Crisis Framing and Credibility: The influence of crisis communication efforts of public leaders on political standing after an unexpected private sector disaster

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Crisis Framing and Credibility:

The influence of crisis communication efforts

of public leaders on political standing after an

unexpected private sector disaster

Jieun Gina Park

Student number: S1616099

j.g.park@umail.leidenuniv.nl

Supervisor: Dr. Ruth S. Prins

Second reader: Dr. Joery Matthys

Master Thesis, MSc in Crisis and Security Management

Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs

Universiteit Leiden / Leiden University

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1: Introduction

The world today is becoming more interconnected, and perhaps more crisis prone. During these times of crises, the public looks to the government for safety, security and answers; as such, the ability or

inability of the leader to provide an appropriate response to this demand determines his or her political standing after the immediate crisis is over. Crises have become another battleground in the political game for the public leader, yet the magnitude of crisis communication has not yet been recognised in proportion to its importance. With the continued globalisation and cooperation of joint-partnerships between the private and public sectors, the actions of one increasingly affect the other; subsequently any crisis that occurs demands appropriate communication from both sectors. In this light, it is crucial that crisis communication is explored for managing reputation and political standing, as it is political, and therefore strategic.

The effect of crises is palpable, both for the actors involved as well as for the overall community at hand. In the public sector, we have seen that bad crisis management can lead to the demise of the politician both through reputational standing and by physical holding of the office, mostly in cases of personal scandals such as the case of New York governor Eliot Spitzer, or after handling of public protests such as the criminal trials of Hosni Mubarak after his resignation (Washington Post, 2008; Kirkpatrick, 2011). In the private sector we see that bad crisis management can lead to the bankruptcy and dissipation of an entire organisation, shown by cases such as Lehman Brothers and Enron (Wiggins et. al, 2014; McLean and Elkind, 2013).

There are also instances where we observe a seemingly private sector incident cause dramatic fallout in the public sector. This is usually due to the uncovering of a connection – often accompanied activities that are illegal or in the grey zone – between a firm and a public leader. Still, there exists a real-world puzzle for situations where no direct connection is observed between the two sectors, and yet still leads to very tangible and striking consequences for the public official. The public leader in these cases may have no personal links to agents surrounding the crisis, and no knowledge of the causes, mechanisms or the scale of the crisis that is unfolding in front of his or her eyes. However, these crises may lead to the downfall, or trigger greater political power for the public official. This paper aims to study this puzzle

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from the perspective of crisis communication, because crisis communication affects the reputational aspect of crisis management.

1.1. Research Question

The overall objective of this research is to explore the effect of crisis communication efforts of public leaders about a private sector crisis on their political stance, specifically in relation to their reputation. In particular, the efforts of such leaders during the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the United States and the Sewol ferry sinking in South Korea will be examined.

The crisis framing model put forth by Boin et. al (2009) and the Seven Crisis Communication Strategies by Coombs (1998) will serve as frameworks for this study. Framing is key to any portrayal of a complex event such as a disaster. The ability to frame a crisis in a certain way allows the public leader to have a degree of control over the event – and thus his or her reputation - regardless of whether or not the framer possesses the physical resources to actually contain it. As such, successful crisis framing directly relates with the officeholder’s reputation, and thus his or her political standing. The seven crisis

communications strategies that Coombs presents is a typical list of actions employed by communicators representing an organisation during a crisis; and when a strategy is used that complements the overall framing, it can have a positive effect on the reputational outcome and the standing of the communicator.

The public sphere is different to the private sector. While officeholders face the same concerns of

accountability and responsibility as a CEO, the terms vary. A public incumbent is not subject to financial stakeholder concerns related to corporate activities as a private sector leader may be subject to. This means that corporations have stakeholders such as major investors or members of the board of directors, with different motives and goals that guide their crisis communication. The interests of certain

stakeholders may be protecting reputation while others are focused on avoiding economic damage; these various inputs have influence in the goals and thus the subsequent strategies of the communicator to achieve this goal. On the other hand, public leaders are primarily responsible for the safety or cohesion of citizens, and the role of each individual leader is crafted so that financial inputs and other potential stakeholders theoretically do not have such a large influence on the goal of their actions. The metrics of comparison differs, and as such, studies in reputation management or standing from a private sector

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point of view is not relevant or enough to be applied to the public sector in its current state. This means that there is a gap in the study of reputation management and standing of public leaders during times of private sector crises.

With this in mind, my Research Question will be as follows:

How do crisis communication efforts of public leaders influence their political standing after an unexpected private sector disaster?

The following sub questions will guide the research process:

1. How is crisis communication related to political outcome in the public and private sector? 2. What strategies did each crisis communication leader employ?

3. What was their political stance after the acute stages of the crisis?

1.2. Concepts to Define

1.2.1. Crisis

The concept of a crisis in the public sector is poorly defined among scholars in the field of crisis management. However, the general definition that most scholars agree on is the idea that “crisis is… defined as sudden, unexpected, surprising and unpredictable” (Roux-Dufort, 2007:107). The dominant definitions of a crisis in the public and private sector are similar – but in the public sphere, they also usually contain an element of societal urgency, in particular with regards to the idea of governance. Kouzmin restates the idea of Roux-Dufort from a previous study by Rosenthal, Charles and t’Hart – that there are three distinct characteristics that make up a crisis, whether they are natural or man-made: “a severe threat or an unfavourable, destructive and often life-threatening changes to the victim’s

environment; a high degree of uncertainty; and the need for prompt, yet critical and potentially irreversible, decisions” (Kouzmin, 2008:158).

Ulmer et. al (2014) define crises in the private sector as “a specific, unexpected, and non-routine event or a series of events that create high levels of uncertainty and simultaneously present an organisation with both opportunities for and threats to its high-priority goals” (Ulmer et. al, 2014:8). This element of

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threat exists similarly as in the public sector definition presented above, but in the private sector there is also a specific mention of crisis as an opportunity.

The practical realities of crises are often subject to the interpretations or perceptions of the social community. Rosenthal and Kouzmin (1993) argue that crises contain multiple realities, with each

stakeholder perceiving different threats and priorities before, during, and after a crisis. Hence it becomes very important that the public leader of a community communicates the understanding and

responsibilities involved in a manner that addresses the needs of the public. Where the communication and the perceived threats conflict will define the credibility of the public leader to address the

consequences of a crisis. With this in mind, this thesis will use a modified version of Kouzmin’s definition of a crisis: A severe threat or unfavourable, destructive changes with a high degree of uncertainty, and the need for prompt, yet critical and potentially irreversible, decisions including communication regarding the public’s sense of security.

1.2.2. Crisis Communication

As with the concept of a crisis, “crisis communication, in contrast, is more typically associated with public relations and the need for organizations to repair damaged images after a crisis or a disaster” (Seeger, 2006:234). For crisis managers and other practitioners in the field of crisis management, the objective of a crisis communication strategy is to reduce harm and contain the crisis. However, these objectives may clash depending on the various actors involved in the crisis. For example, a politician’s desire to minimize an embarrassing public scandal contrasts with the public’s desire to discover all the facets involved (Seeger, 2006).

Sellnow et. al (2015) state that crisis communication involves the design of messages in such a way that it calls the attention of the audience, motivates them to understand the crisis in a certain way, and then influences their behaviour. This coincides with Boin et. al (2009), who states that crisis communication consists of framing the information in certain ways to influence the political agenda and outcome.

For this paper, crisis communication will then be defined as information dissemination that seeks to reduce harm and influence reputational outcome during a disaster.

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1.2.3. Political Standing

The concept of political standing relies heavily on the idea of reputation management. According to Guisinger and Smith (2002), the choice of words and communication methods employed are critical to the credibility – which translates into reputation – of a political actor. A reputation forms when there is dispositional attribution (the idea that the character of the individual determines action) and instances of past behaviour (Mercer, 2010). Dispositional attribution reflects the believability and acknowledgement of the abilities of the leader; past behaviour reflects the predicted capability of the public leader in the future.

This perspective of political standing is especially important as it also looks to the future political standing of a public leader should a second crisis occur. If the leader’s reputation is tarnished through the first crisis, it will have a direct impact on his or her political standing for the second crisis, extracting harsher judgment from the public. The worst-case scenario on a scale of political stance is resignation or termination of the office; the best-case scenario is promotion of office or increased political clout. Political standing comes from the ability of the leader to act accordingly when an incident occurs, and because they represent the people, the leader derives his or her political standing directly from reputation (Lupia and McCubbins, 1998).

With this in mind, this paper will define the political standing of a leader as the official position or title in the government of the incumbent after the acute stages of a crisis. As a result, a change in position or approval of capacity will define the changes in political standing.

1.3. Relevance

1.3.1. Academic Relevance

Despite the numerous research conducted on crisis communication and reputation, there are limited studies that have explained the effects of crisis communication strategies on the political standing of a public leader through a mechanism. Crises are often political battlegrounds, especially when they expose problems in the existing structure or policy (t’Hart and Tindall, 2009). However, studies regarding crises that originate from a private sector incident are nil. The spillover research is unavailable, and this

research aims to close the gap in literature regarding what mechanism of communication and political standing exist and work during times of crises - which occur from a private sector - for a public leader.

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The results of this research may also provide additional insights into existing literature on how

communication strategies affect the political standing of a leader, as well as dive deeper into the public-private connection.

1.3.2. Practical Relevance

The role of crisis communication is often overshadowed by logistical actions in crisis management. Crisis communication is seen as a supporting role in the overall management of a crisis, enhancing or accelerating the logistical and psychological attempts to return to normalcy (Seeger, 2002). However, because crisis communication has a direct effect on the political standing of a public leader – even in the face of successful logistical response - it is critical for public leaders to understand the role it plays in political management. The results of this research can be important for nations where the public debate can affect the public office, which is particularly apparent in democratic nations. As the risk society becomes more prone to crisis – whether it is due to climate change of the increased interconnectedness of information sharing – public leaders will face greater pressures and frequencies of crisis

communication. It is the hope of this research that any new insights can be used for practitioners in the field to improve their crisis communication strategies, particularly those in the public leadership role who often represent the face of the government.

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2: Theoretical Framework

2.1. State of the Art

Crisis communication literature rests on five key issues or topics, all of which are discussed below. Crisis communication in both the public and private sectors have its origins in the Thomas Theorem and have been developed through the Theory of Attribution. The public sector focuses its crisis

communication on management of the physical crisis, while the private sector studies have focused on protecting business value. However, despite this body of knowledge available, the precise relationship between public sector communication regarding the handling of private sector crises is currently unavailable in literature.

Origins

Crisis Communication in general rests on the Thomas Theorem: “if men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences” (Merton, 1995:380). That is, the perceived responsibility for a crisis drives the reputational damage for that responsible actor, whether or not the actor is actually responsible or not. Currently, the body of knowledge regarding crisis communication has largely been driven by incidents and public relations functions in the private sector, making available a large about of literature that is based on reputation management in the corporate sector, or for individuals (which can be also applied to public figures during times of scandal). Many scholars have looked at the communication strategy of crises that have their beginnings and end in the same industry or sector. For example, numerous studies have analysed the crisis communication strategy and reputational damage of British Petroleum (a private company) regarding the Deepwater Horizon Oil spill, which also began as a private sector incident (De Wolf and Mejri, 2013; Harlow et. al, 2011; Villines, 2011).

Public Sector

In the public sector, existing crises literature focuses on management of the physical crisis rather than management of reputation communication strategies. The goal of public sector crisis management is to contain actual harm to communities; reputation management is in theory, secondary. This means that if crisis communication doesn’t address this goal of containing fear and uncertainty in the community, it fails. As a consequence, any existing crisis communication literature is limited, and revolves largely

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around the public’s emotional response and the need to restore the sense of safety. In line with this reasoning, past studies have concluded that communication should involve advice that instruct and help citizens to adjust (Coombs and Holladay, 2008). Jin et. al (2007) provide a framework for crisis

communication strategies based on the level of engagement and main emotional needs required by the public during various types of crises. Casewise, there are a great number of studies on natural disasters analysing the crisis management actions taken by the government to physically contain the disaster, such as Hurricane Katrina and the Japanese Earthquake of 2011 (Farazmand, 2007; Norio et. al, 2011;

Özerdem and Jacoby, 2006; Quarantelli, 1986). There are also studies on reputation management of public figures after a political scandal, as well as general communication best practices (Seeger, 2006; Coombs, 2007). However, there are only limited studies on the procedural effects of communication strategies (or failures) on the public leader.

Psychology and Attribution theory

A major theory that provides the basis for many subsequent frameworks for crisis communication in general is Attribution theory. Attribution theory is a social psychological theory which states that people make sense of events by trying to explain the cause of the event (Jaspars et. al, 1983). There are three main dimensions to attribution, but the locus (internal vs. external factors of causation) becomes the key concept for crisis responsibility and drives the communication strategy. William Benoit leads the

discourse on such reputation management through crisis communication with his Theory of Image Restoration, which states five main strategies that a company can take in the incident of a crisis: denial, evasion of responsibility, reducing offensiveness of the event, corrective action, and mortification (Benoit, 1997). Denial and evasion of responsibility strategies are taken to reject or minimise the responsibility of the company; reducing offensiveness and corrective action attempt to reduce the

offensiveness of the crisis. Lastly, mortification is used to try and restore the company’s image by asking for forgiveness. Benoit however states that the company may not necessarily need to attempt such

strategies; it must calculate whether it is more important to restore its image or avoid litigation (Benoit, 1997). While this theory is intended to be applied to corporate image crises, the article rests on the context that reputation ultimately drives standing – an idea that could be applied to public leaders and their political stance.

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Crisis communication often depends on the situation at the time, including who is directly responsible for the occurrence of the crisis. In the private sector, communication strategies are usually employed around protecting business value via reputation. Timothy Coombs uses the Situational Crisis

Communication Theory to examine eight best strategy guidelines an actor should utilize during a crisis in order to protect their reputation (Coombs, 2007). The idea is that an organisation’s crisis

communication response depends on the level of reputational threat that is posed towards the

organisation. Coombs’s guidelines are heavily dependent on the assumption that the actor knows exactly what is happening in the situation, and thus is applicable to circumstances where a crisis has occurred in the realm of organizational control or action. It is limited, however, in areas where an organisation is hit with an unexpected situation, not responsible for the crisis itself, and there is lack of information present at the time.

Media

In both sectors, the media plays a large role in crisis communication strategies. Kim and Cameron (2011) found that the emotions generated by news frames largely dictated how the recipient of the news viewed the crisis and assigned blame. Hence, it is important for public leaders to find a way to align their

communication framing with what the public perceives; and as the media is the main outlet for

information, it becomes critical to find methods to influence their framing. A study by Ljungman (2015) looked at crisis framing strategies employed by government officials during the Ferguson Riots in the United States, and concluded that public leaders can influence the media’s definition of a crisis through specific communication strategies, increasing or decreasing the credibility of the public leader in the process. However, the role of media is studied only in contexts of crises that occur in the same sector as the figure conducting crisis communication.

Relationship between the Public/ Private sectors

Overall, private sector literature focuses on reputation risk and the management of reputation once a crisis has occurred, with the understanding that the firm or corporation is responsible at least in part for the crisis at hand. Public sector literature on the other hand, focuses on minimising physical impact on communities, with the understanding that public administration requires physical containment first, and communication second. Additionally, any communication taken should eliminate fear and uncertainty in the community whether or not the sector is responsible for the crisis at hand.

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However, we do not yet know the linkage between the two. Very few scholars have looked at the relationship between crisis communication efforts (rather than physical management) and the direct reputational impact on public figures, during crises that did not have its direct triggers in the public sector. This research will try to analyse the relationship between the two, specifically how a private sector crisis can have an impact on public political standing through crisis communication.

According to previous research, “the abilities of leaders are second only to the cause of the event itself in determining the outcome of a disaster” (Casto, 2014:vii). Despite this finding, the relatively rare

instances of crises have made it difficult to give an in-depth generalization of this claim. This research also aims to provide additional case analysis to contribute to the state of the art from a crisis

communication perspective. As crises increase in our risk society – whether it is perceived or real – public leaders will be able to the scope of their actions reflected in the perceived outcome, and use these case studies to gain their own insights in the world of crisis management.

2.2. Main models/theoretical framework to be used

This research is about examining effect of crisis communication strategies used by public leaders during a private sector crisis, which then affects the political standing of that public leader. In order to examine such an effect, two existing models – crisis framing by Boin et. al (2009) and seven crisis

communication strategies by Coombs (1998) - were employed and combined together into a third model.

The two models were chosen because they present concrete strategies of crisis communication in both the public and the private sector that actors will engage in to protect or enhance their stance. Both consider the engagement of crisis communication with regards to protecting value: for Boin et. al, this value is the public leader him/herself; for Coombs, this value is the organisation that the speaker represents. Then, I will merge these two models into a third model - combining strategies from both sectors – and apply this new model to see how crisis communication by public leaders affects their political standing after a private sector crisis.

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2. Coombs (1998) analytic framework for crisis communication strategies – private sector 3. Integrated Crisis Communication-Political Standing model

2.2.1. Boin et. al (2009) – Crisis Framing

Boin et. al’s crisis framing framework shows how politicians engage in different meaning-making strategies to defend their political capital and/or their policy agendas at times of crises. Crisis here refers to a situation where it is possible to have a “‘dislocation’ of hitherto dominant social, political or

administrative discourses” (Boin et. al, 2009:82). The authors propose that when such a crisis occurs, the outcome and aftermath of any particular crisis in the public sector can be explained through ‘framing contests.’ Here different actors in the political sphere will engage in one of three ‘frames’ of

communication strategies to gain political tract and generate implications for future capital, including the incumbent politician. This model was chosen for this research because it provides concrete

communication frames that a leader will employ during a crisis focused on the public sector. It addresses all the communication possibilities that a public leader will take during a crisis, including specific

political stances and policy routes:

The three crisis frames allow government actors try and escape blame for the crisis, defend their political stance, and/or try to advance their stance crisis communication and its exploitation. The first crisis frame

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is denial – essentially, the office-holder attempts to convince the public that there is no crisis, but rather an ‘unfortunate incident.’ As such, there is no blame assigned to any actor, and political repercussions and change in policy is avoided.

The second crisis frame is the threat frame; that a crisis is, in fact, occurring, and that it poses a threat to the public and the status quo. The existence of a crisis is acknowledged, but blame will be assigned carefully so that the status quo can be defended.

The third and last frame is the opportunity frame. This frame acknowledges the existence of a crisis, and views it as a chance to change the status quo or existing policies – in essence, maximizing the crisis. As such, blame is assigned heartily towards an actor or policy and attempts are made to mobilize the public against the status quo.

In the political game, both the incumbent and the critics of the incumbent play into crisis framing, and each must take into account the other’s perceived actions and the trade-off. For example, incumbents have two choices: accept or deny responsibility. Critics can absolve or focus blame. Depending on which actions each take, the outcome will be different for the ruling elite; for example, accepting or denying by the incumbent with the absolution of blame on the part of critics will likely lead to elite escape. On the other hand, accepting responsibility in cases where critics focus blame will likely lead to damage to the incumbent. When the incumbent denies responsibility and critics focus blame, there occurs a “blame showdown” where all outcomes are possible, depending on the strength of each actor (Boin et. al, 2009:89).

2.2.2. Coombs (1998) – Seven Crisis Communication Strategies

Coombs (1998) provides a framework of crisis responses from a private sector point of view, stating that one of the goals in crisis management for an organisation is to protect or repair its image. In this

capacity, crisis communication strategies are “symbolic resources crisis managers employ in hope of protecting or repairing the organisational image” (Coombs, 1998:178). Crisis situations and crisis communication strategies are inevitably linked by crisis responsibility, and as such strategies employed by the organisation seek to protect or establish its public legitimacy. Stakeholder perception is the central concern during a crisis, and crisis communication employed by the organisation seeks to

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influence this perception.

Coombs provides a guide of seven basic strategies than an actor will take for responsive crisis

communication, in order to decrease the negative effects of a crisis. The choice of strategy will depend on the crisis itself; thus it becomes critical that the actor correctly identifies the crisis he or she is

experiencing, and choose the appropriate response. This model was chosen as it is the assumption of this thesis that certain communication responses to a crisis will lead to a decrease in credibility, and thus have a negative effect on the reputation and/or political standing of a public leader. The model provides specific strategies of communication for the private sector, but is also applicable for an analysis of public leader communication in this sense. The strategies presented in this model can also be merged together with the previous model by Boin et. al for a more coherent and detailed basis for data analysis (Ljungman, 2015).

Crisis Communication Strategies Defined by Coombs (1998)

1. Attack the accuser Crisis manager confronts the person or group who claims that a crisis exists. This may include a threat to

use “force” (e.g., a lawsuit) against the accuser. 2. Denial Crisis manager states that no crisis exists. This may

include explaining why there is no crisis. 3. Excuse Crisis manager tries to minimize the organization’s

responsibility for the crisis. This can include denying any intention to do harm, claiming the organization had

no control of the events that led to the crisis, or both. 4. Justification Crisis manager tries to minimize the perceived damage

associated with the crisis. This can include stating there was no serious damage or injuries or claiming that the

victims deserved what they received. 5. Ingratiation Actions are designed to make stakeholders like the

organization.

6. Corrective action Crisis managers seek to repair the damage from the crisis, take steps to prevent a repeat of the crisis, or

both.

7. Full apology Crisis manager publicly states that the organization takes full responsibility for the crisis and asks forgiveness for the crisis. Some compensation (e.g.,

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money or aid) may be included with the apology. 8. Blame Crisis manager publicly places responsibility of crisis

to an external actor or organization and pursues request for action on their part.

Ljungman (2015), in her study of the role of media in crisis framing, added another aspect of crisis communication strategy – blame. This is because the above model by Coombs assumes that the crisis manager’s organisation has a direct role in the management of a crisis aftermath. This is applicable to a private sector crisis, where the organisation must have a crisis management operation and

communication strategy for its own survival regardless of the cause of the crisis. Here, blame is not so important in terms of an efficient, defensive posture as is getting ‘back to business’ and stabilizing market value as quickly as possible. In the public sphere, while the political reputation of a politician is often dependent on their crisis management skills, it is possible to have a reputational outcome that is removed from logistical actions via the political game. Placing blame can be successful or can backfire, and as it is a factor that contributes directly to the reputation of the politician, it is applicable to have a blame rhetoric included in the above model. This will widen the horizons of crisis communication strategies in reputation management.

2.2.3. Additional modelling extension – the Integrated Crisis Communication-Political Standing Model

With the two frameworks by Boin et. al (2009) and Coombs (1998), along with the combined model by Ljungman (2015), the communication strategies taken by a public leader can be divided into three frames regarding attribution of responsibility: No Crisis, Crisis as Threat, and Crisis as Opportunity. Each have a different set of communicative strategies that attempt to achieve the goals of the crisis framing it falls under. No crisis is a meaning-making frame where no blame for the crisis is attributed to any actors (including the incumbent), and the incumbent either denies that there is a crisis occurring, excuses his office of wrongdoing, or attacks any accusers on his/her office as making false accusations. Crisis as Threat refers a frame where the incumbent feels a threat to his/her holding of office.

Communication strategies will acknowledge the existence of a crisis and attribute the responsibility to the incumbent office, in the hopes of pre-emptively controlling the negative amount of public perception towards the incumbent. These can include a range of tactics, from justifications of why the crisis is not as large as it is perceived to be, to diverting attention from the crisis, some actions to correct any

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mistakes occurred, to a full apology where the incumbent takes all responsibility for the crisis. The last frame, Crisis as Opportunity, refers to a frame where the incumbent sees an opportunity to advance his political agenda and to attack any groups that threaten his or her ability to hold the office. Strategies of blame are used to place responsibility on an external actor.

These three frames and their corresponding strategies can lead to a variety of outcomes for the political incumbent, with the understanding that political credibility during a crisis affects the standing of the incumbent after the acute stages of a crisis. This paper aims to provide an innovation to the earlier models to reflect the consequences of crisis communication on the public leader’s end political outcome regarding a private sector crisis. The following model adds the political outcomes that are possible for a public leader after the conduction of crisis communication:

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If a politician or public leader is not credible, they do not represent the people and do not fulfil the functions of the public office. This is poignant even during private sector crises that threaten to affect the community that the public leader’s office is responsible for. The communication leads to three outcomes of political standing: the most positive scenario of the public leader keeping office with increased

reputation or a promotion of office; a middle ground where the leader stays in office but suffers a decrease in political standing, and; the worst-case scenario where he or she is removed from the office, is forced to resign, or a submitted resignation is accepted by the governing body of the office. These outcomes can be measured by the status of the public leader, and political approval ratings can be an indicator to reflect the degree to which a certain outcome came about. As this study will only at the outcome after the acute stages of a crisis, these approval ratings can also serve as indicators for future direction, should research concerning stages after the acute period are made.

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3: Methodology

3.1. Research Design and Case Selection

3.1.1. Overall Strategy

This research is exploratory, and a qualitative research with a comparative case analysis will be used to fully understand the depth of the context and situation in which the crisis communication took place. A qualitative methodology is able to produce analysis at a deeper level for a more dynamic understanding of a phenomenon than through a quantitative methodological research model. This is because the perception of whether a crisis management has been good or bad through communication strategies are subjective, and primarily engages analysis at the ‘human’ level. Some quantitative data of approval ratings employed in the data analysis section is employed to enhance the coherence of the conclusion. This in-depth analysis will allow the examination of who is responsible, what types of communication strategies are employed and how that directly translates to the reputation of a specific public leader.

A case study approach that studies the data in context will be employed, looking at two crises and comparing the communication strategies and the end consequences for a public leader. The case study method was chosen because it “allows investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events,” a crucial element of this research in allowing application of findings for practical usage (Yin, 2009:4). Case studies are frequently used in social science disciplines – including public administration – and allow an exploration of how and why phenomena occurred without requiring control of behavioural events (Yin, 2009). The research question of this paper requires an analysis of communication and links over a period of time without the ability to control the events, and a case study is the most appropriate method for this study. The two crises chosen are the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, which occurred in the United States in 2010, and the sinking of a privately operated Sewol Ferry in South Korea in 2014. The public leaders chosen in the cases are President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Chung Hong-won respectively.

3.1.2. Case Study Design

The case in this study is defined as the conducting of crisis communication by a public leader after the occurrence of a private sector disaster. This research is a study of how the crisis communication by a

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public leader in the two cases chosen – South Korea and the United States during the Sewol disaster and the Deepwater Horizon oil spill respectively – affected his or her political standing. In order to answer this question, this research will use a most similar case analysis, based on the independent variable. The most similar method “employs a minimum of two cases...and is similar in all respects except the

independent variables of interest” (Seawright and Gerring, 2008:304). For the study, the variable of interest is the crisis communication strategies that each leader engaged in.

The two cases were selected regarding the following criteria:

• Cases from similar political contexts; highly functioning democratic societies, with a stable government accepted by its citizens. Citizens of case countries will have a high degree of freedom of speech towards the government.

• Cases of man-made, maritime disasters originating in the private sector.

• Cases occurring in developed nations that have a standard, functioning crisis management agency within the government.

• Cases with high media exposure – widely televised – during the acute stages of the incident. Incident will remain in the national psyche long after the incident. Crisis will be widely

referenced in the political rhetoric (climate change for Deepwater Horizon, and safety regulations for Sewol), and this large social impact means that a large body of information will be accessible for research, making the study feasible.

• Cases with a top-level public leader, in charge of operational conduct, conducting crisis communication on behalf of the government. The public leader must hold the responsibility of office for the emergency management agency or coordination at the federal or national level.

Political standing is highly affected by the context of political structure, and so it is paramount that the above controls are held constant across all cases. The countries of both cases (South Korea and the United States), while geographically far apart, both have highly functioning democratic societies as a political context where citizens and societal pressure can (and do) affect the political standing of a public leader. South Korea’s democracy was also created with a large influence by the United States, and thus the values in both countries are similar in its core. These controls provide a valid study from a research design point of view, allowing the assumption that a difference in crisis communication strategies is the influential factor for the outcome in political standing. Gerring (2006) states that, “exact matching [of

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cases] is often impossible” (p135). Thus this study uses approximate matching, where cases are considered “close enough” in the relevant factors applicable to the study.

While the two incidents are not the same (one was an oil spill and the other a ship sinking), both cases were maritime incidents that started out as a purely private incident without direct connections with the government official that conducted the crisis communication in its aftermath. The criteria chosen also further narrows the selection of cases to a very specific situation. This allows any findings of this thesis to be considered to have greater validity than if the criteria had applied to a more expansive selection of cases. This paper does recognise that while the internal validity is high due to an intensive study of the cases, the external validity is low due to its small-N study. However, it is the hope that engaging in a deep analysis of these cases – similar in its core - will reveal the factors that differ across these cases, and thus the connection between communication and political standing for further studies in the future.

3.2. Operationalisation of concepts

Frame/ Outcome Concept Definition - adapted from Coombs (1998)

Indicators Data Source

Attacking the

accuser Public leader confronts the person or group who claims that a crisis exists. • Words of anger against accuser • Threat to use force (e.g. lawsuit) against accuser • Official written statements • Oral statements • News reports with

direct quotes o Case1: Yonhap News, Chosun Ilbo o Case2: CNN, Washington Post No Crisis

Denial of a crisis Public leader states that no crisis exists, and no blame is placed on any actor. This may include explaining why there is no crisis. Outrage may also be present. • Words such as “there is no crisis,” “this incident” • No words of blame on any actor – “nobody’s fault,” “unfortunate accident” • Official written statements • Oral statements • News reports with

direct quotes o Case1: Yonhap News, Chosun Ilbo o Case2: CNN, Washington Post

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Excuse Public leader tries to minimize the government’s connection to the crisis. This can include denying any intention, claiming there was no control of the events that led to the crisis, or both.

• Words such as “we had no way of knowing” • “This crisis could

not have been prevented”

• Official written statements • Oral statements • News reports with

Justification Public leader tries to minimize the perceived damage associated with the crisis. This can include stating there was no serious damage or injuries or claiming that the victims deserved what they received.

• “Impact is minimal”

• Words relating to quick and full recovery • “The victims

knew the risks”

Ingratiation Public leader takes actions to increase approval and likeability of himself/herself that may or may not be related to the crisis.

• Words that highlight achievements during the crisis • Words that highlight actions of “going above and beyond” • Words that highlight achievements unrelated to the crisis • Official written statements • Oral statements • News reports with

direct quotes o Case1: Yonhap News, Chosun Ilbo o Case2: CNN, Washington Post Crisis as Threat

Corrective Action Public leader seeks to repair the damage from the crisis, take steps to prevent a repeat of the crisis, or both. Public leader by also seek to push his or her agenda. This may include policy change or an

• Stating flaws in the current policy or system • Words of the

need for change – “this system must be improved”

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policy change. Full apology Public leader

publicly states that the office or government takes full responsibility for the crisis and asks forgiveness for the crisis. Some compensation (e.g., money or aid) may be included with the apology.

• Words of taking full responsibility – “it is our fault”; “we assume full responsibility” • Words of apology

– “we are deeply sorry” • Words stating provision of compensation • Official written statements • Oral statements • News reports with

direct quotes o Case1: Yonhap News, Chosun Ilbo o Case2: CNN, Washington Post Crisis as Opportunity

Blame Public leader

publicly places responsibility of crisis to an external actor or

organization and pursues request for action on their part.

• Statements of blame on external actor – “it is the fault of [actor x]” • Statements of the need for change in external actor – “[actor x] must do [action y]” • Official written statements • Oral statements • News reports with

direct quotes o Case1: CNN, Washington Post o Case2: CNN, Washington Post Positive Outcome Incumbent stays in office with increased or continued level of political reputation, or is promoted to a higher office Public leader remains in the office or is promoted, and public opinion reflects approval of public leader through polls or approval ratings. • Public leader stays in the office • Public leader is promoted to a higher office • Approval ratings rise • Polls show positive view on public leader’s capability of crisis

• Polls regarding crisis • Approval ratings of

public leader before and after the crisis

Middle Outcome Incumbent stays in office, with decreased political reputation Public leader remains in the office, and public opinion reflects disapproval of public leader through polls or approval ratings. • Public leader stays in the office • Approval ratings decline • Polls show negative or neutral view on public leader’s capability of crisis

• Polls regarding crisis • Approval ratings of

public leader before and after the crisis

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Outcome removed from office by impeachment or resignation longer in office; speeches of resignation or reports of impeachment announced. resigns or is removed from office leader’s office • News media

3.3. Data Collection and Analysis

Data will be collected from responses of leaders through official written statements, oral statements, and direct quotes gathered through news reporting, including press releases. For the case of the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, statements from the President, Barack Obama, will be used; these include press statements and official statements from the Presidential website, as well as news outlets CNN and the Washington Post. To gather more data where official statements may not be available on record, news articles will be used to get direct quotes. For the Sewol case, the same official statements by Prime Minister Chung Hong-won will be gathered (available in Korean) and translated into English for this study. An issue here may be that the Korean translations that the author provides could run the risk of decreasing the quality of the research with bias. In order to eliminate this bias, direct quotes from selected news agencies – Yonhap News and The Chosun Ilbo (English: The Chosun Times) - that provide articles in both English and Korean will also be used. This triangulation of data sources will provide a more robust analysis of data, leading to greater accuracy and validity of this study.

CNN was chosen as a news agency that often takes into account political agendas when reporting. It also has an international focus, which will provide a broader understanding of issues in the United States. The Washington Post was chosen not only as a major newspaper across the United States, but also as a news source whose reporting closely centres around the political sphere in Washington, DC. Both sources of crisis communication data will provide a broad and mostly accurate context of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Similarly, Yonhap News was chosen as the largest news agency in South Korea with broad coverage of events occurring in and out of the country. Chosun Ilbo was chosen as another major newspaper, with one of the largest website visits daily. Both sources will again, provide a broad and mostly accurate context of the Sewol ferry incident.

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The keywords used to search for news reports regarding the Sewol crisis were ‘정홍원’ [Chung Hong-won], ‘국무총리’ [Prime Minister], ‘진도 여객선’ [Jindo Passenger Ship], ‘세월호’ [Sewol Ferry], ‘Chung’, ‘Prime Minister’, and ‘Sewol Ferry’. The keywords used to search for news reports regarding the Deepwater Horizon oil spill were ‘Obama’, ‘Deepwater Horizon’, and ‘BP Oil Spill’.

The acute phase of the crisis will determine the time period of data collection and analysis for this study; that is, the time period from the incident itself to the when crucial crisis management decisions are made. An acute phase of the crisis is often the initial and only moment to frame a crisis, especially from a political standpoint, and will be the most appropriate phase for data collection and analysis of this study. Thus the time period of news reports will be 12 days for Sewol ferry disaster, from the sinking of the vessel to the resignation of the Prime Minister (16 April 2014 – 27 April 2014). For the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the time period will be 87 days for Deepwater Horizon, from the first day of the oil rig explosion to date when the majority of the leak was ‘capped,’ ending the immediate spillage of oil into the ocean (20 April 2010 – 15 July, 2010). Although the two datasets present a large difference in timescale, it is the belief of the author that the differences in time will not affect the identification and analysis of major crisis communication strategies that each public leader took.

Thus the data collected will be from the following criteria: a) For the Deepwater Horizon oil spill:

• Direct crisis communication conducted by President Obama and his office; and/or

• Direct quotes of President Obama and his office reflected in the news agencies CNN and The Washington Post;

• During the 87 day period of oil rig leakage;

• Relating directly to the oil spillage in the Deepwater Horizon oilrig. b) For the Sewol Ferry disaster:

• Direct crisis communication conducted by Prime Minister Chung Hong-won and his office; and/or

• Direct quotes of Prime Minister Chung Hong-won and his office reflected in the news agencies Yonhap News and the Chosun Ilbo in Korean or English;

• During the 12 day period immediately following the sinking of the ferry; • Relating directly to the sinking of the Sewol Ferry and its aftermath.

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Then, the data will be mapped along the Integrated Crisis Communication Model, which provides a multi-level understanding of crisis communication strategy undertaken by each public leader built upon existing frameworks discussed in Chapter 2. The information will be coded along the indicators from the operationalisation table, and interpreted using the integrated model, linking the framing and strategy of the public leader’s crisis communication to the results of their political standing. Coding is commonly applied in qualitative research to analyse text data, allowing the researcher to come to a clear conclusion based on the designed scheme (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005). The results section will see how closely the crisis communication strategies aligned with the chosen models and a comparison will be made with how the public viewed the public leader, available through polls and approval ratings.

The coding scheme was created by placing each strategic element of the integrated model from ‘denial’ to ‘blame’ into a table. Definitions from Coombs’ crisis communication strategies (1998) were placed after some alterations to fit in a public sector context. Then, indicators to deduce how to identify such a strategy from crisis communication text – essentially, the language that could reflect such a strategy – were created. This coding scheme will then be applied to the existing data. First, specific language will be analysed, using words from the communication that have direct connotations to a certain strategy, matching the indicators to the operationalisation table, and cannot be interpreted in any other way in context. For example the word “I’m sorry” is clearly an apology, and cannot be considered to match with any of the remaining seven strategies. Words or phrases that fall under two or more categories on their own will be skipped. Most communication conducted by a public leader is the product of an effort to send a certain message, and as such, there will be clear indicators that will allow us to pinpoint towards a certain strategy. If another strategy is seen, then it will be determined which strategy is the major point of the article, and the minor strategy will be coded as a secondary strategy (Appendix).

This paper acknowledges that there may be more than a single message seen in each piece of crisis communication, as the public leader may have multiple agendas that they wish to discuss, or because the public leader simply does not know his or her own agenda. With this in mind, the coding will be done at two levels - primary coding and secondary coding – to see what other strategies were seen. This will provide a better context and nuance for the analysis stage. Primary coding will consist of the main

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message, seen by repeated indicators. Secondary coding will be applied to indicators that are present but lack emphasis or strength to designate it a main strategy.

Poll and approval ratings will be taken directly from the source – and polls that show approval ratings of the leaders as well as additional polls regarding the handling of the crisis itself will be used when

available. The approval ratings directly correlate with how the public views the leader’s reputation; and as discussed above, because the leader derives his or her political standing directly from reputation, approval ratings will allow us to measure the degree to which the leader’s political standing was eroded or enhanced. In order to measure the impact that the crisis communication had on the public leader’s standing, these measurements will also be made before the crisis occurred. Polls relating to the crises provide a more direct reputational feedback; because other issues that are separate from the crisis may affect approval ratings of a public leader, these polls can decrease some of the bias that may be present by its focus. Thus, this paper will look at the approval ratings of the public leaders in question (Obama and Chung) both before and after the respective crises. Public polls regarding the crisis in its aftermath will also be employed when available, and these will provide the scale of change political standing for these two leaders.

The technique for data analysis will be deductive coding of each instance of crisis communication conducted by the offices of Obama and Chung. Indicators from the theoretical model will be used to code each piece of information. The codes will be mapped out along the metrics indicated in the operationalisation table, and secondary codes of strategy will also be mapped out in order to provide a more intensive analysis. These will then be put together at the end to see which strategy each public leader engaged in most frequently. Then, polls and approval ratings will be used (if required and

available) along with the visible end political standing of each leader to determine the degree of outcome present in the incumbent’s final standing. Patterns in communication will be matched, and a comparison will be made between the major crisis communication strategies to the political standing to determine the link between the two.

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3.4. Limitations/Quality of the Research

The two major limitations affecting the quality of this research is the availability of primary data (particularly for the Sewol crisis) and the time constraint of this study. Because the aftermath of both crises are still present in current political debates, the author has chosen to limit the study to a 12-day period for Sewol and an 87-day period for the Deepwater Horizon oil spill; in other words, the acute stages of each crisis. The limited access to primary data means that research may not be as robust as it could be.

The difficulty in gaining access to primary data is present particularly in South Korea, where full transcriptions or videos of remarks and statements by a public leader are not readily available or even recorded. Only official statements given in front of the press at a conference are available, and other remarks are found through snippets of quotations in media coverage. This extends to approval ratings, which are limited to the Presidential office.

A usual problem for a case study research is that results are unable to be generalised as it is based on one or a few cases, rendering them specific to their situation and context – the very reason why the case study research is also an advantage for this study. However, this research study looks at how the crisis communication strategies of a government leader influence a political outcome or policy change, rather than the specific characteristics of the case context. Another critique of the case study approach in this method is that the case study may be conducted at an abstract level; however, this research has been design to minimize this issue through specific measurements, indicators, and data. The clear protocol for data collection was set to increase the validity for the analysis. This research does not predict that the findings of this study will present a pure causal mechanism, but it is the aim of the research to explore potential connections as a first study. This study can be reapplied and tested with a greater number of cases across all types of crises that affect the public sphere and its leader in a similar political context.

A final limitation regarding the quality of research may be that the Korean-English translation skills of the author may not be at a level of academic expertise. However, it is the opinion of the author that any

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minor mistakes in direct translation will not affect the detection of the implied communication strategy, and thus will not have an impact on the quality of the analysis of this paper.

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4: Case Analysis 1 - The Sewol Case

4.1. The Sewol Ferry Disaster

On April 16, 2014 at 1030am, a ferry – the MV Sewol - that carried 476 people, mostly high school students on a school trip from Danwon High School, sank off of the coast of South Korea en route from Incheon to Jeju Island. The incident led to 295 deaths and nine (9) missing out of 476 on board, along with widespread political and social reactions both in Korea and abroad (Yonhap News, n.d.). The ferry was operated by a private company – Cheonghaejin Marine – and investigations led to the conclusion that: a) the vessel was past its lifetime and should not have been in operation, and; b) the modifications constructed on the vessel by the company to accommodate more passengers was illegal and severely affected the stability and safety of the boat. However, the MV Sewol had previously passed an inspection by the South Korean Coast Guard.

The sinking of MV Sewol was complicated in the immediate aftermath by a series of communication mishaps regarding false information from all channels. Major newspapers and media outlets such as the Joongang Ilbo initially reported that all students were safe, then revised their reports to include those who were found to be deceased. The government also revised the numbers of those aboard several times in press releases (Yonhap News, 2014a). Crisis management coordination was slow in its initial stages, as emergency agencies could not mobilise rescue efforts quickly enough, losing precious time.

The Sewol incident led to a prosecution of members of Cheonghaejin Marine, along with other members related to ensuring the safety of the vessel’s passage. Captain Lee Jun-Seok was initially found guilty of negligence, then for murder, which resulted in life imprisonment. Fourteen other crewmembers were also found guilty on lesser chargers and also imprisoned (Evans, 2015).

The government also faced tremendous backlash in its regulation of the safety laws and industry governance. The responsibility of the regulation of shipping in Korea lies with the Korean Shipping Association, an industry trade group, and criticisms also occurred regarding the conflict of interesting safety and business. The Sewol disaster is widely regarded as one of the worst maritime disasters in South Korean history, both in the number and young ages of the people dead, but also in the social and

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political reactions that followed. The vice principal of Danwon High School - who was among those rescued - committed suicide after taking responsibility for the organisation of the school trip (Park and Kim, 2014). Yellow ribbons, initially used to commemorate those who had died, has now become a symbol of national mourning and is dotted around various large monuments in Seoul and elsewhere today.

4.2. Crisis Communication, Prime Minister Chung Hong-won

Prime Minister Chung Hong-Won conducted the bulk of crisis communication representing the Park administration during the crisis. In South Korea, the Prime Minister’s office – as a representative and executive assistant to the President - is responsible for the coordination and supervision of various ministries. As such, the office of the Prime Minister acts as the logistical executive for the Ministry of Security and Public Administration, of which the National Emergency Management Agency is a part. The Prime Minister’s office directly represents the President and the administration, and in this capacity serves as the top-level office responsible for emergency management ("Organization Chart", 2013).

On the afternoon of April 16, 2014, the same day of the sinking of the ship, the Prime Minister returned from his diplomatic trip abroad and immediately called for an emergency meeting, stating that “I feel an infinite responsibility” regarding the ongoing sinking of the ship and the missing on board (Chosun Ilbo, 2014a).

The next day on April 17th, Chung visited the families of the missing gathered in southern Korea

offering words of condolence and a personal commitment, such as “I know how you feel” and “I will do my best” to find the missing. However, when the families lashed out at him, pelting him with water bottles, his words turned to repeated apology as he backed out of the auditorium: “I’m sorry, I’m sorry” (Chosun Ilbo, 2014b).

These words of apology continued during his next two public appearances regarding the sinking of the ship, as he explained what was hampering the search and rescue missions: "Confusion as ministries concerned failed to share information…without coordination” (Oh, 2014a). He followed up with an apology for the confusing and scattered government communication that had occurred through various

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agencies, citing a mishap in the system and stating that actions have been taken to address the issue (Yonhap News, 2014b). The day after, on the 20th, he explicitly stated that he felt “like a criminal” and that all methods for search and rescue missions will be analysed and employed (Chosun Ilbo, 2014c).

On the following day, Chung took a break from communicating his sense of responsibility as Prime Minister to praise the rescue efforts of volunteers in the crisis. This ingratiation method complemented his announcement to deem the area of the ship’s sinking to a ‘special disaster area’ to compensate the efforts of the volunteers of the search and rescue, and he asked that the volunteers “please continue to help us” as a vital asset to the operations (Chosun Ilbo, 2014d). He then acknowledged the system failure of the safety plan the day after, and vowed to restructure the existing model for better safety in the future. However, an element of conflicting apology and blame was apparent in his speech, rendering a mixed message: “a stern punishment of those responsible…I feel sorry for the confusion in the

government’s initial responses and the failure” (Oh, 2014b).

Finally, on the 27th_{of April, he gave a final speech of resignation in his address to the nation, taking full}

personal responsibility for the Sewol disaster: “I apologise to the nation…my head is bowed…I believe I should take full responsibility for the tragedy…I have seen too many flaws in this system” (Prime

Minister’s Secretariat, 2014). This full apology appropriated all government responsibility and logistical operational failure personally to Chung, as he tried to spare the President of blame.

Figure 1: Crisis Communication Strategies of Prime Minister Chung Hong-won during the Sewol disaster, 16 Apr-27 Apr 2014

Date Article Name

Other Articles Citing Quote

Language Primary _Coding Secondary _Coding

16-Apr

[진도 여객선 침몰] 정홍원 "1분1초도 주저하지 말라" [Jindo Passenger Ship Sinking- Chung Hong-won: "Do not be idle for a single second or minute"]

“I feel an infinite responsibility.” Full Apology

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17-Apr 정홍원 국무총리, 세월호 피해가족에게 거센 항의…물병에 깡통 세례까지 [PM Chung Hong-won faced with aggressive protests from family of Sewol victims: water bottles and cans thrown]

“I know how you feel” / “I will do my best” / “I'm sorry.”

Full Apology 19-Apr (5th LD) Rescue efforts continue as death toll rises from sunken ferry

“Confusion as ministries concerned failed to share information…without coordination.” Full Apology 19-Apr <여객선침몰> 정홍원 총리 "정부 발표 혼선 죄송" [Passenger Ship Sinking: PM Chung Hong-won 'apologise for confusing government announcement']

"I apologise for the confusion in announcements" / "From now on we have made sure that all

announcements will be made at the same time from the task force…with confirmed information." Full Apology Corrective Action 20-Apr [세월호 참사] 정홍원 국무총리 "죄인 된 심정" [Sewol ferry sinking: PM Chung Hong-won "I feel like a

criminal"]

“I feel like a criminal” / “I will analyse all method sand employ them for search and rescue.”

Full Apology 21-Apr [세월호 참사] 鄭총리, '자원봉사' 진도군민에 사의 표시

[Sewol ferry sinking: PM Chung expresses thanks to volunteers of Jindo]

To the volunteers: “Your effort is contributing enormously to the search and rescue effort” / “The government has designated the area as 'special disaster area' to

compensate for the efforts” / “Please continue to help us.”

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22-Apr

PM vows safety master plan to prevent deadly disaster

"Learning a lesson from the tragedy, the government will come up with an innovative safety master plan" / "A stern punishment of those

responsible" / "I feel sorry for the confusion in the government's initial responses and the failure..."

Corrective Action Full Apology; some elements of Blame 27-Apr 국무총리 기자회견문

[Prime Minister Press Conference] Yonhap News – English (27-Apr); Chosun Ilbo – Korean (27-Apr)

"I apologise to the nation" / "My head is bowed" / "I believe I should take full responsibility for the tragedy" / "I have seen too many flaws in this system."

Full Apology

Corrective Action

Given analysis of all of the above, we see that out of the eight (8) crisis communication conducted over a 12-day period, six (6) of those fell under Full Apology, and one (1) each under Ingratiation and

Corrective Action. Applying the findings to the model, we can conclude that the framing strategy that Chung engaged in was Crisis as Threat, as all coding falls under this frame.

According to Boin et. al (2009), the Crisis as Threat frame is used to defend the incumbent office holders of the status quo against criticism – in this case, the office of Chung and his policies. It is interesting to find that the government immediately took responsibility for the crisis instead, although the initial cause of the incident was due to the fault of Cheonghaejin Marine Company. Upon further inspection, we see that Chung did not differentiate public opinion from responsibility for the crisis itself, to responsibility for emergency response; his first public words were “I feel an infinite responsibility” without specifications on what he felt responsible for (Chosun Ilbo, 2014a). Thus the discourse quickly focused on the fault of the government, and specifically the Office of the Prime Minister, and his consistency in using the Full Apology strategy served to strengthen the discourse.

There was also no strong statement of attribution of fault to the private company during the initial framing. By the time Chung finally deemed an external actor as the responsible party on April 22 – “a stern punishment of those responsible” – it was already past the crucial time frame to attribute

Crisis Framing and Credibility: The influence of crisis communication efforts of public leaders on political standing after an unexpected private sector disaster