Shalom & salaam : the influence of multilingualism on the aggressive expression of othering among Jewish Israelis

Master thesis Shalom & Salaam

The influence of multilingualism on the aggressive expression of othering among Jewish Israelis

Amsterdam 15/08/2016 Tom W. Etienne Student number | 10856005 tom.w.etienne@gmail.com Supervisor | Dr. V. D. Mamadouh University of Amsterdam

Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences (FMG) Graduate School of Social Sciences (GSSS)

Master thesis submitted to receive the degree

Master of Science in Human Geography, track Political Geography

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BSTRACT

Great amounts of academic research have been conducted on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as well as on the precarious state of the Israeli society itself. Any research, however, that offers insight in even a small portion of what contributes to the conflict, on what it causes or may temper it, seems welcome. From its establishment onward, Israel has known internal tensions, where the differences between language groups supersede linguistic differences greatly. Othering processes (Van Houtum & Van Naerssen, 2002) are widely seen and even politically and judicially pushed, often along religious lines, but often along (highly parallel) linguistic breaking lines. Although Israel is legally defined as a bilingual state, where both Hebrew and Arabic are official languages, they are culturally and spatially segregated, being explicitly linked to the Jewish and Arab population of the region.

This research examines in the first place to which extent, and how, different aspects of multilingualism influence the aggressive expression of othering in Israel. It does so based on an extensive quantitative questionnaire among Jewish Israelis, founded on a profound theoretical framework. The theoretical framework is built on the contact hypothesis, as well as on theories on ingroup love and outgroup hate (Brewer, 1999) in combination with Yiftachel’s vantage point on Territory as the kernel of the nation (2002) and the aggressive expression thereof, measured through an adapted scale of the Aggression Questionnaire (A. H. Buss & Perry, 1992).

Second, the research investigates the influence of electoral voting behaviour on the manner of this aggressive expression, finding that, although discrimination is very much present among Jewish Israelis towards Palestinian Israelis, a control over territory and security are major triggers for said discrimination. This speaks for the combined theory of Brewer and Yiftachel, showing that outgroup hate is not so much inherent to the outgroup as it is triggered by competition over scarce resources and power.

Hypothesised that multilingualism would facilitate contact and thus following the contact hypothesis, this contact would result in lower aggression levels, was found to have complex interrelations. While contact with native speakers of Arabic in itself resulted in lower aggression levels, knowledge of Arabic did not. This revealed the importance of the equality condition of the contact hypothesis. In intergroup contact, equality is a prerequisite for a successful devolution of the contact hypothesis.

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CKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Although it is not surprising that a master thesis that counts more than a hundred pages and countless times more hours and effort does not come about simply by one person’s work, a modest acknowledgements page does not sufficiently express my gratitude to the range of people who have supported me in writing it. Their help has been indispensable, and the thesis that lies in front of you now would not have been what it is without any of them.

I would like to thank Virginie Mamadouh, who has not only been an extremely critical but astonishingly qualified force in the past months’ process. Since September 2015, she has taken on my classmates and me and generously provided us with her knowledge and experience. I will be a fortunate graduate if I manage to take this with me and manage to incorporate it in this thesis. Through the Facebook page ExploringGeopolitics, managed by the second reader of this thesis, Leonhardt van Efferink, I have stumbled across a number of interesting reads, opinions and methodological approaches. A third major academic contributor who has come to feel like an academic ably in the process is André Krouwel. His unprecedented enthusiasm and persuasion have more than once helped me (back) on track. He has been so generous in sharing knowledge, data, contacts and anecdotes.

Secondly, my family, who has obviously supported me for over 22 years, should once again be reminded of the gratitude they deserve. My mother, Kris, has struggled her way through these pages to prove what she does best: not only point me to sleep-drunken typos and grammatical constructions, but also to inspire and support. My brother Evert and my father Walter made sure social sciences received sufficient mockery, giving me the sense of purpose that I needed. Engineering ain’t all that, you guys. At the same time, though, they are part of my amazing family, and I would be nowhere without any single one of them. Benjamin, my extraordinarily close friend deserves a mention in this paragraph for his undying love and conviction of my qualities, even in times when I doubted them so strongly myself. His understanding for the research fieldwork and all that came with it was unbelievable.

Evidently, the very set-up of my thesis required a lot of outside help. I would like to thank my good friends Tala, Nadeem and Dima for their selfless time sacrifices in translating my thesis survey to Arabic in incredible quality. The same goes for Elza, who took on the Hebrew translation of the survey. Elhanan, one of the many yet better friends I have made during my fieldwork was kind enough as to review and translate into Arabic, Hebrew and English, as well as to point to inaccuracies relating to realities on the ground. Elhanan is not the only friend I have made during two months in Jerusalem. Nimrod, from the very beginning, has shown me how he believed in the potential of my research, and I am grateful for his trust in my capabilities. This is not his sole contribution. As the most gifted GIS maniac I know, the maps in this research are to a large extent his to be credited. He provided tons of geodata and shapefiles and came to the rescue when I wished I could kill off the ArcMap character in this story. The difficulties I faced dealing with Stata, SAS and SPSS were greatly alleviated thanks to Eelco, Pieterjan and Andries, who patiently took the time to explain such awful matter to an even more awful statistics stranger.

Lastly, I would like to thank the people of Israel and Palestine for their hospitality and eagerness to talk about their perceptions of the conflict, their daily lives and struggles. These include my roommates, Shir, Leah, Samuel, David and Daniel, my Arabic teachers Rawan and Saed, and all the people who took the time to fill in my survey as well as those who spread it among their friends and family. This concerns Orr in particular, who was so busy spreading the survey that he forgot to fill it in himself. I am very grateful! Tom

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ABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract ... ii

Acknowledgements ... iv

Table of contents ... vi

List of tables and figures ... ix

Tables ... ix

Figures ...x

Thematic introduction ... 1

Relevance and aim ... 1

Academic relevance ... 2

Societal relevance ... 3

Research question ... 3

Conceptualising identities, language and aggression in Israel: a theoretical perspective ... 4

Identity and its need of boundaries ... 4

A geographical critique on nationalist identity theories ... 5

The narratives accompanying territorial containers of identity ... 6

The nested yet fragmented identities of Israel ... 7

In-group and out-group reciprocal dynamics ... 7

“What makes people go to war?” The aggressive turn of in-group love ... 8

Multilingualism ... 10

The decision-making effect of a second language ... 10

Bilingual education in Israel ... 11

Othering and its aggressive expression ... 12

Othering processes ... 12

Aggression, hostility, violence… ... 13

Conceptual relation ... 14

Methods and set up ... 16

Paradigms ... 16

Background of the author ... 16

Ontological and epistemological considerations ... 16

Data collection ... 17

Operationalisation of the survey ... 19

Identification features ... 20

General statistics ... 21

Multilingualism ... 25

Indicator M1: Number of languages known ... 25

Indicator M2: Level of language skills ... 26

Indicator M3: Language acquisition ... 29

Indicator M4: Language learning motivation ... 30

Indicator M5 and M6: Language use and contact ... 31

The aggressive expression of othering processes ... 32

Indicator A1: The Aggression Questionnaire ... 33

Indicator A2: 2015 Israeli Election Compass ... 35

Hypotheses ... 36

Limitations and shortcomings ... 37

Ethical considerations ... 39

This coefficient will tell you your aggression level: results of statistical analysis ... 40

Descriptive statistics ... 40

Political preference ... 42

Geographical distribution ... 43

Multilingualism ... 46

Aggression and othering ... 55

The aggression questionnaire ... 55

The Election Compass ... 57

The influence of multilingualism on aggression ... 59

Identification models ... 59

Language levels ... 61

Language skills ... 65

Language acquisition ... 67

Language contact ... 68

Language motivation and language use ... 68

The relation between multilingualism and a political vote ... 70

The relationship between aggression and the Election Compass scale ... 71

The Election compass scale and multilingualism ... 72

Conclusion ... 74

Discussion ... 75

The pitfalls of the contact hypothesis ... 75

Out-group hate and its underlying causes ... 76

Research retrospective and prospective ... 77 Shortcomings ... 78 Research prospective ... 79 Bibliography ... 80 Appendices ... 85 Survey ... 85 Codebook ... 99 Result tables ... 110

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IST OF TABLES AND FIGURES Tables

Table 1: common European reference levels, a global scale (Verhelst et al., 2009) ... 27

Table 2: formal, non-formal and informal learning, defined as in the glossary (CEDEFOP, 2008). ... 29

Table 3: Buss and Perry's (1992) complete results on all four scales. ... 34

Table 4: Buss and Perry's (1992) findings edited to exclude the anger scale and relative to the number of questions asked. ... 35

Table 5: division of respondents in age categories. ... 40

Table 6: highest completed level of education of respondents in survey. ... 41

Table 7: 2015 parliamentary results and survey voting preferences. ... 42

Table 8: geographical distribution of respondents. ... 43

Table 9: average age and voting preference per district ... 45

Table 10: Overview of respondents self-indicated language levels. ... 47

Table 11: Knowledge of Hebrew and Arabic. ... 48

Table 12: frequencies of parental mother tongues. ... 48

Table 13: mother tongue combinations by frequency ... 49

Table 14: absolute numbers and percentages of Hebrew and Arabic CEFRL can-do statements ... 50

Table 15: Answer counts on Hebrew language acquisition questions. ... 51

Table 16: schematic presentation of Hebrew language acquisition. ... 51

Table 17: Answer counts on Arabic language acquisition questions. ... 52

Table 18: schematic presentation of Arabic language acquisition. ... 52

Table 19: schematic comparison of Hebrew and Arabic language acquisition. ... 52

Table 20: language learning motivation counts for Hebrew and Arabic. ... 53

Table 21: language contact ... 54

Table 22: language use ... 54

Table 23: the aggression questionnaire, total scale and subscales, descriptive statistics ... 55

Table 24: This thesis research's findings on the adapted Aggression Questionnaire (Buss & Perry, 1992). ... 55

Table 25: Buss and Perry's (1992) findings edited to exclude the anger scale and relative to the number of questions asked. ... 55

Table 26: geographical distribution of aggression scores ... 56

Table 27: mean aggression scores of Jerusalemites ... 56

Table 28: election compass scales, descriptives ... 58

Table 29: regression models containing identification variables (models 1, 1a, 1b, 1c) ... 60

Table 30: mean aggression levels per party vote ... 60

Table 31: regression models 2-4, self-indicated language levels ... 62

Table 32: mean aggression score per mother tongue ... 62

Table 33: frequency division of sum of CEFRL can do statements in Hebrew and Arabic ... 64

Table 35: regression models 6-7, language skills ... 66

Table 36: regression models 8-10, language acquisition ... 67

Table 37: model 11, language contact ... 68

Table 38: language learning motivation correlations... 69

Table 39: language use correlations ... 69

Table 40: model 12, language learning motivation and language use ... 69

Table 41: EC total score regression model (13) ... 70

Table 42: EC, equality-discrimination model (13a) ... 70

Table 43: EC, peace agreement-continued violence model (13b) ... 70

Table 44: EC, land division-land occupation model (13b) ... 71

Table 45: EC total score regression model (14), aggression ... 71

Table 46: EC, equality-discrimination model (14a), aggression ... 71

Table 47: EC, peace agreement-continued violence model (14b), aggression ... 71

Table 48: EC, land division-land occupation model (14b), aggression ... 71

Table 49: EC total score regression model (15), multilingualism ... 72

Table 50: EC, equality-discrimination model (15a), multilingualism ... 72

Table 51: EC, peace agreement-continued violence model (15b), multilingualism ... 73

Table 52: EC, land division-land occupation model (15b), multilingualism ... 73

Figures Figure 1: Introductory cartoon 'Shalom & Salaam' ... 1

Figure 2: Simple conceptual model ... 15

Figure 3: the first screen of the 2015 Israeli Election Compass ... 18

Figure 4: welcome screen of the survey ... 20

Figure 5: identification features ... 21

Figure 6: identification questions in the survey. ... 22

Figure 7: geographical location questions in the survey ... 23

Figure 8: map of the State of Israel and the Palestinian Authority ... 24

Figure 9: multilingualism and its indicators ... 25

Figure 10: Multilingualism, number of languages known, as asked in the survey. ... 26

Figure 11: Asking about language levels skills within the CEFRL. ... 28

Figure 12: language acquisition questions in the survey. ... 30

Figure 13: language learning motivation questions in the survey. ... 31

Figure 14: language use and contact questions in the survey. ... 32

Figure 15: operationalisation of the aggressive expression of othering ... 32

Figure 16: four aggression factors from the Aggression Questionnaire (A. H. Buss & Perry, 1992) ... 33

Figure 17: Main hypothesis visualisation ... 37

Figure 18: respondent age histogram ... 41

Figure 19: geographical distribution of respondents. ... 44

Figure 21: CEFRL can do statements (Hebrew), results ... 49

Figure 22: CEFRL can do statements (Arabic), results ... 50

Figure 23: aggression scores map ... 57

Figure 24: election compass scales, histograms... 58

Figure 25: Hebrew language knowledge levels and aggression ... 63

Figure 26: graph of frequency division of sum of CEFRL can do statements in Hebrew and Arabic ... 64

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HEMATIC INTRODUCTION

Figure 1: Introductory cartoon 'Shalom & Salaam'

In the cartoon in Figure 1, a Jewish and a Palestinian Israeli greet each other, respectively in Hebrew and Arabic. “Shalom” (

םולש

) is answered with “Salaam” (

ملاس

), and both mean ‘peace’. However, in a stereotyped cartoon like this, the hostility underneath the greeting is prominent, building on their supposed misunderstanding that leads to a fearful and potentially aggressive perception of the other. This provides a great waypoint into the relevance of this research subject. This cartoon was composed especially for this purpose, reflecting the essential nature of mutual understanding in a hostile environment.

Language plays a considerable role in anyone’s daily life, whether that life is subject to conflict or not. This is not too hard to imagine; from one-on-one communication to narratives, language is omnipresent. Its presence undeniably influences the perception of the outer world, with examples as simple as street signs, restaurant menus or conversations at a bus stop. The latter’s impact may be larger than expected – who speaks with whom and in which language, but also questions such as ‘does the spoken language define the persons’ interaction’ are of interest. As a political geography thesis, this research’s focus is directed toward the role of multilingualism in othering processes (Van Houtum & Van Naerssen, 2002)1_{. More}

specifically, it delves into the aggressive expression of these processes.

The studied case for this research is Israel, where both Hebrew and Arabic are official and commonly spoken languages, although rather segregated along ethnic lines. Israel has long been a highly volatile region, where the differences between language groups supersede linguistic differences greatly. Othering processes are widely observed and even politically and judicially pushed, often along religious and ethnic lines, but many times along (highly parallel) linguistic divides.

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ELEVANCE AND AIM

The understanding of other groups in Israeli society is often limited to stereotypical images that are long fed by specific narratives as well as to a competitive perception of the other group over the region’s resources, whether they are physical in nature or not. In the past few years, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

has further and further prolapsed into vicious cycles of unconstructive political decisions, small-scale and organised violence and terror as well as a stronger othering-inducing narrative. Othering is an exclusionary practice that thrives on differences in identities and will be explained under paragraph 2.2. | For many, the situation is becoming more hopeless every day. Due to this realisation, voices have come to the surface calling for attenuation of the conflict through a more small-scale and bottom-up approach built on understanding. This thesis aspires to contribute to this debate. As illustrated by the quote below by Einstein, understanding is essential to the peaceful settlement of a dispute, and therefore indispensable for peaceful living together in a society where tensions exist between different groups.

"Peace cannot be kept by force. It can only be achieved by understanding. You cannot subjugate a nation forcibly unless you wipe out every man, woman, and child. Unless you wish to use such drastic measures, you must find a way of settling your disputes without resort to arms."

 Einstein, 1930 In hopes that the majority of Israeli and Palestinian citizens strive for eventual peace, understanding is key to this. The former is not as self-evident as it may seem, given Bateson’s ‘double bind’ (1972, as referenced in Bekerman, 2009). This double bind describes “the desire to create a peaceful and democratic society where all groups can coexist while simultaneously striving to retain hegemonic group identities”. Einstein’s quote is furthermore accurate specifically for the Israeli case where force is becoming more prominent in the societal process the region knows, especially compared to other peace promoting initiatives, such as the bilingual education undertakings Bekerman and Horenczyk (2004) study. As Bekerman and Horenczyk state while explaining the contact hypothesis, language is a major mode to understanding. This contact hypothesis forms the basis of this research, and will be elaborated on further on. In short, it states that through increased contact under the important condition of contact equality, mutual understanding will increase.

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CADEMIC RELEVANCE

Great amounts of academic research have been conducted on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well as on the precarious state of the Israeli society. , However, his research does not exclusively serve the people immediately affected by the conflict or the body of literature on it. Exactly because of the unique situation of the conflict, it may offer paths to understanding other conflicts and all of their associated aspects, such as identity formation, exclusion, violent protest, racism, etc. It may thus contribute to scholarship about aggressive behaviour towards other ethnic groups and the potential of contact and more specifically language to attenuate this behaviour. In turn, this could be an addition to conflict resolution research, providing more specific insight into small-scale mitigative circumstances.

Furthermore, drawing on Flint’s (2003) questioning of political geography’s purpose and cohesion, this research does not avoid dealing with the ‘big P’ but believes that it is to be reached through analysis of the ‘little p’. The former, according to Flint, indicates the institutionalisation of high-level and abstract politics, whereas the little p points to a notion called subpolitics, which takes place in non-traditional venues. Flint’s “unease about the relevance and future of contemporary political geography” (ibid., p. 618) is attempted to be alleviated by directly linking both the P and the p. In this perspective, this research aims to go beyond the mere problematisation of issues (Antonsich, 2009) but aims to provide not only academic worthy results and handles for future research and the broad base of conflict research, but also to provide hands-on applicable results for society. Through this, and without anticipating this research’s

findings, the research is not, at least not directly, attempting to dig towards the roots of the conflict, nor is it aiming to solve it. At best, it may provide solace; attenuate the conflict’s symptoms.

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OCIETAL RELEVANCE

Besides this academic scholarship on the topic and the region, a lot has been said, suggested or imposed as well, aiming to solve the inhuman and seemingly hopeless character of the conflict. Any research, however, that offers insight in even a small portion of what contributes to the conflict, on what it causes or may temper it, is welcome. As discussed under the Academic relevance, it also adds to the societal debate about racism, inequality and aggression built on them. The voices that have been raised within this frame and through small-scale parties, grassroots programs as well as human rights organisations, call for a people-oriented approach that operates apart from and below the national political system as a result from the continued violence and nearly systematic unconstructive political decisions.

A studied case like Israel proves useful for scenarios around the world that may at first sight not appear very similar. Nevertheless, in Western-Europe alone, there are several regions which face types of conflict where linguistic divides play a role, such as the Basque country or Belgium. Even in multilingual regions where tensions are felt less strongly and not violently, a study indicating the effect of multilingualism on the perception of the other and its aggressive expression proves its worth. Furthermore, a conflictuous situation is no prerequisite for a useful application of the results of this research – an increased understanding of other groups in society through language will in multiple cases be considered beneficial.

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ESEARCH QUESTION

The following research question is both a result of the theoretical framework that follows, of the topical relevance and aim of this research and of hiatuses in academic literature on the Israeli case.

To what extent does multilingualism influence the aggressive expression of othering among Jewish Israelis?

The multilingualism studied concerns Hebrew and Arabic predominantly, but also the knowledge of other languages is included. It concerns individual multilingualism, not a country’s or a city’s or a linguistics landscape. The aggressive expression of othering processes indicates a violent manifestation of the exclusionary process that is othering, which will be explained under paragraph 2.3.1. | The studied case is not delineated as such by geographical borders alone, since not only respondents within Israel are included, but through a combination of citizenship and religion/culture, thus including subjects who are both Jewish and possess Israeli citizenship. Given this studied group, the party that is confronted with this aggressive expression consists of both Palestinian Israelis and Palestinian citizens, as well as other Palestinian people under different legal status, such as citizens of East Jerusalem. Nevertheless, the research focuses on the group of Palestinian Israelis, the people who live within the 1947 boundaries of Israel and within East Jerusalem. Furthermore, the research delves more into:

How does multilingualism influence

the aggressive expression of othering among Jewish Israelis?

This secondary research question allows for more in-depth analysis of the contributing multilingualism factors in the aggressive expression of othering.

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ONCEPTUALISING IDENTITIES

,

LANGUAGE AND AGGRESSION IN

I

SRAEL

:

A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

This research is grounded in theory on identity construction, language and aggression. Even though the conflicting groups in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can to a large extent be equated with linguistic groups in the region, language is only one rather superficial aspect of the complexity of the conflict. It points, however, to different ethnic groups and their held identities, as demonstrated by Byram (2006) who states that acquisition of a language inherently creates a sense of inclusion and thus an in-group social identity. This is substantiated by the Central Bureau of Statistics in Israel by overlaying ethnic shares of the population with the languages spoken by them (Central Bureau of Statistics Israel, 2010, 2013).

Therefore, this literary frame starts off by studying the geographical containers of identity with a focus on conflicted situations, based on Yiftachel’s chapter in Nested Identities by Herb and Kaplan (1999), as well as his article Territory as the kernel of the nation (Yiftachel, 2002). This investigation of identity formation is crucial to understanding in-group and out-group feelings of inclusion as well as othering processes. The framework then continues onto the feelings accompanying in- and out-group identities, building on Brewer’s article assessing Allport’s theories (1999). A combination of Yiftachel’s Brewer’s work serves as one of two pillars on which this research rests.

The nature of multilingualism both generally and more specifically in Israel, with a focus on bilingual education through Bekerman and Horenzcyk’s work (2004), introduces the contact hypothesis and its conditions. This leads to an analysis of the aggressive expression of the exclusive practices incited by these othering processes, based on Van Houtum and Van Naerssen’s influential work (2002) as well as Böhm’s article on intergroup conflict motivation (Böhm, Rusch, & Gürerk, 2016). Throughout this theoretical evolution from identity formation over inclusion and exclusion to the aggressive expression thereof, the focus of this framework will be gradually more specifically about the case of Israel.

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DENTITY AND ITS NEED OF BOUNDARIES

In most geographical literature, the territorial container of societal phenomena stands central. In the following paragraphs, this is substantiated immediately with a focus on Israel and its surrounding region. Oren Yiftachel repeatedly stresses the importance of the central place of geographical reference and critiques the lack of it in some literature (2002). Territorial factors are essential to identity formation, which forms the basis of Herb and Kaplan’s book Nested Identities (1999). Their book is comprised of several case-specific chapters ordered by scale, again pressing an important concept in geography. What may be more relevant for this thesis, as Paasi notes in his review (2000), is the stress on the nestedness of these scales. In Yiftachel’s chapter, Regionalism among Palestinian Arabs in Israel (1999), he delves into the scale of the minority population of Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel, stating that their ethnoregional identities are influenced by three key factors, being the geographical scale of identity, the impact of both nationalisms on their cohesion, and the construction and imagination of a regional collective identity. Even though his chapter discusses the Palestinian minority in Israel, the concepts he treats are well to be abstracted and reflected onto the Jewish majority in Israel.

Particular for the case of Jewish Israelis in Israel is the generally strong bind between civic affiliations with the state and nationalist identities. This is exemplified in the Israeli Declaration of Independence:

The Land of Israel was the birthplace of the Jewish people. Here its spiritual, religious and political identity was shaped. Here it first attained statehood, created cultural values of

national and universal significance […] By virtue of our natural and historic right we hereby declare the establishment of a Jewish state in the Land of Israel.

 Israel’s Declaration of Independence, 15 May 1948 (as referenced in Yiftachel, 2002) What Yiftachel thus calls the double marginal relation of Palestinian Arab Israelis as a spatial relationship that influences identity formation, is much less applicable on the Jewish majority in Israel, but demonstrates the nestedness of different scales of identity. This particular double relationship is indeed more prominent for minority groups, in this case the Palestinian Arab Israelis, than for majorities, since majorities in a nation generally tend to identify more with the nation thus perceiving a smaller discrepancy between nation and state, but the dominant Jewish hegemony in Israel forge identities on both accounts that are spatially fractured, both within Israel and internationally. Yiftachel demonstrates that the struggle over the land of historic Palestine, the nationalism that have developed there are highly ethno-territorial, contradicting to a certain extent the leading theories on nationalism that place culture, economy or national time over spatial dynamics.

Within this framework, the multi-facetted expansion of the dominant ethnic group, rather than to merge nation and state, aims to segregate group identities as well as to invalidate rigid historical accounts that provide justification for a claim over the land. Although in Israel, territorial control constitutes the larger part of its Zionist nationalism according to Yiftachel, this in turn is based on a conception of a national origin. All of the former could lead to the illusion that Yiftachel’s article adopts an instrumental approach to nationalism. This is incorrect – it is merely seen as both a complimentary lever and result for and of a rather historical-ethnic interpretation that sees the forms of nationalism in Israel as a manifestation of a so-called ethnie. Yiftachel defines this as “a more primordial locus of cultural, religious and political heritage, born out of a mythical belief in common origins, shared texts and specific territories” (ibid., p. 218). Thirdly, a constructivist approach to nationalism is discussed, which focuses on the dynamics of identity construction instead of a state or ethnic-centred perspective.

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GEOGRAPHICAL CRITIQUE ON NATIONALIST IDENTITY THEORIES

In fact, Yiftachel’s article critiques all three approaches from a critical political geography viewpoint and lays the groundwork for this thesis research’s paradigm, which, due to its bottom-up approach, tends to gear towards constructivism, while keeping in mind the three major critiques Yiftachel brings forward. First, the lacking distinction between a nation and a state, as well as the homogenous assumption of nation-states is criticised. Secondly, a bypassing of relevant scholarship on the topic, and geographic scholarship in particular is Yiftachel’s second critique. Thirdly, the privileging of time dynamics of space dynamics are mentioned. This, once again, stresses the geographical background of nationalism theories. This serves as a welcome introduction into the theories this research is framed in, but should not be considered absolute due to the rather psychological approach to aggression this work adopts. What may be one of the most relevant points of Yiftachel’s article, aside from his historical accounts, is the simple reminder that a nation-state should not be assumed a priori.

Along with this reminder comes a critique that many theories ‘flatten’ a state’s human space, disregarding dynamics of class, gender and ethnicity, which are essential for the creation of a (national) identity. Those links are in fact reciprocal: “that is, while political processes create spatial outcomes, these outcomes, in turn, create new political dynamics. […] Hence the division and struggle over space reflects, but also shapes, the social, ethnic and national landscapes” (ibid., p. 221).

Knippenberg (2002, as referenced in Van Houtum & Van Naerssen, 2002) painfully points to its relevance for the Israeli case by arguing “that a state […] claims to represent and imagine one (homogeneous population). In this claiming and producing of a unity out of subcultures and different populations, some groups are (voluntarily) assimilated while others are or remain marginalised as semi-aliens.” Both the assimilation and the marginalisation were demonstrated by Yiftachel. Van Houtum goes on stating that the making of place is thus an act of purification in search for “a justifiable, bounded cohesion of people and their activities in space” (ibid., p. 126) with the consequence of reifying power and displacing others. In his review of Nested Identities, Paasi (2000) recaps that “Identity seems to imply distinction and boundedness, which often – but not always – mean presupposition of the geographies of exclusion” (ibid., p.686). These geographies of exclusion are central in Van Houtum’s work which forms a core of this research.

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HE NARRATIVES ACCOMPANYING TERRITORIAL CONTAINERS OF IDENTITY

Essential to these power practices is the naming of ‘the other’ or ‘the out-group’. Paasi’s Territories, Boundaries and Consciousness (1996) discusses identity (collective identity in particular) and its construction in more detail theoretically, and is therefore a welcome addition to Herb’s and Kaplan’s work and Yiftachel’s chapter. Both books stress the importance of narratives in identity formation. Paasi puts more emphasis on the daily aspect of this construction, as well as on the social processes of continuous re-writing of social collectives. Even though this research’s departure point is the status quo, Jewish, Palestinian and Israeli history constitute an indispensable part of people’s perception of that very status quo and can therefore not be omitted.

In the same critique where he emphasised the importance of the territory in nationalistic studies and practices, Yiftachel (2002) elaborates intricately and as objectively as possible on the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. His article gives particular insight in the formation of collective identity in Israel and therefore in a conflicted region, which, not unlike formation in less sensitive regions, is largely based on narratives. However, it does rely more heavily on a geography of exclusion, returning to Paasi’s review (2000).

As Oren et al. state in their paper Construction of the Israeli-Jewish Conflict-Supportive Narrative and the Struggle Over Its Dominance (2015), “societies involved in intractable conflicts form a conflict-supporting master narrative that provides justification and explanation of the conflict as a whole as well as narratives about its specific events and relevant persons.” They serve both internally and externally to maintain a clear and positive image of the image and storyline of the community in question. These parallel narratives on Israel have been widely recognized as a predominant one in the Middle East, and both the Israeli-sympathetic and the Palestinian-Israeli-sympathetic one have been criticized (Falah, 2004; Tanner, 2014). Falah, in his editorial Truth at War and Naming the Intolerable in Antipode, criticizes passionately the use of language in the Palestinian discourse, mainly claiming that it needs to be strengthened among other by an alternate vocabulary in order to overpower the much-supported Israeli one. An example he gives is not to name the current situation an occupation any longer, but to name it a suffocation. Furthermore, it discusses the lack of a coherent narrative of the Palestinian side of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, both internally and externally towards Israel and its citizens and to the outside world.

The Israeli narrative has in the last decades shifted more towards a focus on security, again drawing on a strong geography of exclusion (Jones,2012) but at the same time strongly includes the ‘other’ in it. Even though the macro-aim of the Israeli narrative does not seem to have shifted that strongly, namely to

“maintain the hegemony of their own dominant narratives among in-group members and to persuade the international community of their validity” (Oren, Nets-Zehngut, & Bar-Tal, 2015, p. 215) as well as to validate their claim to the land, it is again the use of language that is a determining factor in the changed effects of the narrative. Oren et al. use the Israeli-Jewish narrative as a prototypical example and note that their findings can also be found in the Palestinian narrative.

Language is used as a framing practice to influence society members to feel certain emotions that foster continuation of the conflict (Winter, 2010, as referenced in Oren et al., 2015). A clear example is the reference of the West Bank as Judea and Samaria after the Six Day War in 1967 in order to emphasize the metanarrative about the historical link between the Jewish people and this area (Tsur, 2013, as referenced in Oren et al., 2015). This links language immediately to the territory-centred nationalism of Yiftachel’s article (2002) and the nested scales of geographical and linguistic identities.

The nested yet fragmented identities of Israel

In Israel, this scale nestedness is closely linked not simply to identity, but also to ethnic divides in its society which greatly surpass the slightly too simple Palestinian-Israeli divide or even the Jewish Israeli-Palestinian Israeli distinction. Roughly speaking, there are three groups of Jewish Israelis in Israel, namely Ashkenazi Jews, who constitute the larger share of the population and are from European or Russian heritage, Sephardic Jews, who tend to be from Iberian or North African descent; and the Mizrachi Jews, who originally flee from Middle Eastern ancestry. There are of course also expats, refugees, both from the Middle East and from Africa, predominantly from Somalia and Eritrea, aside from a dispersed Palestinian Arab population. This latter share of Israeli society is generally segregated either in villages or cities that are predominantly Arab, or in neighbourhoods in larger cities. Jerusalem is a particular case in this sense However, this fragmentation is not only spatial but also social and historical in nature. The Jewish Arabs (Mizrachim) who have migrated to Israel were, in the Ashkenazi Jews’ fear of integrating with the Palestinian Arabs, quickly stripped of their ‘Arabness’ (Shohat, 1988 as referenced in Yiftachel, 1999) creating a distance in their identities. Parallelly, Jewish Arab awareness of their Israeli identity has grown along with a Palestinian Arab nationalism even within Israel. This Jewish identity is largely constituted by two parts, national and civic affiliation, but complemented with historical accounts. Often, these include histories of persecution, which make for a traumatic view of ethnoregionalist identities that, in the case of Israel, are translated geographically. Furthermore, the dominant Jewish hegemony and nation-building discourse penetrates sub-nation identities, which in turn destabilises the former. This is concealed on a smaller scale due to the power the perceived nation-state possesses over its constituent communities.

I

N

-

GROUP AND OUT

-

GROUP RECIPROCAL DYNAMICS

Building on Yiftachel’s ethnocratic approach to Israel’s statehood, it is essential to take a closer look at the dynamics of intra- and interethnic relationships. Brewer’s assessment of Allport’s recognition that in-group attachment does not necessarily require hostility toward out-in-group members forms an excellent departure ground for this research. This is substantiated by cross-cultural research and experiments supporting the view that “in-group identification is independent of negative attitudes toward out-groups and that much group bias and intergroup discrimination is motivated by preferential treatment of in-group members rather than direct hostility toward out-in-group members” (Brewer, 1999, p. 249). In 1954 already, Allport published his influential book The nature of prejudice, which contains a chapter on in-group formation. Although these studies are predominantly from the field of psychology, it becomes obvious how easily applicable the theories are on geographical identity research.

This chapter serves as Brewer’s waypoint into a deeper investigation of intergroup discrimination, building on Allport’s statement that there exists a primary attachment to in-group members that comes prior to the development of attitudes toward out-groups. To be sure, in-group emotions can be compatible with several other emotional attitudes ranging from positivity over indifference to aggressive hatred. Disregarding these theories, much contemporary research, often implicitly, assumes an automatic negative reciprocal relation between the emotions towards respectively in- and out-group members. Brewer demonstrates that, as she calls it, discrimination for in-groups and discrimination against out-groups are not two sides of the same coin; in-group favouritism and out-group prejudice are phenomena to be separated.

There exist two major approaches to these intergroup dynamics. On the one hand there are structural and functional approaches, and on the other hand there exists the social identity theory. The structural approach builds on an unavoidable clashing of groups over resources in a scarce environment, with the exigencies of conflict giving rise to the maintaining of group loyalty as well as to a combativeness towards out-groups. Functional theories of intergroup behaviour presume in-groups to be formed from a more positive interdependence and in pursuit of a shared aim with intergroup relations characterised by competition and negative interdependence. Both these theories are fairly similar in their approach. The two approaches constitute Campbell and Levine’s realistic conflict theory of intergroup relations (H. Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The social identity theory (Tajfel, 1981 as referenced in Brewer, 1999) however, appoints this negative reciprocity to a more psychological level than to competition.

Brewer notes that there are several empirical and theoretical grounds that disprove an inevitable negative reciprocity. Although the resources that constitute a common goal may be of a zero-sum nature, and hence the preferential treatment of in-group members can be achieved only at the detriment of the out-group, this does not imply a parallel zero-sum nature of mutual attitudes. This indicates that discrimination can draw from an in-group preference exclusively, even in the absence of negative intent towards the out-group. Evidence for this can be found in many experiments and field studies, such as in Tajfel et al.’s study that proved that positive in-group attitudes manifested in the distributive decisions of positive resources disappear when such decisions involve the allocation of negative costs, which suggests that “individuals are willing to differentially benefit the in-group compared to out-group but are reluctant to harm out-groups more directly” (Brewer, 1999, p. 432). Furthermore, other research shows for instance that measures of patriotism and pride prove to be distinct from aggression against out-groups. Coming back on Yiftachel’s Territory as the kernel of the nation, one of the larger resources competed for, and thus a preferential claim over if by the in-group, would imply that territory is in fact what may cause discrimination in the Israeli case, as opposed to intentional discrimination.

“W

HAT MAKES PEOPLE GO TO WAR

?”

T

HE AGGRESSIVE TURN OF IN

-

GROUP LOVE

The conditions of in-group loyalty pave the way for out-group hate and hostility in more than one way. It is a thin line between an absence of trust and a presence of active distrust, as is it a small step from non-cooperation to overt competition. Brewer discusses five ways that may lead to an aggressive expression of out-group hate. The first potential lead towards hostile out-group directed behaviour are feelings of moral superiority, reinforced by a general preference for the familiar over the unfamiliar. The familiar tends to make for more predictable social interactions that are more easily understood than intergroup interactions. This familiarity takes on the form of an institutionalised moral authority. When this authority is seen as absolute rather than relative, as is the case in many of these institutionalised cases, moral superiority becomes incompatible with active feelings of tolerance for difference, according to Brewer.

This intolerance turns into denigration and contempt when the out-group does not subscribe to similar sets of values. This can greatly be influenced by strong narratives that drive apparent sets of values further apart. These emotions are associated with avoidance rather than violence, in many cases making for long periods of unconfrontational mutual contempt. Social changes of many kinds can trigger a violent expression of these feelings however, and moral superiority can rapidly provide a perceived “justification or legitimization for domination or active subjugation of out-groups” (Sidanius, 1993 as referenced in Brewer, 1999).

A second potential way in which group emotions may turn hateful is a perceived threat of the out-group toward the in-out-group. Campbell and Levine’s realistic conflict theory of interout-group relations (H. Tajfel & Turner, 1979) dictates that this out-group hostility is nurtured by a competition over physical resources or political power. When an out-group appears to threaten the interests of the in-group, this creates the conditions for active hostile emotions. Constituting the third point in Brewer’s list, is a lack of common goals. Although a shared threat that faces an in-group increases intragroup solidarity, these dynamics do not necessarily hold up for intergroup behaviour due to a lack of mutual trust, problematising cooperative collective action. In fact, a common threat may promote scapegoating and blame rather than cooperation when social groups are highly differentiated and negative reciprocal emotions are already in place. When this is not the case, other dynamics loom. Positive intragroup relations are dependent on the clarity of in-group boundaries and interin-group distinctions. A cooperation with the out-in-group, or even a positive interdependence threaten the basis for social indentification.

Social values and comparison constitute the fourth way Brewer notes for a hateful turn of intergroup relations. A striving for positive distinctiveness of in-groups over out-groups may compromise a conflictless pursuit of common goals, as describes earlier. This positive distinctiveness can be achieved by multiple groups through the maintenance of a different set of values. In-groups can tolerate out-group superiority on value dimensions considered of lesser importance. In the basis, this is again a competitive striving for superiority on moral points, as both groups pursue positive distinctiveness within similar values. The last of this enumeration concerns political power under the condition that in-groups and out-group are politicised or even politically institutionalised. Political power play may for reasons of maintaining that very power make use of manipulation or mobilisation. Social differentiation provides welcome breaking lines to be exploited for such purposes, and negative feelings such as fear are easily put to use and controlled by a political elite.

Böhm, Rusch and Gürerk (2016) acknowledge the ways Brewer lists as potential leads for a hateful turn of intergroup relations, but heckle the lack of concrete triggers of aggressive behaviour directed at out-groups. Furthermore, they add an important note on the complex nature of intergroup conflict, namely the strong existing incentives of individual freeriding on others’ aggressive achievements, as well as the threat this entails in a falling apart of in-group loyalties. Given Böhm et al.’s recognition of Brewer’s point that in-group positivity does not systematically lead to out-group negativity, and given the existence of frequent and brutal intergroup aggression, it is essential to uncover the motives to such aggressive behaviour. A key factor here is considered to be the distinction between defense and offense where the former consists of in-group protection from an out-group threat, which may translate in strategic acts and pre-emptive strikes. Böhm et al. find direct and causal evidence that the motivation to protect the in-group predicts retaliatory aggression as well as is a promotor of pre-emptive offensive actions against potential threat-forming out-groups. Furthermore, they find that removal of this threat substantially reduced intergroup aggression.

M

ULTILINGUALISM

In the framework on identity and group feelings set out above, it becomes clear that language is a spatial phenomenon. Not only does it take place in a specific location, it is also defined and bounded by it. It furthermore influences its usage and its effects on the person using it. Speaking a specific language does not have the same effect on identity formation in the language’s birth region as it does abroad, but also the use of dialects has an influence on identity formation. This is further substantiated by Valentine, Sporton and Bang-Nielsen (2008), who study the use of language in two different places of encounter among Somali youngsters through surveys, observations and interviews. They note that because language is an interactional given and because individuals’ verbal repertoires contribute to defining the self, the use of different languages, be it mixed or singular, influences socio-spatial relations. More importantly, they demonstrate the opposite is also true. Specific places (of encounter) shape the performance of identity of their subjects, making language a situated practice.

This aside, the conceptualisation of multilingualism, directed towards the influence of a potential mediating effect on aggressive behaviour and its expression of othering consists predominantly of Bekerman and Horenczyk’s research on bilingual education, which builds on the contact hypothesis. This is complimented with cognitive psychological research by Costa, Hernández and Sebastián-Gallés who studied of the effect of multilingualism on conflict resolution, building on results from the ANT-task (attentional network task), as well as Keysar, Hayakawa, and An’s findings (2012) that a second language removes decision making biases. A combination of these studies provides sufficient ground for the main hypothesis of this research.

In most government schools in Israel it is a requirement to study a second language in grades seven to ten. Options include Arabic, Russian, French, or Amharic, which makes Arabic an elective subject in school. It is important to note that most Arabic education is limited to the literary form of Arabic (MSA), which is different from the colloquial forms of the language spoken in Israel and the Palestinian Territories. Very recently, Likud member of parliament Hazan proposed a bill requires that Arabic be taught to non-Arab Israeli students and Hebrew to Arab-Israeli students starting from the age of six (Abdelaziz, 2016). Currently, however, as has been the situation for respondents in this research as well, Arabic has always been an elective subject predominantly taught without actual intergroup contact in mind. As a waypoint to the discussion of Bekerman and Horenczyk’s research, Abdelaziz writes in his item that “there is no doubt that language is key to all human action and acts as the gateway to understanding the social and economic activities of different peoples, as well as their perceptions of conflict and peace. […] learning Arabic is not simply a goal in and of itself. Instead, the primary objective should be to promote peaceful coexistence, equality, respect for the rights of the other, forgiveness, and equal opportunity” (ibid.). Their research qualitatively investigates two bilingual schools, based on data of educational and sociocultural processes involved in the to four major areas of the schools’ functioning: language, cultural and religious identity, national identity, and social interactions.

T

HE DECISION

-

MAKING EFFECT OF A SECOND LANGUAGE

It is essential to take a look at the cognitive roots that cause multilingualism to have an influence on decision making, judgement and thus near-rational outgroup perspectives. Reasoning involves the use of two types of processes. One type is based on mental resources and is more analytic, rule governed, and systematic, and the other is intuitive, affective, and heuristic (Keysar et al., 2012). It follows logically from Brewer’s study that the latter has a bigger influence on emotions felt towards the outgroup, but since both systems tend to act together, both will exert an influence over the expression of these emotions.

Knowledge of a foreign language is said to provide a greater distance and thus reduce biases in decision making due to it being less grounded in the emotional system than a native tongue is. This reduction in emotional response might diminish the influence of affective processes and allow people to rely more on analytic processes when they make decisions. Also the less automatic processing of a foreign language than the processing of a native tongue may cause more distancing and more deliberate processing Favreau & Segalowitz, 1983 as referenced in Keysar et al., 2012. Keysar et al. prove that people rely more on systematic processes that respect normative rules when making decisions in a foreign language than when making decisions in their native tongue.

Keysar et al.’s research strengthens Costa et al.’s findings (Costa, Hernández, & Sebastián-Gallés, 2008), that state that bilingualism has a positive effect on the achievement of more efficient functioning of two attentional networks: the alerting network and the executive control network. Especially the executive control network has been further investigated by Keysar et al. and is assumed to have the biggest influence on this thesis research as well, especially because this executive control network can be subdivided into monitoring processes and conflict resolution. Again, this particular mention of conflict resolution points to decision making, but the links to geographical reference to intergroup conflict are many and apparent.

B

ILINGUAL EDUCATION IN

I

SRAEL

Closer to this thesis’s case than Valentine et al.’s research, Bekerman and Horenczyk (2004) study two cases of bilingual education in Israel where both linguistic groups (Hebrew and Arabic speakers) come together voluntarily on generally constructive terms. They start off by referring to the contact hypothesis, which has a strong relationship with political and cultural geography despite its psychological origin. It suggests that intergroup contact—taking place under the conditions of status equality and cooperative interdependence while allowing for sustained interaction between participants and allowing for the potential forming of friendships—might help alleviate conflict between groups and encourage change in negative intergroup attitudes (Pettigrew, 1998 as referenced in Bekerman & Horenczyk, 2004). However, the paper notes that the structural asymmetry in contact situations is often unavoidable, and this is certainly an often case in Israeli society.

Language thus takes on an important double role. First, it serves as a facilitator for that very contact. When two groups know each other’s’ language, they tend to be more accessible for one another. Second, it serves to remove unequal interaction through offering a more equal platform for two groups to interact, although there will always be a native group and a taught group. Through incorporation of a minority language into an educational system, these minority students are empowered, also making for a more equal ground for interaction. The majority not only benefits from intellectual enrichment, but also from the social consequences of greater cultural integration and pluralism. The article furthermore references Fishman (1989 as referenced in Bekerman & Horenczyk, 2004), stating that “language not only constructs social identity but also may solidify or revitalize national or ethnic identities and loyalties”, which strengthens Byram’s findings.

The study of Bekerman and Horenczyk found that bilingual instruction was more successful among Arab students than it was among the Jewish students. The former group’s scores are markedly higher than those of the Jewish students. This prompted Arabic to be preferred over Hebrew in the second year of teaching in the two studied schools. This affirmative action, complimented with the start of English classes, led students and parents to question the time, effort and need spent on Arabic. This also follows from the general approach that cultural knowledge and understanding dominate the improvement of

Arab-Jewish relations, and bilingualism is only a secondary measure. For this reason, a lot of attention was given to the cultural and religious experience of both groups. Nationalist feelings proved to pose a bigger problem, especially on national holidays which were held separately. Potentially due to the hegemonic force majeure of the Jewish identity, the Jewish group seemed to feel more threatened than the Arab group. Although an openness to the needs of the Arab population and a willingness to grant expression to their identity was observed, this expression does not always seem to falling within the limits delineated by the Jewish group. Especially identification with the Palestinian Authority is not welcomed. In line with the framework built on Yiftachel and Brewer’s articles, national feelings of Arab parents were repressed due to a defensive approach stressing the need for a Jewish homeland.

Another interesting observation from the research is that in unstructured periods such as recess or home visits, compared to structured situations like in the classroom, intergroup interaction is notably lower. Three explanatory attempts are made. The first one is geographical, in the sense that outside of school, both groups live segregated. The distance between homes is simply too great. Second, cultural differences regarding the protocol of social interaction are mentioned, and third, language gaps are considered to be a barrier to social communication. Lastly, it must be noted that participating parents and their children tend to be progressive and rather non-religious and thus provide a flaked view of Israeli society. This in turn contradicts the religious emphasis of the curriculum. However, tension between modernity and tradition, as well as fear of cultural losses are observed. This loss is expressed in other facets of fear, such as a fear for assimilation.

O

THERING AND ITS AGGRESSIVE EXPRESSION

As Barzilai (1999) notes, there are several wars being fought in Israel, and they are all closely intertwined. They are both internal and external, and play out in many different fields, levels and in different arenas, such as on the topic of religion, education, territory, security, land use, etc., and in individual spheres, local communities, along the green line, in the media, in the entire Middle East and far outside of it. This sets out the link with Herb and Kaplan’s Nested Identities (1999) immediately. In his article War, Democracy, and Internal Conflict: Israel in a Comparative Perspective, Barzilai maintains a very state centric approach and therefore steers away from a nation-oriented perspective. Guterman et al.’s article (Guterman, Haj-Yahia, Vorhies, Ismayilova, & Leshem, 2011), as an example on the other hand, indicates widespread community violence, particularly for Israeli-Arabs, and the difficulties they face when trying to seek help. A combination of both accounts helps to conceptualise the aspect othering in this research, as well as its aggressive expression.

O

THERING PROCESSES

Van Houtum and Van Naerssen’s Bordering, Ordering and Othering is an influential work in human geography. Although the focus of their article seems to be on migratory practices, it describes othering as a related practice to the bordering of a securisation of the ‘own’ welfare, identities and resources. Othering as a term was introduced in Tobler’s first law of geography as a cultural interpretation. It can be described as discrimination of people or a population that is different from the collective social norm. They are different and hence they are seen as deviant or in need of being cultured by the group that performs the othering practice (Gallaher, Dahlman, Gilmartin, Mountz, & Shirlow, 2009). In practice, this means othering excludes those who do not fit the norms of the ingroup.

Although Van Houtum and Van Naerssen state that othering generally takes place at an interstate level, they recognise the dangers of intrastate othering. Borders serve a paradoxical role to this extent, in the

sense that serve segregation due to erection in order to erase territorial ambiguity and ambivalent identities. This process aims to shape a new cohesive order. Bordering thus both rejects and erects othering processes. They argue that othering is intrinsically a territorial process and are guided by normatively debatable decision-making. In light of the theoretical framework proposed before, this can be substantiated yet slightly altered in perspective in the sense that the territorial nature of othering is seen as the dominant resource in the Israeli case, together with political power. Furthermore, othering in this research is also a cultural and societal phenomenon where bordering processes are considered less geographical in nature.

A

GGRESSION

,

HOSTILITY

,

VIOLENCE

…

In several cases, including Israel, these othering processes are observed to be expressed in aggressive manners. However, as seen in Brewer’s article (1999), this aggression is often not aimed at hurting the other, or the outgroup, with the sole intention of harm. A distinction must therefore be made between aggression with the intention of change of defence of resources and violence with a pure intention of harm, thriving on emotions of hate and discrimination. Two studies investigate the use of aggression and its purposes, which later serve in the operationalisation of this research as scales for the measurement of aggression. Therefore, these two studies are discussed in slightly more detail, as are their methods and outcomes.

The Aggression Questionnaire by Arnold Buss and Mark Perry (1992) is a remake of the frequently used 1957 Hostility Inventory developed by Buss and Durkee (1957). It has been redeveloped for several reasons which are outlined in the article (A. H. Buss & Perry, 1992) mostly concerning statistical improvements such as factor analyses, introduction of Likert scales and a reduction from seven to four scales of aggression manifestation. These are physical aggression, verbal aggression, anger and hostility. Buss and Perry’s questionnaire development made use of two studies, the first one containing exclusively self-reported data (n=1253), as in this master thesis research, and the second one containing self-self-reported data complemented with observations from knowledgeable informants (n=98).

Physical and verbal aggression involve hurting or harming others, representing the instrumental or motor component of aggressive behaviour. Hostility in its turn consists of feelings of ill will and injustice, representing the cognitive component of behaviour. The affective element of behaviour is constructed by the anger element in the questionnaire, which was not withheld for this survey due to unfit questions that asked about internal anger and as mentioned above, not about its expression. Furthermore, Buss and Perry recognize anger to be a prelude to aggression. What is interesting in their findings is that men are much more physically aggressive than women, slightly more verbally aggressive, and just a little more hostile. There is no sex difference for anger, pointing towards stronger inhibition mechanism among women.

Jackson et al.’s Monopolizing Force? Police Legitimacy and Public Attitudes Toward the Acceptability of Violence is an outstanding tool to measure respondent’s normative beliefs about the acceptability of violence. The article focuses on an acceptability of violence in order to achieve social control and change, where both control and change, and potentially in the case of Jewish Israelis in Israel even more prominently the former, are highly relevant to the case of Israel. The emphasis on the role of state actions and legitimacy in people’s willingness to use violence outside of formal legal or institutional channels, is pursued in the article in the aftermath of the 2011 riots in London and other cities throughout England. During these riots, although not exclusively then, the need to understand why people are willing to

commit violence and others tolerate or approve of it, is stressed by politicians, commentators and society in general (Leiken, 2012; Pargeter, 2008 both as referenced in Jackson et al., 2013).

An important observation that came forth from prior research is that “when police act in line with the norms and values of procedural justice, members of the public tend to believe that the police have the right to power” (p.1, ibid.). This is an important observation in the case of Israel, which, like the UK, knows a trias politica and an established judiciary system in the sense that un-institutionalised violence might be tempered by a the perceived illegitimacy of the criminal justice system. Secondly, according to Black (1983 as referenced in Jackson et al., 2013), what the modern state categorizes as crime is often the moralistic pursuit of justice or otherwise a form of conflict resolution often coming forth from unresolved social grievances. Third, previous studies have found that justice judgements and fear of crime both influence individual aggressive behaviour. A last hypothesis in Jackson et al.’s article that seems relevant for this study is that increasing identification with the nation is correlated to a belief that the state shares one’s normative orientation toward crime and disorder, and therefore that private violence to enforce that normative vision is a positive choice.

The article addresses only two discrete types of private violence, namely social control and social change. This does not exhaust the possible forms of private violence. The latter may also be motivated, for example, by familial status disputes or collective (national, ethnic, or even soccer-related) identifications (Tilly, 2003). The collective violence coming from a community is emphasised more in this thesis’ research due to the items that have been withheld and adapted specifically for it in its survey. The article’s research focused on young men from various ethnic minority communities in London and is based on data gathered prior to the 2011 riots. It is based both on survey and interview data where the survey served to construct the explanatory and outcome variables, as well as the means, standard deviations and range of the relevant scales.

The study’s primary finding is that judgments about police legitimacy are negatively correlated with individual attitudes toward private violence for social control and social change, aside from that procedural justice was strongly correlated with judgments of police legitimacy. In other words, people who believe the right to power belongs with the police as the most important vehicle of state coercion, as well as the right to expect obedience and support, tend to believe that it is wrong to use violence to achieve certain social and political goals. It is noted however, that the regressional data are simply a threshold step identifying causal relationships as well as legitimacy judgements are not the sole determinant of attitudes to private violence. Furthermore, within the heavily policed BME communities that were the subject of this research, negative police contact was associated with diminished legitimacy judgements, to a larger extent than positive encounters. Another caveat in these results in the measurement of attitudes toward violence as a means of self-protection, resolving disputes, and achieving political goals, not actual violence in itself. In the article’s conclusion, a normative tone is taken at hand to state that an emerging social climate of tolerance toward violence would have deleterious implications for social order and justice or even that a such supporting climate has weak normative barriers to the use of force. It concludes with an advice towards policy that argues for a more consensual way of policing in order to generate and maintain police legitimacy.

C

ONCEPTUAL RELATION

Two of the primary concepts of this research are multilingualism and othering processes. Both concepts have received fair amounts of scholarly attention, in academic literature nonetheless, the link between