Satire and News: Contrasting or Complementary? Placing
Political Satire in the Wider Communication Process
Nikki Gommers
11867949
Master’s Thesis
Graduate School of Communication
Master’s Programme Political Communication
Supervisor: Dr. Mark Boukes
2
The effect of political satire has mostly been studied in comparison to hard news, despite the fact that the two are often combined in reality. Furthermore, a new type of satire, characterised by a more investigative and serious nature, has become increasingly prevalent, but little is known about its effects so far. This study formulates and tests a model that outlines how this new type of political satire, in combination with hard TV news, affects political engagement, and incorporates cognitive and affective factors. An experiment with three elements has been performed: political satire in comparison to hard TV news, political satire in combination with hard TV news, and the effect of programme order. This study finds no significant effect on political engagement, but demonstrates that the programme order matters for the level of political trust and anger that young people have. The underlying process seems to revolve around absorption and counterarguing, and relates to the wider theory of motivated reasoning. This study highlights the importance of studying political satire in its complex political communication process and calls for more research into the underlying mechanisms of programme order effects.
Keywords: Political Satire, Political Engagement, Programme Order Effects, Affective Intelligence
3 In the 21st century, political satire appears to be “a truly universal phenomenon” (Baym & Jones, 2012, p. 2), which has spurred the academic world to study its effects. Because of satire’s critical nature, scholars were initially afraid that it could lead to cynicism and apathy towards the political system, therefore reducing political engagement and harming democracy (Becker & Waisanen, 2013; Hart & Hartelius, 2007). Rather, research so far suggests that political satire has a positive effect on political engagement (e.g. Cao & Brewer, 2008; Hoffman & Young, 2011; Lee & Kwak, 2014; Moy & Hussain, 2005), though the number of studies exploring the causal relationship is limited. They largely rely on a survey design instead of an experimental design, which cannot validate the complex casual mechanisms at play.
The effect of political satire is further complicated because consumption of satire does not occur in a vacuum, but instead in a complex communication process. People that watch satire are likely to also consume traditional news (Baum, 2003; Young & Tisinger, 2006), and since satire mocks the genre of television news, watching one programme can influence the effect of the other (Holbert, Lambe, Dudo & Carlton, 2007). Yet, most research into political satire investigates the effect of political satire in comparison to, instead of in combination with hard news, while the latter comes closer to reality and therefore would improve the ecological validity (Boukes, 2018). As several scholars have highlighted (e.g. Holbert et al., 2007; Warner et al., 2018), we should study “communication-to-communication processes” (Landreville, Holbert & LaMarre, 2010, p. 484) to find potential additive or diminishing effects of satire, and to avoid under- or overestimating its overall effect.
Furthermore, existing studies on political satire are heavily U.S.-based and mostly focus on, by now, older forms of political satire, such as The Daily Show with Jon Stewart and The Colbert Report. To understand the effects of political satire in a global context, research that takes into account different political and media systems is necessary (Baym & Jones, 2012). Additionally, a new form of satire has become more prevalent in recent years, which is
4 characterised by its more investigative and serious nature (e.g. Last Week Tonight with John Oliver and Full Frontal with Samantha Bee; Becker & Bode, 2018; Boukes, 2018; Boukes & Quintanilla, forthcoming). Hence, the effect of this new type of political satire might differ from the older forms of satire, but so far little is known.
This study will contribute to the existing academic knowledge on political satire by, firstly, incorporating a multi-message design (combining satire with hard news), and secondly, by focussing on a Dutch political satire show that can be classified as this new type of satire, namely Zondag met Lubach (ZML; Boukes, 2018). The Netherlands presents a good case to study satire in a more global context, as its political and media system strongly differs from the American. The Netherlands can be classified as a typical consensual democratic system (e.g. multi-party system and proportional representation), while the U.S. has a majoritarian system (e.g. two-party system and FPTP; Lijphart & Crepaz, 1991). Whereas the American media system is a typical liberal system, characterised by a deregulated media market, the Dutch media system is more regulated with press subsidies and public broadcasting (Büchel, Humprecht, Castro-Herrero, Engesser & Brüggemann, 2016; Hallin & Mancini, 2004).
ZML is a TV programme by the public broadcaster and has shown to be able to mobilise people to take political action, like signing a petition (Van Lonkhuyzen, 2017) or boycotting Facebook by deleting their profiles (NU.nl, 2018). However, the question remains if these acts are coincidental, or that ZML has a systematic effect on political engagement. Knowing whether ZML has a mobilising role might provide important information for the public broadcaster, as well as for politics in general. To assess the societal impact of political satire, and to fill the gaps in academic knowledge, this study will answer the following question: What is the effect of exposure to political satire, in relation to and in combination with exposure to hard TV news, on non-institutionalised political engagement, and what are the underlying mechanisms in this process?
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Situating the Genre: The Hybrid Nature of Satire
Satire can be defined as “a playful critical distortion of the familiar” (Feinberg in Holbert et al., 2007, p. 23), and political satire does so by adopting and ridiculing the pre-existing genre of traditional television news. It is a news parody, and as such it emphasises how traditional TV news does not meet the journalistic ideals of critical inquiry and in-depth journalism. Accordingly, satirists encourage the audience to critically evaluate the practices of traditional TV news (Baumgartner & Morris, 2006; Baym, 2005; Holbert et al., 2007; Peifer, 2018; Young & Tisinger, 2006).
By combining news with entertaining jokes, satirists attack an object, often a political actor and/or the news media (Baym, 2005; Holbert, Hmielowski, Jain, Lather & Morey, 2011; Kilby, 2018). By doing so, they present in-depth coverage of political or social issues, resulting in lengthy segments. Satirists hold political actors accountable, provide moral guidelines and distance themselves from the journalistic notion of objectivity, as they state that they are not journalists. This allows them to be more derogatory and aggressive, and therefore satire´s coverage is often more critical than the coverage that traditional news provides (Baym, 2005; Becker & Waisanen, 2013; Young & Tisinger, 2006).
The increasingly prevalent new type of satire is characterised by even longer and more information-rich segments. The chosen topics are often relatively unfamiliar and complex, and the in-depth analysis exposes political wrongdoings, which gives this type of satire a more investigative and serious nature (Becker & Bode, 2018; Boukes, 2018; Boukes & Quintanilla, forthcoming). This kind of satire regularly adopts a form of advocacy journalism, which is characterised by partisan rhetoric, the proposing of solutions to societal problems and encouragement to take collective action (Kilby, 2018). In ZML, we see solution building as well, resulting in a call to collective action; some of which have been successful, as the
6 aforementioned examples highlight. This adoption of advocacy journalism further emphasises the relevance of studying the effect of this new type of satire on political engagement.
Political engagement via political satire
Contrary to early expectations, political satire seems to have a positive effect on political engagement (Cao & Brewer, 2008; Hoffman & Thomson, 2009; Hoffman & Young, 2011; Lee, 2012; Lee & Kwak, 2014; Moy & Hussain, 2005). Landreville et al. (2010) show that the effect of political satire on political discussion, which in itself is a form of political engagement, is stronger for younger people. Younger people – defined as those under 30 – watch political satire relatively more than older people (Baym, 2005; Hoffman & Young, 2011) and report that they become more politically educated from watching political satire (Young, 2013), for which Cao (2008) finds support. Research by Boukes, Boomgaarden, Moorman & De Vreese (2015) shows that younger people are more absorbed by political satire than by traditional news, compared to older people, which might explain the stronger effect. They reason that political satire fits better with the needs of adolescents.
Young people find hard news boring and irrelevant, and dislike the supposed objectivity which stops journalists from being critical. Political satire, on the other hand, places political topics in their wider context and provides important background information which helps young people to understand the political world. Satirist´s distancing from ‘objectivity’, and instead providing interpretations of the news, also helps young people to create their political opinion (Marchi, 2012). Additionally, satire’s narrative is more likely to appeal to a younger audience, as they explain complex issues in an entertaining way (Boukes et al., 2015), and as such avoid becoming boring. Altogether, satire´s narrative might be the ideal narrative for young people to learn more about complicated political issues and develop a political identity, and consequently become more politically engaged.
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The mobilising role of cognitive and affective factors
Whether people are politically engaged depends, among other things, on attitudes, such as internal efficacy and political trust. These are often influenced by the media, since the media create people’s images about the political system and their role within it (Gastil & Xenos, 2010). Existing research proves that exposure to political satire significantly increases internal efficacy (Baumgartner & Morris, 2006; Becker, 2011; Hoffman & Thomson, 2009; Hoffman & Young, 2011), which is defined as the “beliefs about one’s own competence to understand, and to participate effectively in, politics” (Niemi, Craig & Mattie, 1991, p. 1407). Satire and traditional TV news are equally substantial (Fox, Koloen & Sahin, 2007), but political satire presents the information in a manner that is more aligned with the skills and interests of ordinary citizens. Instead of fact-based and quick reporting synonymous with hard news, satire such as ZML adopts a narrative and emotional appeal that relates to its viewers. This gives viewers a feeling that they understand the topic better than when exposed to hard news (Boukes, 2018).
Additionally, satire presents the issue in a simplified way, by only presenting one-sided arguments. When the message contains mixed arguments, such as in the multi-layered criticism in The Colbert Report, the effect of satire on internal efficacy disappears (Baumgartner & Morris, 2008). It is satire’s simplified presentation of reality that increases internal efficacy, whereas hard news is often balanced and therefore contains conflicting arguments, increasing the complexity. Because satire’s narrative appeals especially more to younger people, I expect that this effect will be stronger among them.
H1: (a) Watching political satire leads to higher levels of internal efficacy than watching hard
TV news, and (b) this effect will be more pronounced for younger people than for older people.
8 Whereas political satire has a negative effect on political trust, hard news seems to have no effect on it (Baumgartner, 2013; Baumgartner & Morris, 2006; Becker, 2011), whereby political trust is defined as “an individual’s faith or confidence that he or she can trust the government to do what is right” (Becker, 2011, p. 237). A reason for this difference might be the aggressive attacks and ridiculing of political objects that satire contains and hard news does not. Baumgartner (2013) proves that a decrease in trust in the ridiculed object will spill over into a decrease in trust in the political system overall. He reasons that political satire primes a negative schema which will then be applied to other political objects.
Affective factors, especially negative emotions, also play a significant role in the relationship between satire and political engagement. According to the affective intelligence theory, negative emotions, particularly anger, increase someone’s feeling of having control over the situation and stimulate goal-orientated political action that fights the cause of the problem (Best & Krueger, 2011; Chen, Gan & Sun, 2017; Lee & Kwak, 2014; Lu & Myrick, 2016; Valentino, Brader, Groenendyk, Gregorowicz & Hutchings, 2011). Political satire increases the emotional response of anger, while traditional television news does not evoke an emotional reaction (Botha, 2014; Chen et al., 2017; Lee & Jang, 2017; Lee & Kwak, 2014). Anger is triggered when someone feels that their standards are violated or when their goals are not reached (Lu & Myrick, 2016). Since political satire revolves around exposing political wrongdoings and highlighting immorality, exposure to satire may lead to a feeling of violation of norms and standards, resulting in anger. Furthermore, whereas satire depicts an angry host who criticises the political world, the tone of traditional TV news is more neutral (Lee & Kwak, 2014).
Satire’s effects on political trust and anger is likely to be stronger among younger people, as it is more persuasive among them. They are more absorbed in political satire, which reduces their ability to scrutinise and counterargue the arguments of the satirist (Boukes et al.,
9 2015; Young, 2008). Therefore, they are more likely than older people to agree with satire’s criticism on the political system and its actors, which in turn results in lower political trust and more anger.
H2: (a) Watching political satire leads to lower levels of political trust than watching hard TV
news, and (b) this effect will be more pronounced for younger people than for older people.
H3: (a) Watching political satire leads to higher levels of anger than watching hard TV news,
and (b) this effect will be more pronounced for younger people than for older people.
These cognitive and affective factors serve as mediators between political satire and political engagement. Someone is more likely to take political action when they believe they understand politics and can effectively participate (Hoffman & Thomson, 2009; Hoffman & Young, 2011). Anger elicited by political satire triggers goal-orientated political action (Chen, et al., 2017; Lee & Jang, 2017; Lee & Kwak, 2014), and a decrease in political trust can actually lead to the engagement that democracy requires. It may trigger anxiety about the political future, and therefore emphasises the need to stay informed and take political action when required. So trust does not necessarily lead to withdrawal from the political field, but instead can mobilise, especially when combined with higher levels of internal efficacy (Baumgartner & Morris, 2006; Cao & Brewer, 2008; Gastil & Xenos, 2010; Hoffman & Young, 2011; Lee & Kwak, 2014).
Consequently, political satire is likely to promote a type of engagement that does not involve the institutionalised political system. For example, Cao & Brewer (2008) find that political satire does not increase the likelihood of contacting an elected official, reasoning that when satire decreases trust in the electoral system, it is unlikely that someone will contact a politician who is elected through that system. Therefore, political satire is more likely to motivate political action outside of institutionalised political organisations, such as signing
10 petitions or joining protests. This is also the type of political engagement that satirists motivate their viewers to take on via their call to collective action. Thus, I hypothesize as follows:
H4: Watching political satire has an indirect positive effect on non-institutionalised political
engagement via internal efficacy (a), political trust (b) and anger (c), and (d) this effect will be more pronounced for younger people than for older people.
The multi-message effect
Political satire is not consumed in isolation, but rather it is often combined with exposure to traditional news, as most people who watch satire also watch more hard news (Young & Tisinger, 2006). Satire makes the news more accessible, especially for less politically engaged citizens, and can therefore serve as a gateway to hard news consumption (Baum, 2003; Feldman & Young, 2008; Xenos & Becker, 2009). Political satire, thus, serves more as a “news enhancer than a news supplement” (Xenos & Becker, 2009, p. 320). On the other hand, exposure to traditional news often helps in understanding political satire. As Boukes et al. (2015) show, participants that consumed hard news before watching satire understood the satire more easily than those who did not.
To test the effect of political satire in a more realistic situation, this study incorporates a multi-message design, presenting stimuli which include both political satire and hard TV news. Exposure to extra information via hard TV news will likely diminish the effect of political satire on internal efficacy, political trust and anger, and therefore on political engagement. Firstly, in more objective hard news, several sides of a story are presented. This creates a more complicated picture than is created in satire, as satire simplifies stories by proposing one-sided arguments. When the complexity is increased, the effect on internal efficacy reduces or disappears (Baumgartner & Morris, 2008). The diminishing effect of hard news on internal efficacy will be stronger for young people, as the fact-based reporting without any background
11 information of traditional TV news fits less with their needs (Marchi, 2012). Consequently, it is particularly among this younger audience that the addition of hard TV news will increase the complexity of the story, and therefore reduces the internal efficacy.
Secondly, political satire sarcastically evaluates the political system and aggressively criticises the actors within, which results in less political trust and more anger. However, when people are also exposed to more-balanced hard TV news, and therefore to the more positive side of a story, satire’s effect may reduce. This will be the case, especially, among young people, since the effect of political satire on political trust and anger is initially stronger for them. Whereas older people are initially less influenced by political satire, and so the diminishing effect of hard TV news will be relatively smaller. As the addition of exposure to hard news diminishes the effect of satire on internal efficacy, political trust and anger, it therefore diminishes the effect on political engagement. Thus, I expect the following:
H5: (a) Watching political satire without exposure to hard TV news leads to higher levels of
internal efficacy compared to watching political satire in combination with hard TV news, and (b) this effect will be more pronounced for younger people than for older people.
H6: (a) Watching political satire without exposure to hard TV news leads to lower levels of
political trust compared to watching political satire in combination with hard TV news, and (b) this effect will be more pronounced for younger people than for older people. H7: (a) Watching political satire without exposure to hard TV news leads to higher levels of
anger compared to watching political satire in combination with hard TV news, and (b) this effect will be more pronounced for younger people than for older people.
H8: Watching political satire without exposure to hard TV news leads to more
12 anger, compared to watching political satire in combination with hard TV news, and (d) this effect will be more pronounced for younger people than for older people.
The Programme Order Effect
As shown above, the consumption of traditional news can both be a precedent and a result of watching political satire. The current study incorporates both processes and tests the effect of programme order. In their study on order effects in relation to political satire and hard news, Holbert et al. (2007, p. 25) find proof of a primacy effect, which is described as “the dominance of the first persuasive message when two competing messages are provided to an individual one immediately after the other”.
However, in communication science recency effects have also been found, whereby the last message is more persuasive (Choi & Lee, 2007; Haugtvedt & Wegener, 1994). The underlying mechanism of programme order effects revolves around the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM), and counterarguing and message scrutiny in particular. The ELM theory proposes that when a message is processed via the central route, the message is more intensely scrutinised than when it is processed via the peripheral route. A primacy effect will occur when initial message scrutiny is low, accordingly the opinion of the first message is more likely to be adopted. When exposed to a conflictual second message, these arguments will be counterargued or perceived as irrelevant, which results in the first message having the biggest influence (Haugtvedt & Wegener, 1994; Petty, Tormala, Hawkins & Wegener, 2001).
Applying this to political satire in relation to hard news, I expect that the effect of political satire will be stronger when it precedes hard TV news than vice versa. When people are exposed to a humorous political message, they concentrate more on humour comprehension and less on message scrutiny when compared to a non-humorous political message. Humour comprehension takes up such a high cognitive load, that there is not enough cognitive power
13 available to scrutinise the satirist’s message (Young, 2008). Therefore, people are more likely to agree with the satirist (Boukes et al., 2015), and thus with their criticism of traditional news.
Then, when people are exposed to traditional TV news, they are more likely to perceive the TV news as less relevant (Holbert et al., 2007). As TV news presents the story from several sides, the arguments going against the claims made by the satirist will be counterargued, as is explained by the theory of motivated reasoning. This theory highlights that people are not always motivated to form the most accurate opinion, but instead to uphold their existing opinion, which may result in downplaying and counterarguing messages that go against their existing beliefs (Meffert, Chung, Joiner, Waks & Garst, 2006; Slothuus & De Vreese, 2010). As such, conflictual information in the hard TV news programme will be processed in accordance with the stance taken by the satirists, which makes satire relatively more influential.
Again, this effect will be stronger for younger people than for older people. As emphasised before, younger people are more absorbed in political satire (Boukes et al., 2015), and therefore they are more likely to agree with the satirist. Consequently, they are more likely to counterargue the information presented in the hard TV news programme, which limits the effect of hard TV news even more than for older people.
On the other hand, when people are first exposed to hard TV news, the effect of political satire will be relatively smaller. TV news provides important background information that reduces the difficulty in understanding satire’s jokes (Boukes et al., 2015). Humour comprehension will be easier, so there is more cognitive power available for message scrutiny (Young, 2008). This will reduce the effect of satire, as people are more likely to critically evaluate the message presented. Thus, the influence of political satire on internal efficacy, political trust and anger is stronger when it precedes hard TV news than when it follows it, which affects the level of political engagement. Moreover, these effects are stronger for younger people.
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Figure 1. The conceptual moderated mediation model of political satire and non-institutionalised
political engagement for both the single-message and the multi-message manipulations.
H9: (a) Watching political satire followed by hard TV news leads to higher levels of internal
efficacy compared to watching hard TV news followed by political satire, and (b) this effect will be more pronounced for younger people than for older people.
H10: (a) Watching political satire followed by hard TV news leads to lower levels of political
trust compared to watching hard TV news followed by political satire, and (b) this effect will be more pronounced for younger people than for older people.
H11: (a) Watching political satire followed by hard TV news leads to higher levels of anger
compared to watching hard TV news followed by political satire, and (b) this effect will be more pronounced for younger people than for older people.
H12: Watching political satire followed by hard TV news leads to more non-institutionalised
political engagement via internal efficacy (a), political trust (b) and anger (c), compared to watching hard TV news followed by political satire, and (d) this effect will be more pronounced for younger people than for older people.
Figure 1 summarises and visualises the hypothesised moderated mediation effect of political satire on non-institutionalised political engagement for all three analyses.
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Method Research Design
An experiment via an online survey has been conducted from November 28th till December 12th
2018. A between-subjects design with one factor (exposure to which TV programme or programmes) was used. This factor contained four conditions: participants watched either (1) the political satire show ZML, or (2) the hard TV news programme Nieuwsuur, or watched both but (3) first ZML followed by Nieuwsuur, or (4) first Nieuwsuur followed by ZML. Prior to watching the video(s), the participants had answered questions regarding demographic variables and media consumption (Appendix I), and following the video(s) participants answered questions regarding the mediators and dependent variable. Participants were successfully randomly assigned to one of the four conditions, as the randomization check shows that there was no significant difference between the four groups regarding age, F(3, 145) = 0.05, p = .985, gender, χ2 (3, 149) = 6.30, p = .098, education, χ2 (18, 150) = 11.27, p = .883, political interest, F(3, 135) = 1.14, p = .334, and political ideology, F(3, 144) = 0.71, p = .545.
Participants
Because of limited financial resources, a combination of a convenience sample and snowball sampling was used, despite its limitations regarding generalisation. The survey was disseminated via social media, whereby others were asked to share it as well. To increase response rate, a small incentive was provided, as two bol.com vouchers of 8.00 euro each could be won by the participants. To participate speaking Dutch was required, and to be at least eighteen years old.
The survey was undertaken by 184 participants, but 32 participants did not complete the survey and were therefore removed. Furthermore, three participants had to be dropped because they did not meet the requirements or failed the attention check (Appendix II), which left this
16 study with a total of 149 participants. 71.1% of the participants were female and the age of the participants ranged from 18 to 74 (M = 36.42, SD = 15.92). Most participants were highly educated, with 73.6% having either a university or college degree. Regarding political interest, participants rated themselves fairly high, with an average of 5.19 (SD = 1.29) on a scale from 1 (not interested at all) to 7 (very interested). Additionally, people from both the left and the right side of the political spectrum were represented, as answers on the left-right scale ranged from 0 (very left) to 10 (very right) and the average score came close to the middle (M = 4.43, SD = 1.90). Lastly, participants on average regularly watched ZML, with an average of 1.57 (SD = 1.58) per month (programme airs weekly). For Nieuwsuur, the average was 1.38 (SD = 1.74) per week (programme airs daily).
Stimulus materials
The ZML and Nieuwsuur videos both covered the topic of animal welfare in livestock farming and how this relates to the quality label ‘Beter Leven’. Meat that complies with certain standards of animal welfare in the livestock farming process receives a Beter Leven sticker with one, two or three stars. Original items were used to create the stimuli. Both clips were shortened to a 4½ minute video.
The hard TV news condition showed a clip of Nieuwsuur of August 14th 2017 in which is discussed whether the ten-year anniversary of the quality label has led to any change. The video provides insights from a range of actors (positive and negative), among which a supermarket manager and a customer. The video contained typical elements of hard TV news: it is balanced and neutral, but also monologic, as a critical inquiry by the reporter is missing (Baym, 2005). The video concludes that there is still room for improvement and that this largely depends on consumer behaviour, but no solutions are presented.
17 The political satire condition showed a clip of ZML from September 17th 2017. Lubach discusses the poor living conditions of animals in livestock farming and explains the quality label. He uses the supermarket clip from Nieuwsuur to evaluate the state of animal welfare in relation to the label. Contrary to Nieuwsuur, but typical for contemporary satire (Baym, 2005; Kilby, 2018), Lubach critically evaluates and ridicules what is being said by the reporter, supermarket manager and customer, and provides a solution to the problem. He presents his own stickers upon which the cruel conditions of animals in livestock farming are displayed. He encourages people to place those stickers on meat in the supermarket that does not meet the standards of the quality label (i.e. call to action), in order to discourage people from buying this type of meat.
So, the videos are similar in topic and length, ZML contains clips from Nieuwsuur and both videos conclude that the role of the customer is important in creating change. The videos differ in level of criticism and humour/seriousness, and whether they provide a solution and a call to action, which corresponds to the aforementioned description of both programmes. The manipulation check confirms that the participants found the political satire more humorous and critical than the hard TV news (Table 1). Among participants who saw both videos, the hard TV news was perceived as significantly more serious than the political satire, but this difference was not significant among participants who saw one video. This highlights the more serious tone of this new form of satire, and that only when people can compare them, the hard TV news is perceived as significantly more serious.
To check for programme ordering, participants that saw both videos were asked if they found the first or second video more humorous, serious and critical. A dummy variable is created and a χ2-test proves that there was a significant difference between the multi-message
groups whether they found the first or second video more funny, χ2 (1, 67) = 67.00, p < .001, serious, χ2 (1, 67) = 38.85, p < .001, and critical, χ2 (1, 67) = 20.66, p < .001. This difference
18 Table 1. Manipulation checks for ZML (satire) and Nieuwsuur (hard news) in single and multi-message
conditions
Single-Message Manipulation Multi-Message Manipulation
M SD df t p M SD df t p Level of Funniness ZML Nieuwsuur 4.81 1.66 1.53 0.83 52.23 11.03 <.001 4.97 1.85 1.58 1.06 66 15.68 <.001 Level of Criticality ZML Nieuwsuur 5.92 4.54 0.84 1.34 75 5.32 <.001 5.57 4.45 1.21 1.36 66 5.63 <.001 Level of Seriousness ZML Nieuwsuur 5.19 5.61 1.17 0.97 75 -1.70 .093 4.75 5.67 1.20 1.15 66 -5.30 <.001
corresponds to ZML being more funny and critical and Nieuwsuur being more serious, indicating that the participants correctly remembered the order of the videos.
Measures
Mediators.
Internal efficacy. People were asked to rate on a 7-point Likert-scale, ranging from 1
(totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree), to what extent they agreed with six items. These items were adopted from Becker (2011) and Hoffman & Young (2011), but tailored towards the topic of the videos (Table 2, Dutch wording in Appendix II). However, the principal axis factor analysis shows that item 6 does not measure the same concept as the other variables, likely because it relates to internal and external efficacy. Furthermore, item 5 has a low factor loading (0.31), and when testing for scale reliability, decreases the Cronbach’s α value with 0.06 points. Therefore, these two items are dropped. The four remaining items measure one concept (one Eigenvalue above 1, with 57.36% of the total variance explained) and form a reliable scale (Cronbach’s α = 0.75). The average forms the score for internal efficacy (M = 4.36, SD = 1.16).
Political trust. Participants were asked to rate on a 7-point Likert-scale, ranging from 1
(totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree), to what extent they agreed with five statements about trust in the government and in politicians. The items were adopted from Baumgartner (2013)
19 and Boukes and Boomgaarden (2016), but tailored towards the topic of the videos (Table 3, Dutch wording in Appendix II). The factor analysis proves that these five items measure one concept (one Eigenvalue above 1, with 57.87% of total variance explained) and that the scale is reliable (Cronbach’s α = 0.81). The average forms the score on political trust (M = 3.81, SD = 1.08).
Emotional response anger. Participants were asked to answer on 7-point Likert-scale,
ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much), the following question: “After viewing the video(s), do you feel…?”. Referring specifically to ‘after watching the video(s)’ triggers the emotions regarding the video(s) to be recalled (the state anger), instead of people’s general temperament (the trait anger; Best & Krueger, 2011). This question, as well as three items (angry, irritated and annoyed), were adopted from Lu and Myrick (2016). A fourth item was added, as the word ‘angry’ can be translated into two words in Dutch (in Table 4 translated as ‘angry’ and ‘furious’). A factor analysis proves that those four items measure one concept (one Eigenvalue above 1, with 80.44% of total variance explained) and that the scale is reliable (Cronbach’s α = 0.92). The average forms the score for the emotional response anger (M = 3.50, SD = 1.50).
Dependent variable.
Non-institutionalised political engagement. On a 7-point Likert-scale, ranging from 1
(not likely at all) to 7 (very likely), participants were asked how likely it was that they would take on ten political actions which were located outside of the institutionalised political sphere. The items were taken from Edgerly, Gotlieb and Vraga (2016), Hoffman & Young (2011) and Lee (2012), but tailored to the topic of the videos (Table 5, Dutch wording in Appendix II). The principal axis factor analysis shows that the ten items measure two concepts (two Eigenvalues above 1, which together explain 66.54% of the total variance), which can be divided into offline
20 Table 2. Items measuring Internal Efficacy
Item M SD Factor
loading 1 I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of important political and
societal issues facing our country
4.94 1.30 0.78
2 I consider myself to be well qualified to take action regarding animal welfare in livestock farming
4.49 1.52 0.76
3 I think that I am better informed about animal welfare in livestock farming than most people
4.12 1.67 0.71
4 I feel I could do as good a job as a politician as most other people 3.90 1.66 0.78 5 Sometimes, what is going on in politics and society seems so complicated that
a person like me cannot really understand what’s going on (reversed scored)
Item dropped
6 People like me have no say over what the government decides about animal welfare in livestock farming (reversed coded)
Item dropped
Table 3. Items measuring Political Trust
Item M SD Factor
loading 1 The government is pretty much looking out for themselves instead of working
for the benefit of all people and animals (reversed scored)
4.37 1.56 0.68
2 Public officials do not care much what people like me think about livestock farming (reversed scored)
4.27 1.37 0.77
3 Most politicians are competent people who know what to do with regard to livestock farming
3.94 1.45 0.77
4 I trust the government in The Hague to do what is right with regard to livestock farming
3.48 1.47 0.78
5 Politicians have the right solutions for the problems with regard to livestock farming in the Netherlands
2.97 1.26 0.80
Table 4. Items measuring the Emotional Response Anger
Item M SD Factor Loading Item M SD Factor Loading 1 Annoyed 3.81 1.72 0.90 3 Angry 3.24 1.67 0.90 2 Irritated 3.78 1.63 0.88 4 Furious 3.14 1.67 0.91
Table 5. Items measuring Non-Institutionalised Political Engagement (Offline and Online)
Item M SD Factor
loading Offline Non-institutionalised Political Engagement
1 Engage in a conversation about livestock farming in the Netherlands with family, friends and acquaintances
4.16 1.79 0.85
2 Pay attention to news about livestock farming in the Netherlands 3.95 1.66 0.84
3 Seek out more information about livestock farming in the Netherlands 3.54 1.76 0.84 4 Join an organisation that promotes animal welfare in livestock farming 2.43 1.61 0.64 5 Attend a meeting or lecture about livestock farming in the Netherlands 1.96 1.16 0.77 Online Non-Institutionalised Political Engagement
6 Signing a petition (online or offline) regarding livestock farming in the Netherlands
4.14 1.95 0.60
7 Comment or like a post about livestock farming in the Netherlands 2.44 1.76 0.91
8 Join a social media group to receive more information about livestock farming in the Netherlands
2.20 1.55 0.75
9 Post a link to information about livestock farming in the Netherlands 2.15 1.59 0.92 10 Share your opinion on social media about livestock farming in the Netherlands 2.14 1.55 0.87
21 and online engagement.1 The scales for both offline engagement (Cronbach’s α = 0.84) and for online engagement (Cronbach’s α = 0.86) are reliable. The averages form the scores for offline institutionalised political engagement (M = 3.21, SD = 1.27) and online non-institutionalised political engagement (M = 2.61, SD = 1.35).
Analysis
To test Hypotheses 1 to 3, 5 to 7 and 9 to 11, a two-way ANOVA has been used, whereby the variable age has been transformed into a categorical variable. The groups are split at the age of 30, because, firstly, this is the most commonly used age division in existing literature on political satire, as under 30s make up a relatively large part of political satire’s audience (e.g. Baym, 2005; Becker, 2011; Cao, 2008; Hoffman & Young, 2011; Young, 2013). Secondly, it allowed two groups of about equal size to be created (53.7% is 18-29 years old, 46.3% is 30 years or above). However, as a robustness check, the interaction effects have also been tested with age as a continuous variable, and presented in the footnotes. To test hypotheses 4, 8 and 12, which contain a moderated mediation, the PROCESS Model 7 as developed by Hayes (2018) has been used, based on the bootstrapping of 5,000 samples and a confidence interval of 95%.
Results Political satire vs. hard TV news
When comparing exposure to political satire with exposure to hard TV news, the results show that there is no significant main effect on internal efficacy, F(1, 74) = 0.22, p = .645. Age has a significant effect on internal efficacy, F(1, 74) = 7.14, p = .009, whereby younger people score
1 Item 6, regarding signing a petition, loads together with the other online actions. Despite the question stating that the signing of the petition can be either online or offline, it is logical that this item belongs to the online actions, as these days almost all petitions are signed online.
22 higher (M = 4.66, SD = 1.06) than older people (M = 4.01, SD = 1.08), but the interaction effect is insignificant, F(1, 74) = 0.66, p = .420. For political trust, there is no significant main effect of political satire, F(1, 73) = 0.41, p = .526, nor of age, F(1, 73) = 0.12, p = .732, and neither is there a significant interaction effect, F(1, 73) = 0.04, p = .838. Lastly, there is no significant main effect of political satire on anger, F(1, 72) = 0.96, p = .330, nor of age on anger, F(1,72) = 0.10, p = 753, and the interaction effect is insignificant as well, F(1, 72) = 0.56, p = .458. To conclude, H1, H2 and H3 cannot be supported.2
Because there is no significant main effect, nor a significant interaction effect via age, of political satire on internal efficacy, political trust or anger, logically there is no (conditional) indirect effect of political satire on non-institutionalised political engagement via those mediators, which therefore rejects H4. Furthermore, there is no direct effect of the experimental condition on offline nor online non-institutionalised political engagement (Figure 2). An independent samples t-test confirms these results: the mean differences between the groups are small for both offline (∆M = -.09, SE = .30) and online non-institutionalised political engagement (∆M= .11, SE = .34) and insignificant, t(74) = -0.31, p = .759 (offline) and t(74) = 0.32, p = .751 (online).
The addition of hard TV news
Whether political satire is combined with hard TV news or not, does not have a significant main effect on internal efficacy, F(1, 99) = 0.06, p = .811. Age has a significant effect on internal efficacy, F(1, 99) = 5.89, p = .017, whereby younger people score higher on internal efficacy (M = 4.57, SD = 1.02) than older people (M = 4.07, SD = 1.29), but the interaction effect is
2 When performing a moderated mediation analyses with age as a continuous variable and by using PROCESS Model 7, similarly no significant interaction effect for political satire and age is found for any of the mediators: For internal efficacy: b = 0.02, t(71) = 1.07, p = .286
For political trust: b = 0.00, t(71) = -0.14, p = .891 For anger: b = 0.03, t(71) = 1.26, p = .214
23 Figure 2. Model of exposure to political satire vs. hard TV news, internal efficacy, political trust, emotional response anger, age and non-institutionalised political engagement (offline and online; N = 75). Note: The model reports the unstandardized regression coefficients and the significance levels. For reasons of clarity, this model only presents the mediation effects, whereas the interaction effects of the moderated mediation with age are reported in the text.
insignificant, F(1, 99) = 1.31, p = .255. There is no significant main effect of the experimental conditions on political trust either, F(1, 98) = 0.73, p = .396. The main effect of age on political trust is marginally significant, F(1, 98) = 3.14, p = .080, but again the interaction effect is insignificant, F(1, 98) = 1.34, p = .250. To conclude, neither H5 nor H6 can be supported.3
Furthermore, there is no significant main effect of the experimental conditions on anger, F(1, 97) = 0.003, p = .955, nor is there a significant main effect of age on anger, F(1, 97) = 0.43, p = .512. However, there is a marginally significant interaction effect, F(1, 97) = 3.54, p = .063, η2 = 0.04, as the age groups react differently to the addition of hard TV news. The
younger group reports higher levels of anger when they are exclusively exposed to political satire (M = 3.82, SD = 1.40) than when they are exposed to both programmes (M = 3.22, SD = 1.35). The reverse effect is visible among the older group, which reports higher levels of anger
3 When performing a moderated mediation analyses with age as a continuous variable and by using PROCESS Model 7, similarly no significant interaction effect for political satire with or without hard TV news and age is found for both internal efficacy, b = 0.02, t(96) = 1.10, p = .273, and for political trust, b = -0.01, t(96) = -0.97, p = .336.
24 when political satire is combined with hard TV news (M = 4.00, SD = 1.58) than when it is not (M = 3.44, SD = 1.59; see Figure 3).4
To better understand the interaction effect, the mean scores for all four experimental conditions, separated by age groups, have been presented (Table 6). This firstly shows that among older people, the reported level of anger is almost similar for political satire and hard TV news, and slightly increases when the two are combined. As such, it seems that both programmes elicit the same amount of anger, and that the slight increase in anger when exposed to both could be the mere result of an increase in time exposed to content about animal abuse. Among younger people, a more complex effect seems to be at play, as when comparing political satire by itself with political satire in combination with hard TV news, the diminishing effect is only significant when hard TV news precedes political satire, t(35) = 2.35, p = .025, and not when it follows political satire, t(35) = 0.46, p = .650. A possible reason for this will be discussed in the Conclusion & Discussion. To conclude, H7 is partially supported, as among the younger audience exposure to political satire only leads to higher levels of anger than exposure to both programmes, but this effect is only significant when political satire precedes hard TV news. Furthermore, among the older audience this effect is not visible.
However, the emotional response anger has no significant effect on non-institutionalised political engagement (offline nor online, Figure 4). As aforementioned, there is no effect of the experimental condition on internal efficacy nor on political trust. As such, there is no indirect effect on non-institutionalised political engagement via any of the mediators, which therefore rejects H8. There is also no direct effect of the experimental condition on non-institutionalised political engagement (offline nor online; Figure 4). An independent samples t-test shows that people who are exclusively exposed to satire report slightly higher levels of online non-institutionalised political engagement (M = 2.85, SD = 1.53) than people who are exposed to
4 When performing a moderated mediation analyses with age as a continuous variable and by using PROCESS Model 7, a marginally significant interaction effect is visible as well, b = 0.04, t(96) = 1.89, p = .061.
25 Figure 3. Visualisation of the interaction effect on the emotional response anger between the experimental conditions and age.
Table 6. The mean scores for anger for all four experimental conditions, separated by age groups
Younger Older
M SD M SD
Political Satire Only 3.82 1.40 3.44 1.59
Hard TV News Only 3.21 1.43 3.36 1.71
Political Satire followed by hard TV News 3.60 1.51 3.90 1.80
Hard TV News followed by Political Satire 2.85 1.09 4.15 1.26
both political satire and hard TV news (M = 2.40, SD = 1.17), but this difference is insignificant, t(55.86) = 1.53, p = .131. For offline non-institutionalised political engagement, the mean difference between the groups is only 0.05 (SE = .27) and insignificant, t(98) = 0.20, p = .842.
Programme order effects
Regarding political trust, there is no main effect of programme order, F(1, 62) = 2.31, p = .134. Nonetheless, there is a significant main effect of age, F(1, 62) = 7.27, p = .009, and a significant interaction effect, F(1, 62) = 4.65, p = .035, η2 = 0.06. The younger group shows, as
hypothesised, less political trust when political satire precedes hard TV news (M = 3.72, SD = 0.97) than when it follows hard TV news (M = 4.63, SD = 0.83). Whereas, the older group is not affected much by the programme order, as political trust is almost similar for those who
0 0,5 1 1,5 2 2,5 3 3,5 4 4,5
Young (18-29 years) Older (30 years and above) Em o ti o n al R es p o se A n g er
Political Satire Only Political Satire with Hard TV News
26 Figure 4. Model of exposure to political satire with or without exposure to hard TV news, internal efficacy, political trust, emotional response anger, age and non-institutionalised political engagement (offline and online; N = 100). Note: The model reports the unstandardized regression coefficients and the significance levels. For reasons of clarity, this model only presents the mediation effects, whereas the interaction effects of the moderated mediation with age are reported in the text.
were first exposed to political satire (M = 3.59, SD = 1.24) as for those who were first exposed to hard TV news (M = 3.43, SD = .90; Figure 5). To conclude, political satire preceding hard TV news leads to less political trust than vice versa, but only among young people, which supports H10 for just this group.5
Regarding internal efficacy, there is no significant main effect of programme order, F(1, 63) = 1.44, p = .235, nor of age, F(1, 63) = 0.86, p = .359, and neither is there a significant interaction effect, F(1, 63) = 0.48, p = 489. Programme order has no significant main effect on the emotional response anger either, F(1, 61) = 0.47, p = .494. Age does have a significant main
5 When performing a moderated mediation analyses with age as a continuous variable and by using PROCESS Model 7, the interaction effect of programme order and age on political trust is only marginally significant, b = -0.03, t(61) = -1.70, p = .095. Performing a moderation analysis with age as a continuous variable is a more robust test, as it maintains the original variance in the variable. However, the results show a similar trend, whereby showing satire after hard TV news has a significant positive effect on young people’s political trust, b = 0.80, t(61) = 2.49, p = .016 (at 23 years old), while it has an insignificant, slightly negative effect on older people’s political trust, b = -0.08, t(61) = -0.19, p = .849 (at 56 years old). The Johnson-Neyman analysis shows that the cut-off point is at 34.28 years, indicating that up until that age the interaction effect of programme order and age on political trust is significant, and for the older people becomes insignificant.
27 Figure 5. Visualisation of the interaction effect on political trust between programme order and age.
effect on anger, F(1, 61) = 4.81, p = .032, but the interaction effect is insignificant, F(1, 61) = 1.88, p = .176. To conclude, both H9 and H11 are rejected.6
As such, internal efficacy and anger do not serve as mediators between programme order and non-institutionalised political engagement. Political trust does not have a significant effect on non-institutionalised political engagement (Figure 6), and therefore there is no indirect effect via this mediator either. To conclude, H12 cannot be supported. Neither is there a direct relationship between programme order and non-institutionalised political engagement (Figure 6). An independent samples t-test shows that the mean differences between the programme orders are small for both offline (∆M = -0.31, SE = .31) and online non-institutionalised political engagement (∆M = -0.17, SE = .29), and insignificant, t(63) = -1.01, p = .315 (offline) and t(63) = -0.57, p = .571 (online).
6 When performing a moderated mediation analyses with age as a continuous variable and by using PROCESS Model 7, similarly no significant interaction effect for programme order and age is found for both internal efficacy, b = .001, t(61) = .04, p = .968, and for the emotional response anger, b = .03, t(61) = 1.36, p = .180.
0 0,5 1 1,5 2 2,5 3 3,5 4 4,5 5
Young (18-29 years) Older (30 years and above) P o liti ca l T ru st
Political Satire precedes Hard TV News
Political Satire follows Hard TV News
28 Figure 6. Model of programme order, internal efficacy, political trust, emotional response anger, age and non-institutionalised political engagement (offline and online; N = 65). Note: The model reports the unstandardized regression coefficients and the significance levels. For reasons of clarity, this model only presents the mediation effects, whereas the interaction effects of the moderated mediation with age are reported in the text.
Conclusion & Discussion
Overall, this study did not find support for a direct or indirect effect of political satire on non-institutionalised political engagement, despite the call to action featured in this new type of political satire. Neither the addition of hard TV news compared to political satire in isolation, nor the programme order, significantly affected the level of non-institutionalised political engagement. Some forms of political action, such as political discussion and petition-signing, were likely to be taken on by participants from all conditions, and so it seems that both programmes can foster this type of political action.
The programme order, however, mattered for the level of political trust young people have, as political trust was lower when satire preceded hard TV news than when it followed it. Arguably, when people are exposed to political satire first, they likely will carry over the critical viewpoint towards traditional TV news and the political system, as counterarguing is low. As Baumgartner (2013) reasons, satire primes a negative schema which will then be applied to other political objects, resulting in a decrease of political trust overall. Consequently, the
29 arguments featured in hard TV news will be counterargued. This may concern broadcasters of political satire, as they often also broadcast traditional TV news. However, when hard TV news comes first, the background information that it provides can be utilised to scrutinise the satirist’s criticism on traditional TV news and the political system, resulting in higher levels of political trust.
Additionally, among this young audience, the level of anger was diminished as a result of the addition of hard TV news. Hard news, thus, seems to nuance one’s emotions whereas satire may evoke an anger response. However, this difference was only significant when hard news preceded political satire. This might be because exposure to hard news prior to watching satire provides background information that makes humour comprehension easier (Boukes et al., 2015). Satire requires high levels of humour comprehension, which increases absorption in the message, leaving little room for counterarguing. However, it could be that exposure to hard TV news prior to satire decreases absorption, as humour comprehension becomes easier. Therefore, more cognitive power is available for message scrutiny, reducing satire’s persuasiveness (Boukes et al., 2015; Young, 2008). This possibly tempers the anger the satirist elicits among its younger viewers. This effect will not occur when the background information is presented after watching satire, because at that point satire’s persuasive effect has already resulted in decreased trust in the traditional news media (as outlined above), leading to counterarguing of the arguments featured in the traditional news. As such, the addition of hard TV news only seems to matter for the level of anger when it precedes political satire.
Within the programme order effects, motivated reasoning seems to play an important role. Instead of taking in all information and formulating the most accurate opinion, people seem to be more motivated to uphold their existing beliefs, which may result in downplaying and counterarguing messages that go against these beliefs (Meffert et al., 2006; Slothuus & De Vreese, 2010). This is especially prevalent among young people when they are first exposed to
30 political satire and then to hard news, as their high level of absorption limits them in critically evaluating the satirist’s arguments. Accordingly, information that follows will be processed in agreement with these new-found beliefs. However, having background information prior to watching satire helps them to be more critical towards the political satire.
The programme order did not affect older people, likely because they are less absorbed in political satire than young people (Boukes et al., 2015). Therefore, they have a better cognitive ability to counterargue the satirist’s criticism on traditional media and political actors, without needing background information. Whether background information is presented prior or after exposure to satire does not matter much to them, resulting in no programme order effect.
This study was faced with several limitations. The study contained a small sample that was not representative of the population. It consisted of relatively highly-educated people who rated themselves as strongly politically interested. This limits the generalisability of this study. Additionally, it might explain why this study did not find any effect of political satire on internal efficacy, while existing research has proven that a positive relationship exists (e.g. Baumgartner & Morris, 2006; Becker, 2011; Hoffman & Young, 2011). The high level of education and political interest might have led to a sample that already possessed relatively high levels of internal efficacy, therefore political satire could potentially not increase this any further.
Another limitation can be found in the items measuring non-institutionalised political engagement. All items regarding political engagement via social media receive an averagely low score (between 2 and 2.50 on a scale from 1 to 7). This could be because people are less inclined to share political opinions via social media nowadays, as it is perceived as a place of toxic debates, and instead prefer to discuss political issues via private online media, such as WhatsApp (Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, 2018). Additionally, the items could have been better aligned with the topic of the videos, for example an item about boycotting
31 ‘bad’ meat. These items might have been closer to preferred political actions and therefore may have led to a stronger effect on non-institutionalised political engagement than it did now.
Altogether, this study highlights that the effects of political satire do not exist in a vacuum. Rather, they should be viewed in their wider political communication process, which incorporates complex psychological mechanisms and broader theories of communication science, such as motivated reasoning. Only then a more accurate depiction of satire’s real-life effect can be observed. Future research should further investigate the complex mechanism at play in this “communication-to-communication” process (Landreville et al., 2010, p. 484).
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