms and Morsi’s resignation. The protesters were strengthened by the support of the Egyptian army, who gave Morsi an ultimatum to step down (Tabaar, 2013).

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38 The country seemed more divided than ever (Tabaar, 2013). Out of options, the Egyptian government eventually resigned at the end of February 2014, paving the way for head of the military, Abdel el-Sisi, to run for president. In May 2014, el-Sisi had won with over 97% of the vote (New York Times, 2014). Following el-Sisi’s election, Egypt has found relative stability. The next presidential elections are to be held in 2018 (CNN, 2018).

7.2 U.S. decision making: Important events

It is once again important to note is that the U.S. decided not to intervene in Egypt; therefore, the important events are described in a slightly different manner. To be more specific, the important events that shaped the debate in the U.S.’s decision to not intervene are mentioned and reconstructed.

The first important event in U.S.-Egypt relations took place one day before the start of the Arab Spring in January 2011, when Secretary of State Clinton stated, “Our assessment is that the Egyptian government is stable and is looking for ways to respond to the legitimate needs and interests of the Egyptian people” (Aftandilian, 2012:6). The U.S.’s position towards Egypt was more a response to its internal dynamics and the then-relatively strong bond between the U.S. and Egypt. Following several protests in several Egyptian cities, President Obama released two statements in and to Congress stating that he was willing to work with Mubarak on a peaceful solution and that he urged the Egyptian government to respect its people’s universal rights and the right to protest (Aftandilian, 2012).

A second important event occurred on February 2, 2011, when Obama announced that he will not close ranks with Mubarak during the Arab Spring, but rather wanted him to step down (Aftandilian, 2012). On February 11, 2011, Mubarak formally resigned from power and transferred leadership to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces in Egypt (Aftandilian, 2012). The first important event differs from the second since

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39 Obama at first wanted to work with Mubarak, but demanded that Mubarak step down only a few weeks after. However, until then, there was no discussion on U.S. military engagement in Egypt. Rather, it seems that Obama tried to balance the protection of human rights on the one hand with the U.S.’s alliance with the Egypt on the other (Celso, 2014).

A third important event happened in May 2011, when President Obama, along with Congress, announced the intention to support Egypt’s transition to democracy, wherein the U.S. would send up to $2 billion to Egypt (Snider & Faris, 2011). This further strengthened the Obama administration’s support for Egypt’s transition to democracy.

A fourth important event was when Secretary of State Clinton visited the new government in Cairo, further upholding U.S.-Egypt relations (Arafat, 2017). As Arafat (2017) states, her visit embodied the Obama administration’s strategy to keep Egypt as an ally in the region and to ensure its peace treaty with Israel, the cornerstone of U.S. diplomacy in the region (Arafat, 2017). As well, the Obama administration hoped to lift the travel ban for American and Egyptian officials who remained at the U.S. embassy in Cairo around February and early March 2012 (Sharp, 2013).

After some time, when the MB took power through Egypt’s democratic elections, it seemed that U.S.-Egypt relations were rather stable. As El-anani (2017:65) states, “Actually, the United States' rapprochement with the MB is a sign that the American came to see the Brothers ‘as more of a political power than a security threat’”. Additionally, both sides continued to cooperate in military and intelligence matters (Sharp, 2013). Some U.S. policy makers, including several policy advisors in the State Department, welcomed Egypt’s transition to a democratic government, but stressed that more pressure needed to be put on the MB and Egypt (Sharp, 2013). In response to this, the Obama administration has counselled patience (Sharp, 2013).