France's (homo)sexual enemy : a Foucauldian discourse analysis of the Front National (1980-2018)

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FRANCE’S

(

_HOMO

)

_SEXUAL

ENEMY,

A FOUCAULDIAN

DISCOURSE

ANALYSIS OF THE

FRONT NATIONAL

(

_1980-2018)

Lou Mousset – 11782625 Sociology: Gender, Sexuality And Society Graduate School Of Social Science - Uva Dr. Sarah Bracke Dr. Paul Mepschen 15 August 2018 26 118 words

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1. INTRODUCTION: ENGENDERING THE (FRONT) NATIONAL

In April 2018 I met a young woman in the south of France. She had been a member of the Front National (FN) for 13 years but had recently quit. She was bubbly, talkative and a little upset, as she was going through a tough breakup with her longtime girlfriend. At one point during the interview I asked what her opinion on Jean Marie Le Pen was. She told me that she “really likes him.” I felt the need to clarify why I was asking about him and mentioned some of his most famous quotes on homosexuality. Looking at the body of texts and images associated with Le Pen’s FN, it is clear that the party’s stance on homosexuality has historically been varied. In 1984, homosexuality was described by Jean Marie Le Pen as “a social and biological abnormality,” while in 2011, his daughter and current head of FN, Marine Le Pen stated that homosexuals are, “above all, French citizens.”’ Looking at the dates and the authors of these quotes, one wonders: what changed? How did it change? Those where my questions at first. I saw a linear evolution, a cohesive story waiting to be told. I thought maybe my interviewee will let me catch a glimpse from the story of how the perception of homosexuality by FN has developed from abnormality to citizenship. However, my conception of history was deeply flawed. My mistake was to identify a marked political difference between Jean Marie Le Pen and his daughter Marine Le Pen. I erroneously believed that homophobia had simply faded away from FN’s political arena, as if a cohesive process was taking place.

I met with three other members or ex-members of FN. Initially, I wanted to meet with fifteen gay members of FN and ask them how their sexuality relates to their political engagement. What did the Nation mean to them? Why FN? But after numerous unanswered phone calls, I had to accept that, except those four, nobody else would answer my questions. ‘I listen when

they speak, I listen when they are silent. Both words and silence are the text for me.’ wrote

Svetlana Alexievitch (1985). I wanted to read this silence. It led me to new questions. I wanted to understand how the idea of the Nation, so dear to FN, was opening or limiting the way one could speak of homosexuality. How does nationalism produce this silence? As a result, I switched my research question to: ‘how is homosexuality ‘put into words’ by FN?’ However, to find these words, I could not continue the interviews in the manner I had originally planned. As a result, I switched texts.

I started collecting interviews, manifestos, press releases, and campaign posters. Anything written or said about homosexuality by an FN member. From the silence of my interviewees, grew a deafening noise, and I could not gather together all these texts into one coherent story. But when I started to scrupulously analyze the data, I found an apparent contradiction and set of paradoxes that were only visible through the lens of a pre-defined chronology. Once I gave up on continuity and chose to see those texts as a different enunciation of homosexuality, the paradoxes disappeared. I was faced with different systems of meaning. The contradictions were

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the manifestations of different “ways of speaking” of homosexuality (Foucault 1972). Ultimately, what I needed to analyze were different discourses on homosexuality.

1.1. METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

For Michel Foucault, discourse generally refers to a set of statements that may belong to different fields, but that nevertheless obey common operating rules. Stuart Hall describes discourse as:

‘a group of statements which provide a language for talking about – a way of representing the knowledge about – a particular topic at a particular historical moment. Discourse is about the production of knowledge through language. But since all social practices entail meaning, and meanings shape and influence what we do – our conduct – all practices have a discursive aspect.’ (Hall, 1992 p.291).

Essentially, for Hall, discourse is defined as a system of representation, but one which entails both language and practices that produce meaning.

‘What interested [Foucault] were the rules and practices that produced meaningful statements and regulated discourse in different historical periods… Discourse constructs the topic. It defines and produces the objects of our knowledge.’ (Hall 1997)

This is one of the reasons why practices of Foucauldian Discourse Analysis (FDA) have spread beyond the field of pure linguistics. Even if linguistic approaches have been dominant for some time (Van Dijk, 1997), the Foucauldian conception of discourse as a social structure - and of discursive practices as social practices - opens the concept to various uses.

Discourse constructs the object itself, but it also defines the possibilities of understanding objects. Discourse facilitates and limits, enables and constrains, what can be said, by whom, where and when. (Hanna, 2014) For example, the homosexual subject only emerged in the 19th century (Foucault, 1984). There had been homosexual actions, behaviors well before, however, the concept of the homosexual itself is something that came into existence at a specific period. It brought a particular understanding, a specific way of constructing the subject via a range of medical, moral and legal discourses (Foucault, 1984). For Foucault (1984), that very notion of the homosexual defines the subject itself: people who are positioned as homosexual are seen as ‘sick’, ‘illegal’ or to be punished depending what aspect of the medical, moral and legal discourse is mobilized. Therefore, discourses define, allow and limit what can be done, what can be said and how people can behave. Discourses define how one can occupy these positions. This extends to the notion of the subjective self: it is not just that the subject accepts practices/discourses and the ideas that go with them, but that this subject locates and positions themselves on the same conceptual map. Because discourse dictates the roles which subjects take on, it is both a super-individual reality and a collective one. Discourse defines not only how individuals can think of themselves, but also the behavior which is expected of individuals pertaining to these subject positions. Discourse not only impacts us on an individual level (Butler, 1990), and a subjective level, but also regulates the social body at large.

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Discursive practices are productive. They are tied up with power and authorities. Knowledge is put to work via discursive practices to regulate the conduct of individuals within a particular society (Foucault, 1969). Discursive constructions of sexuality in a medical context results in medical control as do discursive constructions in a legal context result in control of the legal sphere. The very notion of sexuality not only describes practices, but at the same time enables control. Different discourses on sexuality underpin different ways in which people’s conduct and behaviors can be regulated. As a result, knowledge becomes a tool for power, both enabling and limiting social practices:

‘All knowledge, once applied in the real world, has real effects, and in that sense at least, “becomes true”. Knowledge does not operate in a void. It is put to work, through certain technologies and strategies of application, in specific situations, historical contexts and institutional regimes.’ (Hall 1997).

Feminist and postcolonial theorists have expressed particular interest in this conception of discourse. If the world is shaped by regimes of truth, then there are no innocent explanations of the world (Said, 1978). Spivak (1997) postulates that the act of speaking is, in fact, a way of

worlding: those who appropriate knowledge through propagating certain discourses,

appropriates the world.

Foucault rejects the idea that power only serves to constrain. Discursive power also produces reality, domains of object and rituals of truth. (Foucault, 1969) One particular way in which both constraint and enabling occurs is through what Foucault names ‘Dominant Discourses’. These are discursive complexes - and the subject positions that go with them - that tend to be privileged (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982). Dominant discourses privilege versions of social reality that legitimize existing power relations and social structures (Laclau, 2000). Some discourses are so entrenched in social consciousness that it is difficult to see how they could be challenged. They become ‘common sense’, and are therefore naturalized into existence. If discourse is understood as a force of socially accepted ‘truth’ that creates, supports and maintains hegemony, the burning question remains: what kind of truth? Whose truth? When Said (1978) analyzed European colonialism, they both looked for regimes of truth produced by colonialism. He interrogated the identity of the subject of colonialism; he asked, who is the ‘Other’ of the ‘Orient’? However, discourses are not eternal. They come and go, creating a historical record, or as Foucault conceptualizes it, a genealogy. Discourses change over time, they can appear and then disappear. Those dominant discourses are also connected to the institutions in which they’re embedded. They don’t simply exist in an ephemeral way in the language we use but are embedded in actual institutions and the various kinds of behaviors, psychology and regulations that go along these institutions. Discourses are not just ways of speaking and writing. By being bound up with institutional practices, they are also ways of organizing, regulating and administering social life. They are caught up in what Haraway (1991) describes as a ‘material-semantic knot.’ This ‘knot’ not only ties subjective experience to objects of knowledge, but also unifies discursive practices and non-discursive practices together.

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Because this thesis not only looks as discourse as a phenomenon, but more specifically, concerns discourse on sexuality on a macro level, I have chosen to employ FDA as a methodology. FDA focuses on discourse, referring explicitly to power and the politics behind it. Discourse does not relate solely to written text, relating to anything that has meaning or can give things meanings. Discourse relates to a whole range of visual texts as well, including pictures, videos, icons or even adverts. In this sense, the focus of FDA is on a macro level. FDA is concerned with large scale objects, it might be public speeches, published books or whole TV programs and so on. After studying different FDA methodologies, I found that most FDA analysts propose methodological phases (Parker 1992; Willig 2008; Hanna 2014). I decided to follow the five methodological steps proposed in Willig’s (2008) article “Towards a ‘critical

ontology of ourselves’?” because I found it to be a good synthesis of the methodological key

points of FDA.

1. The first step of FDA is to identify the discursive resources, the topic, and the themes. FDA focuses less strictly on grammar than on content. FDA requires the identification of ‘what is going on’ in the discourse you come across. Resources are not only about the explicit. Indirect references are important and so are missing statements or the unexpected. Identifying the object of a particular discourse is always the first step. 2. Then, FDA requires a close analysis of the relationship between discourses. There are

typically numerous contrasting discourses concerning particular objects and events. Objects may therefore be constructed in contradictory ways. Discourse is historically and culturally situated. From where has a particular discourse arisen? What institutions were associated with its growth and dominance? The second step focuses on the link between multiple discourses; how they come and go and how they contradict each other. 3. The third step is called action-orientation. What different constructions are being used? What or who gains (or loses) from that particular subject position? How do people use discourse in their normal speech and in various political contexts? This third step interrogates how the individual interacts with, uses and acts according to discourse. 4. The fourth step of FDA is an attention to positioning. What subject positions does the

discourse offer? What kinds of categories, what types of activities can people adopt for themselves or assign to others? What kind of actions do these subject positions make possible? What is prohibited by this positioning?

5. The final step of FDA is an investigation into power. By looking at power relations, FDA invites us to ask how discourses support institutions and reproduce power relations. What kind of political or moral stances are supported or attacked by the discourse?

In the following chapters, using the above five axes, I will identify three distinctive discourses on homosexuality. For each one, I present the topics and the semantic associations surrounding homosexuality. At the end of each chapter I conclude by connecting this particular

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discourse with others, showing how they contradict or connect. I will often mention the political context and power relations of the Front National political party. I consider internal conflicts and events inside and outside the party to influence which discourses have gained dominance, and why. In all three chapters of the analysis I include a close look at the subject-positions which the discourse opens, not only for homosexuality, but also for other figures that may appear alongside.

In my first chapter of analysis I will look closely at the articulation between birthrate and homosexuality. By following the mentions of birthrate, I find homosexuality situated in relation to reproduction, to family, abortion and immigration. In my second chapter I untie the discursive knot formed around filiation. I analyze the semantic link between children and homosexuality in the light of the 2012 French debate on gay marriage and adoption. From there I examine the role of French republicanism and analyze how anti-communitarianism structures the discourse on filiation. Finally, in my third chapter, I identify a third discourse on homosexuality. This last discourse focuses on articulating sexual minorities against Islam and ethnic minorities. As I investigate this articulation, I return to republicanism and how it continuously structures how homosexuality is ‘put into words’.

The jump from one discourse to another makes FN appear as if it does not use consistent rhetoric to address homosexuality. At first, one could argue that these different takes on homosexuality come from history. FN is 46 years old, therefore the way homosexuality has been worded by FN has evolved through history. That which differentiates Marine Le Pen’s homonationalist rhetoric from her father’s eugenics is the new international context in which they are speaking. I partly agree with that take. Yes, new historic and economic context shapes the way FN talks about homosexuality. But still, this is not a mere evolution. Homosexuality did not move from abjection to celebration. In the Archeology of Knowledge (Foucault, 1972), Foucault invites us to let go of the proclamation of continuity. FDA introduces the category of discontinuity and the concepts of "rift", "threshold", "series," "rupture" and "transformation".

There is a coherent timeline linking these three discourses together, as historically, they appeared one after another. This does not mean that one discourse disappears when a new one develops. Instead, discourses pile up. As new ways of discussing homosexuality emerge, older discourses keep existing, they remain linguistically available. The aim of this thesis is to analyze the historical conditions of existence of this discourse through FDA. As FN addresses homosexuality differently at specific key moments, the question arises: when, and why is a discourse mobilized?

The argument that the three aforementioned takes on homosexuality are the reflection of three political traditions in the FN is one that this thesis rejects. I recognize that FN is a party that welcomes politicians with different political backgrounds. Jean Marie Le Pen was a supporter of Ronald Reagan and is a partisan of lower levels of State-involvement, whereas Florian Philpot opposes Europe’s neoliberalism, instead praising the republican legacy of Charles De Gaulle. Discourses go over partisan lines. However, I do think that it is necessary to subvert the perception of FN as a monolithic block, and instead view FN as the aggregation of different political traditions. There are different far-right discourses, and many coexist, precariously, in FN.

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1.2. BACKGROUND DISCUSSION: THE FRONT NATIONAL

Michel Winock’s (1993) analysis of French extreme-right ideology describes it as the synthesis of anti-egalitarianism and nationalism. Egalitarianism is judged to be artificial, it stands against natural law. The Dreyfus affair changed the nature of nationalism in France. After Dreyfus’s trial for treason, anti-Semitism and xenophobia became part of the Nation’s conception. This association of an ethnic principle to the National phenomenon became the sign of the extreme right. (Sternhell, 1972). This association influenced many extreme-right groups that constantly protested the Republic when it started to deploy at the beginning of the 20th century. Even later, anti-republicanism has been associated with the extreme right for the longest time. Extreme-right activist were completely opposed to Republican values, especially human rights’ universalism that they fight in the name of the ‘rooted communities’. Historically, the parliamentarian Republic has been the first adversary of the extreme-right.

After World War II, extreme-right sentiment became weak in France, scattered across dozens of small and disparate fascist groups. The extreme right’s reputation suffers from its association with Vichy and with the terrorist attacks organized by the nationalists during the Algerian war (Lorien, Criton & Dumont, 1985) It is in this context that FN was born. The party was supposed to wipe away the far-right’s past affiliations and present a new image to conquer the political arena (Camus, 1997). Jean Marie le Pen was chosen to preside over the party because he could unify different traditions together (Lorient, Criton & Dumont 1985). From the monarchists, to the fascists, to the Catholic fundamentalists, the FN was supposed to unify the divisions. The party was founded in 1972 by François Duprat and François Brigneau, both ex-members of smaller nationalist group Ordre Nouveau. Jean Marie Le Pen was never supposed to be more than an electoral dummy, but his charisma made him rise quickly to the level of uncontested chief of the party. The party’s first primary message was potent anti-communism, but rapidly shifted to anti-immigration, a topic that, contrary to anti-communism, was not covered by any other French political party at that time (Camus, 1997). The party also fostered some prime figures of French anti-Semitism and appealed to nostalgic veterans of the Algerian War (Crépon 2012). Jean Marie Le Pen particularly helped on this last matter, as he was himself a soldier during the Algerian War. This fascinating mixture was nevertheless not enough to score in an election and during its first decade of existence, the FN dwelt on the fringes of French political life. This first decade of existence is unfortunately not represented in my thesis. The FN’s marginal position in the political landscape at that time made it simply invisible and any media documents that could traced to that period are either absent or unavailable. The FN’s inflammatory reputation kept the party from accessing the public eye.

However, things changed in the 80’s. After intense work to unify its followers, the party achieved strong results in mayoral elections in both Paris and Dreux, and also won 10 seats in the European Parliament (Crépon, Dézé & Mayer 2015). Around that time the Socialist Party made its way to the government which unified the different extreme-right traditions coexisting in FN under the single banner of the “social-marxist threat” (Lorient, Criton, Dumont 1985).

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FN made further advances into the political mainstream in the 1986 French legislative elections, winning roughly 10 percent of the vote and 35 seats in the National Assembly (Crépon, Dézé & Mayer, 2015). In the 1988 presidential elections, Jean Marie Le Pen garnered almost 15 percent of the popular vote, and the following year the party retained all 10 of its seats in the European Parliament (Crépon Dézé & Mayer, 2015). Le Pen himself continued to be one of the most divisive personalities in French politics throughout this period. Some of his public comments, which minimized the events of the Holocaust, led to fines and widespread criticism. But beyond the anti-Semitism and anti-Marxist, it was immigration that made the FN. In time of generalized economic crisis, the FN found its voice by blaming immigrants for two things: unemployment and insecurity (Crépon, 2012). In 1980, the party introduced the concept of ‘anti-French racism’ (Camus, 1997). In less than a decade, FN settled in the political French landscape, with Le Pen’s radical, simple and audible speech making the party stand out.

During the 1990’s the party started hiring executives that had attended prestigious French administrative schools. At the end of the Cold War, Jean Marie Le Pen let go of his love for Ronald Reagan and shifted his rhetoric to entirely suit anti-Americanism. The FN started embracing a specific love for particularisms. The party defended national identity and culture, asserting that these should be defended against what they call ‘mondialisme’. Under the influence of the Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes pour la Civilisation Européenne (GRECE), a think-tank inspired by Gramsci concept of cultural hegemony, FN started privileging culture rather than biology to address issues of race (Taguieff, 1994). Anthropology became the discipline of choice for party’s intellectuals who now referred to natural hierarchy in terms of the preservation of particularisms. Around the same time, FN ceased to present itself as a right-wing political party. They considered that the right-left split was outdated, and that the only real split was between those who defend national identities and the ‘lackeys of cosmopolitism’ (Crépon & Nosbah-Natanson, 2008, p.168). During the 1990’s, FN also won mayoral election in three cities in the South of France. Despite these victories, the party still faced the rejection from the establishment. However, Jean Marie Le Pen seemingly took pride in it (Crépon 2012). This antagonistic relationship become clearly apparent in 2002, when Le Pen surprisingly won the first round of the presidential elections. In the second round, the reaction against Le Pen was overwhelming. Massive demonstrations against FN took place in-between rounds (Crépon, Dézé & Mayer, 2015). Disparate parties united behind Jacques Chirac who ended up winning the election with the largest margin of victory in the history of the French presidency.

After a major defeat in the 2007 presidential election, FN was severely weakened by a €10,000 fine and a three-month suspension for Jean Marie Le Pen’s Holocaust comments. Jean-Marie Le Pen’s famous comments and ‘jokes’ became a problem for the party (Taguieff, 1994). His daughter Marine Le Pen, emerged as a hope for the party’s future. Marine Le Pen and the party’s younger generation launched a program of activism during the 1990’s (Chombeau 2007). They brought new topics and concerns into the party’s ideology: they denounced capitalism, wanted to give more light to social issues, and rejected the traditional split between left and right, pushing instead for a split between ’nationaux’ (republicans) against ’mondialistes’ (globalists) (Crépon & Nosbah-Natanson, 2008). They took distance from

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expansionist discourses, dropped concerns regarding colonialism, and broke ties with radical groups (Crépon, 2012). Predominantly, they desired respectability.

Marine Le Pen became president of FN in January 2011. Her election at the head of the party was difficult, facing the most conservative forces in the party criticizing her lack of attachment to traditions and her lifestyle (Crépon, 2012). During her rise to the party’s presidency, she attracted media attention. Once at the head of FN, she started work on the party’s revival. Both FN and the media started using the word ’dédiabolisation’ (de-demonization), to describe the ‘New FN’. The term is dangerous and supports the party’s strategy of a clear ideological change, change that has been criticized by many (Igounet, 2014; Crépon, Dézé & Mayer, 2015). Marine Le Pen’s ideological novelty came from her adoption of republicanism, especially her defense of ‘laicité’ (secularism). In the name of secularism and of republican values, she constantly attacks Islam and Muslims (Crépon, 2012). On this point, she shows major similarities with her father, pursuing a strong opposition to immigration.

Moreover, both Marine Le Pen and her father constantly oppose “the real people” against the elites. The party has always relied on populist arguments. The party’s definition of the elites is interesting though, as it does not only denounce politicians on both the right and left, but has also blamed them for spreading homosexuality and bringing immigrants into the country (Almeida, 2014). As will be shown in later sections, FN has continuously depicted a conspiracy being inflicted upon society. FN politicians present themselves as the only ones knowing the truth, a truth hidden from society. Attacked from every angle, the EU, the corrupt elites, the immigrants, FN bears the responsibility to ‘enlighten’ its voters by bringing them a ‘hidden’ truth.

1.3. DATA SET

Using Atlas-ti, I analyzed my data set by coding it. I found my codes through the text by looking at mentions of homosexuality. Every time the words ‘homosexuality’ or ‘homosexual’ would occur in documents, semantic associations would be coded. This way, I could map out how homosexuality has been situated in FN’s discourse. How and to what is homosexuality articulated in the discourse? I picked six codes in total. Race (immigration and Islam were the sub-codes), privacy, expansion (sub-coded with invasion and lobby) family (associated to reproduction and children), Republic and finally AIDS.

I have collected four types of media, speeches, posters, TV interviews, press interviews and/or articles, the party’s official website posts. These four types of media come from five different sources:

• First, I went through FN’s website. The website references press releases, transcripts of speeches, and declarations from its elected members. The two websites I used were frontnational.com and marinelepen.fr, analyzing 20 posts from both.

• Speeches that were either too old or not made available on the party’s website come from ViePublique.fr. ViePublique.fr is a government website created in order to make

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daily political issues available to citizens. It references notes on current political discussions but also keeps an archive of 100 000 speeches made by politicians since 1983.

• I also looked for media appearances of party members. For old interviews, I used INA, the National Audiovisual Institute archive. By browsing INA’s archive I found 7 relevant TV interviews.

• For more recent press media, which include interviews given to press journalists and articles written about FN, I used Europresse, a large digital information data base specialized in press and media data. In total 122 articles from Europresse have been selected.

• Finally, I used the CEVIPOF electoral archives. The CEVIPOF is an academic research center affiliated with SciencesPo. This research center has created an electoral archive fund, collecting policy programs, campaign posters and leaflets. My research led me to select 5 electoral policy programs and 13 campaign posters created by FN between 1992 and 2017

When collecting my data, I used the key-words (in French) homosexuality, homosexual, gay, AIDS, Front National, Le Pen, and sexuality. In total this thesis is built on a collection of 228 documents, all media included. This data collection was organized by my intent to get a picture of FN’s own understanding and wording of homosexuality. That is why I selected speeches, texts and images coming directly from the party. In interviews, politicians can express and defend their party’s positions. On official websites, the party directly sets its agenda, expresses its concerns and presents its ideas. The same goes for campaign posters and programs: these are all an emanation of FN’s ideas. I consider them to be good tools to understand what the party is trying to convey, and what kind of images and topics they want to bring to the public. On this point, it should be noted that, being a political party, FN creates texts that will appeal to the public in a particular way. When a political party produces texts, it is important to take in consideration its electoral project. This means that the discursive fragments presented in this thesis already shaped by an intention to appeal to the public.

I am not interested here in the way the media has covered FN, nor in the way political activists and campaigners have reacted to its chosen discourse. For this reason, online comments, reactions or journalists’ analysis of FN have not been included in the data set. These discussions and online exchange, however, are more than necessary to understand how FN have become an agenda setter in the French political landscape, and how FN’s ideas resonate in French society in general. While I acknowledge this as a blind spot, as described above, my intention is to understand the official wording of the party. It is important for the data set to only reflect the official position(s) represented by the party. Discourses do not appear in a vacuum. The discourses of FN spread through society at large, and are not contained solely within the policy’s programs of the party. Much of FN’s wording has become mainstream in French politics. Some of FN’s rhetoric and policies have spread to other parts of the political landscape (Wahnich 2015). While three distinct discourses are identified in this thesis, it must be noted that many elements of these discourses can be found in many other places in French society. It is necessary to mention that some political practices recommended and celebrated by

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FN regulate French society at large. Homophobic discourses are not restricted to FN, neither is nationalism. Nationalism is the most banal phenomenon (Billig, 1995), and FN is only a symptom of nationalism’s ordinariness.

In the case of FN, Breuilly’s categorization (1985) has been employed to identify the party’s nationalist arguments. In Nationalism and the State, John Breuilly proposes a classic exploration of contemporary nationalism. His study is useful for thinking of nationalism outside of Nation-State so to speak. As he studies nationalist arguments rather than nationalism, Breuilly’s categorization is particularly suitable to study a nationalist party like FN. Breuilly defines “a nationalist argument [as] a political doctrine built upon three basic assertions:

1. There exists a nation with an explicit and peculiar character.

2. The interests and values of this nation take priority over all other interests and values. 3. The nation must be as independent as possible. This usually requires at least the

attainment of political sovereignty." (p.3).

1.4. THEORITICAL FRAMEWORK

However important nationalism studies are for my thesis, it is not the only theoretical framework that I mobilize to analyze my data. Because I am looking at the articulation of homosexuality with nationalism, my thesis is part of a larger body of work studying the construction of nationalism on, and tangled with, gender and sexual stereotypes. The literature on sexual nationalism comes mostly from postcolonial studies, as Anne McClintock (1993, p61) wrote “every nationalism is gendered, all are invented, and all are dangerous”. Postcolonial historians have written about how categorization and identification processes move through historical and geographical contexts. These processes are also stabilized and incorporated into hierarchies that sustain existing hegemonic power relationships (Nagel, 2003). For example, Nira Yval Davis (1989) explains how the sexual division of work gave women the role of reproducing national ideology and national subjects, therefore sustaining sexual difference and the Nation as a male-only community.

Another classical example is the work of George Mosse (1996) who studied 20th century European nationalism as the production of sexist hyper-masculine stereotypes. Some minorities were therefore seen as a threat to patriotic masculinity and needed to be excluded from national communities. National communities are always already gendered, they are, as Benedict Anderson wrote it, “imagined community” defines by the terms of sexuality, the borders of normality are established in relation to moving national identity (Jackson, 2009) . In this shaping of gender stereotypes, both public policy and social movements are involved. States have produced discourses of nationalist rhetoric and have used gender stereotypes to support them. Nationalist movements have also justified their political authority, to normalize collective behaviors and to create an “authentic” or “traditional” identity in colonial and postcolonial context by claiming these imaginary sexual categories (McClintock 1995).

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My research is in direct conversation with these previous studies, but also highlights that if nationalisms are still sexual ones, the link between sexuality and nation is undergoing transformation. Nationalism as it was described by George Mosse (1996) in the beginning of the 20th century was constructed around a specific understanding of hyper-masculinity and represented sexual minorities as a threat. However, it seems that today’s nationalism is being re-structured around the integration of minorities into the national community. Therefore, this helps to create a nation that is “hostile” to minorities and marks new sexual borders to democratic modernity. Homo-erotic practices that used to be considered abnormal, that used to be the evidence of the civilizational deviance of the colonies, are now claimed as the flag for the enlightened democracy of Western world (Fassin, 2006). This discursive transformation has been visible since the 2000’s and can be linked to two ongoing processes. On one hand, there is the history and victories of sexual minorities since the 60’s and 70’s. In some countries, the de-stigmatization has been relatively quick and sexual minorities have been strongly integrated into the national community. On the other hand, this gradual integration that granted marriage and reproductive rights to sexual minorities was parallel to a national discourse transforming those freshly granted rights into a democratic argument.

In this sense, respecting minority’s rights has become part of the rhetoric of “sexual democracy” (Fassin, 2006) that creates a European and western “us”, protecting sexual minorities against “them” who are described as ‘naturally’ sexist and homophobic. This rhetoric of sexual democracy creates new borders not only outside, but also inside the national community. These new borders shape two blocks and play into the clash of civilization narrative. Not only there is an opposition between progressive and backward countries, but there is also, as Jin Haritarworn (2011) contends, a separation within Nation-states between good and bad subjects. In France, as it is highlighted by Nacira Guénif-Souilamas (2004) and Isabel Clair (2012), discourse regarding the “quartiers” (suburbs) assign inhabitants to a specific sexual culture, and this culture is regarded as the mark of civilizational backwardness on the national level.

This re-structuration is not monolithic, but still the hypotheses of a global transformation of the western world is at the core of controversy concerning today’s sexual nationalism. The logic of blocs facing each other is sometimes paradigmatic. Sexual nationalism in this perspective is not dependent on the Nation-State but has rather become “Europe” or “the West” that has spread the new “sexual imperialism.” Considering sexual politics through the lens of imperialism is one of the propositions of Jasbir Puar. In her book Terrorist Assemblages:

Homonationalism in Queer Times (2007), she analyzes how American discourses on sexuality

have evolved after 9/11. In the “clash of civilizations” following 9/11, Puar sees a “clash of sexuality” in which the normalization of sexual minorities has been combined into a re-configuration of American imperialism. Her theory refers to the work of Lisa Duggan on ‘homonormativity.’ By homonormativity. Duggan implies that the LGBT movement has abandoned its emancipatory social movement for the benefit of the politics of integration (same-sex marriage, inclusion in the military). Some (same-sexual minorities went from contesting the existing political system to reinforcing it. For Lisa Duggan (2004), there is no difference between homonormativity of American white middle-class gays and lesbians and the traditional heteronormativity of the national majority.

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Starting from her conclusion, Jasbir Puar describes the American “sexual exceptionalism” that manages to not only integrate sexual minorities into the Nation but also to create discourse and policies that redefines citizenship around this supposed sexual exceptionalism. This new definition of citizenship serves an imperialist agenda, reproduces cultural hierarchy and can even justify military intervention outside of the US.

The work of Puar is thought-provoking. and, as I will show in my analysis, not every concept that she offers is relevant in my case. However, I was extremely interested by her use and understanding of biopower. Both Jasbir Puar and Rey Chow criticize the misuse of biopower. For Rey Chow (2002, p7) biopower can be used to problematize ‘the ascendency of whiteness’. She does not conceptualize whiteness through a racial lens but through the lens of biopower. In so doing, she extends whiteness to the capacity to give life, to sustain life, and to make it proliferate. Whiteness has therefore become a biopolitical project.

Biopower is the connecting thread throughout this thesis. When Foucault conceptualized biopower in the last lesson he gave for Society must be Defended (1997), he coined the term after exposing the birth of nationalism in Europe. With this thesis I wanted to look at the place of homosexuality in relation to the Nation, and for that I found biopower to be the best perspective to start with. By doing so I also want to follow Puar’s proposition to bring biopower into queer studies. With this thesis, I wanted to elucidate the biopolitical function of nationalism, not just on focusing on heterosexuality and on the reproduction of the nation (although I will) but also looking at ‘sexual deviance’. I want to demonstrate that the articulation of homosexuality and nationalism is the most visible through the lens of biopower.

***

In this thesis, I mostly use ‘homosexuals’ or ‘homosexual subjects’ rather than queer, LGBT, or gay and lesbians. Even if these appellations are sometimes employed, I refer mostly to ‘homosexuality’ because in my data set, from Jean Marie Le Pen to Marine Le Pen, “homosexuals” is the only word used by party’s members and executives.

To always keep original statements visible in the text, I choose to always include the French version of my quotes in footnotes. All quotes are translated by me.

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2. BIOPOLITICS OF THE FRONT – THE BIRTHRATE DISCOURSE

In this chapter of my analysis, I will unknot the first discourse on homosexuality in the FN by looking at the semantic link between homosexuality and demography. I choose to start with this discourse since, chronologically, it is the first in my data set. Historically, in FN, I identify two key crises during which the discourse is activated: the debate on abortion in 1974 and the AIDS crisis that started in 1983. Both of these crises are centered on the body. Both also deal with life and death at their core. Moreover, in both the AIDS crisis and the legalization of abortion, life itself is a political issue. In both of these situations, life and death depends on political measures. Politicians are asked to answer on the life, or the future life, of citizens who are taken here on the level of the national population. In these cases, life and death are not natural facts, nor are they outside the political realm, but are at the front of the political agenda. It is life or death that politicians must manage. Health is a major aspect of the political domain, and politicians are prone to ‘discuss’ in media, in TV shows, and in cabinets, the life and the health of the population. FN do not hesitate to comment and debate on health as a political issue. Its concerns, though, are specific, as I will show in this chapter.

Of the three chapters of analysis, this one engages most directly with the concept of biopolitics as it was theorized by Foucault. Sexuality, being ‘at the point where body and population meet’ (Foucault, 1997, p.252), is the ideal standpoint to manage life. In this first discourse, I find the focus on demography (birth rates, reproduction, health, family) being over-represented linguistically. Most importantly, here, the Nation is defined as a biological unit. The national community is built around a biological legacy and to defend France, then, to defend Society, is to defend this legacy. This biological legacy is defined along the category of race. Race is crucial to the rule of life and death (Mbembe, 2003). Politics takes life as an object and a project. Racism, through nationalism, takes charge of compartmentalizing life, so that some subjects are set aside from futurity. Racism segments the biological continuum (Foucault, 1997). The population is categorized and hierarchized according to vitality and sickness. The biological legacy, then, is not only related to a glorious, immemorial past, but to a brighter, purer, future (Edelman, 2004)

2.1. FAMILY UNIT/FAMILY CELLS

One of the defenders of this legacy is the family. FN have a high judgement of families. From Jean Marie Le Pen to Marine Le Pen, families have always been described as the most

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vital element of the Nation. If society is a body, families are the its cells, and they are often referred to as such. Successively I have found families to be presented as ‘the base and foundation of every civilized society’ (Jean Marie Le Pen 30 April 2000), an ‘irreplaceable institution’ (2007 campaign manifesto, FN), and ‘the most central and fundamental element in our society’ (current official website of Marine Le Pen).

I identified two different approaches to speaking about families, but, as I will show, these two perspectives are both part of larger biopolitical project. I found these two perspectives on families clearly distinguished but also reunited in a speech given by Jean Marie Le Pen in 2007 in Paris.

‘Destruction of the traditional family will first lead to a decline in social morality, because fundamental values that give structure to society are less likely to be passed on to the youth.

The decline of the family will equally worsen our demographic decline, which will harm our economic and political power, and our social balance.’1_{(Jean Marie Le}

Pen, 21 January 2007, Paris)

Following each other we find back to back the two functions of the family in the FN’s discourse. First, we have the family as a space for moral regulation. In this process of moral regulation, parents have a responsibility to pass on traditional values to their children, which imply at the same time a hierarchy and an intimacy between parents and children. In other speeches, I found this reference to family as moral guardian of the Nation. In a speech made on the 1 May 2000, for example, Jean Marie Le Pen, declared:

‘Family and Nation are their main targets. Families, because they are the material framework to pass on life and moral values. […] Families, therefore, will first be challenged by the weakening of marriage, of parental authority, of solidarity between generation through inheritance. They will be affected in all of their vitality by mass abortion, by pornography, pedophilia and drugs. The goal, to be achieved discreetly but surely, is to diminish the number of children in France and in Europe’2_{(Jean Marie Le}

Pen, speech, 1st May 2000)

The semantic link between morality and family become clearer here. Families serve as protection against moral degradation. Parents, especially, have a responsibility to raise morally correct children. Family is the protection against abnormality. It is not clear if parents must

1_{« La destruction de la famille traditionnelle entraîne d'abord un affaiblissement de la morale sociale, puisque}

les valeurs fondamentales qui structurent la société sont moins transmises ou moins bien transmises aux jeunes. Le déclin de la famille accentue également notre affaiblissement démographique, portant préjudice à notre puissance politique et économique, ainsi qu'aux équilibres sociaux. » Jean Marie Le Pen 21 January 2007 sppech in Paris

2_{« C'est pourquoi la famille et la Nation sont leurs principales cibles. La famille, parce qu'elle est le cadre}

matériel de la transmission de la vie et des valeurs morales. […] La famille sera donc d'abord mise en question par l'érosion du mariage, de l'autorité parentale, de la solidarité des générations par l'héritage. Elle sera atteinte dans sa vitalité par l'avortement de masse, la pornographie, la pédophilie, la drogue. L'objectif, poursuivi discrètement mais avec ténacité, est de diminuer le nombre des enfants en France et en Europe. » Jean Marie Le Pen, 1st May 2000, speech in Paris

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protect their children from those deviant behaviors, or if they must raise children who will not engage in those deviant behaviors. As Foucault wrote in his lecture on abnormality: ‘The family becomes not only the basis for the determination and distinction of sexuality but also for the rectification of the abnormal.’ (2003, p.254). Targeting the family in this context is like targeting the last moral barrier against sexual abnormality. The family is part of the ‘anatomo-politics of the human body’, it secures the morality of the youth, it controls the sexual body of children, and therefore protects the Nation from deviant individuals.

At the same time, as can be seen in both quotes, families are mobilized on a population level. With family, we go from the moral regulation of the youth, from the individual body of the child, to demographic decline, to the nation as a body. Economic growth and political influence are all tied to birth rates. Family, heterosexuality and ultimately reproduction seem connected at such a level, to the extent at which they become interchangeable. To speak about family is to speak about reproduction and so to speak of demography. In the second quote especially, we see how a discussion of family leads immediately to the topic of reproduction. If the family is threatened, then so is the Nation. The strength of the nation entirely depends on the control over life. Family being the cell in which life is biologically produced, is a major concern for nationalists. This emphasis on the production of new lives reappeared in the same speech, on the first May 2000, to stress the importance of the economic weight of reproduction. As Le Pen was talking about family policies, he declared:

‘We will engage with a public salvation family policy, a program of 20 years to bring back balance into the age pyramid. We need to invest more in our most precious capital: the life of our children, the wellbeing of large families, the parental salary, and pensions for housewives. Within the first year, there will be more children, creating a stronger domestic demand, which means more jobs. It will turn upside down the Malthusian pyramid of decadence. They will be the hope of a more free and prosperous society’3_{(Jean Marie Le Pen, speech, 1}st_{May 2000)}

Families are a political object, but more importantly, the object of politics here, is life, or rather, future life: ‘the life of our children’. Politics takes place in the making of life itself. Reproduction is apprehended as a collective phenomenon. Children, in this last quote, are not the same subjects as the ‘youth’ of the first quote (a decline in social morality, because

fundamental values that give structure to society are less likely to be passed on to the youth.)

Children here are not individuals needing to be morally corrected, but they are instead the ‘most precious capital’’. They are mentioned as “future subjects”, they are an investment. As a deal for future fortune, they are what Lauren Berlant calls a ‘cluster of promises’ (2007). Futurity is given to these white subjects in the making. Futurity is at the heart of biopolitical practice (Smith, Vasudevan, 2017). Nationalism maintains a very specific link with the past. Praising the nation is often equivalent to praising its past, its traditions, its myth and ancestors. As

3_{« Décrétons une politique familiale de Salut Public avec un Plan de 20 ans pour rééquilibrer notre pyramide}

des âges. Investissons hardiment dans le capital le plus précieux qui soit, celui de la vie de nos enfants, dans le bien-être des familles nombreuses, le revenu parental et la retraite des mères de famille. Dès la première année, les enfants plus nombreux créeront une demande plus forte, donc des emplois. Renversant la pyramide malthusienne de la décadence, ils seront l'espoir d'une société plus prospère et plus libre. » Jean Marie Le Pen, 1st _{May 2000, speech in Paris}

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Gellner (1964) contends, nationalism creates a nation out of a fantasized past. However, this thesis argues that nationalism also relies on futurity. Not only biopolitics engages with life, its management, its maintaining, but biopolitics also takes responsibility of unborn life, with futurity at its core. The object of politics has shifted from territories, to life and to what is not even life yet. And always, futurity collides with the racial project of biopolitics and we see it again when it comes to where FN stands on abortion.

2.2. INVESTING THE WHITE WOMB

In France, the debate around abortion took place when the demographic discourse was hegemonic in FN. Opposing abortion was a way for Jean Marie Le Pen to reach sections of the catholic electorate who were not ready to join the burgeoning FN at that time (Crépon, 2015). However, looking closely at statements made by FN politicians, the declarations consecrating life as sacred, were rare. I found that the subject of abortion was rather invoked in the context of other issues, such as France’s population decline and women’s autonomy. The battle against abortion was portrayed as a war against France as a Nation, but it was also life versus ‘death

culture’ (Davies, 1999, p130), and Nationalism became associated with vitality. Abortion was

described as an ‘anti-French genocide’. Jean Marie Le Pen sets the terms of the debate: ‘Killing

the child is killing France’. As Sarah Ahmed (2004) contends, the white child, and the fetus

child are figures of hope. The white child is the promise for a better, purer, future. Nationalist politics must engage in this ‘precious capital’ so those children will reciprocate this investment, not only through economic growth, but through love for the nation (Ahmed, 2004, 130). This link between past, more precisely the legacy of an imagined white past, and the future, connects through the white fetus. As we can find in the FN 2002 electoral manifesto, it is because the Nation must “continue through time” that abortion stands against the “common good” and should be made illegal. Fetuses make the link between the past and the future, allowing the Nation to continue. Abrogating the abortion bill will regenerate the nation. This proclamation of youth as a vital force can only be fully understood when we consider that the fantasy of a white nation is under threat. The FN’s anti-abortion stance is a staunch belief in the genetic profile of the nation. The preservation of life is not merely seen in humanitarian terms. The nation is defined on a genetic level, not on a political ground, or cultural one, and it is ultimately blood that ties Frenchness together (Davies, 1999, p. 131)

As the relationship is established between the notions of youth, family and national strength, a prospect of decline is also introduced. White women’s fertility is problematized because non-white women make more babies. Abortion has only become more dangerous, when considering that white women don’t produce enough babies and non-white women produce too many (Millar, 2015). The ‘first problem’ of France is its dénatalité (the term denoting ‘population decline or ‘too few children’), or as Bruno Mégret, the FN’s vice-president (1987-1998), contended after complaining about the extension of abortion rights, “there are not

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enough little French babies!”4_{If that investment must be stressed, it is because, the national}

population is at threat. The demographic decline is coming from within. The state is taking anti-family measures, encouraging abortion, homosexuality, and women’s emancipation. This annihilation from within is coupled with a threat from outside: immigration.

“I am told that France is one of the most populated country in Europe, that France’s population has grown by 50% in the last half of the 20th_{century. This growth}

is actually limited. During the same period, the population of Spain and Portugal has multiplied by 2, Egypt by 4 and the population of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia by 6. What we have here is the primary cause of immigration from South to North, these last 40 years […] To those, like INED [French Institute for Demographic Studies], who congratulate themselves, that the number of children per women reached 2 in 2006, I riposte that this number is calculated by considering the total number of women living in France, not the number of women who have French origins! If you look away from INSEE [National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies] stats, you discover that the fertility record is in Seine-Saint Denis. In this department, 40% of birth are from foreign mothers. Yes, ladies and gentlemen, the real demographic state of France is the replacement of its population. […] The demographic reality is that there is around 700 000 birth of ethnic French born, out of a total of 830 000 births. In conclusion the number of children per French women is closer to 1,80 than to 2 […] If we don’t make more children we will be flooded. 5” (Jean Marie Le Pen, 21 January 2007)

This entire quote illustrates how a technology of (bio)power, more specifically here statistics, engages with population as a racialized project. The word in French used for natives here, is ‘de souche’, the literal translation of which would be rooted. ‘De souche’ is used to refer to an imaginary whiter past, establishing a distinction between foreign and native births. Demography is addressed from two different perspectives here, but both connect: France is weakened within, and attacked from the outside. France is taken as a microcosm of the world: inside France, north African immigrants and their descendants are viewed as a flagrant demographic threat (see the reference here to Seine-Saint-Denis, a region in the suburbs of Paris, that is often stigmatized in the FN’s discourses because of its high concentration of people

4_{« Le problème numéro un c’est la dénatalité, c’est le fait qu’il n’y a plus assez de petits bébés Français ! »}

Bruno Mégret, 27 August 2000, speech in Quimper.

5_{« On me dira que la France est l'un des pays les plus peuplés d'Europe, que la population française a cru de 50}

% dans la deuxième moitié du XXème siècle. J'observe d'abord que cette croissance est relative, et que sur la même période, celles de l'Espagne et du Portugal ont été multipliées par 2, celles de la Turquie et de l'Egypte par 4, celles du Maroc, de l'Algérie et de la Tunisie par 6. C'est là la cause première du mouvement historique d'immigration des peuples du Sud vers le Nord depuis 40 ans. [...] A ceux, qui comme les spécialistes de l'INED, se félicitent que le nombre d'enfants par femme soit passé à 2 en 2006, je réponds qu'il s'agit là de la fécondité de la totalité des femmes résidant en France et non de celle des femmes d'origine française. Il faut aller chercher ailleurs que dans les statistiques de l'INSEE pour découvrir par exemple que le département record de la fécondité est la Seine-Saint-Denis, et que dans ce département, 40 % des naissances sont de mère étrangère. [...] Oui, mesdames et messieurs, le vrai bilan démographique, c'est celui d'une substitution de population [....] Le vrai bilan démographique, c'est l'effondrement des naissances Françaises. Il y a en effet environ 700.000 naissances d'enfants Français de souche, sur un total de 830.000 naissances. Le nombre d'enfants par femme française est donc plus proche de 1,80 que de 2. [...]Si nous ne faisons pas assez d'enfants alors nous serons submergés. » Jean Marie Le Pen, 21 January 2007, speech in Paris

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of color) but on a worldwide scale the rising demography of the southern hemisphere is viewed as an equally disruptive force for France and the other nations of the north. (Davies 1999, p. 121) The reproductive rate of immigrant women threatens the essence of French identity. This discourse is influenced by the work of historian Pierre Chaunu who theorized a history of worldwide demography and predicted the decline of Europe. Jean Marie Le Pen seems to refer to him often (Davies, 1999). The reproductive mentality of foreign women depicted here ties up with the colonial history concerning the threatening sexuality of women of color. I will come back to this point later in the thesis, but it is crucial to recognize that quotes such as this produce a specific subjectification specifically for women.

Whether white or non-white women, both play a key role in the making or destroying of the nation. This can be observed in the following statement published in National Hebdo, the magazine of the Front National:

‘The future depends a lot more on young girls than boys. One of the gravest menaces facing France and the world is depopulation [dénatalité]. I want to say to young girls and young women of France that they hold the destiny of the country in their hands’6

(Jean Marie Le Pen, 11 May 1984)

Who is the subject from this last quote? The heterosexual woman tangled up in the tryptic family-heterosexuality-reproduction, the figure of the housewife emerges here but it has been implied by every mention of family. Families are essential only because they are apprehended as heterosexual and therefore as reproductive. The heterosexual family, as presented here, is oriented towards reproduction. This emphasis on reproduction implies a specific subjectification of heterosexual women. Earlier I stated that families are hierarchical along the axis of parents-children, but here we get to another axis: men to women. Heterosexuality sustains this hierarchy (Rich, 1980; Wittig, 1992). The heterosexual female subject in this discourse is entirely dedicated to domestic work and reproduction. For example, in one of the preceding quotes, women are referred to as housewives, while larger families are also mentioned. What kind of feminine subject is implied then? Following the inner structure of this discourse, the woman subject expresses patriotism when giving birth. Marion Maréchal Le Pen, niece of Jean Marie Le Pen and a senior executive of the party, said in Le Monde that she

“realized one of her duties as a patriot” when she gave birth to her daughter “so [children] can pay for our pensions”.7

Biopolitics relies on the appropriation of women’s bodies, we see illustrated in this slogan “French women to French men8_{”, a play on the famous “France for the French”.}

Dedicated to the reproduction of the Nation, women play at the same time the most important

6_{« Le futur dépend bien plus des jeunes filles que des jeunes garçons. L’une des plus grandes menaces à}

laquelle la France et le monde fait face aujourd’hui c’est la dénatalité. Et pour cela je veux dire aux jeunes filles et aux jeunes hommes de France qu’ils tiennent le destin du pays dans leurs mains » Jean Marie Le Pen, National Hebdo, 11 May 1984 (n°1)

7_{« J’ai accompli un de mes devoirs de patriote, qui est de faire des enfants pour payer nos retraites » Marion}

Maréchal Le Pen, Le Monde du 24 novembre 2014

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role but are also the property of greater politics. One of the bluntest illustrations can be found in a 1996 interview, when Jean Marie Le Pen stated that it was ‘ridiculous’ to think that women own their bodies since ‘it belongs half to Nature and half to the Nation.’9

2.3. UNPATRIOTIC SEXUALITY

It in this context where heterosexuality is intimately associated with patriotism through reproduction that I want to come back to the quote from Jean Marie Le Pen that started my thesis. This quote comes from a 1984 TV show called L’heure de Vérité, one of the most popular TV shows of the 80’s in France. That day Jean Marie Le Pen was interviewed for the first time on national TV. This interview is crucial in the history of FN. At that time FN had been struggling to gain political visibility. The reputation of the party had just begun to be less than negligible. FN was suffering from its affiliation to neo-fascists micro-groups. Jean Marie Le Pen was still an unknown figure in the French political landscape, and mostly, he is feared by the public. This interview was his first breakthrough (Crépon, 2015; Igounet, 2014). The day after the show, the party’s headquarters received thousands of new membership applications. Le Pen’s book “La France est de retour” starts with a throwback to this interview, describing it as “the event” that “broke the wall of silence” surrounding his party. The interview is filled with bold punchlines and culminates with an unexpected minute of silence that he dedicates to the victims of the communist regime. A very impertinent style that will become associated to his persona. I choose to pick this quote on homosexuality, though, because it still haunts the party’s relation to homosexuality, in the sense that, to this day, when Marine Le Pen tried to take a stand against homophobia, this one sentence is often cited by journalists in their reports of her statement, as a tool to disqualify her ‘gay-friendliness’.

The context of the quote is extremely relevant. At that time in the interview, the interviewer let the public ask a question to Jean Marie Le Pen by calling the TV channel, the question is then transmitted to the interviewer who asks: ‘Mister Le Pen, you often talk about

moral and traditional values, do you believe that homosexuality is a crime?’ to which Le Pen

answers:

‘-Homosexuality is not an offence, but it must not be privileged either. For all evidence shows that it constitutes a biological and social abnormally. And, in these conditions, I believe that homosexuality should not occupy the higher moral ground, nor seek converts. I believe that this is not just a question of common sense, but also a question of decent taste’.10_{(Jean Marie Le Pen, 13 February 1984)}

9_{« Il est ridicule de penser que leur corps leur appartient, il appartient au moins autant à la nature et à la}

nation. » 20 March 1996, Le Parisien, quoted in le Dictionnaire de l’extrême droite (sous la direction d’Erwan Lecœur), Paris, Larousse, 2007, p. 142.

10_{« L'homosexualité n'est pas un délit mais elle ne doit pas être non plus une valeur privilégiée. Car de toute}

évidence elle constitue relativement une anomalie biologique et sociale. Et dans ces conditions je crois qu'il ne faut pas occuper le devant du terrain ni faire du prosélytisme. Je crois qu'il y a là non seulement une question de bon sens mais aussi une question de bon goût. » Jean Marie Le Pen, 13 February 1984, L’heure de vérité, Antenne 2

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I will come back to this last bit on conversion (prosélytisme in the text) later in the thesis. Right now, I want to focus on the definition of homosexuality as a social and biological abnormally. In Le Pen’s definition, homosexuality is abnormal in two ways; first socially and then biologically. To be a social abnormality is to be incorrigible. Homosexuals are a social abnormality in the sense that they go against the social order and go against regularity and social norms. They are not that far away from being qualified as ‘dangerous’. Homosexuals are individuals to be corrected, and to be corrected they must first be named as abnormal (Foucault, 2004). Jean Marie Le Pen proceeds in his response to move from the field of law to the domain of nature. Homosexuality is not a problem for politicians, it is a problem for psychiatrists and for doctors.

Now I want to look deeper into the term ‘biological’ here, because I think it tells us about the place of homosexuality in relation to biopower. In the regime of biopower, health becomes a major leverage. Defining a group by their biological abnormality already places it outside of futurity. Isn’t the monster the most classical figure of the biological abnormality? Monsters go against the law of nature and the law of men. (Foucault, 2004) The dialog is entirely significant. There is no need to qualify homosexuality as an offence for it to be inferior. We are not in the field of traditional sovereignty where the sovereign can make a life worthy or not. This is the not the lens of Jean Marie Le Pen, as he does not pick the realm of law. Homosexuality is not situated in a legal context, as a crime or an offence. Power leaves the field of sovereignty and invests in the biological. The disqualification of homosexuality is made from a concern for life: will it intensify life, or will it weaken it? Again, we are on the level of population. Biology is relevant here, not law. It is the same need to kill, but the expression is different. It is not as a criminal, a political enemy, that homosexuals must (socially) die. They must die as biological threats and their death does not only protect the Nation, it fortifies it. When the pursuit of life becomes the goals of politics, death becomes framed by it. Those who must die are dying for more life. Life of the population expands when the diseased fade away. By portraying homosexuals as biological abnormality, Jean Marie Le Pen instigates the possibility for social rejection, for social death. Therefore, I argue, that, in this first discourse, homosexuality is portrayed as a species. Homosexuality creates a break between those who should live and those who should die. Within the population, homosexuality creates a hierarchy, between the biologically normal and the abnormal. Abnormality creates ‘the condition for the acceptability of putting to death.’ (Foucault, 1997)

2.4. VIRAL NECROPOWER

Those conditions unraveled as AIDS spread. Abnormality created a death world (Mbembé, 2006) for homosexuals. When the AIDS crisis emerged, and politicians let HIV-positive patients die, this can only be justified through race. When homosexuals and people of color die of AIDS, the Nation gets healthier. By framing those that FN calls the ‘sidaïques’, Hiv-positive people, as biological enemies, FN advocated their social exclusion, their rejection and for their death. Homosexuals were designated by FN as the prime actors in the spreading of the virus; they were the ‘prime enemy’ (Davies, 1999) Homosexuality acted as a distinction