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Time to Agree: A Comparative Analysis of Ripe Moments for
Negotiation Concerning the FARC-EP between 1998-2016
Nanette Taams MA Thesis International Relations – Global Conflict in the Modern Era Supervised by Isabelle Duyvesteyn Second reader: Andrew Gawthorpe
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Content
Chapter 1: Introduction ... 4
Chapter 2: Literature review ... 6
2.1 Civil war literature ... 6
2.2 Negotiated settlements ... 7
2.3 Negotiated settlement – the case of Colombia ... 12
Chapter 3: Ripeness theory – a framework ... 14
3.1 Mutually Hurting Stalemate ... 14
3.2 Sense of a Way Out ... 15
3.3 Ripeness as a tool ... 15
Chapter 4: Methodology ... 17
4.1 Case study ... 17
4.2 Process tracing... 17
4.3 Measurement ... 18
4.4 Data collection & Limitations ... 20
Chapter 5: Case Analysis ... 21
5.1 A brief history of the FARC ... 21
5.2 The Pastrana Administration: Peace negotiations from 1998-2001 ... 23
5.2.1 Introduction ... 23
5.2.2 Mutually hurting stalemate ... 24
5.2.3 Perceptions of MHS... 28
5.2.4 Sense of a Way Out ... 28
5.2.5 Conclusion ... 31
5.3 The Santos Administration: Peace negotiations from 2012-2016 ... 32
5.3.1 Introduction ... 32
5.3.2. Mutually hurting stalemate ... 32
5.3.3 Perception of a MHS ... 37
5.3.4 Sense of a way out ... 37
5.3.5 Conclusion ... 40
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6.1 Conclusion ... 41
6.1.2 Mutually Hurting Stalemate ... 41
6.1.2 Sense of a way out ... 42
6.1.3 Ripeness ... 43
6.2 Discussion ... 44
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Chapter 1: Introduction
In November 2016, the Colombian president Juan Manuel Santos and the commander Timoleón Jimenez of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolutionarias de Colombia - Ejército del Pueblo, also known as the FARC, shook hands at a celebratory signing of a peace accord. This accord would facilitate the rebel group to turn into a political party and put an end to the five decades of conflict that caused at least 220,000 deaths and nearly 6 million people to be displaced from their homes (Casey & Escobar 2018). The road to peace with the FARC has been exceedingly long and tumultuous, with a history of multiple negotiations having faltered. The signing of the accord was therefore seen as a pivotal moment in Colombia’s history, ushering in a new era of peace.
The FARC was founded in 1964 as the armed wing of the Communist Party following a decade long civil war in Colombia referred to as La Violencia. Many administrations have struggled with the left-wing guerilla group, as three other attempts at peace negotiations had previously failed. The most promising, and in hindsight most disappointing, attempt at achieving a ceasefire was witnessed during the negotiated peace talks under the Pastrana administration from 1999-2002. Three years of fruitless negotiations eventually came to a halt after the FARC appeared to use the assigned demilitarized zone as its ‘strategic rearguard’ (Pizarro 2011) and violence continued. The FARC’s abuse of the government’s concessions deeply impacted Colombian society and further deteriorated already minimal support for the guerilla’s cause, not to mention hope for a peaceful solution.
These events formed the tipping point in Colombia’s approach to the rebel group. Rather than continuously extending olive branches, the new government chose instead to fight fire with fire. Campaigning as a hardliner against the country’s guerilla group, president Alvaro Uribe came into office in the aftermath of the contested negotiations. Determined to tip the balance, Uribe initiated an extreme militarization of the country with the support of the US government. By strengthening the Colombian military, it was able to push the FARC out of the cities and back into jungle, while rapidly reducing the size of its force. This strategy continued until Uribe had to make way for his successor, president Juan Manuel Santos, who would eventually reopen the door for negotiations. Santos was later elected as new president in 2010 and in 2012 initiated a new round of peace talks,
5 which after four years culminated in the signing of a peace deal that would put an end to the decades long conflict. With the signing of this accord, Colombia’s largest rebel group finally agreed to lay down its arms while continuing to push its ideological agenda through non-violent, political means as the Common Alternative Revolutionary Force.
Given the series of attempts by the government to come to a negotiated settlement over the course of five decades, it raises the question why Colombia’s peace talks had previously failed, and why the latest one was eventually successful. In response, this thesis seeks to answer the following question: why were peace talks with the FARC eventually able to succeed in 2016? More specifically, this paper will look into Zartman’s ripeness theory and argue that peace talks fail when a conflict is not yet ripe or ready for negotiations. As it will be argued here, ripeness of the conflict was a necessary, although insufficient, condition for the two parties to end the conflict with a negotiated settlement. By applying ripeness theory to the last two negotiations, this thesis will showcase that the conditions under the Pastrana administration indicate that the conflict had not yet reached a ripe moment and that the negotiations were therefore doomed to fail. Then, during the Uribe and Santos administration, the status of the conflict had changed dramatically. The counterinsurgency campaign eventually sufficiently ripened the conflict, creating the necessary conditions for peace talks to unfold successfully.
The Colombian conflict offers a highly relevant and robust case study to test Zartman’s ripeness theory given the multitude of negotiations between the FARC and the government of Colombia, which allow for a comparison in relatively similar contexts. Evaluating the effect of ripeness on conflict negotiations in the case of Colombia will allow for a contribution to the literature on negotiated settlements in general and in practice inform the importance of timing in peace negotiations in particular. This paper does not, however, predicate that the ripeness of the conflict was the sole determinant in the success of the latest negotiations. Rather, it argues that this was a necessary condition, or necessary contextual element that allows for other factors to successfully bring the negotiations to fruition.
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Chapter 2: Literature review
The following chapter will give an overview of relevant literature on negotiated settlements in civil wars.
2.1 Civil war literature
Before addressing the primary question at hand, a discussion of civil wars, conflict resolution and peace negotiations is in order. As there are several types of conflict, it should be noted that this research will focus solely on internal conflict or civil war. Kalyvas defines civil war as ‘armed combat taking place within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity, between parties that are subject to a common authority at the outset of the hostilities’ (Kalyvas 2006). Even though the aim of this paper is not to flesh out a semantic discussion, it is worth noting that the phenomenon of civil war has been subject to both semantic and political contestation. Its declaration carries significant political weight as defining a conflict as a civil war can affect the legitimacy assigned to warring parties (Kalyvas 2006). While several definitions of the term exist, the common key dimensions are that the conflict is militarized, involves at least two competing parties and entails a domestic challenge against the holder of sovereign authority (Kalyvas 2006). The insurgent group often aims to take over the incumbent government or demands political reforms (Gersovitz & Kriger 2013). Civil wars are different from that of non-state violence such as riots and communal violence as in these cases the government does not directly participate in combat (Cederman & Vogt 2017). Over the past few decades, civil wars have gained significant scholarly attention as they have been the most frequent and deadly type of militarized conflict for the past half century (Mason and Fett 1996). Gaining a better understanding of why and how such conflicts end is therefore of value for future approaches that attempt to end these civil wars.
Ending civil wars
Ending a civil war is described in the literature as an especially daunting task. While obstacles such as organizational inertia, tunnel vision and miscommunication are not unique to a single type of war, civil wars in particular rarely end in negotiated settlements (Walter 1997). To illustrate, while at fifty-five percent the majority of interstate wars between 1940 and 1990 were settled at the bargaining table, only twenty percent of civil wars faced the same fate (Walter 1997, 335). Like Walter, other scholars (Pillar 1983; Stedman 1991; Licklider 1995; Walter 1997) have similarly found that negotiated settlements are the exception. Instead, history has shown that most
7 civil wars have ended with the extermination, expulsion, or capitulation of the losing side (Walter 1997, 335). As negotiated settlements offer a way out of the conflict without having to ride it out until one side conquers, coming to an agreement can shorten otherwise seemingly endless wars. However, it has been stated that conflicts that end with negotiated settlements are more likely to lead to renewed violence than those that end in a decisive victory by either side (Wagner 1993; Licklider 1995). Critics of negotiated settlements have therefore argued that letting a war play out instead is more favorable (Luttwak, 1999). As wars that end in decisive victory are less likely to reoccur as the defeated party often lacks the capability to go back to war, it can be argued that it would save more lives. However, more recent research has refuted this reasoning (Human Security Report Project 2012, 13). Not only are peace agreements more stable than is usually assumed, even when they break down, the annual battle-death toll still reduces dramatically. Especially with long-running conflicts that have reached a stalemate with neither side seemingly able to attain a victory, negotiated settlements are often the only way to end the violence. Even though the high rate of recurrence seems concerning, battle deaths are reduced by more than 80 percent on average once fighting resumes. This is often because not everyone returns to violence but rather only a fraction of those formerly fighting. Despite peace agreements failing and violence recurring, ending conflicts in negotiated settlements saves lives, “not only by stopping hostilities, but also by reducing the level of violence if the conflict recurs” (Human Security Report Project 2012, 178). Understanding the specific mechanisms behind negotiated settlements can therefore help shape policies that aim to shorten the duration of civil wars and thereby put a halt to conflicts that are economically, socially and politically debilitating.
2.2 Negotiated settlements
In civil wars, there are a myriad of reasons that conflicting parties are unable to reach the point of getting to a negotiated settlement. The follow section will outline a few of the most prominent issues highlighted in the literature, but is not an exhaustive list given the constraint of space. These elements are summed up in no particular order.
Commitment problems
An important issue that makes ending civil wars different from interstate wars is that only one of the adversaries will be able to retain independent armed forces if they agree to settle their
8 differences (Walter 1997, 227). The demobilization and disarmament that is required drastically cuts down bargaining power of the consequently unarmed side. This makes it difficult for the party laying down its arms to trust that peace agreements will be enforced, and their security maintained. Such commitment problems are an often-cited barrier to successful peace settlement (Fearon 2004; Walter 1997; Pillar 1983). However, commitment problems can be overcome when external parties who can be seen as credible players are able to oversee the implementation of peace agreements.
Information Asymmetry
Related to commitment problems albeit treated as a distinct hurdle in conflict resolution literature is: information asymmetry (Walter 1997: Fearon 1995). Fearon (1995, 83) states that “negotiations to avoid devastating violence can fail when parties withhold information about their positions and capabilities or when parties lack a mechanism to ensure that agreements will be honored in the future”. While Walter (1997) and Fearon (1995)’s arguments can offer an explanation for failure, they do not provide the answer to the other half of the puzzle, namely negotiations that end with a peace agreement. In addition, researching information asymmetry can be a complex task for the outside world as the secrecy of information that leads to asymmetry is the same hurdle that researchers will face.
Mediators
The most prominently discussed way to overcome problems surrounding information asymmetry is by allowing for third-party mediation, suggesting that it bridges the relative power gap and reduces uncertainty and can help reduce the severity of the conflict (Beardsley, Cunningham and White 2018). Walter (2002) showed in her research that negotiations where a mediator was present more often reached a negotiated settlement. Moreover, third party mediation becomes more effective when the mediator is seen as unbiased (Fisher 1995). According to Young (1967) third party mediation can only be meaningful if it is perceived as an impartial participant who is seen to have nothing to gain from aiding either side. On the other hand, some scholars have questioned the necessity of an impartial mediator (Touval 1982; Bercovitch and Houston 1996; Touval and Zartman 1989). According to Zartman and Touval, “mediators are seldom indifferent to the terms being negotiated. Even when they seek peace in the abstract, they try to avoid terms not in accord with their own interests” (Touval and Zartman 1989, 118). However, they also state that this does
9 not prevent them from being successful, a claim that was later backed up by Kydd (2003). This opinion can be reinforced by clarifying the distinction between a powerful mediator who can be biased, and the weak and impartial mediator as described by Princen (1992).
Leadership
Changes in leadership have been described by Lieberfeld (2016) as a possible explanation for why seemingly intractable conflicts are able to come to an end through negotiated settlements. He argues that governments are often hesitant to recognize a rebel group’s political legitimacy which is what implicitly happens when these groups are invited to the negotiating table. Governments therefore arguably proceed with more caution, seeking as many assurances as possible that negotiations will take place on acceptable terms (Lieberfeld 2016, 19). Once the government decides to enter into negotiations with a rebel group and accord them public recognition, structural pressures will push the government to remain engaged in the negotiation (Ibid, 19). As the government’s survival is often linked to the success of the negotiation, this incentivizes the government to commit to the process. Lieberfeld (2016) argues that intractable conflicts can become negotiable when the government changes its policy of non-recognition towards rebels. Such changes in policy more often occur when there is a change in leadership. The rebels can also perceive changed leadership as an opportunity for a changed relationship. Leadership changes in rebel groups has also been shown to significantly increase chances for successful war termination (Tiernay 2013).
The cost of continued armed struggle
Another crucial consideration in conflict resolution is the weighing of the cost of continued armed struggle that each side incurs against the potential benefits of a settlement (Mason, Weingarten and Fett 1999; Pillar 1983; Walter 1997; Walter 2002; Shugart 1992). These costs can include territory, casualties and other costs of continuing warfare. Such considerations are also critically linked to the duration of war, as research has shown that the probability of negotiations increases as wars get longer (Walter 1997; Walter 2002; Mason and Fett 1996). Cost considerations in war termination follow from the rationalist school on conflict resolution, assuming that the warring parties are rational players that make the same cost-benefit calculations before agreeing to sign a peace treaty (Walter 1997, 336). However, Walter (2002, 87) states that in the process of
10 negotiations, this cost analysis shifts for the party laying down arms. For them, the cost of war starts to become secondary to the costs it might incur if the other party reneges on the agreement. Cost considerations can also be more complex in civil rather than interstate wars as the ultimate stake, control of the country, is indivisible (Pillar 1983; Ikle 1991; Modelski 1964; and Bell 1972). Lastly, rising costs can instead also have a prolonging effect on civil wars, as the accumulation of sunk costs can encourage combatants to fight for a decisive outcome (Regan, 1998).
Military stalemates
Lastly, military stalemates can influence the combatant’s willingness to initiate negotiations and come to a settlement as parties realize that the situation will not improve in the near future (Walter 1997; Walter 2002; Pillar 1983; Licklider 1993). Military stalemates are an indication of a balance of power and can signal to parties that a long fight lies ahead before any one party will prevail on the battlefield. This is in line with the findings by Hultquist (2013) who found that power parity increases the likelihood of negotiated settlement and ceasefire. In civil wars, the often-asymmetric nature of warfare can cause the conflict to drag on. Because the government usually enjoys greater capabilities and power, the rebel group will compensate by an asymmetry in commitment (Zartman 1993; Mack 1975; Arreguin-Toft 2001; Human Security Report Project 2012). This was clearly noted by Kissinger (1969, 214), who wrote that “the guerilla wins if he does not lose, the conventional army loses if it does not win”. While both sides may find stalemate more attractive than a negotiated settlement in the short-term, in the longer term this is often not seen as a sustainable solution (Ibid, 683). As the fighting groups reach a power parity, a situation arises where weak rebels are “unable to achieve concessions through negotiation since governments view them as minor threats. Yet governments have difficulty defeating weak rebels due to an emphasis on guerrilla warfare” (Hultquist 2013, 623).
Ripeness of the conflict
Zartman (1993; 1997; 2002) includes many of the aforementioned elements into one theory that explores how conflicts cannot be resolved until a ripe moment has occurred. Rather than a factor affecting negotiations, ripeness is considered a state in which the conflict finds itself. As ripeness theory will form a substantial part of this work, a more elaborate review of the theory will be presented here.
11 Zartman considers ripeness a necessary yet not sufficient condition for groups to enter into negotiations. Ripeness theory holds as its core assumptions that a perceived Mutually Hurting Stalemate (MHS) and a Way Out (WO) make for a situation that is ‘ripe’ for negotiations. As with many seminal works, Zartman’s theory has sparked fierce debate among scholars (Kleiboer 1994; Pruitt 2004; O’Kane 2006). Common criticism revolves around the issue that a ripe moment can only be identified once it has happened. While this criticism is valid for true ripe moments, the theory is also able to weed out negotiation attempts where moments are not ripe and therefore might have a different objective than to end a conflict. Moreover, applying ripeness theory to case studies can aid in identifying processes that lead to a ripe moment in hindsight. This knowledge can in turn be used to accelerate them. Another sharp critique is given by O’Kane (2006), who argues that both the theory as well as the information needed to apply it are too subjective. This pertains in particular to the fact that in Zartman’s theory it mostly about perceptions of a MHS. However, Zartman himself has already somewhat addressed this in his subsequent work, stating that “the greater the objective evidence, the greater the subjective perception of a stalemate and its pain is likely to be” (Zartman 2000, 230).
Rather than dismiss its applicability altogether, Pruitt & Kim (2004) have tried to complement the theory, including dimensions such as: failure of contentious tactics, exhaustion of necessary resources, loss of social support, and unacceptable cost and risk to the conditions that might lead to a stalemate. Further, Pruitt (2005, 9) argues that parties to the conflict do not necessarily always have the same reasons for wanting to enter into negotiations, stating that one party can be “motivated mainly by a belief that they cannot win, others mainly by the cost of the conflict, and still others mainly by the risk of a future catastrophe or pressure from a powerful third party”. This critique is similar to that of Kleiboer (1994), who claims that the underlying assumptions of ripeness theory are intertwined as it looks at the individual perceptions of ripeness yet they must occur to all parties simultaneously for ripeness to be identified according to Zartman (1989). While much can be said for an approach that accepts different motivations to initiating a peace process, I argue that imbalances in perceptions can lead to differing opinions of each respective strategic position in the negotiation. This would be especially applicable to the MHS.
12 However, ripeness theory is often described only as a way to understand why parties agree to negotiations in the first place and has never suggested to hold explanatory power for the outcome. Westendorf (2015, 10), however, has argued that the theory “goes a significant way toward explaining why some agreements are reached after years of inertia in a peace process”. Given Zartman’s underlying logic that “parties resolve their conflict only when they are ready to do so – when alternative, usually unilateral means of achieving a satisfactory result are blocked and the parties feel that they are in an uncomfortable and costly predicament” (Zartman 2001, 8), the theory could also provide an explanation for failed negotiations if they were initiated without a ripe moment. This would also address the criticism by Walch (2014, 79) that “parties may decide to negotiate for other reasons than getting to a peace settlement”. In line with this critique, Urlacher (2011, 82) has argued that sometimes parties enter into negotiations without “good faith.” Instead, negotiations can be used by a conflict party to buy time, gain legitimacy or get international visibility. In such a case, ripeness theory should be able to show that no ripe moment has existed as it will likely not meet the conditions elaborated on by Touval & Zartman (1989). This could be an important element in identifying why a peace process fails. Given the many facets of ripeness theory, it has been able to incorporate many of the elements that influence peace processes as have been identified above.
2.3 Negotiated settlement – the case of Colombia
The civil war in Colombia saw different attempts at negotiating a settlement with the FARC succeeding only following the negotiations that commenced in 2012. Much emphasis has been placed on the way the negotiations were structured and the role the international community played in mediating the talks over the span of the entire conflict. However, multiple players including not only states but also the UN and NGO’s were also involved in different phases of the peace process during the earlier Pastrana administration where talks did not lead to an accord. Here too, none of these parties gave guarantees for the successful implementation of the agreements, nor did they guarantee the overcoming of commitment problems. From the government’s side, trusting that the FARC would demobilize as agreed upon was equally uncertain. A UN monitoring mission might have reduced some of this uncertainty, or perhaps partial remobilization was considered an acceptable cost. After all, even as some paramilitaries have returned to taking up arms (Steele
13 2016), the peace agreement is still upheld. Bayer (2013) sheds some light on the possible reason behind the limited role of mediators during the Colombian civil war. She argues that negotiating parties often sought international presence for the sake of legitimacy rather than to reach a negotiated settlement, which hindered the third parties’ mandate.
The launch of Plan Colombia in 2000, a US-funded plan to combat drug trafficking and the insurgent groups, is often considered an important factor in the success of the peace negotiations with the FARC. As Colombia’s military was strengthened and the rebel group weakened, this tilted the balance of power. On the other hand, with Plan Colombia launched during ongoing peace negotiations, others argue that this negatively affected the talks and postponed the prospect for peace for another decade. Either way, the effect of Plan Colombia and the crackdown on insurgent groups in the country will be an important factor to analyze. Especially given the weakened position of the FARC and the different outcomes of the negotiations. Other factors that have been explored in relation to the negotiations are the use of strategic violence in different political contexts (Wolf 2018) and the role of kidnappings (Keijzer 2017). Conclusions showed that both these factors had changed under the different administration and can therefore be considered as factors that influenced the peace processes.
Ripeness theory has been applied to an array of conflicts, such as in Cambodia (Amer, 2007) and Northern Ireland (Connolly and Doyle, 2018), but has been absent from more recent conflicts. While much has been discussed about different factors that made the negotiations in Colombia crumble, Zartman’s idea remains largely unexplored: that the parties were not yet ready to reach a settlement when negotiations started. In the case of Colombia, the theory has already been applied to the successfully negotiated settlement with the M-19 (Caicedo 2014). Given the novelty of the negotiated settlement with the FARC a gap in the literature remains on the ending of the five decades long war. Reflecting now on why the negotiations with the FARC eventually did succeed allows us to not only test Zartman’s theory but also to offer potentially valuable insights into the factors that contributed to successful negotiations.
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Chapter 3: Ripeness theory – a framework
After briefly touching upon ripeness theory and the various criticisms it has been faced with, a more thorough look into what the theory entails will be discussed. First introduced in his 1985 book, Ripe for Resolution, the fundamental premise holds that conflicts will only be able to successfully end in negotiated settlement when the involved parties are ready to do so, when the moment is ‘ripe’. This places considerable importance on the timing of efforts for resolution. Such ripe moments can occur when two conditions are met: when there exists a Mutually Hurting Stalemate (MHS) and there is a Sense of a Way out (WO).
3.1 Mutually Hurting Stalemate
Zartman poses that when parties to a conflict find themselves in a situation where they are unable to escalate it to victory and this situation causes a costly and uncomfortable position for both of them (though not necessarily to the same degree), they will seek an alternative way out. Such stalemates often occur due to an impending, past or recently avoided catastrophe (Zartman & Berman l982; Zartman l983), although this is not always the case - stalemates can also develop gradually over time. Grounded in rational choice theory, a MHS is the product of a cost-benefit analysis. A decision to change course can be induced by increasing pain associated with the present (conflictual) course (Zartman 2008).
While Zartman does not go into depth about how to achieve such a MHS, Lustenberger (2012) seized the opportunity to fill that gap. To get to a MHS, he proposes three push factors, or dimensions of the conflict that can be altered, namely military, economic and political factors. The military dimension focuses on the ability of the armed group to achieve its goals through armed resistance, crunching down on their fighting power. Affecting the political dimension focuses on the political support and legitimacy these groups enjoy. Lastly, the economic dimension focuses on diminishing the economic resources these groups need for their survival. These indicators can not only help decide what is needed to accelerate a ripe moment, but also in tracking the factors that aided a situation to become ripe for negotiation in hindsight. Lichtenberger’s push factors can there be of value in analyzing the period that led up to a ripe moment.
15 According to Zartman’s theory a stalemate means “parties are caught in a conflict that they cannot win at an acceptable cost: They cannot escalate their way to victory” (Zartman and de Soto 2010, 11) and with ‘hurt’ it is meant that “the parties are suffering some costs or losses ⎯ physical, financial, or less tangible ⎯ as a result of the stalemate”. As the theory posits that both parties should perceive such a hurting stalemate, the perception should be ‘mutual’. However, this does not need to exist to the same degree, complete symmetry is not required. Nonetheless, it is important that both parties perceive such a MHS to exist. This makes ripeness a necessarily perceptual occurrence, although it is likely that it will be linked to objective factors as was mentioned earlier. Objective referents can be highlighted by a mediator when the perception is not yet there, but parties can also refuse to acknowledge them. A situation can arise where in objective terms a MHS stalemate exists, but parties to the conflict do not perceive it as such (Zartman 2008).
3.2 Sense of a Way Out
In addition to a MHS, parties to the conflict must also perceive a WO. According to Zartman (2008, 2), “parties do not have to be able to identify a specific solution, only a sense that a negotiated solution is possible for the searching and that the other party shares that sense and the willingness to search too.” While this too is a perceptual event, the other party’s willingness is often expressed by spokespersons who indicate whether or not they are open to negotiating a solution and ready to make concessions (Zartman and Aurik 1991). Here too, Lustenberger’s model can provide tools to identify the factors that lead to a WO. These include compatibility , trust and confidence (Lustenberger 2012). Compatibility entails that a potential peace agreement must become in line with the basic interests of the insurgent group (Ibid, 17). Often this means that the barriers to negotiation by the state must be lowered and the rebel group becomes more moderate. The insurgent group must also get over the deep mistrust that is often present. It must trust that the state is willing and capable to deliver on its agreements and enters into the negotiation for the right reasons. These factors can positively affect the insurgent group’s WO and therefore help signal a ripe moment.
3.3 Ripeness as a tool
Ripeness theory can be used as an analytical tool to help explain in retrospect why some conflicts were able to successfully end in negotiated settlement and others were not. While ripeness theory
16 is not a predictive heuristic and therefore cannot be used to predict when a conflict will be ripe for negotiations, it is able to identify when a moment is ripe for negotiations to be productive. When a ripe moment occurs, this does not automatically lead to the initiation of negotiations but instead this moment must be seized. As argued by Zartman (2008, 1), “Not all ripe moments are so seized and turned into negotiations, hence the importance of specifying the meaning and evidence of ripeness so as to indicate when conflicting or third parties can fruitfully initiate negotiations.”
A ripe moment, however, is not sufficient for negotiations to end in a successful settlement. Many other factors as mentioned in the literature review influence the outcome of this. Nonetheless, its value extends beyond the initiation phase of negotiations as a ripe moment must be sustained throughout the process. As the perception of a MHS and WO is not indefinitely guaranteed once achieved, monitoring the factors that made for a ripe moment is important and Zartman’s theory can in that way offer prescriptive value. As argued by Haass (1990), it can help busy policymakers to identify disputes amenable to negotiation, or, in the case of apparent stalemates, factors requiring change, and attention before diplomacy can prosper' (Haass 1990, 7).
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Chapter 4: Methodology
This paper seeks to find an answer to the research question by exploring the validity of the ripeness as a factor in the success or failure of conflict negotiations. In order to answer the research question at hand, a within-case comparative analysis will be performed. As ripeness has yet to be applied as a theory to these two particular cases, this thesis presents an opportunity to test ripeness theory once more. It will serve as a framework as it implicitly encompasses many of the elements that have been deemed important in peace processes; furthermore, it has held up relatively well in the literature review.
4.1 Case study
Qualitative methods with a small-n comparative case-study approach are put to use. Applying the theory to the case of two different negotiations between the FARC and the government of Colombia will allow us to evaluate whether ripeness of the conflict, or lack thereof, was what helped determined the outcome of each respective negotiation. This fits with the wider application of case study research, used to test hypotheses and develop theories. This method allows for the detailed examination of the operation of causal mechanisms in individual cases in order to provide historical explanations of cases (Bennett and George 2004). After all, “only case studies provide the intensive empirical analysis that can find previously unnoticed causal factors and historical patterns” (Achen and Snidal 1989, 167-68).
4.2 Process tracing
In order to perform a detailed analysis of both of these cases, process-tracing will be used as a methodological approach. This approach is seen as a fundamental tool for qualitative analyses which “attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable, or variables, and the outcome of the dependent variable” (Bennett and George 2004, 206). Tracing causal mechanisms that link causes to their effects allows for stronger evidence-based inferences and a better understanding of how a cause produces an outcome (Beach 2016). Based on both qualitative and quantitative observations as well as causal linkages of events, this paper will evaluate how the so-called ripeness for negotiations has changed over time. Identifying this requires a careful description of the cases to recognize trajectories of
18 change and causation. In order to do that, a clear elaboration of the different factors affecting ripeness is necessary.
4.3 Measurement
The research question will focus on specific factors that will be similar for the analysis across the different negotiations with the FARC. While Zartman’s theory is used to explain that negotiated settlements are initiated when there is a ripe moment, this thesis argues that it can also help explain why negotiations fail, namely because negotiations are sometimes initiated even though the conditions were not yet ‘ripe’ enough to actually come to a settlement. Moreover, even though ripeness theory cannot guarantee a successful outcome of negotiations once started, a ripe moment does need to be sustained throughout the negotiations to prevent parties from dropping out. Therefore, the state of the MHS and WO during the negotiations must also be considered.
The factors to be analyzed will be derived from Zartman’s Ripeness theory, using indicators that have commonly been used in the application of his theory and have been described in his work with De Soto, ‘Timing Mediation Initiatives’ (Zartman & de Soto, 2011). Even though the theory often speaks of perceptions, Zartman’s own defense that objective evidence and subjective perceptions are related allow for some margin between the two. Perceptions, however, will as much as possible be deducted from official party statements and comments made to the press, although recognizing that these may be limited and not always a true reflection of a party’s stance.
Negotiated settlement
The dependent, or outcome variable will be whether or not a negotiated settlement is reached. According to Zartman, “negotiations take place when both parties lose faith in their chances of winning and see an opportunity for cutting losses and achieving satisfaction through accommodation” (Zartman 1995, 18). The outcome also depends on the terms and conditions for both parties that need to be agreed to during negotiations. While research on these terms would also form an important piece of the puzzle of why negotiations succeed or fail, detailed information about interim decisions and trade-offs is often handled behind closed doors. Such secrecy makes it nearly impossible to obtain the necessary information for analysis. Instead, this thesis seeks to analyze whether the absence of a ripe moment can be what impeded parties from reaching an
19 agreement, it will test when a negotiated settlement is able to be reached. Ultimately, ripe moments cannot be quantified and therefore remain a contentious factor for analysis. In order to identify a ripe moment as best as possible, objective factors must be assessed alongside subjective factors that indicate the perception of the parties that they have reached a dead end and are looking for an alternative solution. Identifying ripe moments through these means is easier when done in hindsight. Much of the criticism directed at Zartman’s theory also concerns this limitation. While it is not the aim to predict when a ripe moment will occur if it has not yet, we can draw lessons from these past negotiations with the FARC for future action.
Mutually hurting stalemate
One of Zartman’s core assumptions is the existence and perception of a MHS for a ripe moment to exist. According to Zartman and Soto both direct and indirect indicators influence the perception of a MHS. First, objective indicators are those that point to rising costs and (Zartman 2001). This research will use Lustenberger’s (2012) categorization of economic, military and political factors that can lead to a MHS. For military factors, this thesis will concretely look at changes in troop sizes, territorial control, and attacks . In addition, changes in leadership or allies can also cause hurt and will be added to the military indicators. This will look at are changes in head figures of the FARC, especially where these changes occur involuntarily, due to for example desertion or death. For the economic factor, the availability of economic resources will be researched. Lastly, loss of public support can also lead insurgents to perceive a hurting stalemate and will therefore be assessed as political factor. These objective indicators can be measured concretely over time and compared and contrasted between different negotiations in time. It should also be considered that “both the absolute figure for losses and the gap between losses and expectations inflict pain” (Zartman & de Soto 2010, 14).
Sense of a Way Out
The second condition for a ripe moment to occur according to Zartman is that each of the conflicting parties have a WO, meaning “that both parties have perceived that they and the other party are willing to look for a joint solution” (Zartman and Soto 2010, 23). As this is a latent variable, it requires measurable indicators or manifest variables in order to be identified. Objective indicators for this can be drawn from official statements in which an openness to a joint solution can be identified. Other measurable indicators are that can be interpreted and assessed as
20 preliminary signs of cooperation are: cease fires, exchanges or releases of prisoners or hostages and assurances of troop movements. These indicators can be found as oral or written notifications such as speeches and declarations or can be identified after the fact in news reports or other statements. Subjective indicators for a WO can be identified by ‘past moments of cohabitation or cooperation with the other side’, ‘positive comments about the other side’ or ‘statements that seek to de-demonize the other side, or recognized the other side’s needs and aims’ (Zartman and Soto 2010, 26). An important limitation to consider here is that the parties might not always be willing to state their interests in negotiations explicatively so as to tread lightly.
4.4 Data collection & Limitations
Data will be collected through primary as well as secondary sources. Secondary sources will consist mainly of scholarly and news articles to gain a better insight into the developments of each party in their respective peace processes. Both the Colombian newspaper El Tiempo and online news platform Colombia Reports as well as international press, such as Reuters, The Washington Post, The New York times will be used. Primary sources will be used primarily for official statements from the respective parties, but also to obtain statistics on force power, public opinion, attacks, kidnappings, etc. Databases such as Colombia Reports, the Rand Corporation, Gallup Colombia, and The Global Terrorism Database to name a few will be used to obtain the information on the objective factors such as attacks, kidnappings and public opinion on negotiation efforts. Combining primary and secondary data will help to avoid bias and make an objective analysis of the information more likely.
As with all research, this one too will face limitations. Firstly, the role of perceptions in ripeness theory is difficult to identify. Not only because perceptions are subjective, but also because what is put forward by leaders might not be their true view, but rather what is in their interest to put forward as the truth. This will partially be overcome by looking at objective factors, as Zartman suggests that the more available these are the closer they will lie to the perceptions. Facts and figures on attacks, kidnappings, manpower, etc. have been sufficiently documented for this. In addition, combining both English and Spanish sources should allow for sufficient material. However, my Spanish reading proficiency is only intermediate, which may make some sources too difficult to analyze and will have to be forfeited in the interest of time.
21
Chapter 5: Case Analysis
5.1 A brief history of the FARC
After a decade of political violence known as La Violencia, left-wing guerilla groups who were excluded from a power-sharing agreement took up arms against the government and the Colombian civil war began. Two of the better-known groups from this period are the FARC and the ELN, both communist guerilla groups claiming to represent the country’s rural poor, and both opposed to the privatization of natural resources. The unequal distribution of land, power and wealth in the country resided at the root of their armed struggle as both groups represented the fight for social justice through communism.
The FARC was officially founded in 1964 and started off with a small number of guerilla founders looking to expand their support base (Kline 2012). By the late 70’s the party had expanded across different regions in the country but remained a relatively small guerilla group with enormous internal divisions. Over the years, however, the organization started to grow tremendously and the increase in its military strength was unprecedented. The reasons contributing to this growth are largely twofold. Firstly, political participation and legal opposition were limited in the country. As the Colombian government failed to implement proper land reform or reduce poverty, the FARC became an appealing alternative to express grievances felt mostly by peasant farmers in the region (Lee 2012). Secondly, in later stages as the group was growing, the FARC’s taxation of illicit drug production made the funding of its rapid expansion possible as better pay to fighters helped fill the ranks and retain them (Kraul, 2016).
As the guerilla group expanded, so did its activity. While they started off with small attacks and ambushes, the FARC eventually went on to perform operations with large groups of fighters from different divisions of the force (Rabasa & Chalk 2001). They also expanded geographically, with their areas of operation no longer being confined to thinly populated rural areas but also moving towards medium-sized cities and economic centers (Johnson & Jonsson 2013). As a group they also became more organized, establishing a central hierarchical structure, a general staff, military code, training school and political program (Molano 2007). Given their sheer size and the swathes of land over which they spread out, they divided themselves into operational regions named
22 “blocks”, each with their own responsibilities and authority. In turn, each of these blocks were subdivided into fronts which could have up to 300 fighters. At the height of its strength, the group had 80 active fronts.
In 1985, an avenue for political participation of the guerilla group opened up after the Betancur administration allowed for the formation of the Union Patriotica (UP), a political party formed by the FARC and the Colombian Communist Party. The group achieved some political success in the election of 1986, winning “350 local council seats, 23 deputy positions in departmental assemblies, 9 seats in the House, 6 seats in the Senate and 4.6% of the presidential vote” (Colombia Reports 2014). The following years however, assassinations of the party’s leaders by right-wing paramilitary groups, often colluding with the army, led to a diminishing of the party. These assassinations continued throughout the 90s and early 2000s, with over 3,000 member being killed (Herbolzheimer, 2016). Many of the remaining members eventually chose to flee the country and go into exile abroad. By 2002, the party had shrunk so dramatically that the government rescinded the party’s legal status, meaning they were no longer able to take part in elections and were thereby deprived of any official political power (Mapping Militant Organizations 2019).
Over the years, public support for the FARC’s military wing also started to wane and ultimately reduced to almost nil (UNHCR 2006). However, these number had been in the single digits for decades as the population grew increasingly aggravated over their tactics such as kidnapping, the use of child soldiers and indiscriminate use of car bombs and mines. Moreover, the launch of Plan Colombia severely diminished the group’s force. While Plan Colombia (2000 – 2015) was a United States foreign aid, military and diplomatic initiative which aimed to fight drug cartels, it ended up boiling down to a counterinsurgency rather than counternarcotic operation (Delacour 2000). This operation resulted in drastic reduction in the FARC’s force and tipped the military balance in favor of the Colombian Armed Forces. The FARC, however, did not sit idly by and was able to maintain some, although more limited, pressure on the government with its guerilla tactics and caused the conflict to drag on. Only by 2012, as the conflict’s duration approached its fifth decade, a new approach to negotiations was initiated under the Santos administration. Four years of talks eventually culminated in an extensive peace accord that would end the conflict and turn the FARC into a political party to continue its struggle through legitimate means.
23 5.2 The Pastrana Administration: Peace negotiations from 1998-2001
5.2.1 Introduction
After two earlier peace talks failed under the Betancur administration (1984-1989) and the Gaviria administration (1991- 1992), president Pastrana too would make an attempt to negotiate a way out of the conflict. Andres Pastrana assumed office in August 1998 after running a campaign that centered around his promise to end the three decades of war that was tearing the country apart (Marcella, 2001). Preceding the initiation of these talks were years of increasing growth in peace mobilization by the population. Mass demonstrations and the establishment of a variety of peace initiatives such as the Committee for the Search for Peace and the Network of Initiatives for Peace and Against War aimed to create the conditions conducive to peace negotiations with the FARC (Fernandez, García-Durán, and Sarmiento 2004). This national mobilization was spurred by the FARC’s increasing encroachment of major cities as the guerilla group had changed its strategy to a ‘war of movement’. This took the conflict to the more urbanized, industrialized and densely populated core of Colombia (Kilcullen 2016). Rather than their guerilla existence mostly affecting the peasant population, the more populated Colombian center was now also feeling the threat of their existence (Spencer 2016). More problematically, however, was the conflict’s increased intensity, with some experts saying that the state was on the brink of collapse (Farah 1998; Otis 2014). Once in office, newly elected president Pastrana kept his promise to the public to enter into peace negotiations with the FARC. However, after four years of fruitless talks, the administration would look back on what was a tumultuous and damaging process whereby the guerrillas disregarded and exploited the negotiating efforts.
As will be argued in this chapter, this peace effort was doomed to fail from the start as the conflict was not yet “ripe” for negotiation. The following section will analyze the MHS and WO according to the objective and subjective indicators aforementioned to show that both the existence and perception of a MHS was lacking. Mistrust between the two parties and a lack of commitment particularly from the guerilla’s camp also meant that a WO was absent. In line with Zartman’s reasoning, the absence of these factors caused the negotiations to falter and ultimately collapse.
24 5.2.2 Mutually hurting stalemate
The following section will assess the economic, military and political indicators of a MHS in order to evaluate whether the conflict had reached such a stalemate.
Military strength
While the FARC started off small, the organization saw a steady increase in force throughout the first few decades. Then in the 1990s, the narcodollars and kidnappings funded their rapid expansion and facilitated the greatest advance in the group’s history (Villarraga 2009, 36). The FARC went from around 7,000 fighters in 1995 to an estimated 15,000-20,000 fighters at the height of its power in 2000 (Farah 1998). Their new sources of income made it possible to overcome lack of voluntary recruits and instead offer decent pay to fill the ranks. The area controlled by the FARC spread like an oil-stain while the group grew significantly in numbers. The FARC’s fighters were divided into so-called fronts which grew from 18 fronts in 1983 to 60 fronts in 1995 just a few years before the start of negotiations (Vargas 1999). Even during the negotiations their network continued to grow, with over 70 fronts in 2000. These fronts were combat units which were responsible for the planning and execution of their own operations and varied in function. This way the group became more decentralized, while still being highly organized to effectively plan and carry out attacks.
As President Pastrana took office and the peace negotiations were initiated, the FARC controlled around 40 percent of Colombia while roughly one fourth of the country’s municipalities lacked police presence (Farah 1998l; Rabasa and Chalk 2001). The small and isolated towns where there were police or military posts became vulnerable targets for guerilla attacks or infiltration (Rabasa and Chalk 2001). By the late 1990s they hit further blows to the Colombian government when they started to engage and defeat battalion-sized units of the Colombian Army (Las Delicias in 1996 and El Billar in 1998). The FARC also started increasingly posing a threat to the stability of the country with its attacks on transportation, communications, and energy infrastructure. Although the group had never disabled vital economic assets, they did manage to interdict highways, destroy electricity towers and attack oil pipelines (Rabasa and Chalk 2001). The FARC’s offensive strategy and their explosive growth made it an increasing threat to the stability of the state. In fact, in 1998 a report by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency even issued a warning that the FARC
25 and its drug-trafficking allies would be able to defeat the Colombian military within five years and asserted that the country could be converted into a “narco-state” (Farah 1998; Otis 2014).
Opposite the increasingly powerful FARC stood Colombia’s weakened and demoralized Armed Forces. Preceding Pastrana’s administration, the country was led by President Samper who had been accused of accepting narcodollars to finance his election campaign. This severely affected the government’s needed legitimacy in fighting the guerilla’s (Richani 2005). At the time, military General Ricardo Cifuentes even stated that “The President doesn’t deserve my support”. Moreover, the Armed Forces lacked a sufficient budget and were increasingly targeted in terrorist attacks. Troops were often in possession of equipment and weapons that were at least as good as the Colombian army and police units they would fight (Kilcullen 2015, 73).
With little manpower and in the absence of sufficient resources, the state’s mobility and fighting power was severely limited (Villarraga 2009, 36). The Colombian military proved to be “inept, ill-trained and poorly equipped” (Farah 1998). The British International Institute for Strategic Studies similarly warned that “the guerrillas are winning the war and will take over the country” (Almario 1998, 23). These analyses laid bare the weakness of the state and the possibility that the FARC would eventually end up as the victor. The military indicators therefore showed no sign of a MHS.
Economic indicators
The initiation of peace talks under the Pastrana administration came at a time when the FARC also strengthening its economic resource base through drug operations and kidnappings. The FARC’s power position before and during the negotiations was inextricably linked to the enormous wealth they accumulated through these operations. The FARC’s initial extraction of resources from drug operations were indirect, but a changing landscape of drug production and trafficking in South America changed the group’s role in these activities as coca production shifted to Colombia. Coca growers as well as drug flights leaving rebel-held areas would be taxed and they would collaborate with or extort funds from drug traffickers (Otis, 2014). The vast stateless spaces in Colombia’s jungle proved an attractive area to engage in production and the country soon became the producer of almost 75 percent of the world’s cocaine (Moor & Zumpolle, 2001, p. 24). Colombia’s coca crop rapidly jumped from a few thousand acres to 400,000 by 2000. Not only did income from
26 taxation of drug lords increase, the FARC itself started actively participating in the cultivation of these illicit crops. Initially, the guerilla group’s income grew as the breakup of the Medellín and Cali cartels led to a rise of smaller cartels which sought the FARC’s protection of their operations (Otis 2014). Eventually, however, the FARC started to engage in production and distribution of cocaine itself and pushed other players from the drug trade out (Kilcullen 2016, 69). This vast amount of funding from increased drug operations allowed the FARC to significantly expand its organization into a formidable force that could inflict serious defeats upon the Colombian military (Marcella 2001).
Further reinforcing the FARC’s position was the boom in kidnappings. The guerilla group began actively pursuing funds from the kidnapping business halfway through the 1980s. By the time the negotiations began, the total number of annual kidnappings had risen dramatically. In 1998, the numbers rose to more than 2000 cases, and continued to rise during the negotiations to a record 3706 registered kidnappings in 2000 (Moor and Zumpolle 2001, 25). Despite some inconsistencies in the statistics from different sources, all report a spectacular growth since the 1990s. This was the result of the well-oiled machine that the FARC had set up whereby roadblocks would create checkpoints to filter out those that would allow for the group to reel in lucrative ransom payments (Moor and Zumpolle 2001, 30). As the government had insufficient capacity to monitor all transport infrastructure, this created plenty of opportunity for the FARC to set up checkpoints in remote places. In just a few years’ time the number of kidnappings more than doubled, going from 1677 cases in 1997 up to 3706 in 2000 (Ibid). In addition to the increase in checkpoints, the steep rise was also a result of mass abductions performed by the group. These abductions were also being increasingly conducted in cities rather than only in rural areas, forming part of their new urban strategy (Ibid, 32).
For the wealthy members of the population and large enterprises in Colombia, the FARC introduced a new ‘revolutionary law’, ley 002. This entailed that the guerrilla group would start to impose a 10% tax on all those with assets over one million US dollars. Noncompliance would likely result into kidnapping (Moor and Zumpolle 2001). Large companies faced similar threats, with the FARC reportedly extorting over 2000 companies for a minimum amount of 100,000 US dollars and threatening with acts of sabotage or harassment (Moor and Zumpolle 2001, 25).
27 Besides drug operations and extortion, kidnapping became the third greatest source of income for the group.
Figure 1 Growth in kidnappings in Colombia, Source: Pax Christie Netherlands (2001)
Political indicators
Popularity of the FARC at its inception was mostly fueled by an unheard peasant population who felt their hardships went unnoticed by the ruling government. Social and political support for the group then increasingly grew since the start and peaked around the 1980s as limited political participation and opposition turned many to supporting the armed struggle (Vargas 1999). However, as the nature of the conflict started to change around the nineties and the line between economic and political objectives started to get blurred popular support also declined (Ibid). Even though the FARC’s military strength continued to increase throughout the nineties, its political power was already nearly non-existent during the negotiations under the Pastrana administration. What little representation it once had through its UP party was diminishing as assassinations against members continued to be carried out and others fled the country. They also barely enjoyed any public support as their attacks and kidnappings had turned many of the supporters they once had against them. The establishment of their own drug network gave them ready access to large sums of drug money that would make them less reliant on both external sponsors and popular support. Whereas classical insurgents “depend on local populations for recruits, intelligence, money, food and shelter” and draw on adversaries or external sponsors “for weapons and military
28 supplies” (Kilcullen 2016, 70), the FARC became mostly self-reliant and therefore could do without this public support. Instead of being dependent on financial support from the population and a need to win hearts and minds, their financial autonomy instead left their behavior largely unchecked (Otis 2014). A Gallup opinion poll even showed that less than 3% of Colombians had a favorable opinion of the FARC (UNHCR 2006) and is therefore the only factor that could have contributed to a MHS.
5.2.3 Perceptions of MHS
As argued by Zartman, the objective state of the warring parties will have consequently influenced their perception of that very asymmetry. In an interview published in March 1999, then FARC leader Marulanda recognized that the group’s advances had strengthened its position and forced the Colombian government to the negotiating table. Marulanda spoke critically about the demobilization of the M-19 movement as a result of the negotiations with the Colombian government in the mid-1980s and stated that the FARC would continue its struggle “until victory” instead (Rabasa and Chalk 2001, 39). Later in 2000, minutes from the FARC secretariat’s annual meeting were published by the Colombian Weekly Semana which stated that “the acquisition of arms currently has permitted us a qualitative jump in our process of becoming the Ejército del Pueblo [People’s Army or FARC-EP].” This indicates not only the group’s understanding of its increasing power, but also its goal of becoming the army of the people of Colombia (Rabasa, 2007, 62). For the FARC, there was no such thing as a MHS, rather there was the perception that they were on a path to victory. Instead, the hurt was likely disproportionately felt by the Colombian government. The valuable concessions that president Pastrana made to the FARC in order to initiate the peace negotiations indicate the desperation with which these negotiations were entered. The FARC continued to hand out powerful blows to the Armed Forces and seemed to have little regard for civilian casualties. Further putting a strain on the government was its constraint by the electoral schedule to achieve results in the peace promises made during the campaign. The FARC, instead, could afford to be patient.
5.2.4 Sense of a Way Out
The following section will assess the objective and subjective indicators of a WO to assess if a WO was present.
29
Objective indicators
Already before his election, Pastrana had created channels of communications with the FARC (Molano 2007). The FARC in turn had demanded that the government withdraw from five municipalities and that negotiations would be handled directly with the FARC leader Marulanda. Once in office, Pastrana agreed to these terms, along with “formation of an unarmed civic corps to keep local order in the demilitarized zone, dismantling of the paramilitary groups, decriminalization of popular protest, and convening of participation by the international community” (Molano 2007). Meeting these demands, with the demobilization of a large swath of land in particular, were a gesture to show good will and meaningful intentions for the negotiations (Marcella 2001). From the government’ side, the initial approach to the negotiations therefore seemed positive and in line with Zartman’s indicators of the WO.
Other positive developments unfolded during the negotiations, most notably that the two parties agreed to a landmark prisoner swap in June 2001 (Miller 2001). In the first large exchange since the start of the conflict, the FARC released 42 soldiers and police officers in exchange for 15 FARC guerillas. For a brief moment, this exchange was met with optimism. A former top peace negotiator states that “This is going to build confidence and generate trust on both sides” (Danial Garcia Pena 2001 as cited in Miller 2001). Pastrana even saw this as a break-through moment, saying that “The peace process is going to change,” and that “This gives force for new accords - it will allow us to consolidate and advance the process” (Miller 2001).
Unfortunately, the cooperation and optimism were short-lived. From the get-go, the negotiations were off to an inauspicious start when the FARC’s leader, Manuel Marulando, failed to show up to the opening ceremony of the talks and thereby snubbed president Pastrana (Leogrande and Sharpe 2000). Later, the use of the demilitarized zone would shed light on the FARC’s intentions of the negotiations. While the demilitarized zone was used as a gesture of willingness to negotiate a peace deal, the FARC had instead used it as an opportunity to recruit, reequip and train its forces. With unfettered control over the area, it could expand its power undisturbed and use the territory to stage operations against the government as well as increase their cultivation of coca (Marcella 2001). As the FARC continued its attacks apace and suspicions surrounding their abuse of the demilitarized zone increased, Pastrana started to question the FARC’s motives. In October 2001,
30 the FARC denied the government’s initiative for new control measures of the zone, such as aerial surveillance and checkpoints at entry points (UNHCR 2006). The FARC forces continued to use the DMZ to plan and intensify attacks. Executing a fight and talk strategy, their calculated and rapid increase in force was facilitated by the demilitarized zone. Rather than committing to the negotiations, this was a clear sign of their pursuit to expand their power and fight till victory. In February 2002, the abduction of Senator Eduardo Gechem, President of the Senate Peace Commission, would prove to be the final straw for the government. Colombian armed forces moved into the DMZ the next day and put an end to the peace negotiations.
Subjective indicators
Although the FARC appeared to be the aggressor in the peace talks initially, the government of Colombia also turned the tides with the launch of Plan Colombia in 2000. In May of that year, Cristina Garcia, a member of the FARC’s parliamentary commission noted that due to the US’ funding the Colombian Armed forces were gaining in fighting power. She mentioned that it was “strange that on the one hand they talk about peace, but on the other hand their troops are being increasingly better equipped.” When asked if the same did not apply for the FARC, she defended this with saying “if the military and police are preparing for war, so must we” (Cristina Garcia 2001 as cited in Genovesi 2001). Therefore, for the FARC, the launch of Plan Colombia was seen as a sign that the Pastrana administration was not genuinely interested in peace (Tate, 2004).
Both parties also displayed signs of deep distrust of each other’s intentions as brought forward by their representatives’ rhetoric. A representative Army official was stated saying “The guerrillas are a bunch of bandits and narco-traffickers. You cannot trust them. They are not interested in peace” (Army official 1998 as cited in Azcarate 2003). A representative from the FARC in turn stated that “The Oligarchs of Colombia only understand the reason of force. They are not really interested in peace, just the rendition of our people” (Azcarate 2003, 59). These statements show the continued demonization of the opposing party and the suspicion of the other’s aims of the negotiations. Public support for the negotiations also started to wane. An opinion poll performed by the newspaper El Tiempo showed that 83% of respondents believed that the FARC was not interested in peace (Americas Research Group 2001).
31 5.2.5 Conclusion
Analysis of the peace negotiations under the Pastrana administration showed that there was no MHS and no WO. During the ‘90s, the FARC benefitted from explosive funding from drug operations and together with their kidnappings set in motion a vicious cycle that allowed for rapid military growth. This meant a strengthening of both objective economic as well as military indicators that made the conflict move further away from a MHS as suggested by Zartman. Such strong objective indicators will also have influenced their perception that the conflict was far from a MHS. The only indicator that could have contributed to a MHS was the political indicator, which looked at public support for the FARC. Public support appeared incredibly low even if actual numbers could possibly be slightly higher due to fear of some people expressing their support for the group. Nevertheless, given the group’s military and economic strength and limited dependency on public support, this was not enough to perceive a MHS. While initially the open stance of the Pastrana administration by assigning the DMZ might have given a WO, the deep mistrust underlying the conflict and the widely differing interests meant there was no sustainable WO. In combination with a lacking MHS, the moment was not ripe for negotiation.
32 5.3 The Santos Administration: Peace negotiations from 2012-2016
5.3.1 Introduction
Rather than running his campaign on a peace platform, president Santos entered office in 2010 on the promise to continue his predecessors’ aggressive security policies against the FARC. The peace negotiations that were launched during the Santos administration followed over a decade of military and economic weakening of the FARC by the Colombian government. Where the Colombian military suffered devastating defeats due to the FARC between 1996 and 2002, the failure of the negotiations under the Pastrana administration caused a shift in Colombia’s strategy that would turn the tables. Near the end of his term, Pastrana set his sights on military defeat of the FARC by reforming the Colombian military in terms of both strength and reputation. A large part of the conscripted forces was replaced by professional volunteers, military education was improved and human rights trainings were increased. This enhanced both the capacity and the legitimacy of the military.
The objective to bring the FARC to its knees was continued by President Alvaro Uribe who was elected in 2002 after his iron fist approach to the insurgency earned him a landslide victory (Spencer 2012). In 2003 he launched the Democratic Security Policy (DSP), a counterinsurgency strategy that combined structural reform and enhanced security to regain and consolidate full territorial country of the country. This would be achieved by continuing to increase police and military capacity, eradicating illicit drug trafficking and building and maintaining a deterrent capability (Spencer, 2016). The victories by the Colombian Armed forces against the FARC that ensued created a MHS. Moreover, despite Santos’ hard stance on the conflict, he did start to show a willingness for peace negotiations, creating a WO. These thereby formed the more conducive conditions necessary for the negotiations to be successful under the Santos administration.
5.3.2. Mutually hurting stalemate
The following section will assess the economic, military and political indicators of a MHS in order to evaluate whether the conflict had reached such a stalemate.
Military indicators
Even though Uribe’s objective to bring an end to the conflict by defeating the FARC completely was not achieved, his counterinsurgency policy created the conditions for a MHS to occur that
