Investigation on the role of Dutch community police officers in the Dutch approach to combat radicalisation

Master thesis – Crisis and Security management

‘Investigation on the role of Dutch community police officers in the Dutch approach to combat radicalisation’

Name: Twan Zwaan

E-mail: t.l.zwaan@umail.leidenuniv.nl Student number: s1788426

Date: 12-06-2017 Version: Definite

Thesis supervisor: Bart Schuurman Second-reader: Dr. Elke Devroe

Abstract

Recent terrorist attacks within Western Europe demonstrated the threat that emerges from home-grown jihadism. In a reaction to the current terrorist threat the Dutch government developed the Dutch comprehensive action program to combat jihadism. The aim of this program is to prevent the Netherlands against a potential terrorist attack, as a consequence of home-grown jihadism. Part of this program is the objective to prevent (violent) radicalisation within the Netherlands. In an attempt to do so the Dutch government included actions and measures aimed at early detection and prevention of radicalisation. This study critically addressed the underlying policy maker assumptions that early detection and prevention of radicalisation is possible. Academic insights on the possibility to detect and prevent

radicalisation are ambiguous, while it can also be attested that community police officers are the most applicable to execute tasks related to early detection and prevention. To evaluate the Dutch comprehensive action program this research made use of the plan evaluation approach from Nelen et al. (2010). With help of the plan evaluation approach this thesis reviewed the cognitive logic aspect of the Dutch comprehensive action program to detect the underlying policy maker assumptions. Besides the cognitive logic this thesis also addressed the

operational logic of the program by addressing challenges and dilemmas the police and community police officers face in the execution of this program. For this thesis, it is not possible to determine and evaluate the policy outcomes of the implemented actions and measures, but based upon the reviewed data it can be concluded that the assumptions included within the Dutch comprehensive action program are only to a small extent realistic.

Radicalisation is a complex concept which lacks generalizable features, thereby comes that community police officers face several challenges that obstructs them to execute the assigned preventive tasks. These two findings combined makes the included assumption only to a small extent realistic, because there is too much ambiguity about radicalisation and community police officers face too many challenges which obstructs the execution of tasks related to detection and prevention of radicalisation.

With sincere gratitude to the police officers who were willing to participate as respondents in the for this thesis conducted interviews, and a special word of thanks to my thesis supervisor Bart Schuurman for his guidance, patience and support during my writing process.

Dutch abstract

Recente terroristische aanslagen in West-Europa hebben aangetoond dat de dreiging die voortkomt uit Jihadistische bewegingen nog altijd reëel is. In een reactie hierop hebben het Ministerie van Veiligheid & Justitie, de NCTV en het Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid in 2014 gezamenlijk het actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak van Jihadisme ontwikkeld. In deze scriptie is er evaluatief onderzoek gedaan naar de beleidsassumpties ingesloten in dit Integrale actieprogramma, gericht op het signaleren en preventief tegengaan van radicalisering door Nederlandse wijkagenten. Voor het doen van dit evaluatieve

onderzoek is er gebruik gemaakt van de planmatige evaluatie aanpak van Nelen et al. (2010). Deze aanpak is gebruikt om de cognitieve en operationele logica van de Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme te achterhalen. Verder is in deze scriptie eveneens de praktische uitvoerbaarheid en de wetenschappelijke ondersteuning voor het integrale actieprogramma nader onderzocht.

Allereerst is er gekeken naar de cognitieve logica van het Actieprogramma om de achterliggende assumpties van de beleidsmakers te ontdekken. Hieruit blijkt dat de beleidsmakers van het Actieprogramma ervan uit gaan dat radicalisering wel degelijk gedetecteerd en preventief tegen kan worden gegaan. Kijkend naar het huidige academische debat rondom radicalisering en dan in het bijzonder naar de mogelijkheden voor detectie en preventie hiervan, blijkt dat de wetenschappelijke inzichten omtrent de mogelijkheden tot vroeg signalering wisselend zijn. Verschillende academici hebben getracht om

generaliseerbare kaders en profielen te creëren die professionals kunnen ondersteunen bij het uitvoeren van hun taak om radicalisering vroegtijdig te herkennen en preventief tegen te gaan. Uit de diversen pogingen om kaders en profielen te creëren van radicalisering, kan worden afgeleid dat verschillende auteurs geloven dat radicalisering vroegtijdig herkend kan worden en preventief kan worden tegengegaan. Daartegenover staat dat andere auteurs het idee aanhangen dat het niet tot nauwelijks mogelijk is om radicalisering vroegtijdig te detecteren en zodoende preventief tegen te gaan. Volgens deze auteurs zou radicalisering een te complex proces zijn. Mede daarom is het tot op heden nog niet gelukt om radicalisering en alle

factoren die dit proces kunnen beïnvloeden in één theorie, kader of profiel te passen.

Naast het probleem dat het over de oorzaken van radicalisering moeilijk generaliseren is, ontbreekt het bij veel ontwikkelde kaders en profielen ook aan specifieke criteria die behulpzaam zijn bij het herkennen en vroegtijdig tegengaan van dit proces. Dit wordt bovendien aangehaald door praktijkdeskundigen die voor dit onderzoek zijn geïnterviewd. Detectie van radicalisering lijkt ‘slechts’ mogelijk te zijn wanneer de signalen van

verschillende betrokken professionals en (directe) omgeving worden gecombineerd. Hierbij is het belangrijk dat meerdere betrokkenen rondom een persoon herkennen dat er meerdere significante veranderingen in bijvoorbeeld het gedrag zijn.

Verder heeft dit onderzoek nader onderzocht in hoeverre Nederlandse wijkagenten

geëquipeerd zijn om de aan hen toegeschreven taken in het Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak Jihadisme te implementeren. Het antwoord hierop is dat de wijkagent in zijn algemeenheid niet volledig toegerust lijkt op het uitvoeren van contra-radicaliseringstaken. Gedurende dit onderzoek is naar voren gekomen dat wijkagenten niet altijd in staat zijn om de gevaren van radicalisering vroegtijdig te herkennen. Naast het probleem van gevaarherkenning, zijn er ook andere problemen die de wijkagent hinderen bij het uitvoeren van zijn taak om radicalisering vroegtijdig te signaleren en tegen te gaan. Daarbij komt dat de mogelijkheden en bereidheid om radicalisering tegen te gaan vaak sterk afhankelijk zijn van de wijkagent zijn individuele kwaliteiten en intrinsieke motivatie. Verder is ook het ontbreken van een nationale aanpak binnen de Nederlandse politie een belemmerende factor in de aanpak van radicalisering. Het preventief tegengaan van radicalisering is een extra aanvulling op het toch al ruime

takenpakket van de wijkagent. Hierbij blijkt dat in sommige gevallen de facilitering vanuit de organisatie voor het uitvoeren van deze taak onvoldoende is.

In conclusie kan er worden gesteld, dat wanneer er gekeken wordt naar de academische inzichten omtrent het signaleren en preventief tegengaan van radicalisering er weinig academisch draagvlak lijkt te zijn voor het realisme van de benoemde beleidsassumptie. Kijkend naar de operationele logica van het programma blijkt dat er nogal wat uitdagingen en obstructies zijn die overkomen dienen te worden om wijkagenten de toegeschreven

preventieve taken op het gebied van radicalisering te laten uitvoeren. De combinatie van deze twee uitkomsten leiden tot de conclusie dat de in het programma opgenomen assumpties nauwelijks realistisch zijn te noemen. Er is te veel dubbelzinnigheid en complexiteit rondom radicalisering en de Nederlandse wijkagent wordt geconfronteerd met (te)veel uitdagingen die het moeilijk maken om contra-radicaliseringstaken uit te voeren.

Table of content

Abstract...2

Dutch abstract...3

Table of content...5

1. Introduction...7

1.1 Outline and relevance of the problem...7

1.2. Research question and sub-questions...8

1.3. Conceptual framework...9

1.4. Research design & methodology...18

1.5. Structure of this thesis...24

2. Detection and prevention of radicalisation...25

2.1. Academic insights on radicalisation...25

2.2. Academic insights on possibilities to signal and detect radicalisation...29

2.3. Conclusions drawn from academic insights on radicalisation...38

2.4. Evaluation of the DCAP...39

3. Community police officers...45

3.1. Differences between CPOs and regular police officers...45

3.2. The role of community police officers in combatting radicalisation...47

3.3. Challenges CPOs are facing with the execution of tasks related to detection and prevention of radicalisation...49

3.4. Sub conclusion about the role of CPOs...55

4. Conclusion...59

4.1. Discussion of the results...61

4.2. Recommendations...62

5. Bibliography...65

5.1. Literature...65

5.2. Interviews...70

Appendix 1: Topic list...71

1. Introduction

1.1 Outline and relevance of the problem

Recent terrorist attacks within (Western) Europe together with an increase of the number of Dutch citizens who travelled abroad to join the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) as foreign fighters, have led to growing awareness and concerns about (violent) jihadism in the Netherlands. Global jihadism is currently viewed as the most urgent terrorist threat within the Netherlands (V&J et al., 2014). As a reaction to the above described developments, the Dutch government developed a program aimed at combatting Jihadism in the Netherlands, the so-called Dutch Comprehensive Action Program to combat jihadism (DCAP) (Ministry of Security and Justice (V&J), National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV), & Ministry of Social affairs and Employment (MSZ), 2014). To combat jihadism, the Dutch government follows a two-way approach:

1. The first identifiable path aims at combatting ‘existing’ jihadism, extremist (violent) ideas and prosecuting those who are planning, or already travelled abroad to join a jihadi movement.

2. As a second path, the DCAP aims at preventing the growth of new adherents by countering radicalisation and diminishing jihadist ‘breeding grounds’ (V&J et al., 2014).

For the execution of this action program a variety of partners is identified, the most prominent ‘key’ player is the Dutch police force. Within the DCAP the police are expected to execute several actions and measures (V&J et al., 2014). Police responsibilities are not limited to prosecution and enforcing the rule of law, but also include actions and measures aimed at detection and prevention of radicalisation. These latter responsibilities are primarily assigned to Dutch community police officers. Due to their position and involvement in the (local) community, it’s assumed by the V&J et al. (2014) policy makers that community police officers are apt for executing actions related to detection and prevention of radicalisation (V&J et al., 2014).

An important though implicit assumption the DCAP makes, is that radicalisation can be detected and prevented. This thesis questions whether this assumption is a realistic one. The academic literature on this subject is ambiguous. Some authors even attest that such initiatives are at their heart empirically ill-founded attempts at profiling with the potential to stigmatize communities (Spalek, 2010; Bakker, Grol & Weggemans, 2014; Bakker & Grol, 2015;

Weggemans & De Graaf, 2015). On the other hand, authors and governmental agencies like Zannoni et al. (2008), the New York Police Department (NYPD) (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009) and De Wolf & Doosje (2010) developed frameworks helpful in signalling and detecting radicalisation, thus arguing that such detection is indeed possible.

A second important assumption that results from the policy’s focus on community police officers is that these officers are prepared for their task in terms of training, knowledge and sense of their own professional goals to successfully carry out this work. However, as argued by Kop and Moors (2015), the police face several challenges when it comes to executing the DCAP measures intended to detect and prevent radicalisation. The main challenge for

community police officers while executing these tasks is to determine what they need to look for in their attempt to detect and signal radicalisation (Kop & Moors, 2015). These concerns are the foundation for this thesis, which evaluates the assumptions inherent in the V&J et al. (2014) DCAP regarding the degree to which radicalisation can be detected and prevented together with Dutch community police officers’ suitability for carrying out this task.

This thesis will address an important and socially relevant issue by evaluating the policy makers’ assumptions and while considering the supposed role of community police officers. Recent terrorist attacks have demonstrated that Western European countries continue to be vulnerable to (home-grown) terrorism. In combatting home-grown terrorism, the prevention of (further) radicalisation is important, because during the ‘process’ of radicalisation the development of violent extremist ideas can occur (Weggemans & De Graaf, 2015). The evaluation of the policy makers’ underlying assumptions found in the DCAP, makes this research relevant on a policy level, as this evaluation will be helpful in determining to what extent these policymakers’ assumptions are realistic. The outcomes of this research can be used as a starting point for improving current and future counter-terrorism policies. Finally, this research will also add to the current academic debate about to what extent it’s possible to detect and prevent radicalisation.

1.2. Research question and sub-questions

The problems outlined in the previous section lead to the following main research question for this thesis:

‘To what extent are policy assumptions behind the “Dutch Counterterrorism Action Program regarding the detection and prevention of radicalisation by community police officers’ theory driven and how can they be implemented in practice?’

This research will evaluate the (underlying) policy maker assumptions of the DCAP to combat jihadism (V&J et al., 2014). The aim of this research is to determine whether these assumptions about radicalisation detection and prevention are supported by academic insights and are realistic in the sense that community police officers are indeed the most apt candidates to put these measures into practice. A further explanation of evaluative research will be given in section 1.4.

Sub-questions:

 To what extent do academic insights support the notion that radicalisation can be detected and prevented?

 To what extent are Dutch community police officers suited to implement the counter radicalisation tasks assigned to them in the V&J et al. comprehensive action program to combat jihadism?

Both questions focus on one of the two ‘main components’ of this research. The first sub-question aims to acquire a clear understanding of the concept of radicalisation and whether radicalisation can indeed be detected and prevented. The answer to this research question will be found in considering the current academic debate about radicalisation, and possibilities for detection and prevention of (further) radicalisation. The second sub-question is aimed at investigating the counter radicalisation tasks as assigned to community police officers within the DCAP (V&J et al., 2014). To answer this second sub-question, academic literature about the role of community police officers in general and in particular about those in the

Netherlands will be addressed. In addition to these insights derived from desk research, interviews with community police officers will be carried out in the Netherlands to gain a first empirical understanding to what extent Dutch community police officers are fit to implement the assigned counter radicalisation tasks.

1.3. Conceptual framework

To provide an answer to the above proposed research questions it is important to understand the three main concepts that will be addressed within this thesis, namely “radicalisation”, “community police” and “jihadism”. This conceptual framework will provide some slight insights into the current academic debate on these three concepts. The discussion about these

concepts is too extensive to fit entirely into the conceptual framework. Therefore, chapter two and three will further elaborate on the academic debate on these concepts. The conceptual framework will focus on the meaning of these concepts, will provide insights into the current academic debate and it will also try to establish clear working definitions.

1.3.1. Radicalisation

This thesis investigates the policy makers’ assumptions of the V&J et al. (2014) DCAP, about possibilities to signal and detect radicalisation. Consequently, radicalisation will be an

important concept within this research. Before the current academic debate about possibilities to detect and signal radicalisation can be addressed, at first, it’s important to create better insights and a better understanding of radicalisation. This will be done by considering the academic debate on the definition of radicalisation. Furthermore, this paragraph will also introduce a working definition and will give a brief introduction on the current debate about detection and prevention of radicalisation. This latter discussion will be further elaborated on more extensively in the second chapter of this thesis.

‘The terms of radicalisation, de-radicalisation and counter-radicalisation are used widely, but the research for what exactly radicalisation is, and what causes it has been a frustrating experience’ (Schmid, P.4, 2013). From Schmid’s quote (2013) it can be derived that

radicalisation is an often-used, but also ambiguous concept. Until now studies on

radicalisation struggle to answer the questions how radicalisation can be defined and how it is caused. To clarify some of these questions around radicalisation Schmid (2013) did a

literature and reconceptualization study. In the field of counter-terrorism studies Schmid is perceived as an expert in his discipline. This makes the extensive literature and

reconceptualization study from Schmid (2013) particularly appropriate for better understanding the radicalisation concept. From this study, useful insights in the various ambiguous parts of radicalisation can be derived.

A first point recognized by Schmid (2013) is that there are two sides to radicalisation.

Radicalisation acknowledges certain forms of violent resistance towards political oppression, while in some cases violent resistance may be illegal under national law, but can be accepted under international humanity law (Schmid, 2013). Violent resistance against political

oppression should be separated from the use of terrorism. Violent resistance can be

categorized in a range from misbehaviour until unacceptable behaviour, while terrorism is perceived as a clear border-crossing form of violent (political) resistance (Schmid, 2013). Also, political violence should be considered in the broader perspective of political action,

because political violence can also be executed by state-actors. This makes it equally

important to also examine the role of state actors, because the use of violence against the own citizens indicates that also state-actors have the potential to radicalize in their actions

(Schmid, 2013).

According to the International Crisis Group (ICG) (2009) radicalisation is a term poorly defined and with a wide variation of definitions. Currently, the term of radicalisation is mostly used in the context of terrorism studies and counter-terrorism policies. Furthermore,

especially Western governments focus on radicalisation as part of their approach to combat home-grown Islamic political violence. Consequently, radicalisation is nowadays often linked to Islamic jihadism, extremism and terrorism. This is a development that Schmid (2013) refers to by stating that radicalisation has become a politicised term. Not only the politicised use of radicalisation by governments and politicians has made radicalisation less meaningful, also several academics have come up with vague and unprecise definitions. Based upon his literature review Schmid (2013) proposes the following reconceptualization of radicalisation, to add more meaning to the concept:

‘An individual or collective (group) process whereby, usually in a situation of political polarisation, normal practices of dialogue, compromise and tolerance between political actors and groups with diverging interests are abandoned by one or both sides in a conflict dyad in favour of a growing commitment to engage in confrontational tactics of conflict-waging. These can include either (i) the use of (non-violent) pressure and coercion, (ii) various forms of political violence other than terrorism or (iii) acts of violent extremism in the form of terrorism and war crimes. The process is, on the side of rebel factions, generally accompanied by an ideological socialization away from mainstream or status quo-oriented positions towards more radical or extremist positions involving a dichotomous world view and the acceptance of an alternative focal point of political mobilization outside the dominant political order as the existing system is no longer recognized as appropriate or legitimate.’ (Schmid, P.18, 2013)

Although Schmid (2013) acknowledges that too much complexity and a high level of abstraction are not conductive to a better understanding of the phenomenon, Schmid (2013) argued that his proposed definition covers more ground than previous radicalisation

definitions.

Besides Schmid’s (2013) definition, for this thesis it is also relevant to consider the

radicalisation definition used by V&J et al. (2014) within the DCAP: ‘An attitude that shows a person is willing to accept the ultimate consequence of a mind-set and to turn them into actions. These actions can result in the escalation of generally manageable oppositions up to a level they destabilise

society due to the use of violence, in conduct that deeply hurts people or affects their freedom or in groups turning away from society (V&J et al., 2014, P.33).’ In comparison to the definition used by Schmid (2013) the V&J et al. (2014) definition of radicalisation is limited. It’s noticeable that within the definition of Schmid (2013) radicalisation is viewed as a process, while V&J et al. (2014) are referring to radicalisation as attitude. Also, the definition of the DCAP is much more focussed on escalation and violent consequences of radicalisation, while Schmid (2013) separates non-violent and violent radicalisation. Considering the V&J et al. (2014) definition, it’s noticeable that radicalisation is framed in a counter-terrorism manner. A development which is in line with Schmid’s (2013) observation on the use of the term radicalisation by (Western) governments.

As a result of the lack of a universally accepted definition, the authors of various policies, programs and academic articles are to some extent free to add their own comprehension to radicalisation. For this thesis, the definition of V&J et al. (2014) will be used as a working definition. Even though this definition is less extensive and ‘precise’ than Schmid’s’ (2013) constructed definition, it’s the most applicable definition for this thesis. Within this research, the DCAP is the main unit of analysis. To stay in line with this program, it’s useful to apply the same working definition. As a result, this thesis will also mainly consider the terrorism-side of radicalisation, which is prominently represented within the DCAP definition (V&J et al., 2014). So, considering these two advantages, the DCAP definition is the most applicable for this thesis, although this may not be the most extensive and complete definition of radicalisation.

Besides the definition of radicalisation, also the academic debate about possibilities to detect and signal radicalisation remains ongoing. The V&J et al. (2014) DCAP includes actions and measures aimed at detecting radicalisation, while the academic debate struggles to determine whether this is indeed possible. Bakker, Grol & Weggemans (2014) argue that detection of radicalisation and recognition of the preparation phase of joining a jihadi movement is easier said than done. Next to Bakker et al. (2014) also Schmid (2013) contests whether current available academic literature has succeeded to create conclusive results when looking for radicalisation causes. In opposite to what is argued by Schmid (2013) and Bakker et al. (2014) various researchers attest that possibilities exist to detect and prevent radicalisation in an early phase. These authors attempted to create generalizable frameworks and profiles helpful in the detection of radicalisation. Chapter two will further address these developed frameworks, profiles and the overall debate on the possibilities to detect radicalisation.

1.3.2. Global jihadism

According to the V&J et al. (2014) DCAP global jihadism and radicalisation are two closely related concepts. The DCAPs’ overall aim is to combat jihadism in the Netherlands, as part of this approach the DCAP aims at taking away jihadism breeding grounds and preventing further radicalisation within the Netherlands (V&J et al., 2014). V&J et al. (2014) policy makers seem to assume a relation between radicalisation and global jihadism – as can be derived from radicalisation prevention actions that are included in a program aimed to combat jihadism. To better understand the relation between these two concepts it is necessary to get a better insight in jihadism. This paragraph will dive into the definition of jihadism, the way how jihadism is framed within Dutch counter terrorism policies and the relation between jihadism and radicalisation.

The NCTV interprets (global) jihadism as a violent ideological movement with “sect alike” features (NCTV, 2014). In their description of (global) jihadism the NCTV makes a clear distinction between the (political) Islam and (violent) Islam related jihadi movements. Jihadism and the Islam seem closely related, but jihadism is critical towards ‘regular’

Muslims and Islam. Regular Muslims acknowledge democratic systems and elections, which is according to jihadists contradictory to Divine law, the so called ‘Sharia’. Jihadists

emphasise that Muslims are globally viewed (and treated) as a repressed community. According to Jihadists, especially Western governments are to blame for the ‘repression’ of Muslims and the Islam (NCTV, 2014).

The idea that Western governments repress Muslims and the Islam, leads to ideologically and geopolitics driven hostility from jihadists towards Western countries (NCTV, 2014). The hostility and ideological resistance towards Western countries presents the risk that jihadists try to increase the political awareness within the Muslim community. Therefore, jihadists spread the message that participation within the current existing political systems will not contribute to combat Muslim grievances (NCTV, 2014). The risk of spreading these ideas is that it can obstruct political integration of Muslims and it can lead to Muslim recruitment to join (extremist) jihadi movements (NCTV, 2014). The latter is also an essential element of jihadist objectives. A second risk of jihadism is the ‘religious solidarity principle’, by which is meant that jihad ‘brothers’ should not let each other down. This solidarity principle also entails that jihad brothers are willing to sacrifice themselves for their ‘bigger purpose’ of spreading the jihad ideology and to combat opposing religious and political views (NCTV, 2014).

Consequently, jihadists are mainly focussed upon travelling abroad to join a jihadi movement. Especially, the Syrian insurgency had a magnetic effect on foreign jihadi fighters (NCTV, 2014). The call from Sunni1 _{brothers to mobilize themselves in Syria to support their fellow} believers and to avenge injustice done, sorted their effect. These arguments, together with the relative simplicity to reach Syria explain why Syria became a magnet for foreign fighters (NCTV, 2014). To several foreign jihadi the conflict in Syria offered the ‘ultimate’ chance to join an appealing jihadist organisation like ISIL and Al Qaida (NCTV, 2014). Further, successful jihadi set-outs have an invigorating effect on those left behind. Due to modern communication channels like social media, foreign fighters can inform their relatives and ones left behind about their experiences as a foreign jihadi fighter. In comparison to outsiders, who frame jihadist fighters as terrorists, jihadis perceive themselves as militarized humanitarian assistance (NCTV, 2014). The latter is one of the utopian incentives which motivates the jihadi fighters, and which is used as argument to convince other Muslims to join jihadi movements (NCTV, 2014).

V&J et al. (2014) DCAP frames global jihadism as: ‘An ideological movement of political Islam which is based on a specific interpretation of Salafist teachings and on the works of Sayyid Qutb and seeks a global dominance of Islam and the establishment of an Islamic state (caliphate) through armed struggle (jihad).’ An essential element of the framing is included within the last part of this definition, because armed struggle is viewed as an important part of jihad. While relating this part of the jihadism definition to radicalisation, it can be identified that armed struggle also to some extent returns within the radicalisation definition as cited in the previous section. V&J et al. (2014) refer to accepting the ultimate consequence and use of violence and

emphasise that by countering radicalisation the growth of new adherents can be prevented and jihadism breeding ground can be diminished. Although, it is not explicitly cited within the DCAP program, from these two points it can be derived that V&J et al. (2014) policy makers’ assume that there is a direct link between radicalisation and jihadism.

1 Sunnism is one of the flows within the Islamic religion. Part of the Sunnism flow is the spectrum of fundamentalist flows known as Salafism (NCTV, 2014).

1.3.3. Community policing & community police officers

Within the DCAP first-line professionals are framed as key actors to combat and prevent (further) radicalisation. Part of these so called first-line professionals are community police officers (CPOs). This thesis aims to assess if policy makers’ assumptions on the possibilities for detection and prevention of radicalisation by Dutch CPOs are realistic. To assess if these assumptions are indeed realistic it is a necessity to, besides better understanding the concept of radicalisation, also get a better insight in community policing and the role of CPOs in the Netherlands. This paragraph will at first consider the bigger concept of community policing, further this paragraph will also give an overview of how community policing is organized and integrated within the Dutch police. Thereby, this part of the conceptual framework will also give a slight insight in why Dutch CPOs are assumed to be applicable to execute tasks aimed at signalling and detecting radicalisation.

As argued by Bervoets, Van der Torre, & Besselink, (2009), the origin of the Dutch CPO can be found in the doctrine of community policing. Bervoets et al. (2009) did an extensive study on CPOs and community policing within the Netherlands. This is interesting, because this thesis will also specifically address community policing in the Netherlands and Dutch CPO’s. The concept of community policing can as best be described as a form of locally bounded police work. Locally bounded police work involves the role, position, influence and tasks the local police force executes at the local level, with as underlying strategy to build ties and work with members of the local community. This point is also recognized by Terpstra, Van

Duijneveldt, Eikenaar, Havinga, & Van Stokkom, (2016) who did an extensive study towards local bounded policework within the re-organized police organization. Often the police are perceived as a national organization, charged with upholding the rule of law, prosecution of criminal offences and as executors of the governmental monopoly of violence. Within this ‘bigger’ national police organization the local bounded policing work is an essential element (Miltenburg, Van Steden, & Boutelllier, 2014).

To determine the extent to which Dutch CPOs are suited to implement the counter

radicalisation tasks as assigned to them within the DCAP, first it needs to be investigated how Dutch CPOs are perceived and positioned within the Netherlands. This paragraph will further consider the academic debate around community policing, before it focusses upon the role of CPOs within the Netherlands. Dunn et al. (2016) did a similar research on the contribution of community policing in Australian counter-terrorism policies. Their conducted research will be used to provide this thesis with better insights about the concept of community policing. Dunn

et al. (2016) argue that within Western democracies, like the Netherlands, the concept of community policing is viewed as an essential part of successful police work (Dunn et al. 2016).

Academics share a broad acknowledgement that since the start of modern police work the community policing philosophy has been a foundation which has legitimised various forms of policing work (Reiner, 2000). Within these Western democracies police work moved from a responsive- towards a more pro-active approach (Dunn et al., 2016). This more pro-active policing approach comes along with an increased execution of primary police interventions. It also includes that the police do not only respond to crime, but that the police also fulfil a much broader role in the protection of democratic citizenry (Dunn et al., 2016). Murray (2005) characterizes community policing as a rather pro-active instead of reactive approach towards crime. This pro-active characteristic of community policing work is represented within primary interventions with the intention to help prevent crime, to confront social determinants (youth programmes), or to set contexts that mitigate against crime (using urban design, or regulating mobility and densities) (Dunn et al., 2016).

Although the concept of community policing is broadly addressed within the academic debate, some authors argue that no one quite knows what community policing exactly means (Bayley, 1986; Klockars, 1988). A crucial factor in the critical examination of community policing is that community policing has evolved from practice towards theory instead of the other way around (Dunn et al., 2016). As a consequence, there is not a single universally accepted definition which clearly defines it. Despite that fact, it can be argued that community policing at least includes the following elements: direct contacts with the public, public consultations and partnerships (Sarre, 1996).

Both Weisburd (2010) and Neyroud (2011) argue that community policing can’t reduce crime on its own and point out a certain overestimation of what can be done. In the Netherlands though, it is acknowledged that community policing is essential for the anchoring of police work at the local level (Miltenburg et al., 2014; Terpstra et al., 2016). Also, it is perceived as useful to decrease feelings of insecurity and to strengthen the (tactical) relationship between the police and citizens (Braga and Weisburg, 2008; Terpstra et al., 2016). As cited within the conceptual framework Dutch CPOs are positioned within the local base teams of the Dutch police force. Within these base teams, CPOs are a permanent pair of eyes and ears on the street (Miltenburg et al., 2014; Terpstra et al., 2016). The execution of this role also includes that CPOs are often perceived as the most visible representation of the (local) police force.

The visible representation and the contacts with the local community makes the CPO a linking pin between the police organization and the served community, which makes them an essential element for the Dutch police force to reach the intended ambitions (Terpstra et al., 2016).

In 2013, the Dutch police organization re-organized from a decentralized organisation into a centralized national police force. Within the Dutch national police three closely cooperating levels can be identified: national, regional and local (see figure 1 (P.14), for a visual overview of the Dutch police organization). In total, the Dutch police organization consists of the rural unit, a police service centre and ten regional units. Every regional unit is separated in various district units. These district units are established as a bridge between the regional and local level police force (Politie, n.dA). According to Terpstra et al. (2016) the local embedment of police work is one of the main challenges and priorities for the re-organized national police. Responsible for local embedment of police work are the locally positioned base teams. The working area of these local base teams is limited to a municipality, an (area) of a bigger municipality or several (smaller) municipalities. Within their working area, the local police base team is responsible for the execution of core tasks of fundamental police care2 _(Politie, n.d.B). Within these local police teams a main task is provided to CPOs (Politie, n.d.B).

2 The Dutch police force includes the following tasks under fundamental policing care tasks: Daily surveillance, prevention, traffic, detective force and prosecution, emergency assistance and upholding the rule of law (Police, n.d.D)

Figure 1: Organizational scheme of the Dutch police force (Politie, n.d.C)

Dutch CPOs execute a special role within the police force, because they form a prominent representation on the streets and are the most visible part of the police force for citizens. (Bervoets et al., 2009). Especially, outsiders (administrators, politicians, policy workers’ and citizens) perceive the role of CPOs as special. The importance of CPOs is also emphasised by Dutch parliament; a law included that on every 5000 citizens there should at least be one active CPO (art. 38a lid 1 Politiewet 2012). The perception from the outside, that CPOs execute a special role, comes along with ‘high’ expectations (Bervoets et al., 2009). Within (local) security policies and programs the CPO is framed as a key actor and ‘linking pin’ between the police and community, caused by its’ involvement and contacts within the local community (Terpstra et al., 2016).

As a result of these high expectations and perceived role as linking pin, a broad variety of tasks is assigned to Dutch CPOs. One of the tasks is included in the DCAP to combat jihadism (V&J et al., 2014). Because of their position as linking pin within local communities, CPOs are assumed to be able to signal potential signs of radicalisation within their working area. Apart from the debate whether signalling and detecting radicalisation is possible, there is also ambiguity whether CPOs can execute the by V&J et al. (2014) foreseen tasks. According to Kop & Moors (2015) CPOs perceive several challenges and dilemmas when it comes to executing this role. Chapter three will further address the challenges and dilemmas CPOs perceive in their attempts to signal radicalisation and will also consider the academic debate on realism in the expectation that CPOs are able to signal and detect radicalisation.

1.4. Research design & methodology

This thesis will take the form of an evaluative research. Evaluation research identifies two main approaches, these are formative and summative evaluation (Lawrence, 2011). The aim of formative evaluation is to strengthen or improve the object of evaluation, while summative evaluation is aims to examine effects or outcomes of a certain policy or program (Lawrence, 2011). This research will make use of a formative approach, because this research can be helpful to improve current or future counter terrorism policies. The aim of this research is to determine to what extent community police officers can execute their ascribed role within the DCAP (V&J et al., 2014). Which will be the main unit of analysis. This can be viewed as a form of evaluation of policy effects and outcomes, which will be further explained within this section.

Nelen, Leeuw and Bogaerts (2010) specifically addressed counter terrorism policy evaluation. Within their research Nelen et al. (2010) identified three approaches towards counter

terrorism policy evaluation: plan-, process- and effect/impact evaluation. The latter evaluation occurs after a policy or program is finished. Aim of impact evaluation is to test the effects and/or outcomes of a certain policy or program. While doing an impact evaluation it is likely that the researcher will face the ‘attribution problem’, which means that it is difficult to assess whether any change in the dependent variable is caused by the policy intervention, or whether there is another (logical) explanation for the changing dependent variable. For an impact evaluation, a so-called ‘control group’ is required. This is a group or population on which the effects or a lack of policy interventions can be tested. For example, to compare the group with a lack of policy interventions with a group which has been the subject of policy interventions. This research won’t use impact evaluation methods, because this research won’t use a

measure group on which the impact can be tested. The lack of a measure group makes it impossible to conduct a proper impact evaluation research (Nelen, et al., 2010).

The second evaluation approach addressed by Nelen et al. (2010) is process evaluation. A process evaluation serves two different aims: At first, it is important to determine if a measure is indeed brought into practice, and if so, if this is done as intended. A second aim of process evaluation is to determine whether the supposed mechanisms to assure policy goals are present in practice. Process evaluation is often done by interviewing professionals who were included within the policy design, and the professionals who are involved during the policy implementation. If interviews aren’t an option for process evaluation, it can be replaced by doing a simulation exercise (Nelen et al., 2010).

This research won’t do a full process evaluation, but will make use of some elements included in process evaluation. This thesis will investigate the policy makers’ assumptions included within the DCAP, regarding the assigned role of CPOs within this action program. This research will investigate if the intended actions were indeed brought into practice, and if so, if this is done as intended. For this thesis interviews with CPOs will be conducted. These interviews will be used to determine the practical feasibility, which relates to the process evaluation approach of interviewing involved professionals (Nelen et al., 2010).

Finally, the plan evaluation approach, often a form of ex ante evaluation. So, this often occurs before a policy or program is developed or implemented. Program theory is related to the plan evaluation approach. Program theory includes different assumptions on which a policy or program is based. These assumptions can relate to for example; reasons for addressing the problem, intended solutions and (side-)effects of the policy. Therefore, Nelen et al. (2010) speaks about policy theory, just as academic theory, policy theory can be true, somewhat true

or false (Nelen et al., 2010). This research will use the plan evaluation approach to identify the (underlying) assumptions of policy makers within the DCAP when it comes to detection and prevention of radicalisation. These assumptions will be tested through consideration of the current academic insights and their practical feasibility. So, therefore the plan evaluation approach is the most suitable for this research.

By using the plan evaluation approach this research will focus upon assumptions and theories behind the DCAP. These assumptions and theories are mostly aimed at two aspects. At first there is cognitive logic, which is about social and behavioural mechanisms which should lead to successful implementation of a proposed policy (Nelen et al., 2010). Second, there is operational logic, which is about operational steps that need to be taken to successfully implement a proposed policy (Nelen et al., 2010). For the evaluation of policy maker assumptions, on detection and prevention of radicalisation by CPOs, both types of

assumptions as suggested by Nelen et al. (2010) will be addressed in this research. Evaluation of both assumptions will provide this research with insights on both the cognitive- and

operational (more practical) logic.

1.4.1. Use of research methods

This research will combine two research methods: desk research and interviews. These research methods will be combined to gain insights from various sources. This thesis will consider academic literature about the concept of radicalisation and possibilities to detect and prevent radicalisation. Besides considering academic literature about radicalisation, this research will also investigate academic insights and current policies about community

policing and CPOs. These academic insights will be combined with practical insights derived from interviews and relevant news articles. Combining these two methods will give on the one hand an insight into what is documented on this problem, to assure that this research is able to add to current knowledge, while on the other hand this thesis will also give an insight in how the problem is currently perceived in practice.

At first this research will use desk research to analyse what has already been said about radicalisation. This will be done by reviewing various kinds of studies done on radicalisation. Reviewing the academic debate will include studies that have tried to define radicalisation, researches that have studied the ‘process’ of radicalisation and researches regarding the possibilities to detect and prevent radicalisation. It is important to get an insight in what ‘causes’ radicalisation, and if it is indeed possible to detect and prevent radicalisation.

Combining these distinct types of academic researches towards radicalisation will give a better insight in the definition, process and possibilities to signal and prevent radicalisation.

The second part of desk research will focus on the current academic knowledge and policies on the general role of CPOs. The main interest within this part of desk research is on

community policing in the Netherlands, because this thesis will focus specifically on a problem that occurs within the Netherlands. In other countries community policing could be organized differently, which makes it less relevant for this research. The role of CPOs, as described within academic literature and policies, will be compared to assumptions made while developing the Dutch action program to combat jihadism. The comparison between the academic literature and policies on the one hand, and the assumptions about this role on the other hand, are necessary to determine whether the policy maker assumptions are supported by academic insights.

To find relevant articles for this research, this thesis will mainly use Dutch keywords like: radicalisering (radicalisation), wijkagenten (CPOs), politie en radicalisering (Police and radialisation) etc. The literature gathered with the use of these keywords will be further expanded with use of the snowball principle. Within these articles most likely other articles, which are relevant for this thesis, can be found. Hence, the used keywords for this thesis are mainly focussed upon gathering relevant (Dutch) literature about the key-concept of this thesis. From the found ‘main-articles’ the literature for this thesis will be expanded. Besides using the cited keywords this thesis can also further build upon literature consulted for earlier research.

A main part of this thesis considers the role of CPOs in the DCAP. As CPOs are the main unit of observation in this thesis. The actual execution of this role happens on the streets, and is not written down on paper. To get an insight into how CPOs perceive their role, interviews will be conducted. CPOs are chosen as respondent group, because interviews are the most applicable way to get an insight in how CPOs perceive their own role. To conduct interviews this research will use a purposive sampling technique to select interview respondents. The main criteria for sampling is the respondents’ professional background. Dutch CPOs will be the only respondent group for this research. Besides the professional background, also the geographical location in which the CPOs are operating will be a criterion. The geographical

focus will be upon the ‘Randstad3_{’ area within the Netherlands. Considering statistics} regarding radicalizing individuals within the Netherlands it’s noticeable that radicalisation mostly occurs within the Randstad (Bergema & Koudijs, 2015). So, within the Randstad this problem is the most urgent and most relevant. Further criteria like age and gender aren’t relevant while selecting respondents, because the professional background and geographical working area are sufficient to create a representative sample, as this research won’t focus upon a ‘specific’ background of Dutch CPOs. Like for instance the influence of the CPOs ethnical background on the execution of counter-radicalisation tasks.

Next to purposive sampling this research will also include parts of an opportunity sample. The respondent sample is based upon the professional background and geographical working area of the respondents. Finding respondents that fit within the created sample will be done by making use of opportunity sampling. At first the authors network will be consulted to find suitable respondents. In addition to the own network, social media will be used to find respondents. Nowadays most CPOs are active on various social media channels (Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn). This active use of social media by CPOs makes it easier to approach them for doing an interview. By using the described opportunities to create a sample, this research conducted a total of five interviews.

The subject of this research can be perceived as a sensitive subject and this can be a potential limitation while approaching respondents. Interviews will be used anonymously and the outcomes will only be used for the purposes of this research. In agreement with the

respondents the interviews will be recorded and notes will be taken manually. Afterwards a transcription of the interviews will be made. Respondents will get the opportunity to read the interview transcript and/or listen to the records made during the interviews. A record of the interview is only made if the interviewee agrees. Further, it is a possibility to discuss the outcomes of interviews with the respondents. So, data gathered from interviews will be used in consultation with respondents, to increase the opportunity of cooperation.

When generalizing the results of this research there are two problems noticeable. At first the political and social situation in the Netherlands determines the outcome of this research. In countries, comparable to the Netherlands this research can be useful, but cultural, social-economic and policy differences should be taken into consideration. For example, the social 3 The randstad is the biggest conurbation area within the Netherlands, which includes the four major Dutch cities (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht) and their surroundings. The Randstad area residents around seven million people.

position of police officers can vary per country. This can cause that the same research will result in different outcomes - a problem that can also occur while conducting the same research in the Netherlands. Even within the Netherlands there can be cultural and social economic differences. So, the outcomes of this research strongly depend upon the context in which the research is conducted.

A second problem that occurs with generalization of the results of this research is

generalizability of the interviews held. Results gathered from interviews depend upon the selected respondents. This research uses a purposive sample built upon the professional background and working area of the respondents. The same research and type of interview, but with different respondents, obviously can give different results. For example, because of the working area of the selected respondent or the period in which the interview is conducted. To maximize possibilities for generalization, this research will give an extensive description of the conducted interviews and data exploited from these interviews. These interviews will be conducted with the help of semi-structured interview methods. During these interviews, the main concepts of this research will be addressed. The interviews will start off with some questions about the general role of CPOs, next the concept of radicalisation will be addressed to get an insight on how CPOs experience this issue in practice. Lastly, the interviews will focus specifically upon the role of CPOs in the (local) approach towards radicalisation and how this approach is regulated with the local base team. Three of the four addressed topics are particularly useful to answer the second proposed sub-question, related to community

policing. The concept of radicalisation will be addressed to get some insights on how

radicalisation is perceived in practice and can perhaps be used to confirm academic insights. The outcomes of these interviews will be combined and compared with insights gathered from desk research. In chapter two and three (analysis) the data derived (practical insights) from interviews will be compared and added to data derived from desk research. For example, by citing quotes derived from the conducted interviews.

To analyse the conducted interviews this thesis uses a ‘simple’ form of color coding. A transcription of all interviews will be made. Within these transcripts there will be looked for data which explicitly relates to the addressed concepts, and more specifically to which data is useful to answer the proposed RQs’. To code the most relevant data there will be made use of in-text marking, as this research does not require extensive data coding and programs. The number of interviews is limited and the semi-structured interview method will be helpful to distinguish various ‘parts’ within the interview transcripts. The main findings of these

interviews will be summarized within a conclusion of the transcript. Further, this research will summarize the most important findings of all interviews within one document, which will give an overview on the conclusions about the various addressed topics.

As earlier addressed in this chapter, for this research at least five interviews will be

conducted. Five is a limited number of interviews, caused by the limited amount of time and resources available for this research. Consequently, due to the limited number of interviews it is difficult to generalize the conclusions drawn from these interviews. Therefore, these interviews are mainly used to get an insight on how the research subject is perceived in daily practice, because the vision of the selected respondents is often not described in academic literature, policy documents etc. Among these five respondents are four CPOs, which in this thesis will be referred to by using the references CPO 1, CPO 2, CPO 3 & CPO 4. The fifth respondent executes the function of counter-terrorism expert. This respondent doesn’t fit the original research sample, but based upon the respondents’ professional background this respondent is of added value. This thesis will refer to this respondent as CTO (Counter terrorism officer). The geographical background of these five respondents differs, which will provide this thesis with insights from various local police forces within the Randstad area.

1.5. Structure of this thesis

Chapter one gave a first outline of the problem that will be assessed within this thesis. Further, chapter one also introduced the proposed research questions, gave a brief overview of the main research concepts and discussed the used research methods. In the next chapters this thesis will give an in-depth insight in and analysis on the research subject. Chapter two will focus on the current academic debate about possibilities to detect, signal and prevent radicalisation. Further, chapter two will also give an answer to the first sub-question of this thesis, about academic support for the notion that radicalisation can be detected and

prevented.

In chapter three there will be further attention for the concept of community policing and the role of (Dutch) CPOs in prevention and detection of radicalisation. This will be done by addressing the current academic debate, complemented with empirical insights gained from the conducted interviews. The conclusion of chapter three will give an answer to the second proposed sub-question. Chapter four will present the conclusions of this thesis, and will also give an answer to the proposed research question. Further, in chapter four there will also be room for discussion and it will provide some potential recommendations based upon the conclusions drawn during this research.

2. Detection and prevention of radicalisation

The theoretical and conceptual framework in chapter one gave a first brief overview of the academic debate on the concept of radicalisation. From the theoretical and conceptual framework, it can be derived that radicalisation is a broadly discussed concept and that there is ambiguity about whether and how radicalisation can be detected and prevented. In this chapter, there will be further attention for the debate on defining radicalisation, the

radicalisation process itself and the current debate on radicalisation detection and prevention opportunities.

This latter discussion will be supported by various frameworks which were developed to be helpful in detecting radicalisation. Next, the development of radicalisation ‘profiles’ will be further investigated and case studies on radicalized individuals will be considered.

This chapter will also evaluate the underlying policy makers’ assumptions as included in the V&J et al. (2014) DCAP. To better understand and interpret the policy makers’ assumptions this thesis will use the plan evaluation approach developed by Nelen et al. (2010). This approach will help to determine and interpret the cognitive logic of the policy makers’ assumptions. The comparison of insights gained from the academic debate on the policy makers’ assumptions included in the DCAP, will support in answering the sub question. This question aimed at determining the extent that academic insights support the assumption that radicalisation can be detected and prevented.

2.1. Academic insights on radicalisation

Before an assessment on the DCAP can be made, this thesis will at first further discuss the current academic debate about possibilities to detect and prevent radicalisation. To better understand this, at first, it is necessary to investigate what is already known and documented on the process of radicalisation. This paragraph will discuss a limited amount of literature about radicalisation processes, because there is simply too much literature available about radicalisation to address within the scope of this thesis. Therefore, this thesis will mainly focus upon studies on radicalisation conducted in the Netherlands, as these are in some cases also input for Dutch governmental policies and programs, like for example Weggemans & De Graaf (2015). Based upon findings and references included within these consulted studies the literature about radicalisation processes for this thesis is further expanded.

These Dutch studies also provide useful insights in radicalisation processes of Dutch foreign fighters and radicals. Interesting for this thesis is that these consulted studies are also taking the Dutch social, political and economic situation into account. This makes it particularly

interesting, because some authors argue that radicalisation processes are influenced by for example the political and cultural situation in a country (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009). It is relevant to see how these factors influence Dutch radicalized individuals, because this thesis especially focusses upon a problem that occurs in the Netherlands.

As cited within the theoretical and conceptual framework radicalisation is a broadly discussed topic within the academic debate, but it still lacks a universally accepted definition, which makes radicalisation a subjective concept. Despite, the in the conceptual framework quoted limitations of the V&J et al. (2014) definition of radicalisation, this thesis will make use of the same working-definition: ‘An attitude that shows a person is willing to accept the ultimate consequence of a mind-set and to turn them into actions. These actions can result in the escalation of generally manageable oppositions up to a level they destabilise society due to the use of violence, in conduct that deeply hurts people or affects their freedom or in groups turning away from society (NCTV et al., 2014, P.33).’

As referred to within the conceptual framework the V&J et al. (2014) definition of

radicalisation strongly emphasizes the ultimate consequence of radicalisation that can result in escalating (violent) actions. Prior to the ultimate (violent) consequence of radicalisation an extensive and often dynamic radicalisation process takes place. A process which is mostly based upon an increasing aversion towards ‘the system’ (Weggemans & De Graaf, 2015). Because of increased feelings of dissatisfaction, radicalized individuals feel the urge to do something. What this something will be in practice, depends upon the radicalized individual, but it is known that in the end only a small number of individuals are able and willing to use violence (Weggemans & De Graaf, 2015).

Several researches emphasize the need for vengeance as the most important incentive for radicalisation. This need for vengeance can be caused by so called trigger events, or can be a consequence of someone’s individual experiences (Weggemans & De Graaf, 2015). Although vengeance is viewed as the most important incentive for radicalisation, this doesn’t make personal injustice a predictive nor a necessary element of radicalisation. Radicalisation requires more incentives than only personal injustice (Weggemans & De Graaf, 2015).

Klandermans and Van Stekelenburg (2010) argue that radicalisation can be viewed as an interactive group process, based upon the idea that no individual is born radicalized. It is the individual itself that radicalizes, but the process of further radicalization often occurs as part of an interactive group process. Radicalisation processes as part of an interactive group

process occur, because (small) groups with ideologically like-minded people create their own socially constructed reality. The creation of an own socially constructed reality can strengthen the radical ideas among the individual group members (Klandermans & Van Stekelenburg, 2010).

The process of radicalisation can be compared to an elevator inside a multi-layered building. Individuals start at the ground floor and caused by several factors and developments along the way individuals can move up to the higher levels of radicalisation. Only a few of the

radicalizing individuals will make it to the higher levels that will bring them to (violent) radicalisation (Klandermans & Van Stekelenburg, 2010). While being part of an interactive group process, some of the individual group members within the group develop such radical ideas that it can eventually lead to escalation and (violent) radicalisation. The idea that participation in a group process can stimulate (further) radicalisation is supported by

McCauley and Mosalenko (2008). McCauley and Mosalenko (2008) argue that radicalisation is made possible by bringing individuals into (small) groups. During the radicalisation process, interactive group-thinking (‘us versus them’), will encourage the individuals’ rage and hostility towards other groups and society (McCauley & Mosalenko, 2008; Weggemans & De Graaf, 2015).

The idea that radicalisation can be viewed as an interactive group process is also supported by empirical evidence found in case-studies done by Bakker et al. (2014) and Bakker and Grol (2015). From these case studies, it can be derived that most individuals who became involved in (violent) radicalisation had intensive contact with ideologically like-minded people (Bakker & Grol, 2015). These groups of ideologically like-minded people consisted of (old-) friends from the same neighbourhood, new friends belonging to radical groups and charismatic persons articulating and disseminating a radical agenda they encountered (Bakker & Grol, 2015). In the process of becoming involved in these interactive group processes individuals tend to become more open and vulnerable to articulated radical ideas. By exchanging ideas among group members, the radicalisation process of individuals in this group can be strengthened.

Besides the presence of an interactive group process, Bakker & Grol (2015) also observed that radicalisation processes often differ per individual. The diversity within the individual

radicalisation processes are much more obvious than the comparable issues within these processes. Although there are some ‘general’ tendencies observed within the case study done by Bakker & Grol (2015), it must be noted that their case study only researched six different

cases. From this number, no general conclusions can be drawn (Bakker & Grol, 2015). Nevertheless, the discovered general tendencies relate to the individuals’ limited chances on the labour market, limited possibilities for a social career, the lack of expected possibilities to improve their future and a lack of perspectives in the Netherlands. Also, most researched (potential) foreign fighters have a romantic view of the live inside the Caliphate (Bakker & Grol, 2015).

The outcomes of the case study done by Bakker & Grol (2015) are comparable to the

outcomes of a similar case study conducted by Bakker et al. (2014) one year earlier. Bakker et al. (2014) also refer to a complex and divers picture of Dutch Muslim foreign fighters.

Considering the various backgrounds, characteristics and motivations of radicalized individuals it becomes clear that radicalisation is a complicated and not easily noticeable process, because the path that leads to (violent) radicalisation varies per person (Bakker et al., 2014; Bakker & Grol, 2015).

The outcomes of the case studies from Bakker et al. (2014) and Bakker & Grol (2015) are to some extent contradictory to the outcomes of a study conducted by Veldhuis & Staun (2009). Veldhuis & Staun (2009) noted: ‘Demographic profiles of radical Muslims in the Western world show that they are generally not poor, religiously fanatic, or desperate due to suffering from extreme poverty, political oppression, or other deprived circumstances.’ (Veldhuis & Staun, P. 8, 2009). From this quote, it can be derived that general tendencies as proposed by Bakker and Grol (2015), are not necessarily factors for radicalisation. This is a point they also acknowledge, because Bakker and Grol (2015) argued that the diversity among radicalisation processes is more obvious than the things these processes have in common. The differences in terrorists’ and radicals’ backgrounds is agreed upon by Stern (2010) who conducted several interviews with detained terrorists. Stern (2010) concluded that terrorists come from all sorts of socio-economic backgrounds as was also noted by the case studies conducted by Bakker et al. (2014) and Bakker and Grol (2015).

Veldhuis & Staun (2009) also emphasize there is no single explanation for radicalisation, because causes of radicalisation are as diverse as they are abundant. Even though Veldhuis & Staun (2009) emphasize there is no single explanation for radicalisation, they developed the root cause model, which analyses factors responsible for causing radicalisation among Muslims in the Western world (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009). In their model, ‘root causes’ refers to causal factors without which the radicalisation process would not have occurred. Within this model causal factors of radicalisation are categorized at the macro- and micro level.

Factors on the macro level are caused by for example economic, politic and cultural

developments, which are a consequence of so called trigger events. These causal factors are coherent with factors at the micro level. On the micro level, a distinction can be made between social and individual factors. Within this model, the macro level factors are viewed as preconditions for radicalisation, but to explain why some people do radicalize and others do not, it’s necessary to also do a scrutiny towards micro-level causes (Veldhuis & Staun, 2009). Studying these micro-level causes can also be helpful to explain why radicalisation processes differ per individual.

Figure 2: Overview of the root cause model (Veldhuis & Staun, P.23, 2009)

2.2. Academic insights on possibilities to signal and detect radicalisation

The academic literature about radicalisation processes, as assessed in the previous section, indicates that processes of radicalisation are complex and differ per radicalized individual. Insights gained from these various processes of radicalisation give a brief overview of developments that can occur and stimulate (further) radicalisation. The developments within radicalisation processes demonstrate that these processes are complex and diversified, which makes radicalisation hard to predict and detect for involved professionals. This explains why Kop & Moors (2015) argue that one of the main problems the police are experiencing while executing the V&J et al., (2014) ascribed role is to determine what the actual danger is that should be signalled to detect radicalisation.

This section will discuss several developed frameworks and profiling attempts, aimed at recognition and detection of radicalisation. This thesis will only address a limited number of the total number of developed frameworks. There are simply too many developed frameworks to address them all. Focus will be upon the two most ‘well-known’ frameworks, namely the

Danish Intelligence Service (PET) PET-model and the New York Police Department (NYPD) NYPD-model. Both models are developed by governmental institutions with

counter-terrorism objectives, and are therefore interesting to compare with the DCAP. Further, the pyramid model developed by McCauley & Mosalenko (2008) will be discussed, because this model gives an extensive description of the radicalisation process. In addition to these three models, this thesis will also address three models which are represented within Dutch

(counter-radicalisation) related policies namely: a guideline developed by the Association for Dutch Municipalities (VNG), a model introduced by Zannoni et al. (2008) and the framework from De Wolf and Doosje (2010) used within the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science (Ministry of OCW) program Puberaal, lastig of radicaliserend (Puberty; just making a fuss or in the process or radicalisation?) Further, this section will also further elaborate on the

academic debate on various attempts to create a generalizable radicalisation or terrorist profile.

2.2.1 Radicalisation frameworks

Already back in 2006 a problem occurred with recognizing signals of radicalisation, when the Dutch four biggest municipalities4 _{took a leading role in developing local policies aimed at} detection and prevention of radicalisation. During this trajectory, several municipalities were not prepared for executing these policies, caused by a lack of knowledge on how to detect signals of radicalisation (De Graaff, De Poot & Kleemans, 2009). To tackle this problem the association for Dutch Municipalities (VNG) developed a guideline helpful in doing this (De Graaff, et al., 2009).

The VNG (2006) guideline separates the following six different signals of radicalisation:

 Signal 1: Taking distance  the subject suddenly and violently takes distance from things or people that were before perceived as near and familiar

 Signal 2: Devotion  the subject honours radical ideas

 Signal 3: Image forming of the enemy  the subject does not only honour a certain ideal, but also creates a strong enemy image.

 Signal 4: Public = Private  the subject prefers private norms over public norms.

 Signal 5: Appearance characteristics  the subject wears a specific kind of clothing with which he disassociates himself from the crowd – on its own not sufficient to signal radicalisation, but in combination with other signals it could indicate something.