The 'flip-flop' approach to terrorism. An Analysis of the Responses of Successive Nigerian Governments to the ongoing Insurgency of Boko Haram

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The ‘flip-flop’ approach to

terrorism

An Analysis of the Responses of Successive Nigerian

Governments to the ongoing Insurgency of Boko Haram

CRISIS AND SECURITY MANAGEMENT MASTER’S THESIS

AUTHOR BASTIAAN SMEETS

STUDENT NUMBER 1044427

SUPERVISOR: PROF. A.P. SCHMID

SECOND READER: PROF. DR. E. BAKKER

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ABSTRACT

Governments may deal with terrorist organizations in numerous ways, depending on numerous circumstances. The options available to governments range from legal reforms to intelligence gathering and from negotiations with terrorists to violent repression. This thesis uses qualitative research methods in order to describe which of these options have been pursued by successive Nigerian governments, in order to deal with Boko Haram, Nigeria’s most radical and violent Islamic sect. To date, the battle is still ongoing. Countless military operations had for a long time not yielded satisfying results. However, recent developments show significant gains due to the involvement of neighboring countries and foreign mercenaries. Other efforts, including the introduction of counterterrorism legislation, negotiations with representatives of the sect, and the consideration of an amnesty programme, have all failed to adequately address the issue of Boko Haram. In the meantime, the government appears to have mostly neglected underlying grievances in society, which in theory may fuel a terrorist campaign. Whether this is the case regarding Nigeria remains unclear, however the government should be aware of the possibility of newly emerging terrorist organizations after Boko Haram, when such grievances remain unaddressed.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

APC All Progressives Congress

AQAP Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula AQIM Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

BH Boko Haram

GTD Global Terrorism Database

IDP Internally Displaced People

IMN Islamic Movement in Nigeria

INEC Independent National Electoral Commission JTF ORO Joint Task Force Operation Restore Order

LGA Local Government Area

MEND Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta MNJTF Multi-National Joint Task Force

NA National Assembly

NACTEST National Counter-Terrorism Strategy

PDP People’s Democratic Party

START National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism

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1 INTRODUCTION

The issue of how to handle militant religious movements in general and militant jihadist movements in particular, is one of great concern to several countries throughout the world, mainly in Africa and the Middle East. Such movements tend to challenge a country’s government, or ‘the state’, one of its most valuable properties: the sole authority over a demarcated territory, in terms of legislative powers and monopoly of violence. Especially in countries that are inhabited by significant Muslim populations, militant jihadist movements try to gain power at the expense of governments, for the purpose of de-secularizing and Islamizing the country, for instance by means of enforcing a strict Islamic legal system or by prohibiting elements of modern, secular and Western lifestyle. It is primarily up to the government to deal with this challenge, to maintain its authority over a population and to not let jihadist movements achieve their objectives.

The radical Islamic sect known as Boko Haram has plagued Nigeria since 2009. In 2015, Boko Haram surpassed so-called Islamic State (in Syria and Iraq) as the deadliest terrorist organization in the world (Global Terrorism Index 2015, p. 4). The sect is one of many concerns to the Nigerian government, which is also confronted with high unemployment rates, armed struggle in the Niger Delta, corruption, and many other issues. Is it possible for one country to cope with so many issues simultaneously? This thesis addresses just one, the Boko Haram insurgency, and will focus on how successive Nigerian governments have dealt with the issue.

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2 LITERATURE REVIEW

A systematic review conducted by Lum, Kennedy, & Sherley (2003) found that of all reviewed work on counterterrorism, four categories of counterterrorism strategies are discussed the most: preventative, detection-oriented, managerial, and response-oriented. Regarding preventative strategies, Crenshaw (1987) distinguishes two types of counterterrorism: instrumental and organizational. Instrumental counterterrorism aims at lowering the probability of a terrorist attack, by raising the costs of terrorism relative to alternative actions and/or increasing those other actions’ success rates. This type consists of both defence and deterrence policies, the former includes active (i.e. pre-emptive use of force to deny an actual attack) and passive (i.e. reduce probability of succesfull attack) measures, whereas the latter includes measures of denial (i.e. raise the costs of an attack) and retalitation. Organizational counterterrorism, contrary to the instrumental approach that focuses on the terrorists as rational individuals, focuses on efforts that cause terrorist organizations to decline, thus to lose strength. Such efforts are directed towards two different ways in which the organization declines: exit and voice. The former refers to terrorists leaving the organization, for example due to alternative pathways offered by the government, whereas the latter refers to provoking dissent inside the organization, which decreases the level of conformity.

Authors who have written about counterterrorism do so in different ways. Frey (2004), for instance, divides responses to terrorism into two basic types: using the ‘stick’ and using the ‘carrot’. The stick refers to coercive interventions, which mainly comes down to the deployment of military and police forces, after an attack has occurred. The main goal is to punish terrorists, by either killing or capturing them. He notes that this type of counterterrorism responses is most often undertaken throughout the world, although evidence shows that this approach is often unsuccessful and sometimes even counterproductive regarding the ultimate goal of defeating terrorism. Using the stick, or in other words the policy of deterrence or the reactive response, locks terrorists inside their organizations, without the opportunity to cease their terrorist activities by choosing alternatives other than terrorism. This approach causes both sides to lose; the government spends a lot of money to maintain their deterring activities, while the terrorists get either killed or captured. On the other side of the counterterrorism dichotomy as described by Frey, is using the ‘carrot’. Contrary to the stick, the ‘carrot-approach’ is a more positive approach to terrorism. It aims at identifying newly emerging conflicts that possibly lead to terrorism, thus making it a

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proactive response that is predominantly performed before an attack has occurred. Its main goal is to address the root causes of terrorism and focuses on long-term solutions rather than the short-term approach of military retribution. Dealing with those individuals that are already considered to be terrorists, instead of killing them, more favourable and non-violent alternatives are offered. They are given incentives to opt out of their terrorist organization. Contrary to the consequences that follow the approach of the stick, this type of government responses potentially results in both sides to benefit. The government doesn’t rely entirely on costly military interventions, while the terrorists are given the opportunity to stay alive by refraining from terrorism. Terrorists withdrawing from a terrorist organization potentially undermines its cohesiveness, since the loss of members weakens its overall strength. Despite the potential benefits of positive sanctions such as giving terrorists incentives for withdrawing from their organization’s activities, Frey notices that the majority of the literature on (counter)terrorism is devoted to the deterrence response, whereas less attention is paid to positive sanctions. Forest (2007) also roughly divides counterterrorism measures into two categories: hard power and soft power. Hard power refers to the use of military force and law enforcement, whereas soft power refers to efforts related to diplomacy, information, and intelligence. In order to be effective, a country’s approach to terrorism and/or insurgencies should be a comprehensive one that combines different elements of both sides in a concerted fashion. While pursuing efforts related to both these sides, governments should also be responsive to underlying grievances in society, which requires long-term strategies and solutions. Emphasizing hard power or soft power to deal with a terrorist organization, while neglecting structural societal problems such as economic inequity, unemployment, a weak educational system, and internally displaced people, eventually decreases the possibility of effectively dealing with terorrism.

Other authors choose to describe the variety of counterterrorism measures in a different fashion. Instead of the dichotomy as described by Forest and Frey, some argue for another categorization. For example, Jarvis (2009) argues that in the field of terrorism and counterterrorism studies, authors mainly recommend one of (or a combination of) three broadly defined approaches to terrorism: militarizing, criminalizing, and liberal. Which approach is advocated and preferred over another, depends on how the issue of terrorism is understood and framed. In the case of militarizing and criminalizing approaches, terrorism is understood as a technical problem that predominantly requires short-term solutions. On the other hand, liberal approaches consider terrorism as a symptom of underlying dynamics in society, to which long-term solutions should be offered. Militarizing approaches naturally rely

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on the use of force, negotiations are considered to be fruitless. Criminalizing approaches move away from the military idea of war on terrorism and consider terrorism as a criminal issue, to which efforts such as intelligence-gathering are advocated. Authors who advocate liberal approaches, without entirely rejecting military interventions, favor efforts that are aimed at the extension of democratic and human rights for a country’s population.

Wilkinson (2011) also categorizes responses to terrorism, in particular those of liberal states, into three different aspects or dimensions: the use of politics and diplomacy, the use of both the law enforcement and the criminal justice systems, and the deployment of the military. The use of politics and diplomacy refers to, inter alia, so-called peace processes that require sufficient political will to develop and maintain a peaceful solution to a conflict situation. Both individual leaders and external mediators play a crucial role in these processes. They must be capable to deal with the complexity of peace processes, while efforts such as disarmament and demobilization of armed forces are to be pursued as well, in order to address security concerns that one or more participating parties may have. The use of the law enforcement and the criminal justice systems refers to what Wilkinson calls the ‘hardline approach’ of the liberal state to deal with terrorism. The approach prescribes liberal states to avoid both over- and underreaction, since they both endanger a country’s democratic values, and to always act within the rule of law, especially during states of emergency. Intelligence efforts are crucial in this approach to win against terrorists, though they should always be under close scrutiny of and accountable to the democratically elected government. Wilkinson concludes his description of this approach by warning against granting (too many) concessions to terrorists, since that might signal the government’s weakness and support the capabilities of a terrorist campaign. Simultaneously, addressing underlying grievances in society may decrease support for the terrorist cause, it essentially diminishes whatever legitimacy terrorist claims have. The deployment of the military refers to the obvious approach in which the armed forces engage terrorists. Of greater importance is Wilkinson’s assertion that this approach is often proven to have been counterproductive. He further argues that the three dimensions should not be regarded as mutually exclusive. Instead, carefully selected elements from all three dimensions should be combined in order to create a comprehensive approach to terrorism, one that is able to effectively deal with a variety of terrorist activities.

Oyewole (2013) divides counterterrorism measures in a similar fashion, into three dominant categories: military-based, justice-based, and political-based. Military-based counterterrorism is based on the idea of a ‘war on terrorism’ against terrorists who are

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portrayed as nihilists, in which the military is in charge of confronting them, predominantly by the massive deployment of both covert and overt operations. Alternatively, justice-based counterterrorism views terrorism as a crime, to which legal responses are needed. Terrorists and their acts are criminalized, after which they are put through a country’s legal system, which includes the detection, investigation, and prosecution of suspected individuals. Because (counter)terrorism is highly politicized, the third category as described by Oyewole comprises political-based counterterrorism measures, divided into ‘hard politics’ and ‘soft politics’. The former relates to the two aforementioned categories and consists of capturing or killing terrorists, while strict counterterrorism laws and counterterrorism forces are put in place. The latter, on the contrary, refers to a softer and more diplomatic approach to terrorism. Efforts such as capacity building, encouragement of democratic values, economic development, and counter-radicalization policies are considered preferable to either military-based or justice-based measures.

Instead of the dichotomous or tripartite categorizations that are described so far, yet another model that describes counterterrorism measures is proposed by Miller (2007). According to Miller, the traditional categorizations fail to adequately represent the variety of potential counterterrorism measures. He argues for the use of five categories, which lie along a continuum, ranging from ‘doing nothing’ to ‘violence’. Firstly, doing nothing, refers to ignoring terrorism and refusing to apprehend terrorists. This category may be considered only theoretical, since in practice governments have to respond in some way to terrorist organizations that contest the government’s authority and terrorize the population. Secondly, conciliation refers to negotiating with and making concessions to terrorists, which includes the promise of change in their favour and the release of prisoners. Thirdly, legal reform refers to the strengthening of government capacity to deal with terrorism, for example through the creation of counter-terrorism specific legislation. Fourthly, restriction refers to measures and policies that limit terrorist activities, through hardening targets and increasing expanding intelligence-gathering capabilities. Fifthly, violence refers to the government applying force in order to eliminate or capture suspected terrorists.

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3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The thesis does not make use of a grand theory to analyse government responses. Instead, for the purpose of answering the central research question, the thesis builds on several categories of counterterrorism responses, which are derived from the literature review. This section defines the theoretical boundaries of the thesis by highlighting which elements of counterterrorism are included in the analysis of the case that is under study: the responses of successive Nigerian governments to Boko Haram. The literature review has given a concise, thus limited, overview of existing counterterrorism measures. It shows that the included authors choose to describe the variety of counterterrorism measures in their own fashion, by using different wordings, categorizations, and approaches.

For the sake of oversight and feasibility, the theoretical framework of this thesis consists of categories that are somehow described by one or more authors, but then pieced together as simplified categories: (i) responses to underlying grievances, (ii) political responses, (iii) legal responses, and (iv) military responses. Each of these categories may, theoretically, consist of numerous responses. Responses to underlying grievances may include efforts to strengthen the economic positions of certain communities, efforts to adequately deal with internally displaced people, and efforts to combat the issue of (youth) unemployment. Political responses to terrorism may include negotiations and talks with terrorists, amnesty and political incorporation. Legal responses to terrorism may include the introduction of counterterrorism legislation and the strengthening of a country’s law enforcement capacities. Military responses to terrorism obviously include the deployment of armed forces in order to fight terrorists on the battlefield, trying to kill or capture as many as possible.

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4 RESEARCH PROPOSITION

4.1 Central research question

The aim of this particular thesis, is to describe the campaign of successive Nigerian governments against Boko Haram.

The central research question is therefore formulated: How have successive Nigerian

governments dealt with Boko Haram between 2009 and 2016?

4.2 Hypotheses

Since this thesis is based on a descriptive research, including hypotheses may not seem the most logical thing to do. However, two relevant issues related to the overall topic of government responses, might be interesting enough to discuss on the basis of a hypothesis. Including these two hypotheses doesn’t exactly serve to answer the central research question of how successive Nigerian governments have dealt with Boko Haram, it rather offers interesting insights regarding perceived or observed consequences of the responses undertaken by Nigerian governments.

Underlying grievances in society are often described as the root causes of terrorism. Feelings of injustice within society, for example when the government fails to respond to an attack on a religious community, economic disparities between different communities in the country, the issue of internally displaced people, a weak educational system; all and more of these potentially contribute to the persistence of terrorism. As Forest (2007) argues that in order to effectively deal with and ultimately defeat a terrorist organization, governments need to address issues that are not directly linked to the organization itself (2007, p. 102). Likewise, Wilkinson (2011) argues that addressing underlying grievances in society may decrease the terrorists’ ideological operating space, or, their ‘water in which they swim’ (2011, p. 199). Thus, the first hypothesis is formulated:

Hypothesis 1: The persistence of the Boko Haram sect is caused by Nigerian governments’ neglect for underlying grievances in society; this neglect decreases the effectiveness of the governments’ overall response to Boko Haram.

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In 2009, Mahmud noticed that the Nigerian government’s approach to what was then called the ‘Nigerian Taliban’ – now Boko Haram – predominantly relied on the use of military force, engaging in acts of violence and performing harsh crackdowns (Mahmud, 2009, p. 121). However, for instance according to Forest (2012), for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts to be effective, strategies should not only involve hard power (the threat and use of force, especially by the military), they should also incorporate soft power efforts including intelligence gathering and efforts aimed at limiting the potential resonance of terrorist ideologies in the ordinary people’s perspectives and beliefs (2012, pp. 108-109). An overreliance on the military dimension of government responses to terrorism might even be counterproductive, as argued by Frey (2004) and Wilkinson (2011).

In the end of July 2009, the Nigerian armed forces launched a large military operation against Boko Haram, especially against their headquarters in Maiduguri. Until around April and May 2010, this battle appeared to have resulted in the destruction of the sect. However, the developments since then prove the contrary; Boko Haram resurfaced stronger and more violent than ever before, it even exceeded so-called Islamic State regarding the number of fatalities. This development, especially when bearing in mind the presumed destruction of the sect in July 2009, raises questions about what happened in the period July 2009 to April/May 2010. This specific topic of interest combined with the notion regarding the overreliance on military force as being counterproductive, results in the second hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: The large and brutal military operations performed by the Nigerian armed forces, especially in Maiduguri, in July 2009 have been counterproductive; they contributed to Boko Haram resurfacing stronger and more violent than ever before in April/May 2010.

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5 RESEARCH DESIGN

5.1 Objectives

The primary objective of this research, is to find out how successive Nigerian governments have dealt with the Boko Haram challenge since it evolved into a wider insurgency in the period 2009 to 2016. The primary objective is achieved when a clear understanding of the prevalent government approaches to the Boko Haram issue is obtained Furthermore, the two secondary objectives are:

(i) Firstly, after having analysed the Nigerian case, it would be satisfying to be able to offer a recommendation for peaceful co-existence for the country’s (near) future;

(ii) Secondly, in case effective government responses are observed, they might offer guidelines for other governments dealing with comparable religious militancy issues.

Determining the achievement of these secondary objectives is somewhat more ambitious than determining whether or not a clear understanding of government responses is obtained. Firstly, due to the complex nature of the case and, secondly, the production of generalizable results is hampered by the type of research conducted, which will be discussed in the next section.

5.2 Type of Research

This thesis is based on a descriptive research, which best fits a type of research that attempts to systematically describe government responses (Kumar, 2011, p. 9). Since the research focuses on a variety of aspects related to just one case, it is classified as a holistic single-n case study. The selection of just one case enables the researcher to take multiple relevant aspects regarding the phenomenon under study into account, instead of selecting a limited number of aspects pertaining to multiple cases. This enhances the understanding of the particular topic under study even when resources are relatively limited, which is the case when one has to rely mainly on secondary sources (Lijphart, 1971, p. 691). Furthermore, this type of research fits the researcher’s desire to monitor a phenomenon over time, by repeatedly measuring the same phenomenon at various points in time. Thus, the intensive approach of a

single-n case study enables this research to acquire in-depth knowledge concerning a

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The theoretical framework has outlined which theoretical categories of counterterrorism measures are applied to the case of Nigeria’s struggle with Boko Haram. Since the thesis is based on a descriptive research, the purpose of this thesis is to describe whether or which of these categories are observed in the particular case. Thus, the analysis includes sections that describe the observed measures, placed within their respective categories. Some categories of government responses are preceded by additional information about the case, in order to place the responses of that category in a relevant context. By following this design, this thesis aims to have offered a clear oversight of all relevant approaches, measures, and initiatives as undertaken by successive Nigerian governments between 2009 and 2016.

5.3 Methods

This thesis exclusively makes use of qualitative research methods. In order to answer the central research question, actual government responses have to be analysed. The theoretical framework outlines the categories of government responses that will be looked for in the case of Nigeria. The conclusion of the research then contains a clear understanding of the applied government responses. In order to strengthen the internal validity of the research, triangulation of methods is a profitable research strategy. By using multiple methods to acquire data from various kinds of data sources, rather than relying on just one method, more accurate and complete results can be expected (Swanborn, 2010, p. 160). Therefore, this thesis project makes use of this triangulation method; it contains the following: reviewing existing literature, content analysis, and two semi-structured interviews. Through these different approaches, both secondary and primary data are obtained. Firstly, a part of the research is devoted to the interpretation of secondary data sources such as encyclopaedias, academic articles, and books, written by scholars in the field of Nigeria, Boko Haram, counter-terrorism, religion, and the Sharia law system. In addition, several governmental and organizational reports are used as well, including the US Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism, International Religious Freedom Reports, Human Rights Watch reports, and International Crisis Group reports. Secondly, parts of the research are devoted to content analysis of primary data, such as the Nigerian Constitution, Nigeria’s terrorism-related legislative acts, speech acts by key government figures, and online newspaper articles from both the Nigerian and the international press. Thirdly, two semi-structured interviews will be conducted, producing primary data, in order to gather insights and opinions of experts

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regarding the subject. The African Studies Centre in Leiden, a multidisciplinary academic knowledge institute solely devoted to the study of Africa, will be contacted and asked if two of their experts are willing to talk about the topic of this thesis.

5.4 Justification

Terrorism is all but a new phenomenon; Rapoport (2004) distinguished four waves of terrorism of which the first ‘anarchist wave’ started around 1880. The terror attacks that struck the United States on 11 September 2001 have dramatically increased the amount of attention devoted to the phenomenon within the fields of academics, politics, and society as a whole. However, despite this increased attention, some aspects of the phenomenon are still under researched. Counterterrorism policies are amongst these under researched topics and are in need of further research (Schmid, 2011, p. 76). Furthermore, a Campbell systematic review on counter-terrorism research found that the vast majority of all research are so-called ‘thought pieces’, theoretical discussions, or opinions. Only 1 per cent of the reviewed articles were case studies that offered in-depth analyses of a particular case. Besides, of all reviewed articles, just a small fraction dealt with a variety of responses to terrorism, or counterterrorism, whereas a significant larger amount was devoted to weapons of mass destruction (Lum, Kennedy, & Sherley, 2006, pp. 492-493).

The scientific relevance of this thesis stems from the aforementioned shortcomings. This thesis aims to contribute to tackling these in two ways. Firstly, it deals with the under researched topic of counterterrorism and, secondly, it is a case study that provides a more in-depth analysis of a particular topic than a thought piece would do.

The societal relevance of this thesis stems from the fact that nowadays, terrorism, and thus also counterterrorism, is considered a highly topical issue. Especially in the immediate aftermath of terrorist attacks, members of society ranging from academics to politicians to the ordinary citizen engage in an open debate, asking themselves and others what should be done against terrorism. A substantial part of the answer to this question may lie in the analysis of government responses to terrorism. With the eventual goal of assessing the effectiveness of government responses, a description of what actually has been done appears to be a good starting point. This thesis does exactly that; it illustrates in which ways subsequent Nigerian governments have responded to Boko Haram.

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The first limitation that should be addressed logically stems from the chosen research type, which is the single-n case study. After having researched just one case, the produced results are unlikely to be generalizable to contexts other than the Nigerian case (Lijphart, 1971, p. 691). Another limitation stems from the case of Nigeria itself. Data obtained from Nigerian news websites are not always trustworthy, since reporters sometimes tend to write according to their own opinion or even to the opinion of the incumbent president. This potentially damages both the reliability and validity of the facts concerning, for instance, a major military operation or terrorist attack. Furthermore, both governmental and parliamentary online sources are messy to say the least. There is no such thing as an archive in which legislation or communication documents are stored orderly, the websites themselves are from time to time inaccessible altogether. Due to these difficulties, an analysis of data obtained from these sources may lack accuracy.

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6 CASE DESCRIPTION

Nigeria is a highly complex country, historically divided along the lines of ethnicity, religion, and language. Before this thesis elaborates on the pivotal part in this research, the analysis, it is helpful to first get accustomed with the country to which the analysis relates. This chapter serves this purpose, although it describes far from every imaginable aspect of Nigeria. Instead, it focuses on those aspects deemed relevant for the following chapters. Firstly, a brief political history of Nigeria will be discussed. Secondly, the country’s demographics is outlined. Thirdly, the history of the domestic conflict is addressed. Fourthly and lastly, a collection of five religious militant movements is discussed, which, to varying degrees, pose a threat to present-day Nigeria.

6.1 Brief political history of Nigeria

From the beginning of the 19th century, the creation of several protectorates in what is now known as Nigeria, had served British interests in trade and in the ending of slavery. It eventually led to the establishment of the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria and the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. On 1 January 1914, the two protectorates were amalgamated into the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria, however they remained administrated separately. The British chose to administer Nigeria through indirect rule, leaving local government in the hands of traditional rulers, who were subjugated to British oversight. These rulers, before the British arrived, had governed a variety of kingdoms and empires, such as the Hausa states of Kano, Katsina, and Zaria and the Kanem-Borno empire in the North, as well as the Yoruba states of Ife and Oyo in the South. The administrative system of indirect rule was designed to prevent all these separate states and populations to join forces and revolt against the colonial rulers. By leaving Muslim leaders in charge, the British accepted that the spread of Western education by Christian missionaries was resisted in the North (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2016). This prevented different populations to unite. However it also led to the asymmetrical development of Nigeria that has resulted in various problematic issues, some of which are still present today. Besides, because of earlier colonial experiences, the British were wary of removing traditional Muslim rulers in the North, since that might evoke popular protest. They therefore left the Fulani aristocracy in charge, along with their legal system of Sharia, thereby isolating North from South. These intentional ethnic and religious divisions have been at the

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root of much of the inter-ethnic and inter-religious conflicts that followed after the country’s independence on 1 October 1960 (Mahmud, 2009, p. 118) (Comolli, 2015, pp. 17-18).

Nigeria’s road after independence in 1960 has been full of troubles. The British division of the country in three regions (North, South-East, and South-West) that all had significant influence, inhabited by the largest ethnic groups (respectively Hausa-Fulani, Igbo, and Yoruba), largely contributed to the secession attempt of Biafra, which started the Nigerian Civil War in 1967. At the start of the war, the First Republic had already been replaced by Nigeria’s first military junta, which lasted until 1979. The Second Republic, like its predecessor, was short-lived. It began in 1979 and already ended in 1983. It was succeeded by the second military junta, which ended in 1999, when Nigeria returned to civilian rule, and started the Fourth Republic of Nigeria, which as of today remains the country’s form of government (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2016).

6.2 Demographics 6.2.1 Population

According to a July 2015 estimate, Nigeria is Africa’s most populous and the world’s eighth most populous country, inhabited by 181,562,056 people - an enormous increase when compared to the 33,000,000 inhabitants in 1950 (Central Intelligence Agency, 2016). The Nigerian population has grown, is growing rapidly, and will continue to do so in the future. A United Nations projection estimates Nigeria’s population to have reached 399 million in 2050 (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2015, p. 4). Consequently, the Nigerian population is relatively young. Slightly less than two-thirds is younger than the age of 25 and the remaining third, apart from seven percent older persons, consists of people between 35 and 54 years old. Regarding the worldwide rankings of median age (18,2 years) and life expectancy at birth (53 years), Nigeria is situated at the bottom of both rankings when compared to other countries in the world. Only a dozen other African countries reveal statistics worse than Nigeria (Central Intelligence Agency, 2016).

6.2.2 Religion

In addition to Nigeria being Africa’s most populous country, it also accounts for the largest number of believers in Africa, which logically stems from the fact that almost every Nigerian citizen adheres to at least one religion. Two religions dominate the country’s religious sphere: Islam and Christianity. Exact statistics are hard to come by, but there is a general agreement on a 50/50 division between these two religions. Roughly 90% of Nigerian Muslims are Sunni Muslims, divided among Sufi groups such as Tijaniyah and Qadiriyyah, following the Maliki

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school of Islamic law. There is also a growing minority of Salafi movements. The remaining 10% are Shia Muslims, who are spread throughout northern Nigeria, especially in Sokoto State. As to the different branches of Christianity, numerous churches can be found in Nigeria, including: Roman Catholics, Anglicans, Baptists, and Presbyterians (American Foreign Policy Council, 2013, p. 6; Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2014, p. 2). A minority of Nigerians practices indigenous beliefs, some even combine them with one of the main religions. Before British colonial rule, the majority of Nigerians adhered to indigenous beliefs or to Islam. The British, however, discouraged the indigenous practices to such an extent that once the country became independent, the overwhelming majority of Nigerians adhered to either Islam or Christianity. Together with ethnic divisions, which will be discussed hereafter, the two main religions are generally understood to be divided into two geographical areas. In Northern Nigeria, the majority of the population is Muslim, while in Southern Nigeria, the majority is Christian. Originally, both geographical areas are also inhabited by sizable groups from the minority religion (i.e. Christians in the North, Muslims in the South). However, due to the ongoing Boko Haram violence in Northern Nigeria, especially Christians have fled the region in the last couple of years. This development is further described in the section on internal displacement. As to the Middle Belt, the geographical area situated between North and South, roughly half the population is Muslim, the other half Christian, thereby representing the general picture of religious divisions in Nigeria (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2016).

6.2.3 Ethnic groups

Regarding ethnic groups, Nigeria is roughly divided into three regions, which correspond to the three largest ethnic groups: the Hausa and Fulani (29% of the total population) in northern Nigeria, the Yoruba (21%) in southwestern Nigeria, and the Igbo (18%) in south-eastern Nigeria. Beside these, over 250 other ethnic groups inhabit the country, some of those of significant size and political influence: Ijaw (10%), Kunari (4%), Ibibio (3,5%), and Tiv (2,5%) (Central Intelligence Agency, 2016). Roughly two-thirds of these smaller ethnic groups are located in northern states. The smaller ethnic groups tend to cluster around the three largest groups, which gives Nigeria a tripolar ethnic structure (Mustapha, 2006, p. 2). This regional ethnic structure resulted from colonial policies, which were based on divide-and-rule principles and left the three regions with a substantial degree of self-government after the country’s independence in 1960. Not only did this reinforce a feeling of separateness between the three largest ethnic groups, it contributed to a North-South division as well. As

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mentioned earlier, this division is also given a religious dimension, as the North is mostly populated by Muslims and the South by Christians (Forest, 2012, p. 19; Mohammed, 2014, p. 11).

6.3 Recent history of domestic conflict

Since its independence in 1960, Nigeria has faced multiple domestic conflicts that are driven by varying causes. The Nigerian Civil War, during which the Igbo people declared the independent Republic of Biafra (1967-1970), has been the first major conflict since independence. However, this chapter only highlights those conflicts that have occurred more recently. Two are described, both for different reasons. Firstly, the conflict in the Niger Delta, which started in the early 2000s, is described, because it is relatively recent and shares some similarities with the Boko Haram insurgency regarding government responses (Akpan, Ekanem, & Olofu-Adeoye, 2014, p. 153). Secondly, the Maitatsine uprisings of the 1980s are described, because these events share similarities with the Boko Haram insurgency regarding Islamic fundamentalism (Adesoji, 2011, p. 100). Describing these two previous conflicts sheds a light on how the Nigerian government has dealt with domestic conflict recently as well as how it approached religiously motivated domestic conflict in the past.

6.3.1 Conflict in the Niger Delta

The conflict in the Niger Delta can be attributed to what Ibeanu (2000) calls “a contradiction of securities” (2000, p. 24). Put simply, the contradiction in the Niger Delta arises between different perceptions of what security should be. State officials and petro business actors, on the one hand, desire an untroubled crude oil industry, of which they benefit both economically and financially. On the other hand, local communities demand their interests to be recognized and seriously dealt with, including their environmental, economical, and physical suffering as well as their marginal share in the profits from the crude oil industry. Here, the state should interfere as mediator, striving for consensus and proper management of these contradictions. The Nigerian state, however, has not been able to rise above the competing parties. Instead of serving the interests of Nigerian people, the state has been privatized by the rulers with oil revenues as main source of income (Ibeanu, 2000, pp. 24-25).

The Niger Delta has seen multiple opposition groups with varying interests and objectives come and go. Some of them used violence, some did not. Some were genuinely concerned about local grievances over oil and gas pollution, infrastructure, poverty, and the

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region’s marginal share in oil revenues, some were not. The most important militant group involved in the armed struggle with oil companies and the federal government, is the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). Their militant activities, which started in 2006, severely impacted on Nigeria’s main revenue source: export from the oil industry (International Crisis Group, 2015, p. 1).

Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND)

In January 2006, MEND became publicly known as the group responsible for kidnapping a group of Western oil workers in the Niger Delta (Asuni, 2009, p. 3). The group’s emergence resulted from talks in 2005 between the leaders of various militia groups that were active in the Niger Delta states, who agreed upon using violence by attacking oil installations and illegally bunkering oil. Following the kidnapping, in March 2006 they demanded increased political participation, increased involvement in the oil and gas industry, socioeconomic development, and reduced militarization of the Niger Delta (Asuni, 2009, pp. 17-18). Despite its creation being based on an agreement between several militia leaders, MEND should not be seen as a coherent militant organization. Instead, MEND is better characterized as an overarching entity. Right from its origin, groups joined and left constantly. Some were advancing their own goals rather than the common goals as formulated in March 2006 and only joined temporarily for particular operations. Furthermore, there seemed to be no agreement concerning the modus operandi. While some groups tried to address injustices felt by the population through dialogue, others chose to engage with oil companies and the federal government through armed struggle. Particularly those who chose to take up arms, soon set aside their initial justifiable goals and shifted towards criminal activities in order to enrich themselves (Asuni, 2009, p. 6).

Government responses

Back in 2000, over eighty percent of government revenues came from Nigeria’s oil industry. In other words, the survival of government officials and agencies largely depends on oil revenues (Ibeanu, 2000, p. 21). Consequently, the Nigerian government understandably gives high priority to protecting this particular industry against all sorts of disruptions.

In analysing government responses to the Niger Delta conflict, a rough distinction can be made between pre-2009 (starting in 2005) and post-2009. Before 2009, the predominantly military approach to protecting the government’s oil interests, has contributed to the violent escalation of justifiable and nonviolent protests and demands, leading to an all-out armed

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struggle (Akpan, Ekanem, & Olofu-Adeoye, 2014, p. 153). Due to the use of considerable military force against unarmed political activist groups, these groups increasingly felt the need to arm themselves and fight for the survival of their people (Forest J. J., 2012, p. 47). Thus, this approach contributed to the transformation of those groups into armed militia organizations such as MEND. The military was instructed to tackle the opposition groups of the Niger Delta. However contrary to these instructions, the military has aided the militant cause, both directly and indirectly. Directly, in cases where corrupt military personnel participated in criminal endeavours such as oil bunkering. After disagreeing on how the profits of oil bunkering should be divided, militant groups sought additional weaponry to fight off the military. Indirectly, by the overwhelming presence of military personnel in the Delta region combined with their brutal and violent behaviour, which drove ordinary civilians into the hands of militants, leading to an increased popular support for militant groups (Asuni, 2009, p. 14).

The 2009 Presidential Amnesty Program has proven to be a key turning point in the Niger Delta conflict. This program aimed at the disarmament of militant groups by offering amnesty to the militants and offering them also both training and reintegration opportunities. Between 2009 and 2011, over 30,000 alleged militants signed up for the program. As a result of this program, the number of kidnappings and attacks on oil installations has decreased drastically (International Crisis Group, 2015, p. 2). However, at least one of several criticisms pertaining to the amnesty program should be mentioned. The program also contains monthly payments of $ 500 per militant, in a country where the minimum wage is around $ 130 (Comolli, 2015, p. 119). Besides the downside of being very expensive, it also gives little incentive to former militants to reintegrate into society, where they will be paid less for a regular job. Such a program could be translated into simply paying former militants to not commit violent offences, every month again, a rather dubious situation.

Looking at the program’s primary objective of disarming the Niger Delta’s militants and stabilizing the overall security situation in the region, it has proven to be rather successful. Besides a decrease in numbers of kidnapping and attacks, the oil production tripled in the same time period 2009 – 2011, after it had decreased following the attacks on oil installations. However, as of 2015, kidnappings again seem to have increased gradually, although accurate statistics are missing. Furthermore, although most groups affiliated with MEND have accepted the amnesty program, some shadowy leaders and their followers continued to threaten violence (International Crisis Group, 2015, pp. 1-2). This again points at the unstructured, incoherent, and diverse features that characterize MEND.

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6.3.2 Maitatsine uprisings

In the early 19th century, a teacher following the Maliki school called Sheikh Usman dan Fodio waged a jihad in Northern Nigeria against the ruling Hausa elite, whom he loathed for being corrupt and blamed for being apostate. His jihad culminated in the establishment of the Sharia-governed Sokoto Caliphate in 1809 and started the region’s history of militant religiosity (Hickey, 1984, p. 251). The conquest of the Sokoto Caliphate by the British colonizers in 1903, opened the region up to the influence of a secular political power. The colonisers initiated the process of separating religion and the state, which were tightly interwoven prior to this conquest (Falola, 1998, p. 50). Due to, inter alia, this fundamental change, many Muslim Northerners felt uncomfortable and rejected Westernization in general and Western education in particular, a sentiment that has been at the core of the Maitatsine uprisings in the 1980s.

Muhammed Marwa

Usman dan Fodio’s jihad brought a deeply conservative version of Islam to Northern Nigeria. Muhammed Marwa, an Islamic scholar and preacher strongly inspired by Usman dan Fodio’s view on Islam, had migrated from Cameroon to Kano (Kano State) in 1945. He established and became leader of the radical Islamic sect Maitatsine, which also became his personal nickname, meaning ‘the one who curses’. Maitatsine strived for the purification of Islam and was opposed to the corrupting influence of modernization and Western presence (Falola, 1998, p. 146). He opposed modernization to such an extreme extent, that he even cursed those who read any book other than the Quran, as well as those who made use of watches and even bicycles (American Foreign Policy Council, 2013, p. 4). Furthermore, the secularity of the Nigerian state was a significant thorn in the sect’s side. Marwa’s opposition to Western influence, to the affluent elites whom he portrayed as infidels and hypocrites, and to secular authorities, appealed to the urban poor in Kano. Furthermore, his promise to get rid of what he considered ‘detestable entities’ while the promise of bringing God’s redemption and salvation, attracted the urban Muslim poor. Among these poor are the Almajirai, poor and wandering Quranic students who lead a simple lifestyle and beg on the streets for alms (Hickey, 1984, pp. 252-253).

Uprisings and government responses

The Maitatsine uprisings consist of a chain of riots throughout Northern Nigeria, the largest of which took place in Kano State (1980), Kaduna State (1982), Adamawa State (1984), and

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Bauchi State (1985) (Adesoji, 2011, p. 101). Arguably the most significant of these, were the first in this sequence: the December 1980 riots in Kano State, where the Maitatsine sect attempted to take over Kano City’s central mosque. Initially, the local police responded, however soon they received assistance of the Nigerian Army due to their inability to deal with the large amount of involved sect members. The military took over leading position of the operation and engaged in severe clashes with the sect’s followers, which lasted for eleven days. In the end, over 4,000 people were confirmed dead, most of whom were Maitatsine followers. The extensive use of military force against the December 1980 riots also resulted in Marwa himself being killed. The uprisings did not end there, but continued for four more years, until 1985. As in all previous riots during the five-year uprisings, again in 1985, the Nigerian government used its military might to crush the Maitatsine sect. During this last major confrontation, thousands of sect members were killed, which ended the sect’s existence, although some argue that a Maitatsine offspring called ‘Kala Kato’ still commands some level of following (Comolli, 2015, pp. 41-42).

6.4 Religious militant movements in Nigeria

Today, Nigeria faces thousands numerous Islamist groups and movements, varying in size, beliefs, objectives, and so on (American Foreign Policy Council, 2013, p. 2). This paragraph deals with four Islamist movements, three of which are seen as the most prominent of them all, namely: Boko Haram, and Maitatsine/Kala Kato, and Izala. Ansaru is the fourth movement described here, for it is considered the most extreme and violent off-shoot that has emerged from Boko Haram. This paragraph emphasizes Boko Haram, since this particular movement is generally believed to be the most extremist movement in and biggest security threat to Nigeria.

6.4.1 Boko Haram

In much of the world, the most notorious and radical Salafist-jihadist sect of Nigeria is known by the name of Boko Haram. However, the current leader has never adopted this name and prefers to call his sect Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad, which means People

Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad (Comolli, 2015, p. 50).

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There is no generally accepted account about the exact origins of Boko Haram. According to Nigerian security forces, the group emerged from a conservative non-violent Islamic youth movement that was established at the University of Maiduguri (Borno State) in 1995, of which a man called Mohamed Yusuf became the leader in 2002. Another version points at a select group of radical youth who isolated themselves from a Maiduguri mosque in 2002, showing its discontent towards both the city’s administration and the local religious establishment. In 2004, Mohamed Yusuf is believed to have become the group’s leader, when its members returned to Maiduguri after their base in Kanama was destroyed by Nigerian security forces. Yet another explanation points to a group of students, who left the University of Maiduguri in 2000 in order to follow the teachings of a foreign preacher, who denounced Western education for being contrary to Islam. Mohamed Yusuf, who was already preaching at a Maiduguri mosque, became influenced by this group’s views and in 2002 set up his own teaching institution, which soon attracted growing numbers of pupils. Finally, a fourth version traces Boko Haram’s origins back to the early 1990s. A student named Mohamed Yusuf disagreed with his teacher on several theological topics, whereupon he dissociated himself and established his own sect. Yusuf’s sect strongly opposed Nigeria’s secular education system as well as modern Islamic teaching, Nigerian institutions, and refused to accept the Sultan of Sokoto to be the head of all Nigerian Muslims. Although these four accounts differ significantly on date of origin and key motives, one element seems to be ever-present and agreed upon: the involvement of Mohamed Yusuf, who is considered Boko Haram’s original leader or front-man shortly after it emerged, whether that took place in the 1990s or early 2000s (Comolli, 2015, pp. 46-49). Dispute between Yusuf and Ja’far Mahmud Adam (Izala), Yusuf’s former teacher, eventually led to Yusuf separating from him. The disagreed on several issues. Mahmud Adam believed Western education was necessary for Muslims to eventually fight the Western enemy. Besides, instead of a militant struggle against Nigerian institutions, which he deemed counter-productive in the long-term, he propagated a slowly Islamization process of these institutions (Loimeier, 2012, pp. 148-150)

2002/2003 – 2008

On 21 September 2004, members of the sect attacked two police stations in Borno State, to which a joint force of police and military personnel responded, killing 24 attackers. But in general, this early phase of Boko Haram is generally described as one of relative calm. Apart from sporadic hit-and-run attacks, the period between 2002/2003 and 2008 saw few militant activities, and thus few clashes with security forces (Onuoha, 2010, p. 56; Comolli, 2015, p.

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51). Consequently, the government did not take the sect seriously and paid little attention to its militant yet mostly unarmed activities. The fact that Yusuf fled to Sudan and later Saudi Arabia, following the September 2004 clashes, may have contributed to this limited government attention (Loimeier, 2012, p. 150).

2009 – present-day

After Yusuf’s death in July 2009, his former second-in-command, Abubakar Shekau, took over Boko Haram’s leadership in April 2010. From this moment onwards, the group assumed a more radical ideology and became more violent than before (Comolli, 2015, p. 60). Agbiboa speaks of “…the recommencement of Boko Haram attacks in 2010…”, which he attributes to the desire for revenge that was strongly present among Boko Haram members, after their leader Yusuf had been extra-judicially killed in 2009 (Agbiboa, 2013b). Considering the sect’s modus operandi before and during Shekau’s leadership, a worrisome development can be observed. Whereas previously occasional hit-and-run attacks were carried out, shortly after Shekau took over, more sophisticated tactics and more advanced weapons were used. For example, before 2010, machetes, clubs, and knives were commonly used to harass and assault both civilians and police officers in Boko Haram’s area of operations. Gradually changing from 2010 onwards, vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), rocked propelled grenades, and even T-55 tanks were deployed in more strategically planned attacks (Falode, 2016, pp. 43-44). Another and more recent disturbing development regarding Boko Haram’s tactics, is the increased use of children as suicide bombers in North-eastern Nigeria and neighbouring countries, especially Cameroon. A 2016 UNICEF report stated that in 2014, four children had been used as suicide bombers, but in 2015 and the first month of 2016, that number had dramatically increased to 44, with one out of five suicide bombers being a child (UNICEF , 2016, p. 2).

Boko Haram’s Objectives

Over time, Boko Haram has been quite ambiguous on its objectives. However, the overarching objective of Boko Haram has been the creation of an Islamic state in Northern Nigeria, ideally in the rest of Nigeria as well (Forest J. J., 2012, p. 58) (International Crisis Group, 2014, p. 9).

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According to the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), compiled by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), from the July 2009 Battle of Maiduguri until 31 December 2014, 1,313 incidents or attacks could be attributed to Boko Haram. The majority of these targeted private citizens or property (554), the second-most targeted type is the Nigerian police force (328), followed by the military (138). Religious figures or institutions were targeted on 120 occasions, federal government representatives or institutions on 122 occasions, and educational institutions were targeted on 78 occasions, fewer than businesses (95). Prior to 2011, the majority of Boko Haram’s attacks targeted institutional entities and symbols, especially police and security forces. Other attacks, driven by the sect’s interest in the purification of Islam, targeted Muslims, either those who worked for, or cooperated with, state authorities, or those who were deemed apostate or hypocrite. According to Cook (2011), Boko Haram’s targets between September 2010 and September 2011 could be divided into seven target categories: military; police; teachers and universities; banks and markets; purification attacks on beer drinkers and card players; Christian targets, and individuals of their interest, who were assassinated. In contrast to many other fundamentalist Islamist groups, Boko Haram rarely attacked Christians in 2010. However, starting with the major attacks in Damaturu in Yobe State on 4 November 2011 and the Christmas Day attacks in 2011, Boko Haram initiated its campaign of frequently targeting Christians. Apart from two exceptions, the bombing of the UN headquarters in Abuja (2011) and the kidnapping of a French family in Cameroon (2013), up until 2011 Boko Haram’s targets had all been national targets (Cook, 2011). However, this has not remained true for the years following Cook’s 2011 observation. On 19 February 2013, Boko Haram committed its first act outside of Nigeria. Boko Haram members kidnapped seven French tourists in neighboring Cameroon, after which they took them into northern Nigeria, demanding the release of detained comrades who were being held in both Nigeria and Cameroon. Both governments eventually responded by releasing an unknown number of Boko Haram prisoners, in addition to paying ransom, after which the hostages were released (START, n.d.a). In subsequent years, Boko Haram increased its operations in Cameroon. The GTD evidences this increase. In 2014, Boko Haram reportedly carried out 56 attacks in Cameroon, mainly against civilians and security forces (START, n.d.b). Since the end of 2014, Boko Haram has also crossed Nigeria’s borders with Chad (through Cameroon or by vessels across Lake Chad) and Niger, now operating in an area to which is commonly referred as the Lake Chad region (Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism, 2016, p. 11). The first Boko Haram attack on Chadian soil took place on 13 February 2015, when members

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of the sect crossed Lake Chad at night. The attack ended after a confrontation with Chadian forces; reportedly four civilians were killed by the sect (Vanguard, 2015).

6.4.2 Ansaru

After a series of attacks in Kano State in January 2012, which resulted in the death of 150 mostly Muslim innocent civilians, a faction called ‘Ansaru’ broke from Boko Haram, reportedly due to its discontent with Boko Haram’s indiscriminate killing of Muslims (American Foreign Policy Council, 2014, p. 8). The faction’s full name is Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan, which means Vanguard for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa, leaving little doubt about the group’s primary concern. Shortly after Ansaru splintered from Boko Haram, the U.S. Department of State considered the emergence of this faction, taking into account its alleged ties with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), a matter of particular concern to the United States, since the group had prioritized targeting Westerners, including Americans (Bureau of Counterterrorism, 2013, p. 27). Ansaru was designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization in November 2013, after several incidents had taken place. Among these were kidnappings of both Nigerian and foreign civilians and multiple attacks on Nigerian government and security officials. The exact size of Ansaru’s membership is unknown, yet it is estimated that Ansaru is significantly smaller than Boko Haram. The identity of its leadership is also unclear, although an AQIM-linked designated terrorist called Khalid al-Barnawi is supposedly in charge. Remarkably, as to 2014, no attacks have been attributed to Ansaru. This is possibly due to, despite its disapproval of the indiscriminate killing of Muslims, Ansaru still cooperates with Boko Haram since their overall objectives remain quite similar (Bureau of Counterterrorism, 2015, pp. 355-356; Comolli, 2015, p. 67).

6.4.3 Maitatsine/Kala Kato

The Maitatsine uprisings of the 1980s have been covered in a previous chapter. That chapter ended mentioning Maitatsine’s ‘successor’, as claimed by the successors themselves, Kala Kato. Its name has been interpreted as meaning ‘Those who say “A mere man said it”’, which refers to their belief that the Prophet’s teachings were words spoken by a human, not by a divine entity. This traces back to Maitatsine’s leader Marwa, who used this idea when he declared himself to be a prophet (Adesoji, 2011, p. 116). The current Kala Kato movement is led by the prominent Islamic scholar Mallam Salisu, who claims not to be connected to Boko Haram. Kala Kato ideologically differs from Boko Haram, stating that only the Quran provides a reliable guide for Muslims (Umar, 2012, p. 120). In July 2009, the Nigerian government issued restrictions on preaching outdoors, which followed clashes with Boko

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Haram. When Kala Kato members disobeyed the ordinance five months later, several clashes with the security forces occurred. These led to the deaths of approximately 70 people (American Foreign Policy Council, 2013, pp. 4-5).

6.4.4 Izala

Izala’s full name is Jama’t Izalat al Bid’a Wa Iqamat as Sunna, which means Society of the Eradication of Innovation and Implementation of the Sunna. The movement was established by Abubakar Gumi and Ismaila Idris in 1978, as a result of their break with Sufism due to ideological disagreements with Sufi Brotherhoods. Since its establishment, Izala has been a growing Salafist movement of reform, particularly opposing the traditional Sufi orders that practice acts of bidaa (innovation/heresy), while striving for the purification of Islam. Over the past years, members of the Izala movement have obtained positions in institutions throughout the country, at local, state, and federal levels. It has grown to one of the largest Islamic societies in Nigeria, a success partly attributed to its claim of having been the main initiator of the reintroduction of Sharia criminal law around 2000, as well as to its emphasis on educating women and self-sufficiency in financial matters. Besides, Izala actively encourages education even in often neglected rural areas, albeit in their own ‘modern’ Islamic schools. This development aimed at education has been criticized by Boko Haram’s Yusuf from the start (Loimeier, 2012, pp. 141, 149; American Foreign Policy Council, 2013, p. 5). Another significant factor that contributed to the movement’s success, is the extensive financial support, given by donors from both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (Comolli, 2015, pp. 36-37). Compared with the Islamist movements discussed so far, Izala is a rather peaceful movement. Although, in earlier times, they actively fought the Sufi orders, but had to become more moderate and even found themselves eventually cooperating with the Sufis out of political convenience, when faced with a rise of Pentecostal Christianity in northern Nigeria during the 1987 local government elections, while the Muslim vote was split among the Sufi brotherhoods and Izala (Loimeier, 2012, p. 143).

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7 ANALYSIS

7.1 Responses to underlying grievances 7.1.1 Context

This section deals with the role of religion in Nigerian society, since religion is deemed such an important aspect of Nigerian society. Although religion is formally separated from the state, arguably the opposite is true for the role it plays in the majority of Nigerians’ everyday lives, and thus in society. On first sight, for example by looking at statistics on religiosity, the importance of religion is perhaps most obvious with regard to the private sphere, in which religion constitutes a vital part of life (Akinyoade, 2016, p. 75). According to a 2012 worldwide poll on religiosity and atheism, only Ghana was inhabited by a larger percentage of religious people than Nigeria (94% and 93%, respectively), and just 1% of Nigerians openly qualified themselves as convinced atheists (WIN-Gallup International, 2012, p. 4). Nigerian atheists are exceptions to the rule; however more atheists might actually inhabit Nigeria but prefer to remain silent, since the issue is considered taboo and even punishable in Sharia states (i.e. atheism is interpreted the same way as apostasy). Taking a closer look reveals that religion penetrates the public, societal sphere as well. Two particular elements of religion in society are discussed: the educational system as well as religious conflicts and tolerance.

Religion in educational system

The first example of religion penetrating the public sphere that is considered, is Nigeria’s educational system, particularly in northern Nigeria. Education in northern Nigeria has been a major concern for decades. During the colonial era, the British had done little to either reform or add secular schools to northern Nigeria’s predominantly Islamic education system. This lack of interference is ascribed to the British policy of avoiding tensions with their Muslim subjects, since northerners associated secular education with Christian missionaries, who had introduced secular schools in the South. Besides, limited financial resources and an overall fear of self-conscious opponents to its rule made the British reluctant to interfere with traditional the traditional education system. Therefore, immediately after the British left, doubts about northerners’ ability to educate ‘modern’ citizens, who were capable of contributing to the newly united Nigeria, instead of remaining within their religious boundaries, due to the presence of mainly Islamic schools (Hoechner, 2014, p. 68). This concern, although significant and worth further consideration, falls short to the concern that is highlighted here: the widespread assumption of Boko Haram finding easy recruits among

The 'flip-flop' approach to terrorism. An Analysis of the Responses of Successive Nigerian Governments to the ongoing Insurgency of Boko Haram