Leiden University
Providing security in a
post-conflict transitional context
A case study of security networks and their effectiveness in
Western Mindanao, Philippines
Juliette Loesch
Providing security in a
post-conflict transitional context
A case study of security networks and their effectiveness in
Western Mindanao, Philippines
Master’s thesis submitted with the view to obtaining the degree of Msc in Crisis and Security Management.
Student: Juliette Loesch Student number: s1916452 Cohort: February 2017 Submission: January 2018
Word count: 22 185 (including references and appendices) 18 417 (excluding references and appendices) Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Jaap Reijling
Table of contents
Abstract ... 3
Abbreviations and acronyms ... 4
1 Introduction ... 5
1.1 Introducing security networks ... 6
1.2 Exploring security networks in a post-conflict transitional context ... 7
1.3 Assessing the peacebuilding effectiveness of security networks ... 7
1.4 Security networks in Western Mindanao ... 8
1.5 Research questions ... 8
1.6 Outline ... 9
2 Chapter 2: Theoretical framework ... 10
2.1 Security network effectiveness ... 10
2.2 Peacebuilding effectiveness ... 13
3 Chapter 3: Methodological framework ... 16
3.1 Research design ... 16
3.2 Case selection ... 17
3.3 Data collection ... 18
3.4 Data exploitation... 19
3.5 Validity and limits of the research design ... 20
4 Chapter 4: Empirical observation and analysis ... 21
4.1 Case study 1: The Ceasefire Monitoring Mechanism ... 21
4.2 Case study 2: The Community Security Working Groups ... 39
4.3 Comparative analysis ... 51
5 Chapter 5: Conclusions and recommendations ... 57
5.1 Main findings ... 57
5.2 Answers to the research questions and proposition of hypotheses ... 59
5.3 Recommendations ... 61
6 References ... 62
6.1 Theoretical frameworks ... 62
6.2 Case study 1: The ceasefire monitoring mechanism ... 64
6.3 Case study 2: The Community Security Working Groups ... 67
6.4 General ... 69
7 Annexes ... 70
7.1 Data collection protocol – detail of variables and sub-variables ... 70
Abstract
This thesis explores how “normal” security issues, such as criminality or terrorism, are dealt with when the state is weakened or rivalled by a rebel group, a reform of the security sector is underway, or a peace process prevents classic law enforcement operations.
It studies and compares two security networks in Western Mindanao, Philippines, to determine which factors make them (in)effective and, considering the ongoing peace process, if they contribute to peace. It moreover asks whether the post-conflict transitional context alter their properties, and tests the applicability of the theories on security network effectiveness established by Provan and Kenis (2007) and Whelan (2016) to this context.
Provan, Kenis, and Whelan’s correlations between a network’s properties and its effectiveness are verified. The networks are successful regarding their objectives thanks to the commitment of all members, frequent interpersonal contacts, increasing levels of trust, a shared culture of peace and/or human rights, as well as their ability to adapt to local needs and realities. Conversely, a complete absence of trust, no interpersonal contact, and the detachment of one organisation are factors of network failure. The study outlines other factors of network effectiveness which have not yet been theorised, such as the participation of local actors, and trust-building strategies within networks which involve members with broken or inexistent relationships.
The context determines the networks’ properties. The peace process, specifically, structures the network’s objectives, culture, practices, membership, and governance. The conflict, on the other hand, is less influential. It affects members’ relationships before the creation of the network, and, to some extent, the choice of governance and technologies used by network participants.
Finally, both networks are framed according to peacebuilding objectives, and involve peace stakeholders, which increases their effectiveness regarding peacebuilding. A security network, as specific form of organisation, furthermore promote peacebuilding regardless of the network’s objectives and participants, because of its non-hierarchical form of organisation.
Abbreviations and acronyms
AFP: Armed Forces of the Philippines AGCH: Agreement on a General Cessation of Hostilities
AHJAG: Ad Hoc Joint Action Group ARMM: Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
ASG: Abu Sayyaf Group BC: Bantay Ceasefire
BDA: Bangsamoro Development Agency BIAF: Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces BIFF: Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters
BRP: Bangsamoro Regional Police CAB: Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro
CCCH: Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities
CMM: Ceasefire Monitoring Mechanism C-R: Conciliation Resources
CSO: Civil Society Organisation CSWG: Community Security Working Group
EU: European Union
FAB: Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro
GPH: Government of the Philippines ICP: Independent Commission on Policing IDP: Internally displace persons
IMT: International Monitoring Team IMT-CPC: International Monitoring Team-Civilian Protection Component
LGU: Local Government Unit LMT: Local Monitoring Teams MILF: Moro Islamic Liberation Front MNLF: Moro National Liberation Front NAO: Network administrative organisation NGO: Non-governmental organisation NISA: Nisa Ul Haqq fi Bangsamoro OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OIC: Organisation for Islamic Cooperation PNP: Philippine National Police
TLWOI: Teduray Lambangian Women's Organization
UNYPAD: United Youth for Peace and Development, Inc.
ZAMBASULTA: Zamboanga-Basilan-Sulu-Tawi-Tawi
1 Introduction
Decades of armed insurrection and various violence have turned the Philippine region of Western Mindanao into a humanitarian disaster area, and a regional hotspot for criminality and terrorism. National agencies however dispose of a limited margin of manoeuvre for intervention, due to the ongoing peace process between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the government of the Philippines (GPH), and the structural deficiencies plaguing the state services in this region. As an answer to these obstacles, some peace and security stakeholders have sought to make members of the MILF, the civil society, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) or people from the communities themselves collaborate with state actors to provide the inhabitants of Mindanao with some basic security.
Peace experts refer to these initiatives as “security arrangements”, i.e. the “processes, infrastructure and assets a state, organizations or citizens of a country/countries might establish to protect themselves, while trying to stop the violence within a specified territory” (The Berghof Foundation 2014). The governance of security during peace processes has attracted the attention of peace scholars and practitioners over the years, as it is reputed a key domain to secure a successful transition towards sustainable peace. The literature on that matter nevertheless focusses more on the security aspects of a peace process1 than on how “normal”
security issues, such as criminality or terrorism, should be dealt with when the state is weakened or rivalled by a rebel group, a reform of the security sector is underway, or a peace process prevents classic law enforcement operations.
My thesis explores this side of security governance in post-conflict transitional contexts, by explaining how multi-stakeholder arrangements provide security to the people of Western Mindanao. Its originality is that it does so, not by using the theories developed in the field of peace studies, as is usually the case for the study of post-conflict transitional contexts, but by applying a security network approach. The term network designates “a set of actors (or ‘nodes’) that are linked by various relationships (or ‘ties’)” (Whelan 2016, 11). As a concept, network can either be used as a “metaphor” to emphasize inter-nodes relations, or to describe a form of organisation which differs from markets and hierarchies. This study adopts the second approach. Security networks are networks which specifically gather “in order to authorize and/or provide security to the benefit of internal or external stakeholders” (Dupont 2004, 78).
1 Such as the reform of the security sector, or disarmament, demobilisation and rehabilitation processes (see for instance: Bryden and Hänggi (2005); UNODC (2011); and Valters, Rabinowitz, and Denney (2014).)
The security network perspective comes with a set of theoretical and methodological assumptions and guidelines, which are particularly helpful to conduct in-depth studies of security networks, in order to explain why they succeed or fail.
I analyse two security networks in Western Mindanao, to determine which factors make them (in)effective in this specific environment and, considering the ongoing peace process, whether they contribute to or derail peacebuilding efforts.
From an academic perspective, studying security networks in Western Mindanao contributes as much to the literature on security governance in transitional contexts, as to the one dealing with security networks. From a practitioner’s standpoint, an in-depth study of what makes security networks work in Western Mindanao benefits donors and peacebuilders committed to design effective peace and security projects.
1.1 Introducing security networks
Networks have become a prevalent form of organisation in public management since at least the 1990s, and further expanded to the field of safety and security management. Networks are supposed to be more efficient forms of organisation to deal with “wicked” problems, or problems which “cannot be handled by dividing them up into simple pieces in near isolation from each other” (O’Toole 1997, 46), such as urban criminality, terrorism, border management, natural disaster, etc. The progressive privatisation of security and ensuing transfer of security prerogatives to non-state actors moreover contributed to the development of networks as classic hierarchies were no longer possible. In the academic domain, the literature on security networks theorises the conditions leading to the creation and evolution of a security network, by observing “the relationship between a given set of nodes and the underlying properties of such relationships” (Whelan and Dupont 2017, 672). This observation can be descriptive or prescriptive, to explain and enhance the effectiveness of security networks.
Whelan and Dupont, in a review of more than a decade of research on security networks, indicate several gaps or confusions and outline a four-point research agenda. First, a security network approach can only develop if research moves away from using “the network term as simply a metaphor to denote some kind of relationship”, to “concentrate on the structural and relational properties of security networks and how these interact” (Whelan and Dupont 2017, 682, 683). Second, scholars “must adopt an appropriate methodological position” which could significantly benefit from the inputs of Social Network Analysis, as well as the “organisational or network governance literature” (Whelan and Dupont 2017, 682). Third, the research on
security networks should take more various contexts into consideration, to diversify the sample of available empirical data, which is now quasi-exclusively limited to Western, mainly North American contexts. Fourth, a security network does not exist in a vacuum, which means that their properties and effectiveness should be studied in light of the context in which they form. The present study falls within the lines of this agenda, as I examine the properties and effectiveness of security networks in Western Mindanao, thus extending the geographical and material scope of the security networks literature to South-East Asia and post-conflict transitional contexts.
1.2 Exploring security networks in a post-conflict transitional context
Whelan and Dupont note that most of the literature on security networks focuses on security networks in Western countries, with “cameo appearances” of African (Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Soudan), Latin-American (Argentina, Brazil) and Asian (China, India and Japan) countries (Whelan and Dupont 2017, 678). Among the non-western networks, only the African ones (i.e. five cases out of the 162 reviewed) develop in contexts which experiment some form of instability such as uprising, political instability, terrorism, or armed conflict. It is not specified whether they are examined in light of their environment. I otherwise found two articles which specifically study security networks in fragile contexts (Menkhaus 2007; Baker 2007), but none of them deals with post-conflict transitional contexts, as in Western Mindanao. Finally, some studies establish descriptive accounts of security networks in Western Mindanao, but do not apply a security network approach (Hall 2015).
My research extends the geographical scope of the literature to South-East Asia, and its material scope to security networks in post-conflict transitional contexts, thus adding to the existing empirical database. I moreover test whether the theories on security networks effectiveness, which are based on Western cases, are applicable to other contexts.
1.3 Assessing the peacebuilding effectiveness of security networks
Besides academic considerations, my choice to study security networks in Western Mindanao is guided by a desire to explain and promote security initiatives with high peacebuilding effectiveness, and warn against those with counter-productive effects on peace. Whelan and Dupont recommend to “concentrate on what makes security networks effective … in relation to community or society expectations” (Whelan and Dupont 2017, 683). Security networks in post-conflict transitional contexts must therefore be analysed in light of their overall
peacebuilding effectiveness, as “all interventions in all sectors in Fragile and Conflict Affected States should contribute to tackling conflict and fragility as a primary or secondary set of objectives” (DFID, 2010, quoted in Bayne and Vaux 2013, 1.)
I measure peacebuilding effectiveness based on the network’s capacity to make a (positive) contribution to peacebuilding. Assessing the security networks’ peacebuilding effectiveness serves to verify that they do not develop at the expenses of peacebuilding objectives. Taking a step further, I seek to explain which of their properties catalyse or impede peacebuilding efforts, with a view to developing hypotheses about the peacebuilding effectiveness of security networks in general, which could be adapted to other contexts. Such endeavour is imperative, as the multiplication of security stakeholders in conflict- and post-conflict situations accelerates the development of networks.
1.4 Security networks in Western Mindanao
I chose the context of Western Mindanao because it is affected by a four decade-long armed conflict, which has been stabilised to post-conflict in some areas. Two peace processes – initially between the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the government of the Philippines (GPH), and now between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the GPH – and multiple local and international peacebuilding initiatives have resulted in a proliferation of networks, among which some aim at security objectives. I focus on two security networks, one which pursues objectives similar to what can be found in the West (community-policing), and one whose purpose is specific to a conflict-affected context (ceasefire monitoring.) 1.5 Research questions
My research question reads as follows: What makes security networks succeed or fail in the post-conflict transitional context of Western Mindanao, and how do they contribute to peace?
I also aim to answer the following sub-questions.
1.5.1 Sub-question 1: Is the post-conflict transitional context a structuring factor of a security network’s properties?
I seek to determine whether the post-conflict transitional context alter the properties of a security network. I advance that it does because parameters such as political volatility, violence, state failure, or international intervention have repercussions on the networks’ properties in terms of design, membership, objectives, governance and practices.
1.5.2 Sub-question 2: Do existing theories on security network effectiveness apply to a post-conflict transitional context?
I use the theories established by Provan and Kenis (2007) and Whelan (2016) to analyse my cases. As said, these theories are based on the study of Western cases. Analysing the effectiveness of security networks in Western Mindanao through these frameworks therefore de facto tests their applicability to a non-Western, post-conflict transitional case.
1.5.3 Sub-question 3: To what extent do security networks, as a specific form of organisation, contribute to peacebuilding?
It may prove difficult to establish a causal relationship between a network property and peace or conflict on the ground, as peacebuilding typically depends on countless external factors. I therefore examine the network’s peacebuilding effectiveness, based on whether it supports or impedes projects which respect the principles of effective peacebuilding, and its outcomes support or contradict peacebuilding objectives. I then determine to what extent the network form of organisation is responsible for the network’s peacebuilding effectiveness.
1.6 Outline
This thesis is divided into five chapters, including this introduction. The second chapter introduces the concepts of security network effectiveness and peacebuilding effectiveness, and lays out the theoretical and analytical frameworks through which I analyse my cases. The third chapter describes my research design, presents my selection of cases and establishes the protocols for data collection and exploitation. The fourth chapter develops the main analysis, whose conclusions are summarised in the fifth and final chapter, along with some recommendations.
2 Chapter 2: Theoretical framework
I use two concepts, namely security network effectiveness and peacebuilding effectiveness, to analyse the factors of success and failure of security networks in Western Mindanao, and assess their contribution to peace.
2.1 Security network effectiveness
The study of a security network can be descriptive or prescriptive, with a view to, in the latter case, promoting the network’s effectiveness. Effectiveness should be differentiated from efficiency. Provan and Kenis define efficiency as a quantitative “measure of outputs over inputs” (2007, 242). It is an indicator of the network’s ability to achieve things: for instance, technological issues do not impede inter-organisational communication, or decision-making procedures are not questioned. Effectiveness, on the other hand, refers to the quality of the network’s outcomes, and its performance regarding its stated objectives. Effectiveness can be measured at three levels: “‘organizational’ (effectiveness for individual organizations in the network), ‘network’ (effectiveness for the network), and ‘community’ (effectiveness for the overall community in which the network operates)” (Provan and Milward 2001, quoted in Whelan 2015, 540). I focus on network-level effectiveness, defined as “the attainment of positive network-level outcomes that could not normally be achieved by individual organizational participants acting independently” (Provan and Kenis 2007, 230).
2.1.1 Measuring the effectiveness of security networks
Provan and Kenis, writing about networks in general, theorise that the type of governance within a network affects its effectiveness. Whelan advances that properties such as the network’s structure, and the (sub-)culture(s), policies, technologies, and relationships within it are structuring factors of effectiveness for networks in the field of national security. My scope of study slightly differs: unlike Provan and Kenis, security networks in Western Mindanao specifically aim at security objectives, and, unlike Whelan, they reach beyond the field of national security. As these theories are the most widely used in studies about security network effectiveness, I nevertheless build upon them to conduct my research, and, by the same occasion, test their applicability to non-national security networks in post-conflict transitional contexts.
2.1.1.1 Analysing network properties
Unless specified otherwise, the following paragraphs are based on the work of Whelan (2015, 2016) and Provan and Kenis (2007).
2.1.1.1.1 Structure and governance
The structure of a network can refer to the network design or the way it develops. There are two ideal-types of network designs, to which correspond three ideal-types of network governance. A network can adopt an all-channel design. In that case, any member is linked to any other member. An all-channel network usually adopts a shared model of governance, which means that all members are involved in decision-making. The network can otherwise adopt a hub design, in which governance is brokered through either a lead organisation or an ad hoc network administrative organisation (NAO.) A network evolves when members enter or leave, and/or if the kind of governance or other properties change due to internal or external factors. 2.1.1.1.2 (Sub)-Culture(s)
A network supposedly has as much chance to develop a culture as any organisation. A network-level culture concretely consists in “shared beliefs, values and attitudes that can be identified at the network-level” (Whelan 2016, 60). It is usually manifested through a “common language” (Whelan 2016, 65). The culture can be designed by management, or emerge over time. It is caused or reinforced by routines, procedures, stories and shared experiences. A network-level culture may be accompanied by sub-cultures at the organisational or infra-organisational levels. Sub-cultures are typically occupation-based.
2.1.1.1.3 Policies
Policies are “written formal procedures that prescribe certain courses of action to actors” (Whelan 2016, 78) in order to “address the risks of problems arising from tensions between network and organisations/individuals” (Whelan 2016, 79). Depending on the mode of governance, policies can be imposed by the leadership (brokered governance), or established through negotiation (shared governance.)
2.1.1.1.4 Technologies
Technologies are the “skeleton” of the security network as they “provide an infrastructure that allows members to communicate” (Whelan 2016, 97). Technologies may support or alter a network-level culture over time. Network members using a same software may for instance develop a common language based on this software vocabulary.
2.1.1.1.5 Relationships
Relationships are formal or informal ties between network members. Informal ties spontaneously emerge from shared experiences repeated over time. They are shaped by trust or lack thereof. Trust can be personal or impersonal. Personal trust emerges from shared experiences, while impersonal trust relies on formal clearance and/or organisational reputation. Formal ties are shaped by policies and procedures. They can overlap with informal ties. 2.1.1.2 Theories on security network effectiveness
Provan, Kenis and Whelan establish several correlations between the above-mentioned properties and the degree of effectiveness of a security network, regardless of the network’s objectives. These correlations are summarised in the following propositions:
A network with a limited size and a general goal shall be more effective if it adopts an all-channel design. A network with a larger size, and a more specific objective shall be more effective if it adopts a hub design.
A hub network shall be more effective if the leadership enjoys high legitimacy and demonstrates its ability to define clear goals, and recruit relevant members.
A network which adopts a shared governance model shall be more effective if the majority of members is committed, trust is “shared among network participants” and “network-level goal consensus is high” (Provan and Kenis 2007, 241).
A network which adopts a lead organisation type of governance shall be more effective if the number of participants remains relatively limited, “trust is narrowly shared among network participants” and “network-level goal consensus is moderately low” (ibid.) A network which adopts a NAO type of governance should be more effective if “trust
is moderately to widely shared among network participants” and “network-level goal consensus is moderately high” (ibid.)
The existence of a network-level culture augments the network’s effectiveness. The persistence of organisational or individual sub-cultures may have productive effects if they promote interdisciplinarity, as long as they do not engender misunderstandings, conflicts, secrecy and/or bad coordination.
Policies augment the network’s efficiency. They may also increase its effectiveness, for instance by facilitating the emergence of a network-level culture, as long as the network conserves some flexibility.
Technologies enable a network by facilitating fast, cheap and creative forms of connectivity, integration, storage and sharing. They disable it in case of non-interoperability of systems within and outside of the network, and if they cause an overload of information.
Security networks shall be more effective if interpersonal trust is high between network members, as long as trust does not lead to undue information sharing, and lack of transparency and accountability.
2.1.1.3 Testing theories on security network effectiveness
I must assess my cases’ actual effectiveness, to test the validity of these propositions. Provan and Kenis reckon that “selecting criteria to measure performance is inevitably a ‘normative decision’” (quoted in Whelan 2015, 540). I pragmatically use the networks’ own stated objectives as benchmarks for effectiveness.
Case 1: The ceasefire monitoring mechanism established by the GPH-MILF peace process Supervise the maintenance of ceasefire between the parties
Prevent the occurrence of conflict
Disseminate information on the ceasefire agreement Source: OPAPP (2015)
Case 2: Community-policing networks in Western Mindanao Build a culture of community-driven policing
Link communities to local government units and security service providers Increase citizen’s safety
Source: British Council (n.d.) and Conciliation Resources (2017) 2.2 Peacebuilding effectiveness
I determine in a second time the network’s peacebuilding effectiveness, i.e. its capacity to contribute to peacebuilding. Peacebuilding seeks “to promote sustainable peace by addressing the “root causes” of violent conflict and supporting indigenous capacities for peace management and conflict resolution” (Galtung 1996, quoted in UN Peacebuilding Support Office 2010, 5). Peacebuilding activities differ from other conflict resolution mechanisms such as peacekeeping (e.g. the deployment of a peacekeeping force) and peace-making (e.g. the negotiation of ceasefire agreements.)
2.2.1 Measuring the peacebuilding effectiveness of security networks
I measure a security network’s peacebuilding effectiveness, based on whether it supports or impedes projects which respect the principles of effective peacebuilding, and its outcomes support or contradict peacebuilding objectives. The more supportive the network is, the higher its peacebuilding effectiveness will be.
2.2.1.1 Effective peacebuilding
Principles of effective peacebuilding are established according to normative and managerial considerations. The liberal peace paradigm, which is the “most widely accepted” among peace practitioners and supporters of peace interventions (Richmond 2014, 90), assumes that “liberal democratic states are more inclined to respect the rights of their citizens and less likely to go to war with democratic neighbours” (Wallis 2012). Liberal peacebuilding thus encourages post-conflict recovery through the establishment of a liberal democratic constitutional order and a free-market economy. This model is however criticised for being too reflective of the “global north” values, and not enough of those of conflict-affected countries and communities. Sociologists and psychologists moreover emphasise the need to put the people at the centre of peacebuilding projects, to facilitate healing and reconciliation (McKeown 2013). Following these suggestions, a “local turn” in peacebuilding (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013) and a shift of focus from the state to the people have led to a more “organic” vision of peacebuilding (Stroschein 2013). Organic peacebuilding concretely commands more consideration for local initiatives and/or customs, which shall inform internationally-funded peacebuilding projects. Besides theoretical considerations, “good practices” endorsed by the United Nations and/or non-governmental organisations prescribe that a peacebuilding project, to be effective, shall be based on thorough and regular conflict analyses, which must be locally informed and gender-sensitive; adopt the most appropriate model of intervention given the phase of the conflict2;
formulate its objectives and theories of change3 as clearly as possible; favour trusted and local
organisations; establish realistic goals; etc. (see Corlazzoli and White (2013); Veen and Rijper (2017); Working Group on Lessons Learned of the Peacebuilding Commission (2010); Galama and van Tongeren (2002); USAID (2011) for a non-exhaustive sample of good practices.)
2 For instance, using on the “hourglass” model established by Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (Ramsbotham, Miall, and Woodhouse 2011, 13–14).
3 A theory of change articulates how an activity should result in an intended change. It clarifies the assumptions underlying a project, and provides a clear picture of the expected process of change for monitoring and evaluation. (Care International UK n.d.).
The peacebuilding effectiveness of a security network is consequently measured based on whether it supports or impedes locally-informed, locally-owned, adaptable, conflict- and gender-sensitive, activities, towards the cessation of violence, democracy and economic development, and/or the correction of local grievances and structural violence.
2.2.1.2 Peacebuilding objectives
The network’s outcomes moreover should not contradict the peace agreements, if there are any, nor sustain or trigger tensions, as defined by local conflict analyses.
3 Chapter 3: Methodological framework
This study adopts a descriptive and comparative multiple case study design. This chapter details the reasons behind this choice, presents my selection of cases, and establishes the protocols for data collection and exploitation.
3.1 Research design
My research aims to contribute to the empirical body of knowledge on security networks, test existing theories on security network effectiveness, and propose hypotheses regarding the influence of a post-conflict transitional context on the development of a security network, and the peacebuilding effectiveness of security networks. A descriptive and comparative multiple case study design complies with these objectives: the descriptive case study design produces a maximal amount of data, and the comparative case study design allows for the observations of cross-cases patterns towards theory-testing and theory-development (Mills, Durepos, and Wiebe 2010, 174–76, 288–89).
The descriptive theory4 for my cases reads as follows:
Research question: What makes security networks succeed or fail in the post-conflict transitional context of Western Mindanao, and how do they contribute to peace?
Propositions based on existing theoretical constructs
The effectiveness of security networks is successfully analysed and explained using a framework which considers the network’s properties at five levels (structure and governance, (sub-)culture(s), policies, technologies, relationships.)
The peacebuilding effectiveness of security networks depends on whether the network supports or impedes projects which respect the principle of effective peacebuilding, and its outcomes support or contradict peacebuilding objectives.
Questions
Is the post-conflict transitional context a structuring factor of a security network’s properties?
4 A descriptive theory is the “articulation of what is already known about the phenomenon.” It is formulated in “propositions and questions”, which establish which aspects should be scrutinised, “in order to advance theory development.” (Mills, Durepos, and Wiebe 2010, 288–89).
Do existing theories on security network effectiveness apply to a post-conflict transitional context?
To what extent do security networks, as a specific form of organisation, contribute to peacebuilding?
The data are reported into two single-case descriptions, which serve as basis for the comparative analysis. The comparative analysis identifies “contrasts, similarities, or patterns across the cases” (ibid. 288) regarding the influence of a post-conflict transitional context on the properties and development of a security network, as well as the effectiveness and peacebuilding effectiveness of security networks in such contexts.
3.2 Case selection
I adopt a whole-network approach, which takes the entire network as unit of analysis, instead of focusing on one node exclusively. My cases are therefore whole security networks, whose objectives are to provide security in Western Mindanao. I exclude the neighbouring archipelago of ZAMBASULTA, because the presence of the Moro National Liberation Front and the ongoing counter-terrorism operations against the Abu Sayyaf Group alter the dynamics in this region compared to Western Mindanao. All network participants do not need to be situated in or be from Mindanao, as I am interested in studying the participation of national and international organisations along grassroot members. Organisations or individuals who are directly involved in the pursuit of the network’s objectives are considered network participants. Indirect involvement such as remote assistance is not considered as network membership. Considering the explorative objective of this study, I chose cases of two types. One network is related to a community-policing project, and resembles in name and rationale to security networks which can be found in a Western context. The other supports the ceasefire monitoring mechanism established by the peace agreements and is specific to a conflict-affected context. 3.2.1 Case study 1: The ceasefire monitoring mechanism established by the GPH-MILF
peace process
The peace accords signed between the government of the Philippines (GPH) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) create a complex mechanism of ceasefire monitoring, consisting of three committees and their declinations at the regional and sub-regional levels: the joint Coordinating Committee on Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH), the Ad Hoc Joint Action Group (AHJAG), and the International Monitoring Team (IMT.) The committees provide
venues for coordination between the MILF, the army, the police, and local and international organisations on issues such as ceasefire monitoring, but also political and economic development, counter-terrorism, civilian safety and human rights. The mechanism has not been studied yet, as the attention of experts is concentrated on its grassroots and civilian counterpart, the Bantay Ceasefire (Ceasefire Watch.)
3.2.2 Case study 2: The Community Security Working Groups
In 2015, the British Council in the Philippine initiated the Bangsamoro5 Community Policing
Project to support “the introduction of community policing in seven provinces … of the conflict-affected Bangsamoro region” (British Council n.d.). The non-governmental organisation Conciliation Resources (C-R) was appointed as delivery partner to carry out the project in the cities of Pagalungan, South-Upi, and Bongao. C-R partnered up with three local organisations to organise three Community Security Working Groups (CSWGs.) The CSWGs involve members of the communities, the police and other state representatives, along with C-R and the local facilitators. The CSWGs hold dialogues to decide on “joint action and collaborative points” such as “putting up of road safety signages” or resolving land disputes (Conciliation Resources 2017). The CSWG project is currently being reviewed by C-R, in order to publish a learning paper addressed to policy-makers and security practitioners in Mindanao and beyond.
3.3 Data collection
I use the following protocol to collect the data. It reflects my descriptive theory.
Introduction: history, rationale, actors and environment of the security network. Description of the network’s properties, operationalised as follows: structure and
governance, (sub-)culture(s), policies, technologies, relationships.
Description of the network’ outcomes, operationalised as follows: network’s efficiency, network’s effectiveness regarding their stated goals.
The complete protocol, with the detail of each variable and sub-variable used to operationalise the network’s properties and outcomes can be found in the annexes (7.1.)
The data are retrieved from sources such as organisations’ internal documents (policy papers, learning and evaluation papers, project proposals, presentations), open sources (press, online
5 Bangsamoro, literally “Land of the Moros”, is the Moro denomination of the portion of land claimed by the MILF.
reports), legal and policy documents (executive orders, legislation, peace agreements), and, for the CSWG case, regular discussions with C-R’s project coordinator conducted as part of our collaboration on the publication of a learning paper. I also use my own experience working with peace organisations in the Philippines, through which I had access to some of the network participants in the past years, and built an insider’s understanding of the Philippine world of peace and security. Documents are exploited according to a document analysis methodology. 3.4 Data exploitation
Each case study is then analysed to answer the descriptive theory’s remaining questions, using the following script:
Is the post-conflict transitional context a structuring factor of the security network’s properties? Does the conflict structure the security network’s properties? Why?
Does the peace process structure the security network’s properties? Why? Do existing theories on security network effectiveness apply to this case?
Do the previsions of Provan and Kenis, and Whelan listed in Chapter 2 match with the network’s actual effectiveness?
Are there any differences? How can they be explained?
To what extent does the security network, as a specific form of organisation, contribute to peacebuilding?
Does the network support or impede peacebuilding projects which respect the principles of effective peacebuilding?
Do its outcomes support or contradict peacebuilding objectives? Can this be explained by the network properties?
Can this be explained by other factors?
The detail of the variables and sub-variables used to operationalise peacebuilding effectiveness can be found in the annexes (7.2.)
I conclude with a comparative analysis of my cases, to expose any contrasts, similarities and patterns regarding the influence of the context, as well as their effectiveness and peacebuilding effectiveness.
3.5 Validity and limits of the research design
The case study design allows for an in-depth examination of my cases, which limits risks of neglecting parameters which are not included in the research protocols, if they happen to stand out during the empirical observation. The transparent description of the protocol for data collection and the analytical script moreover allows the reader to track and report my personal biases, if any, and propose alterations to the descriptive theory.
Due to time and resource limitations, the study is nonetheless limited to an observation of the networks’ properties at the network- and organisational-level and cannot consider properties and variables such as interpersonal ties, interpersonal trust, etc. in full depth. I moreover rely mostly on secondary data or, when I use primary data, they are self-assessments, which can be biased. My knowledge of the Mindanaoan context enables me to nuance some of the documents I reviewed6, but I cannot certify that my sources are fully objective. My conclusions may finally
not be generalised. The comparative design compensates to some extent for the low external validity of the multiple case study design. Two cases are nonetheless not a large sample enough to be considered a solid groundwork for theoretical development.
All in all, this study seeks more to explore an under-researched territory of the literature on security networks and propose ideas and hypotheses for future research, than to establish a full-grown theory of security networks in post-conflict transitional contexts.
6 To give an example, members of the GPH-CCCH attribute the resumption of touristic activities in Western Mindanao to the success ceasefire monitoring mechanism. There is however no tourism in Western Mindanao so far.
4 Chapter 4: Empirical observation and analysis
This chapter applies the theoretical and methodological frameworks laid in the preceding parts to the study and comparison of two security networks in Western Mindanao. It seeks to determine the influence of the context on their development, as well as their effectiveness and peacebuilding effectiveness.
4.1 Case study 1: The Ceasefire Monitoring Mechanism
The first case study discusses the ceasefire monitoring mechanism established by the peace process between the government of the Philippines (GPH) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF.)
The data used to substantiate this study are retrieved from presentations given by the GPH-CCCH, the IMT, Nonviolent Peaceforce and former Bantay Ceasefire’s members in November 2015, internal archives of the Mindanao Peoples Caucus and Initiatives for International Dialogue, the peace agreements, baseline studies conducted by fellow researchers, my own former research as analyst for the GZO Peace Institute and Initiatives for International Dialogue, and press articles.
For readability purposes, my sources are not quoted in the text, except for direct citations. An exhaustive list of the materials can be found in the bibliography.
4.1.1 Introduction and context
The MILF declared war against the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in 1987. Circa 1996, commanders of the AFP and the BIAF7 received signals from their political counterparts to
prepare the ground for talks. They started to conclude local ceasefire agreements to sustain a stable enough environment to allow for a discussion among the parties. This strategy paid off as an Agreement on a General Cessation of Hostilities (AGCH) entered into force about a year later. The AGCH does not foresee the demobilisation of either the BIAF or AFP forces. The parties must therefore coordinate to avoid unwanted confrontations. Coordination is done through an ad hoc mechanism, also set up by the AGCH: the Joint Coordination Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH.) The Joint Committee is the reunion of two CCCH, one for the government, and the other for the MILF. Both CCCH are instructed to investigate on
violations of the ceasefire, and report to the parties for them to take proper action. Other activities were later added to its mandate, such as:
peace advocacy;
limited medical/dental civic action;
assist with the evacuation of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and casualties, and facilitate the movements of contending forces;
facilitate the resolution of rido (clan feud) through mediation;
support the implementation of socio-economic development and reconstruction projects and other peace building activities;
coordinate the clearing of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO.)
The Joint CCCH is the first ceasefire monitoring mechanism created by the peace process. In 1998, the president in office, Fidel Ramos, was replaced by Erap Estrada, known for his hostility against the negotiations. In April 2000, indeed, Estrada declared an “all-out war” against the MILF. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took over the presidential office in early 2001. She convinced the MILF to return to the negotiating table, where they concluded the Tripoli Agreement on Peace. The Agreement foresees the resurrection of all former agreements, the re-activation of the joint CCCH, and the creation of an OIC8-led ceasefire monitoring team, later
referred to as the International Monitoring Team (IMT.) In May 2002, as the Philippines joined the US war on terror, a joint GPH/MILF communiqué created an Ad Hoc Joint Action Group (AHJAG) tasked to coordinate, monitor and disseminate information between and among the AFP, the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the MILF to apprehend and arrest criminal elements within MILF areas/communities. The IMT and the AHJAG are the second and third pillars of the ceasefire monitoring mechanism.
Despite these substantive progresses, the war resumed in 2003, when Macapagal-Arroyo ordered air and artillery attacks to unroot terrorist cells hiding within the MILF camps. The war caused massive losses and displacement. As a response, a grassroots initiative, the “Bantay Ceasefire” (Ceasefire Watch), was formed in January 2003 to “interpose” unarmed individuals “who will physically position themselves between armies or armed groups so that potential conflict situations will be hopefully defused” (Arnado et al. 2003, 7). The Bantay Ceasefire is born out the frustration of the communities, especially those displaced by the conflict, over the
inaction of the CCCH Local Monitoring Teams, and the desire to promote independent and grassroots monitoring. The Bantay Ceasefire was principally composed of grassroots members, with the assistance of (international) NGOs, humanitarian and evacuee protection groups, as well as Manila-based peace associations. The Bantay Ceasefire conducted the following activities:
Mediation of local conflict (rido);
Monitoring of the implementation and compliance of the ceasefire agreements; Accompaniment of IDPs;
Verification and investigative missions on reported violations, conflicts and evacuations;
Early warning mechanism for any incidence of violence, displacement and disaster within the communities;
Lobbying activities with the MILF and the GPH.
The Bantay Ceasefire did not supplant but complement the CCCH. It was active until the early 2010s. Its main convenor, the Mindanao Peoples Caucus, joined the IMT Civilian Protection Component (see infra) in 2010, and some teams were institutionalised as accredited institutions in a couple of barangays.
The GPH and the MILF agreed on a new Mutual Cessation of Hostilities in July 2003. The ensuing round of talks resulted in 2008 in a pre-Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain, which presaged a political solution to the conflict. The Supreme Court however suspended all discussions on this piece, which triggered a new wave of violence in Western Mindanao. The peace panels re-established official contacts in late July 2009, to create an International Contact Group, and add a Civilian Protection Component to the International Monitoring Team (IMT-CPC.) Like the Bantay Ceasefire, the IMT-CPC shall be impartial, neutral, independent, self-managed, and would continue if the IMT were to be disorganised. It is composed of civilian members, mostly NGO employees, mandated to monitor, verify and report on the safety and security of civilian communities, the needs of IDPs, the delivery of relief and rehabilitation support effort, and to support and empower the communities to handle conflict at the grassroots level.
The Ceasefire Monitoring Mechanism (CMM), as presented in this study, is composed of three sub-mechanisms: the CCCH, the AHJAG, and the IMT. The Bantay Ceasefire is not formally part of the CMM but is considered as it prefigured the IMT-Civilian Protection Component. The CMM originally aimed to ensure a minimum of stability for the talks to continue. It has developed over time into a self-standing pillar of the peace process, and pursues peacebuilding objectives such as trust-building between BIAF and AFP members, community empowerment through development, awareness-raising on peace and gender-based violence, etc. It also pursues security objectives, such as the prevention and facilitation of rido, violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, and intelligence sharing for counter-terrorism purposes.
Overview of the network’s environment:
Representation of the CCM:
Retrieved from GPH-CCCH (2015a)
4.1.1.1 Actors and objectives
The CMM as a network is in fact composed of three interconnected security networks: the CCCH and their teams, the AHJAG and their teams, and the IMT and their teams. The three networks have overlapping memberships, thus, evolutions within one network has implications for the others.
The CMM was at first restricted to the commanders and soldiers of the AFP and the BIAF in Mindanao, piloted by their civilian counterparts.9 It extended post-2004 to international actors,
which entered the network as members of the IMT. The IMT was composed, as of 2015, of civilian and military personnel from Malaysia (the leading country), Brunei, Japan, Norway, Indonesia, and the European Union. Its Civilian Protection Component gathers members of the NGOs Nonviolent Peaceforce (USA); Mindanao Peoples Caucus (former main convenor of the Bantay Ceasefire, local, tri-people); Mindanao Human Rights Action Center, Inc. (local, Moro);
9 The GPH/Office of the Presidential Advisor on the Peace Process (OPAPP) for the AFP, and the MILF for the BIAF.
the Moslem Organization of Government Officials and Professionals, Inc. (local, Moro), two members from the Malaysian delegation and one from the EU delegation.
In 2005, the creation of the AHJAG introduced the PNP into the network.
The Bantay Ceasefire exponentially extended the number of people involved in ceasefire monitoring activities, though they are not formally part of the CMM network. It was convened by the following organisations: Mindanao Peoples Caucus (MPC) (lead secretariat), Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society (CBCS) Mindanao Peace Advocates Conference (MPAC), Initiatives for International Dialogue (IID) (lead secretariat), Mindanao Coalition of Development NGOs, (MINCODE), Sumpay-Mindanao Balik-Kalipay, Mindanao Peoples Peace Movement (MPPM), LAFFCOD,Inc., Muslim Multi-sectoral Movement for Peace and Development, Maranao Peoples Development Center, United Youth of the Philippines (UNYPHIL), Immaculate Conception Parish - Pikit Cotabato, Freedom from Debt Coalition, Gathering for Peace, Balay Rehabilitation Center (Balay) Inc., Mennonite Central Committee (MCC), Task Force Detainees of the Philippines (TFDP); Gaston Z. Ortigas Peace Institute (GZOPI), Community Resource Development Center, Inc. (CRDC), Hope for Change, Legal Rights Center (LRC), Mindanao Solidarity Network, Civil Society Organization Forum for Peace and Development. Most of these organisations are based in the conflict-affected areas, some in other locations in Mindanao or in Manila, and the remaining ones are Philippine branches of international NGOs. Bantay Ceasefire monitors are volunteers from the grassroots, but also from abroad. They were equipped, trained, and organised by Mindanao Peoples Caucus, with the financial, technical and logistical support of international organisations and donors.
4.1.1.2 Environment
The CMM is deployed over almost all Mindanao, and the neighbouring ZAMBASULTA archipelago.
The CCCH has teams in the following areas:
The AHJAG has teams in the following areas:
Retrieved from GPH-CCCH (2015b) The IMT has teams in the following areas:
The CMM participants thus evolve in diverse environments, and can be confronted to multiple kinds of security situations, including:
Conflict with the MNLF, MILF, lawless elements, the New People’s Army (communist insurrection);
Post-conflict;
Inter-community tensions (indigenous peoples (IPs), Moros, Christian settlers); Tensions between the army and indigenous communities;
Rido;
Election-related and political violence;
Petty and high criminality including drug trafficking; Terrorism.
It must further be noted that the CMM is only one mechanism among others that seek to prevent unwanted confrontations between rebel groups and state forces. Other security arrangements however are less formal and more localised (see Hall (2015) for a comprehensive overview of local security arrangements in Western Mindanao.)
4.1.2 Description of the networks’ properties
The following paragraphs examine the properties of the CMM’s sub-components, in relation to each other.
4.1.2.1 Structure and governance
The CCCH, AHJAG and IMT networks adopt a hub design with, respectively the joint CCCH, the AHJAG and the IMT serving as coordinating mechanisms. They adopt a network administrative organisation (NAO) model of governance, though it resembles more to a form of shared governance exercised through delegates. The strategic decisions regarding the networks’ orientations and activities are taken by the committees, and apply to all individual network members without their express consent or participation in the decision-making processes. These decisions are nonetheless negotiated by all participating organisations through their representatives in these committees. Some leadership is moreover distributed at the lower levels, as individuals in the field (commanders, chief monitors) retain a large autonomy regarding the way they conduct their missions.
4.1.2.2 (Sub-)culture(s)
Network participants share a common culture of peacebuilding and coordination, except for the police, which remains driven by its own culture of performance through crime repression. A network-level culture of peace is visible through the tendency of participants to place peacebuilding objectives over their organisational objectives (AFP commanders for instance accept to let go lawless elements if they fear that an intervention would disrupt the peace process), automatic reference to the peace process, and increased sensitivity to conflictual dynamics (illustrated for instance by the extension of the CCCH mandate to the mediation of rido.) This culture of peace partly derives from the peace agreements, which determine the network’s rationale and orientation (peace over security objectives), and partly from the network’s activities themselves, such as peace education seminars, joint conflict assessments, peace advocacy, etc.
The culture of peace is reinforced by, as much as it supports a culture of coordination among network participants, especially between the AFP and the BIAF.
See for instance this slide:
Retrieved from a presentation by the GPH-CCCH (2015b)
The ceasefire agreements oblige the AFP and the BIAF to communicate their positions and movements to the other, which they do automatically. The parties are mutually confident in their counterpart’s attachment to the peace process; thus, they do not fear that the other would use these pieces of information to take the strategical advantage. Furthermore, coordination effectively helps avoid unwanted encounters, to the benefits of the peace process and the communities, and is therefore considered useful by both parties.
The police, on the other hand, do not share such culture of peace and coordination, which makes their participation in the network problematic. This can be attributed to the high turnover rates in the police. Most of the PNP agents in Western Mindanao do not come from the region, and they do not stay long enough to get themselves acquainted with the subtleties of the peace process and local conflict dynamics. The PNP has also been left aside of the peace process for a long time: it is not part of the CCCH, only of the AHJAG; it took until 2015 to create a PNP “Team on the Peace Process”; and it was only recently that police officers started to be involved peacebuilding activities, such as peace-oriented community-policing (see case study 2) or the AFP-PNP-BIAF Joint Peace and Security Teams. Their own organisational culture, which values performance based on the number of warrants of arrest served, thus continues to precede the culture of peace which has otherwise developed among other network members.
4.1.2.3 Policies
The peace agreements provide the CMM with a rather exhaustive framework. They define the networks’ rationale, objectives and establish the terms of reference of its sub-components, thus prescribing how they should be organised, which kind of acts they should monitor, according to which procedures, and by which members.
These rules are nonetheless adjusted by internal guidelines decided at the organisational and network-level. The civilian monitors of the IMT-CPC, notably, are self-organised, and depend mostly on their organisation’s code of conduct. Good practices for effective and safe monitoring are also shared through interpersonal interactions or formal trainings. Besides, the extension of the CCCH’s mandate to peacebuilding activities and rido-related mediation without any amendment of its terms of reference demonstrates that monitors autonomously adapt to their environment, according to their own perception of what would support the network’s objective of peace.
Membership is also not totally imposed, even if some participants are directly cited in the agreements. In the case of the CCCH, the GPH and the MILF voluntarily committed to the network, though some of their local members may have been reticent. Members of the IMT, apart from Malaysia, are selected by the GPH and the MILF peace panels, on the basis of their candidacy. The police are the sole institution whose membership was strictly imposed.
4.1.2.4 Technologies
Network participants mostly rely on low technologies such as SMS and radio. This is particularly true when they are posted in remote areas (local monitoring teams, BIAF and AFP
commanders) but also in a city like Cotabato, where there is poor access to Internet. These technologies allow for quick and cheap communication, which is crucial for early-warning systems and coordination on the spot.
The exchange of phone numbers and the sharing of military material (radio) are both signs and factors of improving interpersonal relations between network participants. SMS, notably, favour informal interpersonal contacts between AFP and BIAF commanders, who then learn to know and trust each other.
4.1.2.5 Relationships
The CMM establishes and consolidates formal and informal relationships between members of the AFP, the BIAF, and other participating organisations, except the PNP.
These relationships mostly take the form of informal interpersonal ties, which either pre-dated the network (kinship ties, relations outside the network) or are created by it. At the political level, members of the GPH, MILF and other participants such the representatives of IMT-participating states, maintain relatively casual interpersonal relationships, with high levels of personal and organisational trust. All participating organisations have been in frequent contacts through their political organs and the peace panels for many years, and even more so since the signature of the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro in 2012. The same holds true for BIAF and AFP officers who have been collaborating in the CMM since 1997, with low percentage of personnel turnover. Impersonal trust is supported by the shared belief that both parties are committed to the peace process, regardless of political fluctuations, benefits from the betterment of the public perception of military work in Mindanao since the implementation of the Internal Peace and Security Plan.10 On the ground, kinship ties significantly increase
levels of trust between BIAF and AFP members or local monitors as blood is deemed “thicker than water” in Mindanao.11
Where there is no pre-existing relation, network participants have built one progressively through telephone contacts, mutual visits and joint missions.
10 This plan, which basically lays out the AFP counter-insurrection doctrine, was nonetheless criticised for authorising human rights abuses against members of the communist insurrection and indigenous communities (ABS-CBN News 2017).
11 Family is the first circle of allegiance in Mindanao, and many individuals are related by either blood or marriage.
Relationships and trust within the CMM network are typically grounded into interpersonal ties. This situation leaves the police aside, as PNP officers, who usually come from other regions and stay for a short time, do not have the time to build dense relationships.
4.1.3 Description of the network’s outcomes
This part presents the CMM outcomes through three examples, which outline factors and inhibitors efficiency and effectiveness.
4.1.3.1 The Marawi peace corridor: a spill over of the CCCH success
The number of reported ceasefire violations considerably decreased after the wars of 2000 and 2003.
Retrieved from GPH-CCCH (2016)
The GPH-CCCH partly attributes these results to the coordination and rapprochement between the AFP and the BIAF, which are made possible through the ceasefire mechanisms.
The CMM network ensures effective coordination among the parties (except for the police, see infra) and unwanted encounters have been avoided most of the time, though procedures sometimes take a bit too long.12 As the chart above shows, ceasefire violations are typically
related to a resumption of the conflict, and incidents between the AFP and the MILF remain rare outside of these periods. As already discussed, the network also links members of the AFP and the BIAF. The improvement of interpersonal trust between them supports the normalisation process, and strengthens the peace process against destabilising factors such as terrorist violence or political changes.
12 In the Salvo-Pagatin-Mamasapano-Shariff Aguak area, a request for clearance by the army takes up to “one day to process as request goes up to Division level then across to MILF brigade level, rendering their pursuit operations moot” (Hall 2015, 11).
The GPH-MILF collaboration to evacuate civilians during the Marawi siege illustrates the strength of their relationship and how it supports the peace process. On May 23, 2017, the AFP launched an attack against the militants of the Maute and Abu Sayyaf groups, two terrorist organisations from Western Mindanao, who were hiding in the city of Marawi. The battle lasted for five-month, until the Maute brothers and ASG leader Isnilon Hapilon died in the battlefield, and the army recovered the city in full. The conflict took place in an urban theatre, thus calling for the evacuation of civilians en masse. A “Peace Corridor” was established to that end. The corridor was jointly managed by the implementing peace panels of the GPH and the MILF. Meanwhile, “the ceasefire mechanisms are … working to prevent any armed conflict between the two parties” in such destabilised context (OPAPP 2017). The MILF leadership furthermore refused to act as mediator between the Maute Group and the AFP, as it could have jeopardised the peace process (Associated Press 2017). One piece of news reported AFP/BIAF collaboration in kinetic operations but this has not been confirmed elsewhere (Al-Jazeera 2017). 4.1.3.2 The Mamasapano encounter: failed PNP/BIAF coordination through the AHJAG The AHJAG was organized in January 2005 to avoid unwanted encounters between the state forces and the BIAF during law enforcement operations. The AHJAG Terms of Reference establish that “the AFP/PNP shall convey to the MILF through the AHJAG the Order of Battle … containing the names and identities of the criminal elements” and “the MILF through the AHJAG shall validate and subsequently act on the information as contained in the Order of Battle.” It furthermore stipulates that, “except for operations against high priority targets … the AHJAG shall inform the GPH and the MILF CCCH at least 24 hours prior to the conduct of the AFP/PNP operations in order to allow sufficient time for the evacuation of civilians and to avoid armed confrontation between the GPH and MILF forces” (« AHJAG Implementing Guidelines » 2012, sect. VI). The AHJAG has proved effective to avoid unwanted encounters between the AFP and the BIAF. As a bonus, it resulted in the seizure and devastation of several BIFF camps in late 2014 and early 2015.
Coordination is however less fruitful between the PNP and the BIAF, as exemplified by the so-called Mamasapano massacre. In January 2015, a PNP-Special Action Force (SAF) operation targeted two high-value criminals who were reportedly hiding in the MILF-dominated area of Mamasapano. The mission resulted in a confrontation between the SAF, the BIAF, and some BIFF13 members who happened to be in the area, leading to the deaths of 44 SAF members, 18
13 Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters, a breakaway faction of the MILF, turned jihadist. Not to be confused with the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces, the armed wing of the MILF.
from the MILF, 5 from the BIFF, and several civilians, plus one of the targets. The subsequent senate investigation on the matter concludes to a blatant lack of cooperation between the BIAF and the PNP. The Mamasapano incident gravely affected the peace process: trust between the parties was diminished at both the political and local levels, Mamasapano inhabitants have been living in deep anxiety ever since, and the death of the 44 SAF troopers revived strong revived nationalist and anti-Moro sentiments among the bulk of the people.
This example is one illustration among others of the PNP attitude in Mindanao. A BIAF member stationed in the Salvo-Pagatin-Mamasapano-Shariff Aguak area indeed regrets that “the police has serious gaps in coordinating with the MILF when they serve a warrant of arrest” in this zone (quoted in Hall 2015, 12), which sometimes results in the undue arrest of local MILF members or, worse, confrontation between the rebel group and the PNP.
4.1.3.3 Learning from the Bantay Ceasefire experience: good practices for effective monitoring
The Bantay Ceasefire (BC) did not formally participate in the CMM. It however significantly re-defined the scope and manner of monitoring activities after the 2003 war.
A key factor of the BC’s effectiveness was that both conflicting parties acknowledged it as a credible and trustworthy institution, which simplified access to the field. The BC’s neutrality was instrumental to secure such trust. The fact that volunteers were recruited among the local communities also facilitated contacts and mediation, as monitors were sometimes related to combatants through family ties, and had a better understanding of local dynamics of conflict. To avoid any inefficiency due to the volunteers’ non-professionalism, the convening organisations massively invested in educative activities (human rights, conflict analysis) and established relatively rigid guidelines to frame the reporting missions. To some extent, the BC owed its efficiency and effectiveness to its centralised mode of governance, within which the convening organisations and their representatives retained most of the power. This model enhanced communication, coordination, and coherence among the organisation members and beyond, with the CMM and the international community, whose financial support was vital to the BC’s very existence.
Another explanation for the BC’s success lies in its comprehensive mandate, which extended beyond ceasefire monitoring activities to encompass mobilisation, education and protection of the communities, communication/liaison and dissemination of information among the CMM participants, and lobbying with the same. Such multi-level and pro-active involvement
