1
University of Amsterdam
Faculty of Humanities, Department of History MA: History of International Relations
A shifting political tide
Thailand-Myanmar relations and
the Karen Conflict 1988-1997
Supervisor
R. van Dijk
Second reader R. van der Veen
MA Thesis by: R. Deckers
5879477
email: Ralph_Deckers@hotmail.com
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3
Preface
In February 2012 I bought a jacket at a local market store in the city of Hpa-An, Karen state, Myanmar. I did not realize what the flag on the jacket meant for millions of ethnic Karen. I asked the owner of my guesthouse. I had been reading up on Myanmar’s history, but what the owner said startled me. He told me about the war of the Karen National Union and the Burmese government. Since the Second World War fighting had never stopped in this region.
I was not planning to go to Myanmar, but I am happy that I did back then. In September 2012 I started a Master’s degree History of International Relations. For one class I had to visit the website of the International Institute of Social History (IISH). To my surprise I came across several Myanmar related archives like the Burma Communist Party archive or the Burma Personal Papers collection. Finding the archives in the IISH really felt like an opportunity to do research on Myanmar. My time as an intern early 2014 at the Dutch Refugee Foundation or Stichting Vluchteling drew my attention to the refugee question in Thailand of which the causes lay inside Myanmar. In the second half of 2014 I decided to go on an exchange semester with the specific goal to follow courses on Myanmar history and related fields. It was at the National University of Singapore from August to December 2014 where the subject I would do research on took shape. After my study time in Singapore I had the chance to travel to both Thailand and Myanmar. Through the Dutch Refugee Foundation I was offered the opportunity to visit two refugee camps in Mae Hong Son province, in the north of Thailand close to the border with Myanmar in November 2014. Later that same week I visited Dr. Cynthia Maung’s clinic and the Back Packer Health Worker Team in Mae Sot, central-west Thailand. On the final day of that week I had a meeting with David Arnott, the creator of the largest online Myanmar archive, www.burmalibrary.org. Meeting Mr. Arnott and visiting the regufeecamps and different NGO’s was a learnful experience. Seeing how international aid was provided really felt like a final stage of my internship. But what caused all this? What lay at the root of these problems? And how can we solve it?
Three years later this master thesis is the result of something that started in that market store in Hpa-an, the capital of Karen state. My internship at the Dutch Refugee Foundation provided me with much background information on the Karen conflict in Myanmar. In
Singapore I met many Burmese and other professors who helped to shape my thoughts. My time in Singapore gave me a chance to visit refugee camps in Thailand and to meet with Eef Vermeij, the person who works for the IISH in Southeast Asia. He made sure I got permission to enter the archives of the Karen National Union. Upon return in the Netherlands I found the Burma Peace Foundation and the Karen National Union archives useful. Unfortunately time was against me and if ever given the chance I wish to extend this research and use all the sources found in the IISH at their fullest potential.
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Index
Preface 3 Terminology 5 Introduction 6 Map 101. Thai-Burma Relations in Historical Perspective
111.1 The Karen 12
1.2 World War II and the rise of the Cold War in Southeast Asia 15
2. The End of the Cold War: Thai-Myanmar relations 1988-1997
19
2.1. 1988 and its aftermath 20
2.2. Thailand in the 1980’s 22
2.3 Thai-Myanmar trade: Logging, Oil, Gas and refugees 24
3. 1988-1997 and the Karen National Union
28
3.1 Thailand as a safehaven
293.2 Rising Pressure
313.3 Cross-border trade
343.4 The Karen Borderland 36
Conclusion 37
Archives 40
5
Terminology
Burma/Myanmar: In 1989 the military junta of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) renamed the country ‘Myanmar Naing-ngan’. Several other place names were changed too, for example ‘Rangoon’ has become ‘Yangon’ and ‘Tavoy’ has become ‘Dawei’. I use the old terms when I refer to the period before 1989. I use the new names when I refer to the period during or after 1989.
SLORC/Tatmadaw: Both terms refer to the military junta of Myanmar. The SLORC (State Law and Order Restoration Council) forms the political branch of the same military institute. The SLORC are military men who turned to politics but who function as an instrument of the Tatmadaw. The Tatmadaw is a Burmese name for the top officials of the Burmese military. In my thesis I use the two terms interchangeably.
The Karen/KNU: The Karen are Myanmar’s largest ethnic minority and the Karen National Union is their largest political and military organization. There are at least 10 other Karen organizations. The Karen are called the Kayin by the government of Myanmar
ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Comparable to the European Union (EU)
BPF: Burma Peace Foundation. British Non-governmental Organization (NGO) which worked for the United Nations.
IISH: International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam, The Netherlands. Nation-states: I have used the definition of Max Weber: A nation-state is a continuous
legal administrative apparatus exercising control over a certain territory and holds the monopoly on the right of using violence.
6
Introduction
“From the late 1980s, Thai policy regarding its neighbors changed from one of surreptitiously undermining rivals and traditional enemies through supporting armed groups in the border areas to a strategy of directly engaging national governments.”1 During the Cold War the foreign
policy of Thailand was based on creating buffer zones to protect Thailand’s borders. The largest minority group of Myanmar, known as the Karen, have been waging a war against the
government of Myanmar since 1949 to gain independence or more autonomy. The Karen live mainly along the Thai-Myanmar border and thus the Karen have received support from the Thai government to act as a buffer.2 At the end of the 1980’s support from Thai authorities for the
Karen’s armed struggle vanished.3 What caused this change? Why did Thailand diverge from its
traditional foreign policy of using buffer zones? Why did Myanmar cooperate in the newly found bilateral relation? And secondly, how did this new relationship influence the development of the Karen Conflict?
The armed struggle of the Karen is known as the longest civil war in the world. The conflict broke out in 1949 and has been raging on since 1949.4 From 1962 the Burmese military
ruled the state of Burma and introduced ‘The Burmese Way to Socialism’. The next twenty-five years the economic situation of Myanmar5 worsened. The Karen, a group of 5 to 7 million
people, profited from this situation by levying taxes. The Karen started controlling border posts between Thailand and Myanmar to levy taxes on products entering the black market trade of Myanmar from Thailand. In the 1980s the first Karen refugee camps sprang up on Thai soil. These refugee camps are known to have been used by Karen rebels to prepare for clashes with the Myanmar government.6 While Myanmar followed an economic policy based on Marxism,
Thailand became an American base in the 1960s and gradually developed an economy based on capitalist principles. In the 1980s the Thai economy grew exponentially every year opposed to a worsening economic situation in Myanmar.7 Throughout the twentieth century contact between
Thailand and Myanmar was minimal. By the 1980s Burma was one of the poorest states in the world. The capitalist urge of Thailand’s elite to make use of the extraordinary rich resources of Myanmar combined with the Myanmarese government financial bankruptcy moved the elites of both states to establish relations in 1988, which pushed the Karen in a difficult position.
The struggle for power between the USA and the Soviet Union influenced the Southeast Asian region deeply. Thailand became an American military base to fight communists in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Thailand thus came in the American sphere of influence and capitalism became the accepted system of the economy. Burma followed a neutralist policy internationally, however foreign relations were established with communist China. For this
1 South, A., “Burma’s Longest War. Anatomy of the Karen Conflict.” Transnationale Institute/Burma Center
Netherlands, (Amsterdam, 2011) pp. 1-53, p. 20.
2 South, A., “Burma Longest War. Anatomy of the Karen Conflict.” Transnational Institute/Burma Center Netherlands,
(Amsterdam, 2011), pp.1-53, p. 20.
3 South, “Burma’s longest war.”, p. 20 and 34 and A. Rajah, “Contemporary Developments in Kawthoolei: The Karen
and Conflict Resolution in Burma.” Thai-Yunnan Project Newsletter 19, 1992, (
http://www.nectec.or.th/thai-yunnan/19.html#3) and J. Brouwer & J. van Wijk “Helping Hands: external support for the KNU insurgency in Burma.” In: Small Wars & Insurgencies, Vol. 24, No. 5, pp. 835-856, p. 840.
4 Nijhuis, M., Birma. Land van geheimen. (Amsterdam, 2009), p. 21.
5 The Burmese government renamed the country ‘Myanmar’ in 1988. When I use the term ‘Burma’ I thereby refer to
the country before 1988. When I use the term ‘Myanmar’ I refer to the country after 1988. When using ‘Burmese’ I refer to the largest ethnic group of Myanmar, the Burmans.
6 Brouwer, J. & J. van Wijk “Helping Hands: external support for the KNU insurgency in Burma.” In: Small Wars &
Insurgencies, Vol. 24, No. 5, pp. 835-856, p. 836.
7 Battersby, P., “Border Politics and the Broader Politics of Thailand’s international Relations in the 1990s: From
7
research I will use this struggle for power between these two ideologies as a basic frame to explain why the foreign policies of Thailand and Myanmar suddenly changed in 1988. The state is an instrument of analysis I will be using to conduct this research. An important concept I will use is proposed by Baud & van Schendel.8 Their theory refers to how nations without states
living in borderlands can profit from their position which is generally perceived as fragile. Borderland nations or tribes can use this perception to their benefit because they can communicate between elites on both sides of the border. The Karen are an example of a borderland people which has profited from their position in a border region. Baud & van Schendel define a border as a political construct. Baud & van Schendel use Anderson’s concept of a nation to explain certain historical developments.9
In 1988 Thailand and Myanmar established political and economic ties. This relations was further developed throughout the 1990s. The membership of Myanmar to Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1997 brought an end to Myanmar’s isolationism. In 1988 Myanmar had to cope with high inflation and a large foreign debt. Large protests broke out in the country against the regime in August 1988. In December 1988 Thai General Chaovalit Yongchaiyudh visited Rangoon to meet the Burmese generals.10 This was the start in new
diplomatic relations between Thailand and Myanmar. This relationship would lead to lucrative trading deals between the two Southeast Asian nation states. Within a year the military regime of Myanmar possessed a 100 million dollars.11 The breaking of the status-quo between Thailand
and Myanmar had a lasting effect on the armed struggle of the Karen. Without the permission of Thai authorities to use their soil to rest, reorganize and buy arms the Karen were forced into a burdensome position. The trading deals with Thailand gave the military junta of Myanmar also known as the Tatmadaw the financial means to buy Chinese weaponry and start an all year round offence against the Karen.12 A final step for Myanmar to step out of decades of
isolationism was to become a member of the ASEAN which opened political and economic relations with all member states. Furthermore the downfall in November 1997 of then Prime Minister of Thailand, former general Chaovalit, introduced a new phase in Thai-Myanmar relations.13 I will therefore focus on the period between 1988 and 1997.
For this research I have used two archives, both can be found in the International Institute of Social History in Amsterdam. The first is the Burma Peace Foundation (BPF) archive and the second is the Karen National Union (KNU) archive. To my knowledge the latter has barely been used for research. The Burma Peace Foundation was an NGO which tried to gather as much information as possible as to what was happening inside Myanmar from 1987 to 2010. Especially fighting for the rights of ethnic minorities in Myanmar at international institutes like the United Nations, the Burma Peace Foundation archive contains a lot of information about the development of the Karen conflict and Thai-Myanmar relations. This information is found in newspaper articles, NGO reports, academic reports, magazines and journals like Burma Issues. This three monthly issued magazine wrote about many different subjects related to Myanmar. Economics, politics and refuge policies were the central themes. The Karen National Union or KNU is the main political and military organization of the Karen, who have been fighting for
8 Baud, M. & Schendel, W. van, “Toward a Comparative History of Borderlands.” In: Journal of World History, Vol. 8, no.
2, 1997, pp. 211 -241.
9 Anderson, B., Imagined Communities. The Origins of Nationalism. (London, 1991), p. 14.
10 Chachavalpongpun, P., A Plastic Nation: The Curse of Thai-ness in Thai-Burmese Relations. (Lanham, 2005), p. 67. 11 Myint-U, Thant, The River of Lost Footstops. Histories of Burma. (New York, 2006), p. 328.
12 South, “Burma’s longest war.”, p. 20.
8
independence from 1949 to 1974 and later fought for more autonomy within Burma.14 This
archive contains similar material as the BPF archive, but it contains more information on the KNU’s armed struggle and its financial income through the illegal border trade. Especially important is the KNU bulletin, issued every four months from the 1970s onwards. The KNU bulletin reports about the military and political activities of the KNU. The archive contains information on a wide variety of subjects by many different people and institutions. Locating specific information is easy because the bulletin is ordered by theme. The KNU archive is very interesting for research on the organization itself. The KNU archive contains information on the history of the KNU, the people running the organization, its armed struggle and how and by whom certain policies developed overtime. The one sided perspective forms a disadvantage of the KNU archive. Furthermore most of the material is written in Burmese or Karen script and thus it is only accessible for those who have mastered these languages. Both archives contain detailed information waiting to be discovered. The existing literature tends to focus on either the history of Thailand (Chachavalpongpun) or the history of Myanmar (Callahan, Mint-U). Some studies do look at the relationship between Thailand and Myanmar (Kramer), but do not study the borderland as a single unit and do not focus on the Karen. Other studies specifically look at the refugee history and politics of the border region (Lang). My research specifically looks at the relationship between Thailand and Myanmar and how this influenced the struggle of the Karen National Union. The archives consulted provided me with detailed information not found in the existing literature.
The Karen region is divided by the border running between Myanmar and Thailand. In this research the Karen region is studied as a single unit of analysis. Most studies use the state as a framework for analysis. The social scientists Baud & van Schendel argue to use a cross-border perspective, in which the region on both sides of the cross-border is the unit for analysis. Thus a borderland is made up from two parts across one border in a single borderland. It is important to treat the borderland as one unit, because changes in one part of the borderland lead to
immediate adaptations on the other side.15 According to Baud & van Schendel national borders
are political constructs, they are imagined projections of territorial power. In this respect the border is the ultimate symbol of a state’s sovereignty.16 It is important to look at both sides of
the Thai-Myanmar border, since the KNU and more generally the Karen people have used Thailand as a safe haven for decades. In this respect this research differs from the existing literature produced by historians and political scientists.
For Myanmar’s neighbors her geographical location is very important. Both China, India and the ASEAN are trying to gain influence in the country. Myanmar is one of the richest
countries in Asia with large oil, gas, teak reserves and gem mines. Myanmar’s membership of ASEAN puts the country into this Southeast Asian economic bloc. China wants to use Myanmar as her backdoor by building gas and oil pipelines from the port of Sittwe to Yunnan, thus avoiding the vulnerable bottleneck of the Malacca Strait through which 90% of China’s oil is transported.17 Myanmar’s historical legacy may influence the developments in this strategic
region in the twenty-first century. It is therefore important to understand Myanmar’s history. This study tries to clarify why the bilateral relationship between Thailand and Myanmar changed overnight and what the consequences were for the Karen conflict. Little research has
14 Chachavalpongpun, A Plastic Nation, p. 22.
15 Baud, M. & Schendel, W. van, “Toward a Comparative History of Borderlands.” In: Journal of World History, Vol. 8,
No. 2, 1997, pp. 211 -242, p. 231.
16 Baud & van Schendel, “Toward a Comparative History of Borderlands.”, p. 211 and 226.
17 Battersby, P., “Border Politics and the Broader Politics of Thailand’s international Relations in the 1990s: From
9
been done on this subject of Thai-Burmese relations and its effect on the Karen conflict. The influence of international and local developments between 1988 and 1997 analyzed here will shed light on contemporary decisions and developments in Thailand and in Myanmar. Some studies do analyze Thai-Myanmar ties in the same period, but they lack an analysis of the economic ties which developed over time. The economically motivated new relationship especially affected the border region and therefore the insurgency of the KNU.
10
Map of Myanmar
11
1. Thai-Burma Relations in Historical Perspective
The most prominent physical features of the present day territory of Thailand and Myanmar are the North-South river valleys. Originating in the Himalayas the rivers have shaped migrant waves for centuries. Different linguistics groups like the Karen, the Burmese and the T’ai came down from present day China along these rivers and have settled on both sides of the border.18
The proto nations states of modern Thailand and Myanmar waged war against each other from the sixteenth century onwards. Burmese kings Tabinshweti (1530-1550) and Bayinnaung (1550-1581) both attacked the kingdom of Siam, the former name of Thailand. Throughout the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the two kingdoms wanted to extend their power across the Dawna range and Tenasserim hills, today still these mountains form the border between Thailand and Myanmar. The most notable battle of this rivalry was the ransacking of Siam’s capital Ayudhaya in 1767 by the Burmese king Hsinbyushin (1766-1776). Ayudhaya’s splendor was greater than any city in Burma at the time.19 While in Myanmar
Hsinbyushin is revered as a legendary Burmese king, in Thailand the destruction of the beautiful royal city Ayudhaya is still remembered in dance, theatre and songs. After the destruction of Ayudhaya the Siamese had to endure other Burmese attacks in 1774, 1775, 1785. The last Burmese invading force entered Siam in 1810.20 From that time the Burmese kingdom was
threatened by another force, the British East India Company. In the early modern aged Thai-Burma relations were predominantly characterized by war. The Thai and Burmese historically have perceived each other as the traditional enemy. Thai governments up to 1988 have
invented and reinvented Burma as the personification of the historical enemy. Thainess was defined by creating an enemy ‘other’, Thainess was defined by what it is not: Burmese.21
The British brought a change in the relations between the Burmese and Siamese
kingdoms. Driven by forces of the Industrial Revolution, the British were drawn into Burma. The British East India Company operations in Manipur and Assam (East-India) were threatened by attacks of Burmese armies.22 In three wars the British defeated the Burmese kingdom and by
1886 had taken full control of the territory known today as Myanmar. In each Anglo-Burmese war the British used the Karen for guidance and military support.23 The British were looking for
an ally in to them unknown territory.24 The British divide-and-rule tactics relied on ancient
antagonism between the Karens and the Burmans.25 Karen groups lacking a privileged social
and economic status in nineteenth century Burma saw it as an opportunity to align oneself with the British to improve their socio-economic status.26 Accordingly throughout the 19th century a
18 Silverstein, J., “Some thoughts on Burma-Thai Relations”, In: Legal Issues on Burma Journal, no. 6, September 2000,
pp. 1-14, p. 1.
19 Mint-U, T., The River of Lost Footsteps. Histories of Burma. (New York 2006) p. 98-99.
20 Kramer, T., Thai Foreign policy towards Burma. 1987-1993. PhD, University of Amsterdam, 1994, pp. 1-122, p. 15. 21 Chachavalpongpun, A Plastic Nation, p. 33, 57-59, 65, 84 and 135. Chachavalpongpun refers to Edward Said’s
concept of ‘Other’, as explained in his book Orientalism (London, 1978).
22 Callahan, M.P., “Myanmar’s Perpetual Junta. Solving the Riddle of the Tatmadaw’s Long Reign.” In: New Left Review
60, Nov/Dec 2009, p. 32.
23 Aung-Thwin, M. and M. Aung-Thwin, A History of Myanmar since ancient times. Traditions and Transformations.
(London, 2013). For the role of Karen in each Anglo-Burmese war in chronological order see p. 180, 184 and 191-192 and M. Gravers, "The Karen Making of a Nation." in: Asian Forms of the Nation, Stein Tonnesson and Hans Antlöv, eds. (Surrey, 1996), pp. 237-269, p. 245.
24 Christie, Clive J., “Anatomy of a Betrayal: The Karens of Burma.” In: I.B. Tauris (Eds.), A Modern History of Southeast
Asia. Decolonization, Nationalism and Separatism (London, 2000), pp. 54 – 80.
25 Harriden, J., “Making a name for themselves: “Karen identity and the politization of ethnicity in Burma”, in: The
Journal of Burma Studies, vol. 7, 2002, pp. 84-144, p. 98 – 99.
26 Aung-thwin M. & M. Aung-Thwin, A History of Myanmar since ancient times. Traditions and Transformations.
12
loyalist relationship developed between these groups of Karen speakers and the British.27
British colonial rule brought unprecedented changes to Burmese society. Traditional social systems disappeared and the Burmese economy was changed to produce. The British and other foreign companies were the largest benefiters of this change. Thailand managed to maintain its sovereignty during the colonial and imperialistic period, although a large share of its export was controlled by British companies. From 1886 to 1948 Thailand communicated and dealt with the new power on her border, the British-Indian colonial administration.28 It was the Karen who
had been living on both sides of this border for centuries.
1.1 The Karen
The Karen conflict is of great importance to understand Thai-Myanmar relations in the Cold War era.29 The Karen are the largest ethnic minority in Myanmar constituting around 5 to 7 million
people. Around 300.000 Karen live in Thailand.30 The alignment of certain Karen groups with
the British colonizer caused the development of Karen nationalism. In 1947 the Karen National Union or KNU was established and in 1949 an armed struggle between the KNU and the
Burmese state broke out. Thailand used the KNU as a buffer against the Burmese state and to prevent Burmese and Thai communists from collaborating. The Karen were among the first people to be Christianized by American and British missionaries. The British colonial administration preferred Karen in the colonial administration over ethnic Burmese. This process had huge implications for the future of Burma. As soon as Burma gained independence ethnic tension erupted into civil war. The Karen were banned from states institutions like the army. Soon the Karen took up arms to fight for independence or more autonomy within the newly independent Burma. But who are these Karen? Why where they preferred by the British colonial administration over the Burmans?
The Karen emigrated to Burma from what today is known as Mongolia around 500 BCE.31 Since their arrival the Karen dispersed over different territories nowadays found in
Myanmar and Thailand. Karen communities developed distinctly communal characteristics overtime within Myanmar and Thailand. The Karen constitute a population of 5 to 7 million and speak about twenty mutually unintelligible dialects, the two biggest subgroups being the Pwo and Sgaw. The Pwo speaking Karen constitute around 80% of the Karen population and they are mainly Buddhist.32 Around 15% is Christian and the remaining Karen are either animist or
Muslim. About three million Karen live in the Ayeyarwaddy river delta and have developed an urbanized society based on the agriculture of rice. The Karen living in Burma’s eastern hills bordering Thailand developed their own distinct society and history. The hill Karen generally speak Sgaw, their communities traditionally based on a subsistence way of life.33 Karen
communities are religiously, linguistically, culturally separated and geographically dispersed. The majority of the Karen never supported an armed conflict and have never affiliated with the
27 Christie, Clive J., “Anatomy of a Betrayal: The Karens of Burma.” In: I.B. Tauris (Eds.), A Modern History of Southeast
Asia. Decolonization, Nationalism and Separatism (London, 2000), pp. 54 – 80, p. 62.
28 Kramer, T., Thai Foreign policy towards Burma. 1987-1993. PhD, University of Amsterdam, 1994, pp. 1-122, p. 15. 29 Callahan, M., Making Enemies. War and state building in Burma. (Ithaca/London 2003), p. 23.
30 Burma Peace Foundation archive, inventory number ARCH02962 box 4, International Institute of Social History,
Amsterdam. (Onwards referred to as BPF archive, inv. No., …. , IISH, Amsterdam.)
31 Worland, Shirley L., "Displaced and misplaced or just displaced: Christian Displaced Karen Identity after Sixty Years
of War in Burma" PhD. Philosophy at The University of Queensland, March 2010, p.8
32 Thawnghmung, A. Maung, The Karen Revolution in Burma: Diverse Voices, Uncertain Ends. (Washington, 2008) p. 3. 33 Christie, Clive J., “Anatomy of a Betrayal: The Karens of Burma.” In: I.B. Tauris (Eds.), A Modern History of Southeast
13 armed struggle of the KNU-KNLA.34
The term Karen hardly refers to a homogenous group, as is illustrated by the following quote: “No matter whether a Karen lives in the mountains or in the plains, whether animist, Buddhist, Christian or otherwise, whether from whatsoever tribe, Sgaw, or Pwo, Red or Black Karen – A KAREN IS A KAREN: one in blood brotherhood, one in sentiment, one in adversity and one mass of a Karen nationhood.”35 Some scholars have claimed that the Karen do not exist and
that at least five different ‘Karen’ identities can be recognized.36 The Karen lived and still live
along the Thai-Myanmar border and have played a pivotal role between the civilizations of the Ayeyarwaddy river valley (in present day Myanmar) and the Chao Praya river valley (in present day Thailand). Historically the Karen were used by armies of both sides as guides. The British continued this tradition for whom Burma was unknown territory at first.
The Karen groups with low socio-economic position in nineteenth century Burma were the first people to be Christianized. The first missionary in Burma was Adoniram Judson of Malden, Massachusetts, who arrived by ship from New York in 1812 and spend the next four decades in Burma.37 In the 1820s and 1830s other American and later British missionaries
started converting communities speaking Karen languages to Christianity. The Karen already had their own stories of a great flood and of a woman being created from the rib of a man. They even had a tradition that messengers from across the sea would one day bring “the lost book”. These stories proved to be a perfect opening to European missionaries.38 The missionaries soon
found out that Sgaw Karen speakers were easier to convert than Pwo speakers. The latter group had recently converted to Buddhism.39 American missionaries started searching for the origin of
the Karen speakers and slowly constructed a pan-Karen identity through writing ‘the Karen’ history. The Karen were ascribed to be the first people to have arrived in Burma, a claim the KNU still uses in negotiations with the government of Myanmar. British colonial officers copied the historical narrative constructed by American missionaries. Christian missionaries helped modernize the Karen script, translated the Bible into Pwo and Sgaw Karen and established the first Karen journal, all before 1900. In the latter half of the nineteenth century Christian Karen were taught how to read and write and many learned English.40 In 1875 the Baptist College was
erected in Rangoon, which soon got the nickname ‘Karen College’.41 Karen from the eastern hills
made ‘pilgrimages’ to these newly erected educational institutes in urban centers of Burma. 42
Another instrument of the British colonial administration which formed an ethnic identity known today as ‘Karen’ was census taking. The British census taking has been an important factor contributing to elevating the Karen from an ethnic minority to a ‘nation’. In the first census taking of 1872 the British colonial administration recognized a separate Karen category.
34 South, “Burma’s Longest war.”, p. 24 - 25 and A. Maung Thawnghmung, The Karen Revolution in Burma: Diverse
Voices, Uncertain Ends. Washington: East – West Center, 2008.
35 Christie, “Anatomy of a Betrayal”, p. 80.
36 Harriden, “Making a name for themselves”, p. 90. Harriden refers here to the article: Peter Hinton, "Do the Karen
really exist?" in: J. McKinnon and W. Bhruksasri (eds.), Highlanders of Thailand (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 155 – 168 and Christie, “Anatomy of a Betrayal”, p. 54.
37 Mint-U, The River, p. 210. 38 Ibidem.
39 Harriden, “Making a name for themselves”, p. 88.
40 Callahan, M., Making Enemies. War and State building in Burma. (London/Ithaca 2003), p. 34 and M. Gravers, "The
Karen Making of a Nation." in: Asian Forms of the Nation, Tonnesson and Antlöv, eds. (Surrey, 1996), p. 249.
41 Harriden, “Making a name for themselves”, p. 96 – 97.
42 Anderson, B., Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, (London/New York,
1991). I refer to Andersons’ notion of ‘pilgrimages’. In this case the journey from the Karen hills to the capital Rangoon helped to create a Karen consciousness. Ch. 7 emphasizes the importance of census taking for creating an
14
This particular census also indicated that ‘the Karen’ were the first to have arrived in Burma. This label and official recognition helped forge the claim of Karen that they had the right to create their own state.43
In the 1880’s Karen nationalism developed significantly fast. In 1881 The Karen National Association (KNA), the first Karen political organization was established. It aimed to represent all Karen. The KNA was led by Christian Karen speaking the Sgaw dialect. This organization developed into the KNU in 1947. After the third Anglo-Burmese war in 1886 Karen soldiers helped to control the new territories in central Burma and Christian Karen helped to crush an uprising in lower Burma. From 1886 large numbers of Karen were recruited into the army and military police.44 The preference of the Karen in Burma’s army can be clearly seen in 1941 just
before the outbreak of the Second World War in Asia. Ethnic Burmans made up only 75.11% of the total population in Burma in 1941, while they only accounted for 23.7% of the total in the army. The Karen in the army constituted 35% while the Karen only represented 9.34% of the total population in Burma. This means that the recruitment of Karen was much higher than the recruitment of Burmans per head of the population.45
The low socio economic position of certain Karen groups and the British demand for an ally within Burma resulted in an alliance between the two. The groups of Karen who wanted to improve their socio-economic status did so by aligning themselves with the British and more generally with Western culture through Christianity. Christian Karen were being ‘advertised’ by American missionaries to be used in the colonial government. The reason for this was not only their Christian identity but also their knowledge of the English language. Most of the population in British Burma had no access to education, those people who did immediately gained access to the English language. It was this group of Karen who quickly developed into a new middle class. The knowledge of English helped these Karen to operate in the private and public sectors of the Burmese colony.46 Several developments ignited the development of Karen nationalism and
were partly the cause of the outbreak of the Karen Conflict. The first process was the
construction of the history of the Karen by missionaries. Another important process was the development of an independent Karen literature in the form of journals, newspapers and books. Concludingly many Karen gained access to English-Christian education. These developments contributed to the growth of a pan-Karen ‘national’ consciousness.47 However it must be
emphasized that American missionaries operated predominantly among the hill tribes.48 ‘The
Karen’ in the minds of the British and the American missionaries became a category which was seen to be anti-Burman, Christian, loyal to the British and from the mountainous region
bordering Thailand. ‘The Karen’ therefore referred to by the British meant Christian Karen largely speaking the Sgaw dialect.49 The role of education and language are of great historical
importance for the rise of a Karen identity and thus for the later outbreak of the Karen Conflict. The exceptionally well educated Karen elites soon acquired a taste to have an independent Karen state. 50
The Karen were imagined to be Christian and loyal to Britain. The Burmese nationalist
43 Gravers, "The Karen Making of a Nation.", p. 248 – 249 and Anderson, Imagined Communities. See chapter 7 for the
importance of census taking.
44 Mint-U, The River, p. 211. 45 Callahan, Making Enemies, p. 42.
46 Aung-Thwin and Aung-Thwin, A History of Myanmar, p. 197 – 198. 47 Christie, “Anatomy of a Betrayal”, p. 54 – 55.
48 Brant, Charles S. and Mi Mi Khaing, “Missionaries among the Hill Tribes of Burma”, in: Asian Survey, Vol. 1, no. 1
March, 1961, pp. 44-51, p. 44.
49 Gravers, "The Karen Making of a Nation.", p. 245.
15
movement was anti-imperialist and Buddhist. The Burman came to be seen by the British as disloyal and treacherous. Once Burmese nationalists started demanding home rule from the 1920s onwards, Karen nationalist started demanding their own state. Karen believed they would never receive a fair treatment under the Burmese. Burman nationalism was on the rise and several Burman rebelllions broke out. These rebellions were put down by armed units of Karen.51Before the outbreak of World War II the Karen nationalist movement was moving
completely opposite of the Burmese nationalist movement.
1.2 World War II and the outbreak of the Karen Conflict
“The Burmese had nothing to do with the war, but it destroyed their country.”52
This quote applies to Thailand too. Both Burma and Thailand were destroyed after the Second World War. The Japanese had conquered Thailand and invaded Burma from Thailand on the 23rd of December 1941. The British quickly retreated to India, leaving Rangoon on the 7th of
March 1942. On the 2nd of May 1942 the conquest of Burma by the Japanese was completed.53
Both the Burmese and Thai nationalists movement welcomed the Japanese, while the Karen and other ethnic minorities in Burma stayed loyal to the British.54 After the war Thailand made a
relative smooth transition to peace and independence while Burma entered a phase of chaos. Up to that point there was little or no contact between the two states it was only under Japanese occupation that their history once again intertwined.55
Before the outbreak of World War II the Japanese financed the creation of the Burma Intelligence Army or BIA, led by Burmese nationalist Aung San. For the first time an indigenous Burmese army representing the majority of the population (70%) was created. The Karen and Mon minorities were favored by the British and were thus not to be trusted by the BIA.56 The
BIA was an ethno-nationalist Burmese force, described by Burma expert Callahan as ‘a “school” in nation-ness’.57 Early in 1942 violence between the BIA and the Karen broke out. Karen
soldiers who had fought for the colonial army were disarmed by the BIA. A group of Karen tried to ‘rescue’ the Karen in the village of Myaungmya from the BIA, because they believed the Karen trapped inside were in serious danger. The BIA discovered the plot and killed all partakers. Fearing more Karen treachery, the BIA killed hundreds of ethnic Karen in the Ayeyarwaddy river delta over the next weeks. The Karen retaliated by attacking Burmese villages which further boosted communal violence throughout the river delta. The Japanese army had to step in to quell the fighting.58
The events of World War II have strained Burmese-Karen relations deeply. For the first time since British occupation ethnic Burmans were allowed to form political and military institutes. During the war the Karen and other ethnic minorities like the Kachin stayed loyal to the British. Some British officers promised these minorities postwar autonomy. There was a strong sense among Karen war veterans that they at least deserved self-determination after the war.59 They fought jungle insurgencies for years and tried to undermine Japanese and hence
Burmese operations in the years 1942-1945. The BIA and its successor the Tatmadaw still hold this as betrayal. In their opinion ‘the’ ethnic minorities tried to prevent Burma from becoming independent. The BIA under guidance of Aung San switched sides in 1945. The BIA helped to
51 Callahan, Making Enemies.,p. 36 and Mint-U, The River, p. 211–212. 52 Mint-U, The River, p. 220.
53 Tarling, N., The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia. From World War II to the present. Volume Four (Cambridge,
1999), p. 3.
54 Mint-U, The River, p. 240 – 244.
55 Silverstein, J., “Some Thoughts on Burma-Thai Relations” In: Legal Issues on Burma Journal, no. 6, 2000, pp. 1-14, p.
3.
56 Aung-Thwin, and Aung-Thwin, A History of Myanmar, p. 231 -232. 57 Callahan, Making Enemies., p. 67.
58 Mint-U, The River, p. 231 and Callahan, Making Enemies., p. 75.
16
drive out the Japanese and so was invited at the negotiation table by the British. Aung San vowed for independence and tried to establish a political framework to keep Burma a single territorial unit after independence, arguably a territory with the world’s widest variety of peoples.60
In 1947 Aung San organized a gathering in which the Panglong Agreement was signed by the Shan, the Kachin and the Chin. A formal representative delegation of the Karen was absent. The KNU's leadership by this time was boycotting all official government organized gatherings.61 This boycott effectively removed a Karen voice from the critical debates which
were to come in the future. In 1947 the Burmese government produced a new constitution, but this document failed to address and resolve the Karen question.62 On the 17th of July 1947 the
KNU headquarter in Rangoon ordered the establishment of Karen fighting units, known as Karen National Defence Organization or KNDO's. The KNU also established an underground communication line with the Karen Rifles within the Burmese army. In October 1947 the AFPFL government proposed to the KNU to create a Karen state but the KNU refused. The KNU
demanded more territory than was included in the proposal.63 In that same year the one symbol
and person in Burma to which all groups could relate to, namely Aung San, was shot.64
To both Thailand and the Burmese government after World War II the biggest threat came from Thai and Burmese communists.65 After Burma gained independence on the 4th of
January 1948, stability was soon threatened by three groups. 66 The communists, the People’s
Volunteer Organization (PVO) and the Karen National Union (KNU) fought for more political power or independence from the Burmese government in Rangoon.67 Some Karen believed the
British or Americans would support their cause in postcolonial Burma.68 The communists in
Burma started their armed insurrection in March 1948.69 If the Thai and Burmese communists
would unite this would pose an even larger threat to both Thailand and Burma. To prevent this the Thai government put up a buffer zone at the end of 1940s. The buffer zone was in operation for almost half a century. The buffer zone policy supported ethnic minorities along Thailand’s border. This policy can therefore be characterized as anti-Rangoon. Although Thailand officially established bilateral relations with the government of Burma in 1948, one could not speak of a political relation. After WWII Thailand’s politics was dominated by a military which lacked political legitimacy. The Thai military elite upheld the image of Burma as an external threat to Thailand, in order to sustain and protect their own power interests. Leaders in the Thai military assisted ethnic rebels to fight against the Burmese central government, instead of reviving friendly ties with Rangoon.70 The only transfer of information, people or goods between the two
states for a long time was via the 2000 km long stretch of border controlled by the Karel National Union. After a traumatizing colonial experience, the Burmese government followed a policy in international relations of neutrality. The Thai government wanted to prevent the spread of communism and welcomed foreign support.
In 1954 the American inspired anti-communist Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) opened its headquarters in Bangkok. Thailand became one of the two Southeast Asian nations to join the SEATO.71 Thailand openly supported the United States struggle against
communism in Indochina (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia) starting in the 1960s. This was largely due
60 Mint-U, The River, p. 235-250 and Chachavalpongpun, A Plastic Nation, p. 63.
61Smith, Martin J., Burma: insurgency and the politics of ethnicity. (London, 1999), p. 73-75 and Myint-U, T., The
Making of Modern Burma (Cambridge 2001), p. 94.
62 Smith, Burma, p. 77 and 83. 63 Ibid., p. 86.
64 Callahan, M., Making Enemies. War and state building in Burma. (Ithaca and London, 2003), p. 108-109. 65 Chachavalpongpun, A Plastic Nation, p. 130.
66 Aung-Thwin and Aung-Thwin, A History of Myanmar, p. 227. 67 Ibid., p. 238.
68 Callahan, Making Enemies., p. 85.
69 Yoshihiko, Tanigawa, “The Cominform and Southeast Asia” in: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia. Ed. Yonosuke
Nagai and Akira Iriye. (New York, 1977) p. 371.
70 Chachavalpongpun, A Plastic Nation, p. 58-59.
17
to the increasing pressure of communism in this decade. The neutralist policy of Laos and Cambodia urged the Thai elite to seek external support. Thailand gained American guarantees of armed support if it were seriously threatened. US financial aid helped to develop Thailand’s communications and economy.72 By the late 1970s however, Thailand was divided into two
rivalling power centres. One was centred in Bangkok and the other was situated along the border with neighboring countries Burma, Laos and Cambodia and controlled by communists revolutionaries.73
The Burmese state was troubled by several insurgencies in the 1950s. Virtually all ethnic minority groups (the Shan, the Karen, the Mon, the Chin, the Kachin and the Wa) inside Burma had started fighting the central government in the 1950s, either to gain more autonomy or to fight for independence. In 1958 prime minister U-Nu asked the army to take control for two years. This so-called care-taker government which ruled from 1958 to 1960, was the most effective government Burma had in the twentieth century. This government stabilized the country for a while.74 After 1960 instability threatened to overthrow the Burmese government.
In 1962 general Ne Win staged a coup and established a military junta which has controlled the Burmese state up to 2012.
One of the first acts of general Ne Win was introducing ‘The Burmese Way to Socialism’, which had a devastating effect on Burma’s economy and on the relationship with Thailand.75
The Burmese Way to Socialism is a mix of Buddhists and Marxists principles. Thailand’s anti-communist leaders were afraid that socialism would be exported to Thailand. Therefore they supported anti-communists groups on the border like the Karen. To stop the communist insurgency in mainland Southeast Asia the Thai and U.S. government supported Karen
rebellions through the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. KNU General Bo Mya once described the KNU as Thailands' 'foreign legion', because the KNU guarded the border. The KNU prevented Thai and Burmese communist from unification. The strong shift to the right in 1976 under Karen General Bo Mya was a strategy of the KNU to gain more support from the Thai government.76 The U.S.
government simultaneously also supported the Burmese government to fight communists. The U.S. government provided weapons and American produced helicopters, which strangely have been used against the KNU.77 General Ne Win and his regime therefore distrusted Thailand’s
government, because the Karen were seen as the number one enemy of the Burmese army.78 Ne
Win sacked all well-trained and well-educated personnel from the government. He also expelled foreign aid agencies and advisers. Anything connected to Britain or America was closed down. Hundreds of thousands of Burmese Indians were kicked out of Burma in 1964, a terrible loss for the professional and commercial class of Burma. Foreigners were not allowed entry into Burma anymore. All business was nationalized, even Burma’s twenty four foreign banks were taken over by the state. In 1962 alone the industrial output of Burma fell by fourty percent.79 The
changes led to the rise of an illegal trade with Thailand and a large black market developed. By the 1980s the Burmese Way to Socialism had led to tremendous economic problems. The demonetization of Burma’s currency severely hurt many people, as there was no compensation. Between 1981 and 1987 the price of rice and timber fell by 51 percent.80 The Burmese
government had to apply for Least Developed Country (LDC) status of the United Nations in December 1986. A year later, one of the richest countries in Southeast Asia regarding natural resources, received this status. Burma needed this LDC status to cut the foreign debt, which was
72 Tarling, N., The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia. From World War II to the present. Volume Four (Cambridge,
1999), p. 294-297.
73 Battersby, P., “Border Politics and the Broader Politics of Thailand’s international Relations in the 1990s: From
Communism to Capitalism.” In: Pacific Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 4 (1988-1989), pp. 473-488, p. 475.
74 Mint-U, The River, p. 282-298.
75 Kramer, Thai Foreign policy towards Burma. 1987-1993., p. 33-36. 76 Smith, Burma, p. 297-298.
77 Pederson, D., Secret Genocide. Voices of the Karen of Burma. (Dunboyne, 2011), p. 19. 78 Chongkittavorn, K., “Thai-Burma Relations”, p. 119.
79 Mint-U, The River, p. 290-296.
18
US$5 billion in 1988 while the gross domestic product was declining at the same time.81
After World War II there was virtually no contact between Thailand and Burma. While Burma was struggling with a worsening economic situation, Thailand’s economy in the 1980s was growing at an unprecedented rate. The official income per capita in Burma was around US$200 in the fiscal year 1988-1989. A considerable difference with Thailand’s income per capita in the same year which was US$800. 82 As Thailand’s elite grew more focused on
economic prosperity, its interest in the resource rich territory of Burma grew too.83 In 1987
Burmese general Ne Win started liberalizing the Burmese economy. Trade in rice and beans was liberalized. But in March 1988 protests broke out at Rangoon’s university. On the austere date 8-8-’88 large national protests were planned to protest against the junta. “The underlying causes of these riots were economic ‘bread and butter’ issues which can be attributed to the previous 30 years of the Burmese Way to Socialism. Its stagnant economic policies saw earlier eruptions, but by 1988 they had crystallized in more recent events such as the demonetization of the currency and the stigma of LDC status.”84
1988 proved to be the year in which the relationship between Thailand and Burma would change with lasting effects for many people in the region and the wider international community. The threat of communism was disappearing. In the preceding years Thailand adopted a market economy as part of the international capitalist system. Burma’s economy was ruined by several ethnic insurgencies and the policy implemented by General Ne Win. The economic malaise was answered by the Burmese people with large national protests in 1988. After the riots a warm and an energetic relationship between Thailand and Burma developed. How and especially why did this relationship change? Why did Thailand move away from its traditional foreign policy of maintaining buffer zones? And who profited of this new
relationship?
81 Kramer, Thai Foreign policy towards Burma. 1987-1993., p. 40. 82 Ibidem.
83 Silverstein, “Some Thoughts on Burma-Thai Relations”, p. 9. 84 Aung-Thwin and Aung-Thwin, A History of Myanmar, p. 257.
19
2. The End of the Cold War: Thai-Myanmar relations 1988-1997
In the period 1988-1997 Thailand and Myanmar established a relationship which quickly developed into a complex and interdependent economic tie. This chapter tries to clarify how and why this happened. The preceding decade saw the ideology of communism losing support worldwide. In the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s Asia saw the excesses of the Cultural Revolution in China, the cruelty of the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia and the stagnation of Vietnam’s economy. In the 1980s China was preoccupied with modernization and gradually introduced capitalist inspired market principles to its economy.85 The USSR introduced a new policy of glasnost and
perestroika and Russian troops retreated from Afghanistan. In 1983 the Communist Party of Thailand ceased to exist. A few years later in 1989 the Communist Party of Burma ceased to exist too.86 These examples were proof that communism as a model for development did not
function properly.
Thailand became Myanmar’s ‘big brother’ in international politics after 1988. Politically and economically relations developed fast. In 1991 Thailand launched its ‘constructive
engagement policy’, thereby officially abandoning its buffer zone policy. Thailand argued that Myanmar would integrate faster into the international community through engaging with Myanmar.87 Thailand initiated the construction of a highway early 1990s from Thailand to
Tavoy, a large harbor city inside Myanmar situated on the Indian Ocean. The existing harbor in Tavoy was enlarged by an Italian-Thai company.88 In January 1993 The Thai-Burma Joint
Commission was established. The Thai-Burma Joint Commission promoted Myanmar’s admission to ASEAN. The admission into ASEAN would give Thailand even greater access to Burma’s economy. The Burmese generals committed to ASEAN immediately.89 In August 1994,
Thailand was ASEAN’s largest investor in Burma.90 In 1996 former General Chaovalit became
Prime Minister of Thailand, although only for a year. When resigning in 1997 he took credit for the closer ties with Myanmar, the termination of the buffer policy, the introduction of the constructive engagement policy and the ascension of Myanmar into ASEAN.91
Central to the first part of this chapter are the developments between Thailand and Myanmar in the 1980s. Why did their foreign policies change and especially how did they change? To clarify how this relationship changed the second part of this chapter uses three examples in which Thailand and Myanmar collaborated. Each example had an immediate effect on the struggle of the Karen, which will be discussed in the next and final chapter. The first example is the logging industry, which had a large impact in the border region between Thailand and Myanmar. The second example is the oil and gas industry, Thai and other foreign companies were and still are highly interested in the gas and oilfields found in the coastal waters of Myanmar. The third example is the movement of cheap labor/refugees from Myanmar to Thailand, which was beneficial to many Thai businessmen.
85 Steinberg, D. and Hongwei Fan, Modern China-Myanmar relations. Dilemmas of Mutual Dependence. (Copenhagen,
2012), p. 33.
86 Lang, H., Fear and Sanctuary. Burmese Refugees in Thailand. (New York, 2002), p. 11. 87 Chachavalpongpun, A Plastic Nation, p. 128.
88 BPF archive, inv. no. ARCH02962 box 109, IISH, Amsterdam. 89 Chachavalpongpun, A Plastic Nation, p. 125 and 139.
90 Hyndman, J., “Business and Bludgeon at the Border: A transnational political economy of human displacement in
Thailand and Burma. In: GeoJournal, Vol. 56, 2002, pp. 39-46, p. 43.
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2.1. 1988 and its aftermath
In spite of opening up its economy to foreign investment in the 1980s, Burma’s economy stagnated. In 1987 Burma was granted the Least Developed Country (LDC) status by the United Nations.92 But the government invalidated 70% of the currency in circulation in the same year.93
The majority of the Burmese lost all their savings and did not receive any compensation for it. The shortage of foreign exchange combined with a decline in growth rate of the gross domestic product was the major cause of the economic malaise.94 The stagnation of a once prosperous
Burmese economy and the poverty which followed resulted in growing political unrest.95 In
March 1988 in a teashop in Rangoon a brawl between groups of students broke out. The matter escalated and within a couple of days between 20 and 100 students lay dead in the streets of Rangoon. In May 1988 a rapport of the government claimed only two students had died. The students continued their protests throughout the summer. The students received support from the Burmese society as a whole. The protest movement set an austere date for a country wide general strike: 8-8-‘88.96 The Burmese military responded with an aggressive military campaign
to quell the protests. By the end of August 1988 the country was in a state of complete chaos, thousands of people were killed, thousands of prisoners were released by the Burmese government (to form fight gangs working for the government), the transport system had stopped operating, prices rose and food was scarce.97 In the middle of September 1988 the
protest movements momentum was over.
The civilian unrest in Burma from March to September 1988 had large political and economic consequences for Myanmar and its wider region. The U.S. and the European Union strongly condemned the military crackdown and put up economic sanctions and called for an isolation of Myanmar. The West and Japan suspended all development assistance like financial aid.98 The Burmese military also called the Tatmadaw needed hard cash fast. 90% of the
country’s foreign exchange was provided by Western and Japanese aid.99 The Tatmadaw did not
have any foreign exchange reserves by the end of 1988. Thousands of students fled to remote parts of country due to the harsh military crackdown. Some joined the armed insurgencies like that of the Karen National Union. By mid-October 1988 it was estimated that around 7,500 students had fled to the Thai-Burmese border with another 1000 students at the Indian border and around 2000 at the Chinese border.100 The Tatmadaw was taken off-guard by the wide
protest against their regime. Due to its harsh reaction towards the Burmese people the regime lost international credit. First scared by its own people and later by the international
community, the Burmese military leaders displayed a multitude of strategies to ensure its own survival.
To safeguard their power position already in 1988 the Tatmadaw introduced changes in the political, military and economic fields. In an effort to lose the legacy of the military
92 Mint-U, The River, p. 276. 93 Ibid, p. 40.
94 Kramer, Thai Foreign policy towards Burma. 1987-1993., p. 40.
95 Tarling, N., The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia. From World War II to the present. Volume Four (Cambridge,
1999), p. 309.
96 Kramer, Thai Foreign policy towards Burma. 1987-1993., p. 41.
97 Deutz, A., “United States Human Rights Policy towards Burma, 1988-1991.” In: Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol.
13, no. 2, September 1991, pp. 164-187, p. 173.
98 Callahan, Making Enemies., p. 207 and BPF Archives, int. no. ARCH02962 box 3, IISH, Amsterdam. 99 Callahan, Making Enemies., p. 328.
21
crackdown, a new government was created and the name of the country was changed.101 The
aim of the military junta can be seen in the new name given to the government: State Law and Order Restoration Council better known as the SLORC. The SLORC also changed the name of the country, ‘Burma’ was to be called ‘Myanmar’.102 The conflicts with Burma’s ethnic minorities
was explained as defense of ‘Burmeseness’ prior to 1988. The changing of the name of the country signaled a mentality shift within the higher circles of Burma’s ruling class. ‘Myanmar’ was created by the military regime to include all ethnic minorities. After 1988 the Tatmadaw started concluding deals and ceasefires with many ethnic rebel groups. Between 1988 and 1997 the Tatmadaw signed as many as seventeen ceasefires.103 The ceasefires gave the Tatmadaw
political legitimacy to hold on to state power.104 Yet, while calling for “peace” and signing
ceasefires the Burmese government held devastating counterinsurgency offensives. Along the Thai border key strongholds were attacked to gain control of the border.105
From 1988 the Tatmadaw began a process of military expansion which was financed by investments coming from trade with Thailand and China. The Tatmadaw strengthened its ties with China and traded teak for new weaponry.106 The military personnel in Myanmar’s army
rose from 180.000 in 1988 to over 400.000 in 1996.107 T140 new combat aircrafts, 30 naval
vessels, 170 tanks, 250 armored personnel carriers and other weapons were bought.108 By
mid-1990 US$1.4 billion was spent and the Tatmadaw was able to wage a war in all weather
conditions.109 Due to the new weaponry the Tatmadaw was able to fight the jungle insurgencies
all year round. This would have far reaching consequences for the Karen insurgency in the years to come after 1988.
The SLORC made sure it kept control over certain parts of the Burmese economy while introducing market economy principles. The State-owned Economic Enterprises Law 26 was issued in 1989. In chapter 2, section 3 of this law, the junta clearly expressed in which industries they would like to keep full control. Reflecting their need for currency the most lucrative
industries were to be controlled by the state: “… Extraction and trading of teak within and outside the Union [of Burma]; … All plantation of wood and its preservation and protection, except firewood plantations by villagers for subsistence; … Exploration, trading and extraction of oil and natural gas and the production of oil, natural gas and related products; … Exploration, trading, extraction and export of pearl, jade, ruby and other mineral precious stones; …
Production of fish and shrimps (…)”.110On the 30th of November 1988, the SLORC passed the
Foreign Investment Law (FIL). The FIL shows that the SLORC was desperate for foreign capital.111 The FIL “undermined the major revenue resources of the insurgents who have
monopolized the black market supply of goods for the past 25 years. In the long term this will
101 Aung-Thwin and Aung-Thwin, A History of Myanmar, p. 256-257 and 263 and Deutz, A.M., “United States Human
Rights Policy towards Burma, 1988-1991.” In: Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 13, no. 2, Sept 1991 pp. 164-187, p. 170-171.
102 Kramer, Thai Foreign policy towards Burma. 1987-1993., p. 40-45. 103 Callahan, Making Enemies., p. 220.
104 Chachavalpongpun, A Plastic Nation, p. 61-62.
105 Lang, H., Fear and Sanctuary. Burmese Refugees in Thailand. (New York, 2002), p. 47.
106 Battersby, “Border Politics and the Broader Politics of Thailand’s international Relations in the 1990s”, p. 477 and
McCarthy, S., “Ten Years of Chaos in Burma: Foreign investment and Economic Liberalization under the SLORC-SPDC, 1988-1998.” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 73, no. 2, (2000), pp. 233-262, p. 256.
107 Mint-U, The River, p. 331.
108 Callahan, Making Enemies., p. 211.
109 BPF archive, inv. No. ARCH02962, box 3, IISH, Amsterdam.
110 Gutter, P., “Environment and Law in Burma.” In: Legal Issues on Burma Journal , August 2001, pp. 1-27, p. 6. 111 McCarthy, S., “Ten Years of Chaos in Burma: Foreign investment and Economic Liberalization under the
22
undercut the rebels’ ability to maintain their armies, while it enhances the revenues of the Burmese government.”112 At this crucial stage the Thai army commander in Chief, General
Chaovalit Yongchaiyudh flew to Rangoon in December 1988.113
2.2 Thailand in the 1980s
When the Thai Foreign ministry announced that it would send a delegation to Rangoon in November 1988 to finalize economic agreements Thai students groups, NGO’s and the media protested heavily. The trip was cancelled and instead General Chaovalit travelled to Rangoon in December 1988 to finalize lucrative trading deals.114 Close connections between Thai
authorities and the Burmese generals would produce a large number of trading deals in the years to come. These business concessions granted by Rangoon were of “greater value than the ethnic minorities in Thailand’s bufferzones could offer to Thai cabinet
members-and-businessmen.”115
Thailand’s economy showed exponential growth rates in the 1980s. The gross domestic product of Thailand grew by 10% in 1988. Industrial output, agriculture, construction and tourism were the most important sectors for Thailand’s economic growth. Further boosting Thailand’s economy the country experienced a foreign investment boom in 1988. 1987 saw a total of foreign investment into Thailand of US$2.6 billion. For the first six months of 1988 alone a total of 621 companies invested US$3.8 billion in Thailand. In the first seven months of 1988 Thai export figures showed an increase of 34% compared to 1987, reaching a total of US$8.46 billion.116 Thailand’s economic boom was welcomed by Thailand’s elite. Thailand wanted to be
economically independent. The economic surge in 1988 coincided with a shift in Thailand’s political system.
Prior to the military crackdown in Burma in July 1988 civilian rule was established in Thailand. Up to July 1988 military rule similar to Burma persisted in Thailand. Chatichai
Choonhavan became the first elected civilian prime minister in Thailand since the military coup in 1976. Under Chatichai a new attitude to the resource rich Burma arose.117 The government of
Chatichai consisted mainly of Thai businessmen and army leaders. Chatichai symbolized a new generation of military men who were both businessman and politicians. Money-making and vote-buying went hand in hand for this new generation of Thailand’s leaders. Chatichai’s government developed a good working relationship with Thailand’s army, ruled by General Chaovalit Yongchaiyudh. Chatichai gave General Chaovalit a free hand in the annual army promotions in September 1988 and he offered Chaovalit the post of defense minister several times. Prime minister Chatichai is mostly known for his policy of turning ‘Battlefields into Marketplaces’.118 The business-oriented cabinet ministers targeted logging and fishing deals in
Burma.119 Chatichai wanted to turn Thailand into the region’s largest economy and turn the
battlefields of Indochina into a marketplace. Relations with Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos
112 Taylor, Robert H., “The Evolving Military Role in Burma.” 30 November 1988, The Bangkok Post. In: BPF archive,
inv. no. ARCH02962 box 3, IISH, Amsterdam.
113 Mint-U, The River, p. 288.
114 Niksch, L., “Thailand in 1988. The Economic Surge.” In: Asian Survey, Vol. 29, no. 2, Feb 1989, pp. 165-173, p.
171-172 and Mint-U, The River, p. 288.
115 Chachavalpongpun, A Plastic Nation, p. 60.
116 Niksch, L., “Thailand in 1988. The Economic Surge.” In: Asian Survey, Vol. 29, No. 2, Feb 1989, pp. 173, p.
165-166.
117 Chachavalpongpun, A Plastic Nation, p. 65.
118 Kramer, Thai Foreign policy towards Burma. 1987-1993., p. 52.
23
entered a more active stage in 1988. In February 1988 a peace truce was established between the Thai and Lao forces.120
From the early 1980s the need for maintaining Thailand’s traditional buffer zones became less relevant. The Communist Party of Thailand ceased to exist in 1983 after a forty year old armed struggle.121 The crucial buffer role once played by the Karen, the Mon and other
minority forces diminished in importance. In the dry season of 1983-1984 the Tatmadaw actually started a large anti-insurgency campaign. At that stage the Thai authorities still
provided support to their traditional allies the Karen. Chatichai’s government developed a new foreign policy.122 This policy has been described as ‘resource diplomacy’.123
In 1988 the foreign policy of Thailand led to a new relationship with Burma’s
government. Already in April 1988 General Chaovalit travelled to Burma with a Thai delegation of businessmen and ‘commerce-oriented military officers’, as Thai academic Chachavalpongpun described the delegation.124 Chaovalit was known for his intimate relations with the Burmese
military.125 Thai public opinion turned against the military crackdown and Thailand became the
new safe haven for the activists and students who fled Burma. Despite public opinion in Thailand, Chatichai’s government was the first to develop official ties with the SLORC after the crackdown.126 Under Chatichai “Burma was now presented as a new business partner, whilst
ethnic insurgencies were treated merely as burdens on national security.”127
120 Niksch, “Thailand in 1988.”, p. 171.
121 Silverstein, “Some Thoughts on Burma-Thai Relations”, p. 12 and Lang, Fear and Sanctuary, p. 142. 122 Lang, Fear and Sanctuary, p. 144.
123 Ibid., p. 142.
124 Chachavalpongpun, A Plastic Nation, p. 68.
125 Kramer, Thai Foreign policy towards Burma. 1987-1993., p. 61. 126 Lang, Fear and Sanctuary, p. 143.
