The Politics of Poverty Reduction in
Indonesia
Leiden University
Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences MSc Political Science
International Politics
Author: Susanna Olinda Kusrini Student number: 2068761
Supervisor: Dr. Jewellord Nem Singh Second Reader: Dr. Oda van Cranenburgh Word count: 9908
Abbreviations ii
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Research question and objectives . . . 2
2 Theoretical Framework 3 2.1 Alternative Explanations: Numbers, Social Forces and Ethnicity . . . 3
2.2 Historical Institutionalism as an Approach . . . 5
2.2.1 Party Institutionalization . . . 7
2.2.2 State-Party Dynamics . . . 8
3 Research Design 10 3.1 Data Collection and Operationalization . . . 11
4 Analysis 13 4.1 New Order . . . 13 4.2 Reformasi . . . 20 5 Conclusion 28 Bibliography 31 Appendices 41 A Interviews 41 A.1 Interview with Bitul . . . 41
Abbreviations
ABRI Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, Armed Forces of Indonesia. AUTP Asuransi Usaha Tani Padi, Agricultural Insurance for Rice Farmers.
BAKN Badan Administrasi Kepegawaian Negara, State Civil Service Administration
Agency.
BIMAS Bimbingan Massal, Mass Guidance.
BKN Badan Kepegawaian Negara, National Civil Service Agency. BLT Bantuan Langsung Tunai, Unconditional Cash Transfer Program. BPS Badan Pusat Statistik, Central Statistics Agency.
DPR Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, People’s Representative Council. G30S Gerakan 30 September, 30th of September Movement. GDP Gross domestic product.
Gerindra Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya, Great Indonesia Movement Party.
GMKI Gerakan Mahasiswa Kristen Indonesia, Indonesian Christian Student Movement. Golkar Partai Golongan Karya, Functional Group Party.
Hanura Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat, People’s Conscience Party. HMI Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, Islamic Student Association. ICW Indonesian Corruption Watch.
IMNAS Intensifikasi Massal Swa Sembada Bahan Makanan, Mass Agricultural
KAMMI Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia, Unity of Action for Indonesian
Muslim Students.
NasDem Partai NasDem, Nasdem Party. NU Nahdlatul Ulama.
OPK Operasi Pasar Khusus, Special Market Operations. PAN Partai Amanat Nasional, National Mandate Party. PD Partai Demokrat, Democratic Party.
PDI Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, Indonesian Democratic Party.
PDI-P Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle. PK Partai Keadilan, Justice Party.
PKB Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, National Awakening Party.
PKH Program Keluarga Harapan, Conditional cash transfer program. PKS Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Prosperous Justice Party.
PMII Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia, Indonesian Islamic Student Movement. PNPM Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat, National Program for Community
Empowerment.
PPP Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, United Development Party.
Raskin Subsidi Beras Bagi Masyarakat Berpendapatan Rendah, Rice Subsidies for Low
Income People.
Repelita I First Five-Year Development Plan, 1969/70 - 1973/74. Repelita II Second Five-Year Development Plan, 1974/75 - 1978/79. Repelita III Third Five-Year Development Plan, 1979/80 - 1983/84. Repelita IV Fourth Five-Year Development Plan, 1984/85 - 1988/89. Repelita V Fifth Five-Year Development Plan, 1989/90 - 1993/94. Repelita VI Sixth Five-Year Development Plan, 1994/95 - 1998/99.
Abstract
Indonesia’s poverty rate touched for the first time in its history a single-digit figure in 2018. However, studies on Indonesia’s poverty reduction strategies focused on its past development and have given little attention to the country’s contemporary progress. The study outlined here assesses the political dynamics which enabled Indonesia to pursue pro-poor policies. This is done by a comparison of the New Order era (1967-1998) and the democratic Reformasi era (since 1998). It does so by focusing on institutionalized parties, state-party dynamics and pragmatic pro-poor policies. Institutionalized parties are the organizational weapon of the poor to channel pragmatic pro-poor policies. In order for institutionalized parties to successfully execute their pro-poor agenda, the state bureaucracy provides the institutional capacity for the coordination and execution of pro-poor reforms. The study finds that institutions which represent public interests are a critical factor in Indonesia’s attempt to reduce poverty. However, further research is needed to convincingly generalize the observations.
In recent years poverty reduction gained momentum in scholarly and official circles. Since 2000, poverty became the centre of the development agenda of the most important devel-opment agencies, such as the World Bank and the United Nations (Kanbur et al. 2000; UN General Assembly 2000, 2015). However, South-East Asia stood out as the most success-ful case in poverty reduction until the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997. It was praised as part of the ”East Asian miracle” for its development by the World Bank (Birdsall et al. 1993). The World Bank report summarizes the Asian experience as growth through an emphasis on agriculture and public investments on rural development and welfare programmes. The aim of this study is to assess the political conditions which enabled Indonesia to pursue the reduction of poverty.
This study highlights the institutional dimensions of poverty. Thus, it moves from the limits of economic and sociological explanations and provides the assumption of poverty as the consequence of weak institutions. Indonesia as a case study was chosen due to its past success in poverty reduction. The New Order regime (1967 - 1998) has been celebrated for its impressive reduction of poverty from 60% in 1970 to 11,30% in 1996 (Birdsall et al. 1993; BPS, n.d.). The existing literature credits this success to the New Or-der regime’s Green Revolution and rural development. However, academia has given little attention to Indonesia’s contemporary progress on poverty reduction. In 2018 Indonesia touched for the first time in its history a single-digit figure in regard to its relative poverty rate (BPS, n.d.). Indonesia as a case study allows to assess the influence of political
con-1. Research question and objectives
ditions on the reduction of poverty over a period of over 40 years during different regime types.
1.1
Research question and objectives
The aim of this thesis is to assess under what political conditions poverty reduction was pur-sued in Indonesia. Thus, the research question is the following: What political conditions
enable states to pursue poverty reduction? In order to answer this question a historical institutionalist approach is used. The realization of reduction of poverty is not simply the reallocation of resources but depends on strong institutions which are centred around collective goals and interests (Kuhonta 2011). Thus, poverty is the consequence of weak institutions which do not pursue collective goals and interests. I argue that institutions can affect poverty reduction if political parties are institutionalized and state capacity is based on meritocratic principles. Institutionalized parties are the organizational weapons of the poor to articulate, channel and represent their interests. In order for institutionalized parties to successfully execute their pro-poor agenda, the state bureaucracy provides the institutional capacity for the coordination and execution of pro-poor reforms. Thus, the sub-question is: How do institutionalized parties influence the state bureaucracy?.
This thesis studies Indonesia’s political conditions in a time period of 40 years. Within this time period, two eras, namely the New Order and Reformasi era, are compared in regard to their political dynamics and their attempts to reduce poverty. Academia has given little attention to Indonesia’s contemporary progress on poverty reduction. Therefore, this study contributes to the existing literature on Indonesia by analysing its efforts in poverty reduction during its democratic period through an institutional lens.
This chapter first examines alternative approaches to poverty reduction and explains why historical institutionalism as an approach is chosen. Historical institutionalism differs from other forms of institutionalism by considering the temporal aspect of institutions. Lastly, this chapter further zooms into the central argument of this study: institutionalized parties, interventionist states, and pragmatic policies.
2.1
Alternative Explanations: Numbers, Social Forces
and Ethnicity
The dominant approaches to poverty reduction are focused on economic metrics, social structure or regime type.
Econometric approaches link economic measures and money metrics with poverty reduc-tion. The authors find that economic growth has beneficial effects on poverty reduction (Ravallion 2001; Dollar and Kraay 2002; Ravallion and Chen 2003; Perera and Lee 2013); or increased growth through trade openness leads to a decrease in poverty (Berg and Krueger 2003).
These approaches use indicators such as (per capita) GDP (Gross domestic product), income or consumption. While an increase in GDP does not have to adjust to the dis-tribution of goods and wealth, national social surveys and datasets which produce the
1. Alternative Explanations: Numbers, Social Forces and Ethnicity
aforementioned indicators are known to be plagued with problems concerning survey coverage and accuracy of response (Dixon and Macarov 1998, 18; Priebe 2014, 193; Booth 2016, 188-191). The aforementioned indicators also do not capture the political dimensions of poverty reduction and the role of the state in the process of reducing poverty.
Another theoretical strand stresses the importance of social forces and numerical domi-nance. It differs regarding its focus on either democracy, class or ethnicity. The idea that a democratic environment improves the situation of the poor is based on the notion of social equity through broad distribution of power. Scholars explain economic outcomes by the numerical advantage of different groups (Webster and Engberg-Pedersen 2002, 11; Roll and Talbott 2003; Bates and Block 2013); or competitive elections create incentives for politicians and elites to favour the poor as they compete for their vote (Boix 2003; Wong 2006; Bates and Block 2013). The problem with the argument on regime type is that the existence of effective institutions or state capacity are assumed. Thus, holding competitive elections and giving civil society the opportunity for political voice does not guarantee the implementation of policy reforms (Kuhonta 2011, 19). The second problem of this approach is that it presumes that only competitive elections create incentives for re-distribution. However, authoritarian and semi-democratic regimes have also implemented pro-poor policies (e.g.Singapore’s social housing policies played a critical role in poverty reduction) (Chua 1997; Ramesh 2000; Vasoo and Lee 2001, 279-280) So the outcome of social reforms depends on the kind of institutions which implement policies and not on the regime type.
Approaches which focus on class claim that poverty is a power struggle. Thus, scholars assume that the poor and those representing the poor have the capacity to mobilize and to challenge existing power relations (Webster and Engberg-Pedersen 2002; Hickey 2005; Cuesta 2007). The underlying premise for this approach is again a democratic regime type where representatives of social groups are allowed to compete freely. However, in
Southeast Asia party ideology is absent and parties do not represent specific social groups (Kuhonta 2011, 21). While class and social forces matter for pro-poor reforms, its impact on policies depends on institutions which affect policy.
Other scholars emphasize the importance of ethnicity as a political basis for social re-forms (Ratnam 1965; Jesudason 1989; Teik 1995, xvii-xxii; 2012). The argument is used on the case of Malaysia, since changes in inequality began after the 1969 riots. However, the argument of ethnicity has two problems. First, countries such as Fiji, Guyana and Sri Lanka have similar social structures as Malaysia, but their outcomes in terms of poverty reduction differ (Kuhonta 2011, 22). Second, Malaysia pursued pro-poor policies before the 1969 riots with minimal success (23). So the change in outcome cannot be explained through social structures but through institutional change.
To conclude, there is a vast literature on poverty reduction available. Theories using money metrics have their shortcomings due to the problematic collection of indicators. The theoretical focus on social structure and regime type does not explain policy outcomes. However, the kind of institution in a polity and institutional changes that affect policy and shift economy explain policy outcome. This does not reject the role of social forces on institutions. Since institutions are embedded in social structures, they are not autonomous from social forces (Teichman 2012, 9). Thus, institutions provide an approach to explain how national policies affect poverty reduction.
2.2
Historical Institutionalism as an Approach
This study uses an approach which presumes that institutions are embedded within so-ciety. This assumption departs from ”old” institutionalism which would only analyse government institutions and not include informal institutions and social forces (Teichman 2012, 9; Hall 1996). However, the shift from old to new institutionalism made the latter
2. Historical Institutionalism as an Approach
ahistorical. Historical institutionalism distinguishes itself from other strands of the new institutionalism literature by focusing on the temporal aspect of the origin and change of institutions and institutional processes (Hall 1996; Suddaby, Foster, and Mills 2013; Fiore-tos, Falleti, and Sheingate 2016). This allows to conceptualize poverty “as a long-term structural problem” (Kuhonta 2011, 11) and to understand a country’s efforts to reduce it.
This study uses the framework of historical institutionalism provided by Kuhonta (2011). A social crisis creates an opportunity for social reform because a crisis highlights a per-formance deficit and that a decisive intervention can and should be made (Hay 1999). Crisis is conceptualized as “a moment of decisive intervention” (317). Thus, a crisis is the process of renegotiating the unity of the state. This is achieved by imposing a new trajectory on the institutions that compromise the state (Hay 1999; Pepinsky 2009). If elites want to maintain power and stability, they have to respond to the crisis (Pepinsky 2009). While a crisis creates a stimulus for elites to act, the chosen options do not have to be pro-poor policy reforms, but can also be repression. Institutionalized parties with pragmatic ideologies are likely to respond to a social crisis with policy reform, because their behaviour is rooted within their social base (Kuhonta 2011, 42-44; Pepinsky 2009).
Institutionalized parties are the organizational power to push pro-poor policy reform, sustain policy continuity, monitor the state bureaucracy’s policy implementation and pre-serve ideological moderation in their policy’s content (Huntington 1968; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Kuhonta 2011). While elites have the financial and personal resources to influence policy, the organization of the poor through political parties is a key mechanism to articulate, channel and represent the interests of the poor.
In order for institutionalized parties to succeed with their pro-poor agenda, the state bureaucracy has to intervene. This is done by the interventionist state providing the insti-tutional capacities to use civil servants and to coordinate the execution of pro-poor policies
between the centre and the periphery (Rondinelli 1979; Rueschemeyer and Evans 1985; Kohli 2004; Kuhonta 2011, 34). In return, the institutionalized party monitors and checks whether the state’s civil servants achieve the policy’s goals (Rondinelli 1979; Kuhonta 2011, 37-38). Strong institutions are fundamental to this approach as they are centred around public interests and collective goals instead of private and clientelistic interests.
Institutionalized parties with bureaucratic capabilities and pragmatic policies pursue the reduction of poverty (see conceptual map in figure 2.1).The next subsections point out the concepts of party institutionalization, state-party dynamics and policy content in more detail
Figure 2.1: Conceptual map State-Party Dynamics
Institutionalized Party
Policy Content
Poverty Reduction
2.2.1
Party Institutionalization
Huntington (1968) first conceptualized institutionalization as “the process by which or-ganizations and procedures acquire value and stability” (12). He derives four criteria which can be applied to parties irrespective of the regime type: adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence (13-23). According to Huntington’s criteria, an institutionalized party is more adaptable and is therefore able to survive a changing environment.
2. Historical Institutionalism as an Approach
Mainwaring and Scully (1995) build on Huntington’s definition. Contrary to Hunting-ton’s criteria of autonomy, Mainwaring and Scully emphasize a party’s roots in society. According to Huntington (1968), social forces are a concern for institutional coherence (20-22). However, the link between party and social groups helps to provide consistency and regularity in the party’s political agenda which is crucial for programmatic policies (Mainwaring and Scully 1995, 5; Teichman 2012, 9-10). A party’s rootedness in society also allows continuous dialogue between the party and its constituents. Thus, it maintains its presence in the polity. However, Mainwaring and Scully’s concept is not argued on the institutionalization of individual parties but on party systems. They are concerned regarding the link between institutionalizing a party system and the process of democratic consolidation. However, this study is concerned with institutionalization and policies. Thus, the distinction by Levitsky (1998) is used.
Levitsky uses the criteria of ’value infusion’ and ’behavioural routinization’. The for-mer compromises rootedness in society. Value infusion is characterized as the “shift from the pursuit of particular objectives through an organization to the goal of perpetuating the organization per se” (79). ’Behavioural routinization’ encompasses regularized patterns of behaviour within an organization. Institutionalized parties which take stable patterns of behaviour for granted, reduce the influence of personalism, charismatic leaders and financiers (Kuhonta 2011, 31-34; Levitsky 1998, 80-81).
2.2.2
State-Party Dynamics
State capacity and state intervention are important to push redistributive reforms. Eco-nomic growth without state intervention does not restructure societies. However, the interventionist state alone does also not ensure to achieve a policy’s goals. Thus, the level of state capacity is crucial to the reduction of poverty. In order to uphold state ca-pacity, a meritocratic state bureaucracy which possesses corporate coherence, is needed. This ensures the state’s autonomy (Brødsgaard and Young 2000, 2). However,
bureau-cracy must also be embedded within society in order to provide institutional channels to negotiate. Evans (1995) defines this as ”embedded autonomy”. This provides the state bu-reaucracy’s institutional capacities to restructure social institutions and to execute policies.
The relationship between the state and the governing party can also follow the function of check-and-balance. The party monitors and checks whether the bureaucracy achieves the party’s policy goals. If the governing party is also institutionalized, its presence over the bureaucracy also keeps the direction of the policy in line with the party’s base (Rondinelli 1979, 404-405; Rueschemeyer and Evans 1985, 55-56).
Policy Content
The content of policy has an effect on successful implementation. The level of difficulty to implement a policy determines the success of the policy. Grindle (1980) defines a framework which assesses the implementability of policies. This framework entails the categories (1) zero sum or positive sum, (2) collective or divisible benefits, (3) behavioural change and (4) long-range or short-range goals (8-9).
Zero sum policies, such as agrarian reform, incite opposition from the groups whose interests are threatened (8). Positive sum policies, such as education and health, do not stimulate as much opposition and are therefore more likely to be implemented. Policies delivering collective goods, such as water and electricity in urban slums, invite compliance instead of opposition (8). Policies which require a degree of behavioural change from the recipients, such as new technologies for agricultural development, may be more difficult to implement (9). Lastly, policies which are designed to achieve long-range goals may be more difficult to implement than those with short-range goals. This is because the latter directly affects the recipients’ situation (9). Therefore, successful policy implemen-tation is more likely with positive sum gains, collective gains, low behavioural change and short-range goals.
3
|
Research Design
This study uses qualitative methods to answer the research question. It employs compar-ative historical analysis to analyse the collected data. This enables this study to give a historically grounded causal explanation of poverty reduction which emphasizes processes over time and contextualized comparisons (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003, 11-13; Te-ichman 2012). Hence, it allows to view poverty as a long-term problem and to examine efforts in reducing poverty in different periods of a country’s history. Moreover, it allows to analyse how institutions evolved and adapted to social crises. The comparative approach is done through an in-case comparison.
case comparison is used here to trace the developments in poverty reduction in In-donesia over time. InIn-donesia is chosen because of the country’s long-term engagement in pro-poor policies. The New Order regime focused on reducing poverty since the 1970s. It was hailed as a success by academia and the World Bank (Birdsall et al. 1993; Hill 1996; Timmer 2007; Thirkell-White 2012). However, pro-poor policies were also emphasized by the transitional and democratic governments after the Asian Financial Crisis. This resulted in a decline of Indonesia’s poverty rate which reached a single-digit for the first time in Indonesia’s history. The aforementioned pro-poor strategies took place during dif-ferent regime types. This makes Indonesia for this study’s comparative historical analysis interesting. If this study only analyses the contemporary period or regime type, the result could rely on a variable which intuitively explains poverty reduction.
3.1
Data Collection and Operationalization
Data is collected through semi-structured interviews and primary documents. The in-terviews were held with four bureaucrats from different ministeries in English. Primary documents were obtained from Leiden University’s Asian Library, from official Indone-sian governmental databases, and checked back with secondary sources. The time period for those documents is from 1967 to 2018. The long period is chosen due to the in-case comparison of two different time periods in Indonesia. 1967 as the beginning of this research’s time frame is chosen because the existing literature emphasized the efforts to reduce poverty with the start of the New Order regime (Hill 1996; Timmer 2007; Thirkell-White 2012).The use of different methods of data collection and of multiple data sources
allows to increase the credibility and validity of the analysis (Panke 2018, 229-230).
The official data from BPS (Badan Pusat Statistik, Central Statistics Agency) was used, knowing full well that data from the New Order era can be inaccurate. BPS changed the poverty line in 1998 by the expansion of the definition of non-food needs in order to capture poverty more realistically. Thus, the data in figure 4.1 from 1970 to 1996 with a lower poverty number is calculated based on the old poverty line. Data from 1996 with the higher number for that year and onwards uses the new poverty line. Therefore, it can be assumed that the poverty rate from the New Order era is too low. Moreover, the time reference for all data until 2006 is February. 1998 is the exception with December being the time reference. From 2006 onwards poverty was calculated based on data findings from March. This issue is known and is mentioned throughout the academic literature using official Indonesian data and documents (Logsdon 1992; King 1998; Booth 2016).
Party Institutionalization Party institutionalization is not an either/or category but it is rather assessed in degrees. Value infusion is assessed by the party’s rootedness in society. Rootedness addresses the link between citizens, organized interest groups and
1. Data Collection and Operationalization
parties. A party which responds to grass roots and channels their interests into the according governmental structures, is rooted in society. The higher a party is rooted in society, the higher it is institutionalized. Behavioural routinization is assessed by predictable organizational patterns and by the party’s independence from charismatic leaders and financiers. The higher a party’s behaviour is becoming routine, the higher it is institutionalized.
State-Party Dynamics The competence of the state bureaucracy is measured by mer-itocratic recruitment and predictable career ladders (Evans and Rauch 1999, 752-753). The former increases the chances of a minimum level of competence and internalized organizational values and goals which can affect the individual’s motivation in contrast to someone who owes their office to a person in a position of power. Moreover, the increased diversity of candidates can lead to further innovation (Herring 2009; Hong and Page 2001). This is assessed by the level of education attained by civil servants and if a codified formal recruitment system is used. Predictable career ladders increase corporate coherence and the bureaucracy’s ability to seek long-term goals such as poverty reduction instead of consumptive expenditures (Evans and Rauch 1999, 752-753). Moreover, performance based promotions create disincentives for corrupt behaviour. This is measured on whether ranks are predictable and based on performance.
Policy Content The policies are assessed according to Grindle’s framework which is elaborated in 2.2.2. Policies which are more likely to fall within the categories of positive sum gains, collective gains, low behavioural changes and short-range goals, are also more likely to be successful in regard to poverty reduction.
This chapter presents the collected data on the concept of party institutionalization, state-party dynamics and policy content. It is divided by the different time periods (New Order and Reformasi era) which are compared later in the conclusion.
As pictured in figure 4.1, poverty decreased from 1970 until the Asian Financial Cri-sis in 1997/1998 at rapid speed. From 1978 to 1993 the poverty rate in rural areas was lower than in the cities. This resulted from the regime’s focus on creating labour-intensive employment opportunities in agriculture and rural development, and later on in manufac-turing. From 1996 onwards, rural poverty was higher than the general poverty rate. The poverty rate returned to its pre-crisis level in 2003. However, it declined at slower rates and at times stagnated.
4.1
New Order
As a result of the events on September 30th, 1965 and the subsequent massacres, General Suharto consolidated power and took control of the state apparatus which culminated in his inauguration as President of the Republic of Indonesia in 1967. The concept of family state (negara kekeluargaan) with Suharto as the father of the nation, Pancasila the official state ideology and the 1945 Constitution was established (Besar 1972, 495). Moreover, the state bureaucracy was professionalized in order to have competent civil servants who execute the regime’s policies. The development policies prioritized agriculture and rural development until the mid 1980s. Afterwards, it focused on labour-intensive employment
1. New Order
Figure 4.1: Poverty Reduction in Indonesia since 1970
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 Year P o v er ty Rate
General Poverty Rate Rural Poverty Rate Urban Poverty Rate Data compiled from BPS (n.d.)
in manufacturing.
Political Environment
The first legislative election in the New Order era was held in 1971 with 10 parties par-ticipating. In 1973, the political system was simplified through the fusion of parties and organizations to three parties: Golkar (Golongan Karya, Functional Group), PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, United Development Party), and PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indone-sia, Indonesian Democratic Party). The motivation behind this move was, according to Suharto, “[w]ith the one and only road [with Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution] already mapped out, why should we then have nine different cars?” (Dwipayana and Ramadhan 1991, 226). Islamic parties and organizations had to fuse with PPP. PDI was a fusion
of catholic, protestant and nationalistic parties and organizations.Suharto defined Golkar as a “functional group of representatives of professionals and organizations” (225). In essence, Golkar was the parliamentary vehicle of the regime. It was dominated by three factions: ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, Armed Forces of Indonesia), the bureaucracy and the civilian groups faction (Sekretariat DPR-GR 1970, 18-19). In the 1980s Golkar transformed into a political party with individual party membership. With the law on political parties (Law 3/1975), Indonesian voters were considered a political floating mass (massa mengambang). According to this doctrine, the Indonesian popula-tion was politically uneducated, prone to manipulapopula-tion and had to stay depoliticized except once every five years when it was time to vote. Thus, it had to be free of party politics, so it can devote itself to economic development. This meant that parties and Golkar were not allowed to organize at lower administrative levels. This prevented a comprehensive mobilization of the population and the opposition could not offer real political alternatives.
Data and information regarding the personnel situation in the bureaucracy before 1974 is not available. As described in the government document, there were fictional civil ser-vants with a name and wage registered or children filled the (senior) positions of dead civil servants (Nirwandar and Kodhyat 1993, 41). In 1974 law 8/1974 codified the principles of the bureaucracy. The entire civil service was re-registered and only registered civil servants were to receive an identification number, salary and benefits. Civil servants had to pledge loyalty to Golkar. The data from BAKN (Badan Administrasi Kepegawaian Negara, State Civil Service Administration Agency) and BPS picture an increasing pro-fessionalism of the civil service corps (see Table 4.2). While almost 40% of civil servants had an educational level of primary school or lower in 1974, 60% held a high school diploma in 1998 and 13% had a Master degree.
The increasing educational attainment of recruits also shows a change in the size of ranks in Table 4.1. Civil servants can enter at the ranks I to III depending on the level
1. New Order
Table 4.1: Civil Servants by Rank, 1974-1998 Rank 1974 1984 1994 1998
I 50 27.1 13.1 8.9
II 45.1 64.1 65.0 46.1 III 4.5 8.4 20.8 42.7
IV 0.4 0.5 1 2.4
Data compiled from: Team Pendaftaran Ulang Pegawai Negeri Sipi (1975, 7) and BPS (1986, 92; 1995, 78; 1999, 83)
of education they attained. Other ranks can only be reached through promotion which is based on performance and upgrading the educational level. Regardless of the technical qualifications and the field of study, the level of formal education had a greater influence on agency placement (King 1998, 30-33).
Thus, someone with a graduate degree in humanities is more likely appointed to lead a technical agency than an engineer with a lower degree. In regard to promotions, King (1998) uses survey data from the World Bank from 1988 and he finds that over 40% of civil servants were promoted to positions for which they lacked the educational requirements. This was possible using clause 19 of Law 08/1974, if an individual received the grade good in at least 3 out of 5 critera 1 for two consecutive years.
In 1985 political parties were not allowed to have different party ideologies than the state ideology of Pancasila (Law 35/1985). This led to the biggest Muslim mass organization NU (Nahdlatul Ulama) to pull out of PPP in order to return to a religious organization and it stopped to recommend its members to vote for PPP (Tempo, 1 November 1986, p.2 cited in Suryadinata 1987, 47). Thus, the polity was stripped of social values and divisions.
1. The criteria are: work performance, work discipline, loyalty, dedication, experience, trustworthiness, and conditions other than objectivity.
Table 4.2: [Educational level of Indonesian civil servants 1974-1994 1974 1985 1994 1998 Primary or below 38.7 20.2 11.3 10.5 Junior High 21.9 13 8.6 6.1 High School 32.1 54.2 61.4 60 Diploma/Akta I, II 1.5 1.4 1.7 2.8 3-year ”Bachelor” 3.2 6.1 8.4 7.4 5-year ”Master” or higher 2.5 3.8 8.7 13.2
Data compiled from: Team Pendaftaran Ulang Pegawai Negeri Sipi (1975, 20) and BPS (1986, 91; 1995, 77; 1999, 68)
According to law 3/1975, political parties obtain their funds through membership fees, donations, state-funding or legitimate business (see Article 11). However, neither primary data nor secondary data exist on the issue of party financing for PDI and PPP at that time. Golkar had access to large sums of money thanks to the regime’s patron-client relation-ships with wealthy (mostly ethnic Chinese) businessmen (Interview with Liem Sioe Liong and Bob Hasan in Borsuk and Chng 2014).
The three-party system was controlled by Golkar which also won with at least 60% of the votes in all 6 elections before the fall of the regime in 1998. Candidates of all parties had to be vetted by the regime (see Article 3 of PP no. 3/1976) and the regime also intervened in party leadership disputes. The most famous incident occurred in 1996 against Megawati’s leadership position in PDI. This caused the occupation of the PDI headquarters in Jakarta by Megawati’s supporters in June which was stormed by the mil-itary a month later. Under these political tensions several anti-Chinese riots throughout Indonesia occurred. The Asian financial crisis which started in Thailand reached Indone-sia in August 1997. Suharto’s position as president remained solid as long as the economy grew. When the Asian financial crisis hit Indonesia, he lost his support within the military and the bureaucracy and with it his legitimacy.
1. New Order
To conclude, within the three-party-system, only Golkar had a chance to institutional-ize. PDI and PPP were controlled by Golkar and could hardly root in society and present a political alternative to the existing regime. Due to Golkar’s constant majority within the DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, People’s Representative Council), it could push its policies. However, it was dominated by its charismatic leader Suharto and depended on his good-will. It re-organised and codified its civil service corps with predictable career ladders. The bureaucracy increased its meritocratic practices in regard to recruitment, however it was not fully based on performance and level of education. To answer the first sub-question, Golkar influenced the state bureaucracy through reorganizing it, limiting its corporate coherence through enforcing the bureaucracy’s loyalty to Golkar.
Poverty Reduction
The New Order regime focused on food security, agriculture and rural development in its various programmes and five-year development plans (Repelita, Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun). It established the logistics agency Bulog in 1967 to stabilize rice prices. It bought and sold rice at fixed floor prices when the market price was either low or high (Presidential Decree 114/1967). It was turned into an agency directly under Suharto’s control in 1978. Repelita I (First Five-Year Development Plan, 1969/70 - 1973/74) rec-ognized the importance of the agricultural sector due to the majority of the population earning a living from it. Agriculture received with 30% the highest allocation of the development budget (Repelita I 1969, 45). However, development was also targeted at the countryside through spending on infrastructure and electrification. Thus, the goal was to create employment opportunities, food security, provide basic needs such as clothes and footwear and to decrease the import of food which drained the country’s foreign exchange. In 1969 the rice intensification programs BIMAS (Bimbingan Massal, Mass Guidance) and IMNAS (Intensifikasi Massal Swa Sembada Bahan Makanan, Mass Agricultural In-tensification for Food Self-sufficiency) were implemented. They provided small-holder
credits by the government to farmers and supplied high yielding rice varieties and technical advice on fertilizers. Repelita II (Second FiveYear Development Plan, 1974/75 -1978/79) continued the focus of Repelita I on agriculture, food security and rural de-velopment outside Java. Both sectors received the highest budget allocation (Repelita II 1974a, 198). The Sederhana Project for the small-scale irrigation of 550000 hectares on the Outer Islands was planned and implemented for the same time period (Repelita II 1974b, 99). However, Repelita II also emphasized the need to improve the welfare of all people through increasing employment opportunities and the distribution of welfare benefits. Repelita III (Third Five-Year Development Plan, 1979/80 - 1983/84), Repelita IV (Fourth Five-Year Development Plan, 1984/85 - 1988/89) and Repelita V (Fifth Five-Year Development Plan, 1989/90 - 1993/94) continued to focus on agriculture, rural develop-ment, rice self-sufficiency and the diversification of agricultural products. While Repelita IV and Repelita V recognized the importance of agriculture, they focused on manufactur-ing, transportation, telecommunication. Repelita VI (Sixth Five-Year Development Plan, 1994/95 - 1998/99), which did not finish its execution, focused on infrastructure to support foreign investment and free trade.
The aforementioned efforts on agriculture and rural development culminated in growth in rice production and length of roads. With Repelita I more than 13000km and with Repelita II 2700 km of roads were built (BPS 1995, 387). The length of roads grew on average by 6% until 1990. The per capita yield of rice also increased from 100kg in 1960s to 143kg in 1985 (Booth 2016, 69). By 1984, the New Order regime claimed that rice self-sufficiency was achieved. After 1984, the growth of rice yield decreased due to achieving the technological maximum in irrigated rice farms (World Bank 1998, Table 30). The New Order regime emphasized early on smallholder agricultural growth through spreading high yielding rice varieties, improving and extending road and irrigation in-frastructure, providing micro-credits and the access to fertilizers to farmers, and investing in the stability of rice prices. This helped to increase the livelihoods in rural areas and
2. Reformasi
reduce poverty in the time period 1970 to 1984 from 70 million affected people to 35 million people or from 60% to 21,60% of the population (see figure 4.1). The focus on manufacturing from the mid-1980s onwards created labour-intensive urban employment which decreased poverty, however at a much slower rate.
Golkar as an institutionalized party formulated and pushed pragmatic development plans which were sustained for policy continuity. Competent bureaucrats with limited corporate coherence executed the development plans and programmes. Thus, an institutionalized po-litical party, which wanted to extend the support of its organization to rural areas and gain regime legitimacy through pragmatic development policies, with a competent bureaucracy was able to reduce poverty.
4.2
Reformasi
The Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 had lasting effects on Indonesia’s poor and its political system. Suharto stepped down on May 21st 1998 and his three-party system has since been replaced by a democratic multi-party system with 48, 24, 38 and 12 parties participating in the 1999, 2004, 2009 and 2014 general elections. State bureaucracy was decentralized and professionalized by the principles of merit. The poverty rate returned to its pre-crisis levels in 2003 if the new poverty line is considered. The difference between Yudhoyono’s and Jokowi’s focus on the reduction of poverty stems from the level of institutionalization of their political parties.
Political Environment
All three parties from the New Order regime continue to exist. PDI renamed itself to PDI-P (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, Indonesian Democratic Party of Strug-gle). It is with PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, National Awakening Party) the only direct successor of two of the four big parties from Indonesia’s first general elections in
1955.
While PDI-P and Golkar (Partai Golongan Karya, Functional Group Party) are linked to their specific history and their former charismatic leaders (Sukarno and Suharto), sev-eral parties have historical links to religious organizations. As figure 4.2 illustrates, the links are in general with the two biggest Muslim organizations in Indonesia: NU and Muhammadiyah. PKB is the direct successor of the political party NU from 1955 and PPP represented all Muslim parties during the New Order regime and was supported by the NU until 1985. PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional, National Mandate Party) was formed by the former Chairman of the Muslim mass organization Muhammadiyah Amien Rais. Interviewed PAN members reason their membership with “because I am a member of Muhammadiyah” (Interview with party members in Fionna 2013, 228). The origin of PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Prosperous Justice Party), successor of PK (Partai Keadi-lan, Justice Party), can be traced back to the religious student movement Jamaah Tarbiyah (also known as dakwah movement) which provides the relationship to the Muslim Broth-erhood in the Middle East, the ideological base and members for PKS (Machmudi 2005, 22-24; Damanik 2002, 220).
The social and professional backgrounds of party members can also show possible link-ages to specific social milieus. Widodo and Santoso (2010) and Santoso and Kristanto (2015) illustrated the backgrounds of DPR parliamentarians for the periods 2009-2014 and 2014-2019. Several MPs (members of parliament) from PDI-P were active in Christian and secular student organizations such as GMKI (Gerakan Mahasiswa Kristen Indonesia, Indonesian Christian Student Movement) and or are former members of Golkar. Several MPs from Golkar were members of HMI (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, Islamic Student Association) or NU, former bureaucrats or were members of the party before 1998. Most MPs from PPP were active in NU and its student organization PMII (Pergerakan Maha-siswa Islam Indonesia, Indonesian Islamic Student Movement). Some were active in HMI or were principals of pesantren (Islamic boarding schools). PKB’s MPs were active in
2. Reformasi
Figure 4.2: Historical links to religious organizations Nahdlatul Ulama Muhammadiyah Jamaah Tarbiyah PKB PPP PAN PK PKS succession
support during New Order
chairman & members
chairman & members succession
NU’s youth organisation Ansor or student organization PMII and PAN’s MPs have links to Muhammadiyah and HMI. MPs from PKS were active in the Jamaah Tarbiyah move-ment, HMI and KAMMI (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia, Unity of Action for Indonesian Muslim Students). Moreover, at least 10 MPs in both periods studied in Egypt, Saudi Arabia or Pakistan. MPs from PD (Partai Demokrat, Democratic Party) are former bureaucrats, activists, entertainers, members of Golkar or have a background in the military. Gerindra (Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya, Great Indonesia Movement Party), Hanura (Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat, People’s Conscience Party) and NasDem (Partai Nas-Dem, Nasdem Party) were founded in 2008, 2006 and 2011 after a split within Golkar. Gerindra’s MPs were mostly former members of Golkar, few were active in PDI-P or PD. Hanura’s and NasDem’s MPs are former Golkar members and former members of the Indonesian Armed Forces. All aforementioned parties have MPs who were businessmen, entrepreneurs and several of them have positions in business associations.
According to the various election regulations between 2002 and 2017, all parties have to have offices in all provinces and most municipalities and districts. Despite the efforts
to decentralize power, all parties are required to have their headquarters in Jakarta. While none of the political parties is linked to a specific ethnic identity 2, ethnic identities are expressed through religious associations.
In 2001 it was decided in parliament that the president will be directly elected from 2004 onwards and receives more executive rights. This developed to the presidentializa-tion of political parties which are used as political vehicles for charismatic individuals. The best examples are former president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (PD) and Prabowo Subianto (Gerindra). They lack an ideological platform, organizational structures and rootedness in society. The personalism is further fuelled by the parties’ authoritarian, charismatic leaders. The decision-making process within the parties are centred around their charismatic leaders in a top-down fashion. Critics within the party are met with the termination and replacement of their mandate in parliament or silenced before and during party conventions (Liputan6 2002; Gerakan Pembaruan Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Per-juangan 2005; Liputan6 2005; Notosusanto 2005). This common practice from the New Order regime was legally re-introduced in 2002 (Law 31/2002). The party statutes which regulate party conventions and inter-party voting rights are changed at the convention by the party leadership (Notosusanto 2005).
However, not only has the political landscape transformed, the centralized rule and bureau-cratic system also changed with the end of the New Order regime. With the implementa-tion of several laws, the central government decentralized political power, authority and economic responsibilities. The laws 22/1999, 23/1999 and 25/1999 provide districts and municipalities with political authority and financial resources to execute a range of respon-sibilities (such as health, education, agriculture, trade, transportation, investment), engage more in managing their administrative work and the public goods they provide. The goal was to deliver better local services. Law 43/1999 followed suit with the decentralization
2. Reformasi
Table 4.3: Educational level of Indonesian civil servants 1999-2017 1999 2003 2007 2012 2017 Primary or below 8.4 3.6 2.7 1.6 0.9 Junior High 5.7 2.9 3.2 2.4 1.5 High School 60.8 38.6 37.5 30.8 23.1 Diploma/Akta I, II 3.0 17.6 17.5 15.2 7.3 3-year ”Bachelor” 7.6 7.8 8.3 9.5 9.6 5-year ”Master” or higher 14.4 29.6 30.9 40.6 57.6
Data compiled from: BPS (2000, 74; 2004, 94; 2008, 99; 2014, 51; 2018, 59)
reforms and codified a meritocratic approach to recruitment, salaries and human resource management. Moreover, it prohibited civil servants to be members of political parties. Law No. 5/2014 follows and extends law 43/1999 by defining the principles of merit and career ladders as well as the assessment of performance. All interviewees expressed that they work independently from ministers and only receive visits at the presentation of the results.
The data from table 4.3 show further increasing levels of educational attainment towards graduate and post-graduate degrees. While more than half of Indonesia’s civil servants held a high school diploma in 1999, more than half held at least a Master degree 18 years later. This development also translated in the size of ranks which require a University degree (see table 4.4). The number of civil servants in lower ranks and those who graduated from primary school or below decreased. This could mean that the need for skilled personnel such as geologists, teachers, doctors and others increased. Thus, the decentralization process held meritocratic principles in recruitment high and possibly the recognition of skill when it came to promotions. The World Bank used the national civil servant database of BKN (Badan Kepegawaian Negara, National Civil Service Agency)
Table 4.4: Civil Servants by Rank, 1999-2017 Rank 1999 2003 2007 2012 2017 I 7.9 2.6 2.1 2 1.3 II 45.7 27 27.3 26.9 20.1 III 44.2 59 51.4 47.5 53.7 IV 2.2 11.5 19.1 23.5 24.9
Data compiled from: BPS (2000, 75; 2004, 95; 2008, 100; 2014, 52; 2018, 60)
and finds that the level of educational attainment increases the probability of promotions significantly since 1999 (Sacks and Pierskalla 2018, 17-19). The report attributes the increased meritocratic practices to the aforementioned reforms.
With the fall of the New Order regime, the funding of political parties was also codified and has been reformed several times. While parties are supposed to be funded through state subsidies, membership fees, and registered donations, the former two are insignificant compared to the impact of financiers. Businessmen and entrepreneurs have influenced parties by being sitting MPs, becoming party leaders (such as Yusuf Kalla for Golkar and Soetrisno Bachir for PAN) or receiving ministerial positions (billionaire Aburizal Bakrie being the most well-known case). Moreover, ICW (Indonesian Corruption Watch) discov-ered several cases of false donor registration (Badoh and Dahlan 2010).
To summarize, most political parties are rooted in society. This is due to their spe-cific history. However, since 2004 there is a tendency for presidentialisation of parties. This development has weakened them as organizations and led to further personalism. The bureaucracy was re-codified which increased its meritocratic practices and separated the civil corps from political parties. Regardless of the democratization and decentralization process and the creation of an independent performance based bureaucracy, parties kept the authoritarian New Order character within the organization of parties. Institutionalized parties have influenced the bureaucracy by codifying a meritocratic independent civil
2. Reformasi
corps. Since civil servants are prohibited from party membership, only the government exercises influence through checking the bureaucracy’s achievements by the ministers.
Poverty Reduction
Poverty reduction in the Reformasi era still targeted subsidies in the form of seeds and fertilizers, however it started to focus on welfare programmes which directly target all poor.
After the fall of Suharto’s regime the new government withdrew from all programmes which subsidized fertilizers and high yielding varieties. This was reversed in 2003 for fertilizers and in 2006 for seeds (Ministry of Agriculture 46/2006, Ministry of Agriculture 72/2007). With the Presidential Regulation 68/2002, the subsidized rice program Raskin (Subsidi Beras Bagi Masyarakat Berpendapatan Rendah, Rice Subsidies for Low Income People), which was the successor of the emergency relief package OPK (Operasi Pasar Khusus, Special Market Operations) from the Asian Financial Crisis, was formulated. Through this program, low-income households were entitled to 15 kg of medium-quality rice per month at a 75 to 80% lower price (World Bank 2012, 8). BLT (Bantuan Langsung Tunai, Unconditional Cash Transfer Program) was introduced for the poorest households to receive unconditional direct cash payments to compensate for rising fuel prices (Pres-idential instruction 12/2005). The cash transfers occurred in 2005, 2008 and 2013 when international fuel prices increased. PKH (Program Keluarga Harapan, Conditional cash transfer program) is aimed at the extreme poor and was introduced in 2007. The condi-tions are the usage of local healthcare centres or sending children to school (Law 40/2004). PNPM (Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat, National Program for Community Empowerment) Mandiri began in 2007. Grants are distributed on the sub-district level. Local residents decide how the money is spent, and control and monitor the execution of the projects. In 2016 AUTP (Asuransi Usaha Tani Padi, Agricultural Insurance for Rice Farmers) was introduced. It protects landholding and landless farmers with a size of up to 2ha from incomes losses due to floods, droughts or pests (Ministry of Agriculture 02/2016).
The return to the pre-crisis poverty rate occurred in 2003. The poverty rate slowly decreased with the exception of 2006 (see figure 4.2). It increased from 15,97% in 2005 to 17,75% in 2006 due to increased fuel and rice prices. The first and second Yudhoyono administration (2004-2009, 2009-2014) enjoyed a commodity boom in coal and palm oil. Unlike the oil boom of the 1970s, it did not translate into infrastructure, the creation of labour-intensive employment, nor increased budget allocations to the aforementioned welfare programmes. Moreover, the Yudhoyono administrations did not reform the fuel subsidies which absorbed 20% of the government’s budget. At the end of Yudhoyono’s second administration poverty reduction started to stagnate in 2012. The Jokowi admin-istration (2014-2019) cut the fuel subsidies and reallocated the funds in infrastructure projects resulting in an increase of expenditure in infrastructure from 9,5% in 2014 to 14,6% of the 2015 budget (Presidential Decree 29/2013; Law 27/2014). The infrastruc-ture investments increased to 19% of the state budget by 2017. Despite the changes to the fuel subsidies, the Jokowi administration sustained the aforementioned programmes from the Yudhoyono period, increased their budgets and extended the limited time of receiving subsidies. The poverty rate declined from 11,25% when Jokowi took office to 9,82% in 2018.
Poverty decreased after the fall of the New Order regime, however it declined at a slower pace. Poverty decreased and stagnated under Yudhoyono’s presidency with a profes-sional bureaucracy which however was constrained in fully executing the policies due to low budget allocations. Jokowi’s pro-poor policies were executed by the same profes-sional bureaucracy with corporate coherence. However, it was not constrained by low budgets. The difference between Yudhoyono and Jokowi appear from their political al-liance. Yudhoyono is aligned with the presidentialized PD, while Jokowi comes from the institutionalized PDI-P
5
|
Conclusion
The aim of this thesis is to assess the political conditions in Indonesia and their influence on poverty reduction. Using historical institutionalism as an approach, the political condi-tions during the New Order regime and the Reformasi era were analysed using the concepts of party institutionalization, state-party dynamics, and policy content. The central idea is that institutionalized parties with a capable state bureaucracy articulate pragmatic policies which are needed to pursue poverty reduction.
In both periods, institutionalized parties advanced reforms after crises which restructured the polity. In both eras, institutionalized parties influenced the bureaucracy by codifying, reorganizing and professionalizing it. However, they differ in regard to meritocratic prac-tices and the independence of the bureaucracy. Poverty did not decline with the same pace during the Reformasi era as during the New Order era. The policies and programmes from both periods used a top-bottom approach (with the exception of PNPM Mandiri), however they differ in regard to how the government at the time weighed its importance. Rural development policies received the highest budget allocations during the New Order era, whereas public spending until the end of Yudhoyono’s presidency was still lower than what it was before the Asian Financial Crisis. This changed with the Jokowi administration in regard to infrastructure investments. Golkar as well as Jokowi’s PDI-P are highly insti-tutionalized parties with a clear ideological position. The governing parties of both eras had access to the civil corps and utilized them to push their policy agendas. The results show that the prioritization of poverty reducing measures is crucial. Therefore,
institu-tionalized parties prioritize and fund pro-poor policies better and pursue poverty reduction.
A within-case comparison was done on the national level of a culturally, geographically and socially highly diverse country. Hence, the results of the analysis depict the centre of Indonesia but do not necessarily represent institutionalization on the country’s peripheral islands and provinces. While a within-case comparison is technically not a single case study, the analysis is done only on one country. Thus, the generalizability of the results on poverty reduction is limited. Another limitation of this study concerns state bureaucracy. While this thesis considers the need for a functioning state bureaucracy, it received only attention regarding its meritocratic principles. In both eras, governing parties had access to the civil corps and utilized them to push their policy agendas. Since the results show that the prioritization of poverty reducing measures through the governing parties in both eras were crucial, state bureaucracy is a neutral element.
The New Order’s success in poverty reduction can also be explained by Golkar’s ef-forts to secure support and influence. After the G30S (Gerakan 30 September, 30th of September Movement) coup and the subsequent massacres in mostly rural areas, Golkar realized that spending in rural development was a way to secure support in formally de-feated regions. Moreover, the reduction of poverty created and sustained the legitimacy of Suharto’s regime. Another alternative explanation regards state capacity. The transition from Suharto’s legacy of patronage to a managerial model of bureaucracy takes time to overcome. Thus, the continued fight against corruption removed incentives for civil ser-vants to promote pro-poor programs and the poverty rate stagnated.
The results confirm the argument that institutions which represent public interests have the organizational power to develop and execute pro-poor policies. Moreover, they also confirm the importance of labour-intensive policies as argued by Mosley (2012). De-spite of academia’s critique on the slow decline of poverty, Indonesia’s current absolute
Chapter 5. Conclusion
poverty is a success. The absolute number of poor decreased from 70 million in 1970 to 26 million people in 2018. However, the population size increased at the same time period by more than double. While Indonesia’s past development success still holds the attention of academia, the interest in its current progress should be strong for researchers and policymakers who wish to copy Indonesia’s success.
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