Smart City Innovation - A Conceptual Framework for Behavioural Change

(1)

Smart City Innovation-A conceptual framework for

behavioral change

Kevin van der Gugten

August 2019

Abstract

This paper tries to create a conceptual framework for behavioral change in a Smart City where innovation is pursued. Reykjavik is used as case where car commuting is the mobility problem to tackle. The conceptual model consists of power relationships, incentives, nudges and the definition of optimal Sharing Services. Thereafter, qualitative research is done on the commuting problem in Reykjavik. The application of the conceptual model to Reykjavik shows that sharing services are a valid way to improve the sustainability while commuting. The framework produces recommendations that can be contextualized to different SCs and their characteristics. This framework is not capable of providing the best fit solution, but it will help to design a solution in line with the context.

Keywords— Behavioral Change, Incentives, Internet of Things, Power, Nudging, Sharing Services, Smart City

(2)

1 Introduction

The last decennial the demand for IoT solutions has been increasing exponentially figure 1. This creates opportunities for businesses and governments. Businesses can create new markets and exploit a short term monopoly. This will lead to a business with a healthy economic situation. Reykjavik is using IoT solutions, but this is not because of the economic advantages it will gain. Reykjavik pursues an optimal living climate for its citizens. The creation of a Smart city (SC) is the mean used to pursue an improved quality of life for the citizens in Reykjavik. The creation of a functioning SC is complex. When implementing an IoT solution a holistic view of all the stakeholders and their motives has to be created. Reykjavik created IoT solutions that are trying to improve the quality of life of citizens, but this does not mean that these solutions are operating in full effect.

Figure 1: Number of IoT connected devices worldwide.

Rogers (2003) states in his book that market adoption has the form of a bell curve. Through the years different variations of the curve have been published. One of these variations was published in 2014 where Downes (2013) found that the behaviour towards technology has shifted. This lead to a transformation of the bell curve into a shark fin curve figure 2. The shark fin model shows a significantly shorter adoption process then the bell curve. It also shows that an implementation can only lead to mass adoption in its early stage. The shark fin curve is applicable to the implementation process of an IoT solution. Reykjavik needs to change the design of IoT solutions to convince the end user.

Power relationships can be used to convince the user. Incentives could be created to raise awareness for the topic in question. Incentive are either positive or negative and either economical or environmental figure 3. The development of the incentive should be inside of these spectra with regard to the IoT solutions.

To narrow down the scope of the research there will only be looked into IoT solution that are related to sharing services. People in Reykjavik have the availability of multiple transportation methods to reach their desired destination, but Reykjavik is not satisfied with the current state of commuting. During the Icelandic crisis (2008-2011) Reykjavik saw a growth in the importance of public transport, this due to the economic situation of the people. People lost their jobs and did not have the means to afford personal automobile expenses. This lead to an increase in importance for public transport in suburbs (Ulfarsson et al., 2015). After Reykjavik made a fast economic recovery and reversed the growth in importance of

(4)

Figure 2: Bell curve versus Sharkfin curve.

public transport. Nowadays (2019) the automobile is the most prevalent transport used for commuting. Citizens are still prioritizing their car over other means of transport while commuting. This is due to the fact that citizen’s of Reykjavik do not want to live in the centre of the city. Instead, the people of Reykjavik want to live in the suburbs where driving an automobile is prevalent in the commuting culture. The main alternative of the automobile is public transport, but public transport only consists of the bus with relatively long waiting time in the suburbs. This is because the people density in suburbs is not high to support more public transport buses. Sharing services are an alternative as well, but Reykjavik has only implemented a bicycle sharing service which do not serve the needs of citizens that commute.

Therefore, this paper tries to find a way for Reykjavik to implement sharing service solutions that can support the commuting of citizens. This is done by creating awareness for the IoT solution and consequently creating a relationship between the citizen of Reykjavik and the IoT solutions.

‘’How can Reykjavik achieve behavioral change for sharing service solutions to counter automobile use in commuting?”

2 Theoretical Framework

2.1 Power

The awareness creation for IoT solutions in Reykjavik is required for innovation caused by IoT solutions. The creation of awareness is only possible with the use of power, because power is the engine behind the adoption and consequently innovation. Thus, without power there will be no innovation.

Three faces of power

Power is the relationship between two objects, in Reykjavik’s case it is the relationship between the user and the IoT solution. The creation of a relation between a user and a IoT solution is complex. This relationship is created by stakeholders of the IoT solution with the use of power. It is possible to observe power, but the quantification of power is difficult. That is why (Introna, 2016) divided the power process in three separate faces.

The creation of awareness for IoT solutions does not happen automatically. Even when the IoT solutions are functioning optimally the creation of awareness does not have to happen. That is where power comes into play. The first face of power is when a person A makes person B perform an action that is not significant for person B (Introna, 2016). When Reykjavik wants to promote sustainability among citizen this is the face required to achieve the goal. The first face of power can change behaviour, but in a broad manner where citizens are not guided to specific IoT solutions.

(5)

The first face of power is able to persuade people in changing behaviour, but in a general way. The second face of power goes a step further. Like the first face of power person A tries to persuade person B in performing an insignificant task. It will continue by limiting the actions person B can take (Introna, 2016). Reykjavik wants to promote IoT solutions that improve the sustainability. This is done by limiting the options citizens are guided to. These IoT solutions will fit the goals of Reykjavik. The second face of power can change behaviour in a more specific way than the first face of power by limiting the possible actions person B can take.

The third face of power goes another step further than limiting the possible actions as seen in the second face of power. The third face of power has no focus on the possible actions directly. Person A tries to change the values and preferences of person B, consequently this will influence the possible actions person B can take (Introna, 2016). Reykjavik can use the third face of power to control the behavior of its citizens. This looks like a desirable state to reach for Reykjavik, but this kind of behavior control comes with ethical issues. The autonomy of users is endangered when behavior is manipulated (Tengland, 2012). The use of the third face of power has to be managed carefully to ensure that users can make a decision that is not enforced by other parties. The third face of power can play a huge role in the creation of awareness for IoT solutions, but an unethical approach is not desirable.

2.2 Types of power

(Introna, 2016) defines a clear definition about how power can be achieved in a relationship between two entities, but there are different ways to design the power relationship. The different types of power relationships are: Coercive power, Rewarding power, Referent power, Legitimate power, Expert power (French et al., 1959) and Information power (Raven, 1964). These different power relations can be used to enforce switch behavior. In Reykjavik’s case this can be seen as switching from daily car use to public transport.

Coercive power

Coercive power is a power relationship where power is achieved by creating fear. Fear is an emotion that can be used for repression and social control (Camerablu, 2009). Fear in a power relationship is created by conditional punishment. The punishment will be executed when the conditions are not met. The punishment is linked to the goal it tries to achieve. The punishment-goal alignment will ensure compliance and lead to a change in behavior. Coercive power is only achievable when some sort of hierarchy is present, this is because people will react negatively when they are controlled without the required authority. Reykjavik has the authority required to use coercive power on people. Coercive power can be an effective tool for Reykjavik to increase the adoption of IoT solutions.

Rewarding power

Rewarding power is a power relationship where power is achieved by giving out rewards, thus people will be rewarded when desired behaviour is performed (French et al., 1959). There is variety in type of rewards, for example the literature makes a distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic rewards.

Extrinsic rewards are physical rewards that have no direct connection with the actions it tries to initiate (Guzzo, 1979). When using extrinsic rewards behavior is controlled by an external force that uses instrumental motives to achieve a desired outcome (Brief & Aldag, 1977). A prevalent examples of an extrinsic reward is getting a bonus when a certain goal is accomplished. This motivator will alter behavior in such a way that goals are pursued. O’leary and O’leary (1977) stated that extrinsic rewards are rewards that are not present in the situation. (Research short term rewards) Extrinsic rewards are a valid way to alter short term behavior. Reykjavik can use extrinsic rewards to change the behavior of tourists. This is because tourists are people with low involvement which are more influenced by reward schemes than people with high involvement (Melancon et al., 2011).

Intrinsic rewards are rewards that are directly connected to a part of the activity itself (Guzzo, 1979). Moreover, (Brief & Aldag, 1977) states that a person will commit out of its own motives. (Analogy/example) O’leary and O’leary (1977) defined intrinsic rewards as rewards that are ready for use in the situation. Intrinsic rewards are a valid way to change the behavior of inhabitants. This is

(6)

because tourists are people with high involvement in society and are less influenced by reward schemes then people with low involvement (Melancon et al., 2011).

The extrinsic-intrinsic dichotomy is not always black-and-white. Extrinsic- and intrinsic rewards are generalized concepts, but in reality these concepts can complement or support each other. Extrinsic and intrinsic motives fulfill different kind of needs. Extrinsic rewards are linked with the fulfillment of low order needs. The low order needs of citizens of Reykjavik could be economic advantages. On contrary intrinsic rewards are linked with the fulfillment of high order needs. The high order needs of citizens could be environmental advantages (Slocum, 1971). Gunderman and Kamer (2011) states that the focus should be on intrinsic rewards. In a perfect world all actions start with intrinsic rewards, but in reality this is not feasible. Extrinsic and intrinsic rewards tackle different kinds of motivations, therefore the choice between intrinsic and extrinsic rewards should not be an ultimatum.

Referent power

Referent power is a relationship where power originates from the groups a person is part of (Raven, 1964). The cleaning of stadiums during the world cup of 2018 is a popular example of referent power in practical use. The Japanese actions started as basic learned behaviors, but over time these behaviors became part of the Japanese culture (Illmer, n.d.). Being Japanese could be seen as being part of a group, namely Japanese citizens. People that feel connected to a group have a higher willingness to follow ethical rules than people who are managed by a leader (Kirkhaug, 2010). The culture of a nation has a global impact on the choice of infrastructure (Kaminsky, 2015). Reykjavik could use this power mechanic to tackle the mobility problem and change its culture to a more sustainable culture.

Legitimate power

Legitimate power is a relationship where the one in control is chosen (Raven, 1964). For example the board of Reykjavik is chosen to rule the city. The use of the legitimate power relationship is infinite, at least until the one in control decides to choose selfishness above the ability to rule competent (Lovaglia et al., 2012). When selfishness occurs the power relationship will come to an end. Legitimate power is complemented with other bases of power, for example laws are created to enforce coercive power. The board of Reykjavik has legitimate power and should use this to promote sustainable behavior.

Expert power

Expert power is a relationship where power is acquired through information, experience and specialized skills (French et al., 1959). (Raven, 1964) added a base of power to the conceptual framework, thus the focus of expert power is on experience and specialized skills. Managing IoT is complex and requires experience to function. This is apparent according to (Fleming et al., 2018) who state that expert leaders have to address a chaotic reality. The management of IoT solutions happens on multiple fronts. Reykjavik will need a qualified expert on every front to ensure continuity and flexibility of the IoT solution in a complex environment (Gupta & Gupta, 2014).

Information power

Information power is a relationship where power is acquired through information. The supply and demand of information creates room for power positions. To attain a power position one must acquire information that is wanted (Raven, 1964). Six steps have to be carried out in order for Reykjavik to possess said information. These steps are: Identify problems, frame questions, use data, transform data into information, transform information into decision and evaluate outcomes (Gummer & Mandinach, 2015). The first two steps will not be discussed in this paper, because the problems and question of Reykjavik have already been formulated. Moreover, the last step of the framework will also be skipped due to irrelevance. Thus, the focus will be on the use of data in decision-making.

Reykjavik’s policies towards Smart Cities have a focus on its citizens. Reykjavik has already im-plemented a participatory democracy where citizens can present new ideas for the city. This is a good initiative, because an alignment between people; place and thing has to be present for the creation of awareness for an IoT solution. Unfortunately, what people want and need are not always the same (Sellinger, 2012). The citizens of Reykjavik may want extra vacation days. This is a need for citizens

(7)

with a burnout, but for most of the citizens this is merely a want. Crowd-sensing could help to iden-tify the needs with the help of data acquired by sensors and consequently sharing this data collectively (Ganti et al., 2011). When using crowd-sensing the privacy of the user should be taken into account, because the data could expose private aspects about the user (Perez & Zeadally, 2018). Once the data is acquired the focus shifts to the transformation of the data into information.

Raw data on its own does not hold any value until it has been contextualized (Cooper, 2017). Gummer and Mandinach (2015) states that the data has to be analyzed in order to become information. Reykjavik has to contextualize data in order to use their data. The next step is transforming the information into knowledge.

The last step required to make use of information power is the translation of information into knowl-edge. Information will transform into knowledge when experts give insight into data and information (Kelley, 2002). This will both apply to technological knowledge and practical knowledge that is needed for the implementation of an IoT solution (Tromp et al., 2012). Reykjavik has to use the knowledge in such a way that an alignment is created between the actors of the mobility problem and the context of the information (Munjin & Morin, 2011).

2.3 Incentives

The 6 different bases of power can be used to acquire a power relationship, but the establishment of the relationship itself can be formed by multiple types of incentives. The possible incentives are positive-, negative-, environmental- and economic incentives. These incentives are not all the possible incentives, but cover a spectrum of incentives needed in Reykjavik’s mobility problem.

Figure 3: The spectrum of incentives.

Positive incentives

Positive incentives are stimuli that encourage people to perform an action. Positive incentives can be translated into different kinds of rewards. These rewards can be tangible or intangible. Cash bonuses and

(8)

verbal rewards both lead to an increase in performance, but the removal of the cash bonus led to a decrease in performance while the verbal reward remained unchanged (Bareket-Bojmel et al., 2017). Tangible and intangible can be linked to the intrinsic-extrinsic dichotomy where one another can complement and supplement each other. Promotion is a good example of two positive incentives that support each other. The first incentive is empowerment and the second incentive is higher pay. Reykjavik has a strong focus on its citizens, therefore a combination between empowerment and subsidies could create a power relationship. Synergy could arise when cooperation exists in a power relationship, but the incentive must not be too high (Wei et al., 2007).

While positive incentives can be used to create power relationships it has to be done with care. Positive incentives are capable of triggering unwanted behavior. Instead of showing desired actions people could ask for even more incentives, this is called the deterrence model. The power relationship should be handled properly, otherwise it could eventually lead into war (Jervis, 2017). Positive incentives could be an effective tool in the adoption process of IoT solutions if used in a controlled matter.

Negative incentives

Negative incentives are stimuli that deter people from performing an action. Negative incentives can be translated into different kinds of penalties. A prevalent example of a negative incentive is the use of penal-ties. For example, penalties are used to ensure consistency and reliability from suppliers (Alabduljabbar et al., 2014).

Most of the literature prefers positive incentives over negative incentives, but this does not mean that there is no function for negative incentives. The role of negative incentive is mainly complementing the positive incentives (Mahmoodi et al., 2018).

Negative incentives have the power to deter people from performing an action, but the power re-lationship has to be managed with care. This is because people are irrational and could respond with unwanted behavior. People could react with unwanted behavior, this can be caused by fear (Camerablu, 2009). The object in control will react with more negative incentives. This could eventually lead into conflict. Negative incentives should be handled with care when used in a power relationship. Reykjavik could use negative incentives to complement positive incentives if used properly.

Economic incentives

Economic incentives are financial stimuli that encourage or deter people from performing an action. Economic incentives can be either positive or negative. Economic incentives can be used to enhance the adoption rate of foster children. This is done by offering subsidies to adopters. This will lower the cost for the new parents and the relative cost of the subsidies will be lower than paying for long term foster care (Argys & Duncan, 2013). In contrary economic incentives can also be used in combination positive incentives. For example, a paycheck raise. Reykjavik has the power to use economic incentives in form of subsidies to change the behavior of citizens.

Moral incentives

Moral incentives are environmental stimuli that encourage or deter people from performing an action. This is because moral hazard will occur and people will cross moral borders in order to obtain advantages (Takao & Okura, 2001). Without the proper incentives in place actors will deviate from their goals. Over-fishing is an example where a trade-off between economical- and environmental gain has to be made. Do the fisherman want maximized short term profits and a damaged ecosystem or sustainable long term profits with a functioning ecosystem. (Cheung & Sumaila, 2015). This looks like a rational decision, but people are irrational towards their behavior (Marteau, 2018).

Spectrum of incentives

The design of an incentive can be done with the use of the characteristics in the spectrum of incentives 3. When designing a single incentive two considerations have to be made. The first consideration is how positive or negative an incentive should be. The second consideration to be made is how much focus should be on economic or moral pursuit.

(9)

The use of incentives is not limited to one incentive inside of the incentive spectrum figure (3). Supplementary and complementary incentives can be added to an incentive to create synergy.

A positive incentive accompanied by a negative incentive is more effective than a positive incentive on its own (Lindskold & Bennett, 1973). Chen, Sasaki, Br¨annstr¨om, and Dieckmann (2015) conclude the same and states that positive incentives should be replaced with negative incentives once a certain level of cooperation is achieved and penalties are designed to maintain the cooperation. The synergy of incentives is of significance, but context is needed to choose the best fitting incentives in regard to the situation at hand (Song et al., 2018).

Brihaye, Pril, Labie, and P´erilleux (2019) argue that the payment of due repayments is more likely to succeed with positive than negative incentives. People have negative associations with repayments, thus negative incentives will start a further decline in willingness to pay and positive incentives could stimulate this process. The choice of incentive is made based of the situation it resides in. An incentive could improve the performance in a situation, but this does not necessarily mean that this incentive can be generalized. This is because the incentive can have shortcomings in other cases. The phenomenon that the choice between different kind of incentives is connected to context is called the Able Chooser Problem (Grill, 2017). The Able Chooser Problem can be used in combination with the spectrum of incentives to design an incentive that fits the context.

2.4 Nudging

Power relationships are fundamental in shaping behavior, but Karim, King, and Darzi (2011) state that behavior influences only a part of the health problems. Most health problems are caused by irrational behavior and power relationships seem to be lacking the strength to change these behaviors (Marteau, 2018). Nudging can be an instrumental tool to change these behaviors. There are 4 types of nudges, namely provision of information, Changes in the physical environment, changes in the default option and the use of social norms & regular feedback (Nielsen et al., 2017).

Provision of information

In order to make a decision information processing is required (G¨answein, 2011). This is not possible when the person does not posses relevant information on hand. People are not capable of making complex decision without relevant information (Walton et al., 2015). Crowd-sensing is an instrument that can be used to gather real-time information from portable devices (Farkas et al., 2014). This information can be used to make people aware of their behavior. Reykjavik could provide its citizens with information to nudge their behavior.

Changes in the physical environment

Besides intangible nudges there are also tangible nudges. These nudges are subtle changes in the real world to alter behavior. Limiting portion sizes of food is an example of a subtle change in the physical environment to counter obesity (Hollands et al., 2018). Reykjavik could apply physical environment changes to change behavior towards mobility.

Changes in the default option

People are creatures of habit and live their daily live in routines (Dodson, 2014). This characteristic is apparent when it comes to the undifferentiated behavior of people. Instead of creating better alternatives Reykjavik should redesign car use in commuting.

The use of social norms & regular feedback

The use of social norms and regular feedback goes further where the provision of information stopped. When giving feedback based on social comparison people will take higher risks when the rewards are equal or higher than others (Linde & Sonnemans, 2012). People attach value to previous irrelevant. For example, when people see neighbors donating 5 euros to charity they will most likely match or top it. They want to show they are as generous as the other (Colombo et al., 2014).

(10)

2.5 Sharing Services

The definition of sharing services in this paper is an optimally functioning synergy between a ride sourcing service and a car sharing service. Sharing services have to meet certain norms, namely affordability, attractive, effective and sustainable.

Ride Sourcing Services are applications that bring together the demand and supply of car rides. This ensures that rides will be available in a short period and a high effectiveness and attractiveness.

Car sharing services is a way of transport where a vehicle is used by multiple persons. This will lead to a decrease vehicle possession. thus, to a decrease in congestion if Reykjavik implements Car Sharing Services. This will also lead to better sustainability, because the total pollution decreases. The total cost of the Car Sharing Service fare will be affordable, because the fare is split between multiple passengers. The combination of a Ride Sourcing Service and a Car sharing service has all characteristics needed for an IoT solution to succeed. Thus the definition for a Sharing Service in this paper is the synergy between a Ride Sourcing Service and a Car Sharing Service that have the characteristics: Affordable, attractive, effective and sustainable

3 Methodology

Qualitative research has been conducted during this research. This paper tries to give an insight into the drivers behind the creation of awareness, specifically the creation of awareness for sharing service IoT solutions in Reykjavik. This paper is part of a model that tries to create a process that pursues constant innovation in a SC. Literature research has been conducted to answer this question. The literature sources are Google Scholar and the library of the University of Amsterdam. The keywords used in the search engine are : Behavioral Change, Incentives, Internet of Things, Power, Nudging, Sharing Services and Smart City.

The definition of mass adoption is very broad, that is why this research has been delimited to the use of different power relationships, an incentive spectrum, nudging and the theoretical state of sharing services. The reasoning behind this limitation is that a power relationship has to be established in order to convince the citizen to use an IoT solution. The power relationship can be organized in many different ways with the use of the incentive spectrum. The power relationship has to be aligned with the IoT solution and the values of the citizens. At last the conceptual framework will be linked the sharing services in Reykjavik.

4 Results

4.1 Current state of affairs Reykjavik

Reykjavik has identified a problem with the mobility. This problem is the commuting of citizens with the use of a personal vehicle. The only alternatives are the bus and the taxi. This is not a problem by itself, but long waiting times make bus transport unfeasible outside of the city center of Reykjavik. Taxis are also unfeasible, because of the high fare prices. Sharing services could be an effective alternative for a personal vehicle. Reykjavik has currently implemented a bicycle sharing service, but commuting with a bicycle from the suburbs of Reykjavik to the center of Reykjavik can not compete with the use of a personal vehicle. Means of transport can be compared with the use of the measurements: Affordable, attractive, effective and sustainable.

4.2 Affordable, attractive, effective and sustainable

The affordability is simply determined by the cost in relation to other alternatives while the effectiveness is determined by the fact that a technology does what it is built for. Many people assume that driving a car is cheaper than using public transport. This is false, driving a car costs more than using public transport (MacKechnie, n.d.). The prevalent advantage of having a car is the flexibility in usage. Cars can be used at anytime while public transport is time-constraint. Thus, cars are affordable and effective,

(11)

while public transport are affordable and ineffective. Car sharing services and ride sourcing services combined can be a substitute that is both effective and affordable. The car sharing service makes it affordable and the ride sourcing service makes it effective.

The attractiveness of transport is determined by the fact that a technology is pleasant to use. The use of a synergy between car sharing services and ride sourcing services is convenient. With one push at a button a ride is ordered to your desired destination. The attractiveness of sharing services can be compared with the attractiveness of a taxi. The time constraints accompanied by the bus lowers the attractiveness of buses significantly. All the means of transport can not compete with the personal vehicle which is available directly when needed.

The sustainability of transport is determined by the ecological footprint left by the sharing service. The sharing service has a good ecological footprint, because it reduces the number of cars owned by citizens of Reykjavik and the total kilometers driven by cars (Bondorov´a & Archer, 2017). The car and taxi are not capable of competing with sharing services, because sharing services are an environmental upgrade of the car and taxi. The ecological footprint of the bus remains smaller, because the carbon dioxide per citizen is smaller.

Affordable Attractive Effective Sustainability

Car 3 1 1 4

Taxi 4 3 3 3

Bus 1 4 4 1

Sharing Service 2 2 2 2

Table 1: Characteristics of transport hierarchically ranked from 1-4.

4.3 Behavior change in Reykjavik

Reykjavik tries to constantly innovate as a SC. An essential part of the innovation of IoT solutions in a SC is the creation of awareness and consequently the change of the behavior of citizens. When Reykjavik wants to implement a sharing service IoT solution it has to change the current behavior towards the current commuting possibilities.

Reykjavik is the entity in control and tries to change the behavior towards the commuting problem. Reykjavik starts with the first face of power where it tries to convince its citizens to commute in a more sustainable way. This a rather generalized way of changing behavior. Reykjavik should follow up with the second face of power where Reykjavik’s tries to limit the use of certain sustainable means of transport. An argument can be made that Reykjavik’s has made enough effort to persuade the behavior of its citizens. This is because the third face of power has elements of manipulation written all over it. Reykjavik will try to change the values and preferences of its citizens directly. This a desired state, but the autonomy of the citizens of Reykjavik could be disturbed. Nudging could be a way to execute the third face of power without the violation of autonomy.

4.4 Designing Reykjavik’s power relationships

Reykjavik should not focus on merely one power relationships, because Reykjavik as city has the authority to make use of all different types of power defined in the literature research.

Rewarding power and coercive power can be used simultaneously. The rewarding power relationship is entirely based on positive incentives, in contrary the opposite applies to coercive power. Reykjavik should focus on intrinsic rewards, because the citizens of Reykjavik are high involvement people. For example, When citizens of Reykjavik work for Sharing Services they get subsidized by the city of Reykjavik. In return for the participation in the improvement of the mobility the citizens receive a positive incentive. Once the mobility has reached a threshold Reykjavik should consider the creation of a coercive power relationship that complements. This is to ensure that the improved mobility remains above the threshold.

(12)

Referent power could have an effect on the culture of the citizens of Reykjavik. This is because nationalism can trigger the feeling of belonging to a group. Citizens of Reykjavik have to be taught that sustainability plays a more important role than economic incentives. Over time this will lead to a more environmental friendly culture.

Reykjavik has the authority to exercise legitimate power. Legitimate power can be accompanied by every other power relationship and incentive. This is because laws permit Reykjavik to manage Sharing Services on every front with the help of coercive and rewarding power. The management of the different fronts should be done by an expert, because legitimate power can become complex. The expert has to be able to link all actors with the desired power relationships. The specialized skills and experience support the expert in this process.

Reykjavik has a high priority in fulfilling the needs of its citizens, but it is not always apparent what a citizen needs. This can be solved by crowd-sensing data from the citizens. This has to be done in such a way that the data is only used for functionality in order to preserve privacy. When the determination of the needs is complete the data can be given context to transform into information. Consequently, the information has to be transformed into knowledge in order to be applied into practice. The knowledge can be used while designing power relationships or while nudging.

4.5 Nudging citizens

The provision of information is based on the knowledge gathered in the information power relationship. The information can be shown to make citizens aware about the pollution caused by their actions. The next nudge goes a step further. The information power and referent power can be linked to the use of social norms & regular feedback. In the information power relationship knowledge is gathered to make social comparisons. Reykjavik could use this mechanic in a referent power relationship to show how sustainable a citizen is in comparison with neighbors. This will trigger riskier behavior, because people want to show that they are equivalent or better than others.

Subtle changes in the physical environment can have impact on the behavior of citizens. Reykjavik could make an infrastructure entirely for the use of Sharing Services. This would ensure an experience where there is no chance for congestion. This would make Sharing services in Reykjavik more convenient with a change in the physical environment.

Changes in the default option are changes made in the design of the mainstream option. This is in Reykjavik’s case the automobile used for commuting. Reykjavik could create an application where the demand and supply of carpool is offered. Iceland already has a website called Samferda for this purpose. This could alter the default option in a good way, but it is not as attractive as a Sharing Service.

5 Discussion

5.1 Interpretations

The results show that the creation of awareness and behavioral change are complex process. At first the problem of a city should be clearly defined. Followed by combining power relationships to actors that are relevant for solving the problem. The power relationships can be designed with the use of incentives. This has to be done with care to prevent escalation into the deterrence- or spiral model. Another pitfall is the manipulation of citizens through a power relationship. This can be prevented by using nudges to subtly alter the behavior of citizens. In short this could be the conceptual model needed for a city to reach behavioral change in a SC focused on constant innovation.

5.2 Limitations & Future Research

The research performed in this paper is strictly literature research, thus there is no indication if the conceptual framework is applicable in the real world. Future research about the practical use of the framework could be valuable. The process of behavioral change is broad, that is why a delimiting of the conceptual framework was necessary. Other behavioral concepts could help in expanding the scope of

(13)

the conceptual framework. At last the research could apply to other SCs. This would prove that the conceptual model is applicable to more cases. This makes the comparison between SCs possible and could lead to the discovery of missing concepts in the framework.

6 Conclusion

Reykjavik wants to achieve behavioral change for car sharing services to counter automobile commuting. This is because Reykjavik has to deal with sustainability issues regarding commuting traffic. Sharing Services could be a good fit for solving this problem, but Reykjavik has to make a design for the Sharing Service. Sharing Services are a combination of the favorable characteristics of the car and the bus table (1). Sharing Services are not excelling in any category, but is more favorable than the car, the taxi and the bus.

In order to change the behavior towards Sharing Services Reykjavik has to implement the three faces of power as base of the power relationships. Extra attention has to be paid during implementation of the third face of power, because a violation of autonomy can cause counterproductive results. During the design of Sharing Services a combination of power relationships is used, followed by nudges that are linked to the power relationships. The links created are dependent on the characteristics of the SC. This is because the management of a SC depends on context. This means that there is no perfect way to manage behavioral change. It all depends on the context.

Reykjavik can achieve behavioral change towards sharing services by applying power relationships and nudges in such a way that they are aligned with the context of the specified SC. This makes the recommendation of the design of Sharing Services possible. The recommendation is no guarantee it has the best fit, because the conceptual framework does not include evaluation measures.

7 References

References

Alabduljabbar, A. A., Varnham, A., & Smiai, M. (2014). Design of low power factor financial penalties for bulk customers in electrical distribution networks. Arabian Journal for Science and Engineering, 39 (10), 7189–7197.

Argys, L., & Duncan, B. (2013). Economic incentives and foster child adoption. Demography, 50 (3), 933–954.

Bareket-Bojmel, L., Hochman, G., & Ariely, D. (2017). It’s (not) all about the jacksons: Testing different types of short-term bonuses in the field. Journal of Management , 43 (2), 534–554. Bondorov´a, B., & Archer, G. (2017). Does sharing cars really reduce car use. Transport &

Environment .

Brief, A. P., & Aldag, R. J. (1977). The intrinsic-extrinsic dichotomy: Toward conceptual clarity. Academy of Management review , 2 (3), 496–500.

Brihaye, T., Pril, J. D., Labie, M., & P´erilleux, A. (2019). Positive versus negative incentives for loan repayment in microfinance: A game theory approach. Review of Development Economics, 23 (2), 577–597.

Camerablu, R. (2009). Fear. La camera blu. Rivista di studi di genere(5).

Chen, X., Sasaki, T., Br¨annstr¨om, ˚A., & Dieckmann, U. (2015). First carrot, then stick: how the adaptive hybridization of incentives promotes cooperation. Journal of the royal society interface, 12 (102), 20140935.

Cheung, W. W., & Sumaila, U. R. (2015). Economic incentives and overfishing: a bioeconomic vulnerability index. Marine Ecology Progress Series, 530 , 223–232.

Colombo, M., Stankevicius, A., & Seri`es, P. (2014). Benefits of social vs. non-social feedback on learning and generosity. results from the tipping game. Frontiers in psychology , 5 , 1154.

(14)

Cooper, P. (2017). Data, information, knowledge and wisdom. Anaesthesia & Intensive Care Medicine, 18 (1), 55–56.

Dodson, T. B. (2014). Creatures of habit. Journal of Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery, 72 (12), 2379–2380.

Downes, L. (2013). Big-bang disruption. Harvard business review : HBR, 91 (3), 44,56.

Farkas, K., Nagy, A. Z., Tom´as, T., & Szab´o, R. (2014). Participatory sensing based real-time public transport information service. In 2014 ieee international conference on pervasive computing and communication workshops (percom workshops) (pp. 141–144).

Fleming, K., Millar, C., & Culpin, V. (2018). From hollow hero to expert empathiser: leadership in transition. Journal of Management Development , 37 (8), 606–612.

French, J., Raven, B., & Cartwright, D. (1959). The bases of social power. Classics of organi-zation theory, 7 , 311–320.

G¨answein, W. (2011). Effectiveness of information use for strategic decision making. Springer. Ganti, R. K., Ye, F., & Lei, H. (2011). Mobile crowdsensing: current state and future challenges.

IEEE Communications Magazine, 49 (11), 32–39.

Grill, K. (2017). Incentives, equity and the able chooser problem. Journal of medical ethics, 43 (3), 157–161.

Gummer, E., & Mandinach, E. (2015). Building a conceptual framework for data literacy. Teachers College Record , 117 (4), n4.

Gunderman, R. B., & Kamer, A. P. (2011). Rewards. Journal of the American College of Radiology, 8 (5), 341–344.

Gupta, V., & Gupta, B. (2014). Flexible strategic framework for managing innovation from per-spective of continuity and change: A study of smes in india. Business Process Management Journal , 20 (3), 502–522.

Guzzo, R. A. (1979). Types of rewards, cognitions, and work motivation. Academy of Manage-ment Review , 4 (1), 75–86.

Hollands, G. J., Cartwright, E., Pilling, M., Pechey, R., Vasiljevic, M., Jebb, S. A., & Marteau, T. M. (2018). Impact of reducing portion sizes in worksite cafeterias: a stepped wedge ran-domised controlled pilot trial. International Journal of Behavioral Nutrition and Physical Activity, 15 (1), 78.

Illmer, A. (n.d.). World cup: Japans fans impress by cleaning up stadium. BBC News. Retrieved 2017-03-12, from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-44492611

Introna, L. D. (2016). The algorithmic choreography of the impressionable subject. In Algorith-mic cultures (pp. 38–63). Routledge.

Jervis, R. (2017). Perception and misperception in international politics: New edition. Princeton University Press.

Kaminsky, J. A. (2015). Cultured construction: global evidence of the impact of national values on sanitation infrastructure choice. Environmental science & technology, 49 (12), 7134–7141.

Karim, S., King, D., & Darzi, A. (2011). Nudging. Br J Gen Pract , 61 (584), 223–223. Kelley, J. (2002). Knowledge nirvana. Xulon Press.

Kirkhaug, R. (2010). Charisma or group belonging as antecedents of employee work effort? Journal of Business Ethics, 96 (4), 647–656.

Linde, J., & Sonnemans, J. (2012). Social comparison and risky choices. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 44 (1), 45–72.

Lindskold, S., & Bennett, R. (1973). Attributing trust and conciliatory intent from coercive power capability. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 28 (2), 180.

Lovaglia, M. J., Troyer, L., Willer, R., & Youngreen, R. (2012). How do the powerful aatain status? : the roots of legitimate power inequalities. Managerial and decision economics :

(15)

MDE ; the international journal of research and progress in management economics, 33 (5), 355,367.

MacKechnie, C. (n.d.). Transit 101: Is it cheaper to take public transit or drive a car? Live About . Retrieved 2017-03-12, from https://www.liveabout.com/public-transit -or-drive-cost-2798677

Mahmoodi, J., Prasanna, A., Hille, S., Patel, M. K., & Brosch, T. (2018). Combining “carrot and stick” to incentivize sustainability in households. Energy policy , 123 , 31–40.

Marteau, T. M. (2018). Changing minds about changing behaviour. The Lancet , 391 (10116), 116–117.

Melancon, J. P., Noble, S. M., & Noble, C. H. (2011). Managing rewards to enhance relational worth. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 39 (3), 341–362.

Munjin, D., & Morin, J.-H. (2011). User empowerment in the internet of things. arXiv preprint arXiv:1107.3759 .

Nielsen, A. S. E., Sand, H., Sørensen, P., Knutsson, M., Martinsson, P., Persson, E., & Wollbrant, C. (2017). Nudging and pro-environmental behaviour. Nordisk Ministerr˚ad.

O’leary, K. D., & O’leary, S. G. (1977). Classroom management: The successful use of behavior modification. Pergamon.

Perez, A. J., & Zeadally, S. (2018). Design and evaluation of a privacy architecture for crowd-sensing applications. ACM SIGAPP Applied Computing Review , 18 (1), 7–18.

Raven, B. H. (1964). Social influence and power (Tech. Rep.). CALIFORNIA UNIV LOS ANGELES.

Rogers, E. (2003). Diffusion of innovations.

Sellinger, D. (2012). Ask for what you need, not what you want. The Canadian journal of hospital pharmacy, 65 (1), 84.

Slocum, J. W. (1971). Motivation in managerial levels: Relationship of need satisfaction to job performance. Journal of Applied Psychology, 55 (4), 312.

Song, Y., Wei (David) Phang, C., Yang, S., & Luo, X. (2018). The effectiveness of contextual competitive targeting in conjunction with promotional incentives. International Journal of Electronic Commerce, 22 (3), 349–385.

Takao, A., & Okura, M. (2001). An experimental approach to the effectiveness of an incentive system against moral hazard in the insurance market. Journal of Risk Research, 4 (3), 291–301.

Tengland, P.-A. (2012). Behavior change or empowerment: on the ethics of health-promotion strategies. Public Health Ethics, 5 (2), 140–153.

Tromp, C., et al. (2012). The diffusion and implementation of innovation. Innovative Studies, 2 (1), 18–30.

Ulfarsson, G. F., Steinbrenner, A., Valsson, T., & Kim, S. (2015). Urban household travel behavior in a time of economic crisis: Changes in trip making and transit importance. Journal of Transport Geography, 49 , 68–75.

Walton, M. E., Chau, B. K., & Kennerley, S. W. (2015). Prioritising the relevant information for learning and decision making within orbital and ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Current opinion in behavioral sciences, 1 , 78–85.

Wei, G.-X., Yu, L.-A., Wang, S.-Y., & Lai, K. K. (2007). Study on incentive factors of team cooperation based on synergy effect. Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice, 27 (1), 1–9.

Smart City Innovation - A Conceptual Framework for Behavioural Change