MSC, what else?
Explaining the rise of alternative certification systems
for sustainable seafood
Master Thesis – Political Science (Bestuur en Beleid) Student: Hylke van der Wal
Student Number: 6126855 Supervisor: Luc Fransen
2nd reader: Katja Biedenkopf
Date: june 27th 2014
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Content
Preface' 5! Abstract' 6! Chapter'1:'Introduction' 7! 1.1#Research#Question# 7! 1.2#About#the#study# 9! 1.3#Goal#of#the#research# 10! 1.4#Chapter#outline# 10! Chapter'2:'Theoretical'Framework' 12! 2.1#Introduction# 12! 2.2#Important#trends# 12! 2.2.1!Transnational!Governance! 12! 2.2.2!Corporate!Social!Responsibility! 14! 2.2.3!The!starting!point!for!certifications! 14! 2.3#Coherence#or#proliferation# 16! 2.3.1!A!monopolistic!position! 16! 2.3.2!Fragmentation!in!certification! 17! 2.3.3!Positioning!towards!other!certifications! 18! 2.3.4!Positioning!towards!industry!and!government! 19! 2.3.5!Explaining!fragmentation! 20! 2.4#Summary# 24! Chapter'3:'Methodology' 25! 3.1#Introduction# 25! 3.2#Approach#of#the#research# 25! 3.2.1!Comparative!design! 25! 3.2.2!Selection!of!the!cases! 25! 3.2.2#Analysis#via#processFtracing# 26! 3.3#Data#gathering# 27! 3.4#Threats#to#validity#and#reliability# 27! 3.5#Theoretical#and#societal#relevance# 29! 3.6#Conclusion#and#summary# 29! Chapter'4:'Certifications'in'the'fisheries'sector' 30! 4.1#Introduction# 30! 4.2#(InterF)national#regulations# 30! 4.3#SingleFspecies#certification#and#buyer#guides# 32! 4.4#The#Marine#Stewardship#Council# 33! 4.5#Friend#of#the#Sea# 37! 4.6#Iceland#Responsible#Fisheries# 39! 4.7#Alaska#Seafood#Marketing#Institute# 43! 4.8#Conclusion#and#summary# 46! '4 Chapter'5:'Discussion' 47! 5.1#Introduction# 47! 5.2#Transnational#governance#in#the#fisheries#sector# 47! 5.3#The#rise#and#maintenance#of#a#dominant#actor# 48! 5.4#Proliferation#of#certification#for#sustainable#seafood# 50! 5.4.1!The!need!for!competition! 51! 5.4.2!Inclusion!in!the!governance! 51! 5.4.3!Differences!in!scope! 52! 5.4.4!Differences!in!stringency! 53! 5.4.5!Monitoring!and!accreditation! 55! 5.5#Conclusion#and#summary# 56! Chapter'6:'Conclusion' 57! 6.1#Main#findings#and#answer#to#the#research#question# 57! 6.2#Implications#for#theory# 59! 6.3#Limitations#of#the#study#and#recommendations#for#further#research# 60! Bibliography' 62! Scientific#literature# 62! International#(policy)#documents# 64! Websites# 65! Interviews# 68! Appendix'1:'Topic'list'interviews' 69! Appendix'2:'Overview'of'certificates' 70!
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Preface
That’s it. It is done. This thesis is the result of my first study in International Relations. A field that I have been exploring after studying Sociology, Communication Sciences and Political Sciences (from a national perspective). After months of hard work, especially in the last days before the deadline, the thesis is finished.
This is a report with a personal touch. After working in an organization focusing on litter prevention for a couple of years, I have challenged myself to look into new aspects of the world of sustainability. After writing a paper about a method of prevention and cleaning of marine litter as the final paper for my Bachelor Degree, I wanted to study more of the marine environment. For this thesis I looked at different sustainability certifications and the dynamics and factors that were of influence in the rise of alternative certification systems in this field.
I wrote my thesis in the thesis group; Global Politics of Sustainability, supervised by Luc Fransen. Of a list of people I want to thank in this preface Luc is the first. I want to thank you for your great enthusiasm for the field of certification and your ability to share your knowledge in an accessible way. I have learned a lot during the course and have gained new insights that I will use in the rest of my career. I also want to thank you for your support during ‘rough times’. Times that Ineke Teijmant described as the few moments in the writing process where you’d rather stop writing than continue.
Furthermore I want to thank the representatives of ASMI, IRF, FOS and MSC for their time and information. Thanks to you I have gained insight in important dynamics and factors that help to explain the rise of alternative certification in the field of sustainable seafood. The last group of people is my friends and relatives. I want to thank you for your support and feedback in the process of writing this thesis.
I look back on a very interesting period/process in which I have gained new information, new contacts and also new friends. Once again, thank you all for your support and I hope you enjoy reading this thesis.
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Abstract
In recent years various certifications for sustainable seafood have emerged. This research has depicted how and why alternative certifications have emerged. Unlike other sectors where competition developed shortly after the constitution of the first certificate, competition in the field of sustainable seafood developed only after several years. By changing the certificate of the MSC in accordance to critique of different actors, MSC delayed the rise of alternative certification systems. This research concludes that discussions about topics such as the integration of a social standard or incorporating aquaculture into the certificate were
important in contributing to the rise of alternative certificates. MSC did not implement those critiques in their operations and hereby created opportunities for competitors to fill in the gap. Other factors also influenced this development. These include criticism about the scope, governance or monitoring of the MSC.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Research QuestionThere has been a strong growth of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) initiatives in recent years. E.g. initiatives concerning labor standards in clothing factories (Bartley, 2003), voluntary standards of sustainability in the coffee industry (Reinecke, Manning, & von Hagen, 2012) and certification systems for sustainable produced wood (Meidinger, 2002).
The rise of CSR initiatives can partly be explained by contextual factors such as the globalization of the production chain, growing attention for human rights and growing societal attention for environmental issues. In the broadest sense of the word, Corporate Social Responsibility means that corporations should not only act in accordance to their economic goals, but also take the social and environmental interests into account. Corporations are being pressed by (international) governmental and non-governmental organizations, but also by customers, to improve their working standards (Crane & Matten, 2005, p. 43). This targeting of NGOs and governmental organizations has had varying success. While in some sectors the campaigns of NGOs have proven to change the codes of conducts of industries, in other industries the campaigns have led the industry to start their own certification systems (Sasser, Prakash, Cashore, & Auld, 2006, p. 2). Also because of the targeting campaigns, the industry-based-certification systems have grown much faster than the NGO-based-certification systems.
One particular interesting aspect of the certification systems as organized by NGOs is that participation is voluntary (Gulbrandsen, 2010, p. 1). There is no legal obligation for the participants to actually conform to the rules as prescribed by the certifier. Therefore corporations must have other motives for participating such as a philanthropic or economic motive (Crane & Matten, 2005, p. 44).
One example of such a certification system is the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) (Ponte, 2012, p. 301). During the years before the constitution of the MSC, the fishing capacity of the different (international) fleets had grown exponentially (Gulbrandsen, 2010, p. 113). This growth of capacity led to an even stronger growth in the amount of captured fish (FAO, 2002, p. 27) leading to an imbalance between the capacity of the fish resources and the harvesting potential, which resulted in overfished fish stocks (FAO, 2012, p. 11). According to the FAO more than a quarter (29.9%) of the amount of fish stocks were overfished in 2009 (FAO, 2012, p. 53). 57.4% of the fish stocks are at the maximum of the production and this
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level production may decline when the stock is not successfully managed. 12.9% of the fish stocks are not fully exploited. These stocks can be used for an increase in production in the coming years.
As a response to the concerns involving the sustainable management of the fish stocks, several governmental regimes have been created. As long as the fish stocks are open to anyone, the risk of overfishing remains high. The first step in creating the international regimes was the 1982 UN Law of the Sea Convention (Gulbrandsen, 2010, p. 113; UN, 1982). Part of this law, which came in force in 1994, was the creation of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), measured 200 nautical miles out of the coast of the state. In these areas the states are responsible for the management of the fish stocks. “(…) The extension of national jurisdiction over larger parts of the world’s ocean meant that stocks that used to require multinational management arrangements could now be managed by one state or through the collaboration of a few states.” (Gulbrandsen, 2010, p. 114).
Two other important institutional responses were the UN Fish Stocks Agreement and the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (Gulbrandsen, 2010, p. 114; FAO, 1995). The UN Fish Stocks Agreement ‘strengthened the obligation for regional cooperation among coastal states to promote conservation of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks.’ (Gulbrandsen, 2010, p. 114). The agreement established a legal framework for the conservation of the fish stocks of several types of fish (UN, 2010, p. 1). The FAO Code of Conduct offered a guideline for the sustainable management, conservation and development of fish stocks and fisheries (Gulbrandsen, 2010, p. 114). The guide itself was non-binding, but other treaties (that are binding), such as the Compliance Agreement, were part of the FAO Code of Conduct.
In the eyes of several organizations these different governmental regulations did not have the effect they hoped to achieve (Gulbrandsen, 2010, p. 114). Seafood certificates emerged as a response to these unsolved challenges in the fishery sector (Gulbrandsen, 2010, p. 115). The MSC is one of these initiatives and started in the second half of the 1990’s when the WWF ‘teamed up’ with Unilever to improve fishery practices (Gulbrandsen, 2009, p. 655). The MSC standard for sustainable fishing was inspired by a successful certificate in the forestry sector; the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) (Gulbrandsen, 2009, p. 655).
In 1998 the MSC started to change their internal structure to ‘fend off assertions’ that Unilever and WWF where controlling the MSC. In 1998 the MSC operated independent of their former funders and thereby gained credibility in the fishery sector (Ponte, 2012, p. 304;
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Gulbrandsen, 2009, p. 655). In this period of time the MSC was the only large certifier in seafood and still, there is no large competitor for the MSC (Ponte, 2012, p. 301; Gulbrandsen, 2008, p. 570).
But now the field of certification of sustainable seafood is changing. After ten years of a monopoly position of the MSC several new certification systems are developing. For example in Alaska and Iceland there are new (industrial) parties starting their own certificates. This rise of competition after a period of monopoly of a certification scheme will be the main focus of this thesis when answering the following research question;
“What explains the rise of alternative sustainability certification systems after a period of dominance by one certification program?”
1.2 About the study
This study aims to answer the research question by analyzing a set of indicators that explain the rise of certification systems in general. In the study will be looked for strategies that led to the maintenance of the position of the MSC over time and the process of development of other initiatives.
The factors that have been chosen to explain the rise of alternatives are drawn from theories concerning the rise of competition in sectors such as the forestry and the coffee industry. A basis for this discussion of the rise of certification systems is the upcoming of CSR. Followed by a discussion of the rise of certification systems. In this study these theories are presented and used as a starting point for the analysis of the gathered data. The proposed factors will be used to get a better understanding of the rise of competing certification systems in the fisheries sector.
The factors that are being used in this study are not the only factors that are available in scientific literature. Therefore, this study should not be seen as an exhaustive elaboration on the rise of competing certification systems after years of proliferation of a standard. Rather, this study can be seen as a starting point for more research.
The study is designed as a comparative case study. The different case studies are discussed according to the proposed factors drawing on insights gained from qualitative research into the different certificates. The data in the study will be gathered mostly from websites and official released documents and through interviews with representatives of the initiatives. Also important data for the study is found in academic literature on the issue, both on the rise of certification and on the fishery sector in general.
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1.3 Goal of the research
As discussed earlier in this introduction, the main goal of this research is to get a better understanding of the rise of alternative certification systems in the fisheries sector after years of dominance of the MSC. This study is thereby relevant for two reasons. First, this research is scientifically relevant because little is known about the dynamics of proliferation of a certificate where after competition rises. There is no known research into a case where the ‘first-mover’ was established for a longer period where after competition started to emerge.
The societal relevance of this study is that it creates a better understanding of the process of diversification of certification for sustainable seafood. While the MSC is still expanding and more retailers commit themselves to the MSC, it can be that the new certificates will be in store soon. This research will provide an opening into the understanding of the process of this diversification.
1.4 Chapter outline
The chapter outline will give an idea of the content of the upcoming chapters. Each of the chapters starts with a brief introduction of the topic at hand and ends with a short summary of the discussed topics.
The second chapter is the theoretical framework of this thesis. The first part is a brief introduction into the ongoing processes that lead (and have led) to the rise of certification systems in general. The second part of the theoretical framework discusses several factors that have contributed to the rise of the first certification systems in specific areas, such as the coffee sector and the clothing industry. The third part consists of a theoretical review of factors that have led to the rise of competing schemes in different sectors. It is possible that these theories are not fully compatible with the fisheries case. While in other sectors the competition arose shortly after the introduction of the first scheme, in the fishery sector the competition is starting to rise years after the constitution of the MSC.
The third chapter is the methodology section in which the main features of the study will be discussed. The chapter defines the topics that will be used in order to evaluate the different certificates. Also will the research approach be introduced, followed by an introduction of the chosen certificates and the methods whereby the data will be analyzed. An important aspect of this chapter is the presentation of the main considerations and limitations of the research.
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In the fourth chapter the different certificates will be discussed via a historical representation of the process of development of the certificate. In the first part of this chapter an introduction to the rise of certification in the field of sustainable seafood will be presented, followed by an introduction to the several other alternatives that have emerged in recent years.
Following, in the fifth chapter, the empirical material will be combined with the theoretical framework to get a better understanding of the drivers of the competing certificates. The main question in this chapter is whether the rise of competition in the fishery sector can be understood in terms of the rise of competition in other sectors where the dynamics are very different.
The final chapter, the conclusion, will present the outcomes of the study and presents an answer to the research question. Also will be discussed in what way the findings contribute to theory. The conclusion ends with recommendations for further research.
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework
2.1 IntroductionThis chapter presents a brief review of theories concerning the rise of certification systems. The first part of this theoretical framework will discuss issues concerning globalization and the increasing attention to the responsibility of corporations, followed by a description of the rise of certification systems in general and the motivations of the main stakeholders to start a certificate. Also will the rise of a monopoly be discussed in the second part of the theoretical framework. The third part discusses theories concerning the rise of fragmentation in the field of sustainability certification. It is important to notice that there is yet no theory concerning the rise of competition in certification after a longer period of ‘domination’ of one of the certificates. The different factors that will be discussed that are important for the rise of certification will also be used to get a better understanding of the process in the fisheries sector.
2.2 Important trends
To get a better understanding of the background of certification, two important processes will be discussed. The first process is the rise of transnational governance. In a time where organizations are increasingly operating cross-border, the regulation of this operation should be on that transnational level too. The second process that will be discussed is the growing attention to the responsibility of corporations for their activities. A growing amount of consumers and other actors are paying attention to the consequences of the operations of organizations on a social, environmental or financial level for example. As a final topic of this part of the chapter the rise of certification systems in general will be presented.
2.2.1 Transnational Governance
Globalization has a significant impact on the operations of governments. A main challenge is the ‘effective and legitimate governance of transboundary affairs’ (Keller, 2008, p. 221; Fransen, 2012, p. 5). While societal problems and the operations of corporations become increasingly cross-border of nature, there is a lack of international regulation (Reinecke, Manning, & Von Hagen, 2012, p. 790; Gulbrandsen, 2008, p. 564). Although individual nation states do have the mandate to impose control on corporations operating on their territory, they lack the mandate to impose control on international activities of these businesses (Jenkins, 2001, p. 2).
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This gap in international governance can be handled in different ways (Bartley, 2007, p. 303). First, there is the opportunity to create a certification system, which will be discussed later in this chapter. A second option is to create more international governmental orders (Bartley, 2007, p. 305). When there is a lack of governmental power on the international level, more work should be done to create such an international government, for example by increasing the power of the European Union. Another example of a successful intergovernmental agreement is the WTO (World Trade Organization) (Bartley, 2007, p. 305). A main problem with the expansion of the role of governments is that corporations will try to stop the expansion of the international government structure. They legitimize their viewpoints with, among other arguments, ‘free-trade’- and ‘free-market’-arguments.
This rhetoric of businesses is not the only issue with the possible enlarged role for governments. Before international agreements can be achieved, the relevant actors have to play a ‘political game’. The obstacles for the international agreements are ‘often more political than technical’ (Bartley, 2007, p. 305). An example of such a political struggle can be found in the clothing industry (Fransen, 2012, p. 6). In some countries the focus is on the export of products, driven by economic goals of the government and the industry. ‘This focus does not leave much room for a sensibility for the worker’s plight, especially when countries seek to compete as providers of non-skilled mass-facturing’ (Fransen, 2012, p. 6). In some countries the focus on export even stimulated reducements of the rights of workers.
A third possibility is to create symbolic commitments whereby no actor is actually monitoring the compliance of the other actors (Bartley, 2007, p. 303). For example, voluntary codes of conducts for industries that arise shortly after crises, such as the Responsible Care
code, created by the chemical industry as a response to the ‘Bhopal-tragedy’1. This code had
no monitoring to see whether or not the standards were being implemented or not.
A final possibility to act on the gap in international governance is by doing nothing ‘in the way of a system of governance’ (Bartley, 2007, p. 305). Hereby stimulating a stream of governmental and non-governmental campaigns to change the operation of the industry (in several industries). The risk of this strategy is that there will be no lasting change in the operations.
1 In 1984 a cloud of deadly gas leaked from a factory in India leading to the death of
thousands people (see for more information:
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2.2.2 Corporate Social Responsibility
The trend of globalization is combined with a trend in which consumers demand a certain amount of responsibility of corporations. Social responsibility of corporations refers to the ‘decisions and actions taken for reasons at least partially beyond the firm’s direct economic or technical interest’ (Carroll, 1991, p. 2).
The definition of social responsibility of corporations is under heavy discussion. Several authors have questioned the possibility for corporations to have social responsibility due to a variety of reasons (Fransen, 2012, p. 3; Friedman, 1970, p. 1; Crane & Matten, 2005, p. 39). Critiques address the possibility and legitimacy of social responsibility of corporations (Crane & Matten, 2005, p. 39; Friedman, 1970, p. 4). According to Friedman (1970, p. 4) it is not the responsibility of the managers to decide on social issues, but the responsibility of the state. In this second critique on the idea of CSR the link to transnational governance can be found. Although it may be that managers in a corporation are not the ones best suited for the job of making decisions on societal issues the manager has become responsible for this decision, due to everlasting globalization and the retreat of government.
Apart from this critique, there are also supporters of the idea of CSR (Fransen, 2012, p. 9). These people believe that corporations do have a long-lasting responsibility towards society and that because of CSR new (private) governance can arise. Crane and Matten (2005, p. 41) have described four reasons why corporations do have social responsibilities. The background of these arguments can be found in the idea of enlightened self-interest; ‘the corporation takes on social responsibilities insofar as doing so promotes its own self-interest’ (Crane & Matten, 2005, p. 41). This argument is consistent with Friedman (1970) when he states that corporations only exist to make profit. Crane and Matten (2005) argue that a corporation can make profit by adopting social responsibility.
First, corporations that act in a social responsible way might be getting extra customers. Second, the employees may be more committed to the work they do. Third, voluntary commitment to corporate social responsibility may postpone the implementation of legislation on specific issues and, finally, investing in social responsibility can be seen as a long-term investment in a better community (Crane & Matten, 2005, p. 42).
2.2.3 The starting point for certifications
We have already seen that the emergence of certifications is one of the possible forms of mitigating issues concerning transnational trades, besides the earlier discussed options of more government, self-regulation without monitoring and not acting (Bartley, 2007, p. 305).
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Although non-state actors establish the certification schemes, the schemes are not independent of governments. The schemes are bound by legal regulations on the national and international level (Gulbrandsen, 2010, p. 29). These regulations are the basis for the certifications. In countries where the governments have the least regulations on environmental or societal issues, the growth of a certification system is most likely (Gulbrandsen, 2010, p. 29).
The rise of certification initiatives gave the growing interest for CSR a new face (Bartley, 2007, p. 301). This process started already in the 1970’s when a more critical attitude towards the big multinationals developed (Jenkins, 2001, p. 2). An increasing amount of industries were working on corporate codes of conduct for operating in a socially responsible manner. Different parties have written concepts of such codes of conduct, for example the International Chamber of Commerce who has written the Guidelines for International Investment or the United Nations with the Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (Jenkins, 2001, p. 2).
This rise of certifications can be explained by two different trends; a trend towards liberalization and less regulation on the one hand and a trend towards voluntary codes of conduct on the other hand (Jenkins, 2001, p. 4). This second trend was a response to a growing amount of bad publicity for American corporations, for example concerning bribery.
In recent years these ideas on more ‘responsible’ behavior of corporations have led to the emergence of certification systems. Systems that accredit and monitor better behavior of the corporations. These systems ‘purport to temper exploitation and reward responsible firms through (1) voluntary standards, (2) monitoring of production sites by accredited auditors, (3) certification (or similar recognition) of participating firms, and (4) the provision of information to consumers or other audiences (sometimes through a product label)’ (Bartley, 2007, p. 301; Auld , 2010, p. 219).
The certification systems are also the result of a shift ‘from transnational activism and boycotts to transnational rules and governance programs’ (Gulbrandsen, 2010, p. 9). This new opportunity for non-state actors to be involved in rulemaking, and start rulemaking themselves, has led to the rise of new governance arenas. Arenas outside the traditional area of politics and political influence (Gulbrandsen, 2010, p. 9).
After the start of this certification model in the apparel and forest sector there has been a growth of the model in other sectors (Bartley, 2007, p. 302). This model has now been implemented in other sectors such as fishery. “Certification initiatives have become central
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nodes in an increasingly elaborate “corporate social responsibility field”, which barely existed a decade ago but now produces a plethora of policy documents, conferences, consultants, and even educational credentials” (Bartley, 2007, p. 303).
Overall, the certifications have four ‘key features’. “First, they have logo’s or labels that can be used on products sold to end-consumers. Second, they have some form of inspection and monitoring, which may have begun as an internal process, but over time typically becomes a third-party verification process. Third, they have governance structures and procedures for overseeing operations, including rules for membership, decision-making, setting and revising standards, accrediting auditors, and resolving disputes. Finally, (…) the programs have standards regulating social and/or environmental impacts of production processes, as well as tracking requirements for following products through to the end-consumer” (Auld, 2013, p. 128).
2.3 Coherence or proliferation
When discussing the rise of the first certificate, we also have to discuss the possibility of the emergence of alternative certifications. In different sectors a proliferation of sustainability standards can be found, but the question is why these alternatives emerge. Several factors are important to take into considerations, such as the context, the role of governments and industry and the scope of the certificate.
2.3.1 A monopolistic position
When discussing what could happen after the emergence of the first sustainability certificate in a sector, there are two main options. The first option is that the first certificate gains the greatest market share and becomes a monopolist on the certification in the specific sector. Second, it is possible that new, alternative and/or competitive schemes emerge. Little is known about a monopoly of a certificate, therefore theory concerning other standards will be used. In this case the monopoly of the QWERTY-keyboard and the Windows-computer (Hill, 1997, p. 7).
In his article, Hill (1997) describes a process whereby a technology becomes the industrial standard via four different (self-reinforcing) steps. It starts with the ‘size of the installed base’ (Hill, 1997, p. 9). This is the collection of actors that use the technology in its products. The larger this installed base is, the more ‘application software’ will be created for the technology. This extensive amount of ‘extras’ brings extra value to the consumer of the product and thereby increasing the demand for the product.
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When we use these steps for certification we can interpret them like this; the first step is the size of the industry that operates in accordance to the certificate, or the amount of producers that are certified. The greater the industry is where the certificate operates in, the larger is the potential range of certified products. The second step can be described as a more extensive range of products that is certified. For example when extra types of fish are certified. This more extensive range of products gives extra value to the consumer (step three), because the consumer has a broader range of options to choose from. This will ultimately enhance the demand of the consumer even more and thereby also the need for producers to get their product certified.
2.3.2 Fragmentation in certification
In many sectors the rise of a first certification system has been accompanied by the emergence of a great variety of standards (Fransen & Conzelmann, 2014, p. 1). All of the strategies that will be discussed later are based on the (possibility of) emergence of multiple organizations that, basically, work for the same goal. When translated to the emergence of certification, we can see that the strategies are tactics to deal with this rise of multiple certification system in a specific sector.
On the rise of alternative certifications in a sector there are differing views. Some researchers say that the emergence of competition in the standards market may lead to a ‘race
Size!of! installed!base! Availability!of! Application! Software! Value!of! Machine!to! consumer! Future! Demand!
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to the bottom’ (Auld, 2010, p. 216). The competition between the certificates may erode the social and environmental gains of earlier certificates.
Others state, however, that the rise of a multiplicity of standards may lead to improvement of the standards overall (Auld, 2010, p. 216). Not only because the quality of the standards improves, but also because the multiplicity of standards leads to differences in scope between the certificates. Because of these differences a broader spectrum of issues in the sector is governed by an independent standard (Auld, 2010, p. 216). The emergence of several certifications can be discussed as fragmentation (Reinecke, Manning, & Von Hagen, 2012, p. 793). The fragmentation leads, ultimately, to a market of certification wherein a range of certifications is available to certify specific products. “(…) As these ‘sustainable’ product markets evolve and mature, they become increasingly fragmented as other social movement- and industry-driven standards providers enter the market with their own version of sustainability standards.” (Reinecke, Manning, & Von Hagen, 2012, p. 793).
When we discuss fragmentation, we can discuss different forms. The first is ‘fragmentation in regulatory standards’ (Fransen & Conzelmann, 2014, p. 3). We can speak of this type of fragmentation when alternative certifications emerge on the global level. The second type of fragmentation is ‘fragmentation in standards levels’ (Fransen & Conzelmann, 2014, p. 3). Hereby multiple standards emerge, but on different governance levels. Whereas some of the certifications are on the global level, others are on the national or regional level. The third type is ‘fragmentation in implementation’ (Fransen & Conzelmann, 2014, p. 3). When there is no control on the implementation of the certification, the certificate can mean very different things in practice. The certificate is than open for interpretation by multiple actors. The final type of fragmentation is ‘fragmentation along the value chain’ (Fransen & Conzelmann, 2014, p. 3). This type of fragmentation concerns the existence of different types of certification that certify different steps in the production chain of a product.
2.3.3 Positioning towards other certifications
When being the monopoly in a certain sector, it is not only important to grow into a dominant position, it also important to maintain that position as a certificate. Four strategies will help to understand the positioning of a dominant actor, but also of the weaker actors (Abbott, Green, & Keohane, 2013, p. 8).
The first strategy is to dominate. This strategy is often accessible for organizations that are backed by governments (Abbott, Green, & Keohane, 2013, p. 8). Because of the legitimacy granted by a government the organization is able to exclude other actors from
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doing the same work. The domination is a difficult strategy, for example because the preferences of governments backing the program have to be the same as the preferences of the program. The strategy for domination is easier for Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) than for Private Transnational Organizations (PTOs). The latter are not created by states and therefore have less opportunity to exclude others. However, it is possible that governments delegate exclusive rulemaking to a PTO, thereby excluding competition.
The second strategy is to compete. Only organizations of which the power is equal to the competitors have the possibility to compete (Abbott, Green, & Keohane, 2013, p. 9). Also, actors who try to dominate but fail, have the possibility to compete. It is possible, that competition between actors with different power levels drives the weaker actor to a strategy of adoption, the third strategy (Abbott, Green, & Keohane, 2013, p. 9).
This third strategy is divided in two possibilities; symmetric adjustment, asymmetric adjustment. When the organizations have power that is comparable to each other it is possible that the actors try to avoid the costs of competition by cooperation. For example, by sharing certain costs for exploitation or research. When the power of the organizations is not comparable, the actors do not adjust to the same extent. The weaker actor is then forced to make the biggest changes in its operations and will bear more costs than the powerful organization. This strategy is more alike domination than the symmetrical adjustment.
The final strategy for the organization is a strategy of adaption. This strategy is feasible when the weaker organization is not able, or does not want, to bear the costs of asymmetrical adjustments (Abbott, Green, & Keohane, 2013, p. 10). The organizations look for a niche in the market and adjust their activities to fill that niche. This strategy is no direct competition with the dominant actor, but does have an impact on the position of the actor. The weaker actor gains legitimacy by filling a gap and thereby gains power in the ‘market’.
2.3.4 Positioning towards industry and government
Traditionally, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have had little influence in the regulations of sectors such as forestry or fishery. In recent years, however, several environmental NGOs gained influence in these sectors. This was partly due to the processes described earlier. For NGOs it is important to build partnerships with other, powerful, organizations because the success of the certificate depends on the participation of these governmental or industrial actors. Also industrial actors and ‘green’ companies use the tactic to build coalitions with other strong organizations to gain influence in the regulation of a market (Gulbrandsen, 2010, p. 30).
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Another strategy that is used by NGOs to gain influence is to target industrial and governmental actors to convince them of the benefits of using their certificate and also the benefits of the participation (Gulbrandsen, 2010, p. 30; Sasser, Prakash, Cashore, & Auld, 2006, p. 2). Since the schemes that are used by NGOs are voluntary in character, the schemes depend on the participation of the producers. To convince a producer to join the certificate, the NGO uses different types of threats and benefits.
The targeting of producers can be done in three ways. The first is direct targeting, whereby the NGO pressures the firm directly to join the certificate (Sasser, Prakash, Cashore, & Auld, 2006, p. 5). The second is indirect targeting, whereby more attention is placed on the production chain. Firms in the same sector of a targeted firm get warnings that the same can happen to them if they do not join the certificate (Sasser, Prakash, Cashore, & Auld, 2006, p. 5). The third type is supply chain targeting. Hereby the focus has shifted to suppliers and customers to exert pressure on the firm. By convincing retailers and consumers to buy only certified products, the firms are forced to get their products certified (Sasser, Prakash, Cashore, & Auld, 2006, p. 5).
The role of NGOs in certification is perceived as both positive and negative (Fransen & Conzelmann, 2014, p. 6). Although these actors are sometimes seen as untrustworthy, partly because of the targeting tactics as discussed above, NGOs (and other Civil Society Organizations (CSOs)) create more legitimacy and credibility for the program and for the certified organizations.
The choice for inclusion of CSOs in the constitution of the first certificate offers a strong explanation for (possible) fragmentation in a sector (Fransen & Conzelmann, 2014, p. 21). Although some of the industry actors do see the possibilities of cooperation with CSOs, others see strategic threats to their operations in the collaboration (Fransen & Conzelmann, 2014, p. 21) . The choice that has to be made when constituting the certificate is therefore a choice with unpredictable outcomes.
2.3.5 Explaining fragmentation
An important part of this thesis is to give an explanation of the rise of alternative certifications in the fisheries sector. In order to get a better understanding of the fragmentation, several topics will be discussed that have led to fragmentation in other sectors before.
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2.3.5.1 Inclusion and support
The first factor that will be addressed is the inclusion of actors in the governance of the certificate and the support of interest groups. The first group of actors that can be included are the CSOs in the constitution of the certificate. As we have already seen, the inclusion of these actors has an important impact on the possibility of fragmentation in a sector. Also will be looked for inclusion of industry actors in the constitution of the certificate. Different levels of involvement can have an impact on the eventual rise of alternatives for a first mover certificate.
Also important is to look at the organization of the industry. Where the industry is highly organized, it is in the line of expectation that there will not be an extensive amount of alternative certificates (Fransen & Conzelmann, 2014, p. 21). When there is a low level of industry organizations corporations are vulnerable to the campaigns of NGOs or other standard-setting organizations (Gulbrandsen, 2010, p. 31). In countries where there is a strong organization of producers the resistance to the campaigns is more successful. Industries ‘defend’ themselves by setting up their own certificate or by working towards a partnership with the certificate. Therefore we have to look at the organization of corporations to understand the emergence of a certificate and perhaps, multiple certificates (Fransen & Conzelmann, 2014, p. 21). The industry is also more likely to join a certificate when they rely on the export of their goods to a sustainability-sensitive market (Gulbrandsen, 2010, p. 31)
The third group of actors that can be involved in the governance of the certificate are the governments. Again, it is not necessarily needed that governments participate in the governance of the certificate, but the support of governments for a certificate itself is already an explanatory factor of the success of a certificate. Governments can, on both the demand and the supply side, influence the standardization procedure and the growth of a certificate (Auld, Gulbrandsen, & McDermott, 2008, p. 196; Bartley, 2003, p. 451). This can be done in several ways.
First, governments can grant legitimacy to a certification by giving the institution rulemaking authority or by expressing support for the institution (Gulbrandsen, 2010, p. 32). Secondly, government can help the certificate to gain acceptance on the market. For example via policies or the communication of support can help corporations make the choice for a specific certificate (Auld, Gulbrandsen, & McDermott, 2008, p. 197; Gulbrandsen, 2010, p. 32). The one with the state support will always be favorable above others. Third, governments can facilitate certificates with knowledge and experts and other types of support.
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Governments are a well-know source of knowledge on a wide range of subjects, so with this kind of support by governments it is likely that the certificate will gain credibility as well as success.
On the demand side governments also can have an impact on the certificate (Auld, Gulbrandsen, & McDermott, 2008, p. 197). For example with the FSC (Forest Stewardship Council) whereby several governments have supported this scheme and have decided that all wood used by governments should be FSC-certified.
2.3.5.2 Differences in scope
The second factor that will be looked at is the difference in scope. Another possibility for fragmentation in Transnational Governance is when different types of certification systems focus on different aspects of ‘responsibility’ or on different topics (Cashore, 2002, p. 508). This differences in focus mean differences in the ‘raison d’être’ of the certificates but also the much wider ‘scope’ of the certification. What is part of the certificate and what is not?
In this question a trade-off is hidden between a specialized and a comprehensive focus of a certification (Auld, 2013, p. 127). Both of these foci have costs and benefits. When choosing a more specialized focus for the certificate, this means that the certificate will gain more expertise on a certain aspect of a societal problem. However, when broader coordination is needed to find a solution for the societal problem, the boundaries of the certificate will be a basis of conflict between several stakeholders (Auld, 2013, p. 129). A broader scope for the certificate means that more aspects of the problem can be managed, but the (administrative) costs of such a program are much higher or the used standards will be much lower (Auld, 2013, p. 131).
2.3.5.3 Differences in stringency
The fifth factor is difference in stringency. Important for the operation of a certificate is the degree of stringency (Gulbrandsen, 2010, p. 36). This stringency of a certificate has to do with the degree of prescription of a standard. For example, the use of a specific type of gear when fishing or a specific technique of cutting wood in forestry. Not only does a more stringent approach have positive effects. A negative effect of a more stringent certificate can be that fewer corporations join the certificate. Especially in sectors where a multiplicity of certifications is available, corporations will choose for the certificate with the lowest switching costs (or the highest benefits) (Gulbrandsen, 2008, p. 577; Gulbrandsen, 2010, p. 37).
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A second issue with stringent certification systems is that the prices for small producers may be to high to implement the certificate (Gulbrandsen, 2010, p. 37). This means that a part of the target group may not be able to improve their operations because of the high costs, but because there is no will to improve the production. This has an impact on the compliance with the certificate and even more on the uptake of a certificate.
A third aspect that needs to be considered when discussing the stringency of a certificate is the fact that the focus of a certificate will be steered by the first-movers (Gulbrandsen, 2010, p. 37). Larger corporations that have adopted the certificates first will try to change the technical and operational demands to meet their own operation. Hereby, the first movers try to heighten the switching costs for later movers. The first-movers may use the certificate as a marketing tool to emphasize the quality of their own products, but also to discourage others (Kalfagianni & Pattberg, 2012).
2.3.5.4 Monitoring
The final factor is the monitoring of of behavior of the participants. This monitoring can be done on two levels; on the level of the process (management-system based) or on the level of the outcome (performance-based) (Gulbrandsen, 2010, p. 38). In a performance based scheme the results of the operations of a corporation will be researched, for example the status of the forest or the fishery will be examined. The entire monitoring will be based on a thorough examination of the outcomes of the producer’s operations. This type of monitoring has had some critique; the on-the-ground monitoring is sensitive to discretion of the auditor (Auld, Gulbrandsen, & McDermott, 2008, p. 198). For example in the forestry the arguments of auditors are that there should be room for issues such as ‘natural regeneration, thinning operations (…)’ (Auld, Gulbrandsen, & McDermott, 2008, p. 198) while these are not part of the certificate per se.
With management-system based schemes, the focus is on improvement of (management)-behavior (Gulbrandsen, 2010, p. 38). The goals of the certificate are more dynamic with this type of monitoring, but the critique has been that the goals are set to low. There is to little incentive for the corporation to implement more improvement than the minimum of the certificate and law requires.
The verification of the practices of the corporations can be done in several ways; “first-party verification (self-inspection), second-party verification(inspection by an industry or trade association) or third-party verification (inspection by an independent auditor) (Gulbrandsen, 2010, p. 38). There are differences between the choice for a verification
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method between industry-based schemes and NGO-based schemes. The industry-dominated schemes more often choose for the first-party or second-party verification whereas NGO-based schemes prefer the third-party verification (Gulbrandsen, 2008, p. 575).
2.4 Summary
This chapter gave a brief introduction into the rise of transnational governance and certification systems in particular. Due to globalization, the lack of a global government pressed other organizations into new proposals for regulation. At first, corporations took responsibility for social and environmental issues caused by their ways of producing. These individual responsibilities where combined into prescription for the industry called codes-of-conduct which were often organized via sector-wide institutions. Certifications arose when NGOs began putting pressure on companies to change the operations for the better. Certifications have the following features; they are voluntary standards, monitor the production site by accredited auditors, certificate the participating firm and they give information to consumers and other audiences.
The rise of competition for a certificate in a given sector can be explained by a variety of factors. For example, different perspectives on the ‘right’ scope, focus or actors involved in the certificates. All these factors give room for new certifications to emerge and start certifying organizations. By examining these features of a sector, a better understanding can be given of the reasons for the emergence of competition. This dynamic is rather new to be studied, in other sectors the competition emerged shortly after the creation of a first certificate. In the fisheries sector the competition was created years after the start of the first certificate. First a better understanding is needed of the position of the MSC before we can start looking at the creation of the competition and the differences between these institutions.
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Chapter 3: Methodology
3.1 IntroductionAfter the introduction of the main theoretical framework and the main explanations for the rise of (a market for) certifications, this chapter will give insight in the used methodology of this study. The main features of the research design will be presented here.
The first part of the chapter is the introduction of the research approach. This part of the chapter also discusses the choice for the cases that are studied for this thesis. Also will be presented why the chosen strategy is a viable strategy to research the research question as presented in the introduction. The second part of the chapter presents the methods of data gathering and analysis of the data. The final part of the chapter deals with the main limitations of the research, both in terms of reliability and validity.
3.2 Approach of the research
When discussing the methodology, the first step is to present the chosen research approach. Here will also be discussed what cases are chosen for this study and why.
3.2.1 Comparative design
To get a better understanding of the rise of certification for sustainable seafood and the motivations of the main stakeholders to get involved, this study uses a comparative design (Bryman, 2008, p. 58). In this strategy the researcher creates an in-depth description of the cases at hand and by doing so, the researcher tries to get a better understanding of the on-going processes that have led to a certain outcome.
More specific; the study will follow the strategy of a ‘most-similar’ case study, but differs in some way. Where the ‘most-similar’ case study is mainly suited for cases where the outcome of the process differ, but the starting point is much alike, this is not suitable for the case of sustainable seafood certification. The starting points for the standards differ as well as the final product. In some respects, however, the cases have to be comparable. Following the Most Similar Design, when the cases have differences on several variables (or a single variable), it is likely that these variables can be used to explain the differences in outcomes (Gerring, 2001, p. 210).
3.2.2 Selection of the cases
In the most comparative design, the cases are compared on a multitude of variables. Some of those variables are the same for all the cases, but other variables differ (Bryman, 2008, p. 59).
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For the study of the sustainable seafood certifications, this strategy is viable because the certificates share an extensive amount of common features, but differs on variables such as the influence of stakeholders, the degree of involvement of governments and the scope of the certificate.
The unit of analysis is, as mentioned earlier, the certification system in general. More specific, for this study will be looked into the rise of alternatives certification for sustainable seafood. The sample for this study consists out of four certificates; the MSC (Marine Stewardship Council), FOS (Friend of the Sea), IRF (Iceland Responsible Fisheries) and ASMI (Alaska Seafood Marketing Institute). All of the certificates are based on FAO Guidelines that will be discussed in chapter 4. Another similarity for all the certificates is the perceived need for independent, third-party assessment of the fisheries in order to improve the sustainability of the fisheries and to keep the fish stocks healthy. Sustainability is the key word for the labels and therefore they can be described as ‘ecolabels’.
Although there are similarities, there are also big differences between the certificates. Whereas the MSC and FOS standards are both global, the standards of the IRF and ASMI are regional in scope. Other differences between the certificates are the involvement of stakeholders and the degree of influence of governments and the role of the government in general. These differences will be discussed in chapter 4.
3.2.2 Analysis via process-tracing
A profound way of doing research that helps to understand the processes in which specific issues have evolved over time is the process-tracing method (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 205). Via this method the specific path of development of a specific topic will be followed in order to get a better understanding of the key moments and, also, the main motivations that have had an impact on the development of the issue at stake.
For the process-tracing analysis it is not only important to discuss the history of the issue, but also the status of the issue as it is now. Interestingly, according to the method of process-tracing, it is not enough that some of the steps as predicted in the hypotheses are met, for process-tracing the hypotheses only hold when all steps are as predicted (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 207). However, in this study we will not use hypotheses to predict the steps of the certificates, but will use theoretical insights, as presented in the theoretical framework, as indicators.
The form of process-tracing that will be used in the study is the ‘general explanation’ (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 211). Hereby the researcher does not describe the process in a
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very detailed manner, but describes the case for ‘a higher level of generality of explanations’ (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 211).
3.3 Data gathering
The process will be constructed via qualitative research. Qualitative research is best suited to gain insight in the true motivations of the key stakeholders. To do so, three types of data will be used in order to describe and analyze the process; semi-structured interviews, policy documents and scientific reports. The semi-structured interviews were held with representatives of the certificates. For the MSC the Benelux director, Camiel Derichs is interviewed. At FOS the director, Paolo Bray, has been interviewed. For ASMI Tyson Fick, the communications director. And, last but not least, for the IRF both Kristjan Thorarinsson, chair of the IRF Technical Committee, and Finnur Gardarsson, project manager of the certification, have been interviewed.
As preparation and guidance for the interviews a topic list is created2, based on
theoretical insights. For example themes such as CSR and the rise of certification in other sectors will be included in the topic list. “Here, in order to achieve ‘rich data’, the keynote is ‘active listening’ in which the interviewer ‘allows the interviewee the freedom to talk and ascribe meanings’ while bearing in mind the broader aims of the project.” (Silverman, 2006, p. 110).
A second type of data that will be used in this research are documents such as websites and official publications of the standards and other standardization organizations. In these documents will be searched for motivations for establishing the certificate and whether or not the MSC is used to compare the focus and effectiveness of the certificate. Also will be looked for descriptions of specific key moments in the development of the new certificate.
The third type of data are scientific reports on the rise of alternatives in the certification for sustainable seafood. This data is different from the scientific reports that will be used in the theoretical framework in the sense that these reports do not describe processes on a meta-level, but merely for the field of sustainable seafood in particular.
3.4 Threats to validity and reliability
This method has some very specific implications for validity and reliability. The validity of the research concerns ‘the extent to which an account accurately represents the social
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phenomena to which it refers’ (Silverman, 2010, p. 289). Two problems are of main
importance in the validity of qualitative research; first, ‘believing a statement is true when it is not’ (Type 1 error) and second, ‘rejecting a statement which, in fact, is true’ (Type 2 error) (Silverman, 2010, p. 289). These issues are mainly based on the knowledge that what people say in an interview, is not necessarily what happens in real life. People can use socially desirable answers to answer the questions of the researcher for example. Second, it is possible that the claim of the researcher is based on common-sense knowledge that needs to made explicit.
To tackle threats to validity two solutions have been used in this study. The first is to use multiple types of data (triangulation) (Silverman, 2010, p. 290). By triangulating the data the issue at hand is described from several perspectives. When the findings of the different data types are alike, the validity of the conclusions is established. The second solution is to use respondent validation. With this type of validation the findings of the research are taken back to the respondents (Silverman, 2010, p. 293). By doing so, the researchers ensured the agreement of respondents with findings and conclusions. After transcribing the interviews and writing several parts of the research, for example the introduction of a certificate, the
researchers have sent the document to the respondent. The respondents had the chance to comment on the text and statements. The used quotations and also texts on the introduction of the certificates have been agreed on by the respondents.
Secondly, an important issue to discuss is the reliability of the research. Reliability is ‘the degree to which a measure of a concept is stable’ (Bryman, 2008, p. 698). In short, it means that the ‘findings of a study are independent of accidental circumstances of their production’ (Silverman, 2010, p. 282). To satisfy reliability in a qualitative research, the researcher should be transparent in his operations. This means that most, if not all, the choices that are made during the research have to be reported and clarified (if possible with the use of scientific research). The second way to satisfy reliability is by being transparent also in a theoretical sense. The researcher must make explicit what his theoretical stance is and how the researchers produced particular interpretations (Silverman, 2010, p. 282). In this study we will be transparent in the sense of the steps we have taken to arrive at a specific point in the research and second we will be transparent about our (theoretical) viewpoint. Specifically for improving the reliability of qualitative interviews it is necessary to make transcriptions of the interviews. These transcriptions are available by the researcher.
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3.5 Theoretical and societal relevance
Previous research on certification has been conducted in fields where the competition arose shortly after the first certificate was established. Therefore this case is rather unique, after ten years of a monopoly for the MSC, competition is only starting to rise. As Fransen and Conzellman (2013) argue, there is no known research into a case where the ‘first-mover’ was established for a longer period where after competition started to rise.
The societal relevance of this study lies in the fact that a better understanding can be created of a process of diversification of certification for sustainable seafood. While the MSC is still expanding and more retailers commit themselves to the MSC, it can be that the new certificates will be in store soon. This research is an opening into the understanding of the process of this diversification. More research has to be done to understand the effect on customers when more certificates can be found in-store.
3.6 Conclusion and summary
In this chapter the research method of the study is presented. The study looks into four different certificates that have emerged in the past 20 years, starting with the MSC and followed by FOS, IRF and ASMI. These are alike in some parts, but very different in other aspects. The comparison of the cases will be done via a Comparative Case Study.
The processes of development of the certificates will be reproduced via the Process-tracing method. To recreate the process of emergence of the different certificates different data types are used; interviews, documents and websites and scientific reports.
To tackle threats to validity the researchers use respondent validation and triangulation of the data. To tackle threats to reliability, the researchers are transparent about the choices made on several aspects of the research.
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Chapter 4: Certifications in the fisheries sector
4.1 IntroductionThe main goal of this chapter is to describe the process of emerging certification in the fisheries sector. First, developments in international regulations will be discussed followed by tactics used by social movements to improve the operations of the industry. The third part of the chapter is the introduction of the different certifications that are analyzed in this study. The first certification that will be introduced is MSC, since this certificate can be seen as the first-mover in the field of sustainable seafood. After the introduction of MSC the other certificates that are studied for this thesis will be discussed; FOS, ASMI and IRF. These certifications differ in many aspects, for example the scope of the certifications, the governance and the inclusiveness.
Before turning to the discussion of the findings in the next chapter, this chapter will give insight in the main motivations for starting the certifications, but also into the main principles, the governance and the process of certification. This background of the certificates will be the basis for further analysis in the next chapter.
4.2 (Inter-)national regulations
In the introduction the main challenges to the management of fish stocks were discussed. We showed that 57.4% of the fish stocks are at the maximum level of production and that the maximum level of production can decrease because of unsuccessful management. Overfishing not only negatively influences the reproductive capacity of the fish stock; it also threatens the ecosystem by the destruction of habitats, pollution of the marine environment and through the by-catch of ‘non-targeted fish’ (Gulbrandsen, 2010, p. 113).
The open nature of the fish stocks and the lack of insight in the use of the stocks have led to the constitution of the UN Law of the Sea (Orrego Vicuna, 2001, p. 23). National governments recognized the need for an international approach to the regulation of the fisheries and started the process of writing the UN Law of the Sea Convention. The convention came into force in 1994, providing a legal framework for the exploitation of global fisheries.
One of the main features of the convention is the establishment of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) (Orrego Vicuna, 2001, p. 25). These zones consist out of an area of 200 nautical miles measured from the coast of the state. In this zone the state has the sovereign right to exploit the natural resources, but the state also has the responsibility for a
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sustainable management of the resources. This principle is discussed in article 61 and 62 of the UN Law of the Sea Convention. In article 63 it is stated that when a fish stock occurs within the EEZ of multiple states, these states have the obligation to cooperate in order to ensure the conservation of the living resources (Gulbrandsen, 2010, p. 114). Expanding the jurisdiction of the states to a larger area meant that fish stocks that previously required multinational governance systems can now be governed by one state or a collaboration of states.
The convention was less clear about the regulation of highly migratory stocks, which led to discussion about the right interpretation of the UN Law of the Sea Convention. Some states stated that while the species were in the waters of the EEZ of a single state, the state has the exclusive right to govern and exploit the fish stock (Orrego Vicuna, 2001, p. 28). Others stated that because the fish stock was highly migratory, an exception should be made for this type of fish (for example Tuna).
A response to this uncertainty was the UN Fish Stock Agreement. This Agreement was created in 1995 and came into force in 2001 (Gulbrandsen, 2010, p. 114). The Agreement was created to strengthen the ties between coastal states to ensure the cooperation in the conservation of the highly migratory fish stocks (Gulbrandsen, 2010, p. 114).
“There are problems of unregulated fishing, over-capitalization, excessive fleet size, vessel reflagging to escape controls, insufficiently selective gear, unreliable databases, and lack of sufficient cooperation among countries.” (UN, 2010)
Another aspect of this Agreement is the establishment of the Precautionary Approach, stating that the lack of (scientific) data on the status of the fish stock must not be a reason to postpone the implementation of effective governance of the stock (UN, 2010). Other topics discussed in the Agreement are the ‘requirements for high-sea fishing, rules for effective enforcement and procedures for mandatory dispute resolution’ (Gulbrandsen, 2010, p. 114).
A third instrument in the governance of fisheries was the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, issues in 1995 (FAO, 1995 (a)). The idea behind the constitution of the Code of Conduct was to set out ‘principles and international standards of behavior for responsible practices with a view to ensuring the effective conservation, management and development of living aqautic resources, with due respect for the ecosystem and biodiversity’ (FAO, 1995 (a)). The Code is a guide to adequate fisheries management and provides assistance in the establishment of a ‘good’ management system. The FAO is fully committed to assisting Member States, particularly developing countries, in the efficient implementation
