EMOTIONAL ISSUE FRAMING AND
GOVERNMENTAL POLICY SUPPORT
STRATEGIC EMOTIONAL ISSUE-FRAMING EFFECTS ON THE DUTCH SANCTIONS AGAINST
RUSSIA
ROZEMARIJN PETERS: 6073662
SUPERVISOR: J.M. LEFEVERE, PHD wordcount: 61231
Abstract
Mass media have created vast opportunities to communicate with large groups of citizens. For politicians, this does not only present opportunities in times of election, media may also be very important during a government’s term of power. Emotional issue-framing has namely been investigated during electoral periods and very little during legislation where the media could also cause favorable effects for governmental policies. In an experimental study, we analyzed the impact of positive- and negative emotional issue-framing of news coverage on the sanctions against the Russian Federation, on Dutch citizens. Participants who were exposed to a neutral condition were compared to participants who were exposed to a fear condition and to participants exposed to a hope condition. Results show a significant effect of emotional issue-framing on the support for governmental policies compared to the neutral condition. Overall, fear turned out to be the most effective frame. The effects of the two emotional frames appeared to be age-related. Thus, the impact of emotional issue-framing may be optimized by adaptation to age.
Key words: emotions, issue-framing, governmental policies, fear, hope, Russian Federation,
2 Ever since the Cold War, there has been no period of real quietness and peace in
Russia and surrounding areas, and in recent years the agitation has become worse. Because of the growing turmoil in eastern Ukraine and the militant response from the West, the Kremlin has become more aggressive in its anti-Western stance (Bennetts, 2015; Globe, 2014). It developed into a civil war, with a tragic climax resulting from the downing of an airliner plane of flight MH17 on July 17, 2014. The tensions between Russia and the West since then have brought back memories of the fears during the Cold War (Mara, 2014). In the meanwhile we can speak of a military conflict between the Russian Federation and Europe. Tensions run so high recently that the commander of the United States military has warned Europe that NATO must remain united in the face of a “real threat” from the Russian Federation (Ellian, 2015).
In response to the turmoil in Ukraine, the European Union has imposed restrictive measures against the Russian Federation. According to the European Union Newsroom, a press release database, the European Union is focusing its efforts on de-escalating the crisis in Ukraine and seeks a lasting solution; to protect the unity and territorial integrity of the country and to ensure a stable, prosperous and democratic future for all Ukraine's citizens. On March 3 2014, the Council of the European Union urged Russia to immediately withdraw its armed forces to the areas of their permanent stationing, in accordance with the Agreement on the Status and Conditions of the Black Sea Fleet stationing on the territory of Ukraine of 1997. Because there was no formal response from the Russian Federation, and after several bilateral talks with the Russian Federation, on March 17, 2014, the European Union imposed the first travel bans and asset freezes against Russia and Ukraine. On September 11, 2014, the European Union and the United States imposed sanctions on Russia’s finance, energy and defense sectors. These sanctions affect not only Russian sectors, but also impact on the economy of American and European countries. Calculations vary, but the Russian boycotts are definitely expensive for the Dutch economy. Lobby Clubs see an annual damage to our economy of more than 1 billion euros and ING calculates the annual damage at 937 million euros. Yet, it is necessary to continue the sanctions, according to Bert Koenders, the Dutch foreign minister. "We still see a destabilization in eastern Ukraine, and the agreements that we have made in the framework of the OSCE and Minsk are not respected. There is no ground for easing up."(Koenders, 2014).
3 The sanctions are expensive for the Dutch economy and most likely not all Dutch citizens will agree with these governmental decisions. Because of the importance of implementing the sanctions, it is essential for the Dutch government to secure support for these policies. Media, nowadays, could play a large role in engaging support from Dutch citizens because they have great influence on the public opinion (McQuail, 1977; Gamson and Modigliani, 1989; Soroka, 2003). Media can not only set the agenda (Mc Combs, 2004), but they can also influence how people think about such policies trough issue-framing and with the use of emotions. Issue-framing is a process where media coverage influences how people think about a topic (Jacoby, 2000). Moreover, emotions could be amplified. Emotions are persuasive and allow media to draw the public’s attention (DeSteno, Petty, Rucker, Wegener and Braverman, 2004). Concerning the significant role that media may have on the public opinion, it is important for the Dutch government to consider the effects of emotional issue-framing in media coverage in general, and, in the context of this paper, regarding the
sanctions against the Russian Federation. In this study I will explore whether emotional issue-frames affect the support that people have for the sanctions against the Russian Federation. This leads us to following central research question:
“How does emotional issue-framing in Dutch media coverage of the sanctions against the Russian Federation affect public support for these policies?”
This study addresses two main areas that remain underdeveloped in the literature.
First, the effects of issue-framing during the legislation for governmental purposes. Issue-framing effects have been widely evaluated as partisan effects, but issue-Issue-framing effects without the influences of elections have, to my knowledge, never been explicitly studied. Second, this study tests emotional issue-framing effects of news coverage of a military conflict. Because the nature of the subject itself is emotionally charged, the effects of the manipulation will give a more natural and clear result. The Dutch population is expected to feel emotionally concerned with the topic which probably strengthens the effects.
4 Theoretical framework
The theoretical framework starts with an overview of the history of media effects as an introduction to the enormous power of media nowadays. Framing effects will be discussed with the focus on issue-framing effects. Subsequently, the effects of emotions will be discussed with a distinction between negative and positive emotions. To understand how emotions can produce persuasive effects, the underlying process in the human brain will be discussed.
Mass media effects
To understand the enormous power of media, it is useful to start with the history of media effects. Media effects over the past fifty years may be classified in 3 main phases. The first phase started in the beginning of the 20th century and is the phase of the emerging
communications industry (Van Cuilenburg and McQuail, 2003). Media in Europe and North America had the power to “shape opinion and belief, change habits of life, actively mold behavior and impose political systems” (McQuail, 1977, p.9). Media included popular press, cinemas and radio. Advertisers and government propagandists used the media as a power tool in the First World War, with mainly radio and newspapers. The second phase took place from 1940 to 1980 and is the phase of the public service media policy, which included intensive research of the effects and effectiveness of mass communication. “The mass media, primarily radio, film, or print at the time most research was conducted, emerged as unlikely to be major contributors to direct change of individual opinions, attitudes or behavior or to be a direct cause of crime, aggression, or other disapproved social phenomena”. (McQuail, 1977, p.10). Mass media are technologies that are intended to reach a large audience by mass
communication. The third phase is that of the new media, which began in 1980 and is still in progress. Mass communication emerged in phase two, but with the rise of television and especially with the rise of internet in phase three, mass communication provided countless new opportunities. Research into the effects of mass communication is now an ongoing development of changes and new theories (Severin and Tankard, 2010).
Framing
Mass media may have mayor effects. Not only because they are able to set the agenda (Mc Combs, 2004), but they can also influence how people think about policies through issue-framing (Slothuus and de Vreese, 2015).
5 Agenda setting is defined as the process of (intentional or accidental) media influences in which the importance that the public ascribes to events, issues or people is determined by media coverage. The more attention media devote to an issue, the more importance the public attaches to it. Agenda-setting only influences the topics that people think about, not what they think about them (Nelson and Oxley, 1999; Sniderman and Theriault, 2004). The concept of framing is not independent of agenda-setting (Entman, 2007). According to McComs, Shaw and Weaver (1997), framing is an extension of agenda-setting by focusing on the essence of the issues or events at hand rather than on a particular topic. The basis of the framing theory is that the media focus attention on certain events and place them within a field of meaning or significance (de Vreese, 2005). Framing, also called “the second level agenda setting” not only influences what the public thinks about, it also influences how they think about it. Issue-framing is the specific part of the Issue-framing theory that focuses on the essence of issues. Nelsen and Oxley (1999)write that issue-framing is the (un)intentional process of selecting and highlighting some facets of issues over their alternatives and making connections among them with the objective of promoting a particular interpretation or evaluation and a preferred
solution. Because issue-framing is a process of the mass media whereby favorable messages are able to influence the public opinion it is often used for electoral purposes. In the electoral competition, political candidates frame issues their way to influence the public opinion and gain support for their parties (Slothuus and de Vreese, 2010). Based on multiple studies into the effects of issue-framing we may conclude that the effect of issue-framing is powerful enough to induce changes of opinion at individual levels (Jacoby, 2000; Nelson and Oxley, 1999; Gorp, 2005). Therefore it is relevant to analyze this process for its impact on other purposes, such as gaining support for governmental policies independent of election periods. Emotions
According to Aarøe (2011), the strength of a frame turns out to be dependent on the emotional reactions of citizens. Research on frames has increasingly focused on the role of emotions and their persuasive capabilities. Research on emotions is widespread in (electoral) politics
(Brader, 2005; Marcus, 2000). They are persuasive and allow politicians and the media to draw the public’s attention (Arceneaux, 2012). However, the effects of emotions have also been investigated in issue-frames outside electoral periods. According to Nabi (2003), emotions could serve as frames for issues. “Emotions can privilege certain information in terms of accessibility and they can guide the information seeking process and subsequent judgements” (Nabi, 2003, p. 225). When emotions serve as frames for issues, it is useful to
6 investigate a certain issue that entails a high level of emotions with the whole population. The military and economic conflict with the Russian federation brings along a high level of emotions. The Dutch population feels emotionally concerned with the topic, which lilely strengthens the effects of the issue-frame. According to Nelson and Oxley (1991), the way in which frames affect attitudes is dependent on the importance that individuals attach to issue-relevant beliefs.
By examining how issue-frames in Dutch media coverage may affect support for governmental policies, it is important to investigate how different types of frames affect public opinion. Literature suggests that there are differences in frames that are based on positive emotions, such as hope, enthusiasm, joy and pride, and issue-frames that are based on negative emotions, for example sadness, fear, frustration and anger (Mittal and Ross, 1998; Maheswaran and Meyers-Levy, 1990; Gamliel and Peer, 2006). The majority of existing literature about emotional frames suggests that negative messages are more powerful than positive messages. We anticipate to find this as well. According to Slovic (1993), negative messages are found to be more powerful because they are better trusted than positive messages. Also, research shows that citizens are motivated to pay more attention to information when they have been made anxious (Gadarian and Albertson, 2014). Less
research has been done specifically towards positive emotional frames. Lecheler, Schuck and de Vreese (2013) conducted a study on the effects of negative and positive framing and found a mediating framing effect for anger and enthusiasm. This study convincingly demonstrates that the effectiveness of frames is dependent on whether the frame is suitable for the message and the public. In the following two paragraphs we will discuss negative and positive
emotions and additionally we will discuss the emotional frames which are best suitable for this study.
Negative emotions
The military conflict with the Russian Federation evokes both sadness, anger and fear. The role of anger and sadness in news framing was compared by Kim and Cameron (2011). Anger frames showed an increasing effect of inattention and negative attitudes. The influence of sadness frames overall showed less effects on attitude changes than anger frames. The emotion fear has also been widely studied. In political communication, fear frames are being used as a strategic instrument to draw the attention from citizens towards a political campaign (Singelman and Rovner, 2007), also known as negative campaigning. The purpose of negative
7 campaigning in politics is not to be mean-spirited but to gain votes (Lau and Pomper, 2002; Lau, Sigelman and Rovner, 2007). By cueing fear it is possible to stimulate vigilance, increase reliance on contemporary evaluations and facilitate persuasion. Voters say they do not like threatening ads, but they do retain the information significantly better than from positive ads (Colford, 1986). Moreover, according to Gadarian and Albertson (2014), people are motivated to learn and pay more attention to threatening information because they feel anxious. People who are biased with fear show a biased information seeking process. These people feel more attracted to threatening information and they are more willing to learn about the concerning subject. All these demonstrated effects, and the suitability of the emotion towards the subject resulted in the decision to examine fear as negative emotional issue-frame in this study.
Positive emotions
Cassotti, Habib, Poirel, Aïte, Houdé and Moutier (2012) investigated the potential impact of positive and negative emotional framing effects on the decision-making progress. They found that a positive emotional frame can reduce the loss eversion because it brought up emotions of hope. Within a military conflict, such as the conflict with the Russian Federation, hope is an emotion with favorable effects when triggered. Lazarus (1999) calls hope an important emotion and a vital coping resource against despair, which suits the issue concerning Russia appropriately. Furthermore, emotions like enthusiasm, joy and pride would not be suitable to frame in sensitive issues, which is why we selected hope in this study focuses as positive emotional issue-frame.
The process of emotions in the human brain
The mechanisms through which emotions affect people’s opinion have been traced back to the functioning of the brain. Human emotions can be measured through blood pressure and heart rate, but also in the brain through the function of the amygdalae, which play a role in
perceiving, storing and remembering during information processing. Subjective emotional experiences have been found to enhance memory retention (Turhan, Zhao, Brewer, Gabrieli and Cahill, 2000; Canli, Zhao, Brewer, Gabrieli and Cahill, 2000). As such, emotion-laden experiences are more likely to be remembered compared to experiences lacking an emotional component.
8 Age is a variable that affects the activations in the amygdalae. Children show greater amygdalae activation to positive emotional stimuli than to negative emotional stimuli. The amygdalae activations to negative stimuli increase with age. These findings suggest that with children (under 18), positive stimuli are more salient or meaningful than negative stimuli (Todd, Evans, Morris, Lewis and Taylor, 2010).Mather, Canli, Englisch, Whitfield, Wais, Ochsner, Gabrieli and Carstensen (2004) looked at amygdala responses to emotionally
balanced stimuli in older and younger adults. They made a distinction between older (between 70-90 years old) and younger (between 18-29 years old) adults and found that with increasing age, adults experience less negative emotions, come to pay less attention to negative than to positive emotional stimuli, and become less likely to remember negative than positive
emotional events. These findings suggests that, with age, the amygdalae may show decreased reactivity to negative information while maintaining or increasing its reactivity to positive information. Both older and younger adults show greater activation in the amygdalae for emotional than for neutral stimuli; however, for older adults, seeing positive stimuli leads to greater amygdalae activation than seeing negative stimuli, whereas this is not the case for younger adults. Nashiro, Sakaki, and Mather (2011) confirm these findings by saying that older adults show a positivity effect in their attention and memory, with diminished
processing of negative stimuli relative to positive stimuli compared with younger adults. Younger adults show a positive effect in their attention and memory when processing
negative stimuli (Hamann, Ely, Hoffman and Klits, 2002). Based on these findings we expect to find that age moderates the impact of emotional frames.
In this study we test the following hypotheses: Figure 1: Conceptual model
Age
Emotional issue-frame
Support governmental
policies
9 H1: The use of emotional issue-frames in news coverage about the sanctions against
the Russian Federation will engage more support for the governmental policies among Dutch citizens than the neutral news coverage.
H2: The overall effects of fear as a negative issue-frame, are greater than the overall effects of hope as positive issue-frame
H3A: Age moderates the impact of emotional frames. The effects of fear, used as a negative issue-frame, on the support for governmental policies are greater amongst younger adults compared to older adults.
H3B: Age moderates the impact of emotional frames. The effects of hope, used as a positive issue-frame, on the support for governmental policies are greater amongst older adults compared to younger adults.
H4: Emotionally framed news coverage has a greater effect on the memory of people than neutral news coverage.
Method
Experimental design
In order to test how emotional issue-framing in media coverage affects support for Dutch policies towards the Russian Federation, we implemented an online experiment with a between subjects 3x2 design. The experiment was carried out from May 20 through May 31, 2015.
The experiment is a quantitative procedure were with the use of a survey, among a sufficient number of participants, statements can be made about the population, with the goal to verify the validity of the hypotheses. An experiment is an appropriate design for this study because it makes it possible to confirm a causal relationship between attitudes and media framing. The between subjects design was selected because we are interested in the influence of two different kinds of issue-frames, fear and hope, and we set out to compare the outcomes with the control condition, a neutral frame. We will focus on Dutch policies because policies of the Europe Union will feel ‘remote’ for most people, with the risk that frames do not cause much impact since participants will not feel personally committed. This will be different when the content is about the Dutch governmental policies in which Dutch citizens are directly involved. The design enables us to measure the effect of different emotional
issue-10 frames on the support for Dutch policies concerning the sanctions against the Russian
Federation. Participants
The target audience for the government are adolescents from 18 years old who have the right to vote in the Netherlands. The participants had to fit into this target audience, and were recruited through email and Facebook requests. Forty participants for each experimental group, a total of 120 participants (N=120), took part in the experiment. The age of the sample ranged from 18 to 67 (M = 32.9, SD = 13.7; N= 69 male; N= 51 female).
Experimental design and procedure
Stimulus Post-Test
Group 1: Control condition Natural news article with no stimuli Support governmental policies
Group 2: Fear condition News article with threatening stimuli Support governmental policies
Group 3: Hope condition News article with hopeful stimuli Support governmental policies
Each participant was first asked to answer questions concerning their political preferences, and some questions about gender, age and educational level. Subsequently they were randomly assigned to one of three conditions. Respondents were then asked to read a newspaper article which, depending on the condition, contained a negative emotional issue-frame, a positive emotional issue-frame or a neutral frame. After reading the article, they were asked to give their opinion on Dutch policies towards the Russian Federation. The survey is shown in the Appendix.
We selected a post-test only design, because asking for respondent’s opinion on the Dutch Ukrainian policy might have revealed the aim of the study and influenced the results.
11 Stimulus material
The news articles were constructed to measure the effects of emotional issue-framing. The articles varied in the way the issue was framed, while keeping the other content identical. Lexis Nexis was used to collect articles concerning the sanctions against the Russian Federation, which were positive about the sanctions. We used the articles to make three natural identical fictitious articles and added several threatening sentences to one article to frame it emotionally with fear (fear condition), and to another article we added several hopeful sentences to frame it emotionally with hope (hope condition). The third article remained natural, which we used as control condition. The stimulus material is shown in the Appendix.
Measures
Support (Dependent variable). After reading the article, participants rated their thoughts about
the sanctions against the Russian Federation, using 7-point Likert scales that ranged from 1 (“not at all”) to 7 (“extremely”). They were asked to rate whether they were pro or con the sanctions and whether they thought the sanctions would be useful or not. Exploratory analysis of these rating revealed that the three variables could not be aggregated (pro – con, useful – useless; Cronbach’s alpha = 0.62, average inter-item r = 0.32). The merged variables together were labeled “support”.
Emotional reactions (Dependent variable). After reading the article, participants rated the
positive and negative emotional reactions they had to the exposed article, using 7-point Likert scales that ranged from 1 (“not at all”) to 7 (“extremely”) (Blanton, Strauts and Perez, 2012; Scherer, 2005). Exploratory factor analysis of these emotional ratings to evaluate whether they could be aggregated revealed a two-factor solution, with one factor tapping negative emotions triggered by the article (sadness, fear, frustration, anger; Cronbach’s alpha = 0.66, average inter-item r = 0.44) and another tapping positive emotions (joy, hope, pride,
enthusiasm; Cronbach’s alpha = 0.59, average inter-item r = 0.64). These two indices were significantly and inversely related (r = -0.51, p< 0.01). These distinct emotions were then grouped into “positive emotions” and “negative emotions”.
Memory. Participants were also asked to rephrase the title and a detail of the article using
open questions. The two variables were transformed into dummies and aggregated into a new variable “memory”.
12
Results
Manipulation check
In order to assess whether the framing manipulations successfully influenced the opinions about the policies against the Russian Federation, a manipulation check was conducted.
Emotions. Participants were asked to rank several emotions (sadness, fear, joy, frustration,
hope, pride, anger and enthusiasm) after reading the article about the sanctions against the Russian Federation. Analysis of the results with an Independent Samples T-test demonstrated that controlling for (40) participants in the negative frame condition (M=5.0, SD=0.4) ranked the negative emotions significantly more intense, t(40)= -8.69, p≤.01, than the (40)
participants in the neutral frame condition (M=1.4, SD=0.3). Likewise, the (40) participants in the positive frame condition (M=2.1, SD=0.4) ranked the positive emotions significantly more intense compared to the neutral frame condition (M=1.4, SD=0.3), t(40)= -8,41, p≤.01.
Because the manipulated articles anticipated to a fear frame and a hope frame, we also conducted an Independent Samples T-test for these single emotions. Participants in the fear condition (M=5.2, SD=0.8) ranked the emotion fear significantly more intense, t(40)= -4.70,
p≤.01, than the participants in the control condition (M=4.4, SD=0.7). Likewise, participants
in the hope condition (M=3.5, SD=1.5) ranked the emotion hope significantly more intense,
t(40)= -7.13, p≤.01, than participants in the control condition (M=1.7, SD=0.6). From these
findings we may conclude that emotional framing manipulations successfully influenced the opinions about the policies against the Russian Federation.
Memory. In order to assess whether there was a connection between framing
manipulations and how much the participants memorized from the article, a manipulation check was conducted. Participants were asked to answer two questions about details from the article about the sanctions against the Russian Federation after they had read it (amount of damage costs). Analysis of the results with an Independent Samples T-test demonstrated that controlling for (40) participants in the negative frame condition (M=0.7, SD=0.3) memorized the details from the article better, t(40)= -1.97, p≤.05, than the (40) participants in the neutral frame condition (M=0.5, SD=0.4). Likewise, the (40) participants in the positive frame condition (M=0.5 SD=0.4) memorized the details of the article (slightly) better compared to the participants in the neutral frame condition (M=0.5, SD=0.4), t(40)= 0.29, p>.05. From
13 these findings we may conclude that in the study there was a connection between framing manipulations and how well participants memorized the article.
Randomization
The participants were randomly distributed over the conditions, with 40 participants in each of the three conditions (N=120). The experimental groups did not differ significantly between the three conditions with respect to variables like gender F(2,117)=1.37, p=0.26, age
F(2,117)=0.262, p=0.77, education F(2,117)=0.26, p=0.77, and political preference F(2,117)=1.62, p=0.20 suggesting that the random assignment was successful.
Analyses
SupportTo examine whether the framing manipulations influenced the amount of support participants gave to the sanctions against the
Russian Federation, we merged two variables (pro – con, useful – useless) into one test variable:
Support. Table 1 provides an
overview of the average outcomes per condition.
To test hypothesis 1, which expected that the use of emotional
issue-frames in news coverage about the sanctions against the Russian Federation would engage more support for the governmental policies among Dutch citizens than the neutral news coverage, an Independent Samples T-test was conducted. We found that participants in the fear condition (M=2.5, SD=0.6) supported the policies against Russia significantly more than participants in the control condition (M=2.0, SD=0.6), t(80)= -3.64, p<0.001. Similarly, participants in the hope condition (M=2.4, SD=0.7) supported the policies against Russia significantly more than participants in the control condition, t(80)= -2.93, p<0.01. This confirms hypothesis 1. Participants in the fear condition support the policies against the Russian Federation more than participants in the hope condition, but not significantly, t(80)= 0.51, p>0.05. This means that in our sample the participants in the fear condition reported greater support for the sanctions against the Russian Federation than the participants in hope
14 condition, but in other populations this could be different. Hypothesis 2, stating that the
overall effects of fear as a negative issue-frame, are greater than the overall effects of hope as positive issue-frame, is therefore rejected. Fear-based issue-frames in news coverage about the sanctions against the Russian Federation engage more support for the governmental policies among Dutch citizens than neutral news coverage. About the effects of hope-based issue-frames we are unable make a statement.
When we analyze the variables that independently contain the amount of support from participants; pro-con and useful-useless, so there is a more detailed understanding of why participants support the sanctions or not. Figure 1 shows that participants are
overall more pro the sanctions than that they actually think the sanctions will be useful. Figure 1 also provides a clear overview of the differences in the amount of support between the emotional conditions and the control condition.
Pro - con
In an independent Samples T-test between
participants in the control condition and participants in the fear condition in if they are pro or con the sanctions against The Russian Federation we found a significant difference in the outcomes: t(80)= -2.16, p< 0.05. The same equation was done between participants in the hope condition and the control condition. In this comparison there was no
significant difference, t(80)= -1.43, p> 0.05. When we compared the pro and con ratings of the
participants from the fear condition and the hope condition we also found that there was no significant difference, t(80)= 0.76, p> 0.05. So participants in the fear condition were significantly more pro the governmental policies than participants in the control condition.
Pro – con p Fear condition > Control condition Significant: p<0.05 Hope condition > Control condition Not significant: p>0.05 Fear condition > Hope condition Not significant: p>0.05 Table 2 2,15 2,68 2,5 1,85 2,33 2,35 0 1 2 3
Control Fear Hope
0 = n o 5 = Y es Condition
Figure 3
15 Participants in the hope condition also were more pro than participants in the control
condition, but not significantly. Useful – useless
In an Independent Samples T-test between
participants in the control condition and participants in the fear condition stating if they felt the sanctions against The Russian Federation are useful or not, we found a significant difference in the outcomes:
t(80)= -2.56, p< 0.05. The same equation was done
between participants in the hope condition and the control condition. In this comparison there also was a significant difference, t(80)= -2,79, p< 0.01. When we compare the pro and con ratings of the
participants from the fear condition and the hope condition we found that there was no significant difference, t(80)= -0.14, p> 0.05. So participants in the fear condition estimated the governmental policies significantly more useful than participants in the control condition. Likewise, participants in the hope condition estimated the governmental policies significantly more useful than participants in the control condition.
Age and support per condition
To test hypotheses 3a and 3b, whether age moderates the impact of emotional frames, we conducted a One-Way ANOVA with the merged variable support supplied as dependent variable and experimental condition and age as independent variables. No significant effect was found, F(73, 46)= 1.51, p>0.05, η2= 0,48. After controlling with a Post-Hoc Multiple-Comparison test, we found significant differences between participants in the control condition and participants in the fear condition (Mdifference= 0.5, p<0.001) and, between
participants in the hope condition and participants in the control condition (Mdifference= 0.42,
p<0.05). From these finding we may conclude that age moderates the impact of emotionally
based issue-frames. To test whether the effects of fear-frames on the support for
governmental policies are greater amongst younger adults compared to older adults and the effects of hope-frames on the support for governmental policies are greater amongst older adults compared to younger adults we conducted a regression analysis. A regression analysis allows us see whether there is negative or positive causality. The effects of the hope-frame do
Useful - Useless p Fear condition > Control condition Significant: p<0.05 Hope condition > Control condition Significant: p<0.01 Fear condition > Hope condition Not significant: p>0.05 Table 3
16 not require further examinations of possible causalities because no significant causality was found.
The regression model with the merged variable support as dependent variable and age as independent variable in the fear condition was significant, F(1, 38)=3.12, p<0.05. The regression model was therefore useful to analyse the amount of support that people will have after being manipulated with a fear-based issue-frame. Around 76 percent of the differences in support can be predicted on the basis of age (R2=0.76). Age, b*=0.26, t=1.77, p<0.05, 95% CI [-0.001, 0.019] has a significant, moderate correlation with the amount of support in the
fear condition. Per increasing age year, the approximate amount of support will decrease with
0.009 (support scale runs from 0 to 2). This confirms hypothesis 3A. Within this effect, it is assumed that other independent variables were constant.
The regression model with the merged variable support as dependent variable and age as dependent variable in the hope condition was not significant, F(1,28)=0.16, p>0.05. The likelyhood that the independent variable age influences the dependent variable support is smaller than 95%, therefore hypothesis 3B was rejected.
It is conceivable that education and political preferences may affect how much the participants support the sanctions (Hillyguys, 2005). To examine this, these variables were added as covariates. A MANOVA was conducted with the merged variable support in the three different conditions as dependent variables and education and political preference as independent variables. First we conducted Independent Samples T-tests to compare the divisions of education and political preference in the three condition groups. The education level of participants in the control condition (M=5.1, SD=0.85), participants in the fear condition (M=5.1, SD=0.90) and participants in the hope condition had a (M=4.95, SD=0.91) substantially equal division. Likewise, the political preference of participants in the control condition (M=5.25, SD=1.48), participants in the fear condition (M=5.38, SD=1.55) and participants in the hope condition (M=5.23, SD=1.27) also had a substantially equal division. By conducting a MANOVA test, we can conclude that support for the governmental policies was not dependent from the two variables education and political preference in any of the three conditions (Wilks Lambda = 0.99, F(4, 232)=0.21, p>0.5).
17 Memory
To analyze whether participants were actively attentive and remembered the articles well we tested if they could rephrase the title of the article and recall a detail that was named in the article. An Independent Samples T-test was conducted between the three different
experimental groups to see whether they memorized the articles significantly different. Analyses showed that participants in the control condition (M=0.54, SD=0.4), remembered significantly less from the article than the participants in the fear condition (M=0.69, SD= 0.3), t(40)= -1.97, p <0,05. Participants in the hope condition (M=0.51, SD=0.4) remembered less from the article than participants in the control condition (M=0.54, SD=0.4), t(40)= -0.15,
p > 0,05. This result was not significant. Hypothesis 4, emotionally framed news coverage has
a greater effect on the memory of people than neutral news coverage, was therefore partly rejected. Participants in the fear-frame condition remembered significantly more than participants in the control condition, but participants in the hope frame did not remember differently from the control condition.
Figure 2 provides an overview of how much the participants, at what age, in each condition remembered of the article they were exposed to. The participants were grouped into three age categories in each condition (1: 18-30, 2: 31-50 and 3: 51-70). The graph confirms hypothesis 4. Participants in the control condition had an overall score of 53,8% on what they
remembered from the exposed article. Participants in the fear condition had an overall score of 68,8% in what they remembered from the exposed article. Participants in the hope
condition had an overall score of 51,3% in what they remembered from the exposed article.
0,00% 20,00% 40,00% 60,00% 80,00% 100,00% 120,00% 18-30 31-50 51-70 M em o ry Age
Figure 4
18
Conclusion and Discussion
The effects of emotional framing in the media on the opinions of citizens have been widely studied (Aarøe, 2011; Nabi, 2003; Nelson and Oxley, 1999). Emotional framing is an important subject and its power on the public opinion is frequently underestimated. Previous studies predominantly focused on issue-framing as a partisan effect during election times (Slothuus and de Vreese, 2015). Our current study adds to prior literature by considering how emotional issue-framing could be used in the media as a tool to gain support for governmental policies during the legislation, i.e. not just prior to elections. Another addition to prior
research is that the governmental policies under study concern a military conflict. Because the nature of the subject itself is emotionally charged, the effects of the manipulation will give a more natural and clear result. Also, according to Nelson (2013), framing effects are
influenced by the importance individuals attach to the issue. Most of the Dutch population feels emotionally concerned towards the conflict with the Russian Federation, which strengthens the framing effects. We proposed that participants who were exposed to an emotionally framed news article, would be more affected by the message in the article than participants who were exposed to a neutral article with no emotional frames. We found significant effects which supported this prediction. Hypothesis 1, stating that the use of emotional issue-frames in news coverage about the sanctions against the Russian Federation will engage more support for the governmental policies among Dutch citizens than the neutral news coverage, was therefore confirmed.
Results also showed that participants in the fear condition supported the governmental policies significantly more than participants in the control condition. Participants in the hope condition also supported the governmental policies significantly more than the participants in the control condition, but participants in the fear condition did not support the governmental policies significantly more than participants in the hope condition. Hypothesis 2, stating that the overall effects of fear as a negative issue-frame, are greater than the overall effects of hope as positive issue-frame, was therefore rejected.
When age was introduced as a possible interactor of the influence of the exposed condition and the support for governmental policies, we found that age significantly
moderated the impact of the negative emotional frame, fear. Hypothesis 3A, stating that the effects of fear, used as a negative issue-frame, on the support for governmental policies are greater amongst younger adults compared to older adults, was therefore confirmed. We did
19 not find a significant effect from age as a moderator on the impact of the positive emotional frame, hope. Hypothesis 3B, stating that the effects of hope, used as a positive issue-frame, on the support for governmental policies are greater amongst older adults compared to younger adults, was therefore rejected.
By testing their memory we found that participants in the fear condition significantly remembered more from the exposed article than participants in the control condition.
Hypothesis 4, emotionally framed news coverage has a greater effect on the memory of people than neutral news coverage, was therefore partly rejected.
The research question of this study was as follows: How does emotional issue-framing in Dutch media coverage of the sanctions against the Russian Federation affect public support for these policies? We found that emotional issue-framing in media coverage affects the opinion of the public more than neutral news framing. Framing the issue emotionally with
fear will cause that people remember the coverage better and give more support for the
sanctions against the Russian Federation. We may conclude from these findings that by implementing fear as emotional issue-frame in Dutch media coverage, support for
governmental policies about the sanctions against the Russian Federation may be affected. Limitations
Although the results of this study are strongly suggestive, it does carry some limitations which need to be addressed. The mean education level of the people that participated in this study is considerably higher than the mean educational level of citizens in the Netherlands. The mean level of education of the people who participated in the experiment was a degree in higher professional education whereas the mean level of education of the population in the Netherlands is at secondary vocational education (Bierings, 2013). Despite the random assignment, the sample does not adequately reflect the whole society.
Another limitation is in the stimulus material. The articles were artificially prepared and so were the titles of the articles. The survey tested the memory of the participants by asking if they remembered the title of the article and the amount of damage costs that was noted in the article. The second one was the same in all three articles, so this could not have affected the results. The titles of all three articles were different because they were also conditioned with the emotional frames. The control article had to have a neutral title which was “Sanctions Russia” (Sancties Rusland). The emotionally framed articles had longer titles,
20 “Sanctions Russia necessary” (Sancties Rusland noodzakelijk) and “Sanctions Russia the solution” (Sancties Rusland de oplossing), which could have caused that the title of the article in the control condition was easier to memorize. As noted in hypothesis 4, we expected that emotionally framed news coverage had a greater effect on the memory of people than neutral news coverage. The results showed that participants in the control condition remembered more from the article than participants in the hope condition. Therefore, hypothesis 4 was rejected. This result could be influenced by the length of the titles of the articles.
In the manipulation test we found relatively small mean differences between the rated emotions. This suggests that the emotional frames may not have been not powerful enough, which could have influenced the results. Participants in the fear condition (M=5.2, SD=0.8) ranked the emotion fear significantly more intense, t(40)= -4.70, p≤.01, than the participants in the control condition (M=4.4, SD=0.7). Likewise, participants in the hope condition (M=3.5, SD=1.5) ranked the emotion hope significantly more intense, t(40)= -7.13, p≤.01, than participants in the control condition (M=1.7, SD=0.6). Despite the fact that the
differences were significantly, they were relatively small since they have ranked the emotions using a 7-point Likert scale.
Finally, the experiment tests emotional issue-framing effects of news coverage about a military conflict. Because of the emotional nature of the subject, the participants will feel emotionally concerned with the topic, which strengthens the framing effects. The downside of this is that the results will probably be different when the coverage is about other policy domains. The emotional issue-framing progress on policies about with less personal
involvement, may therefore be less effective. Therefore, the results of this study particularly apply to policy domains with strong personal involvement. This limits the generalizability of the study.
Potential Implications and Future directions
The main results of this study are in line with the findings of other authors who did research on emotional framing. Gadarian and Albertson (2014), for example, found that citizens are motivated are motivated to learn and pay more attention to information when they have been made anxious. In this study we found a significant effect of fear framing on the memory of participants compared to the effects of the control condition. Whether this is because they wanted to learn more about the subject, we cannot conclude on the basis of this study. Colford (1986) found that voters say they do not like threatening ads, but in the meantime they retain
21 the information way better than from positive ads. In this study we also found that participants in the fear frame condition remembered the article way better than participants in the hope condition. Moreover, our results confirm that age moderates the impact of emotional frames. Nashiro, Sakaki, and Mather (2011) and Hamann, Ely, Hoffman and Klits (2002) found that the effects of negative emotions had greater effects amongst younger adults compared to older adults. In this study we found that the effects of fear, used as a negative emotional issue-frame, on the support for governmental policies are greater amongst younger adults compared to older adults. These findings are in line with the findings of earlier authors. We did not find proper results that are in line with the findings of Mather et al., (2004). Mather et al., (2004) found that the effects of positive emotions had greater effects amongst older adults compared to younger adults. In this study we found no significant evidence for these effects.
Given the results about the effects of negative emotional issue-framing it is attractive explore this subject in greater depth. In this study we chose to examine the effects of fear in emotional issue-framing, based on Cobb (2005), Tversky and Kahneman (1981), Slovic (1993) and Gadarian and Albertson (2014), Fear influences activities in the amygdalae and stimulates vigilance, increase reliance on contemporary evaluations and facilitates persuasion. Frustration, sadness and anger are three other negative emotions which in a different way may affect people when they are used in issue-frames (Scherer, 2005). Anger and sadness, for example, are two emotions with different persuasive impacts (Kühne and Schemer, 2015). In a study by Kim and Cameron (2011) participants were exposed to an anger frame or a
sadness frame. The anger frame appeared to have significantly more influence on the
participants than the sadness frame. On the other hand, anger frames showed an increasing effect of inattention and negative attitudes. Frustration is an emotion which has been so far little explored but could also be interesting to include as an emotional issue-frame. According to Amsel (1992), frustration has a positive influence on memory, which could be favorable when influencing opinions.
In this study only 120 participants contributed to the experiment and the sample did not adequately reflect the whole society. What could be interesting is to examine whether different groups of people in society react in a different way to emotions. In the theoretical background about the basic workings of the brain we assume that these are the same for every person but this may only be the case when other influences are being left out. The basic working of the brain could in general be the same for every human, but cultural and social differences may affect the progress of emotion regulation. Gross and D’Ambrosio (2004) for
22 example, found that confessional people and atheistic people react in a different way to
emotional cues. To influence a particular group in society with emotional issue-frames, it is important to know how they will react to particular emotions.
Another important opportunity for future research is to do a mediation analysis to see whether the impact of age on support is mediated by memory differences. Results showed that the effects of fear on the support for governmental policies were greater amongst younger adults compared to other older adults and participants in the fear condition remembered more from the exposed article than participants exposed to the neutral article. A mediation analysis could show if the differences in support between older and younger participants were (partly) caused by their memory. This knowledge could be important for future research because this would mean that in order to induce support for particular policies, strategies may be designed to make the public remember the message that is conveyed.
Emotional issue-framing is one of the many possibilities of mass communication. When influencing large groups of citizens this could be a powerful tool which could not only be used during election periods but also during periods of stable governmental legislation. This represents a field of research that is yet at the beginning of its development.
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Appendix
Introductie tekst
Dank u wel dat u de tijd neemt om deel te nemen aan dit onderzoek!
Dit onderzoek bestudeert de mening van mensen in Nederland over genomen sancties tegen Rusland. Eerst wordt u gevraagd om een artikel te lezen dat gaat over dit onderwerp en vervolgens zal u een aantal vragen worden gesteld. Ook zullen er een aantal algeme ne vragen gesteld worden om uw algemene kennis over dit onderwerp te testen. Het onderzoek zal ongeveer 15 minuten in beslag nemen. Ik wil u vragen om de vragenlijst aandachtig en in een keer in te vullen, aangezien het niet mogelijk is om de survey later opnieuw te hernemen.
Dit onderzoek valt onder de verantwoordelijkheid van de Graduate School of Communication, Universiteit van Amsterdam. Daarom is het volgende gegarandeerd:
1. Uw anonimiteit is gewaarborgd en uw antwoorden of gegevens worden onder geen en kele voorwaarde aan derde partijen verstrekt, tenzij uw toestemming hier nadrukkelijk voor gevraagd is.
28 2. U behoudt het recht om uw deelname aan dit onderzoek te stoppen wanneer u maar wilt,
zonder opgaaf van reden. Ook kunt u na afloop van het onderzoek (bi nnen 24 uur van deelname) uw toestemming intrekken voor het gebruik van uw antwoorden of gegeven in het onderzoek.
3. Deelname aan het onderzoek brengt geen noemenswaardige risico’s of ongemakken met zich mee, geen moedwillige misleiding en u zult niet worden geconfronteerd met expliciet aanstootgevend materiaal.
4. U kunt uiterlijk vijf maanden na afloop van het onderzoek de beschikking krijgen over een onderzoeksrapportage met daarin de algemene resultaten van het onderzoek.
Als u meer informatie wenst te ontvangen over dit onderzoek, nu of in de toekomst kunt u contact opnemen met Rozemarijn Peters: rozemarijnpeters@outlook.com. Als u klachten heeft over dit onderzoek, kunt u contact opnemen met de aangewezen persoon bij de Ethische Commissie die ASCoR vertegenwoordigt op het volgende adres: ASCoR secretariaat, Ethische Commissie, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Postbus 15793, 1001 NG Amsterdam; 020-525 3680;
ascor-secr-fmg@uva.nl.
Ik hoop u hiermee voldoende geïnformeerd te e en dank u bij voorbaat voor uw deelname aan dit onderzoek.
Met vriendelijke groet,
Rozemarijn Peters
Toestemming
Lees alstublieft de onderstaande tekst door en klink vervolgens op ‘akkoord’ om door te gaan met het onderzoek:
-Ik verklaar hierbij dat ik op een duidelijke manier geïnformeerd ben over de aard en methode van het onderzoek.
-Ik stem geheel vrijwillig in om mee te doen aan dit onderzoek. Door dit te doen, behoud ik het recht om mijn toestemming in te trekken, zonder dat ik hiervoor een reden hoef te geven. Ik ben me bewust dat ik mijn deelname aan dit onderzoek mag stoppen wanneer ik wil.
- Ik ben me ervan bewust dat als mijn onderzoeksresultaten gebruikt worden in
wetenschappelijke publicaties of op een andere manier publiek worden gemaakt, dit zal worden gedaan op een manier die mijn anonimiteit verzekert. Mijn persoonlijke data zullen niet worden doorgegeven aan derde partijen zonder mijn nadrukkelijke toestemming.
29 Door op ‘Volgende’ te klikken, verklaar ik mezelf akkoord met deelname aan het onderzoek, en begin ik aan de vragenlijst.
Demografische gegevens - Wat is uw geslacht?
O Man O Vrouw
- Wat is uw leeftijd?
- Heeft u een Nederlandse nationaliteit.. O Ja
O Nee
- Wat is uw hoogst behaalde diploma?
O Lager Beroepsonderwijs, VMBO basisberoepsgerichte of kaderberoepsgerichte leerweg O Mavo, VMBO theoretische of gemengde leerweg, ULO, MULO O Havo, VWO, Gymnasium, HBS, MMS O Middelbaar beroepsonderwijs (MBO, BOL, BBL) O Bachelor, Kandidaats, Hoger Beroepsonderwijs O Master, Doctoraal, (semi-)Wetenschappelijk Onderwijs, Universiteit
In de politiek wordt soms gesproken over links en rechts. Wanneer u denkt aan uw eigen
politieke opvattingen, waar zou u uzelf dan plaatsen op een schaal van 0 tot en met 10, waarbij 0
staat voor links en 10 voor rechts? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Links – Rechts #
30 In het volgende scherm zal u een artikel getoond worden dat gaat over de genomen sancties tegen Rusland. Lees het artikel aandachtig door en zorg dat u niet gestoord wordt tijdens het lezen. Er zullen na het lezen van het artikel een aantal vragen gesteld worden over het onderwerp.
Artikel (zie onder) Vragen over artikel
Op een schaal van 1 (=helemaal niet) tot 7 (=heel erg), hoe sterk voelt u de volgende emoties bij het lezen van het artikel?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Verdriet Angst Genot Frustratie Hoop Trots Boosheid Enthousiasme
Ik wil u vragen om het artikel een cijfer te geven op deze ‘gevoel thermometer’ die van 0 tot 100 graden loopt. Een cijfer tussen de 50 en 100 graden betekent dat u positieve en warme gevoelens krijgt bij het artikel. Een cijfer tussen 0 en 50 graden betekent dat u negatieve gevoelens heeft
31 gekregen bij het artikel en een afkeer tegen de inhoud. Als u niet bepaald positieve of negatieve gevoelens heeft gekregen bij dit artikel, geef dan het cijfer 50.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0 - 100
Op een schaal van 1 tot 7, hoe denkt u over de beleidsmaatregelen tegen Rusland zoals besproken in het artikel? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Voor – Tegen 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Zinvol – Zinloos Merk ik niks van in mijn dagelijks leven - Hebben invloed op mijn dagelijks leven
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Weet u de kop van het artikel nog?
O Nee
O Ja, namelijk:
Weet u nog hoeveel schade de Nederlandse economie jaarlijks leidt door de genomen sancties volgens ING?
O 937 miljoen euro O 378 miljoen euro
32 O 737 miljoen euro
O 997 miljoen euro
--- --- Algemeen
De minister van buitenlandse zaken is.. O Frans Timmermans
O Bert Koenders
O Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert O Maxime Verhagen
O Sjoerd Sjoerdsma
De president van Rusland is… O Vladimir Poetin
O Ivan Ribkin O Dmitri Medvedev O Jozef Stalin
De voorzitter van de Europese Raad is.. O Herman van Rompuy
O Donald Tusk
O Jean-Claude Juncker O Martin Schulz O Charles Michel
